Sam Vincent, Florian Weigand and Hameed Hakimi The Afghan local police – closing the security gap?

Article (Published version) (Refereed)

Original citation: Vincent, Sam, Weigand, Florian and Hakimi, Hameed (2015) The Afghan local police – closing the security gap? Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 4 (1). pp. 1-26. ISSN 2165-2627

DOI: 10.5334/sta.gg

Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons:

© 2015 The Authors CC-BY 3.0

This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63489/

Available in LSE Research Online: Online: September 2015

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

Vincent, S et al 2015 The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security stability Gap? Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 45, pp. 1–26, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gg

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Sam Vincent*, Florian Weigand* and Hameed Hakimi†

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was designed as an international counterinsurgency programme that works by raising small, village-level defence forces from within rural Afghan communities. Despite being driven by counterinsurgency objectives – that is, seeking to defeat insurgents - its emphasis upon harnessing local popula- tions reflects broader fashions in development and security policy circles. Such policies, in turn, are commonly seen as emerging from a body of theoretical litera- ture that is rethinking the nature of political order in conflict-torn spaces. At face value the range of well-documented controversies surrounding the ALP suggests, however, that the practice is much more ‘messy’. Using the case study of the ALP in the district of Andar, we make two main arguments. First, the mess and ambigu- ity surrounding the ALP reveal a gap between objectives and practices, suggesting that interventions that work by seeking to harness the ‘local’ introduce problems that have yet to be fully recognised. Second, however, in explaining the ‘mess’ of the ALP we argue that the theoretically-driven work that is commonly taken to justify ‘bottom-up’ interventions, if taken seriously, is well-suited to understand- ing and even anticipating the supposedly unexpected consequences of intervenors seeking to tap local dynamics.

Introduction light footprint of international forces who The Afghan Local Police (ALP) has its ori- would tap into the purported power of ‘tradi- gins in an international counterinsurgency tional’ systems of local decision-making and (COIN) programme that sought to raise vil- security provision to tip the balance against lage-level defence forces from within com- the insurgency in rural Afghanistan. In this, munities that would help expel the Taliban we suggest, the ALP can be understood as from their areas. The programme was meant a COIN security ‘sub’-culture (Kaldor and to further the COIN objective of defeating Selchow 2015) that pursues COIN objectives insurgents. However, it departed from ‘main- by means of different practices intended to stream’ COIN in that it is based more on a correct the shortcomings of the overall inter- national ‘project’ (Suhrke 2011). In emphasising the purported power of * London School of Economics and Political supposedly local, traditional or informal Science, UK [email protected], [email protected] forms of order, the ALP parallels a broader † Chatham House, UK shift in zeitgeist. This shift can be observed [email protected] on two levels. On the policy level, in response Art. 45, page 2 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? to widespread loss of conviction in the power you’ve seen one village stability platform’ of externally engineered ‘state-building’ (Hanlin 2011; Ives 2013).1 According to one efforts to fix supposedly ‘failed’ states, the assessment: international development and security pol- icy discourses increasingly see ‘bottom-up’ as [r]oughly one third of ALP units are a more cost-effective, efficient, appropriate enhancing local security, undermin- and viable alternative to prevailing modali- ing insurgent influence, and facilitat- ties of intervention. The ALP, for example, ing better governance ( . . . ). Another can be interpreted as a policy that has taken one third are not producing such out- to heart exhortations for ‘alternative non- comes and may, in certain respects, be state-centric approaches to governance, engaged in collusion with the enemy the control of violence, peace-building, and or in abusive behavior that abets the development’ and to be based on an appre- enemy. The last third falls somewhere ciation of ‘the strengths of the societies in in between the first two groups’ (Joint question, acknowledging their resilience, Special Operations University, quoted encouraging indigenous creative responses in Smith 2015). to the problems, and strengthening their own capacities for endurance’ (Boege et al In addition to great spatial variation, some 2009a: 14). Meanwhile, this policy-level units appear to have been involved in seri- shift has been paralleled by, but needs to be ous abuses against the populations that they distinguished from, an increasingly promi- supposedly protect, whilst others morphed nent and diverse scholarship that seeks to quickly in local perceptions from contribut- overcome the perceived intellectual failures ing to security to driving insecurity (Aikens of the failed states discourse by redefining 2014; HRW 2011:3; ICG 2015; Mashal 2011). statehood and suggesting ‘more empirically In this article we seek to explore why the grounded or more conceptually innovative’ ALP has proven so messy and to explain the (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) research into gap between ALP objectives on paper and the emergence and practice of local govern- the way the programme has played out in ance and authority in situations of violent practice. The ALP case indeed suggests that conflict. While scholarship in this vein is policies seeking to reflexively tap the pur- opening the way to a much more sophisti- ported power of the ‘local’ – depicted as cated analysis of social phenomena and pro- more culturally appropriate, effective and cesses currently affecting the lives of billions legitimate – do not simply overcome the of people across the world, the policy turn to limitations of mainstream forms of inter- the local contains highly problematic impli- vention, but introduce new complexities cations that have yet to be fully unpacked or of their own. Here the distinction becomes sufficiently considered by either the policy or important between ‘bottom-up’ policy inter- the academic communities. ventions and the more theoretically-driven The ALP programme has proven extremely scholarship that is often perceived to underpin problematic in practice. We draw attention and justify such policies. While acknowledg- to the wide diversity and changeability of ing the difficulties of the ALP in practice, the ALP practices and distinguish between their more theoretically-driven work should not contribution to local experiences of secu- be dismissed too hastily. Far from justify- rity and their contribution to international ing the ALP, the emerging literature should counterinsurgency objectives. The bewil- instead make policymakers cautious about dering diversity and ambiguity of impacts the current turn to the local both in wider (Noori 2015) is captured by the US military US SOF engagements around the world and Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) expression, in the broader international development ‘if you’ve seen one village stability platform, and security policy communities. Moreover, Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 3 of 26 it offers useful ways to interpret the contrast a wide array of local actors mobilised to between the neat ALP blueprint and the influence according to their own perceived practice. interests. The US forces sent to establish ALP We seek to highlight two strengths of the units saw the programme in terms of the emerging theories. First, the heuristic of COIN objective of encouraging local actors dynamics of contestation has advantages to align behind a shared practice of resisting over dominant approaches to the political insurgents. The ‘security gap’ between COIN order of spaces where a monopoly of the objectives, pursued through the ALP modal- legitimate use of force is not an established ity, and the ‘messiness’ of the ALP in prac- fact. A second, less well-observed, strength of tice, is therefore better understood not in such approaches, is their ability to encom- terms of stated international counterinsur- pass different forms of international inter- gency objectives but as the contingent out- vention into the frame of study as another come of multiple ‘power poles’ (Bierschenk layer of actors engaged in dynamic contesta- and Olivier de Sardan 1997: 441, quoted in tion processes. The emerging theoretical work Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 542) vying to therefore provides a useful lens not only for make the programme serve their own inter- understanding the dynamics of conflict-torn ests. Moreover, the reasons for the problems spaces, but also for understanding the sup- encountered can actually be well understood posedly unexpected consequences of policy and even anticipated by taking seriously the interventions seeking to tap such dynamics. more theoretically-driven literature from To demonstrate these theoretical strengths which the ALP and other ‘bottom-up’ policy we examine evidence from the District of interventions supposedly draw inspiration. Andar in Ghazni Province and apply the The article is arranged as follows. First, we heuristic of dynamic contestation to explore present the ALP as depicted ‘on paper’ as a why an apparently ‘messy’ ALP programme contemporary programme that, while rooted played out as it did. In analysing this con- in COIN doctrine and objectives, emphasises text, part of our intention is to demonstrate the importance of ‘local’ tradition and cus- the analytic purchase of more dynamic and tom. We then locate the programme within emergent conceptions of authority in places a wider turn in zeitgeist entailing grow- where the formal state is at best one among ing interest in spontaneous and evolving many authorities. We also seek to show how forms of authority emerging in situations this heuristic approach can incorporate of violent conflict and attenuation of formal international intervention within the ana- state authority. Thirdly, we explore the case lytic frame, including interventions like the of the ALP in Andar by contrasting official ALP, that seek to reflexively harness insights depictions of the programme with the way about the strength of local, traditional or it has played out ‘in practice’. The case illus- informal authority to achieve ostensibly trates both the complexities and difficulties more legitimate and effective interventions. involved with policies of ‘going local’ and At heart, we argue that the ALP reveals a ten- the value of emerging heuristic approaches sion between ascribing power and agency to that jettison state centric analytic lenses in local dynamics and assuming that local inter- favour of emphasis on dynamic contestation ests can be harnessed and aligned to external processes. objectives. The messy, spatially varied and mercurial character of the programme in The ALP on Paper: Empowering the practice reflects that it added to, but did not Local overwrite, existing local dynamics of contes- The ALP is a US-sponsored, NATO-backed tation between an array of actors. When the security programme that trains ‘local ALP was introduced into Andar’s complex Afghans in rural areas to defend their com- local landscape, it became a resource which munities against threats from insurgents Art. 45, page 4 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? and other illegally-armed groups’ (DOD some villages across Afghanistan seemed 2011: 68). It was inaugurated in 2010 as part to be spontaneously resisting insurgent of the US-led ‘surge’ effort, at a time when groups (Catanzaro and Windmueller 2011). tens of thousands of additional troops were Signalling that the programme intends to deployed on top of the existing international respond to spontaneous bottom-up resent- military forces that were attempting to turn ment rather than being imposed on villages, the tide against mounting insurgency. Given villagers must ‘have either demonstrated Afghanistan’s size and its varied and often active resistance to the insurgency, or have daunting terrain, even the combined Afghan recently asked for assistance to do so’ to be National Security Forces (ANSF) and inter- eligible (Stevens 2011: 65). national military presence were insufficient ALP advocates portray village-level self- to extend security to the local level or to defence forces as ‘traditional’ – and hence dominate the countryside – much of which legitimate and efficient (Jones and Munoz remained contested space. International 2010; Rector 2012). Indeed, in many parts forces came to see villages as caught in the of Afghanistan community level secu- middle, threatened by international and rity arrangements existed for generations national forces for cooperating with insur- (Karokhail and Schmeidl 2006; Schmeidl gents and menaced by the insurgents if they and Karokhail 2009a). The traditional secu- did not. rity mechanisms of the Pashtun provinces The ALP, as presented in official documents, in southern and eastern Afghanistan, called was intended to help address these difficul- ‘Arbakai’ in Pashto (‘Salwishti’ or ‘Shalgoon’ ties. Lacking sufficient forces to pervasively in FATA, and ‘Paltanai’ in Kandahar) (Tariq dominate the countryside at the district and 2008: 3), for example, were volunteer ini- sub-district level, the programme envisaged tiatives for enforcing law and order and pro- enlisting villagers themselves against the viding community security (Schmeidl and insurgency, ‘targeting’, according to NATO, Karokhail 2009a; Tariq 2009). Arbakai have ‘rural areas with limited to no ANSF pres- received particular attention from inter- ence . . . to enable conditions for improved national forces, who often ‘use the term to security, governance and development’ depict well-meaning, disciplined, traditional (NATO 2012). By providing villagers with community defence forces, obedient only to the means to provide ‘security’ themselves, the tribal assembly (jirga)’ (Lefèvre 2010: 3). the programme was intended to change the Building on this tradition the ALP design, basic equation confronting villagers. In this, as presented in official public documents, the programme’s basis in US COIN doctrine entails Afghan and international forces was apparent. COIN holds that insurgency working with village shuras (councils) to cannot be defeated by military force alone agree to the establishment of a local ALP but is achieved politically when the popu- unit, thereby ensuring local ownership, lation is persuaded to consent ‘to the gov- legitimacy and accountability. The shura ernment’s legitimacy and stops actively and then nominates adult men from within passively supporting the insurgency’ (US the community as recruits. Before enrol- Army 2006: 1–14). COIN forces seek local ment, nominees were to be vetted both by opposition to insurgents, and ways to enable the Afghan Government and international that opposition, while trying to generate a forces. If accepted, recruits were then sup- tipping point in which momentum swings posed to be equipped and given three weeks decisively away from the insurgency (Jones of training with US SOF (DOD 2011: 68–70; and Muñoz 2010: 74). The ALP should be DOD 2012). ALP units (officially consisting of understood as designed to enable villagers around 30 patrolmen) were supposed to be wanting to ‘stand up for themselves’, and the raised solely through SOF units, embedded programme grew from the realization that in villages as part of wider ‘Village Stability Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 5 of 26

