EXCERPTED FROM Encyclopedia of South Africa

edited by Krista Johnson and Sean Jacobs

Copyright © 2011 ISBN: 978-1-58826-749-8 hc

1800 30th Street, Ste. 314 Boulder, CO 80301 USA telephone 303.444.6684 fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the Lynne Rienner Publishers website www.rienner.com CONTENTS

Preface vii Map of South Africa viii

Encyclopedia of South Africa 1 Appendix1 Chronology 325 Appendix2 HeadsofStateSince1910 331 Appendix 3 Government Structures 333 Appendix 4 Provinces and Major Cities 335 Appendix 5 Political Parties in theApril 2009 National Elections 337 Appendix 6 Key Racial andApartheid Legislation, 1856–1967 339

List of Acronyms 343 The Contributors 345 Index 349 About the Book 373

v A

Abdurahman, Abdullah (In the Union of South Africa, coloured males in (1872–1940) the Cape Province who met certain income, prop- Abdullah Abdurahman, a politician and a physi- erty, and education standards were granted the cian, was born in the town of Wellington into a right to vote.) Later, between 1927 and 1934, relatively affluent CAPE MALAY family. He Abdurahman and the APO started working more received his medical training in Glasgow, Scot- closely with black African political leaders in an land, qualifying as a doctor in 1893, but received attempt to create a united front. However, little his early education in Wellington and then in CAPE came of this, and some contemporary commenta- TOWN where he set up his medical practice upon tors regard the APO’s position as being too returning to South Africa. accommodating to the white authorities. By the In 1904, Abdurahman was elected Cape late 1930s, other political parties, such as the Town’s first COLOURED city councilor, and he more radical National Liberation League, had sur- remained a councilor almost without interruption passed the APO in prominence, leaving Abdurah- until his death. He worked to improve the condi- man and his party with a mixed political legacy. tions of the coloured community, especially Nonetheless, Abdurahman was clearly a powerful within the field of education, and helped set up the politician and popular among the non-European first secondary schools for coloured children in community. Cape Town. But much of his political work was directed through the African Political Organiza- tion (APO), of which he was elected president in Achmat, Abdurazzack (Zackie) 1905. The APO’s goal was to fight the increasing (1962–) racial oppression in the country, initially only on Founder and president of the AIDS activist group behalf of non-African coloureds. Before the cre- the TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, Abdurazzack ation of the UNIONOF SOUTH AFRICA in 1910, (Zackie) Achmat was a child activist in his native Abdurahman unsuccessfully led two delegations CAPE TOWN (he was arrested numerous times to London to secure franchise rights for coloureds. between 1976 and 1980) and a gay rights activist

1 2 Act of Union in JOHANNESBURG in the late 1980s and the early MATTHEWS became the first black head of the 1990s. Raised in a Muslim COLOURED family, school in 1925, and prominent political leaders Achmat studied at the University of the Western including Luthuli and GOVAN MBEKI were teach- Cape where he received his bachelor’s degree in ers at the college for a period of time. The school English in 1993. He is a member of the AFRICAN continues to operate today. NATIONAL CONGRESS but has publicly clashed with the political party’s hierarchy, particularly with former South African president THABO MBEKI, Affirmative Action over the government’s AIDS policies. Openly gay Also referred to as “employment equity,” named and HIV-positive, Achmat helped found the for the Employment Equity Act passed in 1998, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality affirmative action is integrally connected with the in 1994 and advocated for laws and policies for- government’s broader policy of BLACK ECONOMIC bidding discrimination based on sexual orienta- EMPOWERMENT (BEE). Against a background of tion in the postapartheid dispensation. In 1998, he racial disparities in skilled jobs inherited from helped found the TreatmentAction Campaign, ini- APARTHEID, the law is designed to ensure that des- tially aimed at advocating for affordable and ignated groups defined as black people (meaning accessible antiretroviral drugs (ARV) for people Africans, COLOUREDS, and INDIANS), women, and living with AIDS. He himself has succumbed to people with disabilities have equal opportunities numerous AIDS-related illnesses and must take for employment. The policy has been vigorously ARV drugs. In January 2008, he married his part- applied in the public sector, though less vigor- ner Dallie Weyers (South Africa legalized gay ously by private businesses. Businesses with more marriage in December 2006). Achmat was nomi- than fifty employees and with an annual turnover nated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004. defined in the Employment Equity Act are subject See also TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN to the legislation. The law requires that employers draw up an equity plan, achieve certain quotas and specific outcomes, and submit reports to the Act of Union Department of Labor. Critics of affirmative action See SOUTH AFRICA ACT argue that it has benefited a small group of well- connected black businesspeople and has excluded coloureds and Indians among its beneficiaries. Adams College White critics claim it amounts to “reverse Adams College was a mission school established racism.” In turn, proponents of affirmative action by US missionary Dr. Newton Adams in 1853 in argue that forty years of apartheid rule can be con- present-day KwaZulu-Natal Province. It is the sidered de facto affirmative action for whites and second oldest school, after Lovedale, established that the postapartheid government has an obliga- to educate black South Africans. Originally tion to redress some of the past imbalances. named Amanzimtoti Insitute, this school inspired See also BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT many Africans to attain higher levels of education and boasts many famous alumni, including Chief ALBERT LUTHULI, Chief MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, African National Congress and Dr. Nkosasana Zuma. Like so many great In the years following the 1994 democratic transi- schools during the APARTHEID era, Adams College tion, the African National Congress (ANC) has suffered the impact of racism and segregation but dominated South African politics. The legitimacy has experienced a revival in the postapartheid era. and popularity of the movement has its more With the passage of the BANTU EDUCATION Act in immediate origins in securing black majority rule 1953, the college was renamed the Amanzimtoti in 1994, but its deeper genesis lies in the ANC’s Zulu Training School but was named Adams Col- long history of resistance to white rule, both legally lege again with the demise of apartheid. Z. K. until 1960 and underground and in exile until 1990. African National Congress 3

The Formative Years (1912–1940) groups supportive of interracial cooperation. The ANC was founded in 1912 as the South Another short period of ANC radicalism under African Native National Congress (it became the President J. T. Gumede ended in 1930 when Seme ANC in 1923) at a convention in BLOEMFONTEIN assumed the presidency, ushering in a period of called by Pixley Seme, a political activist, lawyer, profound stagnation. and journalist who had been educated in Britain At the provincial level, ANC politics were and the United States. The formation of the ANC complex. While most members were urban based, was prompted by the 1909 SOUTH AFRICA ACT of a House of Chiefs was modeled on the British Union that largely excluded blacks from political House of Lords, and ethnic politics were not franchise. (In the Cape, some African and entirely absent. In Natal, A. W. G. CHAMPION COLOURED males could vote as part of a qualified forged ties between the ICU and ANC, but the franchise.) Provincial congresses had emerged ANC in Natal was split. There also were rival over the previous decade, and, in 1912, these were branches in the Cape Province, with Western Cape united under the leadership of JOHN DUBE (presi- ANC president James Thaele espousing radical dent) and SOLOMON PLAATJE (secretary). Founder GARVEYISM and James Calata in the Eastern Cape Seme, who was partly influenced by his studies in pursuing a moderate path. Nationally, the ANC the United States at Columbia University where remained weak and lacked strong media outlets. he gained some appreciation of the US structures The Transvaal ANC’s organ, Abantu-Batho, of government, notably Congress, emphasized became the national medium but was defunct by national unity over ethnic-regional divisions, and the early 1930s, and the ANC never developed a this remained a central policy. strong, permanent newspaper. The period of ANC formation saw diverse In its first three decades, the ANC remained ideological currents among Africans: from Chris- small, with limited mass appeal. Provincial struc- tianity, British empire loyalism, and liberalism to tures were loosely structured and poorly financed. nascent AFRICAN NATIONALISM; the ANC did not Estimates of nationwide membership vary from adopt the latter until the 1940s, but its influence 1,000 to 4,000 in the interwar years, though an gradually spread. The nature of power in a white interlocking of membership with grassroots, com- settler society created a deeply ambiguous context munity-based Advisory and Vigilance associa- in whichAfrican political culture developed. ANC tions gave it wider, indirect support. Nevertheless, leaders were largely drawn from the mission- the ANC lacked a mass membership. Leaders educated, Christianized black elite. However, were overwhelmingly male and middle class, and given the nature of settler rule, this was a power- women lacked full membership rights before less elite, and theANC had to seek support from a 1943. Yet, some activists remained deeply con- wide range of social strata. cerned at the harsh conditions of most Africans, The early ANC had a checkered history. In its while the Bantu Women’s League (founded in first decade, it was clearly the major African polit- 1918, which in 1948 became the ANC Women’s ical organization, submitting petitions against the League) under Charlotte Maxeke worked with NATIVES’LAND ACT OF 1913 and other discrimina- some ANC leaders, though it did not affiliate with tory legislation, with Plaatje as an eloquent publi- the ANC until 1931. cist, and sending delegations to Britain in a vain In the mid-1930s, African politics were but principled appeal for intervention. From 1918 reignited by the discriminatory J. B. M. HERTZOG to 1920, the Transvaal branch supported mass Bills. By the end of the decade, the ANC began to worker and anti–PASS LAWS demonstrations. This reorganize under Secretary Calata. In December radicalism came to an end in the 1920s when the 1940, the ANC elected A. B. Xuma as president. In ANC was eclipsed by the populist INDUSTRIAL AND addition to espousing African nationalist and lib- COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION (ICU), while ANC eral philosophies, Xuma oversaw the ANC’s steady members diverted energy into the liberal Joint growth to a more centralized, financially viable Councils, largely white-initiated and -dominated body. Membership grew from 1,000 in the 1930s to 4 African National Congress

