Geofrey Wawro. A Mad Catastrophe. New York: Basic Books, 2014. 471 pp. $29.99, cloth, ISBN 978-0-465-02835-1.

Reviewed by Rian van Meeteren

Published on H-War (October, 2014)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

The battles fought in Serbia and on the east‐ Winter). Two chapters are devoted to the battles ern front in 1914 take a backseat to public and in Serbia. Endnotes to each chapter, a bibliogra‐ scholarly interest in the military history of World phy of consulted archives, a list of published War I. While the number of books dedicated to sources, and an index are provided. A review of the western front continues to increase, only a the sources reveals a striking omission of some few monographs have been published on events important works. Neither the book Krieg im in the east.[1] In particular, the great opening bat‐ Frieden by Günther Kronenbitter, which de‐ tles in Galicia and Serbia have thus far not been scribes the relationship between politics and the the subject of a dedicated study in the English lan‐ military in prewar Austria-Hungary, nor John guage.[2] Schindler’s article on the Serbian campaign are The recently published book A Mad Catastro‐ listed as source material.[3] Also there is no men‐ phe, subtitled The Outbreak of World War I and tion of the use of Russian or Serbian archival ma‐ the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, written by terial. An additional faw is that no "orders of bat‐ Geofrey Wawro, professor of history and director tle" are provided and the scarce maps show posi‐ of the Military History Center at the University of tions only at the army and corps level. These North Texas, claims to fll this void In terms of maps do not match with the narrative that gener‐ coverage this is true. After four introductory ally describes the action at the division level or chapters that cover Austro-Hungarian internal even lower. Consequently it is often difcult to vi‐ politics, the Balkan wars, and the murders in sualize and understand the sequence of events of Sarajevo, the book has dedicated chapters that de‐ the battles described. scribe and analyze the main battles in Polish Gali‐ The author tells the story from a particular cia (Krásnik, Komaróv, Lemberg/Rava Ruska, the Austro-Hungarian perspective. In earlier publica‐ advance on Warsaw, Lodz, and the Carpathian tions the author described the Austro-Hungarian H-Net Reviews army as weak and riven by the confict between leading is the author’s presentation of the German its constituting nationalities.[4] In this new book war plan as an all-encompassing war plan that he seeks to describe the Austro-Hungarian Em‐ called for “rapid mobilization and ofensive use of pire’s history between 1867 and 1918 as a “fatal German and Austrian war plans” (p. xx), while degeneration” (p. xxi) resulting in its defeat and disregarding the fact that the German and Austri‐ dissolution in 1918. The author’s zeal to demon‐ an chief of staf did not meet between 1892 and strate that the empire was moribund and its army 1908 and that there had been hardly any joint woefully unprepared for what it faced is refected planning prior to the war. At several places later in his writing style. Statements are often exagger‐ in the book the author refers to the lack of cooper‐ ated or are in error, quotes are regularly given ation between Germany and Austria-Hungary (pp. without sources, and some given sources do not 64, 80, 125, 129). or only partially support the narrative. For in‐ On several occasions the author provides the stance, when describing the operational planning reader with information that could be considered against Serbia since 1908 the author ofers this new as it has not been published elsewhere. Un‐ quote on pp. 102-103: “Lacking supplies, commu‐ fortunately, in these cases the author fails to back nications and a good overview, our only recourse his statements with proof. Examples are his asser‐ will be a brisk, brave attack.” When going back to tion that the Hungarian authorities “creamed” the the reference it becomes clear that the original army recruits to ensure that the best people were statement in the German language has not been assigned to the Honvéd (the Hungarian militia) (p. translated literally and is defnitely less foolhardy 6) and the claim that decimation was used as pun‐ than the quote by the author.[5] A similar exam‐ ishment in the Austrian army (pp. 354, 359). Nei‐ ple can be found on p. 161 where the author ther assertion is supported with evidence. Anoth‐ writes that “an entire Serbian division wearing er example is his description of the alleged mass pike-gray Austrian coats” was observed. In the desertion of the Czech 28th K.u.K. regiment on original source the referral is to the German Züge, April 3, 1915. On p. 359 the author mentions that which translates to “sections” or “platoons,” but the regiment was dissolved because it “left its defnitely not to “division.”[6] It is also somewhat place in the line in the Carpathians to surrender surprising to see a statement regarding the mobi‐ to the Russians, only to discover that the trench lization problems of the Austrian army supported they thought was full of Russians was actually full by a reference to a French source published in of German infantry.” The author totally ignores March 1914 (!) and not to any other source (p. the recent work by Richard Lein, whose archives- 132). Another example of selective referencing is based reconstruction of the fghts of April 3, 1915 found in the description of the Sarajevo assassina‐ conclusively demonstrates that there was no case tion where the author writes, “The frst (assassin) of mass desertion.[8] There also were no German fred his Browning pistol at a range of thirty feet troops close to the location of the 28th regiment. and missed” (p. 105). This statement is in direct In light of the examples described above (and contradiction to the accepted version that the frst numerous others), I cannot recommend A Mad assailant threw a bomb. The quoted source is Catastrophe. An uninformed reader will get a dis‐ Rudolf Jeřabek’s book Potiorek, which clarifes torted and exaggerated picture of the Austro-Hun‐ that although General Potiorek mentioned a pistol garian army; a well-informed reader should be shot in his report on the assassination, the report careful and trace any story provided in this book was mistaken. The noises Potiorek mistook for to original sources. Unfortunately, A Mad Catas‐ shots were produced by the activation of the hand trophe does not adequately fll the existing void in grenade used by the frst assailant.[7] Equally mis‐

