Def. Doc. 25'55 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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Def. Doc. 25'55 / EXHifil T # <_?IQ

I NTERNATIONAL MILITARY TR IBUNAL FOR ~HE Ft.R Et.ST

SWO~ N DEPOSITION

Deponents ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Having first duly sworn en oath as on attached sheet end in accor r1 ance with the proced ure f ollowed in my country I her eby depose as follows.

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. PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ , . e I NTERNATIONAL , :ILl:T f'.RY TR I BUNt\L FOR '.!'HE Ft..R Et.ST THE UNITED ST ATES OF : AMER IC A, et al - v - ARAKI, Sacao, et al AFFIDAVIT OF ITAGl\K! , Seishiro

I. DUR ING THE PETI IOD "S STf'.FF OVFICER OF THE KWANT UNG t.RMY (1s t ~ la y , 192 ? - 30th July, 1932) l. I was appoi nt ed staff of f icer of the Kwantung Army (Ar my Col onel) on lst Mo y , 1929, the 4th Year of Showa, and hel d t hat post un+il 30 July 1932 , the 7th Yeo r of Showa , Th E' Co?llr:a ndor-i n- Chief of t h? Kwnntung

Ar my at tho tim~ of my above appointnent wvs Lieut. Gen. Ei t aro Ha t a . At tho ti ~e of the Ma nchurian Incident the Coml"'ond 0r - i n- Chief of the Kwantung Ar ny v1as Li eut . Gen .

HO NJO, Shi g~ ru Pnd the Chief of S t ~ ff was Ma j or-Gener el Miyako , 1:1 t suji . My duties wer e t o r eceived or ders from the Chief ot Staff anc t o ma intai n contact bet wee n Steff officers

and manage the steff office , and also attand t o l i ~ ison business of the er my .

As for t he euti ~ s and privileges of the Comma nd or

in-Chief of t h0 Kwantun g ~ r my , the Chi ef of Steff and Strff offi crrs, they ar e r ul ed i n the Regu l etions of the Kwo ntung Ar oy Heacquer t er s (Court Exhibit No . 1415) . 2 . Generel situa tion in Manchuri A bef or e t he Ma n- ehur1en Incident, e s f ollows :

(a) I n Chin ~ , since 1925, a movement for the r e

covery of ~ l l~ged l ost net i o~~ l rights hna been s t arted

ond ci~ +: i- . Jnp e nesc a~tJ. ons b~<~N ..' in~r &as::.neJ.y ac ~i c r e , In MenchJr ia also ther e occ~~r cd vlolatiun : of Japan ' s r ights

and int 0r ests. In Ju ne , _ 1~~8 , t he 3rd Year of St owa , CHANG

Tsuo-lin wa s ki lled b y a b o~b ~nd CH ~NG Hsuch- lieng sue- ccedcd him. In the same yoor the CHANG Hsueh-li ang r egi me

affiliat ed with the NAnking Gov0r nment , cnang0 d ·~ the Manchurien col our, ad o~t~ d the 11 blue sky anc white sun" ensi£n & l etting infl uences of the Chinese Nc> tionalist

Party p enc tr ~ ~ i nt o Me nuhuri a . - l - PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ J • 9 1'ef.Doc. · o . 2555

The anti-JPpanese movement there was organized under tho direction of the Kuomingtang and government offices and it became very active and intense. The Japanese rights in Manchur ia were infringed and the Japanese nationals were squeezed ' '"1'n the belt-like strip along the South Manchurian Ra ilway. The extreme pr essure agains t the Kor ean imi gr ants, violence and oppression of the Japan ese and obstruction to communication, etc . were intensi fied and i ncreased in number. In spite of the earnest and sincere cooper ative policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara, no prospect for relaxation of the anti

J aponese ~ ctiviti e s in China was in sight, and the sit urtion was continuously aggravated . Just before the out break of the Incident, sever al hundred questions wer e

p ~ nding . (b) On the other hand, in the military fiel d , CHANG Hsueh-liang, since taking office as the Vice Comma nd er of the Kuomintang Army in the Fall of 1928, planned to strengthmiand r eorganize the army und er his control, and he increased the strength of the standing army to two hundred odd thousand, enlarged the scale of the Mukden Arsenal, equipped the army with such modern arms as t anks and airplanes and strengthened the system of discipline . Thus he endeavoured to raise both the quality and the quantity of his army, and as a r esult, as compared with the Kwantung Army at that time , not only in its strength but i n its equipment, his army was far superior t o it.

Since then thP a ~ti-Japane s e sentiments gr ad ually i nflueAoing t he Chinese Troeps, they assumed a contemptuous attitude toward the Japanese troops, boast ing of the superiori t y of the Chi nese Ar my and the abund ance of their experienc€3 of actual fighting through

engaging in yearly internH l wa rs~ a:·. -1 he enti-Japanese

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~- - - I l , 9 Def. Doc. No . 2555

Moreover, the disposition of the Chinese troops was changed so as to encircle our garrison areas along the South Manch urian Reilways and the Kwa ntung troops which had been placed dispersedly, fell into a situation extremely danger ous from the ~ilitary point of view. That is to say, that while no more than ten odd thousand Kwant ung troops , with the inferior equipment and formation, had been stationed dispersedly, still on peace time footing, in the ar ea l ong almost one thousand kilomet er $", along the South Manchurian Railway, t hey t ame to be pl aced und er siege by the large thousa:ld force of two hundred/odd Chinese troops, equipped with superior arms, burning with anti-Japanese s entiments, and assuming a most provacative attitude .

~.3. V' i th the anti-Japanese situation increasingly aggravated and the Chinese troops aflame with anti-Japan ese sentiments, a danger of collision bet ween the J apanes e and Chinese armies had thus been gradually ferment ed . The solution of the situa tion s eemed extremel y difficult un l ess either the Japanes e or Chinese v10uld concode or com promise , because the situation between Japan and China at that time was the collision bet ween the confli~ting de mands, the r ecov0ry of China's alleged los t rights and the maintenance of our right s and inter ests. But the Chines· had no intention at all t o compr omi se and the situation wa s that anti-Japanism by force of arms would be inevitable . If we wer e to avoid it, ther e wa s no solution for us ex cept t o abandon all th ~ special rights and interest we ha~ in political, economic and military fiel ds e'Pn~re111'y. Ho w·· ev ~r such a thing as the whol esglc abandonment of our ri g h~ • and interests was not only what our gover nme!"t c ml:!.d not u ndert~ke but elso what t~e national "'.)Ublic opJ.ni :m wv;:;.ld not pernit . Therefor e , as fc .· the Kwant ung Arr.iy, ll1~ y ·..::r ic 1.. hard to avoi d friction wi t h the Chi1 ~e~c , sough ~ a~. .!. Lir:~1:~.s

of appeC1sement, adm':'ln~.s he d our officers and men to be pa :~ :tc ' and cautious , prohibiting any r ash acts. PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ - 3 - I ! • I Def . Doc. No . 2555

However , on the other hand , they v1ere under the necessity t o working out an emer gency countcr - mecsur e in

CCl S e of collision bet ween the J apanese and Chi nese troops , which mi ght happen by positivedlitary actions on the part

of the Chir.ese. The Kvmntung Ar~y , in order t o deal with the pr essing situation desired to increase its strength, change tho disposl tion of its t rcops , ?nd r epl ete its

equipmC' ·it, but ti1 i s desire was not a:-'lroved by tr~o centr al

authori tics of t~e army . Tiwrc :er e ~ thr F\'l:.1!1tr:r g Army

authori ties sir-.:;e tlle prc'1iot:s year. They o st ab:~s~od a

plan of oper~tlons that in case of c ollis~on between the Chinese t:nd the Jap2nE" se t roops , the KwPntung Army would

c onc ~ ntr ate its main forces in the vicinity of Eukden and

del j y1er a he8vy bl:)W t o the nucleus of the Chinese forces in Mukden, and t r:us by sealing the f ate of t ho e:icmy , wo uld

s ettle the ma~t 0r within a siort pe~ice . 1hey deci1ed to

make pr apara t i0~s neres sary fer educ:tion, treiP!~~ , com-

best rossible ~dv-an ta ge .

It was a p:it>t of t~n t r·lt n ~~ -:Rt t: ... ( y set h 7o heavy

at Port A:,~t hur, ond wer0 oppropriated . I t v1as a n at-o.:r~ Et l

step t o make up che: nh0rtr 6'J c ~ the fig~ ·~_; ng ~0 "1;."":-' ~ • (1: ~ t ~

Comm3nder - in-Chi ef Ifrmj o, who l11:tcl taken the p::>: '; ~ : 1 ._; r • •

rived i n August 19Jl, actually wit nesscd r ..: pea ·~GJ r1· .: ·1•• i · ences of i ncident s duo to the i ntensification of anti-

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· J apanese f eel i ng , especia lly such serious cases as killing

Cap ta in ;\TAKAr,TIJr1 A, 1::nn-;_1poshon I .••cident, and disturbances

stegcd against the troo p ~ guarding rri l~ ys in v~rious places And on the ir pr e cticE: maneuvers, r oad out the mount ing t ension of the situation. Then he strictly warned t he of ficers and enlisted men against any r ash act , but at the same time i nstructed them to the execut j on of their duties

positively and d n cid ~dly once emer gency orose.

4. I WAS accompenying Co mm~nder - in -Chief Honjo on his informal inspection trips of the troops under his command , and fini shed the trips with the inspection of

the troops located a t Li ao~r art on 18 Sept ember, 1931 (6t h Year of Showa) . On t he same dey Comn:ander-in-Chief Honjo wns informed by the Chief of Staff Miyake that Major Gen II eral '.I.1ategavm , the Chief of the First Department of the

Gcn

request ed him to send cit her IS!:IW ARA O!' me , s t pff officers,

t o . ~ukden to meet the Ma jor General . Assuming tha t the mAt t er VTould probably be in connection wi t h t he t erms of

negotia tion on t hP case of Nt-K./._~'L.!-i. , S!1 int?ro, Comma!1der -

in Chi ef Honjo order ed me t o go to r.: uY.den. Ac c:or:: i.:i~ ly, I

went to Mukden from Lj ~ ov~ n Toward cveni~g thet

Maj or Goneral TATEK/J. A nr1·.t ved , and I gr1;et.0c.1 ~r.. :_l di·· ~ a

with him. Th0 Major Gencr8l, .:l!.': i.ng ~i1a t h:- ·nng lel't ~.'c kyo

in a hu:""ry he mis.:;cd the spG~j.a :!. t~ -.1:1. n ari1 v10 :. lU1JJ.::.c to

take sufficient r est in the crowd€d coacn, and he v:as VI"' ·n ,, . . - •:.•P.s st->·- t'1 .• f ~ - e V out. Sinc e ho scheduled t,o . . .:rn f .)"; .I • ' . .l 1u1··1 'f; .; ,, ~ ~I ·r he did not incline to mention his busineJJ ... ' ~_.·'-"''-'··· '

except a f ew words to the effect th.s t t~10 su::.- ·; .\·~,_\..,r5 v ._ :-1--,

worrying A bout the carcl r>ss Emd uns crt.:p~.ms co'!{1 t..:; .: <.,.f t:~c

young officers. I answcrcj ~he t t~c r~ w . ~ no ~ 0~ J cf

Worr,rtri"'' "o if 1· t '"asn t 1"'e4 , 'o·..• -c.i· .r'.. -··~~.-: .. : u... -,;·u .rc.". 1°~"'- le .....-~ ~ t. _~ 1 :-~•·, ·. -L ·.,.".·.· .1.

out. Then we close

11 to my billet . - 5 PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ' ,

5. On my wa y t o the bill et a ftor t aking l e eve of I

Major Gener al T!\TEGAWfl , ? S I was concerned with the case I of NAK A~ITJ HA , Shin tc. ro, I went to the S;iecial Se:-vice Se0t ion of ": ul:de~ i n order t o 11e t fu rt ~c r i nf or H··t j on

about i t , but a s t!1 ~ r e \'JnS no f urthe:- nf ,.::; :L ci.13t t Gd for a while with the s t a f fs . Just es I we s going t o r eturn i t~ my bill e t ther e wps d ~ , t el ephone from the garri ~ o n c al l :l ng the Spccinl Se:rv i. : e Sectio;1 ~ma r e- troops, · ~ ported the case of tla 3ting u' t~ e r ~!l~P Y l~ne at L~u Chia okou. By several folL;\•r:J ne cor.tact: hy t elEphone , I undez·stood that jus t afl~ e r. 10 : 00 P. M. Chi11e se troops bl ast- ed the r eil l ine ~f the South Mandn;ri an Railw~y at the ~ ·. ...: ·. • II 11 western side of Pei taying, north 11 f Mukdt3n , and the ~a tr•li ng scouts of the company of Hushihtai r eceived shots f rom the enemy l )·ing in ambush . Upon receiving the 11 infor mation the company of Hushihtai hurriedly went te their r escue , c ollided and engaged in a battle with Ghine se troops . Altho'.lgll they had occupied a corner of Peitaying in s;>it e rJf the er:er.:y ' s r esi s t ance , wit!: the enf'my in-

II croas:.r:g me chine gur:s end i 1 f z:-1:·ry guns , the ccmpany was II 11

\ Ii was cle?. r tllc.t the ini.!idcut was not a ;::e:rE: infr:i.hr_a iu'3nt

railwa y, but a plar1ned chall enge of the Ch:i ne !> e r. eg';llar Army ageins t the J eµ ar.ese Army; and it wns j ~d g ed that the

Sevent h Brigade of Pei tayi1•g ,1a s in act:ion <:4t;a..Ln:>t ua. Ther efor e , I keenly f elt the risk was so close t he t if we hesitated a moment the l epsed t erritorie s at tached t o th~ South Manchu:r:i.un RPi l way and the Japanese t1·oop5 wo ul d te

encircled a~d attacked by "the Chinese Army in M1:li:t.:l.0n . At, tha t moment Lieutenant Col onel ~ ;.:in,·; ,~ •.: .Y.'i" ond

and others through the Specit-tl Service Hecti on c..i... t~~i ~'; •.\ <:.~ t.

