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The ANC/SACP/COSATU Programme of Mass Action

• AIMS OF OUR MASS ACTION • When we return to the negotiating table, itshould be to discuss the transfer of power to the people through a democratically-elected Constituent Assembly. • But mass struggle should not end there. Struggle Is the overall process through which the people determine their own future. • Uur programme of massaction must Include the widest possible pro-democracy front.

• CAMPAIGN DIARY e Klerk blundered ter­ ribly af Bolpatong. You can have a scorched earth 1. AGITATION PERIOD Bui it look him some Up to the first half of July we have focussed on broad policy in southern Angola, mobilisation. As part of this, the SACP leadership has days lo realise just hoDw badly he had blundered. addressed over 100 rallies In all major cities and in Ovambo or Mozambique. It is a numerous rural towns from Marble Hall to Mossel Bay. Why? 2. FROM JULY 15 - HEIGHTENED MASS ACTIVITY The answer is that De Klerk different matter in the PWV From July 15 up to the General Strike there will be has been getting away with nu­ hundreds of local and regional initiatives. Each region merous Boipatongs. Since Feb­ become too arrogant He badly and SACP be banned again? will spearhead the occupation of government buildings. ruary 2 1990 he has been nego­ overplayed his hand. The answer was the Boipa­ Other actions will in­ tiating and at the same lime tong massacre. But the brutal clude: waging low iniensity warfare FW's strategy to arrogance of this answer was • marches, including against our people. This strat­ Icounter mass action jusi too much to stomach, even sectoral marches of pen­ egy has worked well for Dc During his recent trip to Japan for a world that has got used to sioners, children, etc. on Klerk. De Klerk bragged to journalists seeingmassacresonTV screens. specific demands; De Klerk has successfully that he had a plan to deal with The sheerscaleof the Boipatong • work-place go-slows; projected himself as a peace­ the ANC-led alliance campaign massacre, and the clearinvolve- • actions directed at maker and a moderate to the of mass action. He bragged that meni of the security forces, was those involved In vio­ international community and to he was going to gel tough. jusi too much. lence. many people in our country. At All of this meant that the But the National Party re­ Among key points of fo­ the same time the violence has cus In this period should world was waiting to see what gime has got used to getting been portrayed as "black on be the regime would do in the days away with atrocities. After all, black" violence, as "tribalism", • • we must following the June 161aunchof the SADF regularly wiped out as "political rivalry" between demand restoration of citizenship and reincorporation. our campaign. villages in southern Angola. Last the ANC and Inkatha. • Violence - dates and events to be decided locally. We Would there be a state of yearwhen 27 people were butch­ need to build a broad coalition, at all levels, against But this time De Klerk had emergency? Would the ANC ered in the Swanieville squatter camp just two days after Dc government murder and corruption. " • SABC - towards the end of July we will launch the Klerk's last visit to Ulundi, campaign for the democratlsation of the SABC. This Is it a coincidence? Inkatha was blamed and there campaign will run beyond the General Strike. were widespread allegations of 3. THE GENERAL STRIKE In 1991 the ANC set a May 4 ultimatum to the regime: end the SAP collusion. • The General Strike will begin on August 3. violence or we suspend talks about talks, But the world quickly for­ • Its duration and the exact form of actions to be taken • May 10 1991, De Klerk travels to Ulundi to consult with got. To this day nobody has on different days are under discussion. These will be Buthelezl about the ANC ultimatum. been prosecuted for the announced soon. 2 days latere Swanieville massacre. The General Strike will Include: • On May 12 1991. twenty seven people killed by IFP hostel And so De Klerk had every • a stayaway on a fixed day (or days) which will be used dwellers in an attack on Swanieville squatter camp* Widespread hope of pursuing his counter- to hold township rallies and other township-based allegations of SAP collusion and assistance* strategy to our peaceful mass mobilising activities; In 1992 June 16, ANC*alliance launches mass action campaign. action campaign. His strategy • city and town-centre occupations and otheractlons on • June 16, for only the second time in many years, FW De Klerk continued in motion as if it other clearly designated days. Hundreds of thousands of travels to Ulundi to consult with Buthelezi on the ANC stand. strikers will move Into the city centres. hadn't lost its clothes. Captain One day later... 4. BEYOND THE GENERAL STRIKE CraigKoize, the chief SAP press • On June 17, the Boipatong massacre*.. A Other mass action Is being planned. liaison officer, had obviously been told in the weeks before Miry 1992