5,500 by 1947. Xuma’s reforms included abolition Christian and a firm proponent of the African of the elitist Upper House and equality for women, nationalist and liberal ideas of an ANC that confirmed in a new 1943 ANC constitution and the emphasized majority rule by constitutional 1948 formation of the AFRICAN NATIONAL CON- means. This peaceful avenue, however, was GRESS WOMEN’S LEAGUE. Xuma led a committee closed when the government banned the ANC in that coauthored Africans’ Claims in South Africa 1960, leading it to resort to armed struggle and (1943), calling for African self-determination. He exile. forged an alliance with the SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN CONGRESS, and ties with African labor unions were Exile Years (1960–1990) strengthened by the work of ANC communists such After the ANC’s outlawing in 1960, Mandela and as J. B. Marks and Moses Kotane. communist leader JOE SLOVO founded Umkhonto we Sizwe (translated as Spear of the Nation and Years of Growth and Protest (1940–1960) also referred to as MK), the people’s army. MK The growth of African nationalism was seen in the was an integral part of the liberation movement 1944 formation by ANTON LEMBEDE,WALTER led by the ANC but technically separate due to SISULU,NELSON MANDELA, and OLIVER TAMBO of risk of repression. Following the arrest of much of the AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS YOUTH LEAGUE, the ANC leadership and their banishment after the which undermined Xuma’s moderate position after RIVONIA TRIAL to ROBBEN ISLAND, the focus of the NATIONAL PARTY’s victory in the 1948 elections, ANC’s work shifted to exile. This does not mean and its brutal promotion of APARTHEID pushed the it ceased to have influence inside South Africa— ANC to adopt in 1949 a radical Program of Action on Robben Island, Mandela, GOVAN MBEKI, and endorsing direct action by boycotts and strikes. other ANC leaders educated a new generation of The DEFIANCE CAMPAIGNS of the 1950s saw freedom fighters from the 1976 SOWETO STUDENT theANC develop into a mass movement; the 1952 UPRISING who were sent to the island, and under- protests boosted numbers from 20,000 to 100,000. ground structures persisted—but the ANC was Now, its constituency was truly national with now illegal, as its machine was smashed. The vac- great strength among urban workers, as in PORT uum in black politics was filled in the late 1960s ELIZABETH. The ANC supported campaigns and 1970s by the BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVE- against forced removals of blacks from areas des- MENT and labor unions, and in the 1980s by the ignated for whites and BANTU EDUCATION, if inef- UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF), which aligned fectively. Mandela emerged as the powerhouse with the ANC. behind the campaigns, and, with African libera- MK continued to operate, now from exile. tion on the continent imminent, the ANC was Sabotage of the early 1960s directed primarily buoyed, posing a real challenge to PRETORIA, against apartheid military sites and strategic eco- which intensified repression. The ANC fought nomic and energy positions developed into wider back by forging the Congress Alliance with military campaigns from forward bases in the INDIAN, coloured, and white progressives and, in FRONTLINE STATES. In 1982, the ANC was pres- 1955, by hosting the Congress of the People that sured to leave Mozambique, which had been a adopted the FREEDOM CHARTER to embody aspira- main base of operations for them, but MK contin- tions of all South Africans; it became a central ued to implement effective special operations, ANC policy document. These wider alliances notably symbolic attacks on the headquarters of prompted a 1959 split spawning the PAN AFRICAN- Pretoria’s army and the Sasol oil refinery. The IST CONGRESS. The state continued to harass ANC ANC, however, continued to view armed struggle leaders, many of whom were on trial from 1956 to as only one pillar of a strategy that also included 1961 in the TREASON TRIAL. politics and international solidarity. For much of the 1950s, ALBERT LUTHULI was Tambo became the chief leader in exile as the the ANC president. The first African awarded the ANC constructed important bases in the Front- Nobel Peace Prize, he remained a committed line States, notably Tanzania and Zambia, and in African National Congress 5

Mozambique after 1975. A major ANC office was and effectively reestablished its structures inside located in Britain, which hosted a significant the country, successfully navigating a complex number of exiles. The ANC launched a major and dangerous transition period fraught with diplomatic initiative by opening offices from political violence from the state and from political India and the United States to the Pacific. Many rivals such as INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP), as leaders were prominent in diplomatic and solidar- seen in the 1992 Boipatong Massacre, for ity work. In the 1960s, important foundation work instance, where IFP members attacked the resi- was done by Tambo and Robert Resha, with ANC dent of an informal settlement south of Johannes- publications such as Sechaba founded to unite and burg, killing forty-five people. Eager to open up educate widely dispersed members. Others active space for negotiations, the ANC suspended armed in exile included Johnny Makatini in New York, struggles in mid-1990, encouraged lifting of ANC India chief representative Mendi Msimang, sports sanctions banning South African athletes Edwin Funde in Australasia, writer ALEX LA and sports teams from competing in international GUMA in Cuba, Alfred Nzo, Ruth Mompati, and competitions, and entered negotiations in 1991. In FRENE NOSHIR GINWALA. CONVENTIONFORA DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA In Tanzania, the ANC’s Solomon Mahlangu (CODESA) negotiations, the ANC succeeded in Freedom College educated the 1976 SOWETO STU- gaining agreement for democratic elections, DENT UPRISING youth streaming out of South which it won convincingly in 1994 (receiving Africa. The ANC in exile worked closely with the 62.6 percent of the vote) and again in 1999, 2004, South African Congress of Trade Unions and recre- and 2009—so much so that commentators were ated its military, women’s, youth, and religious worried that the ANC’s transition from a libera- structures through the work of people such as tion movement to a more conventional political Slovo, Andrew Masondo, Mavis Nhlapo, Gertrude party had been accompanied by shift to a “one- Shope, and Father Michael Lapsley. After the party dominant party” situation. This electoral ANC’s 1969 Morogoro Conference, whites were dominance was underlined when the ANC later permitted to join the ANC, with Slovo serving on won provincial elections in KwaZulu-Natal and its Revolutionary Council and other progressive the Western Cape, taking over seats previously whites, including Jack Simons, Ray Alexander, and held by other parties. TheANC’s return from exile Albie Sachs, prominent in exile structures. also saw tensions with ex-UDF forces over the Exile was a lonely, isolating experience, level of democratic inner-party practices. accompanied by assassinations orchestrated by The Mandela administration (1994–1999) Pretoria (Joe Gqabi in Harare and Dulcie Septem- achieved impressive advances in reconciliation, ber in Paris) and occasional dissent, as in MK housing, electrification of black townships, and camps in Angola. The ANC sought to overcome economic stability. Mandela endorsed the TRUTH the alienation of exile by creating cultural forma- AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, formed in tions such as the musical troupe Amandla! By the 1995, as a way to heal a nation divided under mid-1980s, the ANC’s diplomatic strategy was apartheid. Yet, while apartheid was dead, elements working, with sectors of white SouthAfrican soci- of its socioeconomic legacy persisted to limit the ety willing to negotiate and more countries recog- impact of ANC policies. Government sought first nizing the ANC as a legitimate representative of to boost domestic accumulation and social equal- the South African people rather than Pretoria. The ity in the RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ANC had become a government-in-waiting. PROGRAM but, in 1997, jettisoned its prosocialist policies to introduce the capital-friendly GROWTH, Transformation and Rule (1990–) EMPLOYMENT, AND REDISTRIBUTION STRATEGY. With financial sanctions biting, the Cold War THABO MBEKI’s administration (1999–2008) over, and intense internal opposition, the apart- continued Mandela’s economic policies but also heid regime unbanned the ANC and released failed to solve high black unemployment and Mandela in February of 1990. The ANC quickly inequality. Mbeki adopted a controversial and 6 African National Congress widely derided position on HIV/AIDS, avoiding ERNMENT STRUCTURES;NELSON MANDELA;THABO proven medical treatment. Like Mandela, Mbeki MBEKI;SOL PLAATJE;OLIVER TAMBO;JACOB played an active role in African affairs, including ZUMA conflict resolution. He encouraged black pride through the concept of AFRICAN RENAISSANCE and Bibliography African economic empowerment through New Benson, Mary. The African Patriots: The Story of the Partnership for African Development, returning African National Congress of South Africa. the ANC to a strongly African nationalist ideol- London: Faber, 1963. ogy, underlining that the ANC’s abandonment of Dubow, Saul. The African National Congress. most of its radical programs echoed processes in Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2000. other postcolonial African countries. The ANC Gumede, William Mervin. Thabo Mbeki and the Bat- . Cape Town, South Youth League and the ANC Women’s League tle for the Soul of the ANC Africa: Zebra Press, 2005. remain important constituents, while the alliance Holland, Heidi. The Struggle: A History of the with the CONGRESSOF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE African National Congress. New York: UNIONS and the SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST Braziller, 1990. PARTY persists despite recent serious tensions over Johns, Sheridan, and R. Hunt Davis, Jr., eds. Man- economic policy and internal democracy. dela, Tambo and the ANC: The Struggle Against By 2006, rising labor and internal ANC dis- Apartheid. New York: Oxford University Press, satisfaction with Mbeki’s overly centralized rule 1991. widened deep fissures, resulting in Mbeki’s Karis, Thomas, Gwendolen Carter, and Gail Gerhart. replacement by the controversial JACOB ZUMA as From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary ANC President in 2007, and then by Kgalema History of African Politics in South Africa. 6 vols. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Motlanthe as state president in September 2008.A 1972–1977; Bloomington: Indiana University breakaway Congress of the People (COPE) party Press, 1997, 2010. later that year was the first major ANC split since Lodge, Tom. Black Politics in South Africa Since 1959. In 2009 elections, COPE had difficulty 1945. Johannesburg, South Africa: Ravan, 1983. establishing a separate platform, receiving only Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom: The Auto- 7.4 percent of the vote, and while the ANC’s biography of Nelson Mandela. Boston: Little, majority weakened nationwide from 69.69 per- Brown, 1994. cent to 65.9 percent, it increased in KwaZulu- McKinley, Dale T. The ANC and the Liberation Natal. In municipal elections in May 2011, the Struggle: A Critical Political Biography. ANC slipped to 61 percent, with COPE falling to Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997. only 2.1 percent, and with some areas reporting Meli, Francis. A History of the ANC: South Africa . Bloomington: Indiana Univer- higher abstention rates. Zuma’s assumption of the Belongs to Us sity Press, 1989. state presidency from May 2009 has not seen Odendaal, André. Vukani Bantu! The Beginning of major policy changes. The government continues Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912. to struggle to find solutions to massive deindustri- Cape Town, South Africa: David Philip, 1984. alization and unemployment—the economy Rantete, Johannes. The African National Congress revived only partially by staging the 2010 soccer and the Negotiated Settlement in South Africa. World Cup—as well as rising xenophobia and dis- Pretoria, South Africa: Van Schaik, 1998. satisfaction over the slow pace of land reform. Suttner, Raymond, and Jeremy Cronin. 30 Years of Notwithstanding these problems, the ANC the Freedom Charter. Johannesburg, South remains Africa’s oldest nationalist body with out- Africa: Ravan Press, 1986. standing achievements, not least of which are the Walshe, Peter. The Rise of African Nationalism in ending of apartheid, establishment of democracy, South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912–1952. Berkeley: University of California and the winning of three consecutive elections. Press, 1971. See also ARMED STRUGGLE;DEMOCRATIC POLITICS SINCE 1994; FREEDOM CHARTER;GOV- —Peter Limb African Renaissance 7

African National Congress 1960, when many of the liberation movements Women’s League were banned by the government, the Youth Five years after women were admitted to the League continued its activities underground dur- AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC), they estab- ing the remainder of the apartheid years. In 1990, lished a branch in 1948. The African National President F. W. DE KLERK legalized the ANC and Congress Women’s League’s major campaigns its associated organizations including the Youth were the 1952 DEFIANCE CAMPAIGN and a mass League. After many years in exile, the ANCYL women’s march in conjunction with other was rebuilt inside South Africa with the main women’s groups in Pretoria on August 9, 1956, objective of mobilizing all sectors of youth into protesting government repression (celebrated as active participation in the struggle to secure Women’s Day in South Africa after APARTHEID). democracy. After 1994, it declined in influence. Some of its See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS; prominent members and leaders include LILLIAN APARTHEID;ANTON LEMBEDE;NELSON MANDELA; NGOYI (the first woman elected to the ANC’s WALTER SISULU;OLIVER TAMBO National Executive Committee in 1956), ALBER- TINA SISULU, and WINNIE MANDELA. See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS;WIN- African Nationalism NIE MANDELA;LILLIAN NGOYI See POLITICAL CULTURES AND IDEOLOGIES