Operations’ who, augmented by a variety Following its inauguration in 2010 the ALP of other initiatives, were to pursue an ‘inte- grew quickly. Initially slated as a temporary grated approach to governance, security, and (2–5 years) force that would peak at 10,000 development’ (DOD 2011: 68; Felbab-Brown men, in mid-2011 it was announced that it 2013; Robinson 2013; Saum-Manning 2012: would be tripled to 30,000. In 2013 it was 8; Huslander and Spivey 2012). announced that it would expand to 45,000 On paper at least, the ALP are not ‘police’, with funding guaranteed by the Pentagon having no powers to arrest, and are only until at least 2018 (Pessin 2010; Goodhand empowered to investigate crimes if spe- and Hakimi 2014: 14–15, quoting US Special cifically requested by the Afghan National Operations Command figures). The US envis- Police (ANP). Rather, they are intended as a aged that 30,000 ALP personnel in 154 dis- lightly armed, defensive, pro-government tricts by the end of December 2014 would presence at the village level capable of deter- be assigned to 1,320 checkpoints across 29 ring insurgents – a ‘night watch with AK-47s’ of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan (SIGAR (Radin 2011), that can call upon ANSF and 2014). By December 1, 2014, there were international forces for support. While the 27,837 ALP personnel (SIGAR 2015: 99). US provided funding, training, equipment In part this expansion can be interpreted and technical assistance, this was directed as a measure to fill a gap in capacity as through the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) international forces drew down but before in which the initiative is formally housed. ANSF reached full strength (Chayes 2011). By making ALP units formally accountable Although the programme is small relative to the District Police Chief, complement- to total ANSF (with over 350,000 person- ing local decision-making with national nel as of January 2014) the distribution of and international vetting processes, and the ALP across ‘key’ rural locations, where SOF training and mentorship, the ALP was government and international presence has presented as creating a fairly reliable, remained tenuous and challenged by the limited, pro-government presence with insurgency, may endow it with disproportion- which the ANSF and international forces ate significance. Additionally, if what some of could work. its proponents have said about the power of The programme became a critical com- the specific programme design proves correct, ponent of the overall international military its relatively small size may belie its signifi- strategy during the surge period. General cance to future security in Afghanistan. Petraeus, credited with the apparent suc- Following the security transition pro- cesses of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ programme, saw cess and the arrival of the national unity the ALP as the ‘game changer’ in Afghanistan, government of President Ghani and ‘CEO’ and having made winning Karzai’s approval Abdullah after the protracted 2014 presiden- for the plan a ‘top initial goal’, invested tial elections, the Afghan government ‘has considerable time lobbying the President not determined the final disposition of the (DeYoung and Chandrasekaran 2010; Rubin ALP’ (SIGAR 2015: 99). As of January 2015 2010). The ALP was, in Petraeus’ view, ‘argu- it was unclear whether the US Department ably the most critical element in our effort of Defense (DOD) still envisaged funding to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to the programme to 2018 (SIGAR 2015: 99), secure itself’ (Norris 2013); it was seen as an although the Ghani administration may be initiative capable of turning the tide against ‘seeking money to continue the program’ the insurgency, ending the drawn-out con- beyond that time (ICG 2015:i). Whether frontation with the insurgency, and mak- or not the programme is continued, it has ing possible the exit of international forces trained and armed some 28,000 people without risking the collapse of the Afghan in villages of tenuous government reach. government. The ALP (and broader VSO), moreover, may Art. 45, page 6 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? well prove to have significance beyond We present this turn in more detail in three Afghanistan. Reflecting on the VSO/ALP steps. First, we set out the neo-Weberian terms concept, Robinson argues that ‘[u]ltimately, in which the dominant theoretical and policy success really involves applying this model discourses were framed, and how perceived elsewhere’ and notes that ‘[t]his is the shortcomings of mainstream policies created vision Admiral McRaven [the then-outgo- a policy appetite for alternative approaches. ing Commander of US Special Operations In its emphasis on tapping the purported Command] is driving toward’ (Manea 2014). power of traditional forms of authority, the US Special Forces now contemplate their ALP programme clearly embodies the wider possible role in future operations around the policy turn in international development world, in areas besides the pursuit of terror- and security circles towards overcoming ists (Robinson 2013). US policymakers seem the limits of the dominant ‘top down’ state- (for now) reluctant to engage in the pro- building model by devising interventions longed and involved forms of intervention that work ‘with the grain’ of existing local that evolved in Afghanistan. The possibility governance (Kelsall 2008). Second, although of distributed SOF teams raising indigenous justifications of the ALP superficially appear forces that address US objectives, without to be close cousins of many of the arguments large-scale deployments, and in ways per- being developed by scholars more oriented ceived as less likely to degenerate into ‘mili- to theoretical challenges of conflict-torn tia’, appears to be under active consideration spaces, this impression is misleading. Taking as a policy option. seriously the more theoretically driven lit- erature should make us cautious of policies The ALP in Context: A Changing seeking to reflexively harness local dynamics Zeitgeist in pursuit of international objectives. Third, While official depictions of the ALP pro- as we seek to demonstrate through our dis- gramme clearly suggest its basis in counter- cussion of Andar District, the emerging theo- insurgency, other aspects of the programme retical work provides a useful lens not only suggest that it is better located at the conflu- for understanding dynamics of conflict-torn ence between COIN doctrine and a wider con- spaces, but also for understanding the sup- temporary shift in zeitgeist regarding how posedly unexpected consequences of policy best to conceptualise, and most effectively interventions seeking to tap such dynamics. intervene in conflict-torn spaces. In describ- Our point of departure is the observa- ing this turn, we emphasise a distinction tion that previously dominant approaches between two related efforts. The first involves to understanding the political order of theoretically-driven work motivated by the conflict-torn spaces in ‘neo-Weberian’ terms desire to overcome the perceived limitations have recently been rivalled by increasing of dominant approaches to understanding interest in alternative forms of analysis.2 such settings. The second is more oriented Neo-Weberian understandings of statehood to designing and advocating policy interven- derive from the Weberian ideal-typical tions that respond to the perceived prob- bureaucratic-rational state seen, at root, as lems associated with existing approaches. a monopoliser of the legitimate means of The conceptual distinction between these coercion. Although Weber intended his ideal different projects is less clear-cut in practice types as ‘pure’ logical categories for analyti- since several authors, implicitly or explicitly, cal purposes that had ‘no connection with seek to address both questions. However, we value judgments’ (Weber 2011 [1904]: 98; highlight the distinction to draw attention to emphasis in the original), his formulation what is involved in moving between seeking has in recent decades become a normative- to better understand social phenomena and teleological benchmark dominating both the attempting to intervene to achieve particu- scholarly and policy discourses (Migdal and lar, typically externally derived, objectives. Schlichte 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 7 of 26

