Values of "Pure Science": Nishina Yoshio's Wartime Discourse Between Nationalism and Physics, 1940-1945

KENJI ITO* Values of “pure science”: Nishina Yoshio’s wartime discourse between nationalism and physics, 1940-1945

NISHINA YOSHIO FOUND in 1940 a new application of Niels Bohr’s “complementarity.”1 Nishina had studied in Copenhagen between 1923 and 1928. His most important work was in theoretical physics, relativistic treatments of Compton scattering, particularly the so-called Klein-Nishina formula. 2 After his return to Japan in late 1928, Nishina built a strong school of atomic physics. Based at the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (or Riken) in Tokyo, Nishina mentored many able young physicists, among others the later Nobel laureate Tomonaga Sin-itiro, and laid the foundation for the development of modern physics in Japan. During the war, as Japan’s supreme authority of atomic physics, Nishina led one of the principal wartime nuclear power projects. 3

*Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo, 4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904, Japan; [email protected]. Japanese personal names are written in the traditional order (family name first, given name second), except when they appear as authors of writings in European languages. Romanization of Japanese words generally follows Kenkyûsha’ s New Japanese-English dictionary , but in case of personal names, I used the person’s preferred form when I am aware of it. I used circumflexes to indicate long vowels. I would like to thank Alexis de Greiff, David Kaiser, Gentarô Katô ,and Keiko Nagase-Reimet. 1. On complementarity, see, Henry J. Folse, The philosophy of Niels Bohr: The frame work of complementarity (Amsterdam, 1985); Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s philosophy of physics (Cambridge, 1987); Gerald Holton, Thematic origins of scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge, 1988), 99-146. 2. Oskar Klein and Yoshio Nishina, “Über die Streuung von Strahlung durch freie Elektronen nach der neuen relativstischen Quantendynamik von Dirac,” Zeitschrift für Physik, 52 (1929), 853-868; Yoshio Nishina, “ Die Polarisation der Comptonstreuung nach der Diracschen Theorie des Elektrons,” Zeitschrift für Physik, 52 (1929), 869-877; Yazaki Yuji, “Klein- Nishina no kôshiki dôshutsu no katei: Riken no Nishina shiryô wo chûshin ni, (How was the Klein-Nishina formula derived?: Based mainly on the source materials of Y. Nishina in Riken),” Kagakushi kenkyû , 41 (1992), 81-91, 129-137. 3. Like the Germans, the Japanese did not get far enough to have to decide whether to build a bomb or a reactor; therefore, “nuclear power project” is more appropriate than “atomic bomb project” for their endeavor.

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Nishina’s adaptation of complementarity appeared in an article in December 1940. In this article, Nishina pointed out two apparently contradictory claims: While until recently the problem of the “overemphasis of science” had been loudly criticized, now everyone called for “promotion of science.” Nishina suggested that these claims were in a complementary relation in Niels Bohr’s sense. The apparently incompatible views had different areas of applicability. The problem of the overemphasis of science should be addressed in the matter of mind, while the promotion of science should be advocated in the material issues. These two were not always clearly distinguished, just as the position and momentum of an electron was not always exactly determined. According to Nishina, in the matter of “mind,” Japan had traditional beautiful morality and spirituality, whereas in the matter of “science,” Japan had been underdeveloped. 4 In about a year, immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, Nishina applied a similar logic on the issue of national defense. Nishina claimed that, while the recent achievements of the Japanese army were, “evidently,” mainly made possible by the superior “spirit” and training of the “loyal and brave” Japanese soldiers, what was similarly important was the weaponry and military equipment developed by Japanese military engineers. Although the “spirit” played an important role, these material conditions should not be neglected. Therefore, he concluded, Japan should not rely on her “superior” spirit, but also try to develop her science and technology so that Japanese soldiers would be equipped with these two weapons, mental and material. 5 Thus, in a way Niels Bohr probably never imagined, Nishina appropriated his mentor’s pet idea for political propaganda. But exactly for what? Was Nishina a fellow traveler of the Japanese fascists, or was he taking advantage of Japan’s military adventure to fund and advance science? Although the wartime Japanese nuclear power project receives much less publicity today than its German counter- part, similar moral questions can be discussed concerning Japanese scientists’ acts during the war. In this paper, I establish Nishina Yoshio’s moral attitude toward the war on the basis of his large corpus of popular writings from 1940 to 1945 regard- ing science and war. I analyze these writings in terms of the question posed above: Was he collaborating for Japan’s war effort, or making the war an excuse to promote “pure science”? Some literature on the subject exists. Hirosige Tetu, in his classic study of the institutionalization of science in modern Japan, depicts Nishina as one of the most active proponents for the mobilization of science for war, who, moreover, remained cheekily in power after the war. 6 Yamazaki Masakatsu, another Japanese historian of science, in his work on Nishina’s nuclear energy project, suggests that Nishina

4. Nishina Yoshio,”Sô hosei to busshin ichinyo,” Chisei, 3 (Dec 1940), 162-167. 5. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa sensô to kagaku gijutsu no shinkô,” Waseda Daigaku shimbun (14 Jan 1942), 3. 6. Hirosige Tetu, Kagaku no shakaishi: Kindai Nihon no kagaku taisei (Tokyo, 1973), 168, 210, 278. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 63

used military research as a “shield” to protect young scientists in Japan from being drafted by the military. Nishina’s disciples, including Tomonaga Sin-itiro, held similar views. In his studies on science in Nazi Germany, Mark Walker depicts most of his actors in “shades of gray.” 7 I limn Nishina’s portrait in a similar way. Nishina identified himself as a scientist (or rather a practitioner of what he called “pure science”). He defined “pure” or “fundamental science” as the investi- gation of nature with the sole purpose of deepening knowledge about it, whereas the goal of applied science was to use the results of “pure science” for the benefit of people.8 He considered it his task to work for a deeper understanding of nature, not to find useful applications of science. However, Nishina was an ardent nation- alist, who had an extremely strong sense of responsibility for the fate of his country. The two commitments did not necessarily pose a dilemma for Nishina; he believed his argument that “pure science” was good for his country, if not necessarily for winning the current war. Jeffrey Herf, in his book Reactionary modernism , points out the tenuous relations between nationalism and appreciation of science and technology in early- 20th century Germany, where politically conservative “mandarins” had to endorse science and technology because of their utility for the nation. 9 Wartime Japan light- ened a similar tension between science and political conservatism.

1. WARTIME THOUGHT CONTROL IN JAPAN AND THE “SLAVE’S LANGUAGE”

Wartime publications should not be taken at face value since Japanese authors had to express cryptically whatever discontent they felt. Accounts written after the war help us no more, since they often contain apologia and post hoc justification of wartime collaboration with the Japanese military, which was summarily stig- matized in postwar pacifist Japan. Nishina’s wartime writings might appear shock- ingly jingoistic. We need to realize, however, that he wrote under a strict censorship. From 1940 to 1945, Japanese newspapers and magazines were strictly super- vised by the military and government. Thought control stood in the frontline of “ideological warfare” ( shisôsen). The government had six main means to enforce its control on periodicals. 10 The Book Censorship Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry

7. Mark W alker, Nazi science: Myth, truth and the German atomic bomb (New York, 1995), 2. 8. Nishina Yoshio, “Senjika no kiso kagaku,” Chû ôkô ron, 57:657 (May 1942), 95. Nishina used the words kiso kagaku (basic or fundamental science) and junsui kagaku (pure science) interchangeably. I use the word “pure science” to refer to both. 9. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary modernism: Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984). 10. This classification roughly follows Mimasaka Tarô, Fujita Chikamasa, and Watanabe Kiyoshi, Yokoahma jiken (Tokyo, 1977). 64 ITO

