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Home , Baath Dam, Diyala Governorate, Euphrates, Haditha Dam, Iraqi Army, Lake Assad

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Water as : IS on the and WP S The Systematic Instrumentalisation of Entails Conflicting IS Objectives Tobias von Lossow

In the course of its territorial expansion, Islamic State (IS, ISIL or ISIS) has brought under its control strategically significant water and large parts of the water in and . It has seized several important on the Euphrates and Tigris as part of its expansion strategy and, particularly since 2014, has used water as a weapon in a number of ways. This practice has disastrous consequences, and it is virtually impossible for external actors to prevent it. And yet, even IS’s room for ma- noeuvre is limited since a functioning water and electricity supply in the areas that it has captured is of existential importance for the . However, the anti-IS coalition’s intensified military interventions since the Paris attacks put the militia under severe pressure. Should IS be forced into extensive withdrawals, then whole regions will be at risk of dramatic and widespread flooding.

Ever since IS first gained control over im- ence. Syrian rebels, joining IS in the course portant water resources in Syria and Iraq, it of the conflict, conquered all of the coun- has been using water to further its military try’s major dams from late 2012 on: the Tish- and political aims. Capturing large dams rin , Euphrates Dam and . and on the Euphrates and Tigris From 2014 on, IS expanded its control over is a crucial part of IS’s expansion strategy, the Iraqi areas of the upper reaches of the along with seizing oil fields, because it Euphrates and Tigris with its lightning- enables IS to control the region’s most im- quick advances in Iraq. Within about a year, portant water resources (see map, p. 3, and IS had occupied all strategically significant overview, p. 5). The heavy fighting it has dams there, with the exception of the Hadi- engaged in over individual dams, and the tha Dam. It has been unable to keep control heavy casualties it has incurred, demon- of all of these facilities. However, several strate the significance of these facilities major dams are still in the militia’s hands, for IS. including those at Falluja and . Almost the entire Syrian part of the Euphrates basin is in the IS sphere of influ-

Tobias von Lossow is a PhD fellow in SWP’s and SWP Comments 3 January 2016

1 IS and water as weapon in May 2015, IS intermittently reduced the For tactical and strategic reasons, water outflow of the Euphrates by up to 50 per- frequently plays a significant role in violent cent by diverting water into Habba- conflicts and . Sensitive components of niya. It thus gained control over water sup- the water infrastructure, such as treatment plies for the governorates of Babil, , , piping systems, pumping stations and Qadisiya, and drastically limited or reservoirs can become targets for mili- the supply to . tary violence and be destroyed. However, After capturing the large dams at Falluja, the use of water as a weapon – in the sense , and Ramadi, IS not only of military tool – is much more complex interrupted local water supplies but also and primarily serves to put pressure on the deprived distant Shiite areas in the lower population and the opponents’ political reaches of the Euphrates and Tigris of water leadership. Drastic interventions in water by damming and diverting it. In order to and electricity supplies are meant to break achieve this repeatedly stated goal of IS, resistance and gain the support of the popu- water from the Euphrates was additionally lation by force, or else drive it out. The aim diverted upstream in Syria. This meant, at can also be to destroy and the same time, that IS also struck at one of production, and render whole areas unin- Iraq’s most important agricultural centre. habitable. The strategic dimension of water Too much water: Whoever has control over in conflict situations is most evident with water can also areas – either upstream because control over the resources in of a dam, by damming and diverting the the upper reaches makes it possible to gain water, or downstream, by releasing large influence over, or inflict targeted damage volumes of water at once. In April 2014, after on, larger and more distant areas, without IS had the Falluja Dam floodgates closed, necessarily directly attacking, occupying or the retained water flooded large areas up- controlling them militarily. stream and submerged Iraqi government There are essentially three ways of using facilities on the banks. The water was water resources as a weapon: by making diverted over an channel into a sure that too little water is available, or too side valley, inundated extensive areas up much, or water of insufficient quality. IS has to 100 km away, and put the town of Abu repeatedly used all three variants and has Ghraib under up to 4 metres of water. Be- had an impact at the local, regional and tween Falluja and Abu Ghraib over 10,000 national level. houses and around 200 square kilometres Too little water: Targeted water and elec- of fertile farmland were destroyed; almost tricity shortages can be created in certain the entire harvest was wiped out; and live- areas, or existing supply problems exacer- stock was killed. Up to 60,000 locals who bated, if pipes and cables are cut, or if had lost their livelihood in the flood were water supplies are kept back, withdrawn displaced. or diverted at a dam. Whoever has control Insufficient quality: Finally, water can be over a dam can cause downright used as a weapon by soiling or poisoning over large swathes of downstream. In water resources. This practice can relatively Syria as well as Iraq, IS has time and again easily be “exported” to other regions since cut off water and electricity supplies to an attack of this kind causes great damage individual districts, towns or whole prov- with comparatively simple means. In Decem- inces. For instance, , a town in ber 2014, IS deliberately contaminated northern Iraq with a predominantly Chris- with crude oil in the Balad tian population, was completely isolated in district of Salahaddin Governorate, south June 2014, with an IS embargo additionally of . There were also reports of poisoned interrupting trade connections to the out- water supplies from , Deir ez-Zor, side world. After seizing the Ramadi Dam and . In one of its video mes-