Weigand 2015). The view that deviation from spaces discourses (Bell 2012; Hughes and this condition is a dangerous pathology Pupavac 2005), treated areas beyond state threatening the wider community of states control as sites of breakdown or Hobbesian has underpinned the tendency to categorise anarchy (Call 2010; Hagmann and Hoehne states with a low degree of monopolisation 2009; Hagmann and Péclard 2010). A sense of force as ‘fragile’ or even ‘failed’ (Fukuyama emerged that an external vision of govern- 2004; Rotberg 2004). As the problems beset- ment could not simply be imposed upon a ting such places came to be defined in terms given country and that such efforts could of state failure, so the view emerged that and would be locally resisted or co-opted the solution lay in concerted international (Englebert and Tull 2008). efforts to establish supposedly Weberian Meanwhile, more theoretically-oriented ideal-typical state structures. This state-build- scholarship had been expressing dissatisfac- ing agenda is widely seen as the lodestar that tion with the intellectual blind-spots created guided a range of international interventions by prevailing neo-Weberian state centrism, since the end of the Cold War, including that which caricatured areas where effective con- in Afghanistan. Yet after a period in which trol of the de jure state was limited or con- international actors grew increasingly ambi- tested as sites of failure and chaos (Hill 2005: tious, attempting the wholesale external 148, cited in Hagmann and Péclard 2010: engineering and transformative ‘modernisa- 541). Consequently, they were incapable of tion’ of post-conflict countries, the visceral seeing them for what they were and inatten- difficulties encountered in Afghanistan rein- tive to the insight that ‘absence of the state forced a sense of deepening doubt about the does not mean a void in its place’ (Bierschenk feasibility of such international endeavours and Olivier de Sardan 1997: 441). Scholarship (Suhrke 2007). emerged decrying the ‘failures of the state The apparent ‘poor performance and failure debate’ (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009), high cost of statebuilding’ (Meagher 2012; seeking to reconceptualise and empirically Paris and Sisk 2009) provoked a search for document the ways social life continues to explanations as well as a new receptiveness be ordered and reordered where state con- at the policy level to alternative or comple- trol is limited or contested (eg Hagmann and mentary approaches. A view emerged that Péclard (ed) 2011; Menkhaus 2006/7; Migdal the travails of state-building were rooted in and Schlichte (ed) 2005; Raeymaekers et the gulf between externally derived under- al 2008; Schetter (ed) 2013; Vlassenroot standings and objectives and local realities and Raeymaekers 2004; Doornbos 2010; and demands. State-building stood accused Friedrichs 2010; Weigand 2015; Schlichte of being overly ‘top down’, both in the sense and Wilke 2000). In the process, researchers of being derived from international pre- sought new ways to describe and conceptual- scriptions and in being disproportionately ise the phenomena they encountered, avoid- focused on central organs of state that would ing dependence on prevailing ‘essentialist, project government across the territory. teleological and instrumentalist conceptions’ Intervenors in Afghanistan, for example, of the state leaving ‘little room for alterna- were accused of assuming that strength- tive models’ (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009) ening the centre would have a ‘cascading’ and documenting the roles played by a range effect in which ‘the rest of the country would of ‘non-state’ actors in governance processes. become successively subject to the Afghan Migdal and Schlichte (2005), for example, state’ (Schetter 2013: 8). Such interventions presented a dynamic understanding of polit- were thought to lack traction because they ical order and statehood that redirects the either largely ignored the periphery, assumed analytical focus from the degree of monopo- a tabula rasa on which they could build lisation of force to interactions between the afresh (Ucko 2013: 529) or, influenced by the involved actors or authorities. Hagmann and ‘pathologizing’ failed states and ungoverned Péclard (2010) use this definition to develop Art. 45, page 8 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? their heuristic framework of ‘negotiating advocates ‘re-conceptualising fragile states statehood’, describing ‘processes of state as hybrid political orders’ (2008: 15) that (de-)construction’ (ibid.: 544) as a non-linear combine ‘state institutions, customary insti- and at least partly undetermined product of tutions and new elements of citizenship ongoing, dynamic interactions between dif- and civil society in networks of governance ferently situated actors (ibid: 545; Doornbos which are not introduced from the outside, 2010: 752). Their emphasis upon processes but embedded in the societal structures on of ‘negotiation, contestation and brico- the ground’ (ibid.: 17). They express the hope lage’ echoes the language of a number of that their ideas could ‘contribute to a reorien- scholars similarly interested in understand- tation of external assistance’, so that ‘possi- ing and documenting processes through bilities of externally influencing governance which ‘governance’ is produced in contexts structures can be re-examined, shifting the of apparently limited government (in the focus from narrow models of state-building neo-Weberian sense) (eg Lund (ed 2007); to understanding and engaging with hybrid Menkhaus 2006/7; Mielke et al 2011). institutions’ (ibid). Kaplan, similarly, argues We emphasise two analytic benefits that rather than ’trying to foist a Western of drawing upon the kinds of heuristic style top-down state structure on Somalia’s approach being developed in this research deeply decentralized and fluid society, the tradition. First, the notion that social order international community needs to work with ‘never ceases to exist but rather changes its the country’s long-standing traditional insti- institutional and normative contents’ (Wilde tutions to build a government from the bot- and Mielke 2013: 353) draws attention to the tom up. Such an approach, he adds, ‘might ways new governance arrangements, how- prove to be not only Somalia’s salvation but ever provisional, emerge as people negoti- also a blueprint for rescuing other similarly ate confusing post-conflict settings in which splintered states’ (Kaplan 2010: 81). questions of political order remain at least The parallels between the broad policy turn partly unsettled. A second benefit, which has described above and the ALP programme received less attention, however, is that such are difficult to ignore.3 The programme was approaches are capable of bringing interna- developed against a backdrop of mounting tional intervenors into the frame of study insurgency, deteriorating relations between as additional sets of ‘stakeholders’ vying to the Afghan government and its interna- influence the emerging political order. The tional partners, and deepening doubt about ‘failed states’ discourse framed such settings the feasibility of the international ‘project’ more in terms of threats posed to neigh- in Afghanistan (Suhrke 2011). The ALP was bouring states and the wider state system explicitly developed from a critique that ech- but tended to neglect or caricature local set- oed wider trends in locating the shortcom- tings. Consequently, while the failed states ings of the Afghanistan intervention in an discourse served as a justificatory basis for unhealthy fixation on neo-Weberian state- intervention it was less well-equipped either building and neglect and ignorance of local to anticipate how particular forms of inter- politics. One ALP advocate argued that since national engagement would be received, or 2001, international policy had been based how they would ‘play’ into fluid and con- on ‘a fatally flawed assumption: The recipe tested local dynamics. for stability is building a strong central gov- Where much of this work focused on ernment capable of establishing law and the theoretical and empirical exposition of order in rural areas’ (Jones 2009a; Jones and social and political life under such condi- Muñoz 2010: 6–7). That assumption, rooted tions, many working in this vein have also in the reconstruction and state-building tem- considered the policy implications aris- plate of the 1990s and 2000s, was contrasted ing from their ideas. An influential body of with a portrayal of Afghan history as a series work developed by Boege et al., for example, of top-down, centralizing attempts to project Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 9 of 26 a (neo-Weberian) monopoly of force across governance and security provision beyond the territory, typically provoking the rural, the state while managing local security ‘under traditional and conservative majority of the the auspices of legitimate tribal institutions’ population into ‘social and political revolts’ (Jones 2009). While such an approach might (Jones 2009a). Exemplified mainly by the appear at odds with the mental template of failed efforts of Amanullah Khan between an ideal-typical Weberian state, this concep- 1919–1929 (Jones 2009a; Jones 2009b; Jones tion of statecraft as encompassing diverse 2010; Jones 2012: 21), similar claims are fre- repertoires for negotiating relations with a quently made about the pro-Soviet Khalqi range of non-state actors aligns closely with regime’s ‘all-out assault on rural conserva- historical accounts of state formation pro- tism’ in 1978–79, which sparked rounds of cesses in early modern Europe. As Goodhand violence in Afghanistan that have yet to be and Hakimi (2014: 8) point out, ‘states and concluded (Giustozzi and Ibrahimi 2012: 1). imperial powers have frequently acted as This influential account of Afghan history brokers rather than monopolists, seeking argues not only that much of Afghanistan to extend their control through franchising existed beyond effective state authority, but the means of coercion’.4 This account of the that the very effort to exert such control had Musahiban ‘secret’ to state-building, more­ driven repeated cycles of violence (Jones and over, would not seem out of place among Muñoz 2010: 84). In this context, the con- contemporary portrayals of ‘hybrid political temporary insurgency began to look like the orders’ or ‘mediated states’. latest rural, conservative, traditionalist back- The view that a strategy of harnessing lash against externally-driven centralising local institutions was superior to top-down and modernising projects. To these critics, imposition was used to argue that existing the idea that central state authority could efforts should, at least, be complemented be built and then projected into the Afghan by strategies for understanding and working countryside revealed the collective failure of through existing local political and security the international community, academics and institutions. In this the ALP paralleled the western-educated Afghan government tech- suggestion, made in relation to Somalia, that nocrats to ‘grasp the local nature of Afghan the ‘best hope for state revival may lie in the politics’ (Jones 2009a; Jones and Muñoz explicit pursuit of a mediated state – in which 2010: 6–7). From this perspective, the empir- a central government with limited power ically oriented and conceptually innovative and capacity relies on a diverse range of scholarly work being developed in parts of local authorities to execute core functions of the academy suddenly seemed exactly what government and mediate relations between US military planners wanted in order to local communities and the state’ (Menkhaus understand and effectively engage the deci- 2007: 103). Politics in Afghanistan were sive authority structures in Afghanistan. ‘local’, but having fixated on central state Reflecting the rising policy interest in institutions, the international community alternative modes of intervention that work had largely neglected the countryside and the through existing authorities at the local level, villages. While the international community the ALP programme asserted that the ‘key’ was ‘looking in the wrong place’ – focusing to stability in rural Afghanistan lay in the on national government institutions (Jones approach taken by the Musahiban dynasty 2009a) – the Taliban had implemented a (spanning the rule of Zahir Shah, Nadir skilful bottom-up strategy aimed at persuad- Shah and Daoud Khan from 1929–1978). ing, co-opting or coercing local leaders, par- The Musahibans were portrayed as having ticularly of majority communities that under recognised the futility of seeking to forcibly Karzai found themselves ‘marginalized by project their state into rural areas. Instead ruling minority tribes’ (Jones 2010: 334). they viewed statecraft as the work of engag- Given the extent to which local poli- ing with customary, tribal and other forms of tics in Afghanistan remained opaque to Art. 45, page 10 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? interveners, the discovery of the importance 2013). These dynamics empowered new of local and rural dynamics by international classes of actors and drove local responses to military actors was welcomed (Ucko 2013). insecurity that contributed to producing new Three issues with the historical account used forms of order and authority (Giustozzi and to frame the ALP programme stand out, Ullah 2006). This compounds the difficulty however. First, as Giustozzi has observed, the in identifying what is ‘traditional’ or equating ‘successful’ Musahiban state-building strat- what is ‘local’ with legitimacy (Schmeidl 2009). egy of achieving progressive rural domina- Thirdly, it is not obvious that insurgency tion through intermediaries and co-optation in Afghanistan is best understood as a rural was an ‘imperial’ model of governance that rebellion against a state-building effort in the worked not on the basis of impartial admin- tradition of earlier delusional visions of mod- istration ‘but on certain communities ruling ernising grandeur. Portraying the insurgency over others or on a strategy of divide and as a rural mass rejection of state-building or rule among local leaders’ (Giustozzi 2009: modernisation efforts obscures that the day- 71; Karokhail and Schmeidl 2006). From to-day experience of many rural Afghans was this perspective, the strategies of ‘successful’ not best described as an encounter with the periods were implicated in producing a ‘pre- grand, internationally-backed Afghan gov- carious’, crisis-prone and inherently unsta- ernment-led, state-building and modernisa- ble system. The local security mechanisms tion mission that was deemed to have failed attributed to the Musahiban period had not or to have fuelled insurgency (Schmeidl and existed in seclusion from the state but had Karokhail 2009b). Particularly in the south been sites of negotiation and contestation as and southeast, post-2001 rural experience the government sought to increase its grip was not primarily of an ambitious neo- upon the periphery. Local institutions were Weberian state-building experiment, but of profoundly (and differentially) affected by a heavily militarised international presence such processes – local security institutions, prosecuting a war on terror and empowering for example, varied considerably in terms a government characterised by a combina- of relations between local mechanisms and tion of corruption, predation and ineptitude national security forces (Tariq 2008). State (Fishstein and Wilder 2012; Rangelov and agents seeking to influence or instrumen- Theros 2012). talise local institutions, meanwhile, required high levels of understanding and skill. This The ALP in Practice: Impressions suggests that contemporary efforts to ‘go from Ghazni Province local’ may risk generating similarly precari- In this section, we consider the evidence ous dynamics, especially given the limited from Andar District of Ghazni Province, local level understanding possessed by out- supplementing the available literature with side interveners. interviews with local people. In order to Secondly, the literature indicates that in investigate how the ALP programme works the past Arbakai and similar institutions in a specific context, we conducted three were embedded in a wider cultural frame- rounds (spring 2013, 2014 and 2015) of work, having been raised and controlled phone interviews with a small number of through customary councils that enjoyed sig- selected community elders in the district. nificant local legitimacy. However, more than The case underscores the gap between por- thirty years of continuous violent conflict in trayals of the programme ‘on paper’ and the Afghanistan has, in addition to destroying way the programme has played out in prac- physical infrastructure and state institutions, tice. It also reinforces the sense, emerging also had profoundly destructive and trans- from the body of existing literature, that the formative effects on village level social struc- ALP is highly ambiguous in terms of its con- tures (Noelle-Karimi 2006; Noelle-Karimi tribution to security/insecurity at the local Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 11 of 26 level and in terms of a confusing patchwork the emphasis on local accountability mecha- of wildly divergent outcomes not only from nisms in the programme design – ALP units village to village, but with ALP units mor- have committed serious abuses against the phing rapidly from apparently locally sup- population they supposedly protect, thereby ported security provider to predatory actor. deepening, rather than alleviating, insecurity In exploring the Andar case, we highlight (Aikins 2014; HRW 2011: 3; ICG 2015; Mashal some of the problems implied by interna- 2011; Sarfraz and Norland 2012; Yoshikawa tional attempts to modify or invent local gov- and Pennington 2011; Yousafzai and Moreau ernance and security institutions by invoking 2013). An unpublished US SOF study report- tradition, history and culture to advance their edly found ‘every fifth ALP is involved in the objectives. Such approaches, we suggest, do drug trade, extorting illegal taxes, land grab- not simply overcome the problems associ- bing, murder, rape, running secret deten- ated with ‘top down’ forms of intervention, tion facilities and violent internal power but introduces tensions of its own. However, struggles’ (Ruttig 2013: 5). As with similar we also seek to demonstrate the analytic past efforts, there has been concern that value of dynamic approaches to political this latest internationally-sponsored armed order in conflict-torn settings by using such actor may one day ‘go rogue’ (Goodhand an heuristic to interpret what initially appear and Hakimi 2014: 45), turning to banditry, to be messy and unpredictable outcomes. being co-opted into militias or joining the Such approaches, we suggest, are capable of insurgency and violently opposing the state encompassing both local setting and forms (Borger 2012). There is some suggestion that of international intervention – even inter- this may be already underway. As the interna- ventions seeking to reflexively harness the tional presence in Afghanistan has receded, ‘local’ or ‘traditional’. At heart, we argue, the so has oversight of ALP units by their US SOF ALP reveals the tension in ascribing power mentors, leaving some local residents ‘shiver- and agency to local dynamics while continu- ing with fear’ not at the Taliban but at the ing to assume that local interests can be har- local ALP military entrepreneurs (Goldstein nessed and aligned to external objectives. 2015; Stancati 2014). The reports of abuses Several provincial and district-level stud- that have dogged the ALP have also fed a ies explore the ALP in some depth (eg on nagging sense of unease that rather than the Baghlan (HRW 2011; Goodhand and Hakimi ALP helping villagers to resist the Taliban, 2014), Helmand (Stevens 2011), Herat (HRW villagers may actually be reaching out to the 2011), Kandahar (ICG 2015), Kunduz (HRW insurgency for protection from the ALP. Such 2011; Goodhand and Hakimi 2014; ICG 2015), a trend would indicate that besides often cre- and Wardak (Goodhand and Hakimi 2014)). ating insecurity for local communities, the These studies both underline the complexity ALP can actually fuel the insurgency it was of local circumstances into which particular set up to defeat. ALP programmes have been inserted and create a chaotic impression of ‘highly une- Competing Authorities in the Andar ven’ outcomes (Felbab-Brown 2013: 138). In Uprising some times and places the programme has The establishment of the ALP in Andar appeared to deliver intended outcomes both District of Ghazni Province is particularly in furthering anti-Taliban counterinsurgency interesting because of an apparently spon- objectives as well as in generating local per- taneous popular uprising against the Taliban ceptions that the ALP was making people that broke out in spring 2012, generating safer. However, most observers provide evi- widespread interest in Afghan and interna- dence that in a significant number of cases – tional media (Peter 2012; Moreau 2012). US despite the claim that the programme had Special Operations Command, perhaps read- learned the lessons of its predecessors, and ing events through the lens of COIN doctrine Art. 45, page 12 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? as evidence of the population breaking from government, and did not see their movement the insurgency, became ‘seized’ with the as a bridgehead for government control, as it uprising, seeing it as a ‘springboard’ for intro- was interpreted by outsiders (Foschini 2012; ducing the ALP (Robinson 2013: 203; Lubold Moreau 2012). This middle position, neither 2012; Trofimov 2013). Subsequent efforts Taliban nor government, however, would to replicate and spread the ‘Andar model’ prove difficult to maintain. underline the importance of this particu- While compelling, the emerging interna- lar case in wider contemporary US military tional narrative of a purely ‘popular’ upris- thinking on Afghanistan. ing concealed how people in Andar, and The dominant narrative about events in even different actors involved in the upris- Andar holds that, having steadily strength- ing, were using widely differing narratives ened their position (Chivers 2011; Harpviken to explain the situation. Moreover, each 2012; Reuter and Younus 2009), the Taliban of these narratives, including that emerg- introduced a number of unpopular meas- ing in international coverage, was politi- ures in Ghazni, culminating in the closing cally charged; the language of ‘uprising’ of schools in response to government efforts can be viewed as a kind of ‘symbolic reper- to ban motorcycles, which they relied upon toire’ through which different actors seek to (Foschini 2012; Habib 2012a). In this read- ‘defend and to challenge . . . power relations’ ing, the ban on schooling caused such strong (Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 547). Foschini local resentment that villagers spontane- and Habib (a pseudonym) provide evidence ously rose up and began to forcibly expel that the uprising was not simply driven by the Taliban from their villages. This account popular resentment, but was marked from is largely followed by Robinson (2013), who the outset by competition between local reflects the US SOF perspective, and receives power-brokers with roots in the anti-Soviet at least qualified support from contemporary jihad, each seeking to mold the uprising to media (Farmer 2012; Peter 2012). In an inter- serve their own objectives (Foschini 2012; view, a former mujahidin member and cur- Habib 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b). rent community elder in the district offered Most accounts acknowledge the role of a similar interpretation of the origins of the figures affiliated with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i uprising. He pointed out that international Islami, a mujahedin-era faction that remains and Afghan forces had regularly conducted influential in post-Taliban Afghanistan. military operations designed to drive out the After the Taliban resurgence in Andar from Taliban, but that after military operations around 2003 (Reuter and Younus 2009), finished and forces withdrew, the insur- descendants of mujahedin era ‘Hizbis’ were gents immediately returned and resumed incorporated into the Taliban movement harassing and even executing local people. but held significantly different views from According to this interviewee, ‘The Uprising’ their comrades on questions such as educa- (‘Paatsoon’) was a locally developed initiative tion and development work (Habib 2012a). that reflected resentment of Taliban behav- Robinson, perhaps reflecting the US SOF iour. However, the interviewee also stressed narrative, maintains that there was a spon- the failure of the government to retain taneous uprising but suggests that when its control over the area following anti-Taliban leader was killed, a Hizbi ‘political figure’ clearing operations. The way our interlocutor then ‘insinuated himself to assert leader- framed his response in terms of government ship’ (2013: 204). Foschini (2012) similarly shortcomings and how he saw the uprising believes that the uprising was driven by as an attempt to expel the Taliban and pro- ‘a broader and deeper malaise’ conceding vide local security directly, offers an impor- only that ‘[t]he Hezb-e Islami connection tant clue. Many involved in the uprising were has certainly contributed to strengthen and rejecting the Taliban without welcoming the militarise the revolt’. On the basis of detailed Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 13 of 26 interviews with local informants, however, rivals through alliances with more amenable Habib relates alternative local narratives local commanders. portraying ‘the “uprising” as a revolt by the The rivalry between local power-brokers “Hezb Taleban” group against their Taleban who had emerged during the war years was brothers’ (Habib 2012a) – a view that is proving to be as significant to local politics supported by the way the revolt apparently as were the ‘traditional’, ‘tribal’ sources of began in a series of historically Hizbi villages authority invoked in the ALP concept. Even if south of the district centre. An alternative the uprising had begun in spontaneous and account, which also interprets the uprising popular terms, within months local strug- as a Taliban rift, plays down the Hizbi doctri- gles to instrumentalise it were resulting in nal schism theory, instead emphasising local fragmentation, with some villages apparently dissatisfaction at growing Pakistani influence flying the flag of Hizb-i Islami, and others the in the local Taliban movement (Economist government of Afghanistan. This had impor- 2012; Felbab-Brown 2013: 149; Rubin and tant consequences. In addition to generating Rosenberg 2012). an escalation of local violence as a result of the An additional narrative, corroborated by a Taliban backlash – within five months more range of sources, emphasizes the role played than one hundred people had been killed by Assadullah Khaled, a Karzai-affiliated (Habib 2012b) – there were reports of clashes figure who would soon head the Afghan between different arbakais and growing wari- National Directorate of Security (NDS). ness as they began to harass local people sus- Depicted by Habib as ‘probably the single pected of Taliban sympathies. In the early most powerful figure in Ghazni calling the months, people in Andar referred to the anti- shots from behind the scenes’ (Habib 2012a), Taliban rebels as arbakai. As described above, Khaled is alleged to have reached out to three international forces and ALP architects had rival local power-brokers with mujahedin-era attached positive connotations to this term, roots, seeking to influence the uprising and but within a year people in Andar were using realign it as an anti-Taliban and pro-govern- the term ‘unanimously and perjoratively’ to ment movement. In return for mobilizing ‘denote a government or foreign-backed local pro-government arbakai, ‘each would be able force which fights, not for the protection of to hire his men for it, thereby gaining power the local community, but because they are in the area again’ (Habib 2012a). One of paid by outsiders and therefore act as irre- those apparently approached by Khaled grew sponsible mercenaries’ (Habib 2013a). suspicious of his Hizbi rivals and felt ‘side- The Uprising exposed the difficulty faced lined’ and then ‘betrayed’ when his arbakai by villagers wishing to reject the Taliban commanders were killed (ibid). However, without aligning with the government. Once the Hizbi leaders who appear to have split the Taliban determined to use force against with the Taliban and initiated the uprising the rebels, the latter had little choice but to were themselves soon marginalized. If it had accept or reach out to power-brokers capa- been ‘started by a staunch, anti-government, ble of keeping their movement alive. Intra- anti-ISAF Hezbi group, fighting for ideo- uprising divisions, both between ‘Hizbis’ logical reasons’ within months the uprising and those affiliated to Khaled and within ‘turned into what looked and acted like an the latter group made the symbolic appeal arbakai – an anti-Taleban militia which fights of the uprising vulnerable to charges that on the government’s behalf and is supplied it had been co-opted. As noted by Foschini and supported by ANSF and coalition forces’ (2012), while support of government-linked (Habib 2012a). Khaled may have sought to powerbrokers might enable the uprising to capitalise on internal division within the survive the Taliban backlash, this might not Taliban, and then to assume control of the mean ‘better security and increased possi- movement, progressively marginalizing bilities for local kids to attend school – the Art. 45, page 14 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? originally stated objective of the rising’. local resistance in practice sought to harness Moreover, the more the uprising was per- the uprising ‘repertoire’ to fulfil overarching ceived to be moving into a pro-government counterinsurgency objectives to the extent orbit, the more likely it would be to elicit that it built a parallel force that alienated concerted Taliban opposition. All in all, as existing uprisers. Those uprisers who did one observer told The New York Times, the not view their rejection of the Taliban as an uprising had become ‘a bit of a mess’ (Rubin endorsement of the government were never- and Rosenberg 2012). theless forced, however reluctantly, to rely on outside help by military necessity. Enter the ALP: A ‘Helping Hand’ – but A further perception was that the ALP was for whom? not set up in the way envisaged on paper. An In late September 2012, barely six months interviewee told us that rather than being into the uprising and in the midst of these appointed through local consultation in the complex local dynamics, US SOF arrived in way formally envisaged, he believed recruits Andar and soon began formal training for were applying directly to district and pro- the ALP. The uprising they encountered did vincial police officers, with positions filled not simply reflect unified opposition to the by ‘young, unemployed people who have a Taliban, but a politically fragmented environ- background in petty crime’, and motivated ment in which competition between local by a salary. This perception echoes a range power-brokers seems to have been more of other sources, who judged the ALP by its decisive than the ‘traditions’ the programme actions rather than its branding and were no was meant to tap. The Hizbi faction was mili- less suspicious of this latest armed group. tarily significant but hostile to the US, which For example, Habib (2013a) reports a local may explain why international commentary teacher’s view that ‘[t]heir treatment of the emphasised the ‘popular’ character of the people did not change. They are the same uprising, and why US SOF, wishing to margin- arbaki guys. They only changed their façade’. alise Hizbi influence, distinguished between The community elder we interviewed was the ‘legitimate’ ALP that they trained, and disappointed with the government for not the original defenders (Robinson 2013: 205). supporting the uprising and instead setting Adding to the complexities of a ‘popular’ up the ALP as an alternative ‘local’ force, movement already steered to some extent by which did not provide more security but was Hizbi leaders as well as Khaled’s behind-the- an additional source of insecurity, saying ‘we scenes activity, the US was now ‘essentially demanded the government to support the trying to set up a competing local defense Uprising instead of sending drug-addicts force that was not under HIG [ie, Hizb-e and thugs pretending to police our com- Islami] influence’ (ibid). Where Hizbis were munities’. From the interviewee’s point of critical of the Taliban and of the govern- view, the way the ALP was set up reflected ment, US SOF sought to draw the uprising that ‘the government and provincial police into their orbit as a pro-government counter- authorities are more concerned with dem- insurgency force. On paper the ALP merely onstrating their presence’ but were ‘not con- offered a helping hand to villagers tired cerned about the demands and needs of the of insurgency and wanting to ‘stand up for communities’. The case of Andar suggests themselves’ (Catanzaro and Windmueller that even where villagers showed a desire to 2011). The way the ALP appears to have been ‘take a stand’, international/state efforts to established in Andar, however, exposes that harness such movements were sometimes the objectives of local uprisers, themselves locally perceived not as a helping hand, but not unified, were not synonymous with as an attempt to align these efforts with international objectives. A programme that international/state security objectives with claimed to simply reinforce spontaneous which they did not identify. Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 15 of 26