AT HE CAN'T ALWAYS GET AWAY WITH MURDER a aw

• THE CARD • THE CARDS • THE CARD • THE CARD Gatsha Buthelezi Special forces SABC News De Klerk the Joker and hostel Jailers

THE THICK THE TRICK THE TRICK THE TRICK Unite anti-democratic Unleash violence on people, Blame the ANC Present FW as 'the forces hiding state involvement Peacemaker1 (card 2) behind 'black on JUNE 18 JUNE 16 black violence' (card 3) Captain Craig Kobe: JUNE 20 De Klerk goes to Ulundi 'Boipatong was caused De Klerk goes to I JUNE 17 by the ANC's mass Boipatong Boipatong massacre action*

thatit was essential IOlay blame ting that there was "some secu­ that he momentarily forgot that Klerk is trying to be a Special Bui Boipatong is less than an for violence on the ANC. And rity force involvement" after all, he is supposed to be presenting Forces high commander and hour away from the largest con­ so on June 18, Koizc dutifully but they were "rogue elements himselfasasuper-dcmocrat.On Violcia Chamorro at the same tingent of international press told a disbelieving world thai acting without any higher au­ the afternoon of June 20 he mut­ time. people on the African continent. the Boipatong massacre "was thority". tered threats about a state of But the people of Boipatong It is in the heartland of the most caused by the ANC's mass ac­ And when Captain Kotze emergency. If you catch him arc perfectly capable of seeing industrialised part of our coun­ tion campaign". makes this claim, we will re­ out, FW starts lo become be­ behind president Dc try. mind him that he said "It is a lie come PW. Klerk's crocodile tears, the cold Unleashing a killing machine One step behind that President FW De Klerk has De Klerk blundered at Boipa­ eyes of the chief commander of into this kindof situation is much Ithe news lost control of the security tong. Part ofth e reason has been the SAP. more transparent than in a re­ That had been pan of the plan, forces." sheer arrogance on his part. But mote bush war to unleash violence and then In being one step behind in there are other reasons. Bush war A massacre in Boipatong blame ourcampaign. ButKotze this way, the regime's propa­ I killing machines also impacts directly on the played that trick too soon after gandists have unintentionally FW de Klerk, There is another reason for Dc economy of our country. Boipatong. too obviously. And revealed that they are indeed Ithe Joker Klerk's blunder To conduct the The captains of industry in so it has been in the weeks since acting in terms of a co-ordinated The kind of strategy De Klerk is low intensity warfare, FW re­ never expressed the Boipatong massacre. The national strategy. using has worked best in situa­ lies on highly professional kill­ any public misgivings about the regime's propaganda machine tions like Nicaragua where US ing machines like Koevoet and dirty warin Angola orNamibia. has been churning out its inter­ FW goes to Special Forces together with lo­ Battalion 32. But it is another thing when pretation of events, according IBoipatong cal puppet forces like the Contras But it is one thing to massa­ their own work-force is to its pre-arranged plan. But, An even more arrogant miscal­ wage low intensity war against cre civilians in the remote bush destabilised here at home. ridiculuously, its statements culation was De Klerk's visit to the people. of northern Namibia and south­ This sets up contradictions have always been one step be­ Boipatong on June 20. Once At the same time BUT ern Angola, It is a bit different within the ruling bloc itself. hind the news. more, he was being half too SEPARATELY a "moderate" doing it in the industrial heart­ You can have a scorched When it was clear that clever, he was revealinghisstrat- politician like Violeta Chamorro land of South Africa. earth policy in southern Angola. KwaMadala hostel dwellers had egy too blatantly. is cultivated as an alternative to Of course, a massacre in a Ovambo or Mozambique. been involved in the massacre, On June 18 the National Party the national liberation forces. township or a squatter camp is It is a different matter in the the SAP was blaming the ANC. announced the launch of its elec­ Here in South Africa, Dc still not a massacre in a suburb. PWV, * Whenitbcgantolook as though tion campaign into the black ar­ Koevoet wasdirectly involved, eas. It intended to present itself the SAP suddenly had a burst of as a force for peace and modera­ activity, and agreed that the hos­ tion standing "above the terrible Kriel must go! tel-dwellers were involved af­ spiral of black on black vio­ ter all -"but there was abso­ lence". Minister of "Law and Order" Hernus Kriel is one of lutely no evidence of any secu­ And so the arrogant De