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

2 Map IS and the Euphrates and Tigris Dams

sages, IS called on its followers to poison failed dramatically to drive the steadily the drinking water of its enemies elsewhere advancing Japanese into the waves as well. In July 2015, IS members acted on of the Yellow by breaching a dam in this appeal even on European . An attack Henan Province. Whilst the Japanese sol- on the in Pristina, which was diers largely managed to escape, the flood only prevented just before execution, was wave forged its way unimpeded to the , intended to contaminate the largest water causing up to 800,000 civilian casualties. uphill of the city. As these examples show, areas are often flooded defensively, to stop advancing enemy forces. Such an act can also be used Tactical uses for the military for offensively, to attack enemy positions. At the same time, water as an instrument of Initially IS retained water behind the Falluja has direct tactical uses for the military. Dam, thus driving off the Iraqi troops on Water can be instrumentalised both defen- the reservoir banks upstream of the dam. sively and, as part of plans to expand or By releasing the dammed water two days attack, offensively. For example, in autumn later, IS prevented a rapid advance onto 1914, during the First , Belgium its own positions by follow-on units of the opened locks on rivers, and – at high . In , too, the tide – even towards the sea near Nieuw- militia repeatedly flooded villages to foil poort so as to flood the contested Yser plain. Iraqi troop advances. This succeeded in driving back the German Partially or totally depriving contested units advancing to the Atlantic coast. In areas of water can reduce the water sup- the Second Sino-Japanese War, by contrast, plies of enemy troops. This simultaneously a 1938 attempt by the Chinese leadership increases the range of movement of one’s