African National Congress African Renaissance Youth League THABO MBEKI, president of South Africa from The African National Congress Youth League 1999 to 2008, popularized the idea of an African (ANCYL) was founded in 1944 by ANTON LEM- Renaissance after South Africa’s democratic BEDE, Ashby Peter Mda, NELSON MANDELA,WAL- ELECTIONS in 1994. This concept calls on African TER SISULU, and OLIVER TAMBO as the youth wing people and nations to be the key drivers of change of the AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS. It marked and development on the African continent as the rise of a new generation of leadership of South opposed to having Western nations set and push Africa’s African population that was more radical the agenda. Key elements of the African Renais- and confrontational than its predecessors. sance include social cohesion, democracy, eco- The ANCYL developed its own manifesto in nomic rebuilding and growth, and the establish- 1944, and its Program of Action was adopted by the ment of Africa as a significant player in ANC in 1949, signaling the Youth League’s geopolitical affairs. Although this term’s popular- increasing control over the entire organization. ity has waned in the past decade, it continues to be This was in part due to the leadership of Mandela, a significant part of the South African intellectual who was elected national secretary of the Youth agenda after APARTHEID. League in 1948. A year later, he and other founding Among other things, the African Renaissance members of the ANCYL were elected to the is a philosophical and political movement aimed National Executive Committee of the ANC. The at ending the violence, elitism, corruption, and Youth League mobilized mass protests and called poverty that plague the African continent and for civil disobedience and strikes against racial dis- replacing them with a more just and equitable crimination and the newly implemented APARTHEID order. Thus, the African Renaissance agenda system. It was under the leadership of many Youth encourages education and the reversal of the League founders that the ANC launched DEFIANCE “brain drain” of African intellectuals, and urges CAMPAIGNS in the 1950s, invigorating the ANC and Africans to take pride in their heritage as well as expanding the movement dramatically. to take charge of their lives. In 1959, many ANCYL members broke away Undergirded by a pan-Africanist ideology, to form the rival PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS. After the goals of the African Renaissance have been 8 African Union taken up by a new generation of African leaders, Afrikaner(s) including President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda Afrikaner is both a self-identity (equal to an eth- and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Together nic identity) as well as a political identity among with President Mbeki, as well as other African a significant portion of South Africa’s white pop- leaders, they have sought to transform the African ulation forged in the nineteenth and twentieth cen- Renaissance vision into a practical reality through turies. The identity became synonymous with the such projects as the creation of the AFRICAN policy of APARTHEID, the South African state, and UNION (that replaced the old and relatively inef- the NATIONAL PARTY. The term Afrikaners was fective Organization of African Unity), the New first used in the early eighteenth century to refer Partnership for African Development, and the to whites of a variety of European heritages. How- Millennium Africa Programme that seek to define ever, it was not until the mid-twentieth century a new relationship between Africa and the West that it was used exclusively to refer to white based on partnership and on Africans taking own- Afrikaans speakers (a significant proportion of ership and responsibility for the continent’s eco- COLOUREDPEOPLE and a smaller group of black nomic development. SouthAfricans also speakAfrikaans). By the early The African Renaissance has also drawn crit- twentieth century, there were significant eco- icism from some circles, as some see the concept nomic and social differences among Afrikaans as utopian and impractical given the prevalence of speakers. In recent decades, the link between an conflict and war in many parts of Africa. Others Afrikaner nationalist identity, regime, and state, suggest that it is a South African project aimed at which characterized the years of apartheid gov- spreading the country’s dominance throughout the ernment as well as sustained a balance of ethnic, continent. The project has also been accused of racial, and class forces, has fractured. conforming to the dictates of neoliberal globaliza- The group identity of Afrikaners has fluctu- tion and thus promoting the interests of the West ated considerably over time but was most coher- over those of Africa. ent during the apartheid era when an organiza- tional axis of the state and the National Party offered systematic access to the ear, agency, and African Union largesse of the government. Indeed, with the onset Established in 2001, the African Union (AU) is a of democratic, majority rule in 1994, many sug- continental organization composed of fifty-three gested a bleak future for Afrikanerdom under an African member countries, covering the entire AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) government continent except for Morocco (which opposes the perceived to be broadly opposed to Afrikaner membership of Western Sahara in the AU). It suc- interests. In spite of the recent and marked ceeds the amalgamated African Economic Com- increase in white poverty levels, it is evident that munity and the Organization of African Unity and the Afrikaner minority still retains a substantial has the expressed goal of uniting and integrating material and cultural inheritance accrued during the African continent. Eventually, the AU aims to the apartheid era. While some Afrikaners feel have a single currency (the Afro) and a single increasingly marginalized in this new order, oth- integrated defense force, as well as other institu- ers are thriving in the new South Africa. tions of state, including a cabinet for theAU heads Racial hierarchies were present from the of state. Inspired by the vision of an AFRICAN foundation of the Dutch CAPE COLONY in the sev- RENAISSANCE, the AU works to secure democracy, enteenth century and were gradually transformed human rights, and sustainable economic develop- into a hierarchy of legal status groups based on ment for the continent. South Africa played a race that established the basis for a racial order, founding role in the AU, and South African presi- with whites being viewed as superior and blacks dent THABO MBEKI was the organization’s first being viewed as inferior. The extension of British president. control over the colony during the nineteenth cen- Afrikaner(s) 9 tury increased with the prohibition of the slave The emergence of the Conservative Party, which trade during 1807 and, more significantly, a bat- followed the National Party’s split in March 1982, tery of legislation from 1828 onward that served shattered any semblance of political unity among to weaken the colonialists’ authority over their the volk. In particular, the rise of an urbanized native workers. Nonetheless, relations between managerial middle class and a relatively indepen- the different frontier communities established fur- dent group of capitalists in the commercial and ther into the interior of South Africa and settlers financial sectors led them to begin to side with were at times harmonious. their white English-speaking class counterparts as The discovery of diamonds and gold in 1867 economic growth began to conflict with a nation- and 1886, respectively, signaled the advent of alist identity. modern capitalism in South Africa and an era National Party attempts at liberalizing the characterized by fundamental societal change. economy during the late 1980s meant that the Thereafter, development by different racial group- government and its business allies began the polit- ings progressed unevenly, with English-speaking ical transition to majoritarian liberal democracy in white capitalist entrepreneurs fast accumulating 1994 with considerable confidence. Indeed, these wealth and power, and the African population efforts bore fruit during the bilateral negotiations being transformed into a poor proletariat, and this between the then National Party government and more broadly contributed to the fractured class the ANC, and during the transition process itself, and ethnic awareness upon which an Afrikaner 1990 to 1994, as domestic business elites helped nationalist identity would be founded. It also to secure a favorable transition characterized by a shaped perceptions among Dutch-Afrikaner pro- successful macroeconomic compromise among fessionals that a significant section of their group policy elites. The fact that the dramatic political was faced with economic and cultural degenera- transition to majoritarian, democratic rule and the tion. Thus, in 1875, the Genootskap van Regte adoption of a new constitution was not matched Afrikaners (Fellowship of True Afrikaners) was by significant economic restructuring has meant established to champion the cause of the that the postapartheid growth path and distributive Afrikaans language. The Afrikaner BROEDER- regime have maintained overall levels of inequal- BOND, which was founded in 1918 and comprised ity, including most importantly those related to the a middle class and urban-orientated elite, formu- distribution of economic power; of property and lated similar strategies ensuring that Afrikaans land; economic, entrepreneurial, and educational was recognized as an official, exclusively racially opportunities and experience; and the share of defined language alongside English in 1925. income and per capita income of the different It was not until the National Party’s 1948 population groups. Nonetheless, the white popula- electoral victory that the highly successful and tion’s share of total income has declined from a rapid socioeconomic transformation of the status high point in the 1970s. According to the South of the majority of Afrikaners properly began. African Institute of Race Relations, white house- Apartheid provided an ideological axis for this hold incomes increased by 67 percent between nationalist order, and in the decades that followed, 1995 and 2004, while African household incomes the broad social coalition that had sustained the were only 24 percent of whites in 2004, and a rise to power was continually refashioned. From mere 1 percent higher than in 1995. the start, contradictions were apparent both within The end of apartheid also meant the end of the nationalist alliance and apartheid itself. These Afrikaner political control, but white Afrikaans came to a head with efforts to reform apartheid in speakers remain important in postapartheid South the form of the vicious broedertwis (divisions Africa due to their longstanding economic and cul- between brothers), which centered upon the tural influence built up during the decades of changing composition of the Afrikaner volk (an apartheid. During 2010, the white population ethnic group or a people) during the early 1980s. formed 9.2 percent of the total population; how- 10 Afrikaner Nationalism ever, Afrikaans and English speakers comprised focused upon disputes over perceptions of margin- 13.35 percent and 8.2 percent of the total popula- alization, entitlement, and belonging, and the tion respectively, as the majority of Afrikaans prospects of divorcing Afrikanerness, characteris- speakers today are not white. Most striking has tically expressed in terms of cultural attributes and been the manner in which Afrikaner groupings less frequently descent, from Afrikaner national- have adapted to the loss of political power while ism, a political project. These perceptions have also experiencing a substantial rise in economic struck a chord with the 100,000 blue- and white- influence. Since the end of minority rule, there has collar, predominantly white members of the trade been an acceleration in ethnic affiliations centered union Solidarity, which campaigns against govern- upon the characteristics of culture, descent, and ment policies, including AFFIRMATIVE ACTION and language, and the range of identification among empowerment initiatives. Nonetheless, the Afrikaans speakers is considerable. A large section Afrikaans business elite and the middle class of the coloured community, black Afrikaans remain key to both the national economy and suc- speakers, and verloopte (walked away) Afrikaners cess of the government’s empowerment initiatives. remain outside of any established community. Paradoxically, the enrichment of these constituen- A resurgence of group-based politics among cies has ensured that class and even race constitute Afrikaners has placed the legitimacy of minority significant divisions among the grouping. It is too cultural rights, including most prominently lan- early to identify the extent of the transformation guage rights (the taaldebat), at the top of the that is occurring among the Afrikaner grouping group’s cultural agenda. Tensions between the today, but it is clear that Afrikanerness and being ANC government’s goal of increasing diversity an Afrikaner have a diversity of meanings in and addressing past inequities through the widen- postapartheid South Africa. ing of access in the higher education sector on the See also AFRIKANER WEERSTANDSBEWEGING; one hand and the survival of Afrikaans as an aca- ANGLO-BOER WAR;APARTHEID;BOER REPUBLICS; demic language with higher functions have come BROEDERBOND; F. W. DE KLERK;POLITICAL CUL- to center upon the historically Afrikaans-speaking TURESAND IDEOLOGIES; H. F. VERWOERD University of STELLENBOSCH in an ongoing and high-profile public debate. The unique population Bibliography and language demographics of the Western Cape Davies, Rebecca. Afrikaners in the New South Province, where the University of Stellenbosch is Africa: Identity Politics in a Globalised Econ- located, as well as the insistence of the vocal omy. London: I. B. Tauris, 2008. taalstryders has made this a test case for the self- Giliomee, Hermann. The Afrikaners: Biography of a Cape Town, South Africa: Tafelberg, styled guardians of the Afrikaners’ language and People. 2003. culture. Interestingly, the Afrikaans-speaking uni- O’Meara, Dan. Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and versities have been at the forefront of radical Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner transformation in higher education, to address the Nationalism, 1934–1948. Cambridge, UK: racial imbalances in access and the critical need to Cambridge University Press, 1983. educate growing numbers of black South Africans ———. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and to take up skilled and leadership positions within the Politics of the National Party, 1948–1994. the economy. Among the younger generation, a Randburg, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1996. wider cultural revival has seen Afrikaans litera- South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). ture and music flourish over the past decade to 2004/05 South African Survey. Braamfontein: encompass many voices, which range from Bok SAIRR, 2006. van Blerk’s controversial and nostalgic elegy to Seekings, Jeremy, and Nicoli Nattrass. Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa. Scottsville, Koos de la Rey during 2007 to more mainstream South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal and traditional genres. Press, 2006. Much of the dialogue among Afrikaans intel- Terreblanche, Solomon. A History of Inequality in lectuals during the postapartheid period has South Africa, 1652–2002. Pietermartizburg, AIDS 11