Klerk the key figures in De Klerk's Low Intensity War rity force involvement whatso­ travelled to Boipatong on June against our people. ever." 20 with this intended message. The death of over 6000 people in political vio­ One day it will finally and He really expected the people of lence since 1990 leaves him cold. conclusively be shown that Boipatong to forget that he De A month or two ago he was overheard by several Boipatong was part of an over­ Klerk had been consorting with peoplein the corridors of CODESAjokingabout the all low intensity war sanctioned Buthelezi on the very eve of the terrible violence in the townships: "Dit is maar net at the very highest level. When massacre. die Sesde Kafferoorlog" ("It's just the Sixth Kaffir that happens, you can be sure De Klerk was so stunned by War")* * Captain Kotze will be admit­ the reception he got at Boipatong ,^a a.N July 1992 How to defeat low Intensity Warfare HOStelS: I • Build DEMOCRATIC organisations, In depends on disinformation and confusion. Mozambique and Angola — here should be no doubt at which differences are debated openly and • EXPOSE UW - we must welcome the this stage about the pattern in a comradely fashion — Low Intensity media, we must call for International BUT HERE IN SOUTH AFRICA — of the violence on the Warfare exploits factionalism, whispers monitoring. • UW is being used in the industrial T and gossip Inside the liberation move­ • We must be the champions of PEACE and heartland of our country, In the full glare Witwatersrand. There is One re­ ment. DISCIPLINE - every act of Indiscipline, of the world's TV cameras. This makes It a curring feature in all the killing • Mid UNIFIED organisations — UW every piece of ultra-milItant rhetoric, •such more clumsy and risky weapon for and that is the presence of seeks to spilt leadership from Its base. every act of coercion against the people, De Klerk. It also disrupts FW's own Inkatha- and more particularly, • Build a BROAD DEMOCRATIC COALITION every short-crt Is a space tor UW to economy, we must make him pay. of its Youth Brigade. exploit. against murder and corruption — UW • UW depends on building a credible "pro- Around the middle of 1991, abas to build Its own "moderate" coali­ Western" alternative to the liberation tion. REMEMBER — movement. FW was hoping to be that there were positive develop­ • Build a DISCIPLINED SELF-DEFENCE LIW has worked quite well for the imperial­ alternative. Let us make sure that the ments in progress around the ability — UW wants communities to feel ists In places like Nicaragua and the people of our country and world never hostels in most areas of the hopeless. Philippines. It has also had a devastating forget the blood of Bolpatong. Transvaal. The hostility which • Spread INFORMATION abort UW — UW effect In remote rural areas of UW CAN BE DEFEATED! had been festering between hos­ tel dwellers and the residents of

umerous self defence the horrifying method of use of SDUs as the cutting edge units (SDUs) have been SACP general-secretary necklacing. It is extremely im­ forpolitical work - for example, established in our coun- portant to note that the entire comrades sometimes want to N tiy since the December CHRIS HANI writes about national liberation movement take a political short-cut "Let's 1990 ANC Consultative Con­ has taken a very, very strong attack the hostel", they say, in­ ference resolution in this regard. ions to be learnt on the stand against the barbaric stead of addressing the whole There can be no question that method of necklacing. question of the hostel politi­ the formation of these units has growth of Self-Defence Units cally. We must avoid at all cost contributed to saving many, Obstructing police tendencies to elevate military many lives in a situation of es­ These, then, are some of the their authority from such com­ • Some elements have used and offensive action over politi­ calating violence. positive and inspiring features munity based organisations. SDUs to obstruct the police cal and defensive operations. The formation of SDUs has of the SDUs. These positive fea­ when the police have been en­ also meant there has been space tures once more underline the Absence of political control gaged in justifiable crime pre­ Infiltration of SDUs for building democratic organi­ absolute correctness of our reso­ • As a result of this first weak­ vention activities. SDUs must •The enemy is generally wor­ sations. The very existence of lution calling for their forma­ ness, there has often been aglar- never be seen to be sheltering ried by our movement's strat­ the ANC in Richmond, Natal, to tion. ing absence of political control criminals. Criminals who prey egy to encourage the setting up take just one example, has de­ But, generally speaking, it is and a clear line of command. on our communities can never of SDUs. Consequently the po­ pended upon the