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Substance, Sorts, and Consciousness : Locke's Empiricism and His SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND CONSCIOUSNESS: LOCKE'S EMPIRICISM AND HIS ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING By EVA DEANE KORT A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2001 Copyright 2001 by Eva Deane Kort TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT vi CHAPTERS ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND TO PART ONE 1 Introduction to the Project 1 Introduction to Part One 2 Notes 6 TWO LOCKE'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND 9 HIS REJECTION OF INNATISM Locke's Introduction to the Essay 9 Locke's Introduction to Innatism 12 Locke's Attack on Innate Speculative and 14 Practical Principles Hints of Locke's Alternative 20 Conclusion 25 Notes 28 THREE LOCKE'S EMPIRICIST ALTERNATIVE TO INNATISM 34 Introduction 34 Locke's Introduction to his Theory of Ideas 36 Simple Ideas and Locke's Attack on Assumptions .... 38 Regarding Essential Features of Material and Immaterial Substances Simple Ideas as Basic Materials of Thought and .... 45 Knowledge and Locke's Rejection of the Idea of Substance in General Other Distinctions Between Ideas 49 Conclusion 32 Notes 33 FOUR LOCKE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 62 Introduction 62 Words as Marks of Ideas 63 Imperfections and Abuses of Words 65 General Terms and the Launching of Locke's 68 Attack on the Schools Locke's Discussion of Essence and the Furthering of . 72 His Attack on the Schools Conclusion 7 6 Notes 38 FIVE LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 85 Introduction 85 Locke's Discussion of Sensitive Knowledge 86 Locke's Discussion of Knowledge of Co-existence .... 92 Conclusion 96 iii Notes 97 SIX INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 101 SEVEN LOCKE'S THEORY OF IDEAS AND HIS ATTACK ON THE IDEA . 104 OF SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL Introduction 104 Locke's Attack on the Cartesians 105 The Senses as Intermediaries 107 Locke's Category of Complex Ideas 110 Complex Ideas of Substance Ill Conclusion Notes 115 EIGHT LOCKE ON SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND ESSENCE 121 Introduction 121 Locke's Attack on the Adherents of the Schools . 123 Substance Kinds 125 Real and Nominal Essences 127 Limitations to Our Ideas of Particulars and Kinds . 130 Conclusion 132 Notes 134 NINE LOCKE'S THEORY OF IDENTITY 139 Introduction 139 Locke's Discussion of the Identity Relation 140 Locke's Discussion of Identity and General 143 Categories of Substance Kinds Locke on Identity, Masses of Matter, 145 and Living Things Identity Conditions for Human Beings 149 Conclusion 150 Notes 151 TEN LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 155 Introduction 155 Same Man and Same Person 156 Constraints on the Resources to Which Locke 159 Can Appeal Conclusion 104 Notes 106 ELEVEN INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 168 TWELVE BUTLER'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF 171 PERSONAL IDENTITY Introduction 171 Butler's Discussion of Identity and Living Things . 171 Butler's Criticisms of Locke's Criterion for .... 174 Sameness of Person IV Conclusion: Problems with Butler's Criticisms .... 180 Notes 186 THIRTEEN LEIBNIZ'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF .... 188 PERSONAL IDENTITY Introduction 188 Leibniz's Introduction to Identity and the 188 Internal Principle Leibniz's Response to the Problem 191 Leibniz's Criterion for Sameness of Person 196 Identity and Determination 197 Conclusion: Problems with Leibniz's Criticisms . 201 Notes 202 FOURTEEN REID'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF 204 PERSONAL IDENTITY Introduction 204 Reid's Criticisms of Locke's Theory of 204 Personal Identity Thinking Substance and Consciousness: Criticisms . 207 Similar to Those of Butler and Leibniz [1.1, 1.2] The Brave Officer [2] 209 Specific (or Kind) vs. Real Identity: A Criticism . 212 Similar to that of Hume [4] Successive Consciousnesses [3,5] 217 Conclusion: Problems with Reid's Criticisms 218 Notes 219 APPENDICES A COMMENTARY ON LOCKE'S CONTEMPORARIES 224 B COMMENTARY ON LOCKE'S USE OF 'IDEA' 230 C VIEWS ON LOCKE'S PRIMARY /SECONDARY 235 QUALITY DISTINCTION BIBLIOGRAPHY 239 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 251 v Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND CONSCIOUSNESS: LOCKE'S EMPIRICISM AND HIS ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING By Eva Deane Kort May, 2001 Chair: Dr. Kirk Ludwig Major Department: Philosophy In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke famously introduces both the problem of personal identity over time and a controversial solution to it. The problem is to provide a criterion for when a person, A, at a time, t, is the same as a person, B, at a later time, t'. Locke's proposal that A at t is the same person as B at t' just in case B at t' is