(Naimushô Keihokyoku Toshoken’etsuka ) took charge of censoring publication. After September 1941, the censorship took place before circulation. The publishers submitted manuscripts to the Censorship Section, which, if it spied problems, called up the publisher a few days later. The censors might merely admonish the publisher, or order deletion of some parts of the manuscript, or ban its circulation altogether. If the materials to be deleted in part were already printed, the publisher had to tear out the banned pages. Prior clearance did not guarantee that the publication had no major fault, however. The Censorship Section or another branch of the government or the military might criticize it later, and even press criminal charges on the publisher and the author for a work that had passed the censorship. If the book or magazine was already on sale, all the employees of the publishing company had to go to the police stations, which had confiscated the material from the bookstores, in order to tear off the banned pages under the supervision of the thought police. 11 The second means of control was blacklisting authors. The thought police en- listed volunteer informers from the publishing and academic worlds, identified dangerous authors, and urged the publishers to refuse their work. The police had a comprehensive card index of writers and encouraged the publishers consult it. 12 The police resorted to this tactic because the style of the resistance literature did not always allow the police to indict the authors. 13 Third, the military often resorted to a more direct intervention. The Cabinet Information Bureau ( Naikaku Jôhô Bu ; hereafter CIB) or the military would call up the editors of major magazines and tell them what to write and what not to write. Established in 1941 as successor of the Cabinet Information Division, CIB centralized Japan’s information control. Upon its inauguration, it incorporated the Book Censorship Section of the Home Ministry Police Bureau. Military personnel occupied many of CIB’s posts. At the same time, the Army Information Division (Rikugun Jôhô bu ) continued its operation to release and manipulate military-related information, holding regular meetings with magazine editors. At such meetings, an army officer would read aloud comments on recent issues of the major magazines, evaluating their degree of collaboration with the military. By keeping scorecards of the publishing companies’ contribution with the war against the United States and making the results known, the Japanese military pressured publishers into conformity. The military also applied a carrot, almost literally, along with its sticks. At the same time, these meetings were the opportunities of business enter- tainment. At these meetings the publishers enjoyed, at the military’s cost, com- paratively extravagant meals when the food supply was extremely tight. 14 Fourth, the government regulated publishing companies through the distribution of paper. A draft plan of the distribution of paper was devised by the Japanese

11. Hatanaka Shigeo, Oboegaki Shôwa shuppan dan’atsu shôshi (Tokyo, 1965), 176. 12. Ibid., 58. 13. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63. 14. Nakamura Tomoko, Yokohama jiken no hitobito (Tokyo, 1979), 244-245. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 65

Association of Publishing Cultures (later the Japanese Association of Publishing). Although apparently a non-governmental organization, the association’s presidents and council members were appointed by the government and served as its accom- plices. Moreover, as a part of industrial reorganization, which the wartime emergency justified, the government had the power to liquidate uncooperative publishing companies. It targeted influential publishers of a liberal bent, such as Chûôkô ronsha and Kaizôsha, for which Nishina often wrote. These companies received increasingly less paper, and were eventually encouraged to “dissolve themselves voluntarily,” which they did in 1944, although (or possibly because) by then their once influential and prestigious magazines, Kaizô and Chûôkôron, had become totally aligned with the official ideology. Fifth, the government and the military persuaded some authors, editors, and publishers to join their ideological campaign. These fellow travelers would publish attacks against a certain article, author, or idea. Profit being their principal concern, most publishing companies, including large commercia l ones like Kôdansha, only cooperated with the government. Some right-wing intellectuals or entrepreneurs and publishing companies established by them enthusiastically at- tacked liberal and resistant publishers and authors. Finally, the government would resort to arrest and torture of authors and editors. It did not apply this measure often until later in the war except against com- munists, but the danger was always there since anyone could be accused of being a communist. During the Yokohama Incident (1942 to 1945), the Kanagawa thought police made a series of arrests with warrants issued by the Yokohama district attor- ney and based on a charge of attempts at reconstruction of the Japanese Commu- nist Party. 15 It started with the arrests of Mr. and Mrs. Kawada, returnees from the United States, and was built on a piece of a photograph taken at a party where dissident author Hosokawa Karoku treated the young magazine editors in his home- town. More than thirty people, many of them editors employed by liberal publishers, were arrested. The unsanitary conditions and poor food in the detention rooms were life threatening. A new inmate in ill health might die in a few months. Hordes of bedbugs and fleas assaulted the prisoners every night; the lice were more be- nign since experienced prisoners could catch them. When all of Japan was starv- ing, inmates could expect only the worst food possible. 16 Suspected thought crimi- nals also had to undergo interrogations with physical and mental torture. The accused in the Yokohama Incident had nothing to say to satisfy their inquisitors, who were often sadistic. 17 The torture by the thought police resulted in four deaths in jail and two deaths immediately after release. 18 Inconsistency and lack of effective organization in Japan’s “totalitarianism”

15. Janice Matsumura, More than a momentary nightmare: The Yokohama incident and wartime Japan (Ithaca, 1998). 16. Mimasaka et al. (ref. 10), 184-193. 17. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63; Nakamura (ref. 14), 27-28. 18. Nakamura (ref. 14). 66 ITO

caused similar incoherence in its thought control. The censorship varied arbitrarily and inconsistently between censoring organs. For example, the army severely criticized the writings of the so-called Kyoto School philosophers, who held an ideal- ist, neo-Kantian, Hegelian position with a Buddhist flavor. Two of its representa- tives, Nishida Kitarô and Tanabe Hajime, praised Japan’ s political system, the invasion of China, and the war against the United States. Their justification of the war brought them many ardent admirers, even in the Navy. The Army, however, condemned the way they justified the war as “too Western.” Because of the Amy’s strong antagonism toward the Navy, the Navy’s support did not help the Kyoto School philosophers. 19 Two days after Pearl Harbor, on December 9, 1941, the CIB summoned an emergency meeting. An officer from the Book Section read out a memorandum to magazine editors. Its first part directed: 20

1. Emphasize that the Japanese Empire had no choice but to wage war against America and Britain to survive and preserve its prestige. 2. Argue that the true cause of the war was the selfish ambition of the enemy for world domination. 3. Emphasize that the new world order is based on the ideal of the “whole world under one roof,” and aims to put every country in its rightful place.

The second part of the memorandum elaborates and instructed the journal editors how to mislead the Japanese people into believing that Japan was winning the war and that continuing the fight would have victory. The editors should: 21

1. Strongly emphasize not only that the war will turn out well, but also that Japan has an absolute strategic advantage. 2. Give people confidence in national strength, especially the national economic power. 3. Try to expose political, economic, and military weaknesses of Japan’s enemies, use and undermine their self-confidence and neutral countries’ reliance on them. 4. Imbue our people with firmly rooted animosity against America and Britain. At the same time, try to obliterate from their minds any notion of dependence on these countries. 5. Prepare people for a long war.

Then, the memorandum details the kinds of writings that require “special precau- tions.” The censors banned not only all criticism against the government and the military, but also any suggestion of differences of opinions within Japan. The righ- teousness of the war should never be doubted. At the same time, the hope for a peace must be suppressed. The editors should avoid: 22 1. Any discourse that distorts the true meaning of the war, and libels the rightful 19. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63. 20. Ibid., 68. 21. Ibid., 68-69. 22. Ibid., 68-69. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 67

attitude of the Empire. 2. Any discourse that distorts the origin of the war, and libels the acts of the government or the Supreme Command. 3. Any argument suggesting that the government expected aid in the war from Germany or Italy. 4. Any suggestion of a conflict of opinions between the government and the military. 5. Any indication that people are not following government instructions or that national opinion is divided. 6. Any hint of disturbances in China, Manchuria, or other colonies. 7. Any statement that might foster antiwar sentiment or war weariness. 8. Any encouragement of antimilitarism. 9. Any argument that might demoralize the people (The authorities consider any suggestion for a concession to the United States and Britain or a cease-fire as very dangerous. The strictest precaution is required). 10. Any argument that might disturb domestic security. 11. Any argument that distorts the true meaning of the foundation of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by claiming that our country had territorial ambi- tions, to attain which we would inevitably resort to force.