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

3 own fighters. It also suspends the specific the damage caused by extensive flooding function of rivers as natural borders and cannot be limited either in its intensity or cancels the strategic importance of bridges: in its geographical spread. a few days after the Ramadi Dam floodgates It was IS’s temporary capture of the had been closed, IS units on the northern in August 2014, in particular, side of the river were able to cross down- that set off alarm bells around the world. stream of the dam at low water levels and After all, around 45 percent of the Iraqi attack the Iraqi troops controlling the electricity supply and the bulk of the water southern bank. supply to the Kurdish regions depend on this dam, the largest in the country. The concern was that IS might use the country’s A powerful threat largest reservoir to let Shiite southeastern Regardless of whether, how and to what Iraq, a key agricultural region, dry out extent water is actually deployed as a rapidly. The feared worst-case scenario was weapon, the very question of who controls that IS might blow up the dam – a highly this vital has a strong psychologi- sensitive and fragile construction in any cal impact. This is especially true for arid case – or let it burst. A flood wave about 20 regions such as the Middle East, which has metres high would then to all intents and just suffered its greatest in 60 years. purposes have wiped out the city of Mosul, Moreover, extensive parts of the dilapidated before travelling on at a speed of 3.5 metres Syrian and Iraqi water infrastructure have per second and hitting Baghdad, 200 kilo- largely collapsed following delayed mod- metres downstream, with a wave height of ernisation measures, violent conflicts and five metres. Total casualties in this scenario targeted destruction – about half of the were estimated at 500,000. However, a few Syrian infrastructure since the outbreak of days later, IS lost control over the Mosul the civil war. At the same time, the majority Dam to and Kurdish of the population depends on agriculture fighters, with US close air sup- and relies on irrigation for its fields, espe- port. cially in the summer months. In the meantime, an existential threat Critical water resources being in the had arisen in connection with the hands of a radical and brutal militia that Dam. Nearly all of Baghdad’s water supply seems capable of anything is a frightening and around three-quarters of Iraq’s electric- idea not just against this particular back- ity derive from these two dams. Supported drop. Moreover, the strategic reach of water by US air attacks, Iraqi forces did manage as a weapon makes it possible to keep threat to hold the , the country’s levels high in the long term without actually second largest, but IS continues its push to deploying the weapon – a logic similar capture it. It has besieged the dam for 18 to that of the atom bomb. As long as IS is months and has repeatedly subjected it to in command of important dams on the heavy offensives and series of suicide attacks. Euphrates and Tigris, and thus controls water distribution over large swathes of the country, it has the potential to inflict great Limited scope for intervention damage. And whenever water is actually The (UN) has been observing deployed as a weapon, the damage caused with concern the increasing use of water is long-lasting because destroyed pipes, as a weapon of war in conflicts around the ruined harvests or contaminated water world, including Syria and Iraq. It has re- resources will continue to have an impact peatedly and severely condemned IS’s prac- even if IS is forced back militarily. Addition- tice, referring to the right to water. ally, the consequences of such a deployment However, the international community’s are virtually impossible to calculate since ability to intercede is limited, and largely

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

4 Overview Important dams on the Euphrates and Tigris, starting upstream (author’s own table)

Name/location Primary use/significance ISIS- or Currently IS-controlled controlled by Dams in Syria near : max. capacity 630 megawatt (MW) 11/2012– /Syrian (Euphrates) 12/2015 opposition Euphrates Dam near Tabqa /  hydropower: max. capacity 824 MW; irrigation since 2/2013 IS with  reservoir: Lake Assad, volume is 11.7 km³ at about 2/3 (Euphrates) full  supply: largest dam in Syria; supplies approx. 5 mio. people with water, and Aleppo and other towns with electricity Baath Dam at Raqqa  hydropower: max. capacity 81 MW since 2/2013 IS (Euphrates)  supply: 60% of Syria’s water supply Dams on the Iraqi upper reaches Dam at Mosul  hydropower: max. capacity 1050 MW; offsets 7–16/8/2014 Peshmerga/ (formerly Saddam Dam) fluctuations in water levels; flood protection Kurds (Tigris)  reservoir: volume is 12 km³ at about 2/3 full  supply: largest dam in Iraq; 45% of Iraqi electricity supply Dam at Haditha  hydropower: max. capacity 660 MW --- Iraqi troops (Euphrates)  supply: 30% of Iraqi electricity supply; together with Mosul Dam, provides almost all of Baghdad’s water and electricity Dam at Samarra,  hydropower: max. capacity 84 MW; irrigation; flood 4/2014– Iraqi troops Tharthar Dam (Tigris) protection autumn 2015  supply: controls Baghdad’s water supply, to Dam at Ramadi  irrigation; flood protection since 5/2015 IS (Euphrates)  canal to Lake Habbaniya; connected to Samarra Dam by Tharthar Canal Dam at Falluja, Nuaimiya-  irrigation; offsets fluctuations in water levels since 4/2014 IS Dam (Euphrates)

ineffective except for military interven- fail with IS: being ostracised by the com- tions. It is basically reduced to verifying munity of states, appeals or sanctions have information and accusations. Indeed, the no traction with IS. In any case, the highest use of water as a weapon and interference level of escalation, namely a military inter- with a state’s vital water supply do repre- vention, has already been reached, albeit sent a clear violation of international law, outside the UN framework. which is why the UN Security Council (SC) This military intervention by the US-led might be able to concern itself with water anti-IS coalition has been effective on the for the first time in its history. However, water issue when nothing else has, prevent- the measures that the SC usually applies ing IS from gaining control over all impor-

