Chiarella Esposito. America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1994. xxxii + 264 pp. $55.00 US, cloth, ISBN 978-0-313-29340-5.
Reviewed by Jefrey G. Giauque
Published on H-France (March, 1997)
Since the early 1980s American and European integration. He attempts to demonstrate that Mar‐ historians have debated the extent and impact of shall Plan funds composed only a small portion of American infuence in western Europe during the European resources applied to reconstruction and Cold War, particularly during the years immedi‐ he suggests that Europe could have managed ately following World War II. Critics usually por‐ without U.S. support. Milward also asserts that tray the United States as a hegemonic power ex‐ American money enabled Europeans to postpone erting its will over western Europe, or inefective cooperation with one another and to focus on in doing so. Supporters of United States policies purely national recovery, delaying real economic argue that European leaders welcomed a major integration. On the other hand, Hogan argues that U.S. role in Europe for the sake of reconstruction the Marshall Plan provided a "crucial margin" and stability and that its eforts played a crucial which enabled Europeans to cover budget and role in western Europe's economic recovery and trade defcits and apply their own resources to in‐ political stabilization. The U.S. "European Recov‐ vestment. Hogan concludes that the United States ery Program" (ERP) or "Marshall Plan," an‐ also helped to transform European economies nounced in June 1947 is the central object of con‐ along American lines, reorienting them away tention in this debate concerning the early post- from the autarkic policies of the pre-war years war years. and toward free trade and economic growth and Two works have largely shaped the Marshall integration. Plan debate, Alan Milward's The Reconstruction Chiarella Esposito, a historian at the Universi‐ of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (1984) and Michael ty of Mississippi, stakes out a position between J. Hogan's The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, Hogan and Milward by focusing on the impact of and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, the Marshall Plan in France and Italy. The title of 1947-1952 (1987). Milward portrays the Marshall the book is somewhat misleading, suggesting that Plan as an unnecessary impediment to European the author takes a critical view of the Marshall H-Net Reviews
Plan itself. The book is actually a study of U.S. ef‐ riences and their post-war ambitions. France had forts to use "counterpart funds" (or more precise‐ sufered a long enemy occupation, and French ly the withholding of those funds) to shape French leaders hoped to overcome the stagnation of the and Italian economic policies. It is this efort Third Republic, regaining a measure of great pow‐ which she views as a failure, not the Marshall er status. In order to achieve these goals, the Plan itself. During the Marshall Plan years, the French developed the ambitious Monnet Plan, a United States provided industrial and agricultural program of massive government investment and goods to European governments, which in turn economic modernization. During the late 1940s sold those goods to private companies. The rev‐ and early 1950s, French governments adhered to enues thus raised were known as counterpart this program without regard for the potential risk funds and were placed in special accounts under of high infation. By contrast, Italian leaders, con‐ the control of the United States government. U.S. cerned primarily with fnancial stability and eras‐ ofcials released the money to European govern‐ ing the fascist legacy of government intervention ments once they had produced detailed invest‐ in the economy, preferred to leave investment to ment plans. U.S. ofcials also threatened to with‐ the private sector and to use U.S. aid for public hold these funds as a lever to push European gov‐ works in order to reduce domestic opposition. ernments toward the potentially contradictory In France the United States had to cope with goals of fnancial stability and rapid economic in‐ unstable centrist "Third Force" governments com‐ vestment and growth. prised primarily of the Socialist (SFIO), Christian Esposito's book analyzes these eforts in Democrat (MRP), and Radical parties, with the France and Italy. Although aimed primarily at his‐ large and hostile communist and Gaullist parties torians of U.S. and European international rela‐ to either side. Fearing the consequences of a com‐ tions, the book has much to ofer historians of munist or a Gaullist takeover, U.S. ofcials decid‐ postwar France. After examining the relevant his‐ ed to support Third Force governments at all toriography, Esposito analyzes the situations in costs. Because of the instability of the Third Force Paris, Rome, and Washington upon the com‐ coalition and the difcult political and economic mencement of the Marshall Plan. For the United circumstances, cabinets rose and fell with a regu‐ States, the plan served primarily to block commu‐ larity characteristic of the Third Republic. U.S. of‐ nism in western Europe by facilitating rapid eco‐ fcials supported French investment schemes, nomic recovery and consolidating stable centrist such as the Monnet Plan, but they feared massive governments. Secondary U.S. goals included the infation and constantly sought to pressure the transformation of European economies along French into allocating more resources to debt re‐ American lines, the stabilization of European cur‐ duction and fnancial stabilization. Throughout rencies and economies, and the promotion of in‐ the 1948-50 period, the United States halted coun‐ ternational trade. By emphasizing the danger of terpart fund releases when a government col‐ political collapse if the United States put too much lapsed, but as soon as the new cabinet was estab‐ pressure on them and by focusing on a few specif‐ lished, it had to reopen the counterpart purse. Re‐ ic economic goals of their own, European govern‐ fusal to release funds would lead the French gov‐ ments could take advantage of both the U.S. politi‐ ernment to draw more money from the Bank of cal focus and its somewhat difuse economic France, producing greater infation and threaten‐ agenda. ing another cabinet collapse. U.S. ofcials repeat‐ Esposito explains French and Italian econom‐ edly informed their French interlocutors that re‐ ic priorities in the context of their war time expe‐ lease of counterpart funds depended on fnancial