However, Andar also illustrates how The Andar uprising was not as it was national and local actors were not passive portrayed internationally – the heuristic in the face of this ‘bottom-up’ international of dynamics draws attention to disparate counterinsurgency intervention, but sought understandings, internal divisions, and how to harness the ALP to agendas other than the uprising ‘narrative’ was itself contested (and often at odds with) the international leit- by different actors, including international motifs of opposing and defeating the insur- actors, vying to define it in their own pre- gency and extending state authority. While ferred terms. The Andar ALP was not inserted the ‘formal’ process of progressively incorpo- into the ‘tribal’ world evoked by the imagery rating the uprising into the ALP programme of village elders and shura decision-making, appeared quite successful, this did not sim- but a landscape in which the class of military ply replace pre-existing contestation over the entrepreneurs that emerged during decades uprising among Afghan stakeholders. Local of conflict were significant. A range of influ- ALP recruits continued to assert their inde- ential figures actively sought to manipulate pendence, one suggesting to journalists that the very attempts at negotiation and co- they had agreed to join up because of ‘the option employed by international actors to shortage of weapons and supplies to con- advance their objectives at the local level. tinue the fight’ but were ‘not like the other Around the country, wartime command- ALP units’ (Habib 2013a). By accepting exter- ers were finding ways to have their militias nal support, the uprisers risked their claim enrolled in the ALP to obtain arms, salary and to local legitimacy by allowing the Taliban backing from US forces (Felbab-Brown 2012; to portray them as being ‘in the foreigners’ see also Shirzay 2012). As a result, the ALP embrace’ (Trofimov 2013). became a means through which a range of While the ALP on paper envisaged rein- actors might obtain powerful external sup- forcing an uprising such as that in Andar, port and resources while claiming the legiti- in practice the ALP was building a new force macy of tradition, or as was the case in Andar, that soon sought to expand into additional of a popular movement. For all that the ALP villages. Violence continued to escalate invoked the power of the local on paper, in throughout 2013. By November the local practice the attempt to harness local dynam- conflict in Andar had claimed more than ics to international COIN objectives proved 300 lives ‘exceeding all the dead of the problematic. The ALP did not simply align conflict between summer 2003 and sum- with and empower local anti-Taliban mobi- mer 2012’ as well as becoming qualitatively lisation, nor did it reconfigure local dynam- worse, with opponents even denying burial ics behind international counterinsurgency to fallen adversaries (Habib 2013b). Youths objectives. Instead, as international actors engaged to fight on both sides ‘do not feel sought to advance their objectives through bound by any outside authority or rule book the programme, so too did local actors seek and their way of fighting is entrenching to harness the programme to their own hurt and anger’ (ibid). Following the wider agendas. post-2014 transition process, the support Rather than evaluating the ambiguity provided by local US SOF has been removed. of the Andar ALP in terms of the degree to Goldstein (2015) reports that the ALP in which it appeared to advance or undermine Andar has subsequently become more vul- stated counterinsurgency objectives, we sug- nerable and also less controlled, and reports gest its practices are better thought of as a accusations that ALP units in Andar engage contingent outcome of contestation dynam- in kidnappings, beatings, extortion and ics between multiple actors. Rather than extrajudicial killing ‘partly to feed them- aligning local actors with international COIN selves and partly because there is no one to objectives, the ALP in practice expresses the stop them’. disparate security interests of these actors Art. 45, page 16 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? playing out under a nominally singular ban- Taken at face value, the literature rethink- ner. Thus, the ALP’s behaviour in Andar is ing the political order of conflict-torn spaces better understood as a ‘merged’ practice, its closely parallels particular claims underpin- contribution to security or insecurity driven ning the programme. In particular, inter- by ongoing contests between actors pursu- preting Afghan history as a tale about the ing quite different security ‘objectives’. In inappropriateness of seeking to project state this sense the ALP ‘modality’ of intervention, authority into a rural periphery governed precisely because it sought to work through by ‘traditional’ authority structures is used the local, produced distinctive, apparently to depict existing international policy as messy, security outcomes. misguided and justify the turn to ‘go local’. This argument echoes broader critiques of Conclusion state fragility discourse and neo-Weberian On paper the ALP expresses COIN doctrine, state-building policy that constitute a point but in ‘going local’ it also shadows a wider of departure for the literature rethinking shift in zeitgeist. The programme might first the political order of conflict-torn spaces. appear as a logical policy conclusion from Arbakai and similar pre-existing security some of the emerging analytic research on institutions are then presented as the key to conflict-torn spaces, purportedly overcom- past success in rural security provision: the ing the unsustainability of heavy footprint government having worked with the grain counterinsurgency by recognising and har- of existing non-state security institutions nessing the latent power of Afghan culture rather than provoking conflict by seeking and traditions to achieve ‘smarter’ forms of to override such institutions. This reason- intervention. These attributes were com- ing, again, closely parallels debates in the bined to create a programme that aligned literature rethinking the political order of international counterinsurgency objectives conflict-torn spaces regarding the need to with an overwhelming local desire for secu- better understand and engage with existing rity, even during the drawdown and with- local institutions. drawal of international forces from combat The widely observed difficulties with the roles. In light of the grave problems asso- programme at first suggest that the policy ciated with the programme, the ALP may turn to ‘bottom-up’ may not simply correct then appear as a cautionary tale warning mainstream approaches but also introduce policymakers of the less palatable implica- new complications. Here we insisted on tions of ‘bottom-up’ interventions. Here, distinguishing policy advocacy from more however, we suggest that a more careful analytically-driven work since the latter, examination of the move from analysis to far from simply justifying the bottom-up intervention is needed. While highlighting policy turn, actually helps to anticipate that such policies do not simply overcome some of the difficulties. To demonstrate the problems of ‘top-down’ approaches, this analytic strength, we adopted a more but also introduce tensions and ambigui- dynamic understanding of political order as ties of their own, we emphasise the ana- an heuristic analytical lens. In the absence lytic strength of the underlying heuristic of a monopoly of force, the political order of approaches supposedly inspiring bottom- Afghanistan can be thought of as an arena up policies. Moreover, we have suggested of competition and negotiation of various such approaches enable useful insights into authorities with different security objec- the dynamics of local settings and exter- tives, degrees of influence and relationships nal interventions, and help to anticipate that vary spatially and change temporally. why the ALP, for all its emphasis on locally Depending on the specific dynamics of each appropriate forms of intervention, has still locality, the competition over the owner- proven so messy in practice. ship of the ALP resulted in a context-specific Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 17 of 26 merged practice. Hence, even though the has, to some extent, taken on a momentum of ALP on paper is described as being embed- its own as it becomes enmeshed in and rein- ded in the counterinsurgency ‘security cul- forces local conflict dynamics. The ALP never ture’, its implementation in the context of became the animal that its creators depicted the outlined dynamics make it look very dif- ‘on paper’, but its practices continue to be ferently in practice. The changing zeitgeist at least as much propelled by local dynam- regarding the political order of conflict- ics as they have been successful in harness- torn spaces and the evolving literature on ing them. Meanwhile, the ALP appears to dynamic statehood is analytically valuable have a community of supporters who see it but should not be mistaken for a new policy as a model with applicability to a range of blueprint guaranteeing legitimacy and effi- conflict-torn spaces. Here we reiterate that ciency in attempts to transform political emerging analytic work on the importance order. of dynamics in such spaces, often seen as In the case of Andar, the ALP’s contribu- the basis for ‘going local’, actually provides tion to international counterinsurgency a valuable lens for anticipating some of the objectives and to community level security supposedly unintended consequences likely was highly ambiguous. We have illustrated arising from the jump to ALP-like policies in that this ‘messiness’ in practice can be better other contexts. understood by using the literature rethink- ing the political order of conflict-torn spaces Competing Interests as an analytical framework – and not as a new The authors declare that they have no com- basis for designing international interven- peting interests. tions such as the ALP. Just as ‘neo-Weberian’ approaches are widely perceived to have sub- Acknowledgments stituted a normative-teleological idea of the Our sincere thanks go to Mary Kaldor, Sabine state for Weber’s ideal-typical analytic tool, Selchow, Anouk Rigterink, Ali Ali, Sally the ALP programme can be interpreted as Stares, David Brenner, Theowen Gilmour, demonstrating the dangers in moving from Louis-Alexandre Berg and two anonymous concepts such as hybridity for analytic pur- reviewers for their invaluable comments poses to employing them as the grounds and suggestions. We also want to express for new modalities of intervention. Using thanks to the participants at the work- this heuristic it becomes clear that although shop on the ‘Unintended Consequences the ALP claims to take seriously the power of Statebuilding Interventions’ at of local agency, this claim is undermined Queen Mary University of London in by the assumption that that power can be March 2014 and at the International harnessed and aligned with international Studies Association’s (ISA) 56th Annual objectives. The way the programme plays out Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana in reflects the outcome – to some extent unin- February 2015. Florian Weigand gratefully tended by any single actor – of processes of acknowledges the support of the Economic contestation between multiple actors – local, and Social Research Council (ESRC) (grant national and international – all vying for number ES/J500070/1). We are also ‘ownership’. grateful for the support of the Security This is not the end of the story. Despite hav- in Transition Research Programme, ing been inspired by US COIN efforts and still funded by the European Research Council being sustained by US funding, the security (ERC) (grant reference 269441) at LSE’s transition process has meant that ALP units Civil Society and Human Security receive less direct mentorship than during Research Unit, and for the opportunity to the surge period. Consequently, the ALP is contribute to the special issue on the secu- both less supported and less controlled and rity gap. Art. 45, page 18 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?