That in effect prohibited all criticism of the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” the official euphemism for Japan’s occupied territories. 23 Most magazine editors acquiesced, gave up their independence, and accepted the terms imposed by the government and the military while occasionally expressing their views and publishing opinions they approved. Similarly, authors who opposed government policies tried to hint at their positions within the imposed limitations or remained silent. One such author recollected that, during the Pacific War, he had had to use “slave’s language,” the language imposed by the government, hoping that readers would decipher his true intent under its militaristic disguise.24 Since editors knew the censorship rules, authors allowed them to revise their writings. Editors might change titles to fit the political situation, as when Hatanaka, as an editor of Chûôkôron, changed Shimizu Ikutarô’s article, “Amerikanizumu” (Americanism), to “Teki toshiteno amerikanizumu” (Americanism as enemy). They changed an assertion of a fact into a conditional statement. They deleted problem- atic paragraphs and restored coherence by changing wording. They inserted jingoistic adjectives and adverbs. Rather than taking offense, authors appreciated the editors’ revisions for protecting them from the thought police. 25 Nishina chose to write within the imposed limitations. Along with other Japa- nese intellectuals, he had to employ “slave’s language” to continue writing and to

23. Ibid., 69-70; William Miles Fletcher III, The search for a new order: Intellectuals and fascism in prewar Japan (Chapel Hill, 1983), chapt. 7. 24. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 171-172. 25. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 80, 185. 68 ITO

attempt to improve the situation. His militaristic and nationalistic language should not be taken at face value. Still, it would be a mistake to project the image of postwar pacifist Japanese scientists backward and to regard everything Nishina wrote as an antiwar statement in disguise or as an opinion forced from him against his true intent. Another point to keep in mind is Nishina’s reputation for sincerity. After the war, when president of Kagaku Kenkyûjo (a private company reorga- nized from Riken), its employees’ union accused its management of “insincerity.” The charge was a ritual of labor disputes that nobody took seriously. Nishina, however, did take it seriously, and refused negotiation until the union apologized. 26 Nishina’s rhetoric often took the following form. He started with nationalistic statements about Japan’s “amazing” military strength or the imperial family, and praised the “loyal and brave” Japanese soldiers. Then he presented his views, often not as his own, but as “what the enemies would think,” or “what was com- monly perceived in the United States.” In another rhetorical move, he would appropriate official propaganda to declare his opinions about the promotion of science. Critics of the regime frequently compared the propaganda of the alleged Asian paradise to the actual situation, tacitly criticizing the government and the military of their failure to meet the advertised ideals. It is therefore a mistake to think that Nishina supported Japan’ s aggression in Asia simply because he repeated the term “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

2. PRE-PACIFIC-WAR YEARS: PRO-AMERICANISM AND MOBILIZATION OF SCIENCE

Nishina’s writings in 1940 and 1941 display his nationalism and his arguments for the wartime promotion of “pure science” and mobilization of science, for his appreciation of American science and technology, but also his high esteem for the “sound ideas” of the American “intellectual class.” During the first months of 1940 the Japanese military manipulated public opinion against Britain, but tried not to antagonize America. In the United States, however, voices protested against exporting war-related materials to Japan for use against China and worried about the war’s damage on U.S. interests there. In January 1940, the Trade Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan expired six months after the U.S. government declared its intention not to renew it. This action was meant to warn Japan against further violation of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 that affirmed China’ sovereignty and independence. Lapse of the treaty also would enable the U.S. to restrict its export of strategic materials

26. Koizumi Kenkichirô, “ Yôroppa ryûgaku jidai no Nishina Yoshio,” Shizen (Nov 1976), 58-67); Tomonaga Sin-itiro, Yamazaki Fumio, Takeuchi Masa, Sakata Shôichi, Nakayama Hiromi, and Tamaki Hidehiko, “Zadan: Nishina sensei wo shinonde,” Hirakareta kenkyûjo to shidôsha tachi, Tomoanga Sin-itiro chosakushû, V ol. 6 (Tokyo, 1982 [1961] ), 57-151, on 89; Tomonaga et al., all disciples of Nishina agreed that “insincere” was a most inap- propriate description of Nishina. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 69

to Japan. Although trade between the two countries did not at first change much, relations deteriorated rapidly during 1940. Japan marched into French Indochina in August and signed an alliance with the Axis countries in September. The previous June the United States had banned the export to Japan of scrap iron and airplane fuel; the ban spread to all forms of iron and other metals in December. In 1940, the Japanese government allowed journalists to write favorably about the United States. The award of the Nobel prize in physics to Ernest Lawrence late in 1939 gave Nishina Yoshio an opportunity to write about American science. 27 In an article of 1940, Nishina recalled Lawrence’s willingness to help foreign scientists, including Nishina and other Japanese physicists to build cyclotrons, and praised Lawrence in the highest terms: 28

I have never met Lawrence in person. Yet, as appears from his letters and work, he must combine harmoniously a passion for science, a boldness of ideas typical of Americans, an ability to carry out those ideas, and indefatigable dili- gence....Moreover, he has a generous mind that deals fairly with people and he sincerely enjoys helping others. This is why he is so respected.

Later the same year, Nishina praised the rapid development of science throughout the United States, likening it to the “beauty of hundreds of flowers blooming in spring time.” The flourishing of science and technology in the United States was a general good for “world culture”— provided that “the American people remain sound. Otherwise, the United States might abuse its tremendous scientific capabilities, which would lead to horrifying results.” Nishina’ s balanced conclusion reflected the uncertain situation of mid-1940. “I do not see any such tendency among the American people today, but I do not know about the distant future.”29 It was Ernest Lawrence who gave him hope that the American people (or its “intellectual class”) would not abuse its strength: 30

I was totally moved by Lawrence’s letters, which showed his sincere desire that scientists collaborate with one other across national boundaries for the advance- ment of science. Of course, not all Americans are like Lawrence. Yet, for the sake of the international scientific community, it is a matter of congratulations that at least one person like Lawrence exists. Although still young, he, being a Nobel laureate, will eventually have an important position in the American physics community. The fact that he behaves as he does means that America’s scientific community and intellectual class have been developing in a healthy way. I know a few other Americans, and all of them are men of sound ideas.

27. J.L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and his laboratory: A history of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory , Vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1989). American scientists’ impressions of Japanese physicists as depicted in this book make an interesting contrast to Nishina’s view of American scientists. 28. Nishina Yoshio, “1939-nen Nôberu butsurigakushô jushô sha, Rôrensu,” Kagaku chishiki, 20:1 (Jan 1940), 110-114, on 114. 29. Nishina Yoshio, “Amerika no kagaku,” Risô , 14:6 (Jun 1940), 655-666, on 655. 30. Ibid., 666. 70 ITO

Exaggerating the superiority of other countries in certain respects is a common strategy in Japan to promote a certain field. Nishina frequently mentioned science and technology in the United States as the goal toward which Japan should aim, the example for Japan to follow. Nishina himself followed Lawrence’s style of scientific research, high energy physics through large instruments, which required outside financial support and, therefore, effective advertisement. Yet, in his article about science in the United States, he praised the American “intellectual class” and ranked science in the United States as a world good, which he would not have done had he intended merely to promote science in Japan. Nishina did not write so favorably about Germany and Italy, even after Japan’s alliance with them. At the first news of the alliance, Nishina was heard to say, “So, Japan has joined the world’s rascals.”31 Nishina’s pro-Americanism of 1940 suggests that he opposed Japan’s attack on the United States as strategically or logistically foolish and as personally offen- sive, and that he disapproved of Japanese racial chauvinism. Nishina resorted to the dualism of mind and matter to avoid a direct confrontation with the official ideology. However, he could not have found the alleged superiority of the “Japa- nese race” persuasive. He candidly admitted Japan’s inferiority to the United States in scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities. In particular, most of its physics was second rate. 32 Nonetheless, much of Nishina’s writings sound jingoistic. He repeated wartime slogans by the Japanese government, such as the “Greater East Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere”(Dai tôa kyôeiken) or the “Advanced Defense State” (Kô do kokubô kokka). In December 1941, presumably before Pearl Harbor attack, he wrote concerning the economic blockade by the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands: 33

Faced with this development, everyone keenly realized that we have to rely on our own power to defend our country. We have to build with our own hands an advanced defense state, and achieve the self-sufficiency of the East Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere. We must devote all of our knowledge, blood, and materials, to make a great march toward the ideal of our country....For this purpose, we can certainly rely on our Japanese spirit inherited from our ancestors. We firmly believe that our sincere patriotism and loyalty are unsurpassed in the world. I have no doubt that these qualities are essential for the defense state, as shown by all the international warfare we have experienced shows.

