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Locke's Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities

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Locke's Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities Locke’s Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities Michael Jacovides1 Is there a distinction between primary and secondary qualities? The question may rest on a confusion. It is not obvious that it would be raised if the questioner knew what he meant by ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities. There is at least this distinction. We may distinguish between the basic explanatory features of things and the derivative features they explain. In the disciplines that gave rise to chemistry, there’s a long tradition of calling the fundamental explanatory qualities or principles ‘firsts’ (Maier 1968: 17-18, Anstey 2000: 20-30). Aristotle’s ‘first qualities’ are hot, cold, dry, and wet; Paracelsus’s tria prima (‘three firsts’) are salt, sulphur, and mercury. Boyle was willing to follow Aristotelian usage in calling hot, cold, dry, and wet ‘first qualities’; he called what he considered to be the more fundamental attributes of size, shape, motion, and rest “Primary Modes of the parts of Matter, since from these simple Attributes or Primordiall Affections all the Qualities are deriv’d” (Boyle [1670] 1999: 6.267). If Locke were only interested in advocating mechanistic physics, his discussion of primary and secondary qualities would be of marginal interest. Long before the publication of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Boyle offers a defense of the thesis that “allmost all sorts of Qualities . may be produced Mechanically—I mean by such Corporeall Agents as do not appear, either to Work otherwise than by vertue of the Motion, Size, Figure, and Contrivance of their own Parts” (Boyle [1666] 1999: 5.302) which is clearer and more developed than Locke’s defense. The account in the Essay remains worth careful study 1 I thank Lex Newman, Matthew Stuart, Jonathan Walmsley, Martha Bolton, and Walter Ott for very helpful comments. 1 because Locke fits the corpuscularianism with an epistemology, a philosophy of mind, a semantics, and a metaphysics. His use of the expression ‘I call’ in E II.viii.9 suggests that Locke officially defines primary qualities as “such as are utterly inseparable from the Body.” This definition of doesn’t seem entirely apt for his purposes. Richard Aaron (1971: 126, cf. Jackson 1929: 62- 66, Mackie 1976: 20-21) observes that that when Locke “first introduces primary qualities in II.viii.9 he seems to be thinking of them as determinates, if I may use W. E. Johnson’s terminology, but as determinables, not as particular shapes, for instance, but as shape in general.” Determinate figures such as Locke’s examples “Circle or Square” (E II.viii.18: 138) don’t count as primary by his official definition unless we tacitly assume that qualities also count as primary if they are determinations of inseparable determinable qualities. Moreover, motion seems to be an intelligible, explanatory yet separable quality by his lights. Locke can only get it to count as inseparable by putting it under the gerrymandered determinable quality motion or rest (R. Wilson 2002: 223).2 If that gerrymandered quality is legitimate, then so are transparent or colored and tasty or insipid. Even so, the definition and the example that he uses to motivate it help to justify his theses that primary qualities are amenable to rational inference and that they are not powers to produce ideas in us. Locke’s use of the expression ‘I call’ in E II.viii.10 suggests that he officially defines secondary qualities as “Powers to produce various Sensations in us”. The wider philosophical community calls this the Lockean account of secondary qualities, and I myself agree that we should accept this definition as definitive. There are, however, at least two weighty reasons for hesitating. 2 Anstey (2000: 46) observes that Boyle “wavers” on the inseparability of motion (1999: 5.307). 2 The first is that it seems indistinguishable from what seems to be his official definition of quality: “the Power to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that power is.” (E II.viii.8: 386). Locke offers, by way of illustration, “a Snow-ball having the power to produce in us the Ideas of White, Cold, and Round, the Powers to produce those Ideas in us, as they are in the Snow-Ball, I call Qualities” (ibid.) Assuming that not all qualities are secondary qualities, commentators have some explaining to do. The problem splits scholars who take his definition of qualities as powers to produce ideas in us seriously (Curley 1972: §3, Bolton 1976b: 306-07, Campbell 1980: 568-70, Alexander 1985: 165) from those who treat it as a mere slip (Jackson 1929: 71, Maier 1968: 65, Cummins 1975: 408-10, Mackie 1976: 