Review Article the Serbian Exception
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The Serbian exception Review article The Serbian exception CHRISTOPHER CVIIC Serbia under Milosevic: politics in the 1990s. By Robert Thomas. London: Hurst, 1999. 443pp. Index. £39.50. 1 85065 341 0. Pb.: £14.95. 1 85065 367 4. Heavenly Serbia: from myth to Genocide. By Branimir Anzulovic. London: Hurst. 1999. 233pp. Index. £25.00. 1 85065 342 9. Pb.: £14.95. 1 85065 530 8. Il dramma del Kosovo. Dall’ origine del conflitto fra Serbi i Albanesi agli scontri di oggi. By Thomas Benedikter. Rome: DATANEWS Editrice. 1998. 138pp. L22.000. 88 7981 125 8. By its sweep and ferocity, the Serbian campaign of mass expulsions of the bulk of Kosovo’s majority-Albanian population into neighbouring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, which started shortly after the collapse of the international conference on Kosovo in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, stunned the world and provoked widespread condemnation. In Serbia itself, it was followed by a deafening silence: no expressions of sympathy, no public demonstrations, not even any of the individual protests—usual on such occasions elsewhere— from normally quick-off-the-mark and articulate human-rights bodies and concerned individuals. With no dissenting voices being heard, the Serbs seemed to be rallying en masse to the support of the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic, the man who had ordered this genocidal campaign. However, on 19 April, nearly a month and a half into the ‘ethnic dumping’ campaign, Belgrade’s liberals at last came up with a statement circulated by e-mail and entitled ‘Let civility prevail’. The statement condemned NATO’s ‘aggression’ against Serbia and the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) ‘violence targeted against the Serbs, moderate Albanians and other ethnic communities in Kosovo’, but coupled it with a condemnation of ‘the ethic cleansing of the Albanian popu- lation perpetrated by the Yugoslav forces’ and a call for all the refugees from International Affairs 75, () ‒ Christopher Cviic Yugoslavia to be allowed ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to return to their homes, ‘their security and human rights guaranteed, and aid for reconstruction provided’. Perpetrators of crimes against humanity ‘whoever they are’ had to be brought to justice. The fighting between Serbian forces and the KLA had to be stopped immediately in order to start a new round of negotiations, with all sides putting aside their ‘maximalist demands’. This admittedly belated and carefully balanced statement contrasted unfavour- ably with the much more forthright and courageous condemnation in a series of newspaper articles of his fellow-countrymen’s atrocities—also against Kosovo’s Albanians—by Dimitrije Tucovic, the Socialist leader who served as a reserve officer in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 when Serbia was reconquering Kosovo. But the latest Belgrade statement must, in fairness, be seen against the background of NATO’s bombing of Serbia, which had begun only days after the start of Milosevic’s ‘ethnic dumping’ campaign. To expect any population to protest against its government while it is being bombed is, of course, a tall order. Often, as was illustrated by the Allied bombing offensive against Nazi Germany in the Second World War, such bombing has the opposite effect on the civilian population, making it more defiant. This is so especially when the government keeps from its population the news it does not want the population to have. The Milosevic regime can do this thanks to its control during the past decade and a half over the public electronic media and a part of the press in Serbia, a control that—unfortunately—it has been able to tighten since the start of NATO’s bombing of Serbia. Thus, unlike in the rest of the world, there has, for example, been nothing on Serb state-controlled television about atrocities against Kosovo’s Albanians committed by Serb soldiers and paramilitaries assisted by local Serb civilians, only tales of Serbs’ woes caused by foreign bombs. Is this, then, a simple case of ‘don’t-care- because-don’t-know’? Are today’s Serbs really ignorant about what is being done to Kosovo’s Albanians? Not quite—it is more complicated than that and the implications are quite serious and disturbing. Serbia under Milosevic is not a closed country like, for example, North Korea under Kim Il-Sung. In fact, as Robert Thomas, a young British academic who has made a special study of Serbia’s contemporary politics, stresses in his solid, well-researched and highly informative work, Milosevic’s Serbia—though it cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a democratic and pluralist polity—is not a totalitiarian one either, like, for example, North Korea. This is how the author sums up Serbian politics at the end of 1998: For all the entrenched power of the ruling elite, Serbia under Milosevic was not a