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Gabinete Adjunto De Crisis KGB Guerra Fría

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Gabinete Adjunto De Crisis KGB Guerra Fría Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis KGB Guerra Fría 12 DE MARZO DE 1947 [email protected] Manual de Procedimientos COSMUN 2020 Manual de Procedimientos GAC Presidente: Gregorio Noreña Vice-Presidente: Ilana Garza 1. Página de portada 2. Cartas de la mesa 2.1. Carta del presidente 2.2. Carta del vice presidente 3. ¿Qué es un GAC? (Composición) 3.1. Gabinetes 3.2. Sala de crisis 3.3. Funcionamiento 4. Historia 4.1. Creación de la KGB 4.2. La KGB en el bloque socialista 4.3. Esctructura 5. La Guerra Fría 5.1. Introducción 5.2. Antecedentes históricos 5.3. Información general 5.4. Guerras subsidiarias 5.5. Final de la guerra 6. Situación Actual 6.1. (1947) 7. Cargos 7.1. Presidente del consejo de ministros de la Unión Soviética 2 7.2. Presidente del presidium del Soviet Supremo 7.3. Primer viceprimer ministro de la Unión Soviética (3) 7.4. Secretario general del partido comunista de la Unión Soviética 7.5. Director de la KGB 7.6. Ministro de relaciones exteriores de la Unión Soviética 7.7. Embajador de la Unión Soviética a los Estados Unidos 7.8. Representante permanente de la Unión Soviética ante las Naciones Unidas 7.9. Ministro de justicia de la Unión Soviética 8. Personajes importantes 8.1. Iósif Stalin 8.2. Nikita Jrushchov 8.3. Leonid Brézhnev 8.4. Nikolái Bulganin 8.5. Vasili Mitrojin 8.6. Albrecht Dittrich/Jack Barsky 8.7. Andrei Zhdanov 8.8. Mijail Gorbachov 8.9. Aleksei Kosyguin 8.10. Nikolai Podgorni 8.11. Konstantin Chernenko 8.12. Aldrich Ames 8.13. Lona Cohen (Helen Croger) 8.14. Juluis Rosenberg 8.15. Yuri Andropov 9. Preguntas al delegado 9.1. ¿Cuales han sido los mayores aportes de su personaje hasta el momento? 9.2. ¿Qué estrategias tiene su personaje que contribuyan al éxito de la Unión Soviética? 9.3. ¿Qué cargo ocupa actualmente su personaje? 3 9.4. ¿En que se especializa su personaje (Atributos pertinentes en la guerra)? 9.5. ¿Qué planes tiene su personaje para el futuro de la Unión Soviética? 9.6. ¿Cuales son los mayores aliados de su personaje? 9.7. ¿Cuáles cree que son los métodos más efectivos de ataque que hay en el momento? Según su personaje. 9.8. ¿Cuales son las mayores ventajas que posee la Unión Soviética? 9.9. ¿Cuales son las mayores desventajas que posee la Unión Soviética? 9.10. ¿Qué influencia tiene su personaje en el momento? 10. Recordatorios 11. Enlaces y graficos útiles 12. Bibliografía 4 2. Cartas de la mesa 2.1. Carta del presidente Mi nombre es Gregorio Noreña, y me complace presentarles el Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis, bando KGB (GAC KGB) del Modelo de Naciones Unidas de The Columbus School 2020. Ésta será mi séptima presidencia y estoy ansioso de comenzar a trabajar con todos ustedes. Disfruto asociarme con los Modelos de las Naciones Unidas ya que me permiten expresar mis ideas fundamentadas en argumentos. Siento que no sólo he adquirido habilidades de diplomacia, sino que también he aprendido a interpretar diversas perspectivas a través de múltiples problemáticas. Espero poder guiarlos junto con Ilana, ganar la guerra y cambiar la historia. Además, queremos que cada uno de ustedes pueda disfrutar al máximo esta experiencia. La Guerra Fría marca un punto de cambio en el mundo. Por esto, los aliento a que se preparen y comprometan con los temas a desarrollar, realizando investigaciones profundas que lleven a argumentos sólidos. Espero que después del modelo puedan comprender a fondo las problemáticas y desarrollar habilidades en, la medida que debaten, creen ideas y resuelven conflictos. ¡Esperamos verlos en el Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis KGB! Si tiene alguna duda sobre la guía, el portafolio o cualquier otra consulta no duden en contactarnos. Gregorio Noreña Munera Presidente GAC KGB 2019 5 2.2. Carta del vice-presidente Delegados, Es un honor darles la bienvenida a este comité. Mi nombre es Ilana Garza y me satisface tener la oportunidad de ser su vicepresidenta en COSMUN 2020, y es un gran placer que hayan escogido al Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis con el bando de la KGB. La oportunidad de participar en un Modelo de las Naciones Unidas es muy única e importante y es muy fundamental que lo aprovechen a todo su exento. Mi experiencia en los modelos me han enseñado una gran variedad de habilidades que me han dejado crecer como persona. Siento que he podido adquirir conocimiento de diferentes fuentes y he podido observar diferentes puntos de vista, que me han ayudado a poder comunicarme con diversas personas. Es por esto que los invito a que aprovechen esta oportunidad y se preparen con todas sus habilidades. Espero que este año puedan aprender mucho y conocer a muchas personas, y que puedan