31. Kobayashi Minoru, “Riron kenkyû,” in Tamaki Hidehiko and Ezawa Hiroshi eds., Nihon no genshi butsurigaku no akebono (Tokyo, 1990), 98-103, on 103. 32. Ishihara Shinobu, Nishina Yoshio, et al., “Kagaku zatsudan,” Kaizô , 22 (Jul 1940), 498- 424, on 402; Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to kotoba,” Shinano kyôiku, 55 (Sep 1941), 20-39, 37. 33. Nishina Yoshio, “Kankô no kotoba,” Zukai kagaku (Dec 1941), 2. This is the preface that Nishina gave to a popular science magazine Zukai kagaku (originally intended to be a series of books). I write more on this magazine below. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 71

After this appeal to nationalistic sentiment comes a reference to the state of Japan’s science and a cry to improve it: 34

Yet, are these [spirit, patriotism, and loyalty] enough for us to complete the Ad- vanced Defense State, and to win all wars? Do they guarantee that we have the natural resources to establish the self-sufficiency of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere? Having seen the armaments and cultures of world powers with highly advanced science and technology, and the degree of progress of science and technology in our country, we cannot help feeling that we should give our very best effort to science and technology.

The content of this paragraph was dangerous. It is likely that the preceding ultra- nationalistic assertions were intended as protection. Nishina’s effort to promote “pure science” coincided with the mobilization of science in Japan. By 1940, the battles in China begun on July 7, 1937, had become a full-scale war that Japan was rapidly depleting their already scarce resources. Wartime economical control tightened, lowering the standard of Japanese domestic life. From May to September in 1939, a clash between Japan’s Kwantung Army and Soviet Union’s mechanized troops under the command of Georgii K. Zhukov along the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, ended in a complete victory for Russia. 35 The Japanese newspapers reported this incident as a victory: the “power of spirit” of the Japanese soldiers withstood the “mechanical force” of the Russian Red Army. Nonethel ess, the defeat, along with the example of Germany’s Blitzkrieg, seems to have convinced some of the Japanese high command of the urgency of mechanization and modernization of Japan’s armament 36 According to Hirosige Tetu, Japan’s serious mobilization of science to war started in 1940, with the “outline of the plan for science mobilization” (kagaku dôin keikaku yôkô ), which the cabinet approved in April of 1940. 37 In May of the next year, the cabinet approved a more detailed “General plan for the establish- ment of a new science and technology system.” This move, championed by “re- formist bureaucrats” including nationalistic engineers like Miyamoto Takenosuke, coincided with efforts to support Prince Konoe’s administration and to end the stalemate in China. 38

34. Ibid. 35. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (2 vols., Stanford, 1985). 36. “Nomonhan jiken no zenbô: Kyô i! Waga shôhei no seishinryoku, sorengun no kikairyoku ni dôô taikô,” in Shimbun shûsei: Shôwashi no shôgen [1939] (Tokyo, 1985), 451-452. 37. Some mobilization had been underway since the mid-1930s; Kawamura Yutaka, “Kyû Nihon Kaigun no denpa heiki kaihatsu katei wo jirei toshita dai niji taisenki Nihon no kagaku gijutsu dôin ni kansuru bunseki” (T okyo Institute of Technology, Ph. D. Disserta- tion, 2001), chapt. 2. 38. Masakatsu Yamazaki, “The mobilization of science and technology during the second world war in Japan: A historical study of the activities of the Technology Board based upon the files of Tadashiro Inoue,” Historia scientiarum , 5 (1995), 167-181, on 167-168; Kawamura (ref. 38), 43-44; Hirosige (ref. 5), 451-452; Ôyodo Shôichi, Miyamoto Takenosuke 72 ITO

Against this background, in 1941, Nishina Yoshio began writing about science and war. He saw in it a great opportunity to reconcile his identity as a scientist with his nationalistic sentiments. He promoted “pure science” (nuclear physics) in a time of scarce resources as he argued for the need for science and engineering in modern warfare. 39 His argument for “pure science” sounded three themes. One concerned the use of science in cultural politics, especially in the occupied territories. In 1940, in relation to the science policy in China, Nishina suggested im- pressing the Chinese with Japan’s scientific achievements “to make them obedi- ent:” and he suggested building a scientific institution to employ them, “and do great work.”40 Secondly, Nishina pushed science as the key to technology. “From the industrial perspective of the development of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere...technology in our country requires a great leap. And the basis of technology is none other than science.”41 Most importantly, Nishina stressed the importance of science and technology in developing weaponry. He used the possibility of unleashing nuclear power as an argument for pursuing “pure science.” He ob- served that nuclear energy had become the “focus of the American scientific world,” and that American laboratories specializing in the field no longer received foreign visitors.42 Implicit here is Nishina’s assumption that “pure scientific” research might result in a “wonder weapon,” not in improving existing conventional weaponry. Returning to his defense of “pure science,” Nishina pointed to its increased importance as the import of new technologi es ceased in wartime Japan. 43 To strengthen this argument, Nishina appropriated the official propaganda of the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Japan had been able to develop its industry despite her poor scientific capability, he said, because it relied on im- ported science and technology. Japan had to develop its own science and technology and establish advanced scientific research traditions to make the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” truly self-sufficient. 44

to kagaku gijutsu gysôsei (Tokyo, 1989). It is not clear whether there was a direct causal relation between the Nomonhan Incident (the defeat in Manchuria) or Germanly’s Blitz- krieg and this plan. 39. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to sensô,” Chisei (April 1941), 22-29, on 27. 40. Ishihara and Nishina (ref. 32), 422. Nishina lectured in Manchuria in January 1942; Nishina Yoshio, “ ‘Kagaku no Manshû’ shikan: Manshû koku Kyôwakai Kagakugijutsu Rengôbukai ni nozomite,” Kagaku asahi (May 1942), 106-107, on 106. The lecture was organized by Manshûkoku Kyôwakai (a Japanese organization for anti-communist propaganda and war mobilization in Manchûria, and the intended audience was probably Japa- nese scientsts. 41. Nishina (ref. 39), 22; Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to gijutsu no shinkô,” Kaizô (Jan 1941), 356-361, on 360. 42. Nishina (ibid.), 358-59. 43. Nishina (ref. 39), 27. 44. Nishina Yoshio et al., “Nihon kagaku no genjô (zadankai),” Bungakukai (May 1941): 50-64, on 56 and 59; Nishina (ref. 32), 36. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 73

It would take time for pure research to bear a fruit. Nishina warned against the “illusion” that science, given financial and material inputs, would soon return results in national defense or industrial expansion. “Unlike what lay people, politi- cians, and the military people unfamiliar with science expect, science is not magic.”45 Human and material resources and the proper organizational and institutional conditions would be useless if the “environment” were not suitable. A suitable environment shaped by an appropriate scientific “tradition,” and high standards, would induce great discoveries and inventions, and nurture “geniuses.” The geniuses would enhance the tradition further, improving the environment, and producing more talented individuals. “Science is a form of national culture that requires a high degree of human intellect, and cannot be built in a short time.”46 Just like the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a strong scientific tradition could not be built in a short time. A long-term planning and development of “pure science,” as well as reform of science education would be required. 47 In view of the international situation, Nishina advocated a two-fold approach. One, the ordinary way, would study basic issues in science as freely as possible. The other, research mobilized for the national emergency, should be tightly con- trolled. If the situation became serious enough, pure scientific research might be temporarily suspended: “scientists in fundamental research might have to be moved to the kinds of research directly relevant to national defense.”48 Balance and organization in the allocation of human resources would be essential. Organization of science should take into consideration both short-term and long-term planning. Nishina extended his vision into the next decade. “If we think of five or ten years from now, it seems that blindly stopping pure science, however useless pure science might appear at this point, might turn out harmful in future. The problem is in what ratio we should put our effort in pure science and in engineering that can be of immediate practical use.”49 Further to his long-term planning, Nishina became involved in a popular science magazine. Raising the national scientific standard would strengthen the nation. Writing on “Science and national defense” (Kagaku to kokubô) for a magazine for educators, Nishina stressed that Japanese people should learn to think and behave scientifically. 50 In December 1941, the publishing company Chûôkô ronsha started a new popular science magazine called Science illustrated (Zukai kagaku ), and Nishina became its advisory editor (kanshûsha). He described its aims in its first issue: 51

45. Nishina, “Kagaku” (ref. 41), 359. 46. Nishina Yoshio, “Dentô,” Kagaku, 10:10 (Sep 1940), 1. 47. Nishina (ref. 33), 2. 48. Nishina (ref. 41), 361. 49. In a discussion sponsored by a literary magazine Bungakukai in May 1941, Nishina Yoshio et al., “Nihon kagaku no genjô (zadankai),” Bungakukai (1941) May 1941, 50-62, on 52. 50. Nishina (ref. 32), 37-38. 51. Nishina (ref. 33), 2. 74 ITO

The purpose of Science Illustrated is to realize the easiest and most effective method to understand science. A single image often helps ordinary people attain a deep understanding more than a large number of abstract texts. I believe that the illustrated explanations in this magazine will greatly nourish the curiosity and creativity of its readers. It would be a great satisfaction to me if this method removed the antipathy toward science held by many Japanese people, especially by women. That would have a great impact on science education for children, and help construct the scientific basis of the Japanese people. It is therefore one way to contribute to the country through science.

