Stop Asking Why There's Anything

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Stop Asking Why There's Anything Erkenn (2012) 77:51–63 DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9312-0 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Stop Asking Why There’s Anything Stephen Maitzen Received: 28 May 2010 / Accepted: 16 July 2011 / Published online: 14 August 2011 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question—couched in such stark, general terms—as too profound for natural science to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I argue, not because it’s profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as it stands, is ill-posed and hence has no answer in the first place. In any form in which it is well-posed, it has an answer that naturalism can in principle provide. The question therefore gives the foes of naturalism none of the ammunition that many on both sides of the debate think it does. 1 Introduction Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? Leibniz called it ‘‘the first question that should rightly be asked’’ (1714, p. 527), and Heidegger called it not only ‘‘the fundamental question of metaphysics’’ but ‘‘the first of all questions’’ (1959, p. 1). Nowadays the question more commonly comes up as a debating tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question—couched in such completely general terms—as too profound for natural science to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I’ll argue, not because it’s profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as it stands, is defective, ill-posed, and hence has no answer. In any form in which it is a well-posed question, it has an answer that naturalism can in principle provide. The question therefore gives the foes of naturalism none of the ammunition that many on both sides of the debate think it does. In short, we ought to stop asking ‘‘Why is there anything?’’ The utterance is a pseudo-question if construed at face value and, at best, a tendentious way of asking S. Maitzen (&) Department of Philosophy, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS B4P 2R6, Canada e-mail: [email protected] 123 52 S. Maitzen other questions that are well-posed and answerable, in principle, by science. Better, then, to ask those other questions instead. My argument applies equally to variants of the same question that one also often sees, such as ‘‘Why is there something (rather than nothing) (at all)?’’ I don’t claim that my argument dissolves every question we might ask about the origin of the cosmos, only that we ought to stop asking various pseudo-questions about it that philosophers and ordinary folk commonly do ask. 2 The Context Naturalistic objectors to theism say that the state of today’s science makes us less in need of God to explain the workings of the universe than even Laplace was, who two centuries ago famously claimed no explanatory need for God at all. Naturalists point to the many phenomena we used to attribute to supernatural agents but can now explain scientifically: the change of seasons, the course of a disease, the orbits of planets, and on and on. Their theistic opponents often admit that natural science has discovered not only good piecemeal explanations of the existence of particular phenomena but even good integrated explanations of the existence and operation of entire systems. In this sense, the opponents concede that natural science can answer not only mechanistic ‘‘how’’ questions but also existential ‘‘why’’ questions, such as ‘‘Why are there penguins?’’ or ‘‘Why is there cancer?’’ Yet they hasten to point out that natural science hasn’t explained why there exists anything at all: not specific things or kinds of things but anything in the first place, anything in general. But what, more precisely, is this theistic challenge to naturalism? Pretty clearly the challenge isn’t to explain the existence of metaphysically necessary things, since in those cases there’s no contrasting state of affairs, no state of affairs in which they don’t exist, that could have obtained instead.1 Rather, the challenge is to explain the existence of contingent things, those things that didn’t have to exist, and even then only some contingent things. If the singleton set containing Mars exists, it exists contingently, since its only member exists contingently and sets owe their identity to their members. But if the set {Mars} exists, it exists abstractly, and presumably it’s not {Mars} the set but Mars the planet whose existence naturalism is expected to explain. In other words, the challenge to naturalism expressed in the question ‘‘Why is there anything?’’ doesn’t seem to rest on the assumption that theism explains the existence of abstracta better than naturalism does—especially because, if there are abstracta, then some of them (say, the integers or the law of noncontradiction) seem both uncreatable and independent of God. Instead, the challenge is meant to invoke only those contingent things that are also concrete, i.e., that exist in spacetime. Properly put, then, the challenge to naturalism is that natural science may do a fine job accounting for particular contingent, concrete things and kinds of things, but it isn’t equipped or even meant to tell us why any such things exist at all. 1 Philosophers, including Leibniz himself, typically interpret the ‘‘first question that should rightly be asked’’ as referring only to those things that could have failed to exist. See van Inwagen (1996, pp. 95–96) and O’Connor (2008) among the many recent treatments that interpret the question this way. 123 Stop Asking Why There’s Anything 53 Many philosophers have taken seriously the theistic challenge ‘‘Explain why there’s anything contingent and concrete at all’’ and have tried to answer it with metaphysical arguments.2 Other philosophers regard the challenge as well-posed but sufficiently met if natural science can explain the existence of each given contingent, concrete thing. Their spokesman is Hume’s Cleanthes: ‘‘Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.’’3 This latter group, however, faces opponents who say that a well-posed question remains even if science can provide each of those particular explanations: the question ‘‘Why are there these contingent, concrete things rather than none at all?’’ Their spokesman is Hume’s Demea: ‘‘The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession or no succession at all.’’4 It’s not just philosophers who take the theistic challenge seriously; so do some much more visible contributors to our culture. Even as battle-hardened a critic of theism as comedian Bill Maher, co-producer and star of the irreverent documentary Religulous, is stumped by the challenge and softens his position as a result. Plugging his documentary on an episode of CNN’s Larry King Live, Maher confessed the following about the existential questions allegedly answered by theism: [Y]ou just give yourself a headache thinking about them. I mean, if you start thinking about these things, you kind of get down to ‘‘Why is there anything?’’ Try to ponder that one afternoon if you’re not high…. See, there may be answers. I’m not saying that there isn’t something out there. I’m not strictly an atheist. An atheist is certain there’s no God. [Maher 2008] In the face of the challenge, then, some of the world’s most visible atheists think they need to disavow atheism and retreat to mere agnosticism. 3 Dummy Sortals and Pseudo-Questions But they needn’t. The question ‘‘Why is there anything?’’ deserves no reply, because it’s ill-posed for a reason that the following example, I believe, helps to 2 Recent examples include Goldstick (1979), Lowe (1996), van Inwagen (1996), Lowe (1998, ch. 12), Gru¨nbaum (2004), Rundle (2004), all of which give non-theistic answers; O’Connor (2008), which gives a theistic answer; and Parfit (1998), whose answer is harder to classify. I find it curious that Lowe takes seriously the challenge ‘‘Why is there anything?’’ given his many persuasive defenses of a sortalist ontology of the kind I’m using to dismiss the challenge as ill-posed (e.g., Lowe 1989, ch. 2). Taking the challenge seriously forces Lowe to defend two highly contentious claims: (i) infinitely many sets and natural numbers exist but, remarkably enough, not the empty set or the number zero; (ii) every possible world contains at least one concrete object, even if no concrete object exists in every possible world (Lowe 1998, pp. 254–255). For a sortalist like Lowe, (ii) implies that although there needn’t exist pens, or plums, or penguins (and so on, for every sortal), it’s metaphysically necessary that, at all times, there exists some concrete object or other belonging to some genuine kind. 3 Hume (1779, p. 66). Edwards (1967) endorses this position, as is well known. 4 Hume (1779, p. 64). Burke (1984) endorses this position, citing also Rowe (1975) as endorsing it. 123 54 S. Maitzen make evident. Hold a capped ballpoint pen in your otherwise-empty hand. Now consider the question ‘‘Exactly how many things are you holding in your hand?’’ You can’t answer the question if it’s posed in those terms. Are you supposed to count both the pen and its cap? The question, as posed, doesn’t imply one answer or the other.
Recommended publications
  • Life Without Meaning? Richard Norman
    17 Life Without Meaning? Richard Norman The Alpha Course, a well‐known evangelical Christian programme, advertises itself with posters displaying the words THE MEANING OF LIFE IS_________, followed by the invitation ‘Fill in the blanks at alpha.org’. Followers of the course will discover that ‘Men and women were created to live in a relationship with God’, and that ‘without that relationship there will always be a hunger, an emptiness, a feeling that something is missing’.1 We all have that need because we are all sinners, we are told, and the truth which will fill the need is that Jesus Christ died to save us from our sins. Not all Christian or other religious views about the meaning of life are as simplistic as this, but they typically share the assumptions that the meaning of life is to be found in some belief whose truth we need to recognize, and that this is a belief about the purpose for which we exist. A further implication is that this purpose is the purpose intended by the God who created us, and that if we fail to identify and live in accordance with that purpose, our lives will lack meaning. The assumption is echoed in the question many humanists will have encountered: if you don’t believe in a God, what’s the point of it all? And many people who don’t share the answer still accept the legitimacy of the question – ‘What is the meaning of life?’ – and assume that what we need is a correct belief, religious or non‐religious, which will fill the blank in the sentence ‘The meaning of life is …’.
