Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 46–59 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Electoral Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German electionsq Lee Ann Banaszak a,*, Peter Doerschler b a The Pennsylvania State University, 219 Pond Lab, University Park, PA 16802, USA b Bloomsburg University, Political Science Department, Bloomsburg, PA 17815, USA article info abstract Article history: While scholars have generally acknowledged that coalition governments are less Received 20 May 2011 accountable to voters than single party majorities, surprisingly little differentiation is made Accepted 7 June 2011 among different types of coalition governments. In this paper, we examine voter support for two very different types of coalition governments: those with a single large party and Keywords: a junior partner and grand coalitionsdgoverning coalitions between two large but ideo- Coalitions logically dissimilar parties. We argue that grand coalitions differ from the more typical Germany senior–junior partners in terms of the ability of individual parties to respond to their Elections Voter support constituencies. We test this argument using survey data from four German Election Studies Grand coalition (GES), before and after each of the two German grand coalitions (1965, 1969, 2005, and Institutions 2009), which provide a unique opportunity to compare voter support for grand coalitions Cleavages to those of the more typical senior–junior party model. We find evidence that voters Spatial model responded to grand coalitions by moving away from their traditional voting patterns, and Party system increasing their support for parties outside of the grand coalition, although this effect varies by the number of alternative parties. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction a particular party accountable for resulting policy than in single party majority systems (see for example Strom,1985; Democracies rely on the ability of voters to hold political Narud and Valen, 2008).1 This is further complicated by the parties accountable for their performance while in fact that coalitions vary considerably in how they distribute government. Yet, as scholars of government formation power and responsibilities among parties. We argue here note, the ability of parties in power to determine that the type of coalition government significantly affects a government’s policies depends on the form that the vote choice by influencing how voters assess a party’s government takes. In coalition governments, where two or ideological position and responsibility for policy. more parties share governance, it is more difficult to hold We show evidence of this by examining voter support for political parties in two different types of coalition governments in post-war Germany. Specifically, the Federal q Republic has witnessed the formation of two grand coali- The authors thank Susan Scarrow, Robert Rohrschneider, Hans-Dieter – – fi Klingemann, Russ Dalton and the other participants of the 2009 German tions (1966 1969, 2005 2009), de ned as a coalition that Federal Election Conference (Kansas University) for their helpful splits portfolios relatively evenly between two large parties comments. We also thank Hans-Dieter Klingemann for providing data with significant ideological differences (in the case of and advice on the positions of German parties from the Comparative Manifestos project, as well as Sona Golder and Eric Plutzer for their valuable advice in revising the paper. 1 Results for single party minority governments where a single party * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 814 865 6573. controls government but may rely on other parties for support in E-mail address: [email protected] (L.A. Banaszak). parliament are somewhat more mixed. 0261-3794/$ – see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.06.008 L.A. Banaszak, P. Doerschler / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 46–59 47 Germany between the CDU/CSU and SPD). These grand choose their most preferred coalition rather than their most coalitions contrast with the more common post-war preferred party (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Pappi, German coalitions, which occur between a large party 2007) or more extreme parties if they believe the likely (e.g., the CDU/CSU or SPD) and a smaller party (e.g., the FDP coalition will moderate policy outcomes (Kedar, 2005). or Greens) that shares some policy positions with the larger A coalition of ideologically similar large and small party. The unexpected occurrence of the two grand coali- parties typical of most German governments and the tions, following in the wake of the more typical coalition “grand coalition” between the two large parties that are between a larger and smaller party, allows us to examine ideologically distant will differ in their effects on vote whether a shift in coalition type affects voter responses to choice in three ways. First, differences in the distribution of incumbent parties. portfolios and the weight of the head of government create To do so, we draw on survey data from the German changes in government accountability. In the typical Election Study and the Politbarometer, assessing changes in German coalition, voters have an easier time assigning the main indicators of voter behavior before and after each responsibility to the larger party because it controls grand coalition. We begin by developing a theory of why a majority of portfolios and the chancellor position. grand coalitions might alter vote choice in comparison to Assigning accountability for policy outcomes becomes the more traditional large party-small party coalitions. We more problematic in a grand coalition where cabinet posts then compare grand coalitions with their predecessors, are more evenly divided and there is less assurance that the looking particularly at the shifts in power sharing, cabinet party that controls the chancellorship can control its composition and policy formation that might affect voter equally powerful partner. On the other hand, in a grand perceptions. After explaining our data and methods – coalition both major parties have more accountability than particularly our use of a pre- and post-analysis of both the junior partner in a typical large party – small party grand coalitions – we turn to our analysis and results. Our coalition. Thus, core constituencies of the large parties are analysis suggests that grand coalitions differ from the more likely to be disappointed by their party’s responsiveness in common partnership between ideologically similar large grand coalitions. and small parties in that they reduce support among the Second, because coalition partners are more ideologi- core constituencies of the large parties. However, the effect cally distant in a grand coalition, the resulting policy of grand coalitions on electoral behavior depends also on outcomes represent more policy compromise than in coa- the specific constellation of political parties in the political litions with ideologically similar parties. The most common system. assumption is that individuals choose parties that are the closest to them ideologically (see e.g., Blais et al., 2001; 2. Coalition governments and accountability to voters Downs, 1957; Kedar, 2005; Hinich, 1978; Westholm, 1997).2 However, alternative models of decision-making Scholars recognize that government institutions struc- also exist; for example, other scholars have argued that ture and shape vote choice. First, we know that electoral voters prefer parties that are ideologically in the same systems influence the number of parties, thereby altering direction as, but are more intense than, their own views on the choice set for voters (Powell, 2000; Lijphart, 1999). In the relevant issues (e.g., MacDonald et al., 1991 and countries with consensus systems, characterized among MacDonald et al., 2001). Furthermore, in a fragmented other things by coalition governments, supporters of non- party space voters may simultaneously identify with more governmental parties are less likely to feel they have lost than one party (Eijk and Niemoeller, 1983). In the typical completely, develop higher levels of satisfaction with large party-small partner coalition, large parties often democracy, and are less likely to become disillusioned with dictate the terms of the coalition agreement, minimizing the system (Anderson et al., 2007; Chap. 7). Such beliefs the ideological or policy shifts necessary to appease the encourage voters to consider smaller parties as viable junior partner. This relationship is fundamentally different alternatives. However, these analyses typically compare in a grand coalition since neither large party can dictate the institutional settings across countries, leaving open the terms of the agreement to the same extent; both must issue of how changes within a country from one type of make more fundamental programmatic shifts if the coali- coalition to another influence voters. tion is to be viable and at least somewhat effective in Second, many authors have argued that voters make governance. For that reason, large parties are more likely to calculations about what the likely coalitions between parties lose core constituents in a grand coalition because these will be before they step into the voting booth, and that their voters will likely be less willing to make the compromise vote choice is based partially on coalition preferences (Blais toward the ideological center that the large parties