Notes as a descendant of similar initiatives 1 Referring to the wider Village Stability during the Vietnam War (Brown 2013; Operations concept with which the ALP Strandquist 2013). programme is associated (Huslander and 4 It is also necessary to note that Jones’ por- Spivey 2012; L’Etoile 2011; Robinson trait of the ‘successes’ of the Musahiban 2013). period working through local institutions 2 The term ‘neo-Weberian’ has also been (which draws on Barfield 2010: 195–225) used by Lemay-Hébert (2013) to con- is a rosier portrait than other scholars vey the need to distinguish Weber’s might allow. ideas from those of later scholars who invoke Weber but simplify or modify References his ideas. Aikins, M 2014 A US-backed militia runs 3 Goodhand and Hakimi (2014), Hakimi amok in Afghanistan. al Jazeera Amer- (2013) and Hakimi (2014) point to this ica, 23 July. Available at http://america. parallel but develop their arguments in aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/23/ relation to the colonial parallels of the exclusive-a-killinginandar.html [Last ALP (see also Belcher 2015; Martin 2009). accessed 19 June 2015]. We do not, however, suggest that the pro- Belcher, O 2015 Tribal militias, neo- gramme drew direct inspiration from the orientalism, and the US military’s art work of Boege et al or Menkhaus. In light of coercion. In: Bachmann, J, Bell, C & of self-conscious efforts to make social Holmqvist, C (Eds.) War, Police and science serve US military objectives in Assemblages of Intervention. Abingdon: Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly associ- Routledge, pp. 109–125. ated with McFate, it seems possible ideas Bell, C 2012 Insurgency and the Allegory from this body of literature may have of Medical Intervention: Why Meta- been assimilated during the development phors Matter. Forum on the Interna- of the ALP. Our argument is that focus- tional Political Sociology of Health ing solely on the ALP neglects its clear and Medicine. International Politi- resonance in broader trends depicted cal Sociology, 6(1). DOI: http://dx.doi. above. The programme also has other org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2012.00166_5.x lineages, both in the SOF/CIA oust- Bierschenk, T and Olivier de Sardan, J-P ing of the Taliban (Shankur 2013) and 1997 Local Powers and a Distant State subsequent militia experiments (Clark in Rural Central African Republic. Jour- 2013; Mazetti and Filikins 2010), and in nal of Modern African Studies, 35(3): earlier programmes such as the Afghan 441–68. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Afghan S0022278X97002504 Social Outreach Program, Community Boege, V et al 2008 On Hybrid Political Defense Forces, Community Defense Orders and Emerging States: State Forma- Initiative (CDI) (which was replaced by tion in the context of ‘Fragility’. Berghoff Local Defense Initiative (LDI)), Interim Handbook Dialogue, No. 8. Security for Critical Infrastructure units, Boege, V et al 2009a Hybrid Political and Afghan Public Protection Force Orders, Not Fragile States. Peace Review, Program (AP3) (Goodhand and Hakimi 21(1): 13–21. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 2014: 10–13; Jones 2012; Lefèvre 2010; 10.1080/10402650802689997 Perito 2009; Saum-Manning 2012). Both Borger, J 2012 US reliance on Afghan para- the National Directorate of Security and militaries in rural areas worries Euro- the Ministry of Interior have also estab- pean allies. The Guardian, 8 January. lished local self-defence units (Felbab- Available at http://www.theguardian. Brown 2012). The ALP is also widely seen com/world/2012/jan/08/afghan-local- Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 19 of 26