    [Show full text]
  • Descartes' Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View
    R ené Descartes (1596-1650) is generally regarded as the “father of modern philosophy.” He stands as one of the most important figures in Western intellectual history. His work in mathematics and his writings on science proved to be foundational for further development in these fields. Our understanding of “scientific method” can be traced back to the work of Francis Bacon and to Descartes’ Discourse on Method. His groundbreaking approach to philosophy in his Meditations on First Philosophy determine the course of subsequent philosophy. The very problems with which much of modern philosophy has been primarily concerned arise only as a consequence of Descartes’thought. Descartes’ philosophy must be understood in the context of his times. The Medieval world was in the process of disintegration. The authoritarianism that had dominated the Medieval period was called into question by the rise of the Protestant revolt and advances in the development of science. Martin Luther’s emphasis that salvation was a matter of “faith” and not “works” undermined papal authority in asserting that each individual has a channel to God. The Copernican revolution undermined the authority of the Catholic Church in directly contradicting the established church doctrine of a geocentric universe. The rise of the sciences directly challenged the Church and seemed to put science and religion in opposition. A mathematician and scientist as well as a devout Catholic, Descartes was concerned primarily with establishing certain foundations for science and philosophy, and yet also with bridging the gap between the “new science” and religion. Descartes’ Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View 1) Descartes’ disbelief in authoritarianism: Descartes’ belief that all individuals possess the “natural light of reason,” the belief that each individual has the capacity for the discovery of truth, undermined Roman Catholic authoritarianism.
    [Show full text]
  • The Absurd Author(S): Thomas Nagel Reviewed Work(S): Source: the Journal of Philosophy, Vol
    Journal of Philosophy, Inc. The Absurd Author(s): Thomas Nagel Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 20, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 21, 1971), pp. 716-727 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024942 . Accessed: 19/08/2012 01:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org 7i6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY The formerstands as valid only if we can findcriteria for assigning a differentlogical formto 'allegedly' than to 'compulsively'.In this case, the criteriaexist: 'compulsively'is a predicate, 'allegedly' a sentenceadverb. But in countless other cases, counterexamplesare not so easily dismissed.Such an example, bearing on the inference in question, is Otto closed the door partway ThereforeOtto closed the door It seems clear to me that betterdata are needed beforeprogress can be made in this area; we need much more refinedlinguistic classificationsof adverbial constructionsthan are presentlyavail- able, ifour evidenceconcerning validity is to be good enough to per- mit a richerlogical theory.In the meantime,Montague's account stands: thereis no reason to thinka morerefined theory, if it can be produced, should not be obtainable within the frameworkhe has given us.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a Methodology for Ontology Based Model Engineering
    Towards a methodology for ontology based model engineering Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty† LADSEB/CNR Padova, Italy {guarino,welty}@ladseb.pd.cnr.it http://www.ladseb.pd.cnr.it/infor/ontology/ontology.html Phone: +39 049 829 57 51 Fax: +39 049 829 57 63 † on sabbatical from Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY Abstract The Formal Tools of Ontological Analysis The philosophical discipline of Ontology is evolving towards an engineering discipline, and in this evolution the Our methodology is based on four fundamental ontologi- need for a principled methodology has clearly arisen. In cal notions, which will be discussed in this section: identity, this paper, we briefly discuss our recent work towards devel- unity, rigidity, and dependence. We shall represent the oping a methodology for ontology-based model engineering. behavior of a property with respect to these notions by This methodology builds on previous methodology efforts, means of a set of meta-properties. Our goal is to show how and is founded on important analytic notions that have been these meta-properties impose some constraints on the way drawn from Philosophy and adapted to Engineering: identity, subsumption is used to model a domain. unity, rigidity, and dependence. We demonstrate how these techniques can be used to analyze properties, which clarifies many misconceptions about taxonomies and helps bring substantial order to ontologies. Preliminaries Let’s assume we have a first-order language L0 (the model- Introduction ing language) whose intended domain is the world to be modeled, and another first order language (the meta-lan- Ontologies are becoming increasingly popular in prac- L1 tice, and the number of poor quality ontologies have made guage) whose constant symbols are the predicates of L0.
