Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

China and : A Rupture Unhealed Kay Möller / Markus Tidten SWP Comments The recent Sino-Japanese dispute has not been brought to an end with Prime Minister Koizumi’s apology for ’s war record and his subsequent meeting with China’s head of state, Hu Jintao. Rather than concerning historical issues, the background to the dispute concerns Japan’s attempts to adopt a higher regional and international security profile and the inclusion of Taiwan in US-Japanese alliance planning. Whereas economic logic would favour cooperative solutions, nationalist trends on both sides have increasingly assumed dynamics of their own.

On 22 April, Japan’s prime minister, Juni- Peking Unleashes Nationalism chiro Koizumi, addressing more than 100 The recent wave of anti-Japanese protests in Asian and African heads of state and gov- China began in mid-February with demon- ernment assembled in Jakarta, expressed strations held in front of the Japanese em- “deep remorse” over the suffering inflicted bassy against the takeover by the Tokyo on Asian nations during the 1941–45 Pa- government of a lighthouse erected by cific War and earlier in China. The follow- right-wing activists on one of the disputed ing day, Koizumi met with China’s head of Senkaku (Chin. Diaoyu-) islands in the East party and state, Hu Jintao, on the fringes of China Sea. At the same time, Chinese over- the Second Afro-Asian conference. On this seas students had launched an internet occasion, Hu called on his counterpart to campaign against Japan’s candidature for a live up to his words through deeds and, permanent seat on the UN Security Council specifically, to actively oppose Taiwanese that in late March was joined by domestic aspirations for independence. PRC (People’s Republic of China) websites. The meeting had been preceded by week- In a couple of weeks, and benefiting from long anti-Japanese demonstrations in China the attention of China’s state-controlled that had exposed the relationship to strains media, these “patriotic” groups had col- unprecedented since mutual diplomatic lected some 22 million signatures. Shortly recognition in 1972. afterwards, the PRC’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, for the first time publicly opposed the awarding of a permanent Security Council seat to Japan.

SWP Comments 21 May 2005

1 In early April, there were demonstra- tation with the PRC over the issue had been tions in several Chinese cities that, in a few witnessed in 1985 when then Prime Minis- cases, led to attacks against subsidiaries of ter Nakasone officially visited the shrine. Japanese companies. At the same time, Eleven years went by before Ryutaro Tokyo authorised the publishing of two Hashimoto followed Nakasone’s example. revisionist history books for use in second- Koizumi has explained his regular visits ary schools. In China, the biggest retailers’ with an interest towards promoting peace organisation responded by calling for a and reconciliation. The prime minister had boycott of Japanese products. Shortly after- postponed this year’s visit following a meet- wards, demonstrations reached a climax ing with Hu Jintao in November 2004. amidst the backdrop of a visit to Peking by In recent years, criticism of the Yasukuni Japan’s foreign minister. At this point, the visits has also been coming from Japan it- number of protesters had grown to several self. Thus far, seven suits have been brought tens of thousands including not only stud- against Koizumi evoking the constitutional ents but also representatives of the PRC’s separation of religion and state (only one of new middle classes. The minister’s visit did the suits was successful but did not produce not result in any relaxation of tensions. any political consequences). One of the asso- In mid-April, the PRC’s security forces ciations running the shrine is among the brought the protests to an end. At this most important supporters of the govern- point, a Shanghai newspaper described the ing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). campaign as being the result of a “conspir- acy” and thus a consequence of a domestic or intra-party power struggle. The National Dimension Japan’s new nationalism is centred on the LDP’s right fringe and elder members. It has The Historical Dispute not been openly advocated by the party's Taiwan and territorial issues apart, Sino- mainstream or any of the big business Japanese rows have for a couple of years fed federations. At the same time, the previ- on the schoolbook and Yasukuni shrine ously widespread Japanese pacifism, while issues. Every four years, Japan’s publishing remaining characteristic for academic houses present new or revised history elites, has been on the retreat in the society books, some of which ignore the atrocities at large. It is thus and amongst signs of a committed by the imperial army in China further differentiation of the political and other regional states (such books are landscape into a true two-party system in only being used by less than one per cent of which politicians could be increasingly all Japanese schools). The Tokyo govern- tempted to make use of “national” issues. ment has for some time suggested the China’s new nationalism is concentrated creation of a joint Japan-China historical on cities along the prospering eastern sea- commission along the lines of an existing board and thus the expression of a grown Japan-South Korea body. The proposal was social self-consciousness. Participants in accepted in May 2005. recent demonstrations were far too young Peking has not only regularly protested to have any personal or indirect recollec- the publishing of revisionist schoolbooks, tions of the . They are neverthe- but also annual visits to the Yasukuni less receptive to an officially promoted shrine by Japan’s head of government and discourse on “historical humiliations” in- leading cabinet members since Koizumi’s flicted on the Middle Kingdom by outside 2001 assumption of office. In the late 1970s, powers—an instrument that was reactivated the names of individuals convicted of war by the political leadership in the mid-1990s. crimes in 1946 had been added to the (pri- This can be explained, on the one hand, vately run) memorial’s lists. A first confron- with the one-party state’s loss of Marxist

