TLO-Policy Brief 1/2012 May 2012 Missing in Transition? Why a focus on military hand-over alone misses the point in Loya Paktia Summary 1 Introduction In July 2011, ISAF officially handed over Despite notable capacity improvements, the seven areas to Afghan National Security Afghan National Security Forces are a Forces,1 beginning a process to gradually politically and socially fragmented force. The transition all security responsibility from existing transition strategy focuses too much 2 on military capacity building but neglects international to Afghan leadership. internal political divisions. A successful Twenty areas have now been formally transition in Loya Paktia will require a transitioned to the Afghan National strategy to address these divisions. Security Force, which is, “part of the Afghan National Security Forces have unfolding plan for all NATO combat troops demonstrated the ability to contribute to to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.”3 holding territory where they are already supported, but they have shown Drawing on The Liaison Office’s experience considerable weakness in gaining support in in the Loya Paktia (the region comprising 4 insurgent strongholds. Transition of security Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces), this responsibility will empower networks already paper examines the shortcomings of a entrenched in the Afghan government and is transition strategy that focuses almost more likely to lead to a direct stalemate exclusively on security, while ignoring rather than an expansion of the important social and political factors that government’s reach. could undermine the strategy. This logic extends to initiatives such as the Afghan Local Police which is mainly After providing an overview of the status successful in areas where the local balance of of the different Afghan National Security power is already in favour of the Afghan Forces in Loya Paktia, the paper argues government. that while these forces can successfully maintain security in areas where the insurgency is already weakened, they are unable to establish, maintain, and expand The Liaison Office is grateful to funding provided by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung to the government’s control over areas where its’ programmes in Paktia and Nangarhar. insurgents are deeply entrenched. www.boell-afghanistan.org It goes on to argue that simply increasing will be able to hold the territory and stop the number of Afghan National Security the expansion of the insurgency without Forces and boosting capacity through the continued ISAF support, particularly in light provision of equipment and training will of the continued strength of the not produce security forces capable of insurgency.7 Indeed, the year 2011 was providing stability. Successful transition the most violent in Afghanistan since 2001, instead requires a broader focus that with a 39% increase in violent incidents in equally recognizes and seeks to address the first eight months of 2011 over the the serious political divides that currently same period in 2010.8 Despite the increase plague the Afghan National Security in violent incidents, an accelerated Forces. drawdown of international forces was announced in June 2011. These imbalances are evident in Loya Paktia where local Pashtun residents As a result, Afghan National Security consider the Afghan National Security Forces will now need to expand their range Forces to be dominated by political of operations to include the “Clear” phase networks. Residents feel excluded from (i.e. recapturing territory from the security forces whose leadership is insurgency) while simultaneously disproportionately comprised of former improving their ability to execute the ruling communist party members (the “Hold” phase (i.e. ensuring territory stays People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan), under government control). former Northern Alliance/United Front5 In order to support Afghan National members, and a handful of pro- Security Forces in this goal, General government tribes. The absence of local Petraeus, former ISAF Commander in Pashtun leadership contributes to the Afghanistan, refocused the international general under-representation of local military strategy, noting: Pashtuns in the security forces. A greater focus on addressing these shortcomings is “The campaign will not be as intensive a fight for every village… but will rest fundamental to ensuring that Afghan largely on the buildup of Afghan Army National Security Forces are able to and police forces to guard the border, provide stability throughout Afghanistan. block infiltration routes, and strengthen communities and local government.”9 2 Changing of the Guard To realize this strategy an overall increase in the number of soldiers (171,600) and ISAF has emphasized that transition police (134,000) was approved.10 Further, demands a level of security that would an increased focus has been placed on allow "the population to pursue routine training and assisting Afghan National 6 daily activities.” However, few expect that Security Forces. the insurgency will be defeated by 2014 and that Afghan National Security Forces TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 2 This transition strategy, however, neglects Afghan National Army face threats and the significant divisions within the Afghan social pressure. As a result, the army does government and its security forces as well not reflect the general population but as the schism between the government mirrors the larger political divisions of the and many communities in Loya Paktia. This country (see Section 4). requires a re-examination of the current The Afghan National Army has strategy to better reflect the strengths and nevertheless been credited with weaknesses of the Afghan National contributing to improvements in security Security Forces and to address potential throughout the country. Furthermore, the pitfalls that could undermine the prospect participation of Afghan National Army of achieving peace and security. soldiers in night raid operations helped improve the accuracy and conduct of such 3 Afghan National Security raids, although these operations are still Forces strongly resented by local populations.12 This paper focuses on the largest and most The 203rd Corps of the Afghan National visible Afghan National Security Forces on Army is one of six individual Afghan Army the ground, the Afghan National Army, the Corps operating in Loya Paktia.13 Of the Afghan National Police, and also touches 203rd's 28 divisions, 10 were assessed as upon the National Directorate of Security. "effective with [international] advisors"; 14 After a short overview of these security as "effective with [international] partners"; providers, it discusses the limitations of and four as "developing with the current transition strategy to improve [international] partners." While these the capacity of Afghan National Security assessments indicate that the force is 11 Forces. generally competent, it still leaves room for improvement.14 3.1 Afghan National Army The international community has often In Loya Paktia both Khost and Paktia have cited the Afghan National Army as a Regional Military Training Centres with a success story. It is generally better capacity to house 600 and 350 trainees equipped and trained than the Afghan respectively. A training facility with a National Police. Still, the army has capacity of 1,750 trainees is planned for 15 problems in achieving an approximate Gardez (in Paktia). representation of the general demographic 3.2 Afghan National Police composition of the county due to the The Afghan National Police is a central absence of large number of recruits from pillar of the Afghan National Security the south and southeast of Afghanistan Forces. It consists of several branches, where the insurgency is stronger. In those each with their own distinct roles.16 The areas, families who send their sons to the TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 3 main force is the Afghan Uniformed According to a United Nations Assistance Police. Mission in Afghanistan survey, the main reasons cited for Afghan National Police As of August 2011 the Afghan Uniformed officers going absent without official leave Police made up 56% (80,275 men) of 17 in Paktika were the high level of Afghanistan’s 144,431 police officers. Its responsibilities include general policing, intimidation and insecurity, the inability to maintaining public safety and the rule of return home due to the unavailability of safe means of transportation such as law, the prevention, detection, and flights, and the fact that the bodies of investigation of minor crimes; road safety those killed in the line of duty often take and traffic policing, and gathering three to four days to reach their family, a intelligence to support counter-insurgency 18 strong source of outrage for devout operations. Muslim families that expect burial within The 2009 approved force total for Loya 24 hours.21 Paktia was 4,556, with about 4,088 known The Afghan National Civil Order Police is to exist (approximately at 90% force another branch of the Afghan National strength). The breakdown per province of Loya Paktia is: Paktia 1,401 approved force Police. Established in 2006, it is mandated strength/1,226 in actuality; Paktika to maintain civil order in and around urban 19 centres, while providing timely support to 1,765/1,650 and Khost 1,390/1,212. police in emergencies, including security Attrition rates in the Afghan Uniformed provision in areas where the Afghan Police are high and are one of