A. EAST Afriean COMMUNITY

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A. EAST Afriean COMMUNITY ktway of kt&ptrg the Bawbns informed. and Lyddat s~ary and their intertsts adwUJy protected". Howev~,no alteration riru envwd in the p*nt 'dhnsion of .phosphate revenusrs between the Gilbert lalanils Government and Barihban landownen, whiCh was regarded a$UIeasanalJle". The Rev. Tebtlke Rotan said in Lofidon on May 27 that the A. EAST AFRIeAN COMMUNITY - Prugmdve Dii integration of Common Services During thehMt fitfour months of t977 three of 'the major wmmo6 services org4mizations uf the East Afdcan Cdthmunitjr -inaugllrated on W:1,1967 [see 22538 A], as agrbd upop h a treaty of June 6.1967, on East African co-opemtimi between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda [see 22 107 A]--effdveb ceased to operate although they were legally still in existence. These were the East Afpicari,Airw;ays Corporation (EM$,the East African I-hImW Corpsretion @MC) and.. the East Abrian Raillvays Carporation @ARC), all Sf whidh \;9tfe organized by eorpoi-aEions which were selfaccounting statutdy bod=, In addition thie ~mudtyhad nuherous other sxxvkes, among them the East k.fti~adPosts and 'FeIecornmunication$Cbrpwa- Wn, the East !AtriaMetearological Department and. the East ARicatl Me&A Rese;ach Council. fie Cornniunity's Authority, condisting of the three countries' pident$, had not shetd any meeting since the assamption of power by bident Amin of Uganda in 1971 [see 24450 A], largely beoause President- Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sit at the same table with the Ugandan malent, and extensive efforts made by Resident Kenyatta of Kenya to amange a'saheetihg had remained unsumisffirl [see also 25022 Aj. Deterlorrtlan of C"ommnnk&n@ in 1975 During the year 1975 wrnmvnieatiirns between the thr& pmer-counMes ha&tqmatedly be& Wpted. Tills deferiotation arose psrtjy fmm fail& by the EARC to pay its debts (W faiIure being aaid to be due to delays in the yment of conM butiona by Tanzania), lead@ to the withholding of &her supplies of KEESING'S CONTEF~PORARY ARCHIVES 2841 1 Despite the closure of the frontier, tourists and drivers of Kenya-registered vehicles stranded on the Tanzanian side of the border were allowed to cross into Kenya. On Feb. 11, on the other hand, the Tanzanian Government imposed a permanent ban on tourists entering Tanzania by road from Kenya-which meant that visitors wishing to see the wild- within EAAC - Suspension of Services - Establishment of life parks in Tanzania would have to fly to that country and Separate National Airlimes make their tours in buses rented inside Tanzania (and not in crisis within the Community came to a head on Jan. Kenya, as previously). 1977, when East African Airways suspended most of its At the same time difficulties arose for the two countries' tional operations-it having already been announced in nationals on the "wrong" side of the border. i on Jan. 7 that the airline had suspended its services to Some 700 Tanzanian employees of East African Airways were per- towns in Tanzania on the grounds that they were un- mitted to leave Kenya for Tanzania after being "dismissed" by the Kenyan Government (which in Tanzania's view had no authority for such dis- obi Doily Nation had previously reported on Dec. 14, 1976, missals), while it was reported from Kenya on Feb. 12 that more than d of the EAAC had unanimously recommended that the 3,000 Tanzanians living in Kenya had applied for Kenyan citizenship. be broken up unless Tanzania and Uganda immediately paid Kenyans living and working in Tanzania were on Feb. LO reported to their debts (of respectively 30,000,000 shillings and have been obliged to carry pass books. illings). However, at a meeting of the Community's Finance All Tanzanians working in the Kenya region of the East African Harbours Corporation were told by Mr Gituma (the corporation's deputy tes, and in particular Tanzania and Uganda, should remit director) on March 13 that they would have to vacate their jobs immedi- and that the airline should continue to be operated "as a ately to make way for Kenyans ordered out of Tanzania. Mr Gituma also said that Tanzania had frozen the corporation's bank account and ordered African Communications Council met on Jan. 19-20 to Kenyans and Ugandans to return to their respective countries. EAAC's cash crisis-the corporation being said to owe over urance brokers in London. over f 1,000.000 to Shell Oil In Tanzania, the EAHC's establishment in Dar-es-Salaam was, according ,000 in overdrafts to the National Bank of Kenya- to a Nairobi report on March 14, closed by Tanzania and its workers were from non-payment of over f3,000,000 by Uganda and ordered to take compulsory leave. ania, while several other African countries were also said On April 18 the Tanzanian Government also announced