capacity of the now time to revisit this whole Where this is the case SDUs be seen as modem-day Robin lice and Military Intelligence people to defend themselves. area of SDUs honestly and self- have sometimes been hijacked Hoods. have intensified their strategies An inspiring feature in the critically. We must admit that by criminal elements. These el­ to smash SDUs. Already we formation of the SDUs has also their record has been uneven. ements have then used the space Weapons aren't for settling know of some SDUs that are been (he great popular creativ­ created by the SDU to organise differences heavily infiltrated. In some cases ity we have seen. Weakness all sorts of rackets. I have heard • The weapons in the hands of elements of the system have ac­ Many SDUs have demon­ • In the first place, there has of examples where some SDUs SDUs must never be used to tually taken over SDUs. strated the potential our people often been a clear weakness on have tried to exact a special tax settle political differences, or to They then use them to carry have to organise themselves, to the side of the political organi­ on township business-people get rid of a leadership by threats. out operations to discredit the acquire skills and weaponry. sations themselves. Thefirst step with some implied consumer Even if the leadership in ques­ national liberation movement. Our people have been mov­ in setting up an SDU isstrength- boycott if they don't comply. tion has become extremely un­ Wrongtargets have deliberately ing away from the old habit of ening our political and commu­ Political organisations mustcurb popular, the only way to settle been selected, attacks have been passively waiting for material nity organisations. Individuals any such tendency immediately. political differences is through carried out that are not under­ from MK. cannot just set themselves up as debate, and through the proper stood or even denounced by the MK does not and will not an SDU. Community control is Kangaroo courts democratic channels. community. have the capacity to defend our central to SDUs. SDUs must • We have also seen an alarm­ The infiltration of SDUs has people against all the violence serve the interests of the com­ ing revival of kangaroo courts Political short cuts also led to a situation where coming from the system. munity, and they must derive and kangaroo justice and even • Another great danger is the rivalry has been stoked between My 1992 • UMSEEEHZI • iwelling units or military bases? the surrounding lownshi ps since in July KwaZuiu Chief Minister became the focus of much of the prevalent. Areas around hostels 1976 - when hostel dwellers 1990, Youth Brigade leaders Buthelezi into the Transvaal, and war of destabilisaiion. like Sebokcng's KwaMazisa were used as police auxiliaries moved from hostel to hostel make htm a political force more Two, with the hostels con­ and most of the hostels in and against township youth - were playing on tribal tensions, per­ to be reckoned with than his solidated as IFP strongholds, a around Pretoria - where the IFP in the processof being resolved. suading Zulu-speaking inmates miniscule degree of democratic cycle of violence was initiated never succeeded in getting a The hostels were gradually be­ their lives were under threat support would indicate. from within the hostels which foothold - have remained rela­ coming integrated into the from the ANCand the 'Xhosas'. Two thi ngs happened around continues to this day. This vio­ tively untouched by the town­ broader community. At the same time large numbers the time of the IFP takeover of lence has apparently been geared ship killings. At this point a campaign of of IFP impis were moved into hostels: one, non-IFP support­ toward destabili sation and sow- Equally suggestive is the fact militancy conducted from the Transvaal from Natal, pro­ ing hostel dwellers were either ing terror in random ways among that it was only after impis forc­ within the ranks of the IFP's viding a fightingcor e to be de­ killed or forced out of the hos­ the township population atlarge. ibly took over Madala hostel in Youth Brigade woilced to turn ployed in the hostel-centred vio­ tels, making way for impis from In every case, it is areas Alexandra in March 1991 that hostels on the Reef into little lence which followed.The broad Natal. Manyhostel refugees then where there arc IFP-controllcd this area became, in a matter of more than military barracks. strategy was* cynically, to ex­ moved into squatter camps sur­ hostels that the violence has been months, one of the worst With the formation of the tend the sphere of influence of rounding the hostels - which flashpoints in the country. *

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•••*, . - / SDUs. taking advantage of poor co-ordination between differ­ ent SDUs. This has happened in IM•• *-#- the Vaal, for instance.