Nishina worked hard for the magazine. In 1940 Husimi, a young lecturer in physics at Osaka University, received a telegram from Nishina asking him to be present at the Osaka Station at a specified time the next day. Although he had never spoken to Nishina, Husimi dutifully went to the station to meet him, wondering what business this leading figure in physics had with him. At the station, Nishina asked Husimi to write for Science illustrated. 52 Nishina took very seriously the responsibility of scientists in the construction of the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Asked how to establish a self-sufficient science and technology for the “East Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere,” Nishina simply answered, “We must do our best.” Asked what was specifically needed, he said, “Spirit—every engineer and scientist first needs to achieve self-awareness (jikakusuru).” 53 Ironically, here Nishina came close to those who advocated military spiritualism, who held that Japan, with superior spirit, could not lose the war.

3. JAPAN’S BLITZKRIEG

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and on the British flotilla in Southeast Asia on December 7, 1941 were great tactical successes. The Japanese Navy and Army scored many victories during the next few months. Hong Kong fell on December 25, 1941; Manila, January 2, 1942; Batavia, March 5; and Rangoon, May 27. Al- though Nishina though it a blunder to challenge the United States, he did not express a pessimistic view of the war and was probably pleased with Japan’s initial tactical gains. At the same time, however, he repeatedly warned that the Allies would eventually strike back with their superior scientific and industrial capabilities. Scientists must therefore work for future, not for immediate needs. Hence he continued to advocate mobilization of science and to promote “pure science.” If we can trust Ogura Shimbi’s reminiscence, Nishina initially opposed war against the United States. “When people were carried away by the victories of early battles, Dr. Nishina’s first words were, ‘They started a stupid war. They do

52. Husimi Kôdi, “Jidai no ko ka,” Shizen (Mar 1971 [1951]), supplement, 300-go kinen sôshû roku, Nishina Yoshio, Yukawa Hideki, Tomonaga Sin-itiro, Sakata Shôichi, 45-46, on 45. 53. Nishina et al. (ref. 44), 55-56. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 75

such a thing, because they are really ignorant of America’s strength. Japan is going to be in a big trouble’.” 54 As an illustration of the industrial strength of the United States, Nishina told Ogura about his experience with cyclotron construction. The Japanese manufacturer could not make a vacuum pump with the necessary speci- fications. Nishina had to instruct the company engineers personally, and it still took half a year. “In the United States,” Nishina said, “one could get such a thing by a single telephone call. They are so much ahead of us in everything. We need to realize that Japan is challenging such a country in a war.”55 In his published writings, of course, Nishina did not criticize the war. He wrote, in line with official propaganda: “Our great Japanese Empire, with an emperor of unbroken lineage and one hundred million people of unparalleled royalty and brav- ery, is going to change the course of world history.”56 “The war has just begun. Making the Greater East Asia that we have won a truly orderly and healthy paradise, a living world of Asians, can only be accomplished by many battles and wars, which will be imposed on our offspring for several generations.”57 Nishina also repeated the usual praises of Japan’s military exploits: “The great achievements of our navy in these early battles had no equal in the past....The strength of our force is unfathomable.” In another place, he wrote about the “great military achievements that exceeded all expectations.”58 “The success of this unprecedented great enterprise depends on our confidence and preparedness. We should overcome whatever hardship we might encounter, and we must earnestly try to achieve the goal.”59 “The series of victories of the Imperial Army during this half a year was truly unparalleled. The force of our nation has brought all of East Asia under our control, and our victories ranged from Madagascar to the West, and the Aleutian Islands to the East....We have experienced in these eight months what our ancestors experienced only over many generations.”60 In this article, of 1942, from an anthology published by the propaganda bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei yokusankai), Nishina quoted Manyôshû , a poem composed in the 8th century: “I, thy humble subject/Live not in vain, having seen/Both heaven

54. Ogura Shimbi, “Sensei to watashi: Dokyumentarî sukecchi,” Shizen (Mar 1971 [1951]), supplement, 300-go kinen sôshû roku, Nishina Yoshio, Yukawa Hideki, Tomonaga Sin-itiro, Sakata Shôichi, 51-54, on 51. Japanese who knew the United States generally opposed the war; Saburô Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A critical perspective on Japan’s role in World War II (New York, 1978). 55. Ogura Shimbi (ref. 54), 51-52. 56. Nishina Yoshio, “Kokuryoku no zôkyô he: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (1),” Asahi Shimbun, 1 Jan 1942, 8. 57. Nishina Yoshio, “Kumichô no kansô,” in Zuihitsushû: W atashi no tonarigumi, edited by Taisei yokusankai sendenbu (Tokyo, 1942), 39. 58. Nishina Yoshio, “Sensô no zento to kagakusha,” Kagaku, 13:1 (Jan 1943), 1. 59. Nishina (ref. 56). 60. Ibid. 76 ITO

and earth prosper/In this glorious age of thine.”61 Citing an old poem came close to jingoism. Furthermore, contrary to all the other articles in the anthology, Nishina’s mentioned Japan’s early victories. The other articles concerned trifling matters about the neighborhood associations to which the anthology was devoted. Hence it is likely that the nationalism he expressed was genuine. Still Nishina maintained his high regard for the United States. After Pearl Har- bor, although he could no longer praise Americans openly, Nishina continued to stress the industrial strength and scientific superiority of the United States. He arranged to have a collection of his articles on science and war published during 1942. Its advertisement in June read: “This book is the first anthology of articles by Dr. Nishina, the final authority of science in Japan. It discusses science and national defense, and the author’s sincere concern over the fate of the country fills the entire volume. Wait for its publication.” The book turned out to be too lauda- tory to the United States to pass the censorship. 62 Nishina carefully avoided expressing a pessimistic view as his own. He got his point across by supposing what the “enemies” would think: 63

They probably think that our national strength has already greatly diminished after four years and a half of war in China. They would think that our national strength would further decrease as the war continues while they expand their armaments greatly with their natural resources and mechanical power, and plan to fight after they complete their rearmament. I do not know whether this will happen in two or three years. Yet, we must be prepared for such a possibility. We must, therefore, not just fight, but also build up our national strength to be able to confront our enemies.

The argument continued: “Because of the initial victories, people seem to be en- raptured. If people think that enemies are easy, that would be a great mistake.” “ It was a common perception in the United States since before the war, that if they fight Japan, they will lose battles at first, but, with their rich resources, can continue fighting until they eventually win.” “ In a few years, shipbuilding capacity of the United States will reach a few million tons per year. Once they achieve this, their defeat in Hawaii will be nothing. It is not easy to plan against it, but we must try to do so. This will not be achieved in a short time. Truly, we need to be prepared for a prolonged war.”64 Even if Japan won the war, Nishina wrote a month later, the struggle would continue for a century: 65

61. Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkôkai, ed ., The Manyôshû : The Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkôkai translation of one thousand poems with the texts in romaji with a new foreword by Donald Keene (New York, 1965), 197. 62. Quoted in Ezawa Hiroshi, “Nishina Yoshio nenpu,” in Tamaki and Ezawa, eds. (ref. 32), 273-300, on 292; Ogura (ref. 54), 52. 63. Nishina (ref. 56). 64. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa sensô to kagaku gijutsu,” Kaizô (Jan 1942), 159-160, on 159; Nishina (ref. 5), 3. 65. Nishina Yoshio, “Yokusan senkyo to kagaku gijutsu,” Chû ô kôron, 57 (Apr 1942), 184. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 77

America and Britain, with their rich resources and advanced science and technology, will start a full-scale expansion of their armaments, and challenge us to a decisive battle. Even if they lose this battle, they will watch for an opportunity to regain their lost supremacy, probably for a century. Our country, as the leader of East Asia, has an important duty to maintain perpetual peace in Asia.

