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VIOLENCIA POLÍTICO-ELECTORAL EN GUATEMALA. Análisis De Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala Escuela de Ciencia Política “VIOLENCIA POLÍTICO-ELECTORAL EN GUATEMALA. Análisis de la violencia pre, post y electoral dirigida a actores políticos en el período comprendido de abril de 1999 a diciembre de 2005” TESIS Presentada al Consejo Directivo de la Escuela de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala por JOSÉ ALFREDO ZARAZÚA SESAM al conferírsele el grado académico de Licencia en Ciencia Política y el Título Profesional de Politicólogo Guatemala, noviembre de 2008 UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN CARLOS DE GUATEMALA RECTOR Lic. Carlos Estuardo Gálvez Barrios SECRETARIO GENERAL Dr. Carlos Guillermo Alvarado Cerezo CONSEJO DIRECTIVO DE LA ESCUELA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA DIRECTORA: Licda. Geidy Magali De Mata Medrano VOCAL I: Licda. Claudia Verónica Ágreda Ajquí VOCAL II: Lic. Pablo Daniel Rangel Romero VOCAL III: Licda. Margarita Castillo Chacón VOCAL IV: Bachiller Víctor Manuel González Robles VOCAL V: P.E.M. Williams Alejandro Álvarez de León SECRETARIO: Lic. Marvin Norberto Morán Corzo TRIBUNAL QUE PRACTICÓ EL EXAMEN GENERAL EXAMINADOR: Licda. Geidy Magali De Mata Medrano EXAMINADOR: Lic. José Luis Domínguez Quintanilla EXAMINADOR: Lic. Juan Fernando Molina Meza EXAMINADOR: Dr. César Ágreda Godínez EXAMINADOR: Lic. Mario Antonio Luján Muñoz TRIBUNAL QUE PRACTICÓ EL EXAMEN PÚBLICO DE TESIS DIRECTORA: Licda. Geidy Magali De Mata Medrano SECRETARIO: Lic. Marvin Norberto Morán Corzo EXAMINADOR: Lic. Roberto Jiménez Ayala EXAMINADOR: Lic. Henry Dennys Mira Sandoval EXAMINADOR: Licda. Ingrid Adriana Elizabeth Rivera Barillas Nota: “Únicamente el autor es responsable de las doctrinas sustentadas en la tesis” (Artículo 74 del Reglamento de Evaluación y Promoción de Estudiantes de la Escuela de Ciencia Política). ACTO QUE DEDICO A DIOS NUESTRO SEÑOR Por darme la vida y la fe para seguir adelante cada día que pasa. A MIS PADRES EVANGELINA Y MANOLO Por el amor fraterno y el apoyo que me brindaron en todo momento para culminar mis estudios. A MIS HERMANOS GLORIA Y RENÉ Con todo mi cariño. A MI HIJA NIURKA ELIANI ESPERANZA ZARAZÚA ARGUETA Por su amor, paciencia y la motivación para seguir adelante. A SHENY HINESTROZA Por todo su apoyo. AL PUEBLO DE GUATEMALA Porque la utopía no se ha alcanzado todavía. A MARCO ANTONIO AGUILAR PALMA Padrino de graduación. A USTED En especial. ÍNDICE Carátula ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..00 Índice …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… I Introducción …………………………………………………………………………………………………..01 Capítulo I Aspectos metodológicos.………………………………………………………………………...03 1. Justificación del problema….…………………………………………………………………….03 2. Planteamiento del problema……………………………………………………………………..04 3. Especificación del problema...………………………………………………………………......04 4. Delimitación del problema………………………………………………………………………..04 5. Hipótesis…………………………………………………………………………………………...05 6. Tipo de hipótesis……………………………………………………………………………….....05 7. Operacionalización de la hipótesis……………………………………………………………...05 8. Objetivo general……………………………………………………………………………...…...10 9. Objetivos Específicos…………………..………………………………………………………...10 10. Metodología……………………………..……………………………………………………….10 10.a. Entrevista……………………………………………………………………………………....11 10.b. Recopilación hemerográfica………………………………………………………………….11 Capítulo II Marco teórico....………………………………………………………………………………….12 1. Partido político .......……………………………………………………………………………....12 2. Comité Cívico Electoral………………………………………………………………………......14 I 3. Gobernabilidad…………………………………………………………………………………….16 4. Niveles de gobernabilidad…….………………………………………………………………….17 5. Violencia……………………………………………………………………………………………20 6. Tipos de violencia…………………………………………………………………………………24 7. Candidato………………………...………………………………………………………………..26 8. Funcionario público………………...……………………………………………………………..27 9. Elector………………………………...………………………………………………..…………..27 10. Electorado……………………………...………………………………………………………...28 11. Cultura democrática……………………………………………………………………………..28 12. Financiamiento de los partidos políticos………………………………………………………29 13. Crimen organizado………………………………………………………………………………30 14. Narcotráfico……………………………………...……………………………………………….31 15. Contradicciones económicas entre grupos de poder conspiran contra líder político…….31 16. Ajuste de cuentas pendientes de orden personal contra líder político…………………….32 17. Campaña negra contra líder político…………………………………………………………..32 18. Intereses del crimen organizado o el narcotráfico conspiran contra líder político………..32 19. Rencillas entre grupos del mismo partido político o comité cívico electoral………………33 20. Reivindicaciones de tipo económico-político-social por ciudadanos……………………....33 21. Problema de propiedad sobre terrenos conspira contra líder político……………………..33 22. Caso fortuito contra líder político......................................................................................34 23. Fuerza pública contra líder político…………………………………………………………....34 Capítulo III Posibles causas de la violencia política y político electoral en Guatemala….