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SHIMAMO TO , the Second BattDlion Commnnder of the Ind e I pendent Infantry Garrison, stP.ted thct he would i mmedia t el y go t o rescue wi t h all his troops the Hushihtni Company,

which ~~ s i n a de sperate bnttJ o at a cor~er of ?citaying , I I and HIR 1\TA , the 2')th Rcgimentel Comt:nnder , v.rho hcd been i nf or med of the situation, decl ar ed thet he , a s the Com

m?nder of the Garrison mad~ up hi s mind to cooperate with SHIMAI10TO ' s Bc-i ttalion by attacking the Mukd en Wa ll with all the power und er hi s commnnd . Vl hO In the capacity of ~ Staff officer/happened to be present th€ro,r accepted their det erminations and took

st ~ps to report to the Commander-in- Chi ef that the In II

I dependence Garrison \muld fight it out with the enemy I Pt Pe itayi ng and the 29th Regiment against the enemy nith- i n V.ukden. The r eCl son why I accept ed was :

(i) the det ermination of the above commanders were II ~bs o lu te l y necessary, in the l ine with the plan of O)er ~ ations of the army in case of emergency, not only for t he

s c lr~ acfense of the troops i n Mukden , but elso for t he benefit of the activities of the main force of the army;

(ii ) I thou c;ht it wos necessary to give t ~1ese CQm m2nders 2ssurance in t aking e ctions accordi ng t o t heir II det er mi nvtions by my ~c Y~ow l edg mcnt , since I as a stEff officer wes f ully conversant w j_th the intenticns of the Commander- i n- Chi ef previously. When I r eported t he det ails of the above s t eps to the Command er-in- Chi ef Honjo as the headquarters of the Kwantung Army mov€c1 t o Mukden on 19 September, he approved the steps as they compl et ely coincided with his intentions. '· On the night of 18th September we i nformed the

Consula t e- Gener al of Mukd en by ~ ."2.0;i 1 1nre of t ile o·,· t ::: rc~k

of t he i ncident and of the ce;tic :s t £>ken by the e.1'Tt.f, 1J!1j

I ~ sking Consul ~10RISHI MA t o come up to the s~ ~ ci ci l Gcrvice I off ice we explainct'l the circumstnnccs i n detail and a::>1{cd for hi s coopcratjon. - 7 - PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ --~ l •

Def. Doc . No . 2555 I I also t al ked about the matt er with Consul- General HAYASHI

sever al times by t el ephone . Consul - Gener al HAY~SHI said i that, as Japan and China had not yet formally enter ed the

I wa r, ~nd as the Chinese, throu ~ h consultant C~ ~Os ~sin - p o, I had announced their adcptlcn of the ~ri ~ i µ l e of non-resist-

ance he hoped that the army wo ·1 ~. d or·,·erlgc -:hr na ttE' r so i t

could be dealt with through dipl oc~t ic agents , putti,g an

end t o the military ~ cti ons on the p~rt of Jap~n at th3t

time . In r eply t o his as se1·tion, I explained the f 0 11011 i ng

I in det ail and asked his r econsiderati on. Th8t is t o say, t he incident this t i me- wr. s dif f er ent from tho!'>e o f the

predecessors , because the r egul ar army of ttc Chinese had ·' ·1 challenged the J apcn0se ar my; t ~1e fighting between the .I Chin0sc anC. the J~;> n nes e was 2lrcedy under way, and it

was i mpossible f or the present t o s0parate t hem . 11

Anyway , unless the pr es ent military actions would Ii be settled i t was practically i mpossibl e t o place the case t o the di pl omatic nego tiati ons . Thoubh the Chinese were I saying that the Chines e wer e complctclir 1 a~ idi L~ by the II principl e of non- r esistance , accordi ng t o the r eport from

the frontier, t hey v1crc attacking at Hush:U. : ai 1 c 0L~c-ir: g II dead and injur ed . I coul.d not t nagine t 1·Jr~ t G!:-i.:i.0 F.- in-po would be abl e t o arrenge a cc"se- firc agreement on his

own r esponsibi lity, br c1us0 be ua~ a mere ctvil o~f lcia l ,

having no i nfluence in lJi~ itary affairs . Pa~t icul a rly wha t hed t o bE' considered was t ha t it could not be known whether

i t mi ght not prove to bo the ~nemy 's habitual trick in

order that th~y mi ght r earrarge the s itueticn by gnining time , ma king the actions of the Japanese army delayed and r el axed . I t old him we hed t o bo cnrcful, t hat tl10 cof!.1 i

tion was of such a grave nature that i t p e r rn lt tc~ no hcsi

ta tion . I , also, po int ad out ·( . ~:· ·; 4-,i::e rcali Z.,:l ! -~-:-:. c r'

possible in thf\ light of th3n a.:: i.,t.:.J l s.•. tu ~t i m!:J .

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ . _, l ' Def. Doc. No. 2555

i·he battle ar ound Mukd en t er minat ed on the 19th ,, Sept emb er. However, as all the Chi nese f unctionaries nho wer e holding i mpor tent posts of the city administration I had fled , the police , communica i;tons , enG the hanking

services ?).l cam~ t o a s t .:md ~ till. All t ~1e citizens closed their doors and the city becam e: utterly chaotic. ':.'ho con- i

Thus the situation became so bad that we coul d not l eeve it

that way evr n f or ~ moment, in the i n t rr ~s ts of public

saf ety. In view of the abov0 ci r cu n' stn ;· ~ c s , and r l so t o

cope v1 i ~:1 the earn0st desire of t i.1c ci t 'L :~,~ ns , the army

c tv11mander Honjo, f or tho purpos0 of mo in·~ CJ in in g public safe t y , pr o!llul gated i mmed i at el y an em1"'1 "£' f'cncy rr unicipal adminis tration and nppo'.1.nted Col onel DOHIH, r.t as t he t cmpor ?ry 1f.ayor . The Kvmntung Ar my had no intention of instituti ng

a militar y adrn inis tr r tit n. Th~ y did not ~ d mit any other 1oldicr than Colonel DOHIHARA t o t ake part in the adninis- tration and appart from a f ew J apanese edvisors, the gr0rt er II part .. of t he functionari es wer e Chinese na tionals. Thus its purpose was t o maintain the public peace as a t empor ary measure with the arrangement that whenever a qualified I Chinese was available the power of administ r ation should ,. II i mmed i atel y be tr a~s f orr o d t o him. Colonel DOHI HARA served only one month as t empor

ary Mayor, ~nd on the 20th October Mr . CHAO Hsin- po became Ma yor and al most all of tho advisors wer e r emoved •. . • '> L

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'1 I • I .. • •

J ·' I - a. • \ . ' ' .i

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'.l·he battle ar ound Mukd en t er minat ed on the 19th

Sept emb er . However, as all the Chinese f unctionar i es who I • wer e holding i mpor tant post s of the city admi nistration had fled , t he pol j_ ce, cornmuni ca!; Jons , ~rnci the hanki ng I services P ~l camE t o a standLtill. All t ~~ cit i zens clos ed I' their doors and the city became: utterly chaotic. ':'he con-

Thus the situation became so bad t hat we coul d not l eave i t

t hat way even f or ~ moment, in the in t rr~s t s of public I

SAf ety. In view of the above> circurr s tn ~· ~ c s, and c: l so to

cope wi ch the earnest desire of ti1c c i ti:~ 1.m s , the army

cn"1mander Honjo , f or tho purpose' of m~lln·;:;e.::..n ing public saf e- t y , pr omul gated i rr.med i at el y an em0l'fency rrunicipal adminis t r ati on und Dppo:Lnted Co l onel DOHHI, r.t as t he t empor c> ry t'.a yor . The Krmntung Ar my had no intention of i nstituti ng

a military adm i ni s tr r t i <'n. They did not Ddmi t any other

purpose was t o maintain the publi c peace as a t empor ary mea sur e with the arrangement that whenever a qualified 'I Chinese wa s available the power of admini s t r ation should I i mmedi at el y be transf c> rrcd t o him. Col onel DOHI HAR A s erved onl y one month as t empor ary Mayor , end on the 20th October Mr . CHAO Hsin- po became Mayor and al mos t all of t ho advisors wer e r emoved • . I . \ • .I. c· .. .., . · · i

., .. ,._ ~ .. ... J ..

~ L • \ . ... ·"

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8. Command er-in- Chief Honjo had bec>n too cautious to disclose any of his political opinions cu.ring the course I

~ f the host ilit i es of the M- nchur i en Inciacnt . I H01.o;evcr , whc n t hr indc p<" ndrncr d C' c ~_?rc:? tion of N'I ch .• I I nrovi nce of i~e nchurie as uc>l l e.s c-f some i 11f .. nE'~ ... i nl pcr so ~

lh0rric crrrtr d a gcnrral t end ency th ro u ~ h out kenc h~ ria thai

pub iic , a t the cn~1 of Oc t ob0r .; '.'~.L ot Kw:J :. cune- Ani.y Hr:od -

In vir ·· of the fp~t tlut thr Sino--J?panes0 conflict

·: 'Yl ch h, ~ ex '.s ..:, '"" oc fore chr ~ ->nchnri. !1 Incj.d c:it l ed i tsc>lf to t hr nrc!;rnt r "'gr l ttable all out clPsh bet ween the t v.'O

countri c s , '\Tc> mus t r. i<:c cC'rtain U!r"C; an u'i:!.' .)r Li.met( i~.i:!:i.drn t

so , we must ~C' vis c m0r su r~s with whi ch t o sctt! c the in-

cidC' nt to the complet e sp tisfpction of toth co ~n tri rs . T~

first st0p t m1e r d mp t cr iPlization of t his mcesur r vcuJ~ be to pay high r 0gara to the expressed desire of th0 whole

Manchuri en pcopJe.

':·hr t=> n" i.-·.TrpPri0s c. movcmrnt v1hi.ch h pd bf' r n conduc ;,. r1

I bf'for c> thf' pr r: s( nt i nc i d c- nt c0.-1tr i bu tf'd to c1·r a ting among I I th ~ Chin0s e pci ple an an t i - Jpp ~ ne s e s entiment, which finally If

d ~ v e l~ re d into ~ bitt er f eel i ng of enmity. This f eel ing seems to hFVO been eliminet ed now , but

Wf' must go P st c~ further t o compl c t r i_y 'wdpE' it out from

t he ir mind by enhancing thr spirit o f r aciel h2rmony t o sue}

0xtent thet the peooic ~ f bo~ h countries f eel no raciPl dis- cri mi nRtion Pmong them .

So long ts J ~pan mAintAins her special rights and

interest s in ~~nchu ri a , i t cPnnot help causing ? s0nse of

unequality and a s -nse of b0i ng oppres sed among thci Mr-" "'htU ·

1 , . ' . , •- I c i~n peopl e , no m~ttt r hog l cg~lly right the ~ 2?P~ ~ ...... ~ .J

nnd inter ests , from the viC'•:1p0 .int of :l n V rnationc. l J. ~· \" > .uy br . - 10 -

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Ther efore , Japan should volunt aril y give up her r ights and

inter ests ther e , r enounce her sp ~ c i e l right of extrat erritor ieli ty ?nd should r et urn Port Ar thur and DPiren t o Ma nchuria ,

if, by doing so, the r el ptions bet ween t he ~ o countri£s can I Attrin such stpndard es wher e the interests of both countri es · •' become i dcnticel Pnd wher e the s ense of racirl discrimination . no longer exists.

Since the J apanese and the I~ip nchuri A n people ar e th€ elements constituting the state of Menchuria , based on the equal footing wi thout raciel di s crimination, J ppanes o should

abandon all of t hei r sup ~ r i or complex and the sense of speciel rights over thet prea. They mus t r ealize thet they s t and on

an (lque l f ooting wi th the I ~anchurien people in constituting this new stete Vlh(lther es government offi ciels or civilians . I suggest thet those who servf the new country es government off ici?ls should heve such det ermination es to naturalize thems elves to that c0untry. Mal administrFtion of Chang HsuPliang was the cause

and Manchuria, but el so of ell of t he thirty million Ma nchur i an popUlPce. ChP.ng Hsueliang ' s f ailure with the Menchurian Ii II Manchuria should be most car ef ul about in the future is t o r espPct the will of the peopl e by r e j ecting the r eturn of Chang Hsuel iang and his part y . Re storation of i mperial r egime in Ma nchuria would be an act of en?chronism, furthermor e , it is apt to give birth to an evil cause which will deprive Manchuria forever of her possible opportunity of harmonizing with China in the future . Even if Mr . Henry Pu Yi wer e to become thr. head of the new

stet e in compliance with the r equest of t hir t y million Man~ hur i en people, t her e must be a clear distinction bet ween his cs

sump tion es head of the stet e and the r estoration of i ?tp0:·J .'.j l

'I r 0gime . - 11 -

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ - ~ I - ·-- -- ...... r cf. Doc . 2555 I

th ~ A Ind0pend ence of new state is the r esult of I

I mov rment of ~ r Pce freeing itself from the nation to which I it belonged , and so it is not in ony wey violating any treety.