dictatorship in the totalitarian sense of the word. Opposition political parties, and civic organisations, continued to operate throughout the period, and the independent media continued to publish and broadcast. These freedoms ‘granted’ to the opposition groupings and the media were, however, symptomatic of the strength of the ruling party, and the authoritarian nature of its rule rather than its tolerance and a belief in The Serbian exception democratic practice. While Milosevic and his associates were safe within the institutional citadel they had created, they showed little concern over the activities of the various opposition groups which existed below those commanding heights (p. 424). The author goes on to point out that on certain specific (and, by his own account, not very numerous occasions), when those opposition activities were perceived as a threat to the regime, they were extinguished. However, due care was taken to ensure that all those actions—though they were understood by all concerned to be ‘manifestations of the naked power of the state’—should nevertheless be ‘clothed in the language of legality’. That was easy because there was nothing to fear from the judiciary, one of the regime’s ‘commanding heights’. In an apt definition, the author describes Serbia under Milosevic, as ‘a country where the laws had fallen silent’ (p. 424). This helps to explain why, under the Milosevic regime, independent information, though not available through the state media, remained relatively accessible to those who wanted to be informed. The regime simply did not feel threatened enough to choke off its supply. As the editor of a respected Belgrade economic weekly very critical of the Milosevic regime and its policies once explained to this reviewer, who was wondering why the paper was not being closed down—and why nobody had even thrown a single brick through its windows—‘So few read us, that we are not worth their bothering about us.’ Strictly speaking, therefore, Serbia under Milosevic has never been isolated in media terms. Even now, as the Serb liberals’ statement of 19 April demon- strates, Serbia is still not completely cut off from outside information. Leaving aside the leaflets showered on Serbia from the air by NATO’s planes, which the Serbs—like populations in similar circumstances everywhere—quite under- standably dismiss as propaganda, hundreds of thousands of (by no means only young) Serbs have access to independent international news via their transistors, via satellite TV and of course via the Internet. The Internet was in fact widely and most imaginatively and effectively used at home and even more abroad by the anti-Milosevic opposition to promote its cause in 1996–97. Now, the most vocal elements of the opposition have put their talents at the service of the Milosevic regime’s anti-NATO propaganda campaign, with the result that it is being conducted with considerable sophistication and even wit. What is most disturbing of all is the absence of questioning among this well-informed elite of the possible reasons behind NATO’s actions against Serbia. The 19 April statement notwithstanding, not a single Serbian voice has been heard asking whether Serbia might perhaps have brought at least some of its present misfortunes on itself by its past policies towards neighbouring peoples, not least by what it has been doing for so long to its own citizens who are ethnic Albanians. This raises fundamental questions not only about the nature of the present regime and of the opposition in Serbia but also about the nature of Serbian society. How has Milosevic managed the feat of staying in power so long after Christopher Cviic all the other communist leaders in Europe have been swept from it? And this after the reverses suffered by his expansionist policy in Croatia and in Bosnia and the steady degradation of his population’s living standards coupled with the reduction of Milosevic’s state, even before the latest Kosovo expulsions outrage, to the status of Europe’s pariah? And why has the opposition in Serbia—despite widespread world sympathy and considerable material help it had received from the West (particularly in the media field) - proved so unsuccessful in compari- son with the opposition parties elsewhere in post-communist Europe? (Except of course in neighbouring Croatia, where the opposition has also been specta- cularly unsuccessful against President Franjo Tudjman, who is, like Milosevic, an authoritarian leader but who can—unlike Milosevic—at least claim to be a winner, having presided both over Croatia’s successful defence in 1991 against the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Milosevic’s Serb paramilitaries and over the return, partly by force and partly by diplomacy, of all of Croatia’s territories seized by the Serbs back in 1991.) What lies at the root of Serbian ‘exceptionalism’? It is difficult to disagree with Thomas that ‘the role of Slobodan Milosevic was critical to the persistence of the ancien régime in Serbia’ (p.