2 H-Net Reviews stabilization measures, but the French quickly re‐ The case of Italy provides a number of paral‐ alized that they could call the American bluf. lels with and diferences from that of France. As Although an unstable political environment in France, the United States was compelled to sup‐ hindered the implementation of the Marshall Plan port the political center--in this case the Christian in France, the situation was ameliorated by the Democrats (DC)--and to tolerate their economic fact that Jean Monnet and his collaborators in the policies. Giuseppe Pella, the Italian budget minis‐ Commissariat general du plan (CGP) had formu‐ ter in the governments of Alcide de Gasperi in lated a precise program of industrial development 1948-50, opposed major government investment which did not depend on any one political party and preferred to focus on fnancial stabilization or cabinet to carry it out. Because U.S. ofcials and to deal later with stimulating economic wished to support Third Force governments and growth. The United States, with its goals of fnan‐ because they viewed the Monnet Plan as a model cial stabilization and massive investment, was investment program, counterpart funds fowed slow to realize that its dilemma in Italy was pre‐ out in 1948 and 1949. This support enabled cisely the opposite of that in France. Even when French governments to continue funding the U.S. ofcials understood the dilemma, they hesi‐ Monnet Plan, covered much of their budget tated to speak out against De Gasperi or Pella be‐ defcit, and limited infation. By early 1950 the cause both were crucial to political stability. French economy showed major improvements. The Christian Democrats never formulated a Infation seemed under control, industrial pro‐ precise investment program comparable to the duction showed rapid growth, and both standards Monnet Plan, preferring to use American funds of living and the balance of trade improved. for short-term political purposes, such as unem‐ In 1950 with a certain equilibrium apparently ployment relief, public works, and housing achieved, U.S. ofcials, still primarily concerned projects. Although U.S. ofcials had advocated with long term political stability, felt able to push similar spending in France, they disliked the hap‐ the Georges Bidault government toward greater hazard Italian approach and hesitated to release consumerism and social spending (low-cost hous‐ counterpart funds for "nonproductive" purposes. ing, schools and hospitals, higher wages). These However, even when Christian Democratic oppo‐ measures were intended to weaken popular sup‐ sition to Pella's policies arose in 1949-- the left of port for the French Communist Party. The French the party called for greater government invest‐ government still hesitated to divert resources ment-- U.S. ofcials chose to stick with Gasperi away from productive investment for social and Pella for the sake of political stability. Esposi‐ spending, and it responded to American pressure to regrets that American ofcials did not consider by stalling, which only increased after the out‐ alternatives to Gasperi and Pella, but she con‐ break of the Korean War. Succeeding French min‐ cedes that leading fgures on the left of the party, istries viewed productive investment and rearma‐ such as Giuseppe Dossetti, made frequent anti- ment as higher priorities than social spending. American statements and opposed Italian mem‐ The outbreak of war in Korea produced a wave of bership in NATO, hardly reassuring to the United global infation from which France was not ex‐ States. Esposito also concludes that U.S. ofcials empt. Esposito concludes that the United States focused too much on solving bureaucratic prob‐ thus lost the brief window of French fnancial sta‐ lems and failed to realize that the key factor bility and was forced again to release counterpart blocking a major investment program was the ab‐ funds simply to keep Third Force governments in sence of political will. Only during the frst half of power. 1950, when agrarian strikes forced De Gasperi to move to the left, did the United States have any
3 H-Net Reviews success in pushing him toward greater industrial was to study the impact of U.S. policies and avoid investment. However, as in France, this window an ethnocentric approach which hampers the of opportunity proved brief. With the outbreak of studies of many historians who have worked only the Korean war, Pella and his anti-infationary in American archives. The chapters on France are policies again prevailed. based on extensive work in the U.S. National Ar‐ The author concludes that political necessity chives, the French Archives nationales, the ar‐ prevented the United States from using counter‐ chives of the Ministere des Afaires etrangeres), part funds as an efective lever to alter French or and on an extensive secondary literature. As Es‐ Italian economic policies. She suggests the qualif‐ posito concedes, the chapters on Italy have a cation of Hogan's view that the United States weaker archival base, due to the fact that most of "Americanized" European economies by means of the relevant Italian government fles are still the Marshall Plan. However, Esposito also empha‐ closed. Here she relied more on U.S. archives, sec‐ sizes that counterpart funds played a crucial role ondary studies, and even newspapers. Despite in the stabilization of the French and Italian gov‐ this limitation and the minor criticisms expressed ernments. The Marshall Plan was a political suc‐ above, Esposito has written an important book cess because the stabilization it produced in which reinforces positive trends in the writing on France, enabled the French to take the lead in Eu‐ United States foreign policy (toward a real inter‐ ropean integration after 1950, in particular the national perspective and multi-archival research) linking of the Federal Republic of Germany to and adds to the growing literature emphasizing western Europe by means of the Schuman plan the limits of United States infuence even at the for the eventual European Coal and Steel Commu‐ time of Europe's greatest weakness. Esposito's nity. study of the actual impact U.S. policy in France and Italy complements the work of Hogan and Notwithstanding these well-reasoned conclu‐ Milward who focus more on the formulation of sions, the book would have been more useful had high level policy and its broader economic efects. it continued the story of the Marshall Plan and counterpart funds to the end of the program in Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights re‐ 1952. It also would have beneftted from a closer served. This work may be copied for non-proft examination of the reasons behind the U.S. politi‐ educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ cal focus, which Esposito tends to accept as an ax‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ iom rather than as a hypothesis to examine. Her tact [email protected] method leads to certain contradictions. Esposito acknowledges the political success of the Marshall Plan; yet she also frequently expresses regret that the United States was so blinded by anti- commu‐ nism that it rejected political alternatives and tied itself to particular parties and politicians, espe‐ cially in Italy. In this regard she seems to fall into the same trap which plagued many U.S. ofcials: trying to have it all, both political and economic stability and economic growth. Esposito wanted to write a multi-archival in‐ ternational history rather than a standard study of United States foreign relations. Her ambition
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Citation: Jefrey G. Giauque. Review of Esposito, Chiarella. America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950. H-France, H-Net Reviews. March, 1997.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=911
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