Those i nf lu ~ntial Manchurian peopl e of th~ present should be fully r esponsible to the peopl e of Ma nchuri a . ' ' It is f eared that the independ ence of fl new stat e

mP.y overshadow the ppth to cooperetion bet ween China end Japaft 1 but at the sPme time , i t is possible t hat the new state , by

administering good rule , can v10rk as ~ tie for Chine-Japan coll obor etion in the future., and we must hope that this should be t he cese with the coming new state . What everything depends upon is good !'dministration cna th0 welfar e of the poople . The misgoverning in the post, Pdminister ed by the formPr military clique should of course be improved . Fi rst of all, the heavy extortion of tax should cithr r be abolished or Pll0vieted. All l ews purporting to be

Pnt1 -J~pan0 s e should immcdi pt ely be Abolished . The K\vant ung P.r my should b0 indifferent to f'l ll poli t i -

cal offeirs of tiiC' ndnr.:-·!.e . It should l ~ F ve all the E'dministra- tiv0 mA ttC'rs of thfl new :JtE' t C' to the independent c>nd riutonomous r0gimf! of the !fanchurien pf>op l e , end should solely limits its

nction, ~s its guiding principl e , to essisting thr ffia intcnancr

of lrw pnd order . ~nwcv c r, the nPtionPl defense should be a problem for the j oint strength of JP.pan and the new stetc , end , for th0 time being , the Kwentung Army should ?ppoint it

s 0lf to this t esk. II I Tho Kwantung Army mus t convince, ?nd gein ab:Jvlute

confidence of thr ~~ c>n churi a n peopl e es being their friend . So I f ar , the Japanese goverrunPrtgevc us those prohibitive instruct- I

ions onl y, such PS prohibiting us from participeting in politi

cel ~ nd pdm inist r~ tive matt ers, or inst ructing us to avoi d rest orPtion of Imporiel r egime , pnd no definite indication as

to the future policy of the Kwa ntung Army has been shown by the ~ - - 12 -

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ \ j • ~ r t, Doc . 2555 j I We pr ~ sume it is only natural und er the circumstences . What II I we should dn at this junctur C' is, while devo t ing our undivi dc1 'I I a ttention t o our primery duty as an ar my , we rr.ust m ~ k e clese t t I obser vation upon t he futur e r el etion bet ween Mpnchuria and l J ~ p a n in order to be able to r eport the true espcct of the I situation to the centrel gover nment, and , at the s?me time , should be determined not to i nterfer e with their politicel

movement whi~h is i ntend ed to represent the unani mous de- s ire of t hirty mill ion Mc> nchurien people of immediately SP. ving the pr €sent situation of turmoil . While we should

II not be r cl uct ent in gi ving a ssistance within our power to Ii

11 the Me nchuri en peopl e whenever esked for it, we must not II

force oursel ves upon them. i

9. I had be en t aking every opportuntty t o t t lk vi th !

the Ch inese l e ~ding authvr ities ?nd powerful civiliens t o

ascertain their vJ.0\J s., 3 0 that I could r epo:ct them to the Mi litary Cnrr.:n0 na er.

I l earned ~h :; t among t 11ose personeges ther e pre- I I I I veiled, a ~ Fl comlT' on sert ·:.rr ("'"C , a ~·~ :·":.g f 2o ~ i !;g of I It ~ I I

- 13 -

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Def. Doe. No . ~'" l l

animo sity against CHANG Hsue- Liang, a dislike of the ,I Koumi nteng p0litics , and, cons equently , the observance of the princi pl e of the "Hokyo Anmin" ( the bor der securit y and the peo cc f or people ) , that i s t o say, ar dent desire f or independ ence of Ma nchur i a . Mr. LO Chen-yu, the authoritative person of the f action of the Re stor etion, came from Lushun (Port Arthur) t o s ee me at the Headquarters of the Kwa ntung Ar my , at Mukd en, on the 23rd September, immed i at ely aftor the incident. He t ol d me then tha t the f action f or the Restor ation wished t o call the Emp er or HSUAN Tung t o Manchuria . He then went t o see HSI Chia in

Kirin where me me t CHANG Ha i-pong ~t Taonan, and vame back again t o Mukden on the 26th September. He then t old me that at Ki rin, CHANG Ha i - peng who was preparing f or

the indep e nd~nt movement was resirous of welcoming the

Emperor HSUAN Tung t o Kiri1. , d~d of the firm decision ot

Gener al CHANG Ha i - peng f 0r ~nd0pe nd 3 1:c e and his intention to support the Emper o1 !.{SPAN Tt.1.g . Mr . YU Chung-hen had an .; nterview with army comma nder Honjo on the 3rd, Novombor, and suggest ed t o him the necess1. ty of es tablishing a new state on the basi s of his cherished principle of the

"Border security and the peace f or the p eo pl e ~" Within a short time after the incident, in many provinces and I

districts, i nd ependence was declared . At that time we got I II infor ma tion t o the effect that the movements of establishing 11 an independent stet e wer e gradually growing among the principal political l eoders in vari ous di stricts, since I t he general t endency in the provinces of Mukd en, Kirin and He ilungkiang had been s ettled, by the entry of the Japanese I ar my into Ts its ihar in the mi ddl e of November -0f the 6th Year of Showa (1931) . So I successively interviewed, by order of the ar my command er, during the period from the

lat t er part of Novemb er t o th ~ middle of De ~emb €r , the political l ead ers of the various di stricts who wer e the sup

p o rt e ~s of indcpcnucnce . - 14 - . PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ -·- ~· . , Def . Do c. No, 2555 I

I I Among them : Mr. CHANG , Ching-hui at He rbin I Mr. MA Chen-shan at Hail un Me ssrs HSI Chia and HSEH Chief-shin at Kirin Me s srs TS /'.NG Shih-i and YUAN Chin-kin at Mukden I I thus me t with th~ l eaders of ind ~ p end e nt stat es ~nd heard thei r opinions about the problem of establishing a new l Stat e . They wer r , without exception, against the r eturn .' of the CHANG Hsueh-liang r egime t o Ma nchuria , and they did not want the .Jangking Government in nanchuria , as they hated the politics of the Kuomintang . Their common and

earnest desire WP• t o take active steps t o establish an independent state , on the basis of the principle of "bor der s ecurity and the peace for people"• They earnestly and frankly told me that, for the con$truction of a new state , thr support of Japan was absolutely necessary, that f or the time being the def ense must be assumed by Japan, and that the new stat e r equired general mod ern knowledges f or which they would dE: pcnd upon Japanes e a id, and that in order t o r ealize the fruit of cooperation, the Japane s e and Chinese should stand on eqil81 f 0ot1 ng. Ther e wer e

som0. diff ~r e nc e s of opinion among them about the qu ~ s tion of its polity and sover Pignty. Such we ll known per sonages of the Rcstor etion f action as HSE Chia , Governor of the Province of Kirin; end HSEH Chieh-shih, both of the Kirin f action, strongly advocated calling in Mr. PU YI a s the s ovf' r cign, after making ?1a nchuria an independ ent stat e ,

r ather than pe r~istently stic~ing t o a mer e theory of r est or ation itself, TSANG Shih-1, Governor of the province of Mukden, and YUANG Chin-kai, both of the Mukden f action, wer e strongly opposed to the maladministration of CHANG I Hsueh··liang, and though thoy wer e advocators of the principle of the 'border s ecurity and the peace f or the people ", they did not agree t o the monarchical r est or ation . They desired a n independent state with a r epublican r egime . l s t o the

s over eign, however, they wer e of the opinion th ~ t they would agrC>e t o i nstall Mr. PU YI as the President, r ather than

I - J ·' -

I PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/I ' -- - •' • Def. Doc. Ne . 2555

t o decide the ruler by el ection, ff,' Chnn- shen of the

Province of H~ il ung h i ~ ng was not t he Governor or the Pr o

vince a t that ti ~o , but he wps e man of r eal worth possess

ing his own troops. It ~a s s ai d thPt r egarJ ing the quest

i on of cstr blishing ~ now stat e he would yield entirely t o the opinion of CHANG Ching-hui wuo., hc;,ring al most the

same view wi : h the> ":Hi of Mukden f action, was against the Restor ation, but was in f ::ivour of an indc: pc nd cnt stat e in the r upublican syst em . All the Mongolien princes wer e

of the same opinion as the Kirin f ~ c t i on . Acc ordingly, the authoritative per sons of the Mukden ond Kirin f actions wer e in the position t o d ominat 0 the general trend of the affairs r s t o the questions of polity ond sover ei gnty. It wa s cl ear that all the political l eaders of

the various di strict s unanimously a~ r ee d on the f or ma tion

of an i nd 0pcn(":ent i:;ta t o. Th i. s '"· -;tS ma i nly due , I f ound out,

t o the pecul i cr ~co gr e phic e l dr i historical position of the

" E~ st Four Provinc

who wer e indi ~ nant with CHANG Hsueh-liAng over his maladmin istration, came t o the surface of the political scene , and I moved by po+itical aspiration des ired t o e t ~ rna lly s olidify their position, r c j 0cting the CHANG 's r eturn t o Manchuria .

I made a det Ailed r eport t o the Military Comme nder Honjo I about the natters above r el ated.

I ~. I, having been called by t el egr am from the Central

authority and cc~.. prehending the desi gns of t he ar my co!lUlla nder Honjo, l eft Mukden f or Tokyo on the 4th day of January 1th Year of Showa (1932) . Pres enting ny:! elf fl t the Military Headquarter s and V'e r Mi nistry, I made r eports as f ollows:

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ' 1. • Def. Doc. No . 2555

(i) That tne·"'g'erieral tend~~f Ma nchuria was to- • • ..• .}.t l 't' I ward an independent State. After having assi duou sly I sounded the prominent authoritative persons and men of real worth in the outside of official circle , I could af firm that they were all eernestly advocating the creation of an independent State, end thet the general public, too, were against, not only the return of CHANG Hsueh-liang's

regime to Manchuria, but also against the advance of Ku~m intang Government to Manchuria. (ii) That the Kwantung Army was entirely absorbed in the maintencance of the public peace, and that it placed no limit on the political desires of the native people; (iii) ·..L.'.hat if the matter should go as 1 t was , an independent State would undoubtedly be formed, so thet the Japanese Government should be well prepared to meet the situation;

(iv) That the Command e ~ qonjo was of the opinion tr~t

there remained no other way t han l • adopt the theory of an independent State, in view of the general trend of the sit uation at that time."

Then the ... ar f ~ inister P.RAKI told me that t hough the Government policy was not decided yet, as the new cabinet had just been constructed, his principle was to observe the actual situation on the spot, but as to the i s sue of the independence of the State he did not interfere one way or the other. During my stay in Tokyo I explained in detail the new conditi ons in Manchuria and the Central authorities well understood r egarding the actual situation.

~oming back to Mukd en, I submitted my report to the Commander Honjo, concerning 'the above liaison affair with I the Central authorities.

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1!• By order of Commender Honjo I h~d an interview I with Mr. PU YI in Port Arthur on Januar y 29 , 1932 (7th Year of Showa ). An enthusiDstic c0sire f or the creation of an independent St et e hN become (•xtrernel y strong among

·~ the powerful as we ll as the gener el public of Manchuria at thPt time end the t endency of forming such a new St e.tc, apart from the Re stor~ tion Mo v e~cnt :ceched its high pitch with the probebility of hrving Mr . PU YI, the ex-Emperor of HSU AN Tung who hPs a close connection with Manchuria, as the sover ei gn of the new State . So Commander Honjo ordered ne to mee t officially with Mr. PU YI and ascertain his intention regarding this matt er . I first gove Mr . PU YI a general information con cerning the esteblishing a new stpte , and then esked his opinion about it. Mr . PU YI was already aware of the trend in Manchuria f or the es t e blish ~0 nt of a new State through the i nformation he had 0bta·1 ·ed from various sources. He

declar ed that it was of g.r ~" t .1 e-..e:> ss~ ';y to est P. blish a new

independent State i n Mr11cburia , s ccedi!1g from China, and to 11 have e good admi nistration f or the salm of the 30,000,000

inhabit ~ nts there , in close cooperation with Japan. He

also stat ed that he h~~ the intention to accept the sover- eignty of the new Stnt e . Ho also insisted up0n the Restor- ntion ond the conversation l astrd for several hours. The ma in r eas ons wer e es follous: (1) The courteous tr e ~tmcnts and conditions afforded to the CHING Family did not abolish the title of ''Emperor". 5o he wa s still an Emperor.

Consequently, he coul d not ~ cc e pt any post which did not carry this title ; (2) The cultural l evel of the people of Ma nchuri a I lj being low, the Imperial Rule w~ s nEcessary; (3) As t G the sy.tem of the I~p e ri a l Rul e , a general cabin~ t had to be established , in

Ii - 18 - 11 PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ , I 1 • Def, Doc. No . 2555

.. I suberdination tQ . ~ . poli tica l or gan und er ,- I the direct control of t he Emperor who shall decide hi ms elf all the state affairs .

I wondered whether the r eal intention of Mr . PU YI was to decline to accept the sover ei gnty of a new state if the State was not formed according to the pr i nciple of the Monarchial Restoration, or whe ther he wo uld accept the offer to be the head of a new state any way . However, as the interview lasted pretty long alread y , I took my l eave , and i n another room I met CHE NG Chui, the son of

CHE NG Hs ieo-hsu, whom I asked if r ~. PU YI had an idea to r efuse to become the head of a new State. tle was ver y much astonished at that and sai d that could not be so; on the contrary he thoroughly und erstood the present day political situation, and was r eady to accept the offer to become thehead of a new St a ; e Ha further explained to me that, though he did not kno·.r t he true meaning of Mr . PU YI' s

talk to me , he thought that it ~ J sc have been, perhaps, a I simple expression of his desire before accepting the office . Then I asked him if I could construe the attitude

of Mr. PU YI, ~ s meaning he would agr ee to become the head or t he new State , and if I could make report to Cnmmander Honjo to that eff0ct. He said 11 Yes "· Then I left Pr.u-t

Authur f or Mukd en, and submitted my r eport ~o the Commander Honjo. The obj ect of my interviews with Mr. PU YI was not to persuade him to become the head of the new State , but mer ely to l earn his intention. I had absolutely no notion whatever or acted in such a way as to coerce or intimidate Mr. PU YI, or to cause his advisor CHENG Chui to make Mr . PU YI agree to become head of the new St ate.