South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal and the attempted murder of a security guard and Press, 2002. former employee of his. He was released in June 2004 after serving three years. During his time in —Rebecca Davies prison, he became a born-again Christian, claimed he had moderated many of his more racist views, and preached reconciliation as “prescribed by Afrikaner Nationalism God.” In 2010, Terre Blanche was beaten to death See POLITICAL CULTURES AND IDEOLOGIES on his farm by two black farmworkers after a dis- pute over wages.

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), AIDS meaning Afrikaner Resistance Movement, is a Initially identified in the United States as early as political and paramilitary group committed to the 1981, AIDS was first reported in South Africa in restoration of an independent AFRIKANER repub- 1982. As was the case in the developed world, the lic, or “Boerestaat,” within South Africa. At the early South African epidemic was concentrated height of the movement in the 1990s, during the mainly among gay men, blood transfusion recipi- negotiations for a new democratic dispensation, ents, and hemophiliacs. But in the early to mid- the AWB boasted a following of 70,000 members 1990s, it became clear that the epidemic had and received much domestic and international become generalized, with various studies confirm- publicity as a white extremist group. ing that HIV had already entered the general popu- Founded in 1973 by EUGENE TERRE BLANCHE, lation by 1989. The 2010 data suggest that over 700 the AWB from its inception opposed the reform of people were dying of AIDS-related illnesses—and APARTHEID laws and the so-called liberalizing even more became newly infected—each day. influences within the ruling NATIONAL PARTY. The With more than five million people estimated targets of AWB violence, particularly during the to be living with HIV and general prevalence levels State of Emergency from 1984 to 1986, were often that only started to stabilize from 2005 to 2009, unarmed blacks. It especially opposed liberation South Africa’s epidemic remains one of the coun- movements such as the AFRICAN NATIONAL CON- try’s most pressing challenges. But while the GRESS in which members of the SOUTH AFRICAN absolute numbers are disturbing, the unequal distri- COMMUNIST PARTY played an important role. Terre bution of the epidemic is alarming. For example, Blanche was a flamboyant orator and forceful per- prevalence levels among females are significantly sonality, and at the AWB’s height was able to con- higher than among males, being 2.7 times higher in vert several thousand white South Africans to his the 15–19 age group. HIV prevalence peaks at 32.7 cause. The group was responsible for disrupting percent among women in the 25–29 age group. the formal talks between the apartheid government Among men, a lower peak—25.8 percent—is and the ANC and other key black liberation move- reached more gradually and a few years later. ments being held at the Kempton Park Conference Geography, socioeconomic status, and race Center just outside of JOHANNESBURG when AWB also have an impact on vulnerability to HIV infec- members drove an armored car through the glass tion. Prevalence is greatest in KwaZulu-Natal, front of the building, threatened delegates, and being more than four times higher than in the pasted slogans on the walls. The AWB was also Western Cape. Furthermore, those living in urban behind the failed attempt to defend the dictatorial informal settlements, where proper housing, sani- government of Lucas Mangope in the homeland of tation, and electricity is scarce, are most at risk of Bophuthatswana, which led to many innocent infection, with prevalence in this group being 50 civilian deaths. percent higher than among those living in similar In 2001, Terre Blanche was sentenced to six conditions in rural areas. Although epidemic lev- years in prison for assaulting a gas station worker els are observed among all groups, black Africans 12 AIDS are disproportionately affected—with the Human be deported from the country. A year later, 1,000 Sciences Research Council noting that “race is an foreign mine workers with HIV were repatriated important epidemiological variable because it after their contracts were not renewed. Two years embodies socio-economic contexts that influence earlier, a survey found a 0.02 percent prevalence risk of HIV infection.” of HIV among South African mine workers, with Prevalence levels only tell part of the story. a significantly higher prevalence of 3.76 percent The large number of people living with among mine workers from Malawi. HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) is accompanied by a crisis The early 1990s witnessed a significant shift. of AIDS-related deaths, reflected in dramatic Shortly after its unbanning in February 1990, the changes in the country’s mortality profile. still-exiled AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) Between 1997 and 2004, for example, death rates hosted a health conference in Maputo that recog- for women age 20 to 39 more than tripled. In the nized the need to prioritize HIV prevention. CHRIS same period, deaths for men between 30 and 44 HANI, a senior SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY more than doubled. For women, deaths peaked at and ANC leader who was assassinated three years age 30 to 34; for men, they peaked at a relatively later, warned against “allow[ing] the AIDS epi- lower level somewhat later. demic to ruin the realization of our dreams.” Not- At the same time, AIDS-related deaths ing that “statistics indicate that we are still at the among PLWHA in the developed world started to beginning of the AIDS epidemic in our country,” fall dramatically. A medical breakthrough in 1996 Hani predicted that, if left “unattended,” the epi- showed that combinations of antiretroviral (ARV) demic would “result in untold damage and suffer- medicines could control the replication of HIV, ing.” Soon thereafter, the ANC worked closely reducing levels of the virus in the blood to unde- with the then Department of Health (DoH) to set tectable levels and allowing the damaged immune up the National AIDS Convention of South Africa system to recover.Among those with access to the (NACOSA), an umbrella body to coordinate the new combination therapies, HIV infection was country’s response. In late 1993, just seven months transformed from an automatic death sentence to before South Africa’s first democratic elections a chronic but manageable medical condition. and the adoption of its first Bill of Rights, the In the context of unacceptably high preva- country’s highest court (at the time) recognized the lence rates and seemingly avoidable deaths, how right of PLWHA to medical confidentiality. But at does one assess the country’s response to the epi- the same time, HIV prevalence among antenatal demic? One way is to consider the manner in and clinic attendees mushroomed—from an estimated the extent to which the legal and policy framework 0.7 percent in 1990 to 7.6 percent in 1994. has been developed and used to limit and/or pro- Within months of President NELSON MAN- tect the rights of PLWHA and those at risk of HIV DELA’s government taking office, the NACOSA infection. Another is to evaluate public sector, civil AIDS Plan—which included a focus on law and society, and business interventions aimed at pre- human rights—was adopted as official policy. A venting and treating HIV infection and providing new HIV/AIDS directorate in the Department of care and support for PLWHA and their families. Health sought and received assistance from the then Wits University–based AIDS Law Project— Responding to the Epidemic: The Early Years now SECTION27—on the implementation of a As was the norm internationally, South Africa’s rights-based approach. Numerous court decisions initial response lacked humanity and insight. The and legislative developments gave substance to first reported AIDS-related deaths were described the new constitutional protections against unfair as isolated cases, with the APARTHEID government discrimination and unjustifiable limitations of the assuring the public that there was no need to panic right to privacy. as only gay men were considered to be at high The rumblings of dissatisfaction, however, risk. In 1987, regulations provided for foreign had also begun. In 1996, the Department of nationals with HIV to be denied entry to and/or to Health’s funding of a musical production—with AIDS 13 deeply flawed HIV prevention messages—came policy developments. Numerous statutes and reg- under fire, primarily because public sector tender ulations expanded the rights of PLWHA, with a processes had not been followed. This was fol- host of legal actions and court judgments address- lowed shortly thereafter by the Virodene scandal, ing issues such as unfair discrimination in the which saw official cabinet support for an alleged workplace, access to essential medicines, and the cure for AIDS—later determined to be a toxic state’s obligation to implement a comprehensive industrial solvent—that had been tested on human program to prevent transmission of HIV from subjects without the approval of the relevant med- mother-to-child. By April 2002, the cabinet had icine regulatory authority. recognized—albeit reluctantly—the role of ARV Mandela, who—like former US president medicines in the prevention and treatment of HIV Bill Clinton—became increasingly outspoken on infection. HIV/AIDS after leaving office, has admitted that Largely as a result of the civil society cam- he could and should have done more when in paign for the public provision of ARV treatment, power. It was during his presidency that highly which was spearheaded by TAC, the cabinet later active ARV therapy became the standard of care agreed to develop—and subsequently adopted in in the developed world; when research proved November 2003—the Operational Plan for Com- that ARV medicines were effective in preventing prehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management, mother-to-child transmission of HIV; when Gugu and Treatment for South Africa. But it would take Dlamini was stoned and stabbed to death shortly the threat of further litigation some four months after publicly disclosing her HIV status, accused later before the plan was implemented and the of shaming her community near Durban; and state started to provide ARV treatment to public when ZACKIE ACHMAT, Mark Heywood, and oth- health system users. ers formed the TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN According to the Joint United Nations Pro- (TAC). These developments were to set the scene gramme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), more for the heightened conflict between civil society PLWHA in South Africa are said to be accessing and the post-Mandela government. ARV treatment—in the public and private sectors collectively—than in any other country. But Denialism Rears Its Ugly Head absolute numbers only tell part of the story. South In a speech delivered in Parliament in October Africa’s treatment gap—the difference between 1999, just six months after coming into office, for- those who have and those who need—still mer president THABO MBEKI began his public remains large. According to official figures, pub- questioning of the causal link between HIV and lic sector coverage was 56 percent by the end of AIDS. Early the following year, he established an November 2009. With new ARV treatment guide- international AIDS advisory panel tasked with— lines that came into effect in April 2010, which among other things—advising him on whether, in contemplate much earlier initiation of ARV treat- fact, HIV causes AIDS. The panel, composed of ment for infants, pregnant women, and those who equal numbers of orthodox scientists and denial- are also infected with tuberculosis, the treatment ists, reached a predictable deadlock. gap will have dropped significantly. The evidence shows that Mbeki supported In the area of prevention, policy interven- the position of the denialists and that powerful tions that previously had a limited impact are elements of denialism continued to bedevil the finally giving way to more comprehensive pro- country’s response to the epidemic throughout his grams. While the discredited ABC approach— presidency. A 2008 study published by researchers abstain, be faithful, and condomize—officially at Harvard University conservatively estimates remains in place, it is now being supplemented by the cost of denial in South Africa at over 330,000 a range of new interventions. These include an lives. ambitious HIV Counseling and Testing campaign, Yet despite his views, the first term of the which aims to have fifteen million South Africans Mbeki presidency also saw significant legal and tested for HIV by the end of 2011, and the intro- 14 AIDS duction of free voluntary medical male circumci- same