TLO-Policy Brief 1/2012 May 2012

Missing in Transition? Why a focus on military hand-over alone misses the point in Loya Paktia

Summary 1 Introduction In July 2011, ISAF officially handed over Despite notable capacity improvements, the seven areas to Afghan National Security Afghan National Security Forces are a Forces,1 beginning a process to gradually politically and socially fragmented force. The transition all security responsibility from existing transition strategy focuses too much 2 on military capacity building but neglects international to Afghan leadership. internal political divisions. A successful Twenty areas have now been formally transition in Loya Paktia will require a transitioned to the Afghan National strategy to address these divisions. Security Force, which is, “part of the Afghan National Security Forces have unfolding plan for all NATO combat troops demonstrated the ability to contribute to to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.”3 holding territory where they are already supported, but they have shown Drawing on The Liaison Office’s experience considerable weakness in gaining support in in the Loya Paktia (the region comprising 4 insurgent strongholds. Transition of security Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces), this responsibility will empower networks already paper examines the shortcomings of a entrenched in the Afghan government and is transition strategy that focuses almost more likely to lead to a direct stalemate exclusively on security, while ignoring rather than an expansion of the important social and political factors that government’s reach. could undermine the strategy. This logic extends to initiatives such as the Afghan Local Police which is mainly After providing an overview of the status successful in areas where the local balance of of the different Afghan National Security power is already in favour of the Afghan Forces in Loya Paktia, the paper argues government. that while these forces can successfully maintain security in areas where the insurgency is already weakened, they are unable to establish, maintain, and expand The Liaison Office is grateful to funding provided by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung to the government’s control over areas where its’ programmes in Paktia and Nangarhar. insurgents are deeply entrenched. www.boell-afghanistan.org It goes on to argue that simply increasing will be able to hold the territory and stop the number of Afghan National Security the expansion of the insurgency without Forces and boosting capacity through the continued ISAF support, particularly in light provision of equipment and training will of the continued strength of the not produce security forces capable of insurgency.7 Indeed, the year 2011 was providing stability. Successful transition the most violent in Afghanistan since 2001, instead requires a broader focus that with a 39% increase in violent incidents in equally recognizes and seeks to address the first eight months of 2011 over the the serious political divides that currently same period in 2010.8 Despite the increase plague the Afghan National Security in violent incidents, an accelerated Forces. drawdown of international forces was announced in June 2011. These imbalances are evident in Loya Paktia where local Pashtun residents As a result, Afghan National Security consider the Afghan National Security Forces will now need to expand their range Forces to be dominated by political of operations to include the “Clear” phase networks. Residents feel excluded from (i.e. recapturing territory from the security forces whose leadership is insurgency) while simultaneously disproportionately comprised of former improving their ability to execute the ruling communist party members (the “Hold” phase (i.e. ensuring territory stays People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan), under government control). former Northern Alliance/United Front5 In order to support Afghan National members, and a handful of pro- Security Forces in this goal, General government tribes. The absence of local Petraeus, former ISAF Commander in Pashtun leadership contributes to the Afghanistan, refocused the international general under-representation of local military strategy, noting: Pashtuns in the security forces. A greater focus on addressing these shortcomings is “The campaign will not be as intensive a fight for every village… but will rest fundamental to ensuring that Afghan largely on the buildup of Afghan Army National Security Forces are able to and police forces to guard the border, provide stability throughout Afghanistan. block infiltration routes, and strengthen communities and local government.”9 2 Changing of the Guard To realize this strategy an overall increase in the number of soldiers (171,600) and ISAF has emphasized that transition police (134,000) was approved.10 Further, demands a level of security that would an increased focus has been placed on allow "the population to pursue routine training and assisting Afghan National 6 daily activities.” However, few expect that Security Forces. the insurgency will be defeated by 2014 and that Afghan National Security Forces