Later on, on the 21st of February LO Chen-yu and

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ' I > I . Def. Doc. No . 2555

. .. tt ~ # ..... his son came to see me at thQ Headquarters of the Kwantung I Army , saying that they wer e sent by the Emp eror PU YI. They said that the Emperor was still contending for the Imperial Rule of the new State. However, at that time time North-East Administration Committee had already i ssued, on the 18th of February, the Declaration of Independence ,

and d ~ cided on the 19th that they shoul d establish r epub lican State and that Mr. PU YI , the ex-Emperor HSUAN Tung be r equested to accept the administratorship.

W~ therefore , considered that this mov e of LO Chen yu we s due to the lack of adequate knowl edge on the part .. of Mr . PU YI of the atmospher e of the North-East Adminis• tration Committee. So we saw the necf:s sity of directly communicating to '·1r . PU YI the actual situation of the North-East Administration Committee , and by order of Com•

mander Honjo I took the nigrt +~ 3 tn that day for Port

Arthur . On the next day, the 22nd 7 I met Mr . ?U YI and conveyed to h:lm that inf')l·ma ti on.. :r. ?TJ YI understood the circumstances, was already acquainted with the decision taken by the North-East Admi nistration Committee, and ex pressed his approval. U.ir. PU YI, vrho had insisted, at our first interview , on February 29, on the Imperial hule for the new Stat.e as his doctrine , end who later indicated t• us through his chief r etainer LO Chen- yu, that hi.$ inten tion was unaltered, gladly adopted, neverthel ess, the decis ion of the North-East Administration Committee , immediately upon being explained tho details of that decision. He also gladly accepted the decision of the North-East Administr ation Committee in r egdrd to the title of the State , the national flad, the site of Metropolis and the name of era . In the

~: midst of our t ~ lk I had a t ~ l e phone call from the Commander Honjo and reported the prngrcss of our interview to him. II

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De f . Dnc . No . 2555 ~ \ I I I : ~· ,._ . ... .\! " ... . • :.. The incident of the 18th Sept emb er wa s a pur e " ~\.- ~ ' . I accident and I defini t el y stat e that the ""K'.wa ntung Army did not pl an it. As t o the estPbl ishment of Manchukuo I and th0 installation of Mr . 9U YI , I state they wer e carried out by thC> natur ally created enthusiasm of the native people , and t her e was no soucallE' d puppet state

~r puppet administrCl tor created by the schemes or threats of the Japanrsc Government, or of the Kwantung Army.

'I'he all egation by the pr osecution.that I and a f ew other staff ,rricers schemed and acted ar bitrarily without f ollowing the desires of the Commander-in-Chief, General Honjo, is a f abrication and as far as I am concerned, I affirm, ther e is not an iota of truth in it.

11 I

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I PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ·- - - I . ,_ Def. Doc. 2555

I II. MY SECOND PERIOD OF SERV ICE HJ THE KVIANTUNG ARMY . (August 1, 1932 - 1 Mc-'rch 1937) I

1. I was attnched to the Kwantung fl r my' s Heedquartcrs (Chief of the Militar y I nt elligence Corps at Mukden - l August 1032 - June 1933) , t o the Gener al Staff (on a inspection tour in Eur ope - June 1933) , t o t he Kwantung Army's Headquart er s (Supreme advisor of the Militar y Adm in i s t r ntion Departme nt of MA nchukuo - 1 August 1934- 10 Dec.

1934) and th ~ n was a ssigned t o the position of the Vic0 Chief Staff Offi cer of the Kvu:mtung Pr my (concurrently

of pn Att~bhe t o the Emb~ss y 10 Dec ember 1934 - 21 Ma rch 1936) and of the Chi ef Staff Officer of the Kwa ntung /\r my (concurrent ly of e member of the Japan- Ma nchurian Joint Econor-.ic Conni ttee, 21 Mar ch 1936 - 1 MPr ch 1937) . 2. The f ollcwing was ~h0 situat ion a~out 1?2i or 1935:

I ' \ l.. ) wcr o mad e by Chines e and Japane se we ll informed circles to allevia t e t he t cn:don bet wee n tho t wo na tions and t o erPd- icat e the causes of future evi ls. Consequently, traffic

wa s opened ~nd ma il s?S~ f'T!i esteblished het ween t he t wo nations after September 1'34 . Forei gn Mi nist er HIROTA made e specch·onr the two na tions r approachment before the Di e t in J anuary, to which r eplies wer e ma de by c:-:drlG Ka i - Shek

end WANG Chiao Ming an~ finally, i n June , an Aml ty Law wa s was promulgat ed . (b) In view of the Chine se Communi st Ar·my' s northwa r d

expansion wj t h the a i ms t o i ntcnRL:~ i~ G the st~ein b~t~c e n

J apan and Chir•a , the Chinese· G( .vel'nt!ient i s:;..ted an order t o

exter minr t e t h t:t . ~rrny (Fvb.:'!t.::.t·y l S." ~5') 'I c. Es :i.en i .ng '::1' t! s ~': -

Chung at the h; ad of the exp ~ditlo~c . ry ~ r ny (J\: n ~: ·· c3 ;) ?

Kwa ntung l\r my nnd 1"a s craw i.ng nc..i..: the Uonc: ol:!.an I?. ~': 'J1-: ••

11 (c) The u.s .s .R. p crsi~ t cd ln accuni ng J 2. p.J!L ::. ...· "t.~ 1.:-ig

i mperialistic ~nd eggrpssive . It was double tra ch.li.6 Siberian Ra i l way and proceeding with f ortification of l.!·:?

F~ r East for Military bases. PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ I •

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The strr ngth of the u.s.s.R. was f our tines es l arge ~s t ha t of the Kv1Rntung J\ r my enc. wa s being still further i n-

crec-scc . (d ) t.rncd corn.rmnists F. nd bPndits in Mr:>nchuria were

much curbed by t he J a pClnes c anc Me nt~hurian expcdi tionary

forces , though not cntir0ly su pp r c s sc~ . (E') SoNe Je.pen€sc and Ma nchnrj rm notel:>los wer e begin

ning to pcvoc1te thrt J r~~ n should P~o !i sh her 0xtrnt crritor

i ali ty in . ::~ n-:!~1, . r 1? . Jud!;ing from the si tur1 .:!.on stated above, the prin-

ciple of co-·prcspcrl ty ac1vocn i; \

shoul c ~ uc~0ca in forcin£ out the pr ogr am of the c c~~uni st

strength.

J?.p~ 1 n , Mc r.churi~ anc~ China would be abl e to pursue

the TI PY of prosperity in peace . Whereas , the t hree notions would be thrown into the guagmirc of war and r evolt, if co- prosperity sl:.oul d not be r erlized and the s i tuation shoul d devel op in f avor of

the communists . Tlw above prospect became ~1 1 the mor e

probBble aft f':- "t,:i '" c.? rr.n:.~~·~E r :i , h o~.d .L i c a gc ~ e ral nc-eting

ot t1osr:ow in Jt~J y J.935, p9ssea a rE-::0 : !. ~ti.:.m t8 ccmcentrate

on cff0 rts t o ove:-thr 0 . !iP~ ~r "'pan r:>nd e cc o:.l~ ].ishing world

r evolution. '.!' he Chi n ~ ~P co !"i t :n~n i st ;a:.~ ·~y issucc. a p.rocl ariat

i on on the ba ~ is of the saic r esolution, t o substitute the principle of "r e sist Japan anct s ave the nation movement" f or

t hflt of 11Bols'1.ei: 1.ze anf. !'iO re th <~ nat1.on movenent" , enc !l lso

uni t(-ld fron: ~nd annonnced i ts r esolution tc P'lt the:' Se p:.·o

g r ~ms into action.

3. The conser:r.us of op:!nion of the ¥ ·~i:\;~:1 ~ r..:·a1:,·' ~

Hcat'.'quP. rters u:id cr the conunC:i1:de"'.' or.c the di~ sf of t.-,. ~

Gcn

2 3

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(a) Streng t hening the Pbility by r eel abil ity: 1 . Constructi on of co - pr osperity soci0ty. 2 . Financial construction centE'ring around i riproving the ne t ional wenlth anC. E: nrich ing the nationel r esources . 3. Securing the national def0nsi ve pov1 er enough to ensure peece• and order, end i n

an 0m€'r z-1 ·-: : . 1 rong enouch to check any

eneny i n-,-..- ~. L r;- .

· • :. n.:; ,

()'I) Tidi!'lG cv r t~H' i ;1lpcnc ine crisis through the ebovc measures .

r a ces in Ma nchuri a ~

4 . While I \·.ro s C11ic. f of thr. General Staff of the Kwantun

t,r ny, f~e nchukuo hD C r1nny p0rsons of brood views and high per-

s on? lity. /'.s f or M0 , I t rust(1d e.nr ..:o- ope!'atcd wtth thE:ir.i j.n

In Ju!'lc , 1Q36 , the first a b ol is~~e nt of the e~t r a

t erritorielity t ook p l~c r . Sinca the outbrepk of the Man-

churian inci ~en t I bne fr ~ o ~r0~ ttis. So~ Also, in consi der

;:i tion of t he trr n...:i r:c 11 ·:i(.nu 1 "bovc > I t~: ~ cd to e i d the work

of the:> conc0rnrc "Pp~n r- s r nn~ Eco.,:·ur·:.an pe;-som1ages and t c

f ncilit~tc i ts 'Tt crinlizcti on ft I Pssistcd concerning the personel aff airs of the J npa!'lc s0 offi cial s in the s orvi co of the lfa nchurian Govern-

mcnt, i n a cc or~ e.nce with tho or0er of the Comman0. er of the nrr.1y . I hPd nothing to do i:1i t h the intcrnc>l personal admln-

istretion am~ tho pc>rsonal aff airs of Manchurian official s ~

The KwantunP f. r f"'. y did not coerce the .Eanchur of ian Gov cr nm(>nt 1n its sel ection or r e j ecti on/its officialsw

5. J ry. pl 0~c nting th~ nationnl ref c- nse against the U. S.S.R. vrns the b;;sic r' uty of the K\ ;intung t r My and the basic principl

- 2 4- PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ .. Def. Doc . 2555

I ther eof wa s csteblished a t the tine of Chief of St~ff

NISHIO , whor.i I SUCC€Cded as c:li<; f of SL ::-1: ~0 ':'!:e :)·t ~t; ~am

est ablished by the Kwa ntung f. i.. :r.y 1 ho·vc·,.,?:"' J •:1cs ~ :. :.:;ej ., of

of purely d efcm!3ive nc. tu~e v. ··: ;~ '.: ;:.0 o:·;,,. ·: ·~ 0f ~:.. :o-r ·.i:'! L1g

6. Ther e wer e many J•oneol:.::in <> i n tiw in-: er~. c r of

Ma nchuria anc1 the ir living pl~c0s rw!'c f0~ad even ol cng

t he railway b e t ween Chanchun anc: DC1 :l::- (m. Au.: o!'d ing~y the

trencs in the oute r anc i nner I.:ongo::_s :!.rlVO~_-.ied sna!·p re-

purcussion on the Mongolions - li71ng in of t!1c domestic P'"P. Ce and of the dE; f ense cf tfar..ch-..-:;::.w . Accordi ngl y the Krmntung t.r riy nnd Har.chukuo always hed a spe ciel interest in O·.lt0r ar.d I nner Mor.golia. Int'lor Mongc,lia vms a sslgned as a region in charge of the Kwcmtung Army for col]_cct.:.::ig info:::-m .::i t:i.on concerning the u.s.s.R. an0. Mongolin, and it was m1<.1e-r tl::!.s assigr.- ment tha t the Kwontung /,r ny collected i nf.'o:·:iat l.on in

Inner ~~ongo lia neer the frontier line b e t ween MB nch~:-ia end Mongolia . The i nfluence of the northward expansion of the Chinese comrr.unist army anc the f ouncntion of Ua::chukuo and

oth0r f actors combined t o giva rise to Inner ~0ngo lian ' s

volunt e r~r mover.wnt for uni tj.ng all 1! ongolians under the banner of co- prosperity. In this connection J apan and MPnchulrno hopen for its heal thy growth from the angle of defense agai nst the U. S. S. R. P.nc prevention of the spread of Bolshevisim, but the Kwantung Army did not s eek to in- duce or su:J port the movcmE)nt , so for as I know .

The Kwantung Army, fro ~ the viewpoint of defense against the u.s.s.R., was interest ed i n the North China

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Def. Doc. 2555

probl em t o s ecure peace in the r ear in case of emergency ,

but even tha t interest was diverted t o c oncentr ?~ .e on t:1e

defense of t h~ northern and internal fo r~ifi c 2 tion t owar e Decemb er •• Accordingly, i t is by no means a f act t ha t the

Kwantung Ar my sent t~oops to the North C ~ ~na .

III. IN MY DAYS AS THE CO MM ANDER OF THE FIFTH DIVISION (Be t ween 1 Mn rch -:i. :-; ~, 7 3 J ur:.e , 1938)

1. On 1 ~for ch, 1937 , I was personalJ.y t;:·ar:sf er r ed

from the position of the Chief of Sta ff of the K1::c;: t1:!'!g

Army to Hirochi."!f' , in Ja pnn, as Cor.:i.lar:.dcr of t~e Fl :··:; ll

Divisi on. :. t t :i~· t 't ·:10 1 -ci·c 5t li D::::::~io !'l was a division

on pec'."1.:0 footing ~nj I> "i..l~.·"' c' .:.v ..i. sional commander, was i n

chargf' of controlling nll rr.y subor dinate units and r esponsible for the military preperation, wit hi n my jurisdiction. Regar ding other mPttcr s , how ever , I wes not in a position t o st at e my opinion wi th any puthority nor t o give any advice .