Lessons From all of these negative prob­ •. lems certain clear lessons emerge: • selection of people for SDUs, especially for the leadership of punishing people who act SDUs, must be carried out with trary to the aims and objectives extreme care. Only people with of the democratic movement and a clear track-record of service of the SDUs themselves. to their communities should be * It is very important that the selected. political and community organi­ Care must be taken to avoid sations look into the welfare of those whose main track-record members of SDUs. They often > is militant rhetoric. Make sure get picked up by the system, that people incorporated into they and their families need le­ SDUs are not lumpen elements gal and other assistance, Other­ - people who are highly adven­ wise demoralisation will set in. WJ turous, often very brave, but I raise all of these criticisms who are open to manipulation notinordertoundermincSDUs. by the system. On thecontrary.it iscrystal clear • SDUs should never be cut off that our people desperately need from the leadershipof commu­ to be able to defend theirhomes, nity organisations. The leader­ their young children, their aged ship of these organisations must parents, their own lives. demand reports from the SDUs Our struggle needs well- ontheiractivitiesandtheremust organised SDUs made up of our be a regular check on material best revolutionary fighters. used. We need SDUs lhat are ever • Community and political or­ sensitive to the needs of our * *l ganisations must be seen to be people. * UMSEBEHZi • July 1992 How to wage war without it looking like yoi he massacrea t Boipatong one former commander of US Vietnam the United States im­ has underlined what Special Operations in El Salva­ Rule 1: 'Let Asians fight Asians' perialist discovered that often Tmany have been arguing. dor described it, "total war at the best targets for assassina­ De Klerk is using a deliberate the grassroots level." Rule 2: Destabilisation tion were the second and third strategy of "low intensity war" LIW draws upon many ear­ Rule 3: Disinformation layer leadership - the critical against our people. lier counter-insurgency and co­ connection between the national But what is "low intensity lonial and neo-colonial strate­ Rule 4: Build a 'moderate', and head-office leadership of war'"? gies - divide-and-rule, winning 'reformist' alternative democratic organisations and "Low intensity war" (LIW) "hearts and minds", dirty tricks their regional and grass-roots is ihe latest in a series of impe­ operations, assassinations and has used all kinds of proxy forces recting and supplying the pup* support, rialist strategies to counter na­ death squads. But LIW place - Renamo, Unita, ihe Lesotho pet forces. The Special Forces Theassassinattonofnational tional liberation struggles. It was much more stress onusing proxy Liberation Army, Askaris, IFP/ are also used for highly leaders (which can never be developed as a strategy after the (puppet) forces than earlier strat­ KZP, kitskonstabels, etc. This specialised tasks like assassina­ ruled out) is, nonetheless, a high United States suffered ahumili- egies. often means less financial cost. tion, infiltration and intelligence risk operation. ating defeat in Vietnam in the Bui most importantly the politi­ gathering. Unless it can be "blamed" 1970s. Rule l:'Let Asians fight cal cost is lower: on factionalism within our The defeat of the most pow­ Asians' • There arc far fewer deaths of Rule 2: Destabilisation movement it would have incal­ erful army in the world by a In using puppet forces it prefers white conscripts, and, The main objective of LIW is culable international and na­ national liberation movement in to use those of the same nation­ • Above all, responsibility is not military victory, bui tional repercussions. But the a poor third world country led ality as the people it is fighting. disguised. Violence is presented destabilisation. Once a country elimination of second and third US strategists to review their This is the first way in which as "black on black" violence, as or a community has been thor­ layer leadership on the ground approach to counter-insurgency. [he cost is "low" forthe imperi­ "intcr-cthnic tri bal v iolence", or oughly destabilised, the long- is less risky,an d possibly much This led to the strategy which alists. even as "factional" violence suffering, war-weary people will more damaging to our organi­ they call Low Intensity Conflict Anticipating LIW strategy. between hawks and doves* com­ vote for a pro-Western, "mod- sations. or Low Intensity War. United States secretary of state munists and