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 2 This transition strategy, however, neglects Afghan National Army face threats and the significant divisions within the Afghan social pressure. As a result, the army does government and its security forces as well not reflect the general population but as the schism between the government mirrors the larger political divisions of the and many communities in Loya Paktia. This country (see Section 4). requires a re-examination of the current The Afghan National Army has strategy to better reflect the strengths and nevertheless been credited with weaknesses of the Afghan National contributing to improvements in security Security Forces and to address potential throughout the country. Furthermore, the pitfalls that could undermine the prospect participation of Afghan National Army of achieving peace and security. soldiers in night raid operations helped improve the accuracy and conduct of such 3 Afghan National Security raids, although these operations are still Forces strongly resented by local populations.12 This paper focuses on the largest and most The 203rd Corps of the Afghan National visible Afghan National Security Forces on Army is one of six individual Afghan Army the ground, the Afghan National Army, the Corps operating in Loya Paktia.13 Of the Afghan National Police, and also touches 203rd's 28 divisions, 10 were assessed as upon the National Directorate of Security. "effective with [international] advisors"; 14 After a short overview of these security as "effective with [international] partners"; providers, it discusses the limitations of and four as "developing with the current transition strategy to improve [international] partners." While these the capacity of Afghan National Security assessments indicate that the force is 11 Forces. generally competent, it still leaves room for improvement.14 3.1 Afghan National Army The international community has often In Loya Paktia both Khost and Paktia have cited the Afghan National Army as a Regional Military Training Centres with a success story. It is generally better capacity to house 600 and 350 trainees equipped and trained than the Afghan respectively. A training facility with a National Police. Still, the army has capacity of 1,750 trainees is planned for 15 problems in achieving an approximate Gardez (in Paktia). representation of the general demographic 3.2 Afghan National Police composition of the county due to the The Afghan National Police is a central absence of large number of recruits from pillar of the Afghan National Security the south and southeast of Afghanistan Forces. It consists of several branches, where the insurgency is stronger. In those each with their own distinct roles.16 The areas, families who send their sons to the

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 3 main force is the Afghan Uniformed According to a United Nations Assistance Police. Mission in Afghanistan survey, the main reasons cited for Afghan National Police As of August 2011 the Afghan Uniformed officers going absent without official leave Police made up 56% (80,275 men) of 17 in Paktika were the high level of Afghanistan’s 144,431 police officers. Its responsibilities include general policing, intimidation and insecurity, the inability to maintaining public safety and the rule of return home due to the unavailability of safe means of transportation such as law, the prevention, detection, and flights, and the fact that the bodies of investigation of minor crimes; road safety those killed in the line of duty often take and traffic policing, and gathering three to four days to reach their family, a intelligence to support counter-insurgency 18 strong source of outrage for devout operations. Muslim families that expect burial within The 2009 approved force total for Loya 24 hours.21 Paktia was 4,556, with about 4,088 known The Afghan National Civil Order Police is to exist (approximately at 90% force another branch of the Afghan National strength). The breakdown per province of Loya Paktia is: Paktia 1,401 approved force Police. Established in 2006, it is mandated strength/1,226 in actuality; Paktika to maintain civil order in and around urban 19 centres, while providing timely support to 1,765/1,650 and Khost 1,390/1,212. police in emergencies, including security Attrition rates in the Afghan Uniformed provision in areas where the Afghan Police are high and are one of the principal Uniformed Police are unable to operate. At obstacles to Afghan National Security times they also fill in for Afghan Uniformed Forces expansion. It also diminishes the Police until that force is fully stood up. continuity of the force and makes it They also rotate frequently and are rarely a difficult to establish a strong police- permanently based in one location. community rapport. As of August 2011 there were 13,678 In 2010 approximately 2,000 Afghan police officers in this force country-wide.22 National Police officers from the southeast In the whole of the southeast region there left their positions and went absent are three Afghan National Civil Order without official leave, of which nearly one- Police units which do not count more than 20 fourth (464) were from Paktia. While a couple of hundred men. One is stationed these positions have reportedly already in Sharana in Paktika Centre comprising 30 been filled, there does not appear to be police officers, although they will soon be any measures in place to address the moved to Khost.23 The second is in Gardez underlying problem of police officers district of Paktia and consists of 70 police leaving their positions. officers. The third unit is assigned to Zurmat district in Paktia, but is currently on