2. ~he n so- called the Lukouchiao Incident occurred ,

on 7 July, 1937, I was, as usual, on duty at the Headquart ~ r~

of the 5th Di vision i n Hiroshi Ma . I l earned about the i nci dent by r eacting about it in the newspapers of the f ollow ing morning . I di d not consi der it wa s serious, as I believed that it wes only a trouble that an expeditionary unit usually has , and that the incident woul d soon be set tlec on the spot. I did not dr eam that this incident would develop into such a gr eat affai r es the China- Japanese Inci ccnt. Knowi ng that the Japanese policy at that time

was l ocalize tion ~mc1 the settlcr.ient on t!10 spot , I expected

1 that it woul c be so scttlcc •

3. HOV!E'VE'r , th0 ncg,:,·~ :!. n tion bet wosn J '3J)t:? !le'>e ar.d

such s ettL:"'ic.:i: ~ t .,,. ~.' ~ to ~ · . l c:l' :· ·. ..i::,; 3 tt :.-: ude of the Ch:.11e s<

the si tui?tion occcc.o .'.! .~ :.~)~.:•• 3 'I - c:.r ,,' ... PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ,

D( f. Doc. 2?55

In this situation, on 27 July , an emer gency Mo~tli - 1

zet1on or ~e r wa s issued t o t he Fifth Division. On 2 Au & ~ s t

of t he sn~e yopr , t he emer gency mobilize tion had beem coM-

pl e t ca . The fir s t enc second t r~ins l ~ ft the Ujina Hc rbour on 3rc1 ond 7th of tugustj r 0:;r·c·cL:!.vcly. After pnssing Kor ea

a nd South rir--:rhnr ta by r ~ 1: ·· 1· · Y -<~ , 1· _,,cy r eached Peiping and

t hen participl' t ca in vG r .~ c •. , ..; ~ - r tl;- (' s in North Chinn. At t he

end of M~y , 1?~:8, on o r c ~c r f .1''...l:l l'o}<;,ro , I l eft the position

of t he CorLi:l<'nc' cr of the F.~ . f ~. h :i; :·;, .:. :: .;_f.'m anC' wos en r oute to Tokyo .

4 . thG ma in f orce of our Fifth

Shrin!:i . ''"' <.:; ,, r·, o ··j .... (7 or-, .., ., ,.,,... -·-e .... I • < - - • .. • "' - ' ..:> i i .&. ..; I '- • '"" .. ~ v · - ol' t:1e s ~me

of or r 0 spo:·. ~i l:: 1.J t y conc0r:1ing the so-·cc:lled 11 .No:lidng I nci f.cnt" .

5. As Corn1endor of th ~ Fifth Di vision , I only ct i d my

duty in n ccorc1t'nce v11 ~ : :1 th~) o r ~0r of r.iy i:mper ic:::- Corrmmnder -

the Ar'!!ly Co...,r"''l11rc1· . In the control and conM£md of tr.e s1:b -

ordina t e units , I pald spcciAl ctt0nt~on to t!~ e s~ ~blis~nc nt

of stern t'iili tPry C' i s c:i }J line. t.bove nl.1- , I we. .rned my me~

a gains t any rii sb0hovionr tO\nird the r csi dcr..ts- I f a soldier did anything wr ong , he woul d have been punished ac·:-o:.."'d i ne t o rnil i tery l aw. In c(di tlon t o such punishment, both the conmrmrcr of the unit t o w:1ich that s ol d i er bel onged and the r es ponsibl e persons f or tho control of thnt soldier wer e

punished accordi ng t o the i r r 0sponci~ llity.

IV. MY P"R!CD OF s ;~ nVJCE f\ S THE r, · r N IS~1 FR OF WAR . (Fro~ 3 June 1 ~38 - 29 August 1 9 ~9)

f\ t :~ng 1 . the end of /\pril or the beB::.n!"'.. of IJay , 19J8 1 wh

as the Co ::n::'1 n~er of the Fifth Division , ;rr . FCRut:o , I ~or. •..;:::e ,

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Def. Doc. 2555 · . . . '

who had been the f irector of the DoMe i News lgency, un

expectedly visited ne ~ s Pr oM i er Konoye •s r epresentBtive t o convey the premi er's desire t o Me , The gist of Konoye ' s desire was as f ollows:

Despite the Konoye C~bin e t's policy of localizDtion,

since the outbreak of the Lubouchiao Incident, the war WFS extended rrorn North China t o Central China , In view of such situation, it was necessary t o have e person, aK Ministe1 of Wa r, who would be Pble t o change the policy toward China to a peace-policy and wh o could carry it out. For this purpose, considering my career and my i C.ees, Konoye thought I we s the best r.1B n for the post. Ther efore , with that in mind Konoye wished to know whether I would accept the post as Mi nister of Wa r, I knew that Premier Konoye 's intention coincided

with my i de?. at that ti~e, na~e ly the withdrawal of the

enti re Japanese forces ~nd the peaceful settlement of Japan China conflict. Lat er, toward the end of Ma y of the same year, Ana mi, the Chief of the Per1onal AffAirs Burea u, War mi nistry, visited me , carrying the of ficial informa l order,

for my appointment as Mi nister of 11'ar, which same had the r ecomnencation of the bi g tl?ree directors of the Ar my (the

Sub-chief of the Gener al St ~ ff Tti.D A, the Inspector-GenerBl of Military Ed ucation, NISH IO and the Minist er of Wa r, SUGIYt.".A), and r equested me to accept that position.

I cecided t o accept the appoi n7. :'is· 1 ·~ and went to

Tokyo. On 3 June of the sa?'le ye~ :-:-, :'.: ·~ o \:: ! >: c:.':"'.:. ce a!; t :1e Mi nister of Wr r.

2 . My func£1rnentel ot t~.t. ucc as K?n:L ~· '.: z !' of Wn:- o

(a) Jopan rmd Chi nn r.'..ls t no·;; ,:.o ~ ::;~:;d w j.~,h eP.ch ot~:e r,

but j oi n hands . This wes the c on~:;. 3t c::1 t 1-J!'i ni'.':!.;. :e o!' ·;.-,::o

J ti1pane s ~ d i pl ol:'A CY t owar d China. Hovicwc:r , t:.,.c Jnv3r..ose €£°•

f orts t owf1 r~ s l ocal izati on onc'l se ~ t .: eMe n t on t~ie r.; 7Jc. ~; v1cre

a ll i n vain, anr A l ocnl c onfl~ct thnt occurred in Nor th

- ~ B- PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ - - l ------~-- · J..JC J • (,~ n° between the J,,pnne se "'nd the Chinese c; :ri:id u.i:tlly developed

i nto Q lnrge scql e con f lict between the two nqt 1ons , sxt end ing

ovs r q l ':lr13e qre n . 1:1hile J~ p.,n WPS thus r e lucti:tnt l y forced into

su~h q s i tunt1on , the Soviet Union, to the No r th; i nc:ref.l sed he r not1onql str e nc th '?normotwly qfr,G r comp l t;t.in3 8eve r:::il units of he r

f1ve-ycar.r- pl nn , Her ArtnQments in the Fq r ::'1:1 st were ov e r~w he l

mi n3l y superior, thrEotcnin3 J 0 p~ni::se r e nr e;'l t E . On the othe r

hnnd , An (5 lo- Ame ri c ~.n powe: rs f intJlly ~. ssumed £\.n i:i.t titude of 1:1 1d 1ng Ch 1nn3 nnd 1nterrupt1nB our m111tory mov €me nts .

rapect~l ly, we ~ere conce rned nbout the United St1:1tes pr essu ·e upon J Qpnn (con s i st1ne; m'"' i nly of f inonc1Pl pr essure) . If s uch

t h 1n3s wou l d 3 0 on , Jnp"n s hould be doomed to stand Qlone 1nte r- n°t1on olly under the (nc1rcl cment by Britn1n, the Unite:d St1:1t es,

Sov 1F. t l1n ion nnd Chi nn . The r e fore , J'"'pnn mus t nccompl i sh pe a.ce

with Chinn , without n mome nt ' s d€ l ay . !~nd , with ree; ~rd t o the

r i; l nt 1on with Ch tnn , I f irmly be 1 i e vcd tho.t the two c oun tric a r l'!:'t b ring to on e nd oll the post confl 1ct bctwn ·n them and

r ·ru ild mutunl d iplomncy on the b ., s is of o b r oQ.d po.int of v i cw, t :1 .... r "h,y rc .,lizing mutuql b e:ne:f 1t , €QUQ11ty nnd hnrmonious rcln.tiona.

(b) Baaed on the nbove ffi( nt i oncd f undnm€ nt1:1l ~ttitudcs , I, " s t he Ministe r of Wnr, de cided the outline of the policy for dc"l1n3 with the Stotr nffn1rs ns follows:

\s the policy for t !c fiGhtins force s: To firml y rstn.bl1sh milit"ry d i scipline Qnd to otttmpt

I!\ " l t.t ,. n "nce -:>f fighting pow:: r n5n inst the me nnce of the Sov l et

Un 1:m . As the policy of St"l.t c , t o nlt ~ r pcnoE' t e rms wl th Ch1ni:t " n'l t o occ::>mpl \sh peaceful settlement qu i ckly . To .ott€mpt An

1'1 11'.)'J '"ltion in the mnnngc ment of nnt1on"l csovc rnmcnt, r ecognizing t h"." f nct th cit t he s ttunt t on 1s g rnvc , 1n ordc r to r e 1nforo( our 1 r~r~ d1n3 powe rs ngn 1nst the Sov iet mcnQ. CE And to suppl€ment f'1 ·ht t.1c; m"'t r riol s wh i ch ore b r. 1n5 r

- 29 -

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ -- -- - Def , Doc . 2555 ee b ouch~ent by t he mi litary power t o the end , to attemp t transfer of ~ ilitary streneth, enn adjust n-::nt of the fl'on; line , thereby stpbiltzing t he s:!.. t 1:ation in the oc::upi €d area , and t o endeavour to bri ng about a settlem e~1t of peace with CHIANG Kai Shek. f\s the policy r eg2 r ding the Soviet Uni on , t o keep watch of her debouchment and t o l!laintain p e~ c e with her. As tho policy r egarding Br i t ai n and France, t o enaeavor t o get them t o stop their CHI ANG aid ~ nd act in concert with us for t er minating the hostilities , A ~ the policy f or Ger rnpny and Itnl y , to BS k of each of them their cooper ntion i n the settlement of the Japan- Chi na hostilities ,

To r.m int[\in friendship vi th the United States and t rust t~1c t f riendship woul d be the mcPns of bringing about an end t o the China- Japan hostiliti 0s ,

3. My activities a s ,.fi nistcr of Wa r. (3 June 1938 - 29 fl u ~ u s t 1939)

(1) It wa s inmcdiatol y nft0r the Hsuchou battle t hat I t ook office as Mi nister of Wer , At tha t time , as i t was belicven that t he Hangkow Op eration would be unavoi dable in view of the g enr r :d s i tun ti on , the Centr al Supreme Com mand of the Ar my (the Ar ny Department of th ~ Imperial Gen ercil H0adquarter s) hac just col'l'mensed prepar ations for thot op ~ r ~ tion . The c i rcu~s t e nc es et that time (2bout June , 1938 ) were as outlined bel ow : (a ) The peace t er ms offer ed China wer e not so exacti ng as the ones Wf: had proposed when Mr . TR AUTMAN ac ted as go b0twcen. Unl ess the ,Jflpllnesc author i ties would l essen them f urther it appe?r cd unlikely thnt the Chinese would accept thc"l . Hov1ev E.'r , both the Japanese public opinion and the Government ' s policy had still been f pr from further r educi those t E: rns .

(b) I n or fcr t o conclu~e peace with China , we had to nakc it p0ssibl0 t o r eel with CHI ANG KP i Shek, Nevertheless,

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Der. Doc. 25'55'

being confronte0 with the Konoye decl ar ation of 16 JP.nunry, this year (1938) , which included the statement that J Dpan

wou l ~ not c' eal wi th the Kuomintang Governr.ient (even though Premi er Konoyc hir.lself und erstood the wrongfulness of that decl ar ation) things were not such as were lik0. ly to develop a t endency favourabl e t o the further r e- examina tion of this

, ~ec laration as a national policy. (c) As one of th ~ i mportant keys for the r eor ganizat i of the Konoye Cabinet, en j oying t he gr eat confidence of t l

people, Mr . UGAKI succ0edcd r~r . HIROTA and a little ahecd

of 1~y entry t ook offi ce as the i1inister of Foreign Aff e.~.r s on 26 Ma y. Howevor, it was still not l ong after his i n

aucur [' iion c~d rio pr ogr ess h~o been maClc about its con~:- e te policy.

(cl ) China asked the Lea gue of Ncit.i ons for help and we.s

su cc cs3~u l in making the League r esolve t o help China . tt the end of · <'" , tr.c United States, British and French Govern

ments dcnouncr d r eported r ei ds on Centrpl and Sout hern C~li na by t he Jeprncsc navy planes .

