The Legacy of the Italian Resistance
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Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi Italia, Primer ministro (1993-1994) y presidente de la República (1999-2006) Duración del mandato: 18 de Maig de 1999 - de de Nacimiento: Livorno, provincia de Livorno, región de Toscana, 09 de Desembre de 1920 Defunción: Roma, región de Lacio, 16 de Setembre de 2016</p> Partido político: sin filiación Professió: Funcionario de banca Resumen http://www.cidob.org 1 of 3 Biografía Cursó estudios en Pisa en su Escuela Normal Superior, por la que se diplomó en 1941, y en su Universidad, por la que en 1946 obtuvo una doble licenciatura en Derecho y Letras. Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial sirvió en el Ejército italiano y tras la caída de Mussolini en 1943 estuvo con los partisanos antinazis. En 1945 militó en el Partido de Acción de Ferruccio Parri, pero pronto se desvinculó de cualquier organización política. En 1946 entró a trabajar por la vía de oposiciones en el Banco de Italia, institución donde desarrolló toda su carrera hasta la cúspide. Sucesivamente fue técnico en el departamento de investigación económica (1960-1970), jefe del departamento (1970-1973), secretario general del Banco (1973-1976), vicedirector general (1976-1978), director general (1978-1979) y, finalmente, gobernador (1979-1993). Considerado un economista de formación humanista, Ciampi salvaguardó la independencia del banco del Estado y se labró una imagen de austeridad y apego al trabajo. Como titular representó a Italia en las juntas de gobernadores de diversas instituciones financieras internacionales. Con su elección el 26 de abril de 1993 por el presidente de la República Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (por primera vez sin consultar a los partidos) para reemplazar a Giuliano Amato, Ciampi se convirtió en el primer jefe de Gobierno técnico, esto es, no adscrito a ninguna formación, desde 1945, si bien algunos líderes políticos insistieron en sus simpatías democristianas. -
Lawlessness in the Occupied Soviet Territories During World War Ii
LAWLESSNESS IN THE OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES DURING WORLD WAR II Ben Hanson Bachelor of Arts in History 1 2 Statement of Presentation This thesis is presented as part of the requirements for the Honours degree of Bachelor of Arts in History at Murdoch University. June 2017 I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains, as its main content, work that has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary educational institution, including Murdoch. Signed: Full name: Benjamin Elliot Hanson Student Number: 31859487 Date: 3 Copyright Acknowledgement Form I acknowledge that a copy of this thesis will be held at the Murdoch University Library. I understand that, under the provisions of s51.2 of the Copyright Act 1968, all or part of this thesis may be copied without infringement of copyright where such a reproduction is for the purposes of study and research. This statement does not signal any transfer of copyright away from the author. Signed: Full Name of Degree: Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History Thesis Title: Lawlessness in the Occupied Soviet Territories During World War II Author: Ben Hanson Year: 2017 4 ABSTRACT Members of both the German counterinsurgency forces and Soviet partisans terrorised the civilians of the occupied Soviet territories during World War II. At times, fighters of either force robbed, sexually assaulted and killed civilians. The nature of the rear-area security war was such that these actions could be treated as legitimate acts of war rather than wanton crimes. This thesis seeks to explain these crimes by exploring its preconditions. -
Media E Informazione - Lunedi 1 E Martedì 2 Giugno 2020 (N
1 Università IULM Osservatorio su comunicazione pubblica, public branding e trasformazione digitale Direttore scientifico: prof. Stefano Rolando ([email protected]) Comunicazione e situazione di crisi https://www.iulm.it/it/sites/osservatorio-comunicazione-in-tempo-di-crisi/comunicare-in-tempo-di-crisi Media e informazione - Lunedi 1 e Martedì 2 giugno 2020 (n. 90-n.91) Rallentamento Il 2 giugno del 1946, attraverso referendum istituzionale, gli italiani scelsero di porre fine alla forma monarchica del Paese, anche a causa della commistione con il ventennio fascista, optando per la forma repubblicana. Con 12.182.855 voti, il 54,3% dei votanti scelse la Repubblica, con 10.362.709, il 45,7% dei votanti scelse la Monarchia. L’affluenza fu dell’89,08%. Solo l’11% degli italiani scelse l’astensione. La carta geo-politica dell’Italia fu molto segnata da quel voto: il centro-nord ebbe una dominante di voto repubblicano, il centro-sud e isole ebbe una dominante di voto monarchico. Il governo in carica fino a fine 1945 presieduto dall’azionista Ferruccio Parri e il successivo presieduto dal dc Alcide De Gasperi prepararono l’insediamento dell’Assemblea costituente che – con le presidenze del socialista Giuseppe Saragat e poi del comunista Umberto Terracini – si insediò il 26 giugno del 1946 e terminò i suoi lavori, un mese dopo la promulgazione in G.U. della Costituzione repubblicana, il 31 gennaio del 1948. Nel frattempo il Paese fu governato con tre mandati consecutivi dall’esecutivo presieduto da De Gasperi. Alla Costituente la DC ebbe il 35,2% dei voti, i socialisti il 20,7%, i comunisti il 18,9%, i liberali il 6,8%, i “qualunquisti” il 5,3%, i repubblicani il 4,4% gli azionisti l’1,5%. -
