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University of Southern California USC Libraries Integrated Document Delivery (IDD) (213) 740‐4020 [email protected] ______The Battle for

ESSAYS ON THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF I937-I945

Edited by Mark Peattie, Edward]. Drea, and Hans van de Ven

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 11111111111111111 IIIII II

There is no instance < Stanford University Press from prolonged wart Stanford, California -Sunzi ©2orr by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permis­ sion of Stanford University Press. Maps produced by David Rennie. photographs reproduced with permission of AFLO/Mainichi Shimbun. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The battle for China : essays on the military history of the Sino-Japanese War of I937-I945 I edited by Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8047-6206-9 (cloth: alk. paper) r. Sino-Japanese War, I937-r945-Campaigns-China. 2. China­ History, Military-r9r2-r949· 3· Japan-History, Military-r868-I945· I. Peattie, Mark R., r930- II. Drea, Edward J., r944- III. Van de Ven, HansJ. DS777·53·B337 20II 940·54'2p-dC22 20r0042047

Typeset by BookMatters in ro/12.5 Sabon THE DR

resentment at thirty years of fore: 2 The Dragon~s Seed the utter defeat of the court and th expeditions ended in the Boxer F ORIGINS OF THE WAR stipulations, authorized foreign tr tioned at key points from Peking t MARK R. PEATTIE It has been customary in Weste in terms of a traditional emeute aJ Protocols as the nadir of China's f ring the ashes of China's defeat, upheaval as less a rebellion than a tory-a war between China and 1 Chinese patriotism, the beginning tance to the Japanese invader fort) cannot be denied that control ove1 weakened; its ports, rivers, and ec The seeds of the conflict can be found as early as the nineteenth century, 1 eign control; and a legacy of nati rooted in the soil of imperial China, an agrarian bureaucratic empire whose would bear bitter fruit in the new c institutional inadequacies at a time of gathering economic, demographic, and technological change complicated its efforts to preserve domestic tran­ quility within the country and made difficult China_'s resista.nce to for­ Japan's Encroachments in China eign encroachment from without. 2 Lacking strong allies and firm control The encroachments by West, over its border regions and peoples, and suspicious as to the nature and been undertaken by nations half a intentions of foreign powers standing on its frontiers and approaching its was checked by time and distancf coasts China was unable to halt the pace and scale of the incursions on a fellow Asian neighbor. But Japa its and territory in the last three decades of the nineteenth sov~reignty cen~ latter half of the nineteenth centuq tury: Japan's invasion of , r87o-r87r; 's occupation ~f the lh sive attitude toward national expan Valley in Xinjiang Province in r879; the loss of Annam to France m r885; demands of Japanese self-interest. C and, most painful and serious, the calamitous war with Japan over , depended on an outer cordon of sa r894-r895, in which Chinese forces were defeated on land and se~ and Japan's political and military leadf after which Korea was stripped from China as a tributary, and Taiwan, the Asian mainland, beginning wit the , and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan. After strategic priorities shifted in the L that further humiliations followed one after another: French demands Japanese coastline to an active poli to adjust the Sino-Annamite border; Germany's seizure of Jiaozhou Bay tinent, it acquired a lethal potenti on the southern coast of the Peninsula; British demands for an Japan had been on a collision cours' offsetting port at Weihaiwei on the northern coast of the same peninsula; to defend its position in Korea. Th French demands for a leasehold at on the southern China armed forces during the Sino-Japa coast demands that provoked a British expansion into the Kowloon "New led to the loss of territories menti, Terri;ories" opposite Hong Kong. Most of these new foreign enclaves were policies on the continent and stren~ surrounded by zones and spheres where each foreign controllin? p~wer capacities.4 Yet by the decade that fc held exclusive rights for extractive industries and modern commumcatwns. Boxer Protocols, Japan came to pla Then with the opening of the new century had come the disastrous deci­ ty's effort to save itself through refo1 sion of the Qing court to encourage and support the spasm of antiforeign to gain a dominant position on the violence led by the , an initiative explicable by the depth of popular While the Qing had suffered a THE DRAGON'S SEED 49