The war with the United States did not force Nishina to change his earlier claims about “pure science.”66

[It] should not be neglected even in wartime. In particular, since it is generally supposed that the East Asian War will be prolonged, we need to develop pure science during the war, nourish creative engineering with its results, and invent suitable new weapons....As we fight, we need to plan for the management of the postwar era. The first priority for our postwar reign is to make the enemy submit. In other words, we will need a Japanese culture, which will make the enemy obey us sincerely. Otherwise, it will be impossible to gain their complete respect.

At the same time, Nishina repeated his argument that Japan’s “powerful” culture would help control Asian people in the occupied territories. “By telling the world that we are strong not only at fighting, we can strengthen our leading place in its transformation of the world.”67 The occupied territories made a good case for “pure science.” The best way to build up Japan’s national strength was “to develop the south and exploit its natural resources.” Then, “the important thing is technology for resource develop - ment....[T]here might be unexpected problems in actual developments. In such a case, we should mobilize scientists and engineers to resolve the problems.”68 Weap- ons development made an even better argument: 69

As I wrote, military equipment does not differ much between them and us. There- fore, each country will do its best to improve [what they have]. In such a situation, the progress of pure science matters a great deal. For example, in order to improve a certain weapon, engineers would improve its design and materials, almost to the limit. And when everything appears to have been done, it is often a new phenomenon or a new material that makes a breakthrough.

Often the breakthrough would occur through pure science. “I only emphasize that we should correct the preconception that pure science is useless in war. We are in the age when today’s pure science can be used to improve tomorrow’s technol-

66. Nishina (ref. 5), 3. 67. Nishina Yoshio, “Kyôryoku bunka no sôzô : Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (3),” Asahi Shimbun (3 Jan 1942), 8. 68. Nishina Yoshio, “Nanpô shigen no kaihatsu: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (2 ),” Asahi Shimbun (2 Jan 1942), 8; the same argument in: Nishina (ref. 8), 97. 69. Nishina (ref. 8), 98. 78 ITO

ogy.”70 “[In] all occupations, the last blood of the Japanese people should be ex- hausted. In the field of science, anything useful, whether people or things, should be devoted to win the war.”71

4. LATE WAR YEARS, FROM LATE-1942 TO AUGUST 1945.

The tide began to change with the battle of Midway on June 4-5, 1942, where the Japanese Imperial Navy lost four of its airplane carriers and its superiority in the Pacific. The news was not disclosed to the public. Two months later, the U.S. landed on Guadalcanal, which the Japanese abandoned on December 31. On May 29, 1943, American forces recaptured Attu Island in the Aleutian chain. The annihilation of its garrison was reported as “gyokusa” or honorable death, the first public announcement of Japan’ s serious loss released by the Imperial General Headquarter. 72 Nishina became more explicit about the scientific and technological superiority of the Allies. He did not state that Japan would lose the war, but implied it. Nevertheless he called for mobilization of science even more emphatically. Ap- parently he considered it his duty to do his best for Japan’s war effort and con- ceded that applied science should now have priority over pure science. At the same time, however, he attempted to preserve scientific manpower for pure science, by insisting on “the best use of human resources.” In October 1942 Nishina pointed out that his predictions about the superior industrial and technological capabilities of the Allies had come true. On March 17, 1943, he wrote that the change of tide had become apparent even to lay people after the battle of Guadalcanal. 73

In the technology of mass production, one must admit that the United States is more advanced than Japan. Factories for the mass production of automobiles can be immediately converted to produce airplanes. Even before the war, the United States produced more copper and iron than any other country. Therefore, we should take seriously when they say that they can produce 120,000 airplanes a year, and build 8,000,000 tons of ships.

Once again he protected himself by putting his diagnosis in the mouth of the enemy. In March 1943 he wrote: 74

Americans believe in numbers. They therefore blindly believe that since their production surpasses ours, the final victory will be theirs. In order to vanquish

70. Ibid. 71. Nishina (ref. 68), 72. “Attu tô ni kôgun no shinzui wo hakki,” Asahi shimbun (31 May 1943). 73. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu no kessen (jô): Fudan no kenshin kenkyû, Shin heiki no jumyô ha mijikashi,” Asahi shimbun (17 Mar 1943), 1. 74. Ibid. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 79

them, therefore, empty propaganda and debates are of no use. We need either to reduce their production or to drastically increase ours. In either way, only when the difference of industrial capacity has become much smaller than it is now can a long-lasting peace in East Asia be realized.

It was total war. “Now is the time for Japanese people to rise and fight in the real sense. The thought sets the blood racing in the veins of us in the home front.” “We need not fear even if our enemies are building an amazing war machine....What we fear is overestimating our forces and forgetting to prepare for our defense and the attack to come.”75 During the war, the eighth day of each month was called “Taishô Hô taibi” (The day of the Imperial Rescript [of war]). Taketani Mituo and Takeuchi Masa remember that on December 8, 1943, Nishina summoned all the members of his group and read out the emperor’s proclamation of the war. Then he told them that scientists should work for the country. His young colleagues had begun to feel the war coming into their research. 76 The previous March he had said: “We must mobilize all knowledge to augment our military power. Consequently, we might have to move researchers in pure science into applied science. We might have no choice other than discontinuing the progress of pure science. We cannot help it. The fate of our country depends on the increase of military power; the final battle will come in the near future.”77 “I am not claiming that research in basic principles is of no use. In today’s emergency situation, we just do not have time for it. When the war situation improves, we should push forward basic research and work hard to raise the national standard of science and technology.”78 He grew increasingly shrill. In January 1945 he called for a total mobilization:79

Now we have to make use of everything in the country to maintain our advantage. In science and technology, we should do our best to mobilize all organizations, all knowledge, all equipment, in the most effective way to contribute to our victory....When every stick and stone must be used to increase our fighting capabilities, researchers should have a lot to offer in terms of human and material resources. The important thing is to use them as effectively as possible, and not to commit the folly of employing a steam hammer to crack a nut.

75. Nishina (ref. 57), and resp., Nishina Yoshio, “Hisshô hissei: Kengaku nimo messhihôkô ,” Asahi shimbun (30 Oct 1942), 8. 76. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, ed., Shôwashi no tennô , Vol. 4 (Tokyo, 1968), 165; Takeuchi Masa, “Nishina kenkyûshitsu monogatari,” in Tamaki and Ezawa, eds. (ref. 31), 209-222, on 221. 77. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu no kessen (ge): Genba e chinô doô in, gijutsusha no kyôryoku koso kyûmu,” Asahi shimbun (18 Mar 1943), 1. 78. Yagi Hidetsugu and Nishina Yoshio, “Taidan kessen e kagaku wo dôin seyo,” Shû kan asahi (11 Apr 1943), 13. A similar point appears in Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu no senryokuka,” Kagaku asahi (Jan 1945), 13. 79. Nishina (ref. 75). 80 ITO

But he did not subscribe to sending scientists into battle. “To take scientists away to a job unrelated to their specialty makes no use of their talents.”80 Ogura Shimbi captured Nishina’s sentiments in the fall of 1944: 81 “We are aboard on a sinking ship called ‘Japan.’ Seeing water coming in, we cannot just stand by and look on it. The natural thing to do would be to bail or pump. Honestly, I often feel anger. But thinking this way, I do not speak my feelings.” Nishina was preparing a life vest. If we can trust Tomonaga’s recollection, Nishina attempted to maintain Japan’s scientific research standard and to protect its personnel for postwar development. 82

5. THE NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT

Although much has been written about Japan’s wartime nuclear power projects, we still do not have a definitive study of it. 83 It is now established that the nuclear power project in Japan had no chance of success and that even the Japanese did not take it seriously. Further studies by Yamazaki Masakatsu and Fukai Yûzô on Nishina and others’ work on atomic energy during the war demonstrate how little Nishina’s group accomplished. 84 Their performance may indicate their lack of ability, re-