2 H-Net Reviews the literature devoted to the eastern front of [5]. Rudolf Jeřabek, Potiorek (Graz: Verlag World War I and should therefore be considered a Styria, 1991), 99-105. missed opportunity. [6]. Joseph Schön, Šabac! (Reichenberg: Notes Heimatsöhne im Weltkrieg 1918), 26. [1]. The recent works G. Tunstall, Blood on the [7]. Jeřabek, Potiorek, 83-84. Snow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, [8]. R. Lein, Pfichterfüllung oder Hochverrat? 2010) on the Carpathian battles; R. L. DiNardo, (Wien: Lit Verlag GmbH & Co, 2011), 53-201. Breakthrough (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010) on the Gorlice-Tarnow campaign; and T. C. Dowling, Brusilov Ofensive (Bloomington: Indiana Univer‐ sity Press, 2008) are examples of recently pub‐ lished monographs on eastern front battles. [2]. The battles in Galicia and Serbia in 1914 are discussed in more general works like N. Stone, The Eastern Front (London: Penguin, 1975); H. H. Herwig, The First World War (London: Blooms‐ bury, 1997); and H. Strachan, The First World War, Vol. 1: To Arms! (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The only book that focuses on the Austro-Hungarian army exclusively is G. Rothen‐ berg, The Army of Francis-Joseph (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1976), which covers the period 1815-1918. [3]. G. Kronenbitter, Krieg im Frieden (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003); J. Schindler, “Disaster on the Drina: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Serbia, 1914,” War in History 9, no. 2 (2002): 159-195. [4]. See, for instance, G. Wawro, Warfare and Society in Europe 1792-1914 (New York: Rout‐ ledge, 2000), 222, where the author states: “Every reverse in Serbia and Poland was accompanied by massive defections, as Austria-Hungary’s Slavic regiments (the bulk of the army) exhibited a dis‐ tressing tendency to surrender rather than fght”; and G. Wawro, “Morale in the Austro-Hungarian Army: The Evidence of Habsburg Campaign Re‐ ports and Allied Intelligence Ofcers,” in Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced, ed. H. Cecil and P. H. Liddle (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, Pen & Swords Books Ltd., 1996), 399-412.

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Citation: Rian van Meeteren. Review of Wawro, Geofrey. A Mad Catastrophe. H-War, H-Net Reviews. October, 2014.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=41478

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