the "permanent" closure of its border with Kenya. espite the difficulties the airline would continue its er, following insistence by some of its suppliers that The Kenyan Government thereupon, in a statement issued on April 19, ave to be made in cash for new supplies, most of the said that it failed to understand Tanzania's action, as border closures were re suspended a week later. normally applied only when countries were at war with each other, and it accused Tanzania of trying to force the dissolution of the Community and anzanian Government, in a statement issued after an emergency the sharing out of its assets. ing on Jan. 28, attacked "a clique of profiteers within the ent who want the airline shut down so that they can start President Nyerere said on April 25 that as a result of the Community's business". The Kenyan Government, on the other hand, disintegration, which he called "a matter for shame, not for pride", many e same day that it could no longer channel funds into the projects under Tanzania's 1975-80 five-year development plan would have "more than El 3,000,000 of debts" were outstanding, most of to be postponed, and that his country had no alternative but to begin ed in Kenya (to oil companies for fuel and to the Kenyan planning for the running of services previously provided by the institutions unpaid landing fees). which had collapsed. Nor was there, he said, any certainty about the future of those of the Community's services which were still operating. mal, then Tanzania's Minister of Finance and Planning, had 25 the Kenyan claims that his Government was in debt to Earlier, on Feb. 10, it had become known in Nairobi that a n and maintained that it had already remitted 10,000,000 new Kenyan railway system, to replace htgf the EARG we e EAAC headquarters in Nairobi during 1977. Kenya, had been formed, its first board meeting being held on of the effective suspension of the East African that day under the chairmanship of Mr Kingangi Njoroge. rations, it was announced in Kenya and also in both anzania and Zanzibar that'separate national airlines Ugandan and Tanzanian Statements on Breakdown of Community g established (the Ugandan Government having The respective standpoints of Uganda and Tanzania were up its own airline-Uganda Airlines-in 1975). defined by the two countries' Presidents during February. it was announced in Kenya that a government-owned airline, President Amin said in a speech (read for him at a conference of the enya Airways, had been set up on Jan. 22 to operate inter- East African Medical Research Council in Kampala on Feb. 7) that "many local air services with leased aircraft, and the majority of the imperialists . very envious of our well-established East African Com- 0 employees in Kenya (out of a total workforce of 6,000) munity and its institutions" were "trying their level best to disorganize its d to be absorbed in the new Kenyan airline. Most of the East member-states so that the Community is dismantled", and he appealed to s fleet had been grounded in Kenya, including four Super the partner-states to "continue the resistance" against the East Africans' enemies who had taken decisions "based on clearly selfish interests to the detriment of the interest of the East Africans as a whole". He added that overnment at the same time formed its own airline, he would like to see a new and stronger East African Community emerge for a seven-year Licence to operate flights within "whatever selfish interests may be temporarily blocking the revolutionary spirit within East Africa", and that there should be "thorough discussion 18 it was announced in Dar+sSalaam that Tanzania was on all these matters". own national airline to be known as Air Tanzania. President Nyerere, speaking to Swedish journalists on Feb. 21, said that 19 the Kenyan Minister of Power and Communica- the break-up of the Community's common market would not be caused by ac Omolo Okero, announced that his Ministry was political differences between the three countries, except if Kenya was afraid of trading with Tanzania; he emphasized that his country was not the Community's Directorate of Civil Aviation and afraid of trading with capitalist Kenya (seeing that Tanzania did in fact cal Department because there was "no possibility" trade with capitalist countries), but he alleged that the East African public ion with Tanzania which, he said, was holding 33 services had antagonized a handful of people in Kenya who had "failed to red light aircraft, or with Uganda, which had get the chance of turning those services into private enterprises". Under a low Kenyan aircraft to land only at Entebbe (and common market, he said, every industry would have had to serve the whole market, and production should have been devoted to the develop- airports in Uganda).
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