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Australian National University THESES SIS/LIBRARY TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 FACSIMILE: +61 2 6125 4063 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY EMAIL: [email protected] CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA USE OF THESES This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author. Ian Clark Soviet Policy Towards India And Pakistan: 1965-71 Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University November 1974 (ii) This thesis is my own original work 3 ^ Ian Clark (iii) Acknowledgments I wish to express my thanks to the Australian National University for making this study possible. As regards the substance of the thesis, I am indebted to the members of the Department of International Relations who commented on the work but especially to my supervisor Geoffrey Jukes and to David Armstrong. I am also grateful to Prof. M.S. Rajan who helped to make my stay in New Delhi a profitable one. Civ) Synopsis The thesis is a study of Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan from 1965-71. Its principal focus is to describe and to explain the changing balance in the Soviet approach towards these two countries. As a prelude to the main thrust of the thesis, an attempt is made to set out the context within which Soviet policy was to operate in 1965: the most important developments in the history of Soviet relations with India and Pakistan since the time of independence are analysed; the relevance of the broader Soviet approach towards the Third World is emphasised; and the adoption of a new Soviet policy towards Pakistan is described. The analysis of the diplomatic record begins with the eruption of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965, firstly over the Rann of Kutch and then over Kashmir. It is shown that the Soviet response to this subcontinental war marked a subtle departure from the previous Soviet attitude towards these two countries. The war, and the sub sequent meeting at Tashkent, signified the emergence of a 'dualistic' Soviet policy in which efforts were made to maintain cordial relations with both subcontinental states simultaneously. In the course of the next few years, the logic of this dualistic policy was worked out in practice. The USSR, as a result of its hosting of the Tashkent Conference, was projected into the very midst of Indo- Pakistani relations. The cumulative strains which this imposed on Soviet policy surfaced conspicuously in 1969 when it became clear that the Soviet Government was less enthusiastic about persisting with its ostensibly 'even-handed' course. The implications of this reversal in Soviet strategy were to be demonstrated during the crisis which developed between India and Pakistan in 1971 as a result of the course of events in East Pakistan. (v) Hence, the Soviet reaction to the Indo-Pakistan war in December of 1971 can be understood partially in terms of the ongoing course of its diplomacy on the subcontinent since 1965 and as a response to the burdens entailed by the Tashkent approach. It can, however, also be understood in terms of the contrasting international environments in which the two Indo-Pakistani wars of the period occurred. It is this second dimension of the question which the thesis explores in the form of a comparative analysis of the international contexts surrounding the wars of 1965 and 1971. The time period of the thesis is thereby justified because it not only concentrates on an interesting period of Soviet diplomacy but it also permits the execution of such a comparative analysis and thus provides us with a greater understanding of the nature of Soviet policy in the area. (vi) CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Chapter 1 The Background: The USSR, India and Pakistan 1947-64 23 Chapter 2 Soviet Reappraisal of the Third World 1964-5 59 Chapter 3 Soviet Assessments of India and Pakistan 1964-71 78 Chapter 4 The Rapprochement with Pakistan 106 Chapter 5 The Indo-Pakistani War 1965 and the Policy of Tashkent 119 Chapter 6 Tertius Non Gaudens - The Tashkent Burden 1966-69 139 Chapter 7 Dualism Falters - Soviet Disillusionment with Pakistan 1969-70 165 Chapter 8 Bangladesh: The Crisis of 1971 192 Chapter 9 Comparative Analysis of Soviet Policy During Two Indo-Pakistani Wars 230 Conclusion 271 Bibliography 289 Introduction a) Purpose of the Thesis This thesis does not pretend to be a comprehensive account of the Soviet Union's relations with India and Pakistan during the specified period. It does not incorporate, as separate entities, detailed treat ments of, for example, Soviet trade and aid policies towards the two countries, Soviet military aid to India, nor Soviet relations with the indigenous communists in the two states. In part, the justification for the selective approach which has been adopted lies in the fact that recent years have witnessed a growing literature on the subject of Soviet involvement in the Indian subcontinent and that, consequently many aspects of the subject