…………...35 II Capítulo IV Marco jurídico e institucional para prevenir y atender la violencia…..…………………….43 Capítulo V Violencia político-electoral en Guatemala. Análisis de la violencia pre, post y electoral dirigida a actores políticos en el período comprendido de abril de 1999 a diciembre de 2005…………………………………………………………….……………..………………………………..51 1. Análisis cuantitativo de la sistematización de hechos violentos políticos pre, post y electorales del período estudiado…….……………………………………………………………………..51 2. Análisis de los indicadores de las variables de la hipótesis…..……………...……………..53 Capítulo VI Conclusiones y recomendaciones..…………………………………………………………137 1. Conclusiones…………………………………………………………………………………….137 2. Recomendaciones………………………………………………………………………………141 Anexos …………….………………………………………………………………………………………….143 Anexo I Modelo de entrevista dirigida a trece actores políticos que sufrieron en algún momento violencia político electoral………………………………………………………………………145 Anexo II Tabulación de las respuestas de la entrevista aplicada a trece actores políticos.............................................................................................................................................146 Anexo III Entrevista efectuada por Alfredo Zarazúa al señor Rodolfo Leonel Sisniega Otero Barrios, el 23 de mayo de 2005.………..…………………………………………………….……………159 Siglas ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….177 Bibliografía …………………………………………………………………………………………………..183 Índice de Cuadros ……………………………………………………………………………………………18 Cuadro No. 1 Niveles de gobernabilidad………………………………………………………….18 III Cuadro No. 2 Frecuencia de indicador por año….……………………………………………….52 Índice de Gráficas ……………………………………………………………………………………………53 Gráfica No. 1 Número de hechos de violencia político electoral…...…………………………. 53 Gráfica No. 2 Indicador No. 1. Intimidaciones [verbales, patadas, coronas fúnebres]……………………………………………….............................................................................54 Gráfica No. 3 Indicador No 2. Asesinatos de líderes o activistas políticos….………………...83 Gráfica No. 4 Indicador No. 3. Líderes políticos sobrevivientes heridos de balas………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………86 Gráfica No. 5 Indicador No. 4. Líderes políticos capturados, acusados de provocar e instigar actos delictivos…………………………………………………………………………………………………94 Gráfica No. 6 Indicador No. 5. Amenazas de muerte a líderes o activistas políticos……………………………..…………………………………………………………………………104 Gráfica No. 7 Indicador No. 6. Renuncia a cargo del TSE por amenaza / Atentados contra personal del TSE……………………………………...……………………………………………………..106 Gráfica No. 8 Indicador No. 7. Municipalidades y/o casas de Alcaldes quemadas por turbas de descontentos con la reelección, su gestión administrativa u otra reivindicación ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………....111 Gráfica No. 9 Indicador No. 8. Tomas de tramos carreteros, radioemisoras, municipalidades o gobernaciones departamentales por ex PAC exigiendo indemnización u otra reivindicación…….118 Gráfica No. 10 Indicador No. 9. Estado de Prevención, Estado de Alarma, Estado de Excepción, Estado de Sitio………………………………………………………………………………….119 Gráfica No. 11 Indicador No. 10. Municipalidades donde hubo destrozos por descontento con los resultados electorales, por la elección o reelección de Alcaldes municipales ……………………122 Gráfica No. 12 Indicador No. 11. Manifestaciones de cientos de electores en contra del TSE por no aparecer en el Padrón Electoral ……….………………………………………………………….124 Gráfica No. 13 Indicador No. 12. Prohibiciones del TSE a institutos políticos e impugnaciones IV a las elecciones por parte de partidos políticos ………………………………………………………….127 Gráfica No. 14 Indicador No. 13. Dirigente político denuncia campaña negra ……………..133 Gráfica No. 15 Indicador No. 14. Simpatizantes políticos heridos o fallecidos en accidentes viales o aéreos por asistir a actividades político electorales …………………………………………...136 V INTRODUCCIÓN El proyecto de tesis “VIOLENCIA POLÍTICO-ELECTORAL EN GUATEMALA. Análisis de la violencia pre, post y electoral dirigida a actores políticos en el período comprendido de abril de 1999 a diciembre de 2005”, se enmarcó en las teorías de movilidad social, lucha de clases sociales, grupos de presión y de partidos políticos, y abordó de una manera muy clara las manifestaciones violentas de la lucha por el poder reflejando cómo los partidos políticos y los comités cívicos guatemaltecos, son víctimas y en ocasiones victimarios y cómo en ocasiones la violencia se ejerce desde el interior del mismo partido. El
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