    [Show full text]
  • Out of Sorts? Remedies for Theories of Object
    Out of Sorts? Some Remedies for Theories of Object Concepts: A Reply to Rhemtulla and Xu Sergey V. Blok University of Texas at Austin George E. Newman Yale University Lance J. Rips Northwestern University Psychological Review, in press. Out of Sorts? / 2 Abstract Concepts of individual objects (e.g., a favorite chair or pet) include knowledge that allows people to identify these objects, sometimes after long stretches of time. In an earlier article, we set out experimental findings and mathematical modeling to support the view that judgments of identity depend on people’s beliefs about the causal connections that unite an object’s earlier and later stages. In this article, we examine Rhemtulla and Xu’s (in press) critique of the causal theory. We argue that Rhemtulla and Xu’s alternative sortal proposal is not a necessary part of identity judgments, is internally inconsistent, leads to conflicts with current theories of categories, and encounters problems explaining empirical dissociations. Previous evidence also suggests that causal factors dominate spatiotemporal continuity and perceptual similarity in direct tests. We conclude that the causal theory provides the only existing account consistent with current evidence. Keywords: Concepts Causation Sortals Object concepts Out of Sorts? / 3 Out of Sorts? Some Remedies for Theories of Object Concepts: A Reply to Rhemtulla and Xu Many objects persist over stretches of time too long for us to track perceptually. If you attend your thirtieth high school reunion, you’re bound to run into classmates like Fred Lugbagg whom you haven’t encountered since graduation and whose perceptual appearance is no more similar to the 18-year- old Lugbagg than is the appearance of most of the other males at the reunion.
    [Show full text]
  • Newton.Indd | Sander Pinkse Boekproductie | 16-11-12 / 14:45 | Pag
    omslag Newton.indd | Sander Pinkse Boekproductie | 16-11-12 / 14:45 | Pag. 1 e Dutch Republic proved ‘A new light on several to be extremely receptive to major gures involved in the groundbreaking ideas of Newton Isaac Newton (–). the reception of Newton’s Dutch scholars such as Willem work.’ and the Netherlands Jacob ’s Gravesande and Petrus Prof. Bert Theunissen, Newton the Netherlands and van Musschenbroek played a Utrecht University crucial role in the adaption and How Isaac Newton was Fashioned dissemination of Newton’s work, ‘is book provides an in the Dutch Republic not only in the Netherlands important contribution to but also in the rest of Europe. EDITED BY ERIC JORINK In the course of the eighteenth the study of the European AND AD MAAS century, Newton’s ideas (in Enlightenment with new dierent guises and interpre- insights in the circulation tations) became a veritable hype in Dutch society. In Newton of knowledge.’ and the Netherlands Newton’s Prof. Frans van Lunteren, sudden success is analyzed in Leiden University great depth and put into a new perspective. Ad Maas is curator at the Museum Boerhaave, Leiden, the Netherlands. Eric Jorink is researcher at the Huygens Institute for Netherlands History (Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences). / www.lup.nl LUP Newton and the Netherlands.indd | Sander Pinkse Boekproductie | 16-11-12 / 16:47 | Pag. 1 Newton and the Netherlands Newton and the Netherlands.indd | Sander Pinkse Boekproductie | 16-11-12 / 16:47 | Pag. 2 Newton and the Netherlands.indd | Sander Pinkse Boekproductie | 16-11-12 / 16:47 | Pag.