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

5 tant dams on the Iraqi upper reaches of supplies to a great extent, IS is able to recruit the Euphrates and Tigris. In particular, the new followers – mostly because over the past air strikes carried out by the US have been decade those in power in Syria and Iraq aimed repeatedly – and, in certain phases have failed to construct a nationwide basic on a daily basis – at supporting the Iraqi supply of water and electricity. IS thus fills army or Kurdish units in defending dams, a void in regions that had been deliberately as was the case for instance with the Hadi- undersupplied or largely left to their own tha Dam in September 2014 and July 2015. devices. After capturing the city of Mosul in Equally, when recapturing the Mosul Dam June 2014, IS initially cut off water and elec- in August 2014, the Iraqi and Kurdish units tricity supplies. When it resumed supplying received massive and decisive close air sup- after a few days, many of those who had fled port from the US President Barack Obama returned for precisely that reason. Under justified this operation with the catastrophic these conditions, parts of the Sunni popu- consequences that a breach of the Mosul lation in particular increasingly perceived Dam would have. He thus accounted for the the IS occupation as a liberation. de-facto expansion of the original US man- Ensuring a basic supply of water and date, which merely provided for protecting electricity also serves IS’s higher purpose minorities. IS positions near the Ramadi in the region: to establish a that pro- Dam have also been bombed repeatedly vides public services. Only if IS is capable since July 2015. Air strikes have been fur- of offering a water supply to the local popu- ther intensified in autumn 2015 and anti- lation in a region that has been groaning IS forces that retook the city of Ramadi in under droughts, shortages and dilapidated December are currently close to liberating piping systems for decades, might it be able the dam from IS. to hold the territories it has conquered, secure and legitimise its power, and consoli- date the proclaimed caliphate. To underpin The importance of water for IS this long-term aim structurally, the milita Even though the possibilities for exerting now uses experts to manage the captured external influence on IS are limited, the water resources, and carries out occasional militia’s use of the water supply is none- repairs to the water infrastructure. theless subject to a number of constraints. Besides increasing support for IS among In the first instance, IS uses water resources the population, providing water and elec- and hydropower to supply fellow fighters and tricity also has a more immediate merit: it the population of the areas it has conquered – is a source of financial revenue. After supplies as well as its own base of operations. That had been halted, certain districts and vil- is why, after capturing the Syrian dams, it lages were offered a resumption of water kept them operating. At the Euphrates Dam and electricity against payment. In Raqqa, in Tabqa, electricity production was even for instance, business people have to pay markedly increased at first so as to supply water and electricity rates. In Deir ez-Zor the population of neighbouring regions for and surroundings almost four percent of IS several hours a day, including the town of revenues are generated by electricity rates. Raqqa where IS has its command centre. However, any lasting use of water re- Besides, large quantities of water are needed sources creates a problem for IS. It might for extracting and processing crude oil, sales control dams and electricity production, of which continue to provide the militia but it does not have the capacities or exper- with its financial basis. Even though rev- tise for professionally operating these com- enues dropped for some months, IS earns up plex facilities or for permanently managing to 40 million US dollars a month from oil. the hydrological systems. For example, when Additionally, in areas which had previous- operating a dam the amount of rainfall, ly been cut off from water and electricity the flow rate and the interaction of surface

