chapter 4 “La ikraha fi’l-din – There Is No Compulsion in Religion” – Or Is There?*
Katajun Amirpur
This article, which is essentially about contemporary arguments in favour of freedom of religion and conversion, focuses specifically on the situation in Iran today. The reason for this focus is because an examination of a specific political and social situation renders the study of Islamic sources on such issues more productive and worthwhile. Contemporary Iran is an especially interesting case since Iran’s legal system applies Islamic law in many key areas of life, including the issue of freedom of religion and conversion. Iran therefore pres- ents us with an extreme and unusual situation, but also one in which discourse about religious freedom and conversion is all the more interesting. The argu- ments formulated here can equally applied in other countries with a predomi- nately Muslim population, although the debate in these other countries remains large theoretical, simply because their legal systems are secular. To return to the issue of religious law: modern Iran grants the recognised ‘religions of the Book’, that is, Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians, certain rights, but not full legal equality with Muslims. Their autonomy as religious commu- nities is respected, and these groups maintain their own hospitals, schools, and retirement homes. They may teach and study their languages, celebrate their holidays, have churches, temples and synagogues (and, indeed, are even per- mitted to build new ones), and they are entitled to send their own representa- tives to parliament. Interestingly enough, this puts Jews and Christians in a better position than Sunni Muslims, since building Sunni mosques is illegal in Tehran. According to the country’s most recent official national census, taken in 1996, there were an estimated 59.8 million Muslims, 30,000 Zoroastrians, 79,000 Christians, and 13,000 Jews, with 28,000 “others” and 47,000 “not stated.”1 However, as has already been said, despite enjoying a far-reaching religious autonomy, the members of recognised ‘religions of the Book’ do not have equal rights under the law. They are constitutionally banned from serving as
* This paper has been published in German language; in H.-G. Ziebertz (ed.), Religionsfreiheit, Würzburg: Echter, 2015. 1 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71421.htm.
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President, and are excluded from many other senior positions in government, society, and – especially – the armed forces. Some aspects of inheritance law also reflect legal inequalities. (For example, the estate of a Christian who dies leaving three sons and a nephew would, if that nephew converted to Islam, pass entirely to the convert, leaving the Christian sons nothing.) Other dis- criminatory rules also persist. In addition, apostasy is a crime under Iranian law. All non-Islamic mission- ary activities are strictly prohibited. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, may freely convert to Islam (Sanassarian, 2000). The situation of the Baha’i, whose faith is not officially recognised by the Iranian state, is different and will be addressed in more detail later (Afshari, 2001, 119–122). In the following discussion, we will explore the ideas of four scholars who pursue different goals in this field. The first of these scholars advocates com- plete legal equality with Muslims for Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, the recognised ‘religions of the Book’. The second goes further and argues that the Baha’i deserve to be granted the civil rights the government continues to deny them. The third proposes complete freedom of religion, including the right of free conversion to any faith. The position of the fourth scholar goes further still: this scholar advocates religious pluralism of the kind proposed by John Hick in the West.
Mohammad M. Shabestari
The first person we will look at here is Mohammad M. Shabestari. Shabestari was born in Iran in 1936. He studied Islamic Jurisprudence in Qom for seven- teen years, and attained the licence to issue legal opinions (ijaza). In the 1960s, Mohammed Shabestari headed the Imam Ali mosque and Islamic centre in Hamburg, a position he held for nine years. During this time, he became fluent in German and read, especially, the work of Protestant theologians (Amirpur, 2013, 207–240). Shabestari is convinced that the Qur’an supports the view that God prefers Muslims to adherents of all other religions. This, he claims, cannot simply be argued away, as some have tried to do in their eagerness for interreligious dialogue. However, he also argues that this preference must not be reflected in law, as is the position in Iran today. Given this, Shabestari attempts a theo- logical justification for full legal equality for Jews and Christians under Islamic law. Shabestari’s key argument for legal equality is that the reasons that moved Muslims to codify unequal treatment in the past no longer apply