Stony Brook University
SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Invasions, Insurgency and Interventions: Sweden’s Wars in Poland, Prussia and Denmark 1654 - 1658. A Dissertation Presented by Christopher Adam Gennari to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Stony Brook University May 2010 Copyright by Christopher Adam Gennari 2010 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Christopher Adam Gennari We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Ian Roxborough – Dissertation Advisor, Professor, Department of Sociology. Michael Barnhart - Chairperson of Defense, Distinguished Teaching Professor, Department of History. Gary Marker, Professor, Department of History. Alix Cooper, Associate Professor, Department of History. Daniel Levy, Department of Sociology, SUNY Stony Brook. This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School """"""""" """"""""""Lawrence Martin "" """""""Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Invasions, Insurgency and Intervention: Sweden’s Wars in Poland, Prussia and Denmark. by Christopher Adam Gennari Doctor of Philosophy in History Stony Brook University 2010 "In 1655 Sweden was the premier military power in northern Europe. When Sweden invaded Poland, in June 1655, it went to war with an army which reflected not only the state’s military and cultural strengths but also its fiscal weaknesses. During 1655 the Swedes won great successes in Poland and captured most of the country. But a series of military decisions transformed the Swedish army from a concentrated, combined-arms force into a mobile but widely dispersed force. -
National Holidays
NATIONAL HOLIDAYS www.bulgariatravel.org multimedia Operative Program “Regional Development 2007-2013 www.bgregio.eu We invest in your future! The project is financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the state budget of Republic of Bulgaria Grant Scheme BG161PO001/3.3-01/2008 “Support for Effective National Marketing of Tourist Product and Improvement of Information Service”, Contract No BG161PO001/3.3-01/2008 /001-5 “Multimedia Catalogue of the Tourist Sites and Electronic Marketing of Destination Bulgaria” This multimedia brochure is created within the framework of the project “Multimedia Catalogue of the Tourist Sites and Electronic Marketing of Destination Bulgaria”, Contract No BG161PO001/3.3-01/2008/001-5, which is performed with the financial support of Operative Program “Regional Development” 2007 – 2013, co-financed by the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund.The entire responsibility for the contents of this multimedia brochure is brought by the beneficiary – The Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism, and under no circumstances it can be considered that this multimedia brochure presents the official position of the European Union and the Managing Body. www.bulgariatravel.org 2 NATIONAL HOLIDAYS The Bulgarian calendar is filled with various Christian and national holidays. On those days our nation worships the saints, heroes and memorable events of the country’s history. The Bulgarian history is marked by great victories and gloomy defeats, and their celebration has preserved those people’s memory and the nation’s respect to the past. Some of the greatest Bulgarian holidays, which are days off in Bulgaria, are 3 March - the Liberation Day, 1 May - Labor Day, May 6 - Bulgarian Army Day, 24 May - Day of the Bulgarian Enlightenment and Culture and the Slav letters, 6 September - the Day of Bulgaria’s Unification, 22 September - Independence Day, 1 November - Day of the Enlighteners. -
The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro- Mediterranean Relations the Case of Italy and the Maghreb
125 The Schengen Agreements and their Impact on Euro- Mediterranean Relations The Case of Italy and the Maghreb Simone PAOLI What were the main reasons that, between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, a group of member states of the European Community (EC) agreed to abolish internal border controls while, simultaneously, building up external border controls? Why did they act outside the framework of the EC and initially exclude the Southern members of the Community? What were the reactions of both Northern and Southern Mediter- ranean countries to these intergovernmental accords, known as the Schengen agree- ments? What was their impact on both European and Euro-Mediterranean relations? And what were the implications of the accession of Southern members of the EC to said agreements in terms of relations with third Mediterranean countries? The present article cannot, of course, give a comprehensive answer to all these complex questions. It has nonetheless the ambition of throwing a new light on the origins of the Schengen agreements. In particular, by reconstructing the five-year long process through which Italy entered the Schengen Agreement and the Conven- tion implementing the Schengen Agreement, it will contribute towards the reinter- pretation of: the motives behind the Schengen agreements; migration relations be- tween Northern and Southern members of the EC in the 1980s; and migration relations between the EC, especially its Southern members, and third Mediterranean countries in the same decade. The article is divided into three parts. The first examines the historical background of the Schengen agreements, by placing them within the context of Euro-Mediter- ranean migration relations; it, also, presents the main arguments. -