side—paved the way for a groundbreaking sion services. agreement on patents and public health at the At the intersection of treatment and preven- World Trade Organization’s Doha, Qatar, meeting tion lies mother-to-child transmission prevention in November of that year. The prices of many services. While countries such as Thailand and ARV medicines, integral to any comprehensive Uganda have long abandoned suboptimal proto- HIV/AIDS program, have plummeted since then. cols, South Africa was slow to develop its program Whereas in 2001 it cost US$727 to treat an adult in line with international guidelines. In response to in a developing country for one year with a stan- civil society pressure, the protocol was first dard triple ARV first-line regimen, for countries amended in 2008 to introduce a more effective that have chosen to exercise their rights to access protocol that nevertheless still fell short of globally generic medicines, the same treatment can be pro- acceptable standards. By April 2010, however, the vided in 2011 for as low as US$61. program had developed to the point where it fully recognized the centrality of maternal health, offer- Mbeki Leaves Office ing pregnant women options that placed their On September 25, 2008, KGALEMA MOTLANTHE health needs at its center. According to scientific replaced Thabo Mbeki as president of the Repub- consensus, this is best for both mother and child. lic of South Africa. While Mbeki had continued— right until the end of his administration—to deny Broader Impact of the Country’s Response the existence of any crisis, with Manto Tshabal- Notwithstanding its negative impact, the AIDS ala-Msimang—his health minister—remaining epidemic has managed to place health and other steadfast in her refusal to concede the inadequacy socioeconomic entitlements on the political of her department’s performance, others in senior agenda. It has reinvigorated civil society, allowing positions in government had already started to for mobilization and action across class lines. take action in late 2006. TAC, for example, has been able to pull organized Working in collaboration with all sectors of labor, the faith-based sector, academics, and civil society, these partners in government final- health care providers together. Many unemployed ized and the cabinet adopted the National HIV and people have been trained in treatment literacy, AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, being both willing and able to assist in the provi- 2007–2011 (NSP) in early May 2007. In addition sion of public health care services. Well supported to setting clear targets and time frames and allo- by legal groups such as SECTION27 and the cating responsibility for the implementation of a Legal Resources Centre, TAC has also made cre- range of prevention, treatment, and other key ative use of the law to compel a reluctant state— interventions, the NSP contemplates transforming as well as numerous drug companies—into action. the South African National AIDS Council into a The impact of these positive developments in truly consultative body that delivers on its man- South Africa has been felt beyond the country’s date as the country’s leading advisory and over- borders. TAC’s leadership at the International AIDS sight structure on the epidemic. Conference in Durban in 2000 forever changed the A cabinet reshuffle following Mbeki’s depar- relationship between the prevention and treatment ture saw the appointment of Barbara Hogan—a of HIV infection. Before, the two were pitted well-respected and independent-minded member against each other. Although a significant global of Parliament—as the new minister of health. treatment gap still exists, by the middle of 2010 an Addressing an international conference only a few estimated three million PLWHA were accessing weeks after taking office, Hogan acknowledged ARV treatment in the developing world. Without the causal link between HIV and AIDS, recog- Durban, this would not have been possible. nized the depth and severity of the crisis, and Furthermore, South Africa’s united stand committed the government to achieving the NSP against the multinational pharmaceutical industry targets. But a budgetary and management crisis in in 2001—which saw TAC and the state on the the Free State Province in late 2008 cast doubt on AIDS 15 the sustainability of the national ARV treatment Cameron, Edwin. Witness to AIDS. Cape Town, program and Hogan’s ability to rehabilitate and South Africa: Tafelberg Publishers, 2005. reinvigorate her department. Cameron, Edwin, and Jonathan Berger. “Patents and Shortly after coming into office in May 2009, Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox.” Proceedings of the British Academy 131 (2005): President JACOB ZUMA appointed Aaron 331–369. Motsoaledi—a medical doctor—as his new minis- Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, ter of health. Dr. Molefi Sefularo, Hogan’s com- Médecins Sans Frontières. Untangling the Web petent deputy, retained his position. But so too did of ARV Price Reductions, 11th ed. Geneva: Thami Mseleku, Tshabalala-Msimang’s trusted Médecins Sans Frontières, 2008. director-general, who was only removed from Chigwedere, Pride, George R. Seage III, Sofia office in September 2009. His removal paved the Gruskin, Tun-Hou Lee, and M. Essex. “Estimat- way for a scaling up of the NSP’s implementation, ing the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use the introduction of new ARV treatment and pre- in South Africa.” Journal of Acquired Immune vention protocols, and the rebuilding of relation- Deficiency Syndromes 49 (2008): 410–415. ships between government and civil society. Government of the Republic of South Africa. Coun- try Progress Report on the Declaration of Com- The Eighteenth International AIDS Confer- mitment on HIV/AIDS. Pretoria, South Africa: ence held in Vienna in July 2010 signaled the com- Government Printer, 2010. pletion of South Africa’s return to an evidence- ———. HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for based response to the epidemic. Both Motlanthe South Africa, 2007–2011. Pretoria, South and Motsoaledi addressed plenary sessions of the Africa: Government Printer, 2007. meeting, with the latter receiving a standing ova- Heywood, Mark. “The Achilles Heel? The Impact of tion. While there is reason to be hopeful, much of HIV/AIDS on Democracy in South Africa.” In the damage caused by Mbeki’s decade of denial- HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 371–383. Edited by ism remains. It will take sustained effort from all, Salim S. Abdool Karim and Quarraisha Abdool accompanied by the allocation of significant finan- Karim. Cape Town, South Africa: Cambridge University Press, 2005. cial resources, to turn the epidemic around. ———. “South Africa’s Treatment Action Cam- See also HEALTH;THABO MBEKI paign (TAC): Combining Law and Social Mobi- lization to Realize the Right to Health.” Journal Bibliography of Human Rights Practice 1 (2009): 14–36. Abdool Karim, Salim S., and Cheryl Baxter. “Intro- Hogan, Barbara. “Speech by the Minister of Health duction.” In HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 2nd ed. Ms Barbara Hogan at the HIV Vaccine Research Edited by Salim S. Abdool Karim and Quar- Conference, Cape Town International Conven- raisha Abdool Karim. Cape Town, South Africa: tion Centre, 13 October 2008.” http://www.tac Cambridge University Press, 2010. .org.za/community/node/2421, 2008. AIDS Law Project. Antiretroviral Treatment Morato- Kapczynski, Amy, and Jonathan Berger. “The Story rium in the Free State: November 2008—Febru- of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of ary 2009. http://www.tac.org.za/community/ Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South node/2491, 2009. Africa.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, Barrett-Grant, Kitty, Derrick Fine, Mark Heywood, 43–79. Edited by Deena R. Hurwitz and Mar- and Ann Strode, eds. HIV/AIDS and the Law: A garet L. Satterthwaite. New York: Foundation Resource Manual, 3rd ed. Johannesburg, South Press, 2008. Africa: AIDS Law Project, 2003. Shisana, O., T. Rehle, L. Simbayi, W. Parker, K. Berger, Jonathan. “Litigating for Social Justice in Zuma, A. Bhana, C. Connolly, S. Jooste, et al. Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica:AFocus on Health South African National HIV Prevalence, HIV and Education.” In Courting Social Justice: Incidence, Behaviour and Communication Sur- Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic vey, 2005. Pretoria, South Africa: Human Sci- Rights in the Developing World, 38–99. Edited ences Research Council Press, 2005. by Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks. New Shisana O., T. Rehle, L. Simbayi, K. Zuma, S. York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Jooste, V. Pillay-van-Wyk, N. Mbelle, J. van 16 All-African Convention

Zyl, et al. South African National HIV Preva- nesburg, in 1886 made the Transvaal—until then a lence, Incidence, Behaviour and Communica- struggling independent BOER REPUBLIC—poten- tion Survey 2008: A Turning Tide Among tially a political and economic threat to British Teenagers? Cape Town, South Africa: Human supremacy in southern Africa. This was at a time Sciences Research Council Press, 2009. when Britain, which had gained CAPE COLONY and Statistics South Africa. Mid-year Population Esti- NATAL along the coast in the first half of the nine- mates, 2010. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics teenth century, was engaged in the scramble for South Africa, 2010. UNAIDS. Outlook Report 2010. Geneva: UNAIDS, African colonies with France and Germany. 2010. In 1896, the Jameson Raid, a scheme devised —Jonathan Berger by CECIL RHODES, the prime minister of the CAPE COLONY, to overthrow the Transvaal government under President PAUL KRUGER, failed abysmally. This caused AFRIKANER NATIONALISM to flare up All-African Convention throughout South Africa. Although Kruger was The All-African Convention (AAC) was founded only interested in preserving the independence of by Professor DAVIDSON DON TENGO JABAVU in the Transvaal, the British colonial secretary, Sir 1935 in response to President J. B. M. HERTZOG’s Joseph Chamberlain, and the British high com- Native Bills, which were intended to increase the missioner in South Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, percentage of land allocated to native reserves from believed that the Transvaal was pressing for a 6 percent to 13 percent, but also to disenfranchise united South Africa under AFRIKANER rule. Mil- black Africans and prevent them from owning land ner, a self-acknowledged race patriot, resolved outside of the reserves. The convention brought that if the Transvaal refused to grant the right to together the entire spectrum of opposition to the vote to foreign mine workers and other foreigners white government and included a number of lead- who came because of the mines (Uitlanders)— ers and provincial bodies of the AFRICAN NATIONAL mostly British—war would be the only way to CONGRESS (ANC). Given the overlap in member- facilitate the development of the British gold min- ship, the relationship between the AAC and the ing industry in the Transvaal and to eliminate the ANC was always an issue, with the AAC offering BOER oligarchy, which allegedly threatened somewhat of an alternative to the ANC at the time. British supremacy. In this way, Milner became As the AAC turned more militant, it later partnered involved in the Transvaal’s domestic issues, stir- with COLOURED and INDIAN organizations to form ring up agitation, which, if successful, would the NON-EUROPEAN UNITY MOVEMENT to reject ensure a British majority in the Boer state. In the cooperation with the government and push for full diplomatic tussle that followed, Kruger refused to rights for all black South Africans. The AAC itself budge on the issue of the vote, despite a meeting was short-lived; by the 1950s, its following had with Milner in spring 1899 in BLOEMFONTEIN, the waned and some of its members joined the ANC or capital of the other Boer republic. A political the SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. deadlock was reached. See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS; DAVIDSON JABAVU Beginning of War On October 11, 1899, the Anglo-Boer War broke out after Britain rejected the Transvaal ultimatum ANC demanding that all disputes between the two See AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS states be settled by arbitration; that British troops on the borders of the Orange Free State and Trans- vaal be withdrawn; and that troops from all over Anglo-Boer War the British empire bound for southern Africa by The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand (liter- sea from Britain should not be permitted to disem- ally white water ridge), the area surrounding Johan- bark at the ports of the Cape Colony and Natal. Anglo-Boer War 17

