Cause Or Consequence? the Alternative for Germany and Attitudes Toward Migration Policy

Cause or Consequence? The Alternative for Germany and Attitudes toward Migration Policy Hannah M. Alarian Political Science, University of Florida Abstract: Does a far-right electoral victory change mainstream support for migration policy? Although we know how migration can shape support for the far-right, we know little about the inverse. This article addresses this question, exploring whether an Alternative for Germany (AfD) candidate’s election changes non-far-right voter attitudes toward migration policies. In combining the German Longitudinal Election Study Short-Term Campaign panel with fed- eral electoral returns, I find the AfD’s 2017 success significantly altered migration attitudes. Specifically, policy support for immigration and asylum declined precipitously where an AfD candidate won the plurality of first votes. Yet these voters were also more likely to support multicultural policies for current immigrants. Successful AfD candidates therefore appear to enable both an endorse- ment of xenophobic rhetoric and a rejection of cultural assimilation. Keywords: elections, far-right populism, Germany, migration, public opinion Few policies are as connected to the rise of the far right as migration. Even in Germany where nationalistic politics are highly stigmatized, the far-right, Alternative for Germany (AfD) has proven successful in linking itself with nativist migration policies. This change in focus for the AfD from Euroscepti- cism to nationalism came at the height of the 2015 refugee crisis, a message that resonated with traditional mainstream and, perhaps surprisingly, immigrant voters.1 For many of these voters, the 2017 election provided a direct referen- dum on Chancellor Angela Merkel’s stance on refugee resettlement,2 espe- cially within eastern districts where demonstrations against immigrants and asylum seekers continued to erupt.3 Thus, by stoking mass anxiety over migration and leaving its Eurosceptic roots behind, the AfD sought a new strategy to secure its place on the national stage in the 2017 Bundestag election. Although such cultural or migration crises never materialized, the AfD’s strategy proved successful:4 voters ensured the AfD’s first entry into parliament. In response, mainstream parties adopted a cordon sanitaire to prevent legitimizing the AfD’s anti-migration rhetoric among the general public. Given the historical and comparative success of Germany’s containment strategies, German Politics and Society, Issue 134 Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 2020): 59–89 © Georgetown University and Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/gps.2020.380203 • ISSN 1045-0300 (Print) • ISSN 1558-5441 (Online) Hannah M. Alarian this parliamentary “firewall” might be enough to the ensure the AfD’s success is short lived.5 Yet whether the AfD’s electoral success itself affected mainstream policy positions remains to be known. Does the mere inclusion of the AfD in parliament encourage citizens to favor nativist policies, by legitimatiz- ing or increasing the salience of anti-migration rhetoric?6 Or are mainstream norms reinforced in the aftermath of a far-right election, generating an attitudinal backlash against the party and its xenophobic platforms?7 Alternatively, are such societal effects overstated and irrelevant in an era where the far right remains safely outside of government and migration is no longer solely cap- tured by the far right?8 This article addresses this theoretical debate, shedding direct light on the impact of the AfD’s 2017 electoral success on mainstream voter support for migration. To do so, I use the 2017 Short-Term Campaign Panel of the Ger- man Longitudinal Election Survey (GLES) to examine changes in non-AfD voter (henceforth referred to as NAV) support for migration policy directly after the 2017 election. Specifically, I analyze attitude change for 2,432 Ger- man NAVs over the course of two months on three migration-specific policies: integration, immigration, and asylum. Next, I combine this individual-level data with constituency reported first vote returns. Here, I categorize each of Germany’s 299 constituencies as either electing an AfD candidate, electing a non-AfD candidate, or narrowly electing a non-AfD candidate in the first vote. Finally, I use a quasi-regression discontinuity framework to gain new, empirical leverage to uncover the societal impact of directly electing a far- right member of parliament (MP) on policy attitudes of mainstream voters. Across each analysis, I find the direct election of an AfD candidate— regardless of the party’s exclusion from government—altered mainstream support for migration policies. The direction of this attitudinal change, however, varied by the immigrant population targeted. For instance, migration attitudes in AfD-winning constituencies become more hostile than those in AfD-losing ones when the policy targeted future immigrants or asylum seekers (i.e., immigration or asylum policy). Yet, when the policy targets were current migrants (i.e., integration policy), NAVs in AfD-winning constituencies become less supportive of assimilationist policies as compared to NAVs in other constituencies. Once a far-right MP is elected, therefore, citizens appear to update their attitudes to endorse xenophobic policies for immigrant and refugee inflows, while rejecting policies of cultural assimilation for their current immigration populations. Robustness checks further confirm that these relationships are tied to the AfD candidate’s direct election as opposed to their popularity within one’s constituency. In sum, I conclude that keeping the AfD from governance with dams and firewalls, does not ••• 60 ••• Cause or Consequence? appear to be enough to prevent normalizing the party’s anti-immigrant and refugee policy platforms. Instead, German parties would be wise to renew their attention to preventing the far right’s success in future national, and likely state, elections. Normalizing the Far Right in Parliament The relationship between electing the AfD to parliament and Germans’ policy support centers on a fundamental question: how can a far-right party affect the political opinion of non-party members? Despite the importance of understanding such implications of the far-right, the current literature leaves little in the way of direct theoretical expectations. This omission is often driven by the scarcity of parliaments including far-right MPs as well as the methodological challenge of disentangling the attitudinal causes from the consequences of a far-right electoral success.9 Other existing literature often considers the effects of a far-right party entering government, rather than its direct election, or the behavior of mainstream parties as opposed to that of the general population. Yet, bridging and applying this literature provides a key potential outcome of AfD candidates successful election: the normaliza- tion of anti-migration policies. This expectation—that the inclusion of the AfD in parliament itself legiti- mizes xenophobic policies among NAVs—builds upon the literature of issue salience, norms, and political behavior. One important finding from this literature reveals that the presence of a successful far-right party can shape mainstream party discourse on the topic.10 After their election, far-right parties can increase the salience of issues relevant to their success, namely migration.11 This increased salience, in turn, allows the far right to occupy an agenda-setting role for migration policy even when outside of government.12 This salience filters down to new voters, allowing the party’s stance on migration to be reproduced regardless of prior attitudes toward migration.13 Nega- tive migration sentiment, similar to elite discontent,14 may consequently both enable and produce the far right’s favorability among the mainstream electorate. Conversely, increased salience can provide NAVs with a policy or topic to blame for the party’s ultimate success. In response, NAVs may move to support restrictive migration policies as a policy tradeoff for ensuring that the far right does not obtain seats in future elections. Thus, provided the far-right and mainstream electorates are truly similar,15 it seems plausible that this increased salience will spread across the electorate to equally shape mainstream support for, or rejection of, migration. ••• 61 ••• Hannah M. Alarian In addition to increasing issue salience, a successful far-right party may alter the perceived normative political space and structure of a country. Many far-right parties, for example, struggle on the national stage largely due a perceived lack of legitimacy within broader public opinion.16 A successful election, however, can be integral to changing these norms and obtain- ing perceived societal acceptance. This is particularly relevant for Germany, where strongly anti-nationalistic norms have made it difficult for far-right parties to make legitimate inroads with moderate voters.17 This legitimiza- tion via electoral support may therefore explain how the AfD’s continued push to the far right has increased, rather than undermined, its appeal to mainstream voters in Germany.18 Hence, even without entering government, an AfD election may lead NAVs to view the party as more palatable among Germans as compared to other far-right parties excluded from parliament (e.g., the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD). Changes to national institutions can further communicate new norms of inclusion, or in this case exclusion. In the United States, for example,

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