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

6 and systems have to be Nevertheless, IS has raised the strategic taken into account. The rapid drop of water deployment of water as a weapon to new levels due to the increased electricity gen- heights by making targeted, systematic, eration at the Euphrates Dam showed IS its consistent and at the same time flexible limits. Within a few days, the level of Lake use of it. Its approach at the Falluja Dam Assad dropped by six metres. As a result, in April 2014 (see above, pp. 2 and 3) is an several water pumping stations supplying exemplary demonstration of IS’s military Aleppo, among other places, were put out use of water for defensive as well as offen- of use. Groundwater levels in the surround- sive purposes, in a number of different ing area dropped too, forcing IS to ration ways within a matter of days, which exac- the additional electricity produced for erbated the region’s existing water supply Raqqa. At the Falluja and Ramadi Dams in- crisis and caused substantial damage. dividual floodgates had to be opened time Simultaneously – and in keeping with and again because the water intermittently the image it has of itself – IS is just as inter- threatened IS positions and areas it had al- ested in taking over state functions and ready captured. Because IS lacks the neces- thus in a sustainable use of resources. IS sary expertise, it has occasionally taken on therefore has conflicting objectives, which the specialists already in the post, who in make strikingly clear that the organisation some cases continue to receive their usual views itself both as a jihadist terrorist organi- salaries from the Syrian or Iraqi govern- sation and as a state-like entity. On the one ment. hand, it demonstrates short-term strength and power, and spreads fear and terror, by drying out or flooding swathes of land and Between terror and state-building depriving individual areas of their liveli- The use of water as a weapon in violent hood by disrupting water, electricity and conflicts is nothing new. In the past, the food supplies. On the other hand, its mas- region’s scarce resources were repeatedly sive interference in the water infrastructure instrumentalised under Bashar al-Assad and supply also hits potential supporters in Syria and in Iraq, who of IS in the civilian population – unlike used water supplies to put pressure on blowing up World Heritage Sites. Above all, specific regions or population groups and in the long run such interference reduces deliberately disadvantage them. For in- IS’s credibility and legitimacy in its own stance, in the 1990s Saddam Hussein had ranks. As long as IS exists as a state-like the marshes in the south of the country entity with a territory that it controls, the drained to punish locals there for an up- feared worst-case scenario of a symbolic dam rising against his regime. explosion is not a strategic option for IS. Equally, in the current conflict in Syria, Such a manoeuvre would, after all, thwart all parties are using water as a weapon. the further development and consolidation Aleppo, for example, has been cut off from of the caliphate. Accordingly, in addressing water and electricity supplies several times: the water issue over the past few months, by various rebel groups, IS and the govern- IS has increasingly backed state-building ment, depending on which party happened measures and has had pipes repaired, water to be attacking the city. Even the Iraqi gov- tanks built and wells drilled – primarily ernment deploys water against IS, accept- in Syria. In other words, at the moment ing dramatic consequences. When IS was the region’s water resources mostly serve retaining water at the Falluja Dam, the Iraqi to make plausible a transformation of the government openened the gates of the jihadi militia into a quasi-state. Haditha Dam upstream to put increased However, the intensified interventions pressure on IS in Falluja – thus contribut- of the international anti-IS coalition since ing to the flooding there as well. the Paris attacks put IS under great pressure.

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

7 Should IS be militarily decisively pushed back and existentially weakened, then the threat represented by the masses of water behind the dams would rise markedly, espe- cially in Iraq. If IS loses large swathes of its territory, and thus also the populations there, then it runs the risk of failing to con- solidate the caliphate. In keeping with its ideology, IS would at that point believe itself to be on the threshold of apocalypse, engaged in a final with its enemies. In such an event, the worst-case scenario of a Euphrates or Tigris dam being blown up, or all floodgates being opened, would

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und apply, with consequences both dramatic Politik, 2016 and virtually impossible to calculate – the All rights reserved proverbial sinking of the regions concerned. These Comments reflect If IS is driven back towards its Syrian heart- the author’s views. land, there is a very real danger that it will SWP cause widespread before the fiercely Stiftung Wissenschaft und embattled dams fall to its enemies, as a last Politik German Institute for display of power. Ultimately, the risk of IS International and deploying water as a weapon in its most Security Affairs devastating form in Syria and Iraq grows Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 if and when the militia is subjected to mas- 10719 Berlin sive attacks and forced to withdraw from Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 large areas. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1861-1761

Translation by Tom Genrich

(Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 94/2015)

SWP Comments 3 January 2016

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