conscious of some episode in the mental life of A at t has drawn considerable criticism and given rise to a specialized area of research in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. I argue that many of what have become standard attacks on Locke's theory of personal identity are vitiated because they divorce Locke's discussion of personal identity from the rest of his argument in the Essay. The criticisms attack, in effect, a consequence of Locke's discussion but not the epistemological assumptions that drive it. In particular, many of the criticisms ignore Locke's empiricist critique of the general idea of substance, which is of central importance in understanding how Locke arrives both at the problem of personal identity and his response to it. vi . CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND TO PART ONE Introduction to the Project This project shows how Locke's theory of identity and personal identity, in particular, are consequences of his larger argument in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1979) (henceforth Essay). Part One will provide an overview of Locke's argument; each chapter will present that part of Locke's argument covered in the consecutive books of the Essay. Locke's argument consists of both an attack on the views of his contemporaries and an alternative to them. His alternative view works within the criticisms of the views of his contemporaries in significant ways. Most importantly, for our purposes, Locke's attack on the views of the Schools and the Cartesians commits Locke to a position regarding substance that limits the options that he has for his theory of identity and personal identity, in particular. In Part One, we shall look at how Locke's overall argument consists of both this attack on the views of his contemporaries as well as his positive alternative 1,2 Part Two focuses on Locke's attack on the Cartesian and 3 4 Aristotelian conceptions of substance and essences ' (henceforth "the doctrine of substance and essence") and how this attack limits Locke's options for his discussion of identity and personal identity, in particular. Finally, Part Three examines 1 2 responses to Locke's theory of personal identity by three of his near contemporaries; we shall see that although Locke's theory of personal identity is a consequence of his larger project, standard attacks against Locke's theory of personal identity by Butler, Leibniz, and Reid have not taken the argument of the Essay into consideration. They have, instead, attacked the theory that is a consequence of it and, in doing so, have not fully engaged with Locke. Introduction to Part One Part One provides the background for situating Locke's theory of identity, and personal identity, in particular, within Locke's general line of argument, of which it is a consequence, by showing how Locke proceeds to develop a consistent line of argument through all four books of the Essay. By beginning with an overview of Locke's line of attack against the innatists in Book One, we see that Locke offers his positive view in Books Two, Three, and Four as an alternative to the views that he attacks. Recognizing in what ways Locke's view provides a response to the competing views of his time will be helpful for seeing how the parts of Locke's positive view work together to provide a coherent alternative to the views that he attacks that 5 works within the limits of his lines of attack . While Locke does not go into detail about particular figures that he is attacking, it seems that the Essay is, in the first instance, though not exclusively, against the position of the Schools, or his Aristotelian contemporaries. It is to the Schools that, in Book Four, he attributes the innatist view that 6 One he attacks in Book One . Specifically, the argument of Book 3 aims to show that the foundations of knowledge are not innate and that they are not principles. 7 Locke argues that these claims are false and provides an alternative account of how we acquire the materials of thought and knowledge in Books Two and Three. While this attack against the Schools drives the main argument of the Essay , Locke's positive view, as well as some subsidiary negative points, is also clearly intended as a response to the Cartesians. Locke does share some doctrines with the Cartesians. Like the Cartesians, for example, Locke argues that the foundations of knowledge are clear and distinct ideas. Unlike the Cartesians, however, Locke claims that our ideas are distinguished from one another, in part, on the basis of whether they are acquired passively as objects affect the senses or through acts of mind. By providing an account of how we gradually acquire clear and distinct, or simple, ideas passively that, in turn, provide the basic materials for the ideas created by acts of mind, Locke undermines the Cartesian claim that we are in possession of foundational ideas stamped upon the mind by God.
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