And Bernardo Bertolucci's 1900
The “Betrayed Resistance” in Valentino Orsini’s Corbari (1970) and Bernardo Bertolucci’s 1900 (1976) Dominic Gavin The connections between Italian film and history have been the object of renewed attention in recent years. A number of studies have provided re-readings of Italian cinema, especially from the perspective of public memory. Charting the interrelations of cinema, the public use of history, and historiography, these studies include reevaluations of the cinema of the Resistance, the war film, the Holocaust and the Fascist dictatorship.1 The ongoing debates over Resistance memory in particular—the “never-ending liberation,” in the words of one historian—have provided a motive for reconsidering popular cultural productions as vehicles of collective perceptions of the past.2 If Italian film studies came relatively late to the issues of cinema and public memory, this approach has now become mainstream.3 In this essay, I am concerned with films on the Resistance during the 1970s. These belong to a wider grouping of contemporary cinematic productions that deal with the Fascist dictatorship and antifascism. These films raise a series of critical questions. How did the general film field contribute to the wider processing of historical memory, and how did it relate to political violence in Italy?4 To what extent did the work of Italian filmmakers participate in the “new discourse” of international cinema in the 1970s concerning the treatment of Nazism and the occupation,5 or to what extent were filmmakers engaged in reaffirming populist -
Amadeo Bordiga and the Myth of Antonio Gramsci
AMADEO BORDIGA AND THE MYTH OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI John Chiaradia PREFACE A fruitful contribution to the renaissance of Marxism requires a purely historical treatment of the twenties as a period of the revolutionary working class movement which is now entirely closed. This is the only way to make its experiences and lessons properly relevant to the essentially new phase of the present. Gyorgy Lukács, 1967 Marxism has been the greatest fantasy of our century. Leszek Kolakowski When I began this commentary, both the USSR and the PCI (the Italian Communist Party) had disappeared. Basing myself on earlier archival work and supplementary readings, I set out to show that the change signified by the rise of Antonio Gramsci to leadership (1924-1926) had, contrary to nearly all extant commentary on that event, a profoundly negative impact on Italian Communism. As a result and in time, the very essence of the party was drained, and it was derailed from its original intent, namely, that of class revolution. As a consequence of these changes, the party would play an altogether different role from the one it had been intended for. By way of evidence, my intention was to establish two points and draw the connecting straight line. They were: one, developments in the Soviet party; two, the tandem echo in the Italian party led by Gramsci, with the connecting line being the ideology and practices associated at the time with Stalin, which I label Center communism. Hence, from the time of Gramsci’s return from the USSR in 1924, there had been a parental relationship between the two parties. -
Italy's Atlanticism Between Foreign and Internal
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 ITALY’S ATLANTICISM BETWEEN FOREIGN AND INTERNAL POLITICS Massimo de Leonardis 1 Catholic University of the Sacred Heart Abstract: In spite of being a defeated country in the Second World War, Italy was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance, because the USA highly valued her strategic importance and wished to assure her political stability. After 1955, Italy tried to advocate the Alliance’s role in the Near East and in Mediterranean Africa. The Suez crisis offered Italy the opportunity to forge closer ties with Washington at the same time appearing progressive and friendly to the Arabs in the Mediterranean, where she tried to be a protagonist vis a vis the so called neo- Atlanticism. This link with Washington was also instrumental to neutralize General De Gaulle’s ambitions of an Anglo-French-American directorate. The main issues of Italy’s Atlantic policy in the first years of “centre-left” coalitions, between 1962 and 1968, were the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, French policy towards NATO and the EEC, Multilateral [nuclear] Force [MLF] and the revision of the Alliance’ strategy from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response”. On all these issues the Italian government was consonant with the United States. After the period of the late Sixties and Seventies when political instability, terrorism and high inflation undermined the Italian role in international relations, the decision in 1979 to accept the Euromissiles was a landmark in the history of Italian participation to NATO. -
«Sì Al Centro Dell'ulivo» Dini Risponde Ai Popolari