nationalists, within crate" government. John Foster Dulles in the 1950s the national liberation move­ Destabilisation in our situa­ Rule 3: Disinformation What's 'low' about LIW? said the best way to maintain ment itself. tion involves twomajor features: As US colonel Oliver North The first thing to remember American power in the Pacific But LIW usually also in* • general destabilisation and recently put it: "There is great about LIW is that it is an impe­ was "to let Asians fightAsians. " volves the use of some Special demoralisation of communities deceit and deception practised rialist term - it is "low" cost for Does that sound familiar? Forces drawn from the imperi­ through random violence (train in the conduct of covert opera­ THEM. But for the third world The apartheid regime has alist army (or in our case the murders and massacres like tions. They are at essence a lie." communities against which it is followed this principle system­ SADF and SAP). These special Boipatong) and The NP Sunday newspaper directed it is HIGH cost. It is, as atically over the past decade. It forces ate used for training, di­ • well targetted assassination. In Rapport outlined the De Klerk The soldiers who do the dirty work: The Spec here is no real telling just destabilise the political oppo­ as they exist today are as fol­ how long or how numer­ nents of the state. Secret aod semi-secret organs lows: Tous are the tentacles of Many of these loose group- • 32 Batalllon, created in 1976 the covert structures of the ingsare connected to paramili­ ol state power proliferated at and made up 1600 to 1800 South African security forces. tary organisations like com­ largely of Portuguese-speaking Under the influence of total mercial security firms (e.g. such a rate that it is doubtful mercenary soldiers. The bata- onslaught theory, and under Springbok Patrols) and far Hion is based at Pomfrets in the the rule of PW Botha's Secu­ right wing organisations, re­ that even the top securocrats Northern Cape, rity Council, secret and semi- secret organs of state power main on the loose today. are fully In control of the whole It was formerly involved in proliferated at such a rate and These 'special forces* con­ conventional operations in with such deviousness that it is tinue to be a factor in the co­ Angola. More recently, it has doubtful that even the top vert strategies of the regime. Secret Forces apparatus been deployed as a' peacekeep­ securocrats are fully In control ing* force in Natal and in Reef of the whole Secret Forces ap­ SAP covert forces Koevoet, made up mainly of the Boipatong massacreof June townships. paratus. SAP-connected outfits like the i) vambos recruited during the 17. An example of 32 BatalHon's Vlakplaas-based Askari and Namlblan war, has resurfaced It is believed that members peacekeepingstylewasonview Millions in secret funding Security Police squads con­ - as South African citizens* of the unit could also have been recently when members went and much hardware were tinue to be operational despite There is widespread belief that involved in numerous train on Ihe rampage in Thokoza, made available during the government claims that they Koevoet is involved in the on­ massacresand in repression in killing, maiming and looting at 1970s and 1980s for informal have become non-political in­ going hostel violence* Phola Park* where attackers random. repression. vestigative units, involved in After 42 Koevoet members were heard to speak foreign In the face of public outrage such exercises as dealing with were discovered biding out at languages, and recommendations by the Loose groupings stock theft. Goldfields' Greenside Colliery Goldstone Commission that It In many instances there ap­ More recently, another near Witbank, the Goldstone SADF Special Forces be disbanded, the government pears to have been just a gen­ 'stock theft unit', the notori­ Commission heard evidence SADF SpecialForces deployed has made no moves whatever eral brief to attack and ous SAP 'support1 unit, that the unit was involved in for covert military operations in this direction. re doing the fighting... regime's approach in similar After a scries of defeats in have occurred in the Reef and words: "Say one thing* but do the late 1960s and the first half southern Transvaal in the past the other. Keep simultaneously, of the 1970s, the US has since two years costing the lives of a whole lot of options open in managed very successfully to 1250 people - an average of 25 struggle. But above all. never snatch victory from national lib­ per atrocity. allow the people lo realise what eration movements, combining Wecouldgoonandon.But