    [Show full text]
  • The Absurdity of Life Without God (Craig)
    The Absurdity of Life Without God (Craig) 1. Life Without God is Meaningless: William Lane Craig argues that, if there is no God, then life itself lacks meaning, value, and purpose. The primary motive of this conclusion is the idea that, without God, there is no immortality. And, without immortality, then each and every one of us is doomed to die. Life is, as Craig notes, merely a brief transition out of oblivion and back into oblivion. Not only that, but the human race—indeed, the entire universe—is doomed to die. In 5 billion years, the Sun will engulf the Earth in a fiery death. Billions of years after that, the entire universe, as it expands and cools, will one day be nothing but a litter of dead, cold stars, forever getting further and further from one another, travelling forever into the dark recesses of dead, cold, lifeless space. (1) Life is Meaningless: If we are all doomed to die, then nothing really matters. No one’s life has any ULTIMATE significance. Our advancements to expand human knowledge, to alleviate human suffering, to learn to live in peace will all eventually be meaningless. Craig claims that, because human beings are doomed to be here for only a short time, astronomically speaking, we are no more significant than a “swarm of mosquitos”; and man, “because he ends in nothing, he IS nothing”. But, he says, even if we could live forever, life would still be meaningless. It is not MERE eternity that gives life meaning. There must be something that GIVES it meaning.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Philosophy (PHIL 10197) Course Organiser: Fedor Benevich
    Islamic Philosophy (PHIL 10197) Course Organiser: Fedor Benevich Email: [email protected] Office Hours: Thursday 10-12am, signup via doodle at least 8hrs in advance. Course Secretary: Ann-Marie Cowe Email: [email protected] Course Description: This course will provide a systematic introduction to key issues and debates in Islamic philosophy by focusing on the medieval period and showing its relevance for contemporary philosophical discussions. It will explore the mechanisms of the critical appropriation of the Western (Greek) philosophical heritage in the Islamic intellectual tradition and the relationship between philosophy and religion in Islam. Islamic philosophy is the missing link between ancient Greek thought and the European (medieval and early modern) philosophical tradition. It offers independent solutions to many philosophical problems which remain crucial for contemporary readers. Starting with a historical overview of the most important figures and schools, this course covers central topics of Islamic philosophy, such as (the selection of topics may vary from year to year): - faith and reason - philosophy and political authority - free will and determinism (incl. the problem of evil) - scientific knowledge and empiricism - materialism (atomism) and sortal essentialism - self-awareness, personal identity, and the immateriality of soul - proofs for God's existence Primary sources will be read in English translation. Learning Outcomes: On completion of this course, the student will be able to: 1. Demonstrate knowledge of the central issues of Islamic philosophy 2. Analyse materials independently and critically engage with other interpretations 3. Provide systematic exposition and argumentation for their views 4. Demonstrate understanding of a non-Western intellectual tradition Topics and Readings: Week 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World
    Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World Clare Due A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University March 2018 © Clare Due 2018 Statement This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously been submitted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any other degree. To the best of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been duly acknowledged. Word count: 88164 Clare Due 7th March 2018 Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful to Daniel Nolan for the years of support he has given me while writing this thesis. His supervision has always been challenging yet encouraging, and I have benefited greatly from his insight and depth of knowledge. His kindness and empathy also played a large role in making a difficult process much easier. My second supervisor, Alan Hájek, agreed to take me on late in my program, and has been enormously generous with his time and help since. The community of philosophers at the Australian National University provides the perfect combination of intellectual development, friendship and personal support. I consider myself very privileged to have had the opportunity to be part of that community. My research has benefited from feedback both written and verbal from many ANU philosophers, including Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson, Jessica Isserow, Edward Elliott, Don Nordblom, Heather Browning and Erick Llamas. I would like to offer particular thanks to Alexander Sandgren. I learned an enormous amount during the first years of my program, and a great deal of it was in conversation with Alex.
