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Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Wall is breached in Hyderabad, Afghanistan, as part of Operation Riverdance, helping villagers defend against Taliban attacks U.S. Air Force (Rasheen A. Douglas) Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police BY ROBERT HULSLANDER AND JAKE SPIVEY his article examines the security and stability programs known as Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP). Created through the combined efforts T of the U.S. military, other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and the Afghan government, VSO/ALP enhanced security, governance, and development in strategically impor- tant rural areas critical to the Afghanistan campaign but beyond the effective reach of the Afghan government and U.S. conventional forces. VSO/ALP attempts to link and effectively balance centralized and decentralized authority by bolstering traditional governance mechanisms. The Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey are Military Analysts in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division of the Joint Staff. PRISM 3, no. 3 FROM THE FIELD | 125 HUlslaNDER & SPIVEY program was designed to mitigate shortcom- Background ings in Afghan governance and security capac- The VSO/ALP program was created ity and capability, while “buying time” for those through the collective efforts of Combined capabilities to mature. Although the program’s Forces Special Operations Component official inception was in August 2010, its roots Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), go back to earlier efforts that served as the basis Combined Joint Special Operations Task of the current initiative. Ultimately, VSO/ALP Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), U.S. Forces– aims to provide a framework through which the Afghanistan (USFOR-A), other U.S. depart- Afghan government can strengthen its rela- ments and agencies, and the Afghan govern- tionship with its citizens and wrest control and ment. For a number of reasons, CFSOCC-A has influence away from the Taliban, other insur- the lead for the VSO/ALP mission and serves gents, and criminal networks. as the executive agent for its implementation. First, while VSO/ALP is a task that may while VSO/ALP is a task that may not not be defined as unconventional warfare, it be defined as unconventional warfare, is clearly an unconventional approach that is it is clearly an unconventional approach within the traditional purview of special opera- tions forces (SOF). Second, CFSOCC-A can that is within the traditional purview of be viewed as a strategic headquarters for SOF in special operations forces Afghanistan. Its proximity to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters Evidence suggests that VSO/ALP has had in Kabul facilitates close collaboration with positive effects; however, there are challenges the ISAF commander and ensures a consistent related to the future of U.S. involvement in vision between the two headquarters relative Afghanistan and with the program post-2014. to campaign plan goals and objectives. Third, Among these challenges are the emerging CFSOCC-A drew on historical lessons and requirement for conventional forces to studies of other similar initiatives conducted conduct highly nuanced foreign internal elsewhere, the majority of which were FID mis- defense (FID) missions (such as VSO/ALP), sions containing elements of unconventional for which they are mostly untrained and warfare conducted by SOF. VSO/ALP has its unprepared; continued assistance to the roots in earlier, rural Afghanistan initiatives Afghan government that emphasizes building undertaken by SOF and/or CJSOTF-A long its credibility and popular support with the before the program was jointly approved and people; and ensuring U.S. organizations that officially sanctioned by the Afghan government. remain in Afghanistan as part of a post-2014 As early as 2005, well before the establishment theater security cooperation agreement are of CFSOCC-A, CJSOTF-A undertook initia- appropriately structured to leverage the tives in Uruzgan Province aimed at strengthen- expertise and collaboration built through ing local community efforts to resist the Taliban VSO/ALP relationships. This article offers and tie those efforts to aspects of governance an opportunity to examine the value of VSO/ and economic development. However, lack- ALP as a component of the overall strategy ing adequate support, those efforts were unsus- in Afghanistan. tainable. With the return in 2006 and 2007 of 126 | FROM THE FIELD PRISM 3, no. 3 VillaGE STabiliTY OPERATIONS AND AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE former CJSOTF-A leaders, the concept was The SOF community recognized the need for a revitalized. One officer described the process: higher level headquarters that could better align its strategic efforts