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 4 duty in Paghman in Kabul province. Similar include the Khost Protection Force (300 to their regular police counterparts, they troops) and the Afghan Security Guards also have a very high attrition rate in the (400 troops). Both are created and, “paid southeast, according to some sources by US Special Forces for guard duties but about 70% attrition.24 also accompany them during counter- A third police force active in the southeast insurgency operations or do patrols on 27 is the Afghan Border Police. It is tasked their own.” Reportedly the Afghan Security Guards also gather intelligence28 with securing border check-posts and and have accompanied US Special Forces in crossings into Pakistan, including house searches and other operations. surveillance and prevention of smuggling, drug trafficking, and movement of The Khost Protection Force is mostly insurgents across the border. In August deployed for border security, though they 2011 5,000 (22%) of Afghanistan’s 23,086 also occasionally take part in search border police were assigned to the operations and raids, sometimes with US southeast.25 Special Forces. 29

In order to partially compensate for the 3.2.1 The Militarization of the Police withdrawal of international military forces, With ISAF forces drawing down there will an additional police force—the Afghan be an increased reliance on all Afghan Local Police, the most recent attempt at National Security Forces to actively combat establishing pro-government village the insurgency. This has led to an ever- defence initiatives26—was established in increasing militarization of the Afghan late 2010. The Afghan Local Police is National Police. For example, there has considered a sub-pillar of the Afghan been increased military training to Afghan National Police that is nominally under the Uniformed Police officers to prepare them auspices of the Ministry of Interior, while for their frequent deployment to high-risk in reality it is frequently run, supported areas where they man checkpoints and and funded by US Special Forces. often engage the insurgency. Considered a temporary and part-time force it is given a salary of 60% that of The focus on military, rather than regular police recruits. In Paktia, there are community-based policing skills, led the US 225 Afghan Local Police in both Chamkani military to create the Focused District and Dandi Patan districts, with plans to Development programme to enhance recruit another 250 for Zazi Aryub. police capabilities through an eight-week training to police officers in selected Finally, several other local pro-government districts, with seven out of the eight weeks security actors are present in the relating to military skills such as improvised southeast, but operate outside the Afghan explosive device awareness and weapons National Security Forces framework. These

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 5 training. Currently, only one week of 4 A Force Divided instruction focus on basic policing skills.30 The transition strategy seems to ignore After completing the training, the police existing ground realties of a virulent and officers return to the district with resistant insurgency, increasing insecurity, international police mentor teams that and the population’s low confidence in the provide oversight and use field experience Afghan government, including Afghan 31 to build on the training. Many of these National Security Forces. While training mentoring teams, however, are made up can contribute to improving the capacity of of current and former soldiers, which only Afghan National Security Forces, it in no 32 reinforce a militarization of the police. way addresses problematic structural The Focused District Development issues rooted in Afghanistan’s history and programme has been implemented in a politics. 33 number of southeastern districts, but Residents of Loya Paktia indicated that, progress has been slow and as of March despite the improvement of the Afghan 2011, only 491 Afghan National Police had Uniformed Police's military skills they are been trained in Khost. still no match for the better-equipped and The increasing militarization of the police highly motivated insurgent fighters. force, however, distracts the police from “According to NATO data cited by the their mandated civilian policing duties. It Brookings Institution, 830 police officers also sometimes leads to conflicts over were killed in the first half of last year responsibility with the army. Converging [2011], more than double the number of the roles of the Afghan National Army and either Afghan soldiers or coalition 34 the Afghan National Police also risks that troops.” the police may simply morph into a more The inability to rely solely on existing poorly equipped and less professional Afghan National Security Forces prompted version of the Afghan National Army. the US to push for the creation of the While a paramilitary police might be Afghan Local Police, which will add to the necessary in the short term for transition, overall number of troops that will be the current training focus is short-sighted expected to take on the insurgency. The as it leaves Afghanistan without a civilian- creation of this force, however, seems to oriented police force. This bears the risk of ignore the fact that traditional Arbakai leaving a crucial gap that can focus on have failed struggled to function as crime-prevention while also opening anything more than a community-policing 35 avenues of the development of force. The Arbakai prevalence in Ghazni paramilitary groups and armed gangs. and Paktika has dwindled in recent years with increasing insurgency pressure, as