SWP Comments 21 May 2005

2 legitimacy, and on the other, with a grow- objective. Had the US-Japan alliance from ing number of losers due to modernisation Peking’s perspective until the mid-1990s whose discontent has expressed itself annu- prevented the neighbour from military ally in several tens of thousands of medium- unilateralism, it would since then have to large-scale demonstrations, sit-ins, and encouraged such moves. In that respect, other kinds of confrontations with the secu- China’s anti-Japanese campaign was also rity forces. directed against Washington. At the same time, Peking remains in- The PRC has for some time been trying to ferior to Tokyo in both economic and mili- lure South Korea out of the US embrace tary terms and would not be able, for ex- while joining forces with Seoul against ample, to solve the territorial dispute by Tokyo. In early 2005, South Korea, too, wit- force. Furthermore, nationalist movements nessed a campaign against Japan’s Security of the past have in several instances turned Council plans that was in turn intensified against a Chinese leadership that was in no by a historical controversy and a dispute position to back up its anti-Japanese propa- over the Dokdo (Jap. Takeshima) group of ganda with deeds. islands in the Sea of Japan. At the same time, the Roh Moo-hyun administration launched an initiative to emancipate itself Regional and International from Washington not only through intra- Dimensions Korean policies of détente but also through Whereas the anti-Japanese campaign was the broadening of its political and military obviously sanctioned and encouraged by relationship with China. In so doing, it PRC authorities, the timing points to a tac- intended to respond to a growing national- tical rather than historical motive. Peking ism at home. Since then, Peking has tried to was driven by concerns of a Japanese mili- coordinate its own antirevisionist cam- tary power blocking the realisation of its paign with Seoul while signalling its sup- own regional ambitions (including the ex- port on the Dokdo issue through the PRC’s ploration of new energy sources). In 2001, state-controlled media. the Bush administration had promoted Much as in the Senkaku case, the Dokdo Tokyo to “cornerstone” its Pacific strategy dispute has been linked to supposed oil and while urging Japan to revise its 1947 “peace gas deposits. In August 2003, China had constitution”. Koizumi has since then pre- awarded gas drilling concessions to domes- pared the ground by dispatching warships tic and foreign firms in the vicinity of the to the Arabian Sea and soldiers to Iraq. Senkakus. After Peking repeatedly refused Japan is due to deploy a missile defence to supply Tokyo with information on its system in the near future, and a regional activities, Japan, in April 2004, threatened shield to be jointly developed with the to award concessions of its own in the dis- could cover Taiwan as well. In puted maritime area. December 2004, Tokyo’s National Defence At the international level, China has not Programme Outline for the first time done itself a favour by launching the anti- named the PRC as a military challenger. Japan campaign only a few days after hav- Earlier, a nuclear powered Chinese sub- ing passed a so-called “Anti-Secessionist marine had entered Japan’s territorial Law” directed against Taiwan. Within the waters, prompting Koizumi to order the European Union, for example, the national- redeployment of fighter planes from Oki- ist experiment has vindicated all those who nawa to Shimoji island which is closer to had earlier referred to the law on Taiwan Taiwan. when calling to postpone a decision on lift- In February 2005, Washington and Tokyo ing the 1989 arms embargo against the described maintenance of the stability in PRC. the Taiwan Strait as a common strategic

SWP Comments 21 May 2005

3 Perspectives and Recommendations international interests, Germany and By quietly encouraging the anti-Japanese Europe in their dialogues with Peking and campaign, Peking has run a double risk. On Washington should not limit discussions of the one hand, the nationalism unleashed East Asian security to the North Korean has exposed new weaknesses of one-party issue and should broaden their security rule. On the other hand, Japanese investor dialogue with Japan. In this context, Tokyo confidence in the Chinese market may have could be encouraged to respond more sen- been negatively affected. As a consequence, sibly to historical criticism from neighbour- China’s first conciliatory gestures in late ing countries. As far as Security Council April were directed at Japanese business- reform is concerned, it is rather unlikely people. that other important players would adopt Since 2004, Japan has been the PRC’s Peking’s antirevisionist polemics, and by leading trading partner and number three resorting to such polemics, China itself investor. At the same time, Tokyo still ranks seems to be focused on bilateral problems.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und among Peking’s most important sources of With a view to preventing the PRC’s pro- Politik, 2005 economic assistance. However, developmen- paganda from negatively impacting on All rights reserved tal aid is to be cut following a reassessment Security Council reform, Germany should

SWP of the neighbour’s economic and military nevertheless offer Tokyo to share in its Stiftung Wissenschaft und capabilities. experiences with schoolbook commissions. Politik German Institute for As far as the political relationship is con- As a matter of principle, both Germany and International and cerned, high-ranking bilateral contacts re- its European partners should guard against Security Affairs main unlikely in the short term, given the any attempts at stigmatising Japan. Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 extent of emotional outbursts on both sides 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 (since Hu Jintao’s coming into power, China Fax +49 30 880 07-100 and Japan have refrained from exchanging www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] high-ranking visitors). And whereas ar- rangements remain conceivable for joint gas exploration in the East China Sea and guidelines for the publishing of teaching materials, they would still fail to address the core issue of a new strategic competi- tion. At the same time, China’s media have wrongly presented Koizumi’s apology as a precedence and a vindication of Peking’s determined stance. It is probable that the Japanese prime minister will resume his visits to the Yasukuni shrine after some time. Obviously, nationalism cannot be switched on and off at the discretion of either an authoritarian China or a demo- cratic Japan. At the regional level, a lingering Sino- Japanese dispute could negatively impact attempts at stabilising the situation in the Taiwan Strait (Taiwan’s independence movement has felt encouraged by the opening of this new front) or solving the North Korean nuclear problem through Six Party Talks. Therefore, and given their economic and

SWP Comments 21 May 2005

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