October 31, 1956 Draft Telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti

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October 31, 1956 Draft Telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti

Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified October 31, 1956 Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti Citation: “Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti,” October 31, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 14 and in The Hungarian Quarterly 34 (Spring 1993), 107.1 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111974 Summary: Draft telegram from the CPSU CC to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the Soviet leadership's position on the situation in Hungary. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation Workers of the World, Unite! Top Secret Communist Party of the Soviet Union CENTRAL COMMITTEE No P 49/69 To Comrade Shepilov (M[inistry] of F[oreign] A[ffairs]) and to Comrade Vinogradov Extract from Minutes No. 49, taken at the October 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of the CC Draft of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti, The CC approves the attached text of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti in con-nection with the Hungarian situation. Secretary of the CC To Paragraph 69 of Minutes No. 49 Top Secret ROME For Comrade TOGLIATTI In your evaluation of the situation in Hungary and of the tendencies of development of the Hungarian Government toward a reactionary development, we are in agreement with you. According to our information, Nagy is occupying a two-faced position and is falling more and more under the influence of the reactionary forces. For the time being we are not speaking out openly against Nagy, but we will not reconcile ourselves with the turn of events toward a reactionary debaucher Your friendly warnings regarding the possibility of the weakening of the unity of the collective leadership of our party have no basis. We can firmly assure you that in the complex interna-tional situation our collective leadership unanimously [yedinodushno] evaluates the situation and unanimously takes appropriate decisions. CC CPSU.

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