80. Nishina (ref. 57); Walter Grunden, “Science under the rising sun: Weapons development and the organization of scientific research in World War II Japan” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara, 1998); Kawamura (ref. 37). 81. Ogura (ref. 54), 52. 82. Tomonaga Sin-itiro, et al., “Taidan riken jidai no omoide,” in Hirakareta kenkyûjo to shidôsha tachi , Vol. 6, Tomonaga Sin-itiro chosakushû (Tokyo, 1982), 183-221, on 211. 83. Despite seemingly definitive rebuttals, Robert Wilcox’s, Japan’s secret war: Japan’s race against time to build its own atomic bomb, updated edn. (New York, 1985, 1995), is still accepted, e.g., by Philip Henshall, The nuclear axis: Germany, Japan and the atom bomb race, 1949- 1945 (Stroud, 2000). For criticisms see Walter Grunden, “Hungnam and the Japanese atomic bomb,” Intelligence and national security, 13:2 (1998), 32-60; Morris F. Low, “Japan’s secret war? Instant scientific manpower and Japan’s World War II atomic bomb project,” Annals of science, 47 (1990), 347- 360. John Dower, “‘NI’ and ‘F’: Japan’s wartime atomic bomb research,” Japan in war and peace: Selected essays (New York, 1993), 55-100. For other sources on Japan’s wartime nuclear power project see: Keiko Nagase-Reimer, Forschungen zur Nutzung der Kernenergie in Japan, 1938-1945 (Marburg, forthcoming); Grunden (ref. 80). The Pacific War Research Society (Bungei Shunjû Senshi Kenkyûkai), The day man lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945 (Palo Alto, 1972). 84. Japanese scientists used slow neutrons to calculate the critical mass, indicating that they did not know how to design a nuclear bomb. See Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Dainiji sekaitansen ji no nihon no genbaku kaihatsu ,” Nihon butsurigakkai shi, 56 :8 (2001), 584-590; Yamazaki Masakatsu and Fukai Yûzô , “ Dainijitaisenki niokeru Nihon no kakukenkyû shiryô (1): Rikugun Dainizôheishô nitaisuru Nishina Yoshio no hôkokukiroku: 1943-nen 7-gatsu kara 1944-nen 11-gatsu,” Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 2 (1999), 45-54; Yamazai Masakatsu, Fukai Yûzô , Satomi Shirô, “Tokyo Daini Rikugun Zôheishô nitaisuru Nishina Yoshio no hôkoku”, Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (2000), 53-72; Fukai Yûzô , “Kyûgun itaku ‘Ni-gô keiakku’ niokeru rinkai keisan,” Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (2000), 1-24; Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Riken no genshi bakudan: Hitotsu no gensô ‘Kanzen nenshô’ kô sô ,” PHYSICS IN JAPAN 81

sources, and efficient organization, or their disinclination to achieve the goal. Keiko Nagase-Reimer shows that Nishina doubted that the Japanese could build a bomb during the war. According to her, Nishina maintained this view throughout the war, but the Army interpreted it differently as time went on. 85 In fact, the changing war situation forced him to change his attitude toward the construction of the bomb. The project for nuclear power began in Nishina’s group in 1940. The staff was small and did not increase by much. The leader, Takeuchi Masa, one of Nishina’s earliest disciples, came from the unprestigious Tokyo Technical Higher School (Today’s Tokyo Institute of Technology, which despite its humble origins, is one of the best technical universities in Japan). He made himself an able experimental- ist under Nishina’s tutelage. He placed Takeuchi on the nuclear power project, keeping graduates from more important universities for the pure science, of cos- mic-ray physics and cyclotron construction. Nishina also assigned leftist members of his group to the nuclear power project. Taketani Mituo and Tamaki Hidehiko, with their leftist inclinations, were in danger of being arrested or sent to the most dangerous battlefields. The nuclear power project gave them a relatively safe haven. Chemistry plays an essential role in the construction of atomic bombs. Nishina recruited Kigoshi Kunihiko, then a fresh graduate from the chemistry department of Tokyo Imperial University, who had intended to work with the chemist Iimori Rian at Riken. Nishina installed Kigoshi as the chief chemist in the nuclear power project in October 1942. 86 Kigoshi’s research, of essential importance to the construction of an atomic bomb, was conducted with the clumsiness of a student experiment. Kigoshi did not know how to produce the fluorine necessary to make uranium hexafluoride for the separation of uranium isotopes. Since fluorine is extremely corrosive, he began in mid-1943 by designing and building a special electrosis tank made of magnesium. The tank produced much less fluorine than he expected and needed. Eventually, he consulted a specialist at Tôhoku University and learned that he needed only to run the electrosis overnight and the tank would begin producing fluorine in the morning. The next step was to produce metal uranium, for which Japan did not have an industrial technique. Kigoshi managed to produce uranium powder by chemical processes from what little uranium com- pounds he had. Since powdered uranium catches fire very easily, he needed to melt it in a vacuum, but he lacked the necessary apparatus. He tried to make uranium hexafluoride by adding fluorine to the powdered uranium. He got a big explosion. He saved himself from blindness only because he turned his eyes away from the tube to answer a question at the moment of the explosion. 87

Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (200), 25-32; Fukai Yûzô , “Nishina Yoshio hakase no kangaete ita genshiro,” Nihon genshiryokugakkai-shi, 42 (2000), 194-195. 85. Nagase-Reimer (ref. 83). 86. Yomiuri Shimbunsha (ref. 76), 101-103. 87. Ibid., 105-110. 82 ITO

As this incident may indicate, Nishina was less than enthusiastic about the project during the first year of the Pacific War. He did not reply to the Army’s question about the feasibility of an atomic bomb until 1943; he answered it was theoretically possible. Kigoshi remembers that Nishina did not appear to be in a hurry when he joined the group in October 1942. Nishina told Kigoshi, “do it at your own pace” ( ma bochibochi yarusa ).88 Nishina seems to have started the nuclear power project as long-term pure science. He did not expect much from this project and did not assign the best of his group to it. Nishina’s attitude began to change late in 1943 or early 1944. According to Kigoshi, Nishina then barked at him “What are you doing? Can you make it or not?” Kigoshi replied nonchalantly, “I can’t.” Everyone expected that Nishina would shout, “then quit!” Instead he changed his tone and said, “keep doing it anyway.”89 This incident suggests Nishina’s ambivalence. As the situation deteriorated, he probably promoted his nuclear project in his mind from remotely promising research to a serious military project whose success was crucial to Japan’s victory. Because of his position as chief of the project and his earlier statements about the utility of pure science, Nishina had to do his best to complete it, even though he knew he could not suceed. And of course he knew that the a-bomb project would protect young physicists and maintain a pure science research tradition. On August 6, 1945, Nishina received news that Hiroshima had been bombed with a new kind of weapon. Since he did not think that even the United States could build a nuclear weapon so quickly, he postponed comment. Nishina was asked by the military, probably its antiwar faction, to investigate the ruin of Hiroshima. A day before leaving for Hiroshima, he left a note to Tamaki Hidehiko, a young theorist who had calculated the critical mass of U235. Nishina wrote: “If Truman is telling the truth, it is now the time for those involved in the Ni-Project to commit hara-kiri....The reports that reached the general headquarter so far cor- roborate what Truman said....If it is the case, American and British scientists crushed the scientists of Riken’s Building 49 [the building for the nuclear power research]. This implies that the personality of the American and British scientists surpassed the (jinkakn) of the scientists of Building 49.”90 For Nishina, committing suicide together with his unfortunate young collabo- rators was an appropriate conclusion. He had made clear that scientists were re- sponsible for maintaining standards of scientific research during the war and for developing military technologies. The U.S. atomic bombs disgraced Nishina’ s group. Moral problems about the use of nuclear weapons against civilians probably did not occur to the members of the Ni-project. There is no indication that

88. Ibid., 101. 89. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 111-112. 90. Nishina Yoshio, A letter to Tamaki Hidehiko (7 Aug 1945), in Genshi bakudan: Hiroshima Nagasaki no shashin to kiroku , ed. Nishina Kinen Zaidan (Tokyo, 1973), 55. Nishina and his disciples did not kill themselves. They thought they should instead take advantage of the unique opportunity to study the effects of the atomic bomb. PHYSICS IN JAPAN 83

Nishina or anyone in his group had any scruple about atomic bombs until they saw what damage they could cause. 91 When Kigoshi succeeded in producing uranium hexafluoride, he stayed overnight at the institute so he would be able to tell the good news to Nishina first thing in the morning. Although their achievement was vastly different in scale, they were not unlike the American scientists in Los Alamos who celebrated the success of the Trinity Experiment with a party. 92 Once again the question whether Nishina undertook the atomic bomb project was to protect his disciples from the draft or persecution must be raised. Here are two straws in the wind. Nishina involved leftist students in the project, but not his best theorist Tomonaga, who was physically unqualified for a military service. 93 Hence no need to protect him. Again, Arakatsu Bunsaku, a professor of physics at Kyoto University and chief of the Navy’s atomic bomb project stated after the war:94

When we accepted this research, there were only a few young scientists and students. The army took them away freely. I wanted to keep those few young scientists and students in our department by any means, and allow them to continue their studies. By doing the atomic bomb research, I thought that I would no longer have to send young scientists to the battlefield. The truth was it was too late, but at least I thought that I no longer had to let them die anymore. Without such a “compensation,” I could not possibly have undertaken such a project. Nishina thought in the same way.