    [Show full text]
  • Just What Is the Relation Between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom
    Just What is the Relation between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom I. Introduction The last half of the (long) first chapter of Brandom’s From Empiricism to Expressivism constitutes an extended argument against one half of Wilfrid Sellars’s version of scientific realism. I say ‘half’ of Sellarsian scientific realism because Brandom agrees with Sellars’s anti-instrumentalism. The half Brandom takes issue with is Sellars’s claim that the “scientific image” [SI] —an idealized, complete scientific framework for the description and explanation of all natural events and objects—possesses such ontological priority over the “manifest image” [MI]—itself an idealization of the ‘commonsense’ framework of persons and things in terms of which we currently experience ourselves and the world—that it will come to replace the MI in all matters of explanation and description. Brandom’s argument against this Sellarsian idea is rather roundabout. First, he traces Sellars’s distinction between the MI and the SI back to the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Then he argues against several attempts to understand identity claims across disparate frameworks. Neither, claims Brandom, will permit us to identify objects across the MI/SI divide. But if we cannot identify the objects of concern across the frameworks, then a shift from the MI to the SI is not a form of replacement of one framework by a better, but simply a change of subject that poses no threat to the MI. The overall argument of the chapter is that, though what Sellars made of the Kantian notion of a category is a very Good Idea, Sellars’s assimilation of scientific realism to a kind of transcendental realism in Kant’s sense, is a Bad Idea with a muddled basis and unworkable consequences.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of Everything
    The Theory of Everything R. B. Laughlin* and David Pines†‡§ *Department of Physics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; †Institute for Complex Adaptive Matter, University of California Office of the President, Oakland, CA 94607; ‡Science and Technology Center for Superconductivity, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801; and §Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 Contributed by David Pines, November 18, 1999 We discuss recent developments in our understanding of matter, we have learned why atoms have the size they do, why chemical broadly construed, and their implications for contemporary re- bonds have the length and strength they do, why solid matter has search in fundamental physics. the elastic properties it does, why some things are transparent while others reflect or absorb light (6). With a little more he Theory of Everything is a term for the ultimate theory of experimental input for guidance it is even possible to predict Tthe universe—a set of equations capable of describing all atomic conformations of small molecules, simple chemical re- phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be action rates, structural phase transitions, ferromagnetism, and observed (1). It is the modern incarnation of the reductionist sometimes even superconducting transition temperatures (7). ideal of the ancient Greeks, an approach to the natural world that But the schemes for approximating are not first-principles has been fabulously successful in bettering the lot of mankind deductions but are rather art keyed to experiment, and thus tend and continues in many people’s minds to be the central paradigm to be the least reliable precisely when reliability is most needed, of physics.
    [Show full text]
  • P(X)]( Y Exists(Y)]) = 9X Snow(X)
    Existential sentences without existential quanti cation Louise McNally Universitat Pomp eu Fabra 1. Intro duction 1 In a chapter on existence statements in Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Strawson makes the following observation: we can...admit the p ossibility of another formulation of existentially quanti ed statement[s], and, with it, the p ossibility of another use of the word `exists'....We can, that is to say, reconstrue every such quanti ed prop osition as a sub ject-predicate prop osition in whichthe sub ject is a prop erty or concept and in which the predicate declares, or denies, its instantiation. (Strawson 1959:241) In other words, there are twoways to express a prop osition whose truth entails the existence of some token entity (or particular, to use Strawson's terminology). Supp ose we take the following there-existential sentence as an example: (1) There was snow. We might, mo difying slightly the analysis in Barwise and Co op er 1981, inter- pret There was as an existence predicate and snow as an existential quanti er over particulars (represented logically in (2)): (2) P [9x[snow(x) ^ P (x)](y [exists(y )]) = 9x[snow(x) ^ exists(x)] Alternatively,we might (essentially equivalently) interpret Therewasas if it were synonymous with the predicate to be instantiated, a predicate that holds of expressions interpreted as prop erties or as what Strawson calls nonparticulars, e.g. as in (3)a. Presumably,itwould b e true that the snow-prop erty is instantiated i some particular, one that is a quantity of snow, exists (i.e.
    [Show full text]