you are really doing." LIWandthecreationofa"mod- the last word belongs to SAP As part of the LIW erate" political bloc. Two no­ press liaison officer, Cap­ disinformation operation the table examples, among many tain Craig Kotze. Reacting SADF runs whal it calls others, are the Philippines(Cory to allegations that Boi- COMOPS. MajorNico Basson. Aquino) and Nicaragua (Violeta patong showed that FW himself a participant in these Chamorro). De Klerk had lost con­ activities, has revealed that a Sometimes, however, where trol of his security massive COMOPS operation acrcdiblc alternative is not to be forces. Captain Kotze was run in Namibia during the found outside of the liberation said that it was "an first elections there. movement, LIW is used to trans­ absolute lie." The aim was to discredit form the liberation movement Exactly. * Swapo, and build up the cred­ from within. ibility of DTA. The aim is to try, through Al present, here in South massive destabilisation. to turn Africa, one of the main aims of the liberation movement into a the disinformation campaign is reformist, pro-imperialist party. to portray the huge wave of LIW violence as "black on But is De Klerk really using black". UW? Hundreds of facts can be quoted Rule 4: Build a 'moderate', to underline what township 'reformist' alternative dwellers throughout South Af­ The objective of LIW is the rica know from their own daily political defeat of a national lib­ experience. Since February 2 eration movement. This re­ 1990 over 6000 people have been quires that some "moderate"al- killed in political violence. temative is manufactured. No fewer than 49 massacres al Force killing machines • Fhreseparatereconnstssance Force manpower to Special support of Renamo bandits in regiments totallingabout7000 Forces. In the event of a mas­ Mozambique, it is the only highly and unconventionally sive clampdown over mass ac­ recce regiment alleged to have trained and dangerous SADF tion, it is likely that2 Recce will been deployed recently inside soldiers, whose overall head­ be among the first units to be the country, in a commuter quarters is at Spieskop outside fully mobilised. train attack In Benrose, Jo­ Pretoria. While they have ap­ • 3 Recce was formed to accom­ hannesburg. parently not been deployed in modate former members of the • Added to these officially ex­ recent covert operations inside Rhodesian Special Forces, and tant special forces regiments, South Africa, they have yet to was later fused with the CCB. there is also the former CCB. be demobilised. • 4 Recce, made up of some 300 When the former 'Section • 1 Recce: Based in Natal, 1 to 400 personnel is based at 6' (the internal arm of the spe­ Recce is made up of 1000 to Langebaan, and is specially cial forces) was disbanded in 1200 soldiers at present. In­ equipped for seaborne opera­ July 1990, many of its mem­ volved in recce training, the tions. It was believed to have bers were reincorporated into unit has also been involved in been integrally involved in other special forces outfits. raids in Maputo, Maseru and sabotage operations in Angolan Gaberone, as well as Angolan harbours. Military Intelligence operations, and in the training • 5 Recce, between 500 and 600 Finally (though not properly a of MNR rebels. strong. Is, like 32 Batallion, 'special forces' outfit) there is • 2 Recce is the largest of the made up largely of Portuguese the SADF's Department of recce regiments, with an over­ speakers, but this time re­ Military Intelligence, a giant all reserve strength of between cruited from Mozambique. It apparatus In Itself and inte­ 2 000 and 3 000 members. The is made up of intelligence as grally involved in repression special function of this recce well as operational comman­ against political opponents of group is to provide Citizen dos. Extensively deployed in the state. * UMSEBEHZI • July 1992 lan Tloome: Patriot and communist an Tloome ihe SACP's part in building up the In thai year ihc underground immediate past chair­ Mineworkers' Union and in SACP look the decision to send person died in organising die great strike of Uncle Dan out of the country to Johannesburg on June 1946 in which nearly 100 000 promote the work of the move­ D12afteralongillncss. Known to miners went on strike. ment abroad- all his comrades as "Oom" Uncle Dan played a promi­ Through the exile years, Dan (Uncle) Dan, he was bom in nent part in the organisation of Tloome remained a staunch Bloemfontein in 1919. die historic revolutionary- He served as a After attending school in of 1952. central committee member of Bloemfontein, Uncle Dan stud­ Together wiih olhcr leaders the