11-12, Stuart 2003: 70). I am more sympathetic to the second group, but, in the spirit of compromise, I’ll later describe two Lockean senses of power. In one of these senses, secondary qualities are powers; in the other, primary qualities are. Here’s a second reason for doubting that Locke genuinely intends to define secondary qualities as powers to produce sensations in us. Locke gives various examples of secondary qualities, including three in the passage where he seems to define them: “Colours, Sounds, Tasts, etc.” (E II.viii.10). And, while these examples are never offered as if they are exhaustive, one might doubt that there is any principled difference to be drawn between the power to produce the idea of red and the power to produce the idea of oblong. Why should our ideas of color pick out mere powers to produce ideas in us, while our ideas of shape pick out intrinsic, mind-independent qualities? To answer this question is to unpack the argument of Essay II.viii. From an argument for a physical hypothesis, Locke draws conclusions about how our ideas represent. From that physical hypothesis and his theory of representation, he draws metaphysical conclusions about primary and secondary qualities. Because Locke believes that primary 3 qualities are explanatory and secondary qualities not, he concludes that our ideas of primary qualities resemble and our ideas of secondary qualities do not. Because our ideas of primary qualities resemble and our ideas of secondary qualities do not, he concludes that our ideas of primary qualities represent intrinsic, mind-independent, real qualities and that our ideas of secondary qualities represent powers to produce ideas in us Locke draws more than one distinction here; he wants to convince his reader that they overlap. If we oversimplify and try to boil his theses down to one essential distinction, his discussion loses part of its depth. The distinctions are: 1. Primary qualities are explanatory; secondary qualities are not deeply explanatory. 2. Ideas of primary qualities resemble something in bodies; ideas of secondary qualities do not. 3. Primary qualities are not dispositions; secondary qualities are dispositions to produce ideas in us. 4. The genera of primary qualities are inseparable from bodies; the genera of secondary qualities are separable. 5. Primary qualities belong to bodies as they are in themselves; secondary qualities do not. 6. Primary qualities, with the possible exception of some sorts of velocity, are real beings; secondary qualities are not. Let me explain these six contrasts in some more detail. First Distinction, Part I: Primary Qualities are Explanatory Defending corpuscularianism is not the primary business of Locke’s Essay, but it still contains arguments that a body “performs its Operations” through “the Mechanical affections” (E IV.iii.25: 556) of its microphysical parts. In particular, Locke argues that “Powers to produce various Sensations in us” work “by their primary Qualities, i.e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts” (E II.viii.10: 135, cf. §§23, 26). 4 In §§11-14 of Book II, Chapter viii, Locke defends a corpuscularian theory of perception as follows. Bodies affect our sense organs through impulse, since alternative forms of corporeal interaction are inconceivable. When we perceive bodies at a distance, they affect our senses. Thus, there must be intermediate bodies between us and the perceived bodies. These intermediate bodies are imperceptible and so, presumably, too small to be perceived (McCann 1994: 62). To those who object that his explanation is vitiated by its postulation of an inconceivable, divinely instituted connection between motions in our sense organs and ideas of color and smell in our minds, Locke replies that it is “no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such Ideas to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resemblance” (E II.viii.13: 136-37. Locke borrows this violent analogy from Descartes (AT 8a.321 CSM 1.284, Maier 1968: 49-50, 66). In E II.viii.21, after this initial defense of a corpuscularian theory of perception, Locke argues that it allows us “to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same time, may produce the Idea of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other,” when we’ve heated one hand and cooled the other. On the hypothesis that “the Sensation of Heat and Cold, be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies”3— that is, if sensations are determined by a change in the velocity in the particles in our nerves—then the phenomenon “is easie to be understood” (cf. W III: 328). The hypothesis is hinted at by Bacon ([1620] 2000: 126, 131), asserted by Descartes (AT 4.237 [1637] 2001: 266; AT 1.424 CSMK 3.66), and developed at length by Boyle ([1673] 1999: 7.345-46, 350- 54, Woolhouse 1983: 150-52).
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