police-us-europe [Last accessed 19 June at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/ 2015]. 1230_Report_final.pdf [Last accessed Brown, M L 2013 Village Stability Operations: 19 June 2015]. An Historical Perspective from Vietnam DeYoung, K and Chandrasekaran, R 2010 to Afghanistan. Small Wars Journal, 9(3). Afghan President Karzai approves plan Available at http://smallwarsjournal. for local defense forces. Washington com/jrnl/art/village-stability-operations- Post, 15 July. Available at http://www. an-historical-perspective-from-vietnam- washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con- to-afghanistan [Last accessed 19 June tent/article/2010/07/14/AR2010071 2015]. 406007.html [Last accessed 19 June Call, C T 2010 Beyond the ‘failed state’: 2015]. Toward conceptual alternatives. Euro- Doornbos, M 2010 Researching African pean Journal of International Relations, Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and its 17(2): 303–326. DOI: http://dx.doi. Limits. Development and Change, 41(4): org/10.177/1354066109353137 747–69. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ Catanzaro, B and Windmueller, K 2011 j.1467-7660.2010.01650.x Taking a Stand: Village Stability Opera- Economist 2012 The Worm Turns: Villag- tions and the Afghan Local Police. Special ers take the counterinsurgency into their Warfare, 24(3): 32–34. own hands. The Economist, 18 August. Chayes, S 2011 Buried Mines in Afghani- Available at http://www.economist.com/ stan. Carnegie Endowment for Inter- node/21560606 [Last accessed 19 June national Peace. Available at http:// 2015]. carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/26/ Englebert, P and Tull, D 2008 Postconflict buried-mines-in-afghanistan/dno1 [Last Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas accessed 19 June 2015]. about Failed States. International Security, Chivers, C J 2011 In Eastern Afghani- 32(4): 106–139. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ stan, At War With the Taliban’s Shad- 10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.106 owy Rule. The New York Times, Feb. 6. Farmer, B 2012 Armed uprising against Available at http://www.nytimes.com/ Taliban forces insurgents from 50 2011/02/07/world/asia/07taliban. Afghan villages. The Daily Telegraph, html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [Last accessed 14 August. Available at http://www. 19 June 2015]. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/ Clark, K 2013 What Exactly is the CIA doing afghanistan/9475141/Armed-uprising- in Afghanistan? Proxy Militias and two against-Taliban-forces-insurgents-from- airstrikes in Kunar. Afghan Analysts 50-Afghan-villages.html [Last accessed Network. Available at: http://www. 19 June 2015]. afghanistan-analysts.org/what-exactly- Felbab-Brown, V 2012 Afghanistan Trip is-the-cia-doing-in-afghanistan-proxy- Report V: The Afghan Local Police: “It’s militias-and-two-airstrikes-in-kunar [Last Local, So It Must Be Good” – Or Is It? accessed 19 June 2015]. Brookings Foreign Policy Trip Reports, No. Department of Defense 2011 Report on 26. Available at http://www.brookings. Progress Towards Security and Stability in edu/research/opinions/2012/05/09- Afghanistan (October). Available at http:// afghan-police-felbabbrown [Last accessed www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_ 19 June 2015]. 2011_Section_1230_Report.pdf [Last Felbab-Brown, V 2013 Aspiration and accessed 19 June 2015]. Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Department of Defense 2012 Report on Counterinsurgency and Statebuilding in Progress Towards Security and Stability Afghanistan. Washington DC: Brookings in Afghanistan (December). Available Institution Press. PMid: 21852092. Art. 45, page 20 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?