( c ) The J apr-ncse Bvnrene Comr.:and had counted grently on tho Hsuchow BA ttle as the decisive battl e with the mein

f orc0 of tho Chi nese C<'ntrr 1 /.r ny, f or bringir.g a'bo~ t t'-:.c t Fr'linctioa of opcr<.tions , the end of wa r and the scttleme,

of the in c ~.d l' nt .. II:>';/('V

streng th and the extont of the f~ct~ in~ ar ea , t he J cp~ncso

finally could not nchi0ve i t s ~t-'utcgicn l obje ct, t hereby

nissinr the nrizc as \:ell as tho cpportunity1 t o settle the

i ncic1 cmt p c;ci cc fully. Cor"!porc0 vri. ~ ~: t!:!~ ~ , the Chinr·so coa

c0ntr r t E>c1 gr C'i' t s '..,·rcn(1th in fr on ~ 01· :' ···:·0·1.r ar.d l"'..:d beon

vigor ously pr0pnr:.r.g f or count0r r. t:; :~;.;- 3 . I f t:1 i.. ~1~ !:: '!:ot~!.d

go on PS they Y.ic rc the f ew J <:!prmcse fo:i.·cos \'! ~1:: :.·i--. \h~1 · e pQ .;tea

in ~ony sca tt,rcd plGccs in e ln~go area woula ~a LXp~sFd to

extronc C<> n [;f''.:' o

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Def. Loe . 2555

Ther ef or e , t he t r r.iy Supr er.ie Command cons i cer ed that

the only we y f or us WP S t o deliver anot her camt er-attack on the Ch i nese pnd t o make i t a t urning poi nt f or s eizing the oppor tunity for peace. Thus the Supr er.:ie Cor.imanC. wa s obl i f -1

t o ~~ ~rre f or the Ha nKow o p ~ r o t i on; and sor.ie pn rts of our

f orc ~ s began t o nove . (f) On th0 oth0r hena , we woul d discern that ther e wer e i mportant dcf 1.".:ts in ou:· pr cpor otions f or def ense aga inst the Soviet Union in t he nort h end that t hat weakness on our

nnrt would i ncr ces0 in t he future. Unc~ er such circur.ist ances , I , having but r cc0ntly assumed my pos t, coul d not hel p being awar e of the extreme diff i cult i es of the ta sk of l eadi ng the s i tuation to peace . Tha t i s t o s ay we had t o 2im at the end of the Henko\" operation f or the pur pose of t aking the next opportunity f or peece , while on the ot her hand , we had t o c cvise mea sur es t het would become ma t erial s of t he peace- s

t t t ho s~ne t i ne , t he si t uetion r equired us t o

purpose of ccf endi·· ..~ n r.·~ i nst t he Soviet U:iion.

The r ci nforcenent of tho ve rious e~e~ gency pol i ci et that we r e nccf'SsP r y f or the ne tional mobil iz:iti on (Exh .. 856)

ond the r evision of the plan of demP nd ~ nd suppl y of i mport ant ma t crie. l s (Exh. 857) wer e made f or r emedying t he def ects of t he C:c. f endi ng s t r cnt: th ann was not f or prepar ing f or aggr es s ive wri r .

(?.) t.lth -."' u .~h Hr.nkow Oper ation (Canton Oper ation was e subsi di ary one t o HPnkow Oper ntion) wn s pl anned nnd executed•

1 AS nbovc r.ent ionc:r , ty t he J rponcse Hi gh Com."la nd wi t h El vi ew t o cover :.ts m n \lr"' !c p0into ri nd t o make a t urni ng point f or

t he t crr:i!,rtion 0f hrs::;~:.:t"!.cs end peacef ul settlement, i ,

object of i ~~0a~,t0 pcrce co&ld not be attai ned even aftc

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Def. Doc . 2555

t he €nding of the Operation (Hankow f el l on October 27 , 1'3?) and the year of 1938 passed over f r ui t l essly.

~- hf i r·portant ma tters with which I wa s confront ed ,

during this peri od , as the Wa r Minister of the Konoye C a bine ~ I wer 0 thr f ollowi nc , and the ci rcumstances r esult ing fr om

c -.c cnti ng h ~ r mea sures forced Japan into a prolonged wa r it f r :-rrc' 110st .

(a ) To keep our r cl ri tion with Soviat Russi a tranquil was one of t he £' bsoJ. ·1tc essentials. It was also an i r.iportent

t~ ct or in exhibiting lntcrnclly and ext ernally, tho s af ety of hC' r n[l t i onel cl c'f c ns0. So , Japan wes quite astonished

whE'n thL CHt.'.TG Ku Feng i ncic1 c. nt unexpectedly broke out in

J uly - lugust , 1938 , when shr r~ s still engaged in the t ask.

of propering f or the Ha ; ~ow Opcrotion,

In 0e~ ling with thi s inci dent , I hoped for set t l e

ment by diploMn tic negot i ati ons , c~b od ying the Governmental principl e of non- expension, Pn0 cnde?voured t o achi eve i m med i r t e and l ocal settlement wi th a ccord of vi ews bet ween the I

\"a r .'i nist ry Pnc the Gen e rv ~ Btrff. Disreear ding antici pat ecl

s erious d is ac v~ nt ascs , the JnpPnese Ar my firmly stuck t o t h ~

principlo of l ocPlizAti on rnr. non- ex~-; ans ion and WAS bar ely

~b l e t o t c r m in~ t c the inciaent bef or e it became t oo s eriou

It br ought about, h ~ 1cvc r, g r c~ t 0 r ncPd f or att ention t o the mcnDce in the North l'nd rerliz0ti on of the superiority of

the Soviet ~c c h~niz P d forces over t ho Japa nese For ces and ,

cons0our utly, 1 ( s~;c nr d the nargin of the J ap?nese pr epar c>d ness f or Ch in? . Thus , it r esulted i n doubts , i nternally

f!nc1 cxt r rnPlly , of the pr 0par ec1:0ss of Japan ~ (b) Since the outbrcrk of the Si no- Japanese incident,

Jepan r cfreincd fron c st ~ bli sh ing nilitary gov ~ r nn e nt , and

stooc u p~n the policy anr. principl e of l eaving the civil

adm i n istr ~ ti on an~ Main t cn~ nc e of pcrcc t o the Chinese .

Neverthel es s , not fl few such accomp lishme nts wer e due t o the

nP neccncnt by Japanese (trk i n~ the ~i li te ry oper ations into considor r tion) in t he Depar t ment of Special Affairs. I PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ J -.

Bef. Doc. 2555

This placed a consider able l oad on the Ar ny. Thus, the

or grn1v1 t i on of the China Affairs Bot> r d (i. e . KO A- YI N) was

propos er by the fi r rny, ana adopted by the cabinet as the with a national policy, of r elieving the er my of their t nsks/view of

bringing about thr unification of a~m inistr a ti o n.

~ 1th such views of orgenizpti on os above mentioned

the China AffAirs Board was established on December 18, 1 9 ~Q • . as the unifying or gan, with the Pr emi er as Pr esident and t

Ministers of Navy pnf WA r as Vice- Presidents. It was abou L

the ~i d dle of the f ollowing Ma rch when the licson offices on the spots startea their work in cooperation with the Chinese Administration, t o promoto co-operation with the Chinese Administrat ions, t o promote pol itical, economical

and cultural neesures . The inter vention of the A r ~y was held to a minimun . (c) It wes sine qua now f or the r ealization of peace ·to amend the peace pr oposals t o China, and convert Japan

to a policy of aealing with Mr. CHIANG Kai Shek. I, there- ,1

fore , att~ch en pri~e significence t o r e- examining the funda mentals of the national policy r egar ding the adjustment of the r el etions between Japan and China ; making the true intention of J npnn underst ... nCebl e t o China , denonstrating

to the \'.'Or l r~ thPt it be embod i "d in the na tional policy, Pnc be carrier out f aithful l y ; anc devel oping our nati onal

policie s so es t o make f or good prospects f or the r e ~liz atior. of pc .., cc . In the Konoye stat er.tent issued et the tir.ie of the f all of Wuhan 'l'hree Cities on 3 Novenber, 19]8, (Exh . 268)

J ~ pnn hoped to ostrblish the r el ations of n~ tua l ai d , r ang

ing over ell the f i el ds of politics, economy , cul t ure, e~ c ., estrblish i ntcrn"tiona l justice , Achi eve the anti-comiliuni sm ob j ective , crPC' t e o new culture , And r ealize the e conomi c

combin0t ion, bC't1.:ecn Japt.'n t'nr. China . - 34 - PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ •

DC"f . Doc . 2555

In t he i nt 0r est of r enlizing those noli ci es , the

Policy of .~ ;i _; 1 sting New Rel at i ons Bet ween J 2pan and Chine

~ . ( J.X ! l , 26 i ) »?S < eci ded on t he 30th of the SP.me mont h. Further•

mor e , a s a det ailed expl ana tion the Ko noye stat ement (Exh s2~f

2535) WP. S i ssucri on 22 Dec Cl mb er 1938. Thi s declnr ed t o

1 t he ·. . or- l c- , t iu' t it was self evident t het wha t Japan wanted

of China was not t er rit ory, nor r ei mbursement of wa r expeL ~' ·

but t h~ t J Apan w~ s wi l l i ng, not only t o r espect tho s ov er ~ t y of China , but al so t o wi t hct r rw her extra-territori olity,

as wel l as t o g iv ~ consider ation t o r eturning the s ettle ment . I did my ut mo s t, e1 s \'.'fl r !Unister , t o pr omo t e that

pol icy. a()wever, C hi ~~ 's r en ct i on , especi ally Mr . CHIANG

KPi-Shek's , wo s V€r y wea k . I t w a ~ t her ef or e , not a suitabl e

time t o c?.rry on p e ~ c e ne g ot i ~ ti o ns .

(r ) Bef or e th ~ t , i n tho i nt er est s of peace , i t had been r.eemed e0vi srbl e t c joi n hands with i mport ant per sons of Chinr who uer 0 bel i eved t o pos ses s pn ar dor f or peace , t o ai d thorn , and hope t o br i ng ?bout pea ce . In July, 1938 , ; Premi er Konoye gf'VO the i nstruct i on t o Mr . BA1!ZAI, Ri hachir o (r c- comlllond ed by YGAKI, war Mi nister ) t o make liai s on wit h

~T . Ti\NG Sheo-1 ~nd Mr . ·:-r u Pei - fu, men of high r eput?t i on

who had r clc si r e for peace , anC:: a sked t hem f or t heir c ~ opcrotion. Tho ar my sent Li eutenant Gener al DOHIHtRA, and Nvy , Li eut enant Gcner el TSUDA t o cooper at e i n it, but the pl an f l' i l 0d , cuo t o t he assasi notion of Mr. TANG Sho o-i in Dcccr..bcr , 1938. (c ) The pr oblem of t he coalit i on of Japan, Ger many and

I t ~ J. y wn s a lr e a~ y under study by the af f ai rs aut horities of

t he throe ccp0r t m0nta of Ar my, NAvy , enct ~x t e rno l Affeirs

bef or e I occupi ec1 the post of VID r Mi ni s t E:'r (about M& y, 1':·38 ) .

As the propos1 l of fl i b b cn tr o p~ the F'orr- i Gn M:'..ni st cr of

Germany , nrri vcd i n th~ firs t prr t of August , 1938 , we s er.t

e f or 1nri l ansv1Cr after consul tinE t !1e Fiv c l!i ni s t or s 1 Confe.:"oD

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a nd wa i t ed f or the f o:.· 11~ 1 r>ro, 0 ~ril of Gcrm::iny . Eorly i n

November, t he init~ ~ l propos •l to be c:~~ ~3 the b 8s ~s of

discussion a rri·1ec frort GC'r·neny, I wc:r:.:."':~ to u t :.2.:.i.z0 it

es fl r1cons t o obt P:l. n Sino-Japanese pence i r.u:wd ia tcly aft0r

t !v C-:1·-~ of P~::if1

of this catt cr b efore tho Five Ministers ' Co~~~ ~cn~o on

11 ·Tov ccb0r . But , my pr oposal me t with c:.7.~:. : -.:=.:~ y in the

a ccor d of c nbinct opinion , and we b c cF.:~10 ti;:~~, 1c to make

(f) J~pn n's wi thc! rf!Wc?l f.:.."Or.l t:"!. .:-- I.c f' rs i.>e c: Kations , wh ic

WPS 0cciC.c:d throu ~ h c o"'.~:.~~--~~,... ~:-0 n in t ' ~ c ·:~ or. :c:-cncc of t~ e

s ome time , mci i nt:~:!.n its n:.::::.. onr'l clienJ :.y o

I maae no stotcncLt3 a t t~is lo ~ fcrenc o .

( g) The c on~ J.usion of en ee r f-'<"'MeI'! t between Japan and

Germ?ny r P f~ rf i ng c u l t~rr l c oop0r e tion uhich was di s cussed

i n the Board of Council C on fcir ~ nc e on 22 No•icnbc-r , 1938 ,

(E):h. 589) , i t wes not Japgnt s i r~tcnt:;.on to c on ~ .1 ud e t his

kine of t r eaty. with Gcr ""1Any onl y , tut vii-Ch 0·:;:1er n a tio!"!.S

es the cir cunstances d 1ctct0.c1 , encl ct•ntr iot..~te to gener al

purposes of diplonr.:7 i ""~ :!.t was ev.:je::.t tl:at it did not h ave any r ol i '.::;.:-r1 }. :-1:. ..-:-~ - ~ -· ( h) t is c1S n0f; ;.J1•-~tl before ::hat the policy of ad jas t ing the new r cl rti ons be t ween Japan an0 China was d iscussed

in the Fi ve I1~ i ni s t e r s' Conf er cnc:e on 25 Novem::,er , l 938 , and

f ecidcd by t he I mperial Council on the J O~ h of the sa~e month. The pr o j e c t of s ocurine lfoinan I sland, propos ed b :

the NAvy a t that t j rrie , WPS n;::,r:·ovoe 1Jy the same co:nfer e P.co

I as a pur e l y l!lili tery l'1Ct>S~r0 rnr e t cripo:r- c: ry one wl:i ch came

about inevit ~ b l y in err.e r t o c~t th0 0cononic rcsi s~inz

power of China . This ,rvo f urther ~ ff c ct to the ~l0~knde

oper ations , anc1 wa s hoped thrt SPT:'lC woul c1 ac~ e l e r ate the sol uti on of the i ncident. , - 3 (, - II- PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/1 T

Def. Doc. 2555

(1) Thr t Janon should pay car eful attention r egrrd i~g

t he observ2nce of the l aws of we r i n military acti ~i:ic:;

r espEct and protc: t the int erests of tt~ ~~ ~CH~=~ ~~ t\:~a ;

dit~ ~ns as soon PS possi ble after the wa r ~ r ~s~ Ja92 ~ we

clored by the J epnr.0s o Govc::- i.1;·!:::-.; j to t tw com-

pla ints of the thi r c p ovtC'!'S ( <';"lc r:.g o~.: -~.:."s , A!"1c.:.~.r. (:"1) up to

October or November , 1938 , end J np~~ n t-.:·:i.~ d f a i··,:1:~·:il":'.. y t o ccrry it out. However , that the third powers pr e ssed J apan f or

str ict obs0r vrnce of tr ~c t~.e s W~!~<: h 0. i d not c ozi~o:-m to t. ~1e

cur r ent si tu[I ti.on , anc, u ~-: i.:.z0d it as an excuse for as~ist -

i ng CHI t.NG , :--"le' the t endency of the powers to be agains t

J ~pen ~ nd e i c CHI ANG be cP.ne nore p r onoun~ 2a .