have already found adequate treatment elsewhere/*^ More fundamentally, however, the eclectic nature of the approach has been dictated by the interests which inspired the thesis - an inter est in Soviet studies and an interest in the systematic study of foreign policy - and by the resultant limited focus of the thesis. In a word, the thesis is not concerned with two distinct objects of study - Soviet policy towards India and Soviet policy towards Pakistan - but rather with tracing out the fluctuating course of the Soviet posture between these two countries. The essence of the task lies, therefore, in integrating the Soviet approach to the two countries, in investigating the triangu larity of the relationship between the three countries rather than con centrating on two disparate sets of bilateral relationships. This should not be misunderstood as an a priori assumption that Pakistan was the major element in Soviet policy towards India nor that India was the major element in Soviet policy towards Pakistan. On the contrary, it will be the function of the thesis to establish the extent to which the regional antagonism between India and Pakistan acted as a constraint on Soviet policy towards either of these states. 1) The list is too long for specific citations to be made here. The works referred to will be found in the Bibliography. - 2 - Hence, the main effort will be devoted to determining as precisely as possible those dates which were significant in influencing the Soviet attitude towards the two countries and to explaining the particular balance, or imbalance, in the Soviet stance between India and Pakistan at any given point in time. It can, therefore, be seen that the material most relevant to this study derives from those aspects of Indo-Pakistani relations which were characterised by contention and on which the Soviet Union adopted a discernible stand. Such a study is made possible by the degree of friction and conflict endemic in Indo-Pakistani relations throughout the period 1965-71 and by the high level of Soviet involvement in subcontinental affairs during that time. The reasons for attempting this exercise are several and may be classified in terms of the nature of the contributions to knowledge which the thesis seeks to make - internally, to the elucidation of the details of a specific diplomatic narrative and, externally, to a more general under standing of Soviet foreign policy or of international relations as a whole. At the first level, one reason for confining the thesis to this specific perspective is to be found in the widespread feeling that the period 1964-65 witnessed a profound departure from the USSR's previous policy in relation to India and Pakistan. This feeling was prevalent amongst Indian and, to a lesser extent, amongst Pakistani politicians at the time and, subsequently, various opinions on the subject have been ( 2 ) expressed in the pages of academic journals. However, while there has been broad agreement that Soviet policy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war signified a departure from the previous Soviet line, there has been little discussion of, and little adequate analysis of, the precise nature 2) e.g. R. Vaidyanath: 'Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policies towards India and Pakistan': International Studies Jan. 1966; H.Kapur: 'The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations': International Studies July-Oct. 1966; S.W. Simon: 'The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective’ Asian Survey Mar. 1967; S.P. Seth: 'Russia's Role in Indo-Pakistani Politics' Asian Survey Aug. 1969. - 3 - of this development. Moreover, the apparent ambivalence of the Soviet stand at that time endured thereafter and persisted throughout most of the period 1965-71. A reading of the Indian and Pakistani press during this period leaves the researcher slightly bewildered. One discovers some Indian politicians claiming that the USSR had ceased to support India and that, after 1965, the Soviet Union was at best neutral in Indo-Pakistani affairs or at worst was actively promoting the cause of Pakistan. Simi larly, one finds Pakistani claims that, after 1965, the Soviet Union was much more responsive to Pakistani requests than hitherto and contradictory claims that the USSR was supporting India as firmly as ever. In short, there seemed to be ample justification for a study which attempted to describe as accurately as possible the precise modification in the USSR’s posture between India and Pakistan at this juncture. Another reason for the exercise lies in the context of a long-term assessment of the future direction of Soviet policy in the region. If the years 1964-65 witnessed the emergence of a new trend in Soviet policy but if the Soviet posture during the 1971 war was more reminiscent of the Khrushchevian period of commitment to India, has the trend initiated in 196 5 been reversed? This question may best be answered by the approach adopted in this thesis.

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