desarrollar nuevas habilidades que los ayudaran en el futuro. El tema de la Unión Soviética es muy controversial y espero que con Gregorio, podamos guiarlos y ayudarlos a tener una experiencia muy enriquecedora. Los espero con ansias y no duden en contactarnos si tienen alguna pregunta. Ilana Garza Patiño Vice-Presidente GAC KGB 2020 6 Recuerden leer el Manual de Procedimientos del GAC 3. ¿Qué es un GAC? (Composición) 3.1. Gabinetes En el Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis (GAC) habrán dos Comités que se desarrollarán de manera paralela en constante interacción. En cada una habrá 15 delegados representando a 15 de los personajes más representativos del conflicto en el momento histórico de la comisión. El propósito de los comités es que los delegados puedan actuar de la manera más libre posible, siempre con el fin de favorecer a su respectivo bando en la guerra que ocurre, considerando además cada una de las acciones del bando opuesto, a medida que estas toman lugar de manera contemporánea. La máxima autoridad dentro de los comités será la mesa directiva compuesta por dos presidentes, respectivamente para la KGB y la CIA, serán Gregorio Noreña con Ilana Garza y Luisa Múnera con Tomás Tobón. Estos actuarán como mediadores del debate así como vínculo del comité con la Sala de Crisis. A excepción de la regla general en los Modelos de Naciones Unidas, en este GAC los presidentes contarán con voz de debate (más no voto), y de igual manera harán esfuerzos para ganar la guerra. 3.2. Sala de Crisis La sala de Crisis es el ente encargado de recibir, analizar y dar respuesta a las acciones tomadas dentro de ambos comités, por ende este es aquel que considera cada uno de los movimientos (Militares, Económicos, Políticos, comunicacionales, entre otros) tanto de los delegados como de cada uno de los bandos. La labor de la Sala, así como la de aquellas personas que la conforman, es regular y sintetizar la información de los movimientos que sean recibidos. Por lo anterior, la Sala es determinada como un ente absolutamente imparcial dentro del desarrollo del conflicto. 7 3.4. Funcionamiento En el presente Gabinete Adjunto de Crisis, la Sala de Crisis va a estar dirigida por Pablo Soto y Sebastián Solórzano. Un comité de crisis es diferente a un comité regular por muchas razones, pero la más importante de estas es que este tipo de comité está centrado en un estado constante de crisis y actualizaciones sobre esta misma, en vez de un tema en específico por debatir. Además, se caracterizan por utilizar diferentes herramientas que a continuación se procederá a explicar. Luego, la Sala de Crisis va a llevar a cabo las distintas acciones que sean consideradas, lo que tendrá un impacto en el desarrollo del conflicto armado que se está tratando, es decir la Guerra Fría. Estos cambios serán informados a los delegados por medio de distintas maneras de reporte, como comunicados de prensa o de manera verbal por parte de los Directores o encargados de Crisis. Pese a que estas no son comisiones dentro de los parámetros de las Naciones Unidas, sí se maneja el mismo protocolo, por lo cual es fundamental el sentido de diplomacia y formalidad, además de cumplir con el código de conducta descrito dentro del Manual del Delegado con respecto a todo. Los papeles de trabajo son el único elemento importante presente en el Manual de Delegado que no se tomará en cuenta en el GAC. 4. Historia 4.1. Creación de la KGB La KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti o en ruso: Комит́ет госуд́арственной ​ безоп́ асности) fue creado el 13 de marzo de 19541. El nombre de la agencia de inteligencia fue: ​ Comité para la Seguridad del Estado, y fue la agencia principal de la policía secreta de la Unión Soviética. La KGB fue popularmente conocida como “El Centro,” y era el paralelo soviético de la CIA. Esta agencia principalmente se encargaba de obtener y analizar toda la información de inteligencia de la nación. 1 Es importante considerar que aunque históricamente la KGB se creó luego del inicio de este GAC, se considerará como si se establezca directamente después de iniciar sesión en GAC KGB 8 4.2 La KGB en el bloque socialista La KGB principalmente trabajó con la Unión Soviética y los países socialistas durante la Guerra Fría para supervisar la opinión pública, la subversión interna, y los posibles o actuales complots que podrían desestabilizar el bloque socialista. La KGB recibió apoyo de los gobiernos comunistas y llevó a cabo intervenciones en la primavera de Praga en 1968 y en la revolución húngara de 1956. Después de la intervención en la revuelta húngara, el presidente de la KGB en el momento, Ivan Serov, supervisó personalmente la “normalización” del país y la KGB hacía seguimiento por satélite de la población del estado para evitar actitudes nocivas y actos hostiles.
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