Thus , the Konoye Cn binet, b e ~. ::.g \~!'".~ bl e t o accornP,l i s·

the sol ving of the probl om of s o curin3 ~-:. ; 1 ,-:-- .J€1 p:a n~~o pco c e ,

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.... tr- •

( 3 ) When t11c r=rtt" MJ_PM Cabinet was organized on J anuary 4 ,

1939, succe:ecL uf; to t he ~ ~ ..'J. •• ·:: Cabinet, I r emained as War Minis t er

upon the e·-i::..·1cs t :::er_,·: · ·:: of i.~:· . EI~.'\t 1 L1AA . My fm:damental att i t udl

a speedy peece bctv;een Japan a ·:l :,.: :l ~[. __-·~: J...,.r . t:)

do but to take mea sur es to cope w::.~t t he c~ : nt ·'.:-:: r ".L'.:;'1.: ....:.-; ::n ior

t he purpose of gr adually br ealcL:~ ~ c~: .' 'ff). the C~:.: :~ ( ·~~2 <'nc :

attitude, and that meant the dem.; 1l!'l-, c1t~!)~1 , 0:1 U.~ o ~-:.G h·:rncl , of f"l ur determinati on not to shun even a long we.r , ar:::i , on t he other hand , to lay great importance on tr.;3 p:.·.nc::..ple of U!'ging our

policy by measures other t h:-:1 t!:e r.l~.!.tar ~ - acti•1itie.3. Although

this doctri ne was carri ed cut e7cr s:r~e t he enl of the Kcncye

inet, i t was i ntensified in t!"e pc-l· ·.·id of t he H!RMm~:.i\ C:3!).:1:ete

Now , the princi pal ~~~t:~s dsalt wit h wh ile I wes V~r Mi ~ is

ter of the HI R'\i'TUi.A C:it::,et; \/~re a$ f .:;ll•)1.vs :

(a) T~-~ bill 11 C~ r::. ' :",J !? 1~ 4.. n•::lples of the Replenishment

of t he Pr oductive r nc ul t ~u:~s " ( E~~l:ib l t No. 84 2) , d.:·a.i.'tc::d t y tho

Pl anning Boar d n!ld ~?proved b:· tiw cabJ.net meet.~r!S of J"a nna 17,

1939 , was the one r r 0v:l.cusly stucl~.ed at the War Ai:i.n !.st1·y on t he basi s of "The Plans of t he Replcnish!llent of t he I..nr-or-Lant Indt..s -

fice at about April of t he 12th year of SHOWA (1937) , and trans f erred to t he cabinet council . The r eal purpose of the plan was to establi sh Japan ' s economy, in order t o acquire security of na t ional defense against t he menace of the Soviet Union, and ther < )" s ecur e the saf et y of Manchukuo i n general so that our plans mi g. be r eali zed i n accor da nce with the 5- year plan f or t he devel op me nt of Manchurian i ndustries projected by the Gover nmen t of Man chukuo. But as it had t "ken a long time in va r ious studi es on the plans, t he pl an was chanced to a 4- year plan, end the scope was also dimi nished , as was testified by the witness OKADA , Klku saburo (Ma rch 30, 22nd year of SHOWA - 1947) . Thus , just at the

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juncture of our unadvoidable change of course· ·to ·.ft· '1'ohg · perio~ war, onr plans were such that they could not keep pace with the

new ni 1. ,<'."t::.:::i .

( b)

.- ... rv ·J1 n ~ 11e 1'' - · . ~ · 1 ; : • • •••• .- • .... H'ln• ._ n • . <...... • • • ' ' ~

ac-

..,.; ' . . T · "'I' Co ..., .. - . ,. • i ... a , .Jn

Sov:.!..ct Union. I a t t~· ::~ed this scrns~~n of tLe P1 ivy Council , l: did not make any s tatcncnt. (c) Conc erning the stor y appearing in the Japan t dver- .

tiser of March 17 of the s ame year (Exh1bit No . 2200) purporting

to r eport a Diet speech by me , I never made sllch a s~e oc h as ap peared in that paper in all my utter CJnces thro'..:gLout the who]e

s es~i.ons of the 75th Inp9rial Diet of t ha t yea ~ . (d) Ccmce1·ning the question of cl0::::..!3 t he Bri tish S9t-

tlement at Tientsin, Pr emi er Hi nJ\ I:U I.~ A :t:: .~' r; r n:eJ r:-~ a bc-:;t june 26 er 27 tha t the British had made a proposal wishing t he question

C ."~ "'i cd to ? i"',"n"'~--(' n -:.Nrt1-.'··· · ..... ~ m )•,..,.... but as t~1c jde• t ,...\ ' t·. _.... "" '- ""'- · '-:'·lo., i- v.;.. ,. :...r, .•v ...... ,,._ \_. n<>t _ .. ·-i"*" '

the i ntention of the Army bef ore he v1ould h3ve liaisoned with the

For ei gn Office authorities. I at once agreed t o that proposal. ·~

summoned the r cp r c~ a!1~:a tives from the spot to Tokyo, and hnd t

cooperate in the t~lk so thet the elimination of the diff e ren ~~ in viev:s between the authorities at the center and at the spot be ef fected , thus in endeavoring to lead the parley toward suc

cess we a ch~eved our purpose so f ar as the problem of the public ' PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/-~ l ,

•D ef. Doc . 2555

p ea~e v1as co~cerned. On the problem of general principles we also sv~c 2~~ : j i n the iss ue of the An~lo -Ja panese Joint Declara- tion on July 24 .

(e ) The probl em of the Amer ica n loan: In view of the

t he B:~ ·:: t:~ sh. I1: r egu~·d t'J cur 1'8l.. -: \.::ms w:~:rh A::i2r :!.-.:u , I t 3liaved

succeed.

(f) The problC'm of Mr . Wang Chti -.:-m~ 1g: A:J I felt t ha t a good opportunity ws s ap:-. :.·oac"'~ ::~. g for the :· .::..:1i. ~. za tion of p0ace , I asked Mr . Wang ChaC:· · : n ~ !\s to a ':r.alerate t ~!C p:-:£.:~ ::cvc:n0'1.t. ( g) In r egard t o t he NO:\IONHAN t.ffa irs, I €:nde&vc ~ red after delibera tion wi th t he Supreme Co:nr.-i:i:id , and with the conse. of the Cabinet, to bring about a s~ee~y sst~:cm2~t , a,,rcving the policy of the K:·1l3 ntnng Army , which was to settle the matter locally and defensive ly.

(h) On the nc&oti ation between J apan, Germany and I taly

I thought 1:& was the way to r elieve the J apanese f .:·:::,m death b y

tiona 1 pos i t:!.on of J apan; to cause the Ch:Lncse Gove1·r.:.!e:."Jt to giv· up her policy of tole r a nce to c cnunu!~ ·: sm and rec;istance to Japan, i n or der to give the Powers oppc~tun!~ies t o t~r!1 China to the cause of anti-communlsm, co ·-pro~pe:L':i. t y and c o---ey: :L:; ten~e , and at the same tim<:> strengthen her d efen,~e egairrnt the mili tar is tic I " and communis tic menace of Russi a in the n o~th .

At t he ~irst f:'..ve-min isters conference of t he HIRANUMA c· net, the coun ter-·proposa 1 of the Forei gn Office against the Ge1 man proposition r e ceived at t he beginning of J anuary was di scusse• . - ·4?-

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After it was r evised t o some extent, the proposition was made t he instruction, and then the confer ence decided to send to Europe

a group of special en~:c ys cnmposed of pe r so;-:; f: '\.•.n ·a.':: :.').:t7, t he

env 1YS took w:L th t2'12.:n wa;:; a::; fi • ~~::...; :.; ;

r1.:.~~:.t\.l.ry ass.Ltance viould be g~von if t he matter CC'll:'.8P.1;\1 Hussia.

w;1Gn E:r~. t 3 in and France were under con3 id en~ c:~~ ~ , ~-t W'.)":. (°: ,'! ~ pend

c.n the s.i.tua tion. For i nstc:mce , in case of tbe~.r b·.: :·-c r<..--.t1e - •• ., # _, ;. - vi3ad, the m::i tter of mili tD ry a :s :> t;mce l:!r.:l i t~ .~ : ::·~ ~- . :/~; v.t~e·~ t -

1 i vely he declded . Another mis~i0:i of the e;-l'/;)/2. vrr.1. 3 ~./) e:'. :.0 : .3. in

i t to t he wo:cld as an extension of the AT~i ·· ·~ ·.;.: '.1Ti.st.i ~ e; ::, r0 e1~;nt.

Neverthel ess, the German side , a1 ~~ng a t t he c ~ ~e~~ l ~o l~ti ~ a l

effect, r equested r el axation of t he abo7e l i~ltation of ru~li~nr i stic. assi :-> t ance against T!1ir d Powers , except Russi a , to whi::!h

the Japanes e Gov ernment, after r epeated di c;cus s~.ons , s ent a m ~ s s age from Mr. HIRANUMA to Hitler on May 5 and told him he should appr eci a t e t hat J apan' s situation was such that it could

not r elax t he limitat ion r ega r ding ass i s t ~nce against Third Pow ers other than Russi a, and asking tha t Germany concede that poit

But j ust at t hat time complications gr adua lly be g~ n to set i n . Mr . Wantiao-ming vis i ted Tokyo (June 1st) and t he problem con-

cer ning the blockade of the British settl ~ ment in Tsintsin ~ c

curred (June 14), followed by the att3ck of Nomcnha n (June 15) ~Y

Russian and Mongolian troops , while in Eti·rope t he si t ua ti on W.'.1$

quire Ge:- ~cmy to concede , I di~.: pat:::hcd ?.1\:l~: .;r · (i ·:: !.. • A.>1:i. ? ~ .3d: ) :;i r:!. ,

I r, I the Chief of the Wa r Se: v ~cc Bureau, on 11 A~~~~ ~ , to rs1~~st ' German Attache Ott to ma ke a concession on the p~.rt of G c : · n1? ~-:;r . However, t he conclusion of the non-inva sion treaty bet·11een Ge r-1.:?. ny and Soviet Russ i a was officially announced on August 22 , and that

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(b) The collaboration with Wang 's Government ~as chi e fl~

1n charge -of Ambassador ABE, but the Expeditionary Army ga·1-= ::'ci:. ·.:.1

!ties and assistance t o t he A1r.bassador , to tl:.(:; c . :·cG n-~ ·1. ~".' a ~ :.t dl.c. not interfere vfi·:h the m~.1;·;ary o: ~ 1 - ~ t . '. .t·::'i 3 . I r~ ;, ~ rt·!. r. l ·;l c- ::::- :_t

supported Mr. Wang Chao-m.i _1g' s 11 Nc:---;·'. l.::>:1cll Sfl lvc.·~i o i"l Fe:ice M .:-_; e~:.e nt ' '

and wished the Na1Jdng Gove rr_me:it t 0 a:.m ul -t i.u.a tely at jo:.. .1:.r ~ with the Chungking Government. (c) Since the possibility of peace negotiation with Mr . Chiang Kai-shek through the ©ffices of Mr. Sun Tzu--chieh , a

younger brother of Mr. Sun Tzu- wen , was found by the Hon3~{0·1g

Or gaa early in 1940, I supported it most enthusiastically and v;

r e2dy to mee t Mr. Chi ang Kai- shek myself in Changsha . In anti ~

pation of its success, I r equested the delay of the establi ~~ 1 £~ t

of Wang 's Government, but, despite our wishes , t he negotia -~j c; ~ ended in a f ailure.