Fishstein, P and Wilder, A 2012 Winning http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relation- PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias- ship between Aid and Security in Afghani- and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf stan. Tufts: Feinstein. Available at http:// [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. fic.tufts.edu/assets/WinningHearts- Habib, E 2012a AAN Reportage: Who fights Final.pdf [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. whom in the Andar Uprising? Afghani- Foschini, F 2012 The Battle for Schools in stan Analysts Network, 10 August. Avail- Ghazni – or, Schools as a Battlefield. able at http://www.afghanistan-analysts. Afghanistan Analysts Network, 3 July. Avail- org/aan-reportage-who-fights-whom- able at https://www.afghanistan-analysts. in-the-andar-uprising/ [Last accessed org/the-battle-for-schools-in-ghazni- 19 June 2015]. or-schools-as-a-battlefield/ [Last accessed Habib, E 2012b AAN Reportage (2): The 19 June 2015]. Andar Uprising – Has the Tide Already Friedrichs, J 2010 The privatization of force Turned? Afghanistan Analysts Network, and its consequences – Unintended 3 September. Available at https://www. but not unpredictable. In: Daase, C & afghanistan-analysts.org/aan-reportage- Friesendorf, C (Eds.) Rethinking Secu- 2-the-andar-uprising-has-the-tide- rity Governance: The Problem of Unin- already-turned/ [Last accessed 19 June tended Consequences. London/New York: 2015]. Routledge. Habib, E 2012c Guest Blog: The Andar Giustozzi, A and Ibrahimi, N 2012 Uprising – Co-opted, divided and stuck in Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti- a dilemma. Afghanistan Analysts Network, Government Mobilisation in Afghani- 30 October. Available at https://www. stan, 1978–2011. Kabul: Afghanistan afghanistan-analysts.org/guest-blog- Research and Evaluation Unit. Avail- the-andar-uprising-co-opted-divided- able at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/ and-stuck-in-a-dilemma/ [Last accessed EditionPdfs/1203EDrivers%20of%20Con- 19 June 2015]. flict%20IP%202012.pdf [Last accessed 19 Habib, E 2013a The Morphing of the June 2015]. PMCid: PMC3473931. Andar Uprising: transition to Afghan Giustozzi, A and Ullah, N 2006 “Tribes” Local Police. Afghanistan Analysts Net- and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, work, 2 April. Available at https://www. 1980–2005. Crisis States Research Centre afghanistan-analysts.org/the-morphing- Working Paper Series 2, No. 7. Available of-the-andar-uprising-transition-to- at http://www.lse.ac.uk/international afghan-local-police/ [Last accessed 19 June Development/research/crisisStates/ 2015]. download/wp/wpSeries2/wp72.pdf Habib, E 2013b Killing Mullahs and Wedding [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Guests, Banning Last Rites: the worsen- Goldstein, J 2015 Afghan Militia Leaders, ing Andar Conflict. Afghanistan Analysts Empowered by U.S. to Fight Taliban, Network, 6 November. Available at Inspire Fear in Villages. New York Times, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ 17 March. Available at http://www. killing-mullahs-and-wedding-guests- nytimes.com/2015/03/18/world/asia/ banning-last-rites-the-worsening- afghan-militia-leaders-empowered-by-us- andar-conflict/ [Last accessed 19 June to-fight-taliban-inspire-fear-in-villages. 2015]. html?_r=0 [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Hagmann, T and Hoehne, M V 2009 Fail- Goodhand, J and Hakimi, A 2014 Counter- ures of the State Failure Debate: Evidence insurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuild- from the Somali Territories. Journal of ing in Afghanistan. United States Institute International Development, 21: 42–57. for Peace: Peaceworks, No. 90. Available at DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1482 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 21 of 26

Hagmann, T and Péclard, D 2010 Negotiating Huslander, R and Spivey, J 2012 Village Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domi- Stability Operations and Afghan Local nation in Africa. Development and Change, Police. Prism, 3(3): 125–138. Available at 41(4): 539–562. DOI: http://dx.doi. http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/ org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01656.x prism125-138_hulslander-spivey.pdf Hagmann, T and Péclard, D (Ed.) 2011 [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of International Crisis Group (ICG) 2015 The Power and Domination in Africa. Sussex: Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Wiley-Blackwell. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ Report, No. 268. Available at http://www. 10.1002/9781444395587 crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/ Hakimi, A 2013 Getting savages to fight bar- south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of- barians: counterinsurgency and the remak- the-afghan-local-police.pdf [Last accessed ing of Afghanistan. Central Asian Survey, 19 June 2015]. 32(3): 388–405. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ Ives, J 2013 Back to Basics: Reenergis- 10.1080/02634937.2013.843300 ing Intelligence Operations Small Wars Hakimi, A 2014 Fetishizing “Culture”: Journal, 9(1). Available at: http://small- Local Militias and Counterinsurgency warsjournal.com/printpdf/13679 [Last in Afghanistan. Open Democracy, 24 accessed 19 June 2015]. January. Available at http://www.open- Jones, S G 2009a Going Local: The Key to democracy.net/aziz-hakimi/fetishizing- Afghanistan. The Wall Street Journal, %E2%80%9Cculture%E2%80%9D- 7 August 2009. Available at http://www. local-militias-and-counterinsurgency- wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702 in-afghanistan [Last accessed 19 June 04908604574336402390524212 [Last 2015]. accessed 19 June 2015]. Hanlin, R 2011 One Team’s Approach to Village Jones, S G 2009b In the Graveyard of Empires: Stability Operations. Small Wars Journal, America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: 7(9). Available at http://smallwarsjournal. Norton & Co. com/jrnl/art/one-team%E2%80%99s- Jones, S G 2010b Stabilization from the Bot- approach-to-village-stability-operations tom Up. Testimony presented before the [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Commission on Wartime Contracting, Harpviken, K B 2012 Warlordism: three 5 February. Available at http://www. biographies­ from southeastern Afghani- rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ stan. In: Suhrke, A & Berdal, M (Eds.) The testimonies/2010/RAND_CT340.pdf Peace In Between: Post-War Violence and [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Peacebuilding. London: Routledge, pp. Jones, S G 2012 The Strategic Logic of Mili- 173–191. tia. RAND Working Paper. Available at Hughes, C and Pupavac, V 2005 Fram- http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ ing Post-Conflict Societies: International rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/ Pathologisation of Cambodia and the RAND_WR913.pdf [Last accessed 19 June Post-Yugoslav States. Third World Quar- 2015]. terly, 26(6): 873–889. DOI: http://dx.doi. Jones, S G and Muñoz, A 2010 Afghani- org/10.1080/01436590500089232 stan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2011 “Just Forces. RAND Corporation. Available at: Don’t Call it a Militia” – Impunity, Mili- http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ tias, and the Afghan Local Police. Human rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_ Rights Watch. Available at http://www. MG1002.pdf [Last accessed 19 June hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 2015]. afghanistan0911webwcover_0.pdf [Last Kaldor, M and Selchow, S 2015 From accessed 19 June 2015]. Military to ‘Security Interventions’: An Art. 45, page 22 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?

Alternative Approach to Contemporary Routledge Studies in Intervention and Interventions. Stability: International Jour- Statebuilding, Routledge, pp. 3–14. nal of Security & Development, 4(1): 1–12. Lubold, G 2012 Are We Winning in Afghani- DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.fu stan? An Interview with Gen. John Allen, Kaplan, S 2010 Rethinking State-building commander of America’s Forgotten War. in a Failed State. The Washington Quar- Foreign Policy, 5 September. Available at terly 33(1): 81–97. DOI: http://dx.doi. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/05/ org/10.1080/01636600903418710 are-we-winning-in-afghanistan/ [Last Karokhail, M and Schmeidl, S 2006 Inte- accessed 19 June 2015]. gration of traditional structures into the Manea, O 2014 Village Stability Operations state-building process: lessons from the and the Future of the American Way of Tribal Liaison Office in Loya Paktia. In: Pub- War (Interview with Linda Robinson). lication Series on Promoting Democracy in Small Wars Journal, 6 February. Avail- Fragile States under Conditions of State able at http://smallwarsjournal.com/ Fragility (Afghanistan), No. 1. Berlin: Hein- jrnl/art/village-stability-operations- rich Böll Foundation: pp. 59–78. Available and-the-future-of-the-american-way-of- at http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/ war?page=1 [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. user_upload/Media/Publications/Jour- Martin, K 2009 The Danger of Tribal Militias nals_Articles/Publications_by_staff/ in Afghanistan: Learning from the British Karokhail__Masood__Integration_of_ Empire. Journal of International Affairs, Traditional_Structures_English.pdf [Last 63(1): 157–174. accessed 19 June 2015]. Mashal, M 2011 Rogue militias abuse Kelsall, T 2008 Going with the Grain in Afri- rural Afghans. Al Jazeera English, 12 can development? Power and politics January. Available at http://www. in Africa. Discussion Paper, No. 1. Over- aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/ seas Development Institute. Available at 01/201111114112880358.html [Last http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/ accessed 19 June 2015]. files/odi-assets/publications-opinion- Mazetti, M and Filikins, D 2010 US Military files/3284.pdf [Last accessed 19 June Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan. New 2015]. York Times, 20 December. Available at L’Etoile, J A 2011 Transforming the Conflict http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/ in Afghanistan: Village Stability Opera- world/asia/21intel.html?_r=2& [Last tions/Afghan Local Police and Bottom- accessed 19 June 2015]. up Population Mobilization. Prism, 2(4): Meagher, K 2012 The Strength of Weak 3–16. Available at http://cco.dodlive. States? Non-State Security Forces and mil/files/2014/02/Prism_3-16_LEtoile. Hybrid Governance in Africa. Develop- pdf [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. ment and Change, 43(5): 1073–1101. DOI: Lefèvre, M 2010 Local Defence in Afghani- http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660. stan: A review of government-backed ini- 2012.01794.x tiatives. AAN Thematic Report. Available at Menkhaus, K 2006/7 Governance without https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State publication/aan-papers/local-defence- Building, and the Politics of Coping. Interna- in-afghanistan-a-review-of-government- tional Security, 31(3): 74–106. DOI: http:// backed-initiatives/ [Last accessed 19 June dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74 2015]. Mielke, K, Schetter, C and Wilde, A 2011 Lemay-Hébert, N 2013 Rethinking Webe- Dimensions of Social Order: Empirical rian Approaches to Statebuilding. In: Fact, Analytical Framework and Bound- Chandler, D & Sisk, T (Eds.) Routledge ary Concept. ZEF Working Paper Series Handbook of International Statebuilding. 78. ZEF: University of Bonn. Available at Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 23 of 26