05POL01A0507 05POL03A0507 FLOWPAGE ZALLCALL 13 14:43:22 07/07/96 K IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Venerdì 5 luglio 1996 l’Unità pagina IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIPoliticaIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 5 Marini apprezza. Il problema leadership: Prodi pensa al governo Bettino scomunica Amato «Sì al centro dell’Ulivo» e Martelli ROMA. E‘ dalle colonne del Dini risponde ai Popolari —quotidiano di An ‘Il Secolo d’Italia‘ che Bettino Craxi rinnova la sua ’scomunica‘ a Giuliano Amato ed Dini risponde ai Popolari: sono d’accordo, facciamo insie- esorta i socialisti italiani a riprende- re in proprio l’iniziativa politica. me il centro dell’Ulivo. E Marini: siamo aperti al dialogo. Craxi definisce l’adesione di Amato Ma nasce il problema della leadership. Chi deve essere il alla cosiddetta ‘Cosa 2‘ ’’una sem- capo: Prodi, come vorrebbero i Popolari o Dini, come au- plice operazione del tutto persona- spica Rinnovamento italiano? Masi: «Prodi è capo della le” e “tutt’altro che politica’’. E al 05POL01AF01 05POL01AF03 dottor Sottile manda un messaggio: coalizione e del governo, non può essere leader della fede- Not Found ’’la politica e‘ una cosa difficile e razione di centro». Silenzio del capo del governo. Per ora Not Found per fare politica bisogna rappre- non risponde alle proposte dei Popolari. 05POL01AF01 05POL01AF03 sentare qualcosa o qualcuno. Altri- GerardoBianco, menti ci si dedichi ad altro: per adestra,ilministro esempio, a scrivere libri...’’. degliEsteri L’appello ai socialisti da Ham- RITANNA ARMENI LambertoDini, mamet e‘ dunque a “rinascere da ROMA. Marini propone a Dini tuazione con grande attenzione. inbasso, soli’’. “Perche‘ se non stai da solo - —di costruire insieme un centro più Ma in questa fibrillazione della EnricoBoselli dice Craxi al suo intervistatore- sei forte dell’Ulivo. -
October 31, 1956 Draft Telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified October 31, 1956 Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti Citation: “Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti,” October 31, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 14 and in The Hungarian Quarterly 34 (Spring 1993), 107.1 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111974 Summary: Draft telegram from the CPSU CC to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the Soviet leadership's position on the situation in Hungary. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation Workers of the World, Unite! Top Secret Communist Party of the Soviet Union CENTRAL COMMITTEE No P 49/69 To Comrade Shepilov (M[inistry] of F[oreign] A[ffairs]) and to Comrade Vinogradov Extract from Minutes No. 49, taken at the October 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of the CC Draft of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti, The CC approves the attached text of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti in con-nection with the Hungarian situation. Secretary of the CC To Paragraph 69 of Minutes No. 49 Top Secret ROME For Comrade TOGLIATTI In your evaluation of the situation in Hungary and of the tendencies of development of the Hungarian Government toward a reactionary development, we are in agreement with you. According to our information, Nagy is occupying a two-faced position and is falling more and more under the influence of the reactionary forces. For the time being we are not speaking out openly against Nagy, but we will not reconcile ourselves with the turn of events toward a reactionary debaucher Your friendly warnings regarding the possibility of the weakening of the unity of the collective leadership of our party have no basis. -
The Center-Right in a Search for Unity and the Re-Emergence of the Neo
The center-right in a search for unity and the re-emergence of the neo-fascist right Elisabetta De Giorgi a and Filippo Tronconi b aPortugese Institute of International Relations (IPRI), Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal; bDepartment of Social and Political Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy ABSTRACT In 2017, the parties of the centre-right camp – Silvio Berlusconi’sForza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s (Northern) League and Giorgia Meloni’sFratelli d’Italia – faced the puzzle of deciding whether to participate in the imminent general elections as allies or as rivals. On the one hand they had partially different aims (especially in relation to the European Union issue) and the problem of choosing the leadership of the alli- ance; on the other, the new electoral system, partially based on single- member districts, forced them to present common candidates in order to maximize their chances of reaching a majority of seats in parliament. In this article, we outline the stages through which the centre-right parties attempted to solve this puzzle over the course of the year, finally reaching an agreement to make a formal electoral alliance. In the final section of the article, we focus on one additional political actor of the right wing: the neo-fascist movements, notably Forza Nuova and CasaPound, which received significant media coverage during 2017. We describe how these movements were able to gain center stage and what this implied for the mainstream centre-right parties. In a way, the year 2017 began for the center-right on January 21 in Koblenz. On that date the leaders of the main extreme right parties in Europe came together in the German city for an event showcasing the visions and political aims that they shared.