(d) In January, 1941, Mr . Chang Yen-hsiang , who V/33 then

i n Pe iping, infor~od me of the desire of Doc tor Stewar d , the

Pr cs~dc nt of the Ycn~ ~~rg University, t o have a t alk with me . As I thought it highly desirable to inform Doctor Steward of our

at t~Ludc of secki ~~ a speedy scttlem0nt of the inc5dPnt, and to

obtqin his opinion and assistanc- a , b~sa d on deep experience, I despatched a member of the staff to get in touch with Doctor

Steward, who agr eed to convey cq·:· w .~c !"l e s to the President of the

United Stat es that she would a·.~t as a med i ator in an ender.vor t

solve the Sino-Japanese Incident am~ .:-:-1 'b'!. y. So I advised the c c ··

tral military authori t i es to that c:i0~ t and wished them to

earnestly promote peace, but, l ~ter en, the American-Japanese ne

gotiation became so aggravated th~t we could not obtain any r esul · (e ) The South China Expeditionary· Army in Canton was,

by or ders of the Imperi a l Heedquarters as of J~ly 5, 1940, r e

leased from the command of our China E:.{p eei t ~.c r:a ry Army and placed under the jurisdiction of the Imperia 1 Hoed~ 1Jartars . Towarc

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(b) The collaboration with Wang ' s Government was chi e fl ~

1n char ge of Ambassador ABE, but the Expeditionary Army ga·. '? :.:'cic ::i

!ties and ass:i.stan(!c i .. i "'..'"\ 2 Arebassador , to tl·r.- .:) .~ ·::~r.~ -t: ot :.t dld

not interfere with the m~.l : .-:~ a ry o: -- 1·a t~~c:i s . In f-c· r ·;:;i. ·:l.] e: :: :. t

supported Mr. Wang Chao-!T: _;_1,:( s 11 fo:·~ Lo : 1...il Sfll1:c.·::.i1)11 f eace h1.;v-e:;,ent'

and wished the Na1:!:i ng Gove n~e :1~ L':) a:".m ul t ~ .1r.a tely at ~o~.1:.1~g with t he Chungking Gover nment.

younger brother of Mr . Sun Tzu-wen , was found by the Hon ~k::n~g Or gaa early in 1940 , I supported it mos t enthusi astically and was

r eedy to mee t Mr . Chi ang Ka i - shek myself in Changsha . In anti~ i

pation of its success, I r equested the delay of the est a bli G~~e nt

of Vlang ' s Gov ernment, but, despite our wishes, the negotia ·~ i :~.:-. ended in a f ailur e .

(d) In J anua ry, 1941, Mr . Chang Yen- hsiang , who V/33 ther

i n Peiping, i nforL.'_, ~' ".:! of t he desire of Doc t or Stewar d , t he

Prcs:i.dcnt of t he Yc. n ~:!1:'..1;g University, t o havE' a t alk wi th me . As I ttought it highly desirLble to inform Doctor Steward of our

at t~ t~de of s e~ ~in g a speedy sc t~leme ~t of the incjdAnt, and to obtc:iin his opi nion and assistance , b.:sad on deep experience, I despatched a member of t he staff to get in t ouch with Doctor

Steward, who agreed to convey our wl~he s to t he President of th

United Stat es tha t she would f! \~t as a med iator in an endezvcr to

solve the Sino-Ja panese Incident ani :'. .:-:; b~ y . So I advi s ed t he cen

tral military authori t i es to t hat c~~~ ~t and wished them to

earnestly promote peace , but, la te ~ on, the American- Japanese ne

gotiation became so aggr avated th~ t we could not obtain any r esul· (e) The South China Expediti onary Army in Canton was, by order s of t he Imp P. ria l Headquarters as of J ·,1ly 5' , 1940 , r e r leased from the c onm.'.'nd of our China Exp i;:;d ~ t 5.c r:ary Army and

placed under the jurisdiction of the Imperia 1 Hcedq1Jartars. Tower~

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Def.• Doc . 2555'

the end of September in the same year, a detachment of the South China Exp~dl t1:onar'y Army .. wa"'s;. oy 'order ·ar - Imp~rial Headquarters

ordered to p: ..J~-~ ~d to I b r ·~h Indo-China . Neither I nor the Chir.

Exped i tiona::: y . \~ ·1iy ::-.;·;:ues:ed or advised this and we had no contro.l

over i t or r e::;p:;rn. .Lb ility concer i:i.ng i t .

VI. The period of my being the Commander of the Korean Army (July ?, 1941 - Apr il 8, 1945) and that of my be ing the Com mander of t he 7th Ar ea Army (April 8, 1945 - war ' s end) .

(a) I wa s the Commander of the Korean Army from July, 1941, up to April , 1945. As the Ar my had been organized on peacetime footing

up to F eb ru~ ry, 1945, I was not at all concerned in the promotion of the Pacific War. In other words, I had no oper ational duties concerning the Pacific War , until the Korean Army was r eor ganiz ed on wartime footing, as the 17th Area Ar my, and detailed on tr.e s ervice of protecting Kor ea on J anuary 1, 1945. As r egar ds the t el egram dated February 28, 1942, from the Chief of Staff of the Kor ean Army to t he Vice Minister

of wa r, r equesting the s ending of pri soners t o Kor ea, and als~ the t el egram dat ed March 23 , 1942, from the Army Commander to the Wa r Minister, r eporting on the plan of accommodating the priso ners, they we r e both dispatched, sent at the r equest of the DirectQr-Gener al of t he Prisoners InformPt i on Bureau , according to t he r eport of Major-General Takahashi, Hiroshi, who was then

the Chief of St~ff of the Korean Army. I have been inf o rm~d that the purpose was to transpor t the prisoners from the southern

fighting ar eas to an atoosphere or qui e tness _ in . the · Jap4n . a~ e as. I made it a rule to trea t the prisoners f a irly, gave them as much in the way of f acilit i e s and provisions as poss i ble. I never serr the above-mentioned despatches, di d not know of t heir being sen·

and did not o~dc r t~c~ s nt ~ 11

- 4 4 ..

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ - j • - ·jif. ~c . 2555

(b) I was ~ppo int ed Commander of the 7th Area Ar my (in Singapor e) on April 8, 1945, and took command of the Army ther e from Apr il 22nd on. The duty of t his Ar my was to def end tts dofense area , but before we could op ~ n hostilities against the enemy , the war came to an end . Such condi tions existed that communications with various quarters w e~e destr oyed by t he

alli ed forces . Finally, I state positively that I never became a Supreme War Councillor throughout my c3r eer.

~ .... ) -

I PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ -. I .· • Def . Doc. 2555

On this 11t h day of September, 1947 at Tokyo

DEPONENT IT AGAK I , Seishiro (se?l) 1, BANNO, Junkichi her eby certify thet the above statenent wa s sworn by the Deponent, who affixed

his sign~ tur e and seal t he r et o in the pr es ence of this witness. On the s nme date At the same place

Witness: (Signed) BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

0 A T H In accordance with my conscience I swear to t ell

the whole truth withhol ding nothing a n~ add i ng nothing.

IT ftGAKI , Seishiro (seal )

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ ,. "°' Def. Doc. 2555 ERRATA SHEET

AFFIDAVIT OF : ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Please insert the number "7" at the top of page 9, · in front of "The battle". Page 16, line 2 , "Governor or" should read "Governor of". Also on the same page the last paragraph should \ e numbered "1011 instead of "9" . Page 22 , 5th line from the bottom of the page the words "Kwantung Army" should be changed to "Chinese Nat ion~l ist Army". Page 23 , beginning with the 3rd paragraph "Judging from the situation'' anc ending with the wor ds "programs into action" please change as f ollows:

"Judging from the situation s tat':?d a ho 1!a , if the principle of co- prosperity ad,,c-cated by Japan and Manchukuo should succeed in forc)ng out the designs of t he communi st power, Japan, Manc huria and China would be able t o pu ~~~ ~ permanently the way of prosperity in peace. v.1herea s, the three nations would be thrown into the guagmire of war and revolt, if Japan 's advocacy should fail and the s ituation should develop in favor of the communists. The above prospect became all the more probable after the commintern holding e general meeting at Moscow in July l9j5,1 passed a resolution to concentrate on efforts to overthrow' Japan and accomplishing world revolution, and the Chinese Communist party issued a proclamation on the basis of the said resolution, to substitute the principle of "resist Japan and save the Na tion movement" for that of "Bolshevize and save the Na tion movement", and also by their threat to r esort to the t actics of the anti-Japanese united front and announcing its r esolution to put thes e programs into action." Also on Page 23 , t he last lino change "Manchuria" to r e.ad "Manchukuo".

Page 24 , 1st 11ne del et e "the ability by r eal ability'~ and insert "ourself by: 7' Page 24, sentence marked "(c)" should read as follows: "The r ealization of ha rmo.q.i ous co-operation of the races in Manchukuo in order to achieve the above mentioned principles, Pagf' 24, 1st paragraph und er 11 4 11 should r ead thuslys , . "While I was Chief of the General Staff of th£ Kwantung Al'ri)y Manchukuo had many persons of broarl views and high personal-~ ity, such as Pr em i er CHIANG and succc:ssive Chiefs of General Bureau. As for me , I trusted and co-operated with them in their policy in accordance with the intentions of my superior officers."

I Same page as above 4th and 5th lines from the bottom of the page, 11 Manchurianl1 should r ead "Manchukuo"; and 3rd line from the bottom "rejection" should bf? 11 dism1$sal".

- 1 .. PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ . Def. Doc. 2555 - ERRATA SHF'..ET Continued (; Page 25, 7th line from top of page "I" should be "We", and add to the end of this &entence the words "and Mongol ia''. Page 25, 2nd s ontonce und er 11 611 should r ead as f ollows : "Accordingly the trends in the Outer and Inner Mongol ia in volved sharp r epurcussion on the Mong olians living in Manchukuo, and became problems of the domestic p e ac ~ and of the defense of Manchukuo. 11 Same page, 20th line from top of page insert after tho words "Kwantung Army" the following: "dis~atche d intc-> lligent agents and n Also on the same page 7th line from botton, del et e the word "co-prosperity" anJ insert "local self-government". Page 26, 3rd line from top of page insert after the word "fortification" the words "of Manchukuo" and in the 4th line insert the year "193 5" after "December". t Page 26, 1st sentence und er "III" dnl ct e the word "personally"; and in the same paragraph, 2nd sentence the word "preparetion" should r ead "administration" . Page 27, 4th line from top the word "train" should be "contingents". Page 27, at the end of "5" please add the sentence "And thus I tried to enhance the prestige of the Army . " Page 27, the 1st paragraph und er number "IV" should begin as follows: 11 1. The circumstances of my appointment as Wa r minist('r,". Same. page, 2nd line from bottom the words "had been" should be changed to "was". Pagf' 29, 8th line from top of page delete "finally assumed" and insert 11 wPr e increasingly assuming". Page 30, plC' ase ch::l ngc paragraph marked "(a)" to r eed as follows: "(n) Tho peace t erms to be offer ed to China should not be so exacting as the ones we had proposed when Mr. TRAUTMAN acted as go-between. Unless th€ Japanes authorities would molify t ho t erms and make them more certain and r easonable, it appeared unlikely that th ~ Chine s ~ would accept them. However, bot h the J apan0se public opinion and the Government's policy had still been far from further reducing those t arms." Page 31, 13th line from top, "its" should be changed to "his".

Page 34, 9th lin~ from top of page , please insert after "Navy and War" the words "and it""oreign Affairs" •. Page 34, lines 12 and 13 from the top, del et e the follow ing "co-operation with the Chine se Administrations, to promote''· Same page as above , 15th line from top change "a minimum" to "the minimum"; last 4 lines on page 36 to ref' d as f ollows: "about inevitably i n or der to make this blockage oper ation more effective , and it was hoped that same would accel er at e the solution of the incident. 11 Page 41, 4th line from top, add after "Foreign Office" 'They sail ed on 2nd :it~ cbruary" . - 2 - PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ Def. Doc. 2555 - ERRATA SHF'..ET Continued

Page 25, 7th line from top of page "!11 should be "We", end add to the end of this 6Hmtence the words "and Mong olia '1 ~ Pag e 25, 2nd sentence under 11 611 should r ead as follows: 11 Accordingly the trends in tho Outer and Inner Mongolia in volved sharp r epurcussion on the Mongolians living in Ma nchukuo, and became problems of the domestic p eac~ and of the defonse of Ma,nchukuo. 11 Same page , 20th line from top of page insert after the words "Kwantung Ar my" the following: "dis~atched int c-> lligent agents and 11 Also on the same page 7th line from botton, delete the word "co-prosperity" anA insE"rt "local self-government". Page 26, 3rd line from top of page insert after t he word "fortification" the wor ds "of Manchulrno" and in the 4th line insert the year 11193 5" after "December". t Page 26 , 1st sentence und er "III" dnl ot e the word "personally"; and in the same paragraph, 2nd sentence the word "preparetion" should r ead "administration". Page 27 , 4th line from top tho word "train" should be "contingents". Page 27 , at the end of "5" please add the sentence "And thus I tried to enhance the prestige of the Army ." Peg€ 27, tho 1st paragraph under number "IV" should begin as follows: 11 11 1. The circumstances of my appointment as War minist<' r, • Same page, 2nd line from bottom the words "had been" should be changed to "was". Page 29, 8th line from top of page del et e "finally assumed" end insert 11 wPr e increasingly assuming''• Page 30, pl£' 8S E" chAngc paragraph marked "(a)" to r eed as follows: "(a) Tho pea ce t erms to be offered to China should not be so exacting as the ones we had proposed when Mr. TRAUTMAN acted as go-between. Unl ess the Japanes authorities would molify t ho t erms and make them more certain and r easonable, it appeared unlikely that the Chinese would accept them. However, both the JDpancse public opinion and the Government's policy had still been far from rurther reducing ~hos e t arms. 11 Page 31, 13th line from top, "its" should be changed to "his".

Page 34, 9th lin~ from tgp of page, please insert after "Navy and Wa r" the words "and !ioreign Affairs" • • Page 34, lines 12 and 13 from the top, dol et e the follow ing "co-operation with the Chine se Administretions, to promote'' · Same page as above , 1 5th line from top change "a minimum'' to "the minimum"; l ast 4 line s on page 36 to r e?d as f ollows: · "about inevitably in order to ma ke this blockage oper ation more effective, and it was hoped that same wculd acccl 0r at e the solution of the incident." Page 41, 4th line from top, add after "Foreign Office" 'They sailed on 2nd :it,cbruary". - 2 - PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/ y

De f. Doc. 2555

Affida v:!. t of ITAGAKI , Se ~· . s hJ.::-o

Page 31, paragraph (d), please d e~et e the second sentence which begins with the words "At the

end of May", and ends with "Japanese m.vy p"!. a~e s .., 11

, . '·

PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31a01/. 33 16

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