Whatever his intentions, the project did provide a relatively safe haven for his students and young scientists worked for it for no other reason than to evade the draft. Kigoshi joined because Nishina told him if he studied uranium hexafluoride, he would not have to go to the army. Taketani confessed to the same motive. In 1944, when some members of the Nishina group began to discuss whether they should continue the work, Taketani insisted that they should; otherwise they would be sent to war. The Ni-project was a golden opportunity to continue scientific research.95 Taniguchi Hatsuzô, who was the chief of the engineering department of the air force (kôhon gijutsu buchô) until 1943, remembers that Nishina often asked him, “I wonder if we can spend money on such an uncertain project when soldiers are

91. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 207. Yamamoto Yôichi, a former Army engineering officer, remem- bered that the planned target after July 1944 was the U.S. military base in Saipan. The choice was not made to avoid civilian targets but because they wanted to knock out the airfield for mainland bombing. Hosaka Masayasu, Shôgeki no senji hishi: Genshibakudan no kansei wo isoge (Tokyo, 1983), 20. 92. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 112; Richard P. Feynman , Surely you’re joking Mr. Feynman!: Adven- tures of a curious character (New York, 1985), 118. 93. Tomonaga (ref. 82), 211. 94. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 219. 95. Ibid., 103, 170-171. 84 ITO

having a hard time in the South.” Taniguchi persuaded him that even if they could not build the atomic bomb during the war, the research might be useful later for the development of atomic energy. Nishina agreed, but soon he would return with the same question. 96 After the war, an Army engineering officer blamed Nishina for his lack of commitment. According to him, Nishina did not intend to build an atomic bomb; he merely did the research that he wanted to do on the military’s money, and kept his disciples from the front. In fact, after 1943 Nishina pursued the project seriously, not because he had any possibility of realizing it, but because he was obliged to. As a scientist in Japan, he had a responsibility to try. He had a problem about wasting precious resources in an uncertain project when soldiers were dying, but the remote possibility of building a weapon of mass destruction did not concern him.

6. BETWEEN SCIENCE AND NATIONALISM

Nishina keenly felt his obligation to his country. His nationalistic statements expressed his genuine feelings. After the war Nishina’s son, Kôjirô wrote that his father had a strong sense of responsibility typical of those who were born in the Meiji Era. “While troubled with his collaboration in Japan’s war against the countries of his friends, my father did his best in the task that he took upon himself. This aspect of Nishina can be confirmed by various sources on his earlier life.”97 Although Nishina might not have supported Japan’s military government, he sympathized with and admired the Japanese soldiers and felt obliged to contribute to the country himself as they did. He had many personal connections to the Japa- nese military and repeatedly praised the “loyal and brave” rank and file. Nishina Kôjirô : “ My father criticized sentimental war propaganda from the scientific point of view, but he was moved by the reported words and deeds of kamikaze pilots.”98 The other son Nishina Yûichirô recollects that when they heard on the radio a report of the annihilation of the garrison in Attu Island in May 1943, Nishina sat in his chair, arms folded, with tears in his eyes. From that day, he repeatedly said, “we are all going to die.” Nishina also identified strongly with “pure science.” He had an agenda and values as a member of the scientific community. In contrast to most other promi- nent Japanese scientists, Nishina needed to convince the public and his sponsors of the values of pure science. Most other senior scientists held a secure position at an imperial (national) university and conducted only low-budget experiments. 99

96. Ibid., 207. 97. Kenji Ito, “Making sense of ryôshiron (quantum theory): Introduction of quantum me- chanics into Japan, 1920-1940” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2002), chapt. 6. 98. Nishina Kôjirô , “Chichi no nichijô no gendô,” Nihon butusui gakkai shi, 45:10 (Oct 1990), 726-727, on 727. 99. An exception, Kikuchi Seishi’s group at Osaka Imperial University, constructed cyclotrons in the 1930s. The Kikuchi group had a funding from a group of industrialists in Osaka, PHYSICS IN JAPAN 85

Nishina held a position at the prestigious but financially insecure Riken, and conducted expensive large-scale collaborative research in nuclear physics. He raised support to construct a 27-inch cyclotron in 1937, the first working cyclotron outside the United States. 100 He needed to continue to advertise “pure science” to obtain funding for his research in this new proto-“Big Science.” From 1937 and throughout the war years, Nishina’s group worked on a 60-inch cyclotron. Nishina obtained financial support from the government, the military, and philanthropic foundations. 101 As a scientist, Nishina considered it his principal role to advance “pure science” in Japan. Tomonaga Sin-itiro remembers that Nishina often said, “we might win or lose the war. But when the war is over, and communication with foreign countries restored, our scientific research during the war should not have been inferior to those of other countries. We should be able to take pride in what we have done during the war.”102 Taketani Mituo remembers that Nishina said the same thing at Riken’s semi-annual conference soon after the Pearl Harbor attack. 103 In writing, Nishina made the same argument, although he assumed that Japan was going to win. “When the war is over, and we open the box, if Japan’s science is much inferior to those of other countries, we scientists must take the blame and then no amount of apology will be enough.”104 Perhaps for this reason Nishina gave Tomonaga, his most talented disciple, special consideration. Tomonaga’s research during this and later periods conducted in isolation from foreign scholars did bear fruit, his renormalization theory, which amazed American and European physicists. In sum, Nishina was a conscientious and sincere man who tried to reconcile his identity as a scientist and his obligation to the country. He was no pacifist. He advocated mobilizing science for Japan’s military adventure and worked for military projects. He was no cosmopolitan. He advocated “pure science” as a benefit to his country. He worked for Japan not because he supported her military aggression, or because he would personally gain from the war, but because, as a man with a strong sense of responsibility, he could not stand by. He tried to curb Japan’s tendency toward a fanatical nationalism and to do his best to better the situation. But the language in his writings, whatever his true intent, tended to justify and presumably through the electrical engineer Yagi Hidetsugu, who chaired the university’s department of physics. 100. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 27), 317-319. 101. Financially, the Ni-Project seems to have been inseparable from the Nuclear Physics Laboratory, the main task of which was to build the cyclotron. 102. Tomonaga (ref. 82), 221. 103. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 164. 104. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa no saiken to junsuikagaku,” Kagaku, 12:3 (Mar 1942), 1; also in Nishina Yoshio, “Rekkoku no kisokagaku,” Zukai kagaku (June 1942), 2; Nishina Yoshio, “Nanpô shigen no kaihatsu: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (2 ),” Asahi Shimbun (2 Jan 1942), 8, also in Nishina (ref. 8), 97. 86 ITO

strengthen Japan’s militaristic regime and its policies. And he never publicly expressed sympathy toward the Asian people under Japan’s occupation. From the safe haven of the present world, it is easy to blame Nishina. . Nishina, in fact, blamed himself. According to his son Kôjirô , Nishina repeatedly said, “We all lacked the courage to stop the war,” in a tone both rueful and indignant. 105 True, had the Japanese leaders, the Emperor Hirohito in particular, mustered the courage to risk their lives against terrorism and resisted the threat from the military, there might not have been a war in the Pacific.

105. Nishina Kôjirô (ref. 98), 726.

KENJI ITO Values of “ pure science” : Nishina Yoshio’s wartime discourse between nationalism and physics, 1940-1945 ABSTRACT: This paper discusses Nishina Yoshio’s attitude toward World War II and scientific research during the war. Nishina was the leading Japanese physicist in interwar Japan and the chief scientist of Japan’s wartime nuclear power project. The paper describes how Nishina was caught between conflicting norms of his professional and national identities and how he tried to resolve the conflicts.