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 6 they are simply not able to do the job of an engage the insurgency and protect army. communities. Fear and intimidation limits the Afghan In short, many feel that fighting the National Police’s willingness to fight the insurgency is not only tantamount to a insurgency, and it appears as if some units suicide mission but also that Afghan collaborate or at least tolerate insurgent National Security Forces and Afghan attacks. For example, due to security government officials are as much an threats, Afghan National Civil Order Police enemy as the insurgency. Consequently, an forces in the southeast rarely leave their assessment of Afghan National Army barracks.36 recruitment patterns suggested that Pashtun recruitment “remains relatively In Musa Khail district of Khost province, minuscule, reflecting a deep and lingering the District Centre was destroyed twice in fear of the insurgents or sympathy for the past two years, yet no police officers were hurt in either attack. There have them, as well as doubts about the stability and integrity of the central government in been similar reports from Paktika, where Kabul, the capital.”37 locally recruited Afghan Uniformed Police often emerge from attacks unscathed, The resilient insurgency, insecurity, and suggesting that agreements are being the population’s perception that Afghan struck to turn a blind eye to each other’s National Security Forces are divided presence. Given the strength of the internally as well as a reflection of larger insurgency, these links should be seen as a national political divisions need to be rational way for individual units to stay addressed in order to diminish the ability alive. of the insurgency to garner support from This, of course, adds to the distrust that alienated communities that feel they have little to lose. Loya Paktia communities already harbour about the Afghan government and its security forces. As will be discussed in 4.1 Divisions within the Afghan National Security Forces detail below, for one they see both dominated by those forces they used to The Afghan National Security Forces, just fight in the past—former members of the like other branches of the Afghan communist government and Northern government, are affected by the influence Alliance/United Front, which for many of patronage networks along factional, southeastern Pashtun used to be a rivalling tribal, and ethnic lines. Patronage mujahideen faction. On the other hand, networks are particularly strong within the they question the ability of Afghan Afghan Border Police because it essentially National Security Forces to efficiently controls custom revenues and smuggling routes from which corrupt officials and criminal groups extract large profits.

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 7 In Loya Paktia, the Afghan Border Police is Pashtuns, close to the ethnic ratio of the believed to cooperate with criminal gangs province itself. This is generally not the in the smuggling of chromite, weapons, case with the Afghan National Army. and explosives. Customs officials have While US sources tend to boast that about reportedly complained that they have not 41% of the Afghan National Army is indeed been allowed to operate at Afghan Border Pashtun, “hence roughly in line with the Police border posts, hinting that this was broad demographics of the country,”38 a because the border police did not want recent independent assessment points out them interfering in their lucrative and that, “the vast majority of recruits come corrupt sanctioning of illegal cross-border from provinces in the North and Northeast, traffic. 39 where the insurgency is weaker.” There was also a strong perception among Yet the problem is not purely about ethnic focus group participants from the make-up of the Afghan National Army, but southeast—including members of the also the domination of certain regions over Provincial Peace Councils—that the Afghan others, which leads to the next point. National Security Forces were plagued by personal rivalries and dominated by 4.2 Divisions between Afghan individuals from the mostly non-Pashtun National Security Forces and Northern Alliance/United Front or who parts of the local population were affiliated with the communist In Loya Paktia there has been a historical People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. legacy of tension between Tajiks linked to Some of the division between the different the Northern Alliance and rural Pashtuns. Afghan National Security Forces can be For example, one elder from Khost partially explained by the fact that many province stated that most key government positions–especially the army–are officials in their area are people who recruited at the Kabul level and later Pashtuns from his area used to fight deployed without consideration of against in the past, i.e. People’s whether recruits are from the area or not. Democratic Party of Afghanistan or In contrast, the Afghan National Police, Northern Alliance/United Front. Elders especially the Afghan Local Police, tends to from Ghazni, Paktika, and Paktia frequently be almost exclusively locally recruited. This argued that by supporting Afghan National often creates an ethnic and tribal Security Forces controlled by the Northern imbalance between the two main pillars of Alliance/United Front, even out of the Afghan National Security Forces that gratitude for their assistance in defeating often leads to competition and tension. the Taliban in 2001, the US was in essence supporting an "opposition" to the Afghan In Paktia province, for example, 90% of all government that enriches itself with Afghan Uniformed Police recruits are current contracts.40