with ISAF and the Afghan We established the Afghan Auxiliary government. Such a construct would eventually Police program with [Dutch army general become a reality in late 2008 with the establish- officer, ISAF commander in Southern ment of CFSOCC-A in Kabul. Afghanistan] blessing. Tribal elders, Brigadier General Edward Reeder, USA, police chiefs and the [Kandahar governor] the first commander of CFSOCC-A and a pre- worked with us to vet these folks. The vious commander of CJSOTF-A, organized the CJSOTF-A commander at that time . new headquarters to support the ISAF com- helped us lobby for support. We worked mander and ISAF Joint Command commander with the governor . to build line min- in order to nest SOF activities into the ISAF isterial capacities and [U.S. Agency for counterinsurgency strategy and ISAF Joint International Development] embedded Command operational plan. CFSOCC-A was in our headquarters to marry development appropriately positioned to provide expertise at the local level with security we were to ISAF and the Afghan government on imple- creating by our guys living and operating mentation of what would eventually become in these remote areas. We integrated [the VSO/ALP. CFSOCC-A would also provide Department of State] into the effort to strategic guidance and greatly enhanced support assist in influencing governance appoint- to CJSOTF-A operational/tactical activities. ments at the district and provincial level. Capitalizing on this new organization and [The CJSOTF-A battalion commander] building on previous CJSOTF-A experience, leveraged influence with the [North the Afghan Public Protection Program, a pre- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cursor to VSO/ALP, was initiated in Wardak and U.S.] chains of command accordingly Province to counter Taliban control. Owing and we were able to get additional inter- to the inability of the Afghan government or agency funding for the effort. But ISAF to provide security for remote villages and again, lacking a viable collective-governing districts, local defense forces were established strategy country-wide, and because every- under the Afghan Public Protection Program one in Kabul remained focused on a top- that sought to emulate historically recognized, down approach, it ultimately fell apart.1 autonomous approaches to security: These and other early initiatives were led Zahir Shah (~1948–1978) supported vil- by CJSOTF-A, at the time the highest level lage-level defense forces called “arbakai” SOF headquarters for such missions. CJSOTF-A to establish order in eastern Afghanistan. is an O6-level command located in Bagram; These village-level forces were used for ISAF headquarters, the U.S. Embassy, and defensive purposes and organized under Afghan government ministries are all located the auspices of legitimate tribal institu- in Kabul. The lack of a strategic-level SOF tions. But, the result was clear: law and headquarters in Kabul was at least one factor order were established by locals, not the why early VSO-like efforts were unsustainable. central government.2 PRISM 3, no. 3 FROM THE FIELD | 127 HUlslaNDER & SPIVEY The first of these defense forces had been criminal and insurgent repression. According established under the auspices of malik (local to Shahmahmood Miakhel, “Historically, strongmen). Traditional tribal leadership that Afghanistan had always had a weak central gov- had provided direction and control of the his- ernment but it has developed a strong district torically viable arbakai was badly damaged by level structure. In the past, successful central rul- years of violence and intimidation or in some ers have worked with tribal and religious leaders cases was nonexistent. The result was a general to achieve balance through compromise.”3 lack of integrity and accountability to both These program refinements were occurring local communities and the central government. when Brigadier General Austin “Scott” Miller, Ultimately, a construct had to be devel- USA, assumed command of CFSOCC-A oped that placed the central government in in early 2010. Under his auspices, the pro- the forefront, while taking into account the gram continued to evolve, yet it was still not culture and traditions of the Afghan people. officially sanctioned by the Afghan govern- General Reeder challenged his staff to design a ment. Working with then ISAF Commander program that would reflect a range of historical General Stanley McChrystal, the Afghan lessons and the unique context of Afghanistan. Public Protection Force–Village Stability pro- Largely influenced by Seth Jones, the result was gram concept was approved. In the following the Community Defense Initiative, later known months, in consultation with Afghan govern- as the Local Defense Initiative. ment officials and with the support of the new ISAF commander, General David Petraeus,
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