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ENHANCING SECURITY and STABILITY in AFGHANISTAN This Page Left Intentionally Blank Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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ENHANCING SECURITY and STABILITY in AFGHANISTAN This Page Left Intentionally Blank Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan DECEMBER 2018 ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN This page left intentionally blank Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan December 2018 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $305,000 for the Fiscal Years 2018 - 2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $293,000 in DoD labor. Generated on Dec 12, 2018 RefID: A-20E89FB This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91); Section 1223 of H.R. 5515 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232); and Section 1216 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the eighth in a series of reports required semi- annually through calendar year 2020. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2018, through November 30, 2018. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2018, through May 31, 2019. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 Section 1 – Strategy and Objectives ............................................................................................... 3 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 3 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 6 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission ............................................................................................. 8 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission ................................................................................. 10 1.5 Indications of Progress ........................................................................................................ 20 Section 2 – Threat Assessment ..................................................................................................... 23 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 23 2.2 Current Security Conditions ................................................................................................ 24 Section 3 – Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ............................... 36 3.1 ANDSF Roadmap ............................................................................................................... 37 3.2 ANDSF Size, Posture, and assessment ............................................................................... 41 3.3 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 47 Section 4 – Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army ...................................................... 59 4.1 Ministry of Defense ............................................................................................................. 59 4.2 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................ 69 Section 5 – Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police ....................................................... 89 5.1 Ministry of Interior .............................................................................................................. 89 5.2 Afghan National Police ....................................................................................................... 98 Section 6 – Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ................................. 105 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable ..................................................................... 105 6.2 U.S. Contributions ............................................................................................................. 106 6.3 International Contributions ............................................................................................... 107 6.4 Afghan Government Contributions ................................................................................... 109 Annex A – Indicators of Effectiveness for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior ..................................................................................................................................................... 110 Annex B – Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 114 I This page left intentionally blank EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The principle goal of the South Asia Strategy is to conclude the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. Over the past 16 months, the United States and its partners have used military force to drive the Taliban towards a durable and inclusive political settlement. There have been some notable developments – the Eid al-Fitr ceasefire and the support for peace from the broader Islamic community – which threatened the legitimacy of the Taliban and may represent leading indicators of success. The Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) has reinforced U.S. diplomatic engagements with Afghans, neighboring states, and interested parties in the broader region. Increased military pressure on the Taliban, international calls for peace, and the new SRAR’s engagements appear to be driving the Taliban to negotiations. While an array of challenges remain—Afghan political stability, Afghan security force capacity, and regional spoilers—the combination of military escalation and diplomatic initiative have made a favorable political settlement more likely than at any time in recent memory. The current military situation inside of Afghanistan remains at an impasse. The introduction of additional advisors and enablers in 2018 stabilized the situation, slowing the momentum of a Taliban march that had capitalized on U.S. drawdowns between 2011 and 2016. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remain in control of most of Afghanistan’s population centers and all of the provincial capitals, while the Taliban control large portions of Afghanistan’s rural areas, and continue to attack poorly defended government checkpoints and rural district centers. The ANDSF have continued to excel in offensive operations; the bulk of their casualties have come in defense of isolated checkpoints, command posts, and bases. The ANDSF, with U.S. and coalition support, have limited new Taliban territorial gains and quickly regained control of population centers when attacked. The intensity of the fighting and level of bloodshed on both sides has risen as both sides vie for leverage at the negotiating table. The reinforcement and realignment of U.S. and coalition forces and authorities under the South Asia Strategy have significantly increased pressure on the Taliban. Continued DoD partnership with the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) has produced an extremely lethal and agile offensive force. Enhanced efforts to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANDSF, from strategic to tactical levels, including by employing the Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) in March improved Afghan offensive capabilities. The 1st SFAB demonstrated its ability to tailor the advisory approach to changing ground conditions and provided advisory assistance at the point of need. To enhance Afghan operational readiness cycles (ORCs) and support Kabul security priorities, SFAB teams shifted assets to Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) and the Kabul Security Force advisory mission mid-way through their deployment, resulting in an improvement in ANDSF readiness and fewer attacks within Kabul. Islamic religious authorities have also increased religious and social pressure on the Taliban, calling for an end to the jihad and condemning terrorist tactics to include suicide bombings. Pakistan’s ulema issued a fatwa on January 16, 2018. A conference of Afghan, Pakistani, and Indonesian ulemas in Indonesia issued a declaration on May 11, 2018. The Afghan ulema issued a fatwa on June 7, 2018. The Grand Imam of Mecca released a declaration on June 13, 2018. On 1 July 13, 2018, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference released a declaration condemning terrorist tactics. U.S. and Afghan military
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