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 8 Indeed, according to an analyst of the US the Afghan government and local tribes Congressional Research Service, “at the and communities. time the United States first began They are also reproduced in the establishing the Afghan National Army implementation of the new Afghan Local [ANA], Northern Alliance figures who were Police programme in Loya Paktia. then in key security positions weighted Recruitment is successful in areas where recruitment for the national army toward the government already has more support its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in and does not work in areas where the reaction, refused recruitment or left the insurgency is strong. For example, during ANA programme.”41 the initial establishment of the Afghan Furthermore, according to an army Local Police in Chamkani district in January recruitment study, over one third of all 2011, residents of the Nozi, Lawari, Pashtuns in the Afghan National Army are Mangiar, and Sarangoor areas in from Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan’s Chamkani, where the insurgency is strong, East.42 In contrast, southeastern and did not join the Afghan Local Police, southern Pashtun only make up about 1.5 limiting the effect these units could have in percent of all soldiers that were recruited these insecure areas. Similarly, in the since 2009.43 The Nangarhar Pashtun Muqbil area of Dandi Patan district of legacy in the Afghan National Army goes Paktia, people refuse to nominate recruits back to their historic support of the to the Afghan Local Police for similar People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, reasons.44 highlighting the power of politics and Finally, the use of militias that are seen as historic allegiances to the communist supporting certain tribes over others, such party. as the Khost Protection Force and Afghan Similarly, the Tani tribe of Khost province Security Guards follows a similar in Loya Patkia, which is also generally problematic pattern. Most of the members considered as close to the People’s of both groups in Khost reportedly hail Democratic Party of Afghanistan, is seen as exclusively from the Zazi tribe of Zazi dominating the Afghan National Security Maidan district, the home of Afghan Forces of the province. In contrast, the Security Guard Commander Sakhi Rehman Zadran tribe—initially linked to the Hizb-e and General Khalibaz, the initial Islami of Mawlawi Khales, while now Commander of the Khost Protection leaning toward the Haqqani-led Force.45 insurgency—is firmly in the anti- In the Barmal district of Paktika, the local government camp. Afghan Security Guard Commander These historic animosities and political ties Azizullah, a Tajik from Urgun district, has perpetuate and deepen divisions between also exasperates tensions between Tajiks