SACP, and as an executive ied at the Modderpoon Angli­ and militants he was tried and member of the ANC and can Teachers' Training Insti­ convicted under die Suppres­ SACTU. During the 1970s he tute where he graduated as a sion of Communism Act for his was appointed Deputy Secre­ teacher. part in leading die campaign. tary General of the ANC- In 1986 he was elected SACP Towards the end of the 1920s Uncle Dan's outstanding role chairperson. the family moved to Johannes­ on all fronts of struggle made burg and Uncle Dan followed him a prime target for die wave After the unbanning of the some time later. In of apartheid repression then ANC and SACP Dan Tloome Johannesburg he gave up teach­ sweeping die country. finally relumed to South Africa ing and became an organiser in (CNETU). He was later to become full- He was barred from attend­ in 1991- It is one of the sad­ the Milling Workers' Union, of CNETU was the direct fore­ timcsccretary/bookkccperofthc ing gatherings, and he was or­ nesses of our struggle that by which he was later elected sec­ runner of SACTU and CO- national ANC. At the 1949 ANC dered to resign from all organi­ the time of his return Uncle Dan retary. SATU. Among the first offi­ conference. "Uncle Dan' sations to which he belonged. was in poor health. cials of CNETU was Dan Tloome wasoneof thenewmili- Undeterred by die harass­ The new generation of young Trade Unions Tloome, who was elected vice- tants elected to the national ex­ ment, he became editor of the revolutionaries were never able With die outbreak ofth e Second president. ecutive committee. journal Liberation, which in­ to see Dan Tloome in his prime, World War, African workers cluded among its contributors one of the giants of our struggle, flocked into industry and a new ANC Communist Party Ruth First, Duma Nokwe, one of those who played a criti­ wave of militancy swept through Dan Tloome also became very Itwasalsoduringtheearly 1940s , OliverTambo cal role in the years when our the trade union movement. In active in the ANC in the course dial Dan Tloome became an and Walter Sisulu. movement truly discovered its November 1941 a meeting of of the 1940s. He was a founder active member of die Commu­ vocation and its mass and work­ trade union delegates from all member of the ANC Youth nist Party. He was elected to the Exile ing class base. over the Transvaal was held in League (launched in 1944). He Johannesburg District Commit­ The apanheid regime's vindic- Dan Tloome, pioneer trade Johannesburg. This meeting was elected chairperson of the tee of the Party and later to the tiveness againsi Uncle Dan con­ unionist, militant patriot and launched the Council of Non- Orlando branch of die ANC in Central Committee. Togedier tinued. In 1963 he was placed communist - H AMB A KAHLE, European Trade Unions 1945. with JB Marks, he played a big under house arrest. OOM DAN! Flying the flag all over South Africa Since May Day the SACP's leadership has been involved in a countrywide campaign to meet the people. In the two months to the beginning of July SACP general secretary cde Chris Hani, in particular, has been on the road. He has been to more than a hundred meetings in this period. In some cases he has been to as many as five meetings in a day* One of the biggest gatherings took place in Kimberley, wherre militant comrades from the Chris Hani Park squatter camp crammed into the local stadium to hear a delegation from head office. • The mystery ol the death of one of the SACP's most dedicated young cadres has not CdeChrishassincebeen to Bloemfontein and Welkom yet been solved. Cde Fani Johannes Jiba, 36, died on June 3 after being shot by a in the ; Pietersburg, Phalaborwa and security guard at a taxi rank in Butterworth in the . At the time, he was chair­ Steelpoort in the Northern Transvaal. In the Border person of the Party's Transkei region. region he hascovered East London and environs; Cat heart, • The famous MK short bursts of the AK47 were the cream on top of full military Dordrecht, Indwe, Barkly East, Seymour, Balfour, honours for Cde Jiba - whose MK name was Mdidiyela Mbambo - at his funeral in East Adelaide and Fort Beaufort. He has covered the PWV London on June 21 (see photo above). region and the Western Cape. Thousands of peoplecountrywidehaveattendedSACP • Police, who had been observing the funeral from a distance, advanced on mourners meetings in this period to confirm the Party belief that to try to find out where the fire came from - but in true guerilla fashion, the weapon socialism is the future. * was concealed.

Issued by me Souiti African Communist Parly, PO Box 1027, Jonannesourg 2000.