The Orange Free State joined the Transvaal Meanwhile, there was a revival in the Boer in terms of the military alliance signed between military effort. In the Orange Free State, General the two Boer republics in 1897. As the war pro- Christiaan de Wet led the recovery of Boer resist- gressed, the British Army was reinforced by vol- ance with surprise attacks on Roberts’s vulnerable unteer contingents from Canada, Australia, New line of communication. After Roberts had dis- Zealand, the Cape Colony, and Natal. persed the Transvaal forces in the last pitched bat- The first five months of the war was a set- tle of the war at Bergendal (Dalmanutha) in the piece battle phase. The Boers besieged Ladysmith eastern Transvaal in August of 1900, General Louis in Natal and KIMBERLEY and Mafeking (the black Botha, like De Wet in the Free State and General town was called Mafikeng before the British Koos de la Rey in the western Transvaal, applied annexation in 1885, but the British called the guerrilla tactics by swiftly gathering his scattered white town that developed there Mafeking, a commandos, attacking isolated British columns, name that stuck until after 1994 when it was again and then disappearing into thin air. In this way, the renamed Mafikeng) in the Cape Colony, while the resistance of about 20,000 Boer bitter-enders was British forces strove to relieve their beleaguered to continue for almost two years—in what became garrisons in these towns—Lord Paul Methuen in known as the guerrilla phase of the war. the west and General Redvers Buller in Natal. Lord Horation Kitchener, successor to From their camouflaged positions, the Boers Roberts, adopted a threefold strategy to end the scored impressive victories at Stormberg and war. First, he continued to implement Roberts’s Magersfontein in the Cape Colony, and Colenso scorched earth policy. The Boer republics were in Natal in mid-December 1899 (called “Black deliberately and systematically devastated, with Week” in Britain) and Spioenkop in Natal in Jan- towns and thousands of farmsteads burned or rav- uary 1900. But, by February 1900, there was a aged. This onslaught on the Boer means of sur- dramatic change in fortunes. Kimberley and vival was exacerbated by a destruction of their Ladysmith were relieved, and the Boer general food supplies, including livestock and crops. Piet Cronjé surrendered at Paardeberg in the Second, Roberts’s concentration camp sys- Orange Free State with 4,000 burghers who were tem was expanded. Boer civilians, especially Boer civilians. All the Boer fronts collapsed under women and children whose houses had been British pressure. burned, were forcibly confined to camps. In The next six months’ time was a period of Kitchener’s view, this meant that burghers on great confusion for the Boers. Everywhere, they commando (that is, in the field) would no longer were compelled to retreat. On March 13, 1900, be able to obtain food from women on the farms Lord Frederick Roberts, the British commander- and would have to surrender to reunite their fam- in-chief, occupied Bloemfontein, and on June 5, ilies. Black people, too, were taken to concentra- 1900, he took Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal. tion camps, partly to deprive the burghers of He then annexed the Orange Free State on May 24, another source of food as they had been providing 1900, and the Transvaal on September 1, 1900. the Boers, voluntarily or involuntarily, with their Lured by British promises of peace and pro- own supplies. The bad administration of the tection, many Boer civilians surrendered and were camps led to poor quality food, unhygienic condi- called hendsoppers (having “hands up”). By the tions, and inadequate and inefficient medical end of the war, they totaled no fewer than 20,000 arrangements, all of which meant that civilians men—about a third of the original Boer force. suffered terribly. Eventually, 26,000 Boer women (Another third of the Boers were taken prisoners and children, 2,000 Boer men, and at least 20,000 of war, and the last third were call “bitter-enders” black people died in these British camps. for having stayed in the field until the end of the Third, Kitchener launched his military war.) In the last six months of the war, about 5,400 drives. This was a method of trapping commandos of these hendsoppers joined the British Army as against lines of blockhouses that were constructed collaborators (known as “joiners”). in a network across the entire theater of war, for, 18 Anglo-Boer War by 1901, the Boers had moved deep into the Cape bywoners (landless Afrikaners) flocked to the gold Colony to spread the war over a larger area and mines of the Witwatersrand to eke out a living. In incite colonial Boers into rebellion. the course of the twentieth century, the Afrikaners In the long run, Kitchener’s strategy was effec- gradually came to dominate South African politics, tive. Despite some resounding Boer victories—for and they resolved to become independent of the example, at Nooitgedacht, Bakenlaagte, and British sphere of influence. This shaped them as Tweebosch in the Transvaal and Groenkop in the race patriots and gave rise to an aggressive nation- Orange Free State—fifty-four out of sixty Boer alism that promoted Afrikaner aspirations to attain delegates at Vereeniging in the Transvaal decided self-determination and predominance in South on May 31, 1902, to submit to the unfavorable Africa. This, together with a fear of the African British peace terms. The Transvaal and the (by majority, helps explain the implementation of the this time) Orange River Colony became crown APARTHEID policy. With the formation of the Repub- colonies of the British Empire. The Boers had lost lic of South Africa in 1961, the Peace of Vereenig- their independence. ing seemed, in a certain sense, to be avenged. Africans were equally devastated by the war, African Participation with similar results as far as poverty and urbaniza- Although both the Boer and British leaders ini- tion. Moreover, their occupation of Boer-owned tially believed that the war should be “a white land was not recognized nor did they receive an man’s war,” Africans played an important part extension of the qualified franchise that was prac- too, and, as has been seen, suffered severely. From ticed in the Cape Colony and Natal (meaning that the beginning of hostilities, both warring parties an African male who owned land and paid a cer- employed Africans in noncombatant roles. About tain amount of taxes could vote in these British 10,000 agterryers (black henchmen, or literally colonies). after-riders) accompanied the Boers to perform camp duties on commando. A very small number Historiography of them unofficially took up arms on the Boer Although the debate on the causes of the war soon side. In the British Army, at least 14,000 Africans became a favored topic for historians, the military operated as wagon drivers, and, increasingly, course of the conflict, the role of prominent com- Africans were employed in combatant roles as manders, and the political aspects were the focus spies, guides, and eventually as soldiers. Under of research until the 1970s. These themes have by Kitchener’s command, they were armed for self- no means been exhausted, but historians have defense against the Boers, who summarily exe- since begun to consider other aspects of the war, cuted them when captured. By the end of the war, thus dramatically broadening our view. The there were probably 30,000 armed Africans in the emphasis has shifted to war and society—the fate British Army. Moreover, African communities and vicissitudes of ordinary soldiers and civilians drove Boer commandos and families from large in wartime. The Anglo-Boer War is now seen as a areas in the Transvaal, curtailing Boer operations total SouthAfrican war in which all groups partic- and thus contributing to the Boer acceptance of ipated and which affected all the inhabitants of the the peace terms. country—hence the designation “South African War” by many modern historians. Outcome of the War The new approach places particular emphasis The imperial policy promoted by Milner, including on the circumstances, role, and suffering of rigorous Anglicization efforts, failed soon after the Africans during the war, showing that they saw war and merely fanned Afrikaner nationalism. the conflict as an opportunity to regain the terri- The war devastated the Afrikaners both eco- tory lost to the Boers when the latter entered their nomically and psychologically; it also increased territory and defeated them in the second half of the number of poor whites who had been emerging the nineteenth century through such battles as the before the war, and accelerated urbanization as BATTLE OF BLOOD RIVER. Anglo-Zulu War 19

In the first half of the twentieth century, Warwick, Peter. Black People and the South African Afrikaner historiography focused on the suffering War, 1899–1902. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge of the Boer women and children in the concentra- University Press, 1983. tion camps; this gave Afrikaner nationalist leaders in the period from 1930 to 1960 the opportunity to —Fransjohan Pretorius promote Afrikaner nationalism. Recent Afrikaner research is more balanced and tends to emphasize the social aspects of the Boer experience. Anglo-Zulu War See also SOUTH AFRICA ACT;BRITISH IMPERI- The Anglo-Zulu War was fought in 1879 between ALISMAND SETTLER COLONIALISM (1870–1910); Great Britain and the ZULU Kingdom. While the SOL PLAATJE;J.C.SMUTS origins of the war are many and complex, the outcome was the defeat of the Zulus, the end of Bibliography the independent Zulu Kingdom, and its division Amery, Leopold Stennett, ed. The Times History of into smaller tribal units that has had a lasting the War in South Africa. 7 vols. London: Samp- impact on the social and political landscape of son Low, Marston, 1902. the region that now comprises the KwaZulu- Cuthbertson, Greg, Albert Grundlingh, and Mary- Lynn Suttie, eds. Writing a Wider War: Rethink- Natal Province. ing Gender, Race, and Identity in the South By most accounts, the war was provoked by African War, 1899–1902. Athens: Ohio Univer- an unwarranted act of aggression on the part of the sity Press, 2002. British. In the 1870s, Britain had adopted a for- Denoon, Donald. A Grand Illusion: The Failure of ward policy in the region, aimed at uniting the Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During entire territory, including British and BOER the Period of Reconstruction, 1900–1905. Lon- colonies as well as the independent Zulu King- don: Longman, 1973. dom. British high commissioner Sir Henry Bartle Farwell, Byron. The Great Anglo-Boer War. New Frere provoked a fight with Zulu king York: Harper and Row, 1976. Gooch, John, ed. The Boer War: Direction, Experi- CETSHWAYO, with the expectation that the Zulu ence, and Image. London: Frank Cass, 2000. army would be no match for the British. British Grundlingh, Albert. The Dynamics of Treason: Boer troops invaded Zululand but were quickly Collaboration in the South African War of defeated at Isandlwana Mountain. In one of the 1899–1902. Pretoria, South Africa: Protea Book worst disasters of the colonial era, over 1,300 House, 2006. British troops and their African allies were killed. Judd, Denis, and Keith Surridge. The Boer War. Bas- But, the success at Isandlwana exhausted the Zulu ingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. army, and they were unable to mount an effective Lowry, Donal, ed. The South African War Reap- defense against the invading British. The British praised. Manchester, UK: Manchester Univer- sity Press, 2000. army based in Natal regrouped with the help of Maurice, Frederick, and Maurice H. Grant, eds. His- troops from other British colonies and advanced tory of the War in South Africa, 1899–1902. 4 toward the Zulu capital of Ulundi, the site of this vols. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1907. war’s last great battle. The Zulu army was Nasson, Bill. War for South Africa: The Anglo-Boer defeated, King Cetshwayo was captured and sent War, 1899–1902. Cape Town, South Africa: into exile in CAPE TOWN, and Zululand was Tafelberg, 2010 (revised edition of The South divided among thirteen pro-British chiefs, a move African War, 1899–1902. London: Arnold, 1999). that led to a decade of destructive civil war and Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. London: Wei- whose legacy continues to the present through denfeld and Nicolson, 1979. Pretorius, Fransjohan. The Anglo-Boer War, 1899– ethnic and political tensions. 1902. Cape Town, South Africa: Struik, 1999. See also BRITISH IMPERIALISMAND SETTLER Smith, Iain R. The Origins of the South African War, COLONIALISM (1870–1910); CETSHWAYO;NATAL; 1899–1902. London: Longman, 1996. ZULU 20 Anthropology