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 9 and Pashtuns by allegedly killing innocent While government outreach efforts have Pashtuns he falsely accuses of being been relatively well-received in areas Taliban.46 His criminal behaviour is in so far where the government is present, these relevant here as his association with the efforts have been met with distrust in former Northern Alliance/United Front and areas where the insurgency is still strong. backing by international military adds to This logic extends to initiatives such as the the local perception of the Afghan National Afghan Local Police that tend to be Security Forces as reflecting the larger successful in areas where the local balance national divisions. of power is already in favour of the Afghan government and fragmentation is minimal. 5 Conclusion The transition strategy needs to put a The 2014 deadline for the Afghan National stronger emphasis on addressing the Security Forces to take over in the current imbalances in Afghan National southeast is ambitious given the challenges Security Forces. Measures to recruit a security organs currently face, both in more representative force are particularly terms of capacity but also reputation and needed. Furthermore, the Afghan trust by local communities. government should pay more attention to There have been improvements in the the take the alienation of many military capacity, but as long as the Afghan southeastern and also southern Pashtuns. National Security Forces remain a This could include ensuring that a political politically fragmented force distrusted by settlement also deals with past grievances many Pashtuns in Loya Paktia, its ability to with former members of the communist extend control into areas where the government and Northern Alliance/United insurgency is strong will be limited. Front. Without a broader political reconciliation, the insurgency will Unless some of the actual and perceived ultimately win out, both locally and imbalances in the composition of Afghan regionally. National Security Forces are addressed, transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government will only empower 6 Recommendations networks, such as the Northern  On the national level, find ways to Alliance/United Front and former make the Afghan National Army more communists that are already entrenched in inclusive and representative. This the Afghan National Security Forces. means looking beyond the number of Consequently, transition is like “preaching recruits to ethnic, tribal and geographic to the converted” and will not necessarily representation. Programmes need to produce an expansion of the government’s be developed to attract Pashtuns from reach. the underrepresented South and Southeast.

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 10  Locally, improve balanced recruitment through engagement with respected 7 http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf 8 BBC News (2011) "Afghan conflict; UN says 39% jump in neutral leaders from under- violence in 2011." 28 September 2011. Accessed from represented groups.  On the provincial and district level, 9 Gall, C. (2011) "Petraeus Confident as He Leaves explore local political settlements to Afghanistan." Kabul: New York Times, 10 July 2011; 10 divisions before transition. In Loya Having previously surpassed its October 2011 target of 171,600 soldiers and 134,00 police, ANSF forces are Paktia, this means reaching out to expected to increase to a combined force of 352,000 by those tribes that feel excluded and October 2012, including 195,000 Afghan National Army members and 157,000 Afghan National Police. These marginalized from the Afghan figures do not include the Afghan Local Police. 11 The ANSF also consists of the Afghan National Air government. Corps.  Make the level of representativeness of 12 Open Society Foundation and The Liaison Office and (2011) "The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Afghan National Security Forces and Surge on Afghan Civilians." Kabul: 19 September 2011. good community relations and rapport 13 Along with the three provinces of Loya Paktia, this unit battalion also operates in Ghazni and parts of Logar. a precondition for transition. 14 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2011) "Quarterly Report to the United Endnotes: States Congress." 30 October 2011. 15 Numbers on government employees are not always reliable. There is a tendency in some cases to inflate 1 These were Bamiyan and Panjshir provinces, Mehterlam numbers or there is a gap between the central level in district in Laghman, all areas of Kabul district except Kabul and the province. Sarubi district and the cities of Herat, Lashkargah, and 16 Not discussed here due to their specialized nature are Mazar-e Sharif. the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, the Counter-Narcotics 2 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, (2011) "Transition to Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Afghan Public Afghan Lead: Inteqal." 5 October 2011. Accessed from Protection Force. approved number of sanctioned posts at each grade 3 Bowley, G. (2012) "Optimism as U.S. Transfers Security level, here the approved size of the ANP. Control to Afghans in Jalalabad." New York Times, 27 18 Ministry of Interior (2010) "Afghan National Police January 2012. Accessed from Strategy." Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January 19 Chilton, S., Eckart Schieweck, E., Bremmers, T. (2009) 4 Southeast refers to the provinces of Paktia, Khost and "Evaluation of the Appropriate Size of the Afghan Paktika, except when indicated otherwise. National Police Force Manning List (Tashkil)." Kabul: 15 5 The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of July 2009; p.113 Afghanistan (or Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi 20 Source: UNAMA ANSF survey February 2011 Nijat-i Afghanistan), often called the Northern Alliance in 21 Ibid short, was loosely formed military-political umbrella of 22 SIGAR October 2011 several mujahideen parties that emerged in opposition to 23 Source: UNAMA Southeast region the Taliban regime in 1996 and was lead by the late 24 Friesendorf, C. (2011) "Paramilitarization and Security Ahmad Shah Massoud. While it united all ethnic groups Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police." International of Afghanistan, it was often seen as primarily made-up of Peacekeeping, 18(1): 79-95 non-Pashtuns, especially at the leadership level: including 25 SIGAR October 2011 Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and others. While 26 Others including the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, United Front is the official name, most local elders the Local Defence Initiative, the Community Defence interviewed referred to the Northern Alliance. Initiative, and the Afghan Public Protection Police (AP3). 6 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, (2011) "Transition to 27 Ruttig, T. (2009) “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Afghan Lead: Inteqal." 5 October 2011. Available from Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity.” Pp.57-89 in

