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The Tokyo Trials: the Unheard Defense

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The Tokyo Trials: the Unheard Defense THE TOKYO TRIALS: THE UNHEARD DEFENSE Written and Edited by KOBORI Keiichiro, PhD. Copyright c. 1995 by KOBORI Keiichiro Original Japanese language edition published by Kodansha Ltd., Tokyo, Japan. English translation rights arranged with Kodansha Ltd., Tokyo. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 3 I. The Legal Basis for the IMTFE ...................................................................... 3 II. The Trials ........................................................................................................ 7 III. The Treatment of Evidence at the Tokyo Trials ............................................. 14 IV. The Arduous Task of Preparing Defense Evidence ....................................... 17 V. The Three-Part Defense Rebuttal and the Documents Selected for This Book ............................................................................................................... 19 VI. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 29 PART 1: DEFENSE OPENING STATEMENTS: GENERAL ARGUMENTS ........ 32 CHAPTER 1: GENERAL OPENING STATEMENT A ...................................... 33 CHAPTER 2: GENERAL OPENING STATEMENT B ...................................... 61 CHAPTER 3: OPENING STATEMENT, DIVISION 1 ....................................... 125 PART 2: DEFENSE REBUTTAL EVIDENCE: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................................... 133 CHAPTER 4: AFFIDAVIT OF TOKUTOMI SOHO ........................................... 134 CHAPTER 5: OPENING STATEMENT, MANCHURIAN DIVISION .............. 154 CHAPTER 6: WILLIS ABBOT'S REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA................................................................................................. 165 CHAPTER 7: OPENING STATEMENT, CHINA DIVISION ............................. 170 CHAPTER 8:EXCERPT FROM PROCEEDINGS OG THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS..... 179 CHAPTER 9: REPORT ON THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CHINA AND THE BOYCOTTING OF JAPANESE GOODS ................................... 185 CHAPTER 10: OPENING STATEMENT, RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS DIVISION ........................................................................................................ 190 CHAPTER 11: OPENING STATEMENT, PACIFIC DIVISION .......................... 197 CHAPTER 12: OPENING STATEMENT, PACIFIC DIVISION, SUBDIVISION 1: TRIPARTITE PACT .......................................................... 203 CHAPTER 13: OPENING STATEMENT, PACIFIC DIVISION, SUBDIVISION 2: ALLIED PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN ......................... 207 CHAPTER 14: OPENING STATEMENT, PACIFIC DIVISION, SUBDIVISION 3: DIPLOMATIC SECTION .................................................. 214 CHAPTER 15: REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR GREW TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ................................................................................ 220 CHAPTER 16: AFFIDAVIT OF ISHIBASHI TANZAN ........................................ 224 PART 3: DEFENSE SUMMATION AND SUPPLEMENT 239 CHAPTER 17: DEFENSE SUMMATION: JAPAN WAS PROVOKED INTO A WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE ................................................................ 240 CHAPTER 18: EXCERPT FROM GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE ............ 282 2 INTRODUCTION KOBORI Keiichiro I.The Legal Basis for the IMTFE (International Military Tribune for the Far East) This book consists of excerpts from a body of documents compiled and published under the title Defense Evidence Rejected by the IMTFE, which encompasses eight volumes and 5,500 pages. The editors of Defense Evidence Rejected by the IMTFE (one of whom is also the editor of this book) undertook its publication in the belief that these documents constitute an indispensable resource for the study of modern history. As deserving as it is of a place in everyone’s library, we found it difficult to urge nonspecialists to purchase the set, given its high price and bulk. To resolve this dilemma, we have decided to publish The Tokyo Trials: The Unheard Defense, an abridged version of the larger work. This Introduction is meant to provide background material, and an explanation of the import of the huge publication from which it was excerpted, for general readers and for those who are not familiar with the Tokyo Trials. The original work, a compilation of documentary evidence prepared for submission to the Tokyo Trials (formally, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East or the IMTFE), embraces three types of documents: (1) documents prepared for submission to the Tribunal, but rejected because of objections from prosecutors or the presiding judge, (2) documents that the defense was not permitted to submit to the Tribunal, and (3) documents that the defense, anticipating that they would be rejected, refrained from submitting to the Tribunal and relegated to their files, where they languished for years. These documents owe their existence to an historic drama that unfolded on the stage of the IMTFE in Japan, a defeated nation. What sort of proceedings were the Tokyo Trials? Although many readers will not require a response to this elementary question, we will answer it, thus providing this Introduction with a proper beginning. When the Cabinet decided to end the war by acquiescing to the Potsdam Declaration, its members anticipated that the victors would institute war-crimes proceedings against the vanquished sometime in the near future. Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies’ final ultimatum to Japan, reads in part, “We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.” The imperial government acceded to the final ultimatum with the knowledge that the Declaration contained such language. (Soon after the Tribunal commenced, defense counsel raised objections to the Japanese translation of the term “stern justice” as “severe punishment” in the prosecution’s opening statement. Thereafter, the term was replaced by the word “trials,” but from the outset, everyone involved knew that it meant “trials.”) At the historic imperial conference that began late at night on August 9 and lasted until dawn, the chief of the General Staff, the chief of the Naval General Staff, and the minister of war discussed the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. We can sense that the three ministers of state knew that war-crimes trials were in the offing from one of the conditions they attached to acceptance of the ultimatum, i.e., that Japan be permitted to administer any trials of war criminals. However, this condition, as well as two of the other conditions submitted by Japan 3 (that there be no military occupation of Japan, and that Japan assume the responsibility for the disarming of its soldiers) was rejected. The only condition accepted was the preservation of the imperial institution. The first arrests of accused war criminals were made in the early days of the Occupation. But having signed the surrender agreement (which contained the same language as the Potsdam Declaration, as far as war crimes were concerned) on September 2, 1945, the Japanese government had been stripped of the authority to protest those arrests. The origins of the trials of Class B and C war criminals, and the IMTFE, which prosecuted persons accused of Class A war crimes, can be traced to the Potsdam Declaration. However, the concept of victorious nations’ trying and punishing suspected war criminals was also outlined in the protocol relating to the prosecution of war crimes submitted by the United States to a meeting of foreign ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., held at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Similar language appears in the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, drawn up after discussion among the foreign ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. As we stated earlier, the “stern justice” mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration referred to trials, but the concept of a war-crimes tribunal remained unformed until August 8, 1945, when the London Agreement was signed. Like the Moscow Declaration, this agreement, which announced the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute and punish citizens of European Axis nations who had been accused of serious war crimes, was signed by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Annexed to the Agreement was a Charter outlining the “constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal.” Although it was assumed that similar proceedings would take place in Japan, no one knew what form they would take when the Occupation began. Moreover, the indictments for the International Military Tribunal held at Nuremberg, which would set the precedent for the Tokyo Trials, were not issued until October 19, 1945. Therefore, when former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki was arrested and charged with war crimes on September 11, and attempted suicide, no one had even a vague notion of the nature of the crimes Tojo had allegedly committed. However, everyone did know that Tojo occupied the position of supreme authority when Japan initiated hostilities against the United States and Great Britain. The fact that the man
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