Anthropology tively to “peoples,” each of which was justified in See PALEOANTHROPOLOGY seeking autonomy and political self-determination as its highest goal. Since individuals could find their highest fulfillment only as part of a volk, it Apartheid followed that churches, schools, and families An Afrikaans word, apartheid (apartness) (pro- were duty bound to inculcate this sacred volk nounced apart-hate) was the name given to the identity in each new generation. broad array of discriminatory laws and policies Apartheid ideology held that the destiny adopted by the NATIONAL PARTY to secure white willed by God for the Afrikaner volk was also the supremacy in South Africa after 1948. During the correct path for other peoples defined by common first two and a half decades of National Party rule, language, culture, and historical experience— Prime Ministers D. F. MALAN, Johannes G. Strij- including Africans. Contrary to the liberal belief dom, HENDRIK VERWOERD, and John Vorster con- that Africans should be encouraged to assimilate structed a vast edifice of apartheid laws and European culture, apartheid stood for the greatest repressive mechanisms to contain antiapartheid possible segregation of Africans in order that they opposition. In its final decade and a half in power, might pursue the unhindered development of their the National Party under P. W. Botha and F. W. DE own God-given destinies as ethnic nations. As KLERK tried to dilute apartheid in order to coun- National Party policy unfolded after 1948, this teract domestic and foreign criticisms. Ultimately, idealistic do-unto-others vision convinced many apartheid was abandoned under pressure from Afrikaners that apartheid was grounded in moral black resistance and hostile world opinion, both principles, even if these might not be fully real- of which threatened to cripple South Africa’s ized in practice. economy. In the two decades before 1948, apartheid ideology coexisted with an increasingly virulent Apartheid to 1948 racism among South African whites. Inspired by Apartheid laws and policies were buttressed by an the rise of Nazism and fed by the pseudoscientific ideology with philosophical roots in Europe and literature of eugenics then being produced in the by a long tradition of racist colonial attitudes. United States and Britain, South African eugeni- Although the word first gained notoriety as a cists popularized a theory of biological determin- National Party campaign slogan in the general ism that cast the Afrikaner volk as a special breed election of May 1948, apartheid’s main ideologi- threatened by degradation through genetic mixing cal features took shape in the 1930s and 1940s as with other races. A pledge to prevent this degrada- a by-product of emerging doctrines of AFRIKANER tion became an important plank in the National NATIONALISM. Nationalist intellectuals at that time Party’s election platform from 1948 onward, with were influenced by Johann Gottfried von Herder laws against interracial sex and marriage priori- and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, eighteenth-century tized in the party’s legislative program of German nationalist thinkers, as well as by the 1949–1950. nineteenth-century Dutch neo-Calvinist theolo- Academic Dan O’Meara has argued that, in gianAbraham Kuyper. Centered in the AFRIKANER embracing apartheid, the Nationalists united the BROEDERBOND, these intellectuals disseminated Afrikaner electorate through appeals that aligned their ideas through the DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH working-class voters with the economic interests and the Afrikaans press and universities, popular- of emerging Afrikaner capital. White workers, izing the central concept of the volk (an ethnic especially the many thousands of rural-born, low- group or a people) as the fundamental building skilledAfrikaners who had migrated to towns dur- block of all societies. Propounding a quasi-reli- ing the Great Depression and World War II, saw in gious doctrine of Christian nationalism, they apartheid a promise of expanded job reservation asserted that public rights and duties were not pri- laws that would protect them against competition marily an individual matter but belonged collec- from cheaper African labor. Aspiring Afrikaner Apartheid 21 businessmen could be confident that new laws museums, restaurants, and the like. Even park controlling the mobility of African labor would benches were inscribed with blankes (whites) and guarantee a reliable stream of docile and low-paid nie-blankes (nonwhites) signs. Sports teams and workers to commerce and industry once the needs facilities were also rigidly segregated for almost of white workers were met. Most importantly, three decades, despite South Africa’s exclusion white commercial farmers saw in apartheid a from international competition as a consequence. guarantee that tighter PASS LAWS would control the The BANTU EDUCATION Act (1953) brought townward movement of Africans, by requiring all African schools under state control, clearing that all Africans carry a pass book and that only the way to impose dumbed-down curricula and to approved Africans could come to the urban areas segregate school children according to language for work, and thus ensure a steady supply of farm group, hypothetically to facilitate each group’s workers without any increase in wages. Academic “separate development” as a volk. In 1959, the Deborah Posel questions this picture of a party Extension of University Education Act restricted brought together around the interests of Afrikaner existing universities to whites only and launched capital and points to fundamental contradictions the construction of ethnically segregated state uni- between apartheid’s promises of political segrega- versities (later dubbed “bush colleges”) for tion, economic integration, and permanent white blacks. A decade later, these tightly controlled supremacy in “white” areas where blacks for institutions spawned the South African Students’ practical reasons would always be a majority. Far Organisation with its militant antiapartheid ideol- from launching its new policy of apartheid as a ogy of solidarity among all nonwhites, who were coherent grand design for the future, Posel argues, now collectively rechristened “blacks.” the National Party proceeded from the start with Apartheid laws of an overtly political kind an ambiguous plan that tried to straddle conflict- were designed to weaken the National Party’s ing views about the future of African urbanization enemies, silence its critics, and bolster its parlia- and migratory labor. mentary majority. The Suppression of Commu- nismAct (1950) banned the SOUTH AFRICAN COM- Apartheid Legislation MUNIST PARTY and established procedures for To give substance to the pledge that whites would gagging and restricting individuals alleged to be be supreme in their own areas and that other peo- furthering its aims. The AFRICAN NATIONAL CON- ple, under white direction, would be appropriately GRESS (ANC) and the PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS compartmentalized elsewhere, the South African were similarly suppressed by the Unlawful Orga- Parliament in the 1950s passed a series of segre- nizations Act (1960). When the ANC experi- gation laws, starting with the Population Registra- mented with passive resistance in 1952, a new law tion and Group Areas Acts in 1950. The first of was passed to make civil disobedience itself a these laws required every citizen to have a racial crime punishable by imprisonment, fines, and/or classification, while the second required all towns flogging. The Senate Act of 1956 led to the and cities to be zoned by race, reserving the best removal of coloured voters in the Cape from the residential and commercial areas for whites and common voters’ roll, placing them on a segre- pushing everyone else out to the peripheries. Par- gated roll and depriving the opposition United ticular attention was given to removing INDIAN Party of their votes. In 1968, the Liberal Party dis- shops from prime areas coveted by aspiring banded when the Prohibition of Political Interfer- Afrikaner entrepreneurs. In inner-city CAPE ence Act banned multiracial political parties. The TOWN, the picturesque DISTRICT SIX, occupied Affected Organizations Act (1974) enabled the mainly by COLOUREDS, was demolished block by minister of justice to prohibit any organization block and rezoned for whites. The 1953 Separate from receiving foreign funds. Amenities Act provided legal sanction for the pro- From the early 1960s, a series of harsh secu- vision of separate (and better) facilities for whites rity laws made imprisonment for political in transport services, office buildings, elevators, offenses increasingly common. Acts of sabotage 22 Photo by Guinnog.

Sign in Durban that states the beach is for whites only under apartheid laws. The languages are English, Afrikaans, and Zulu. Apartheid 23 brought stiff penalties after 1962, and, from the the National Party, however, these jobs were a following year, torture became routine when a valuable form of patronage, helping to secure the new measure was introduced enabling police to loyalty of thousands of Afrikaner voters. detain suspected political offenders or witnesses for up to ninety days without charge or access to a Apartheid After 1976 lawyer. Habeas corpus was dispensed with alto- Notwithstanding the National Party’s continuing gether when the Terrorism Act of 1967 provided electoral strength, the SOWETO STUDENT UPRISING for indefinite detention without charge. In the of 1976–1977 caused verligte (enlightened) 1970s and 1980s, the state conducted hundreds of Afrikaners to question the government’s reliance political trials. The accused of all races sat side by on old-style apartheid in light of changing eco- side in the dock, but, when convicted, they went nomic and political conditions. Radical academ- to segregated prison cells and, when hung, to seg- ics like Dan O’Meara had long argued that regated cemeteries. apartheid and advanced industrial capitalism were A further set of apartheid laws and policies compatible, while liberals like Merle Lipton addressed the administration and development of maintained that capitalists would eventually find the various supposed “Bantu nations.” Whites of apartheid too inefficient and unwieldy. By the all ethnicities, under the leadership of the 1980s, the weight of evidence was tilting toward Afrikaner volk, were seen as one nation, but the latter view. African attitudes were hardening. Africans were said to comprise ten nations, each POLITICALVIOLENCE provoked growing pressure with a designated geographical homeland, or BAN- for international sanctions. As the bargaining TUSTAN. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 began power of skilled African workers increased, the the process of inventing these entities, and with logic of recognizing black trade unions became the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government irrefutable. To dilute apartheid and win foreign Act, Hendrik Verwoerd put the world on notice approval, the National Party introduced separate that these emerging nations, as in the rest of coloured and Indian houses of parliament. Africa, were eventually to be “decolonized.” Although conservative foreign governments Starting with the Transkei in 1976, four were hailed this as “a step in the right direction” by eventually granted nominal independence. The PRETORIA, opposition groups in South Africa, gal- reality, however, was that the bantustans were vanized by the new multiracial UNITED DEMO- never viable political entities and relied heavily CRATIC FRONT, seized on the first elections to the on the apartheid government financially and oth- tricameral parliament in 1984 to mount a massive erwise. Rural Africans living on freehold farms show of resistance. purchased by their forebears before the 1913 Turmoil in the black townships, protest NATIVES’LAND ACT were systematically forced strikes, and industrial disputes built to a from these “black spots” into the bantustans as crescendo over the following two years, plunging part of the nation-building exercise. In the mean- the Botha government into a prolonged crisis of time, coloureds and Indians, who had no territo- indecision. The pass laws became unenforceable rial homelands, were nevertheless put on a path to and were repealed in 1986, along with the prohi- racial self-determination through the establish- bition on mixed marriages. Shantytowns mush- ment in the late 1960s of two national advisory roomed as rural poverty accelerated the migration bodies, the Coloured Persons’ Representative of Africans to towns. The National Party acqui- Council and the South African Indian Council. esced as all-white universities accepted growing Like the bantustans, however, these achieved no numbers of black students and private high more than paltry popular recognition inside South schools began to integrate. Municipalities began Africa and won no praise for apartheid abroad. to drop petty segregation in public places, and Critics often pointed to the wasteful cost of residentially integrated “grey areas” gradually employing thousands of bureaucrats to administer spread in major cities in defiance of the Group apartheid’s multifarious laws and regulations. For Areas Act. 24 Armed Struggle