TLO Policy Brief 1/2012 – Transition in Loya Paktia 11 Giustozzi A. (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban: Insight from 43 Ibid the Afghan Field (London: Hurst Publishers), p.87 44 Information provided by UNAMA Southeast region 28 Cavendish, J. (2011) "Why One of Afghanistan's Most 45 The Zazi of Khost are also seen as close to the Feared Men is a U.S. Ally." Kabul: Time Magazine, 04 communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. October, 2011. 46 In the summer of 2010, he allegedly conducted an anti- eyewitnesses reported that he killed nine alleged Taliban 29 Ibid by dragging them behind his vehicle. 30 European training programmes, although arguably containing a more civilian focus, are limited in their geographical scope; see Chilton et al. (2009) Acknowledgements 31 United States Department of Defense (2011) 32 Friesendorf (2011) This publication was prepared with the support 33 Paktia: Shwak, Wazi Zadran, Gerda Serai, Zurmat, Jani of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (www.boell- Khail and Dandi Patan districts. Paktika: Mata Khan, Urgun and Sar Hawza, and parts of Sharana with plans to afghanistan.org). The findings, interpretations extend it to Gayan, Jani Khail, Yusuf Khail, Gomal, and and conclusions expressed in this policy paper Sharana Centre of Paktika. are those of The Liaison Office (TLO) and do 34 Nordland, R. (2012) “R. Afghan Officer Sought in Killing not necessarily reflect the views of the of 9 Colleagues,” The New York Times, 8 March 2012, Heinrich Böll Stiftung. TLO is solely responsible The Liaison Office (www.tloafghanistan.org) 35 Arbakai in the Southeast, particularly in Khost and Paktia, are a temporary form of "community-based TLO is an independent Afghan NGO seeking to policing with limited reach and mandates." They are improve local governance, stability and invoked by a jirga and generally to enforce and security through systematic and implement the decisions of a jirga/shura, to ‘maintain law and order’ (general policing), and ‘to protect borders and institutionalized engagement with customary boundaries of the tribe or community’. See Schmeidl; S structures, local communities, and civil society and Karokhail, M. (2009), “The Role of Non-State Actors groups. Its main areas of activities are in 'Community-Based Policing' - An Exploration of the research/analysis, dialogue facilitation and Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan,” participatory peacebuilding, including access to Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.30(2):318-342; p. 332. 36 Friesendorf, C. (2011) "Paramilitarization and Security justice. In addition to the Kabul headquarter, Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police." International TLO has three regional offices (Paktia- Peacekeeping, 18(1): 79-95 Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East) 37 Rivera, R. (2011) “Afghan Army Attracts Few Where and over 130 staff across Afghanistan. Fear Reigns.” The New York Times, 6 September 2011; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/world/asia/07afgh TLO has received funding from a wide array of anistan.html?_r=2&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2 governmental and non-governmental donors 38 Katzman, K. (2012) “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.” Congressional and foundations. Its main donors current Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 6 February include the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the Open 2012; http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf; Society Foundation, the United States Institute pp.33-34 39 of Peace, USAID/ARD-Tetra Tech, the British Rivera 2011 Government and the Swiss Development 40 An elder from the Mangal tribe added that as a consequence internationally-led night raids often target Cooperation. the wrong people because local government officials intentionally provide ISAF with incorrect information in order to target an enemy or someone they are in a dispute with. 41 Katzman 2012; see also See International Crisis Group (2010) "A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army" Kabul: May 2010. 42 Rivera 2011

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