http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefpor- 2013/04/05/the-afghan-local-police- tal/Publications/wp78.pdf [Last accessed and-the-u-s-exit-strategy-paying-village- 19 June 2015]. militias/ [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Migdal, J S and Schlichte, K 2005 Rethink- Pessin, A 2010 Pentagon Defends Afghan ing the State. In: Schlichte, K (Ed.) The Local Police Plan. VOA News, 13 July. Dynamics of States – The Formation and Available at http://www.voanews.com/ Crises of State Domination. Aldershot/ content/pentagon-defends-afghan-local- Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 1–40. police-plan-98459414/166022.html Moreau, R 2012 How the Taliban Drove [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Afghan Villagers to Rise Up Against Them. Peter, T A 2012 Locals turn against Taliban Newsweek, 25 June. Available at http:// in eastern Afghanistan. Christian Science www.newsweek.com/how-taliban-drove- Monitor. Available at http://www.csmon- afghan-villagers-rise-against-them-65081 itor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/ [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. 2012/0604/Locals-turn-against-Taliban- NATO 2012 Afghan National Security Forces in-eastern-Afghanistan [Last accessed (ANSF): Training and Development. 19 June 2015]. Available at http://www.nato.int/nato_ Radin, C J 2011 Afghan Local Police Remain static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_12/20121205_ Key to Coalition Strategy, Threat Matrix. 121205-ansf-backgrounder-en.pdf [Last Long War Journal. Available at http://www. accessed 19 June 2015]. longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/ Noelle-Karimi, C 2006 Village institutions afghan_local_police_important.php [Last in the perception of national and inter- accessed 19 June 2015]. national actors in Afghanistan. ZEF Work- Raeymaekers, T, Menkhaus, K and Vlas- ing Paper Series, No. 65. ZEF: University senroot, K 2008 State and non-state of Bonn. Available at http://www.zef. regulation in African protracted crises: de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/ governance without government? Afrika projects/amudarya/publications/ZEF_ Focus, 21(2): 7–21. Working_Paper_Amu_Darya_Series_26. Rangelov, I and Theros, M 2012 Abuse of pdf [Last accessed 8 July 2015]. Power and Conflict Persistence in Afghan- Noelle-Karimi, C 2013 Jirga, Shura and istan. Conflict, Security and Development, Community Development Councils: 12(3): 227–248. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ Village Institutions and State Interfer- 10.1080/14678802.2012.703533 ence. In: Schetter, C (Ed.) Local Politics in Rector, D 2012 Afghan Local Police: An Afghanistan. A Century of Intervention in Afghan Solution to an Afghan Problem. the Social Order. London/New York: Hurst Small Wars Journal, 8(1). Available at and Oxford University Press. pp, 39–58. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof: afghan-local-police-an-afghan-solution- oso/9780199327928.003.0003 to-an-afghan-problem [Last accessed 19 Noori, R 2015 ALP Performance Receives June 2015]. Mixed Reviews From MPs, Analysts. Tolo Reuter, C and Younus, B 2009 The Return News, 6 July. Available at http://www. of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni. tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20336- In: Giustozzi, A (Ed.) Decoding the New alp-performance-receives-mixed-reviews- Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. from-mps-analysts [Last accessed 8 July London: Hurst, pp. 109–118. 2015]. Robinson, L 2013 One Hundred Victories: Norris, J 2013 The Afghan Local Police Special Ops and the Future of American and the U.S. exit strategy: Paying vil- Warfare. New York: Perseus. lage militias. Foreign Policy Association. Rotberg, R 2004 The Failure and Collapse of Available at http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/ Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Art. 45, page 24 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?

Repair. In: Rotberg, R (Ed.) When States Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen­ , Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton: 7(3): 359–384. Princeton University Press, pp. 1–45. Schmeidl, S 2009 Not all hybrid structures Rubin, A 2010 Afghans to Form Local Forces are created equal: Some thoughts on to Fight Taliban. New York Times, 14 July. bottom-up peacebuilding, Open Democ- Available at http://www.nytimes.com/ racy, December. Available at https://www. 2010/07/15/world/asia/15afghan.html opendemocracy.net/susanne-schmeidl/ [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. not-all-hybrid-structures-are-created- Rubin, A and Rosenberg, M 2012 Ragtag equal-some-thoughts-on-bottom-up- Revolts in Parts of Afghanistan Repel peacebuildin [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Taliban. New York Times, 25 August. Schmeidl, S and Karokhail, M 2009a The Available at http://www.nytimes. Role of Non-State Actors in ‘Community- com/2012/08/26/world/asia/ragtag- Based Policing’- an Exploration of the revolts-in-parts-of-afghanistan-repel-tal- Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern iban.html [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Afghanistan. Contemporary Security Ruttig, T 2013 International Engagement: Policy, 30(2): 318–342. DOI: http://dx. Some Things Got Better – How Much doi.org/10.1080/13523260903060193 Got Good? A Review of 12 Years of Inter- Schmeidl, S and Karokhail, M 2009b Prêt- national Intervention in Afghanistan. a-Porter States: How The McDonaldiza- Afghanistan Analysts Network. Available tion of State-Building Misses the Mark at http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ in Afghanistan. Berghoff Handbook, some-things-got-better-how-much-got- 8: 67–78. Available at http://www. good-a-short-review-of-12-years-of-inter- berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/ national-intervention-in-afghanistan/ redaktion/Publications/Handbook/ [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue8_schmeidl_ Sarfraz, A M and Norland, R 2012 Afghans karokhail_comm.pdf [Last accessed Protest Vengeful Militias. The New York 19 June 2015]. Times, 2 September. Available at http:// Shanker, T 2013 Applying Early Lessons www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/world/ to Build Afghan Security’. The New York asia/afghan-villagers-protest-vengeful- Times, 20 May. Available at: http://www. militias.html [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. nytimes.com/2013/05/21/world/asia/ Saum-Manning, L 2012 VSO/ALP: Com- applying-early-lessons-to-build-afghan- paring Past and Current Challenges to security.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0 [Last Afghan Local Defense. RAND Corpora- accessed 19 June 2015]. tion Working Paper, WR-936. Available Shirzay, R 2012 Favoring Warlords: Afghan at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ Local Police. Small Wars Journal, 8(5). rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/ Available at http://smallwarsjournal. RAND_WR936.pdf [Last accessed 19 June com/printpdf/12635 [Last accessed 2015]. 19 June 2015]. Schetter, C 2013 Introduction. In: Schetter, C Smith, G 2015 U.S.-funded Afghan police (Ed.) Local Politics in Afghanistan. A prey on those they’re paid to protect. Reu- Century of Intervention in the Social ters, 10 June. Available at http://blogs. Order. London/New York: Hurst and reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/10/ Oxford University Press. DOI: http:// u-s-funded-afghan-police-prey-on-those- dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ theyre-paid-to-protect/ [Last accessed 19 9780199327928.001.0001 June 2015]. Schlichte, K and Wilke, B 2000 Der Special Investigator General for Afghani- Staat und einige seiner Zeitgenossen. stan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 2014 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Art. 45, page 25 of 26

December 2014 Quarterly Report to the Ucko, D 2013 Beyond Clear-Hold-Build: United States Congress. Available at http:// Rethinking Local-Level Counterinsur- www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015- gency after Afghanistan. Contemporary 01-30qr.pdf [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Security Policy, 34(3): 526–551, DOI: Stancati, M 2014 Left Unmoored, Afghan http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.20 Local Police Pose New Risk. Wall Street 13.839258 Journal, 24 March. Available at http:// U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps 2006 www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052 Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24, MCWP 702304679404579459270523670760 3–33.5. Available at https://fas.org/irp/ [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf [Last accessed Stevens, M 2011 Community Defence in 19 June 2015]. Afghanistan: A Model for Future Stabili- Weigand, F 2015 Investigating the sation? RUSI Journal, 156(3): 42–47. DOI: Role of Legitimacy in the Political http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847. Order of Conflict-torn Spaces, Secu- 2011.591089 rity in Transition Working Paper Strandquist, J 2013 Local defence forces 04/15. Available online http:// and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: www.securityintransition.org/wp- learning from the CIA’s Village Defense content/uploads/2015/04/Legitimacy- Program in South Vietnam Small Wars & in-the-Political-Order-of-Conflict-torn- Insur­gencies, 26(1): 90–113. DOI: http:// Spaces.pdf [Last accessed 19 June 2015] dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.959 Wilde, A and Mielke, K 2013 Order, sta- 772 bility, and change in Afghanistan: from Suhrke, A 2007 Reconstruction as mod- top-down to bottom-up state-making. ernisation: the ‘post-conflict’ project in Central Asian Survey, 32(3): 353–370. Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly, 28(7): DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026349 1291–1308. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 37.2013.843309 10.1080/01436590701547053 Yoshikawa, L and Pennington, M Suhrke, A 2011 When More is Less – The 2011 Afghanistan: Responsible US International Project in Afghanistan. New Transition Must Address Displace- York: Columbia University Press. PMid: ment Crisis. Refugees International, 28 21914765; PMCid: PMC3172323. June. Available at http://refugeesin- Tariq, M O 2008 The Tribal Security System ternational.org/sites/default/files/ (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan. Crisis 062811_Afghanistan_Responsible_ States Research Centre Occasional Papers, US_Transition%202.pdf [Last accessed No. 7. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 19 June 2015]. internationalDevelopment/research/ Yousafzai, S and Moreau, R 2013 Afghani- crisisStates/download/op/OP7Tariq.pdf stan’s Rape Crisis: Villagers Fear U.S.- [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. backed Militias. The Daily Beast, 22 May. Tariq, M O 2009 Community-based Security Available at http://www.thedailybeast. and Justice: Arbakai in Afghanistan. IDS com/articles/2013/05/22/afghanistan- Bulletin, 40(2): 20–27. DOI: http://dx.doi. s-rape-crisis-villagers-fear-u-s-backed-mili- org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2009.00018.x tias.html [Last accessed 19 June 2015]. Art. 45, page 26 of 26 Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?

How to cite this article: Vincent, S, Weigand, F and Hakimi, H 2015 The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap? Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 45, pp. 1–26, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gg

Published: 07 September 2015

Copyright: © 2015 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.

Stability: International Journal of Security & Development is a

peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press. OPEN ACCESS