These derelictions from the old apartheid Smith, David M., ed. Living Under Apartheid: order were denounced by the Conservative Party, a Aspects of Urbanization and Social Change in 1982 right-wing breakaway of working-class South Africa. London: George Allen and Afrikaners from the National Party. The National Unwin, 1982. Party, no longer bound by the outmoded tenets and Swilling, Mark, Richard Humphries, and Khehla Shubane, eds. . tactics of Afrikaner nationalism, held onto power Apartheid City in Transition Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University by attracting English-speaking voters to whom Press, 1991. there was nothing sacred about apartheid per se as Welsh, David. The Rise and Fall of Apartheid: From long as white dominance was maintained. Eventu- Racial Domination to Majority Rule. Johannes- ally, however, P. W. Botha’s faltering leadership led burg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball, 2010. his own cabinet to oust him in August 1989. Under his successor, F. W. de Klerk, a rapid change of —Gail Gerhart course was effected, leading to the repeal of all but a handful of apartheid laws by 1991. Initially pre- pared to concede only that apartheid was a noble experiment that failed, de Klerk in later years has Armed Struggle spoken for many whites in regretting the centuries The armed struggle that originated during the of injustice suffered by blacks. early 1960s by blacks against the APARTHEID See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS; regime arose from the long history of nonviolent AFRIKANER NATIONALISM;APPENDIX 1; BANTU opposition to injustice. In the decade before the EDUCATION;BANTUSTANS; F. W. DE KLERK;NEL- turn to violent tactics, some within the AFRICAN SON MANDELA;NATIONAL PARTY; H. F. VERWOERD NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC)—as well as many people outside of the organization—were begin- Bibliography ning to doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent Cock, Jacklyn. Maids and Madams: A Study in the protest, particularly against a state willing to use Politics of Exploitation. Johannesburg, South deadly force to suppress peaceful opposition from Africa: Ravan Press, 1980. the black majority. The 1960 SHARPEVILLE MAS- Dubow, Saul. Scientific Racism in Modern South SACRE, in which police killed at least sixty-nine Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University people who had been protesting PASS LAWS, rein- Press, 1995. forced an argument that had been gaining ground Giliomee, Hermann. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town, SouthAfrica: Tafelberg, 2003. within theANC and within the rival PAN AFRICAN- Giliomee, Hermann, and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds. IST CONGRESS (PAC) that organized opposition Up Against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and movements would have to adopt the strategic use Privilege in South Africa. Cape Town, South of violence to counter the state’s violence. Africa: David Philip, 1985. Lemon, Anthony, ed. Homes Apart: South Africa’s Strategic Use of Violence Segregated Cities. Bloomington: Indiana Uni- Nonviolence was a tactic born out of the military versity Press, 1991. conquest of African chiefdoms and kingdoms pri- Lipton, Merle. Capitalism and Apartheid: South marily by the British in the late nineteenth and . Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Africa, 1910–84 early twentieth centuries. Many Africans believed Allanheld, 1985. it would be futile to attempt further armed strug- O’Meara, Dan. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, gle and instead looked to the limited parliamen- 1948–1994. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997. tary means available to them to make their politi- Omond, Roger. The Apartheid Handbook, 2nd ed. cal voices heard. New York: Penguin Books, 1986. By the late 1950s, however, politically Posel, Deborah. The Making of Apartheid, 1948– engaged Africans were changing their analysis. 1961: Conflict and Compromise. Oxford: The NATIONAL PARTY state (first elected in 1948) Clarendon Press, 1991. had tightened existing segregationist legislation Armed Struggle 25 and was enacting the more stringent laws that pected of promoting armed resistance. In 1963, became apartheid. A new generation of African most of the Umkhonto we Sizwe’s High Com- leaders who had come to power in the ANC was mand were arrested in a raid and subsequently ideologically committed to a more activist stance. tried for making preparations for sabotage and This activism initially led to a broader use of guerrilla warfare, and furthering the aims of com- Gandhian passive resistance (satyagraha), but as munism (the RIVONIA TRIAL). By the late 1960s, the state refused to make concessions and instead mostANC and PAC leaders were either in exile or stepped up its enforcement of segregationist laws in prison serving life sentences. (and then banned the ANC—the most important Banned within South Africa, the ANC and cause), some ANC leaders, including NELSON PAC established training camps for guerrillas MANDELA, drew up plans for the limited use of beyond South Africa’s borders. The ANC, relying violence. In addition, some ANC members, on its alliance with the SOUTH AFRICAN COMMU- notably ROBERT SOBUKWE, earlier broke away NIST PARTY, developed contacts with the Soviet from the ANC to form the rival PAC partly Union, which provided guerrilla training and because of a growing frustration with what they arms. The ANC later established training camps in characterized as the ANC’s “go-slow” tactics. MOZAMBIQUE and Angola after the Portuguese In the 1950s, antistate violence had already colonial regime collapsed in 1975. However, erupted in several BANTUSTANS of South Africa. through the early 1970s, successful acts of sabo- Originating from the deteriorating economic and tage were relatively few within South Africa. The social conditions in the countryside, the insurrec- apartheid state defined sabotage in such sweeping tions were not controlled by either theANC or the terms in the 1962 General Law Amendment Act PAC. The organizations’ leaders, however, saw (known as the Sabotage Act), however, that polit- the rebellions as both a hopeful sign that people ical activists continued to be convicted of sabo- were willing to resist the state openly and that tage even if they had not committed any acts of political organizations needed to prepare for some violence. By the late 1960s, the state’s repression form of armed struggle to remain relevant to the had rendered the PAC’s armed wing, Poqo, and larger African population. In 1960, the state the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) largely banned the ANC and the PAC, making it illegal irrelevant as significant threats within South for them to pursue their objectives peacefully and Africa. MK guerrillas did, however, fight in con- making it necessary to develop underground flicts in neighboring states, including the “bush networks. war” in Southern Rhodesia (now ZIMBABWE) in Both the ANC and PAC launched quasi- which MK fighters operated alongside guerrillas autonomous wings to promote the armed struggle. from Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s The ANC’s wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of Union (ZAPU). This regional engagement of MK the Nation), was better organized and better in independence struggles in other countries— funded and unleashed its first sabotage campaign which mirrored the actions of the apartheid state’s on December 16, 1961, with attacks on various military in shoring up other white supremacist state installations. PAC’s wing, Poqo (Ourselves regimes in the region—posed a threat of military Alone or Pure), initiated its campaign of violence invasion into South Africa by armed and experi- with an attack on the police station in Paarl in enced guerrillas. November 1962, which resulted in the deaths of The 1970s saw the broader politicization of five Africans and two whites. the South African population with the BLACK The South African state responded with leg- CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT, headed by STEVE islation effectively categorizing all dissent— BIKO. Politicization led to the creation of a num- peaceful or not—as treason punishable by the ber of organizations whose members expressed death penalty and aggressively infiltrated African political opinions at odds with the apartheid organizations. New laws granted sweeping pow- regime, sometimes in very confrontational terms. ers to the police to detain and torture people sus- The state responded to all criticism by Africans, 26 Armed Struggle whether they were leading organized resistance or sabotage, as youths confronted armored personnel not, with harsh reprisals, including detention carriers and police with rifles, and guerrillas without trial, increasingly draconian legislation planted land mines on rural roads used by white that criminalized all forms of dissent, and with the commandos and attacked military bases and gov- deployment of death squads, which in combina- ernment offices. Violence also spread beyond tion with infiltrators inside African organizations, urban areas and black townships into the country- kidnapped and murdered African resistance lead- side where the state found it difficult to maintain ers inside and outside South Africa.The brutal control. While the armed struggle never scored a suppression of the SOWETO STUDENT UPRISING in decisive victory against the South African mili- June 1976, in particular, pushed several thousand tary, it contributed to fomenting resistance inside young South Africans into exile, many in search South Africa, and to destroying confidence in the of guerrilla training. state both at home and abroad. The ANC initially found it difficult to inte- grate the large number of new recruits into their Continuing Violence After Suspension of guerrilla training operations. There were numer- Armed Struggle ous cases of abuse of recruits, some of whom The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and their were suspected of being informers for the South armed wings in February 1990 effectively sus- African security police and some of whom were pended the formal armed struggle. Political vio- merely critical of the ANC’s operational failures. lence continued, however, even after the first uni- CHRIS HANI, who became a charismatic leader of versal suffrage election in April 1994. Some of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the 1980s, was sentenced this violence was fomented by elements of the to death by Umkhonto’s High Command in 1969 National Party government to raise questions for submitting one such critical report. The ANC about the ANC’s ability to control its cadres and political leaders quickly reversed his death sen- ultimately to govern. Different political and ethnic tence, but the episode was indicative of some of groups within the African population also fought the problems faced by the organization in exile. each other as they tried to position themselves for Yet, despite operational problems, the number of political advantage in the coming postapartheid successful acts of sabotage undertaken by state. With the election of the ANC to power in Umkhonto increased over the years 1977–1983 1994, the postapartheid state was successful in with attacks on police stations, a state-owned oil defusing some of these conflicts and worked to refinery, and notably the Koeberg nuclear power integrate former antiapartheid guerrillas into the plant outside CAPE TOWN. South African military. See also AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS; Development of a Broader Armed Uprising CHRIS HANI;PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS;JOE The founding of the UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT SLOVO;TREASON TRIAL in South Africa in 1983 by political activists sym- pathetic to the ANC marked a turning point. The Bibliography front, although committed to peaceful methods, Adam, Heribert, and Kogila Moodley. “Political Vio- developed political networks and created momen- lence, ‘Tribalism’ and Inkatha.” Journal of tum for change. 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