resentment at thirty years of foreign humiliation of China. At all events, the utter defeat of the court and the Boxers by coordinated foreign military expeditions ended in the Boxer Protocols, which, among other punitive stipulations, authorized foreign troops, including the Japanese, to be sta­ tioned at key points from Peking to the sea. It has been customary in Western literature to view the Boxer upheaval in terms of a traditional emeute and China's punishment under the Boxer Protocols as the nadir of China's fortunes in its modern history. Yet, stir­ ring the ashes of China's defeat, historians have come to see the Boxer upheaval as less a rebellion than a serious episode in China's military his­ tory-a war between China and the West, one that gave voice to a new Chinese patriotism, the beginnings of a nationalism essential to the resis­ tance to the Japanese invader forty years on. In the meantime, however, it cannot be denied that control over China's borderlands had been further weakened; its ports, rivers, and economic resources had fallen under for­ i as early as the nineteenth century, 1 eign control; and a legacy of national resentment had accumulated that 1 agrarian bureaucratic empire whose would bear bitter fruit in the new century. f gathering economic, demographic, its efforts to preserve domestic tran- Japan's Encroachments in China, I894-I9I5 ~ difficult China's resistance to for­ lcking strong allies and firm control The encroachments by Western powers on Chinese sovereignty had and suspicious as to the nature and been undertaken by nations half a globe away whose full strategic reach ; on its frontiers and approaching its was checked by time and distance. Japan, on the other hand, had been pace and scale of the incursions on a fellow Asian neighbor. But Japan's own modern transformation in the :three decades of the nineteenth cen­ latter half of the nineteenth century had brought with it a new and aggres­ )-1871; Russia's occupation of the Ili sive attitude toward national expansion, an outlook framed by the tigerish he loss of Annam to France in 1885; demands of Japanese self-interest. Convinced that Japan's national security amitous war with Japan over Korea, depended on an outer cordon of satellite territory on the Asian continent, were defeated on land and sea and Japan's political and military leadership had sought to control events on 1 China as a tributary, and Taiwan, the Asian mainland, beginning with the Korean peninsula.3 Once Japan's cadores were ceded to Japan. After strategic priorities shifted in the late 188os from passive defense of the one after another: French demands Japanese coastline to an active political and military presence on the con­ Germany's seizure of Jiaozhou Bay tinent, it acquired a lethal potential. By the last decade of the century, lg Peninsula; British demands for an Japan had been on a collision course with a belated Chinese determination orthern coast of the same peninsula; to defend its position in Korea. The disasters that had overtaken China's Guangzhou on the southern China armed forces during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 had not only h expansion into the Kowloon "New led to the loss of territories mentioned above but emboldened Japanese st of these new foreign enclaves were policies on the continent and strengthened Japanese contempt for China's 1ere each foreign controlling power capacities.4 Yet by the decade that followed the punitive humiliations of the ustries and modern communications. Boxer Protocols, Japan came to play a significant role in the Qing Dynas­ entury had come the disastrous deci­ ty's effort to save itself through reform while at the same time maneuvering md support the spasm of antiforeign to gain a dominant position on the China mainland. re explicable by the depth of popular While the Qing had suffered a string of humiliations that had dem-

i: I OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE DR

onstrated how inadequate were many of its institutions, particularly its thus played the role of earnest inst armed forces, these defeats had led not to a collapse of the but at the same time harboring chau to a rally of sorts in the last decade of its existence, 1901-1911. And it was only as a field for personal ambiti< the empress dowager, arch symbol of Chinese conservatism, who now gave uncertain foreign terrain that Sun her approval to a program of radical reform that progressive Chinese intel­ took up the cause of revolution, 1 lectuals had advocated without success for nearly twenty years. nization, working out a revolutior Among the many reform projects was the reorganization, reconstruc­ overseas Chinese for his revolutio tion, and modernization of the nation's armed forces. For the most part, with a circle of Japanese friends­ the archaic structures of the traditional Manchu military forces were aban­ whose main appeal to Sun was d doned and new, more modern armies were raised by local power holders ship and cooperation against a co1 but officered by young men with a greater sensitivity to the nation and to As we know, Sun's plans for the foreign threats. Of these "New Armies"5-more efficiently organized, bet­ taken by events. Weakened by fon ter trained, armed with more modern weapons, and given a more profes­ fraying of political legitimacy and sional command structure-undoubtedly the best was the Army collapsed in 1911, in part throu1 of Shikai, governor of metropolitan Province. Established as upon his return to China, was elec part of the reform program of the imperial government, the republic established at , th was perhaps the most important military development between the sup­ Qing army officers who set themse pression of the in the mid-nineteenth century and the Under these conditions, Sun soon r, formation of the Nationalist Army by Chiang Kai-shek in the third decade the one leader with sufficient pov of the twentieth century. In relation to the archaic Manchu military forma­ war and avoid foreign interventio tions of the past, the Beiyang Army was an admirably modern force. 6 perceived new opportunities for e: But what provides particular interest in this survey of Sino-Japanese churia. Indeed, Japanese military interactions in the first decades of the twentieth century is the fact that in mainland China began as early as training, discipline, and organization the Beiyang Army was modeled on blocked by the civilian governmen the Japanese military. Japanese influence was particularly pronounced in within and without the Japanese go the development of the Beiyang Officers Training Academy, which Yuan and aggressive policies in China.9 Shikai established at . In addition to dispatch of military students Until the outbreak of World Wa1 to Japan for advanced training, Yuan brought Japanese instructors to elements in check because it recogn Baoding to teach at the academy/ Given the fact that, in these years, the Western interests in China. Looked Japanese army represented the cutting edge of military professionalism in century treaty system, China had East Asia, Yuan's use of Japanese expertise was a logical outcome of the single treaty power by the rivalry dynasty's belated program of modernization. For its part, the Japanese But with Western attention focuse military had an obvious interest in shaping and guiding the most power­ advantage of China without such ar ful land force in China, the nearest thing to the existence of a Chinese occupied the Shandong Peninsula ; national army. This pattern of Japanese penetration of Chinese military tion to eliminate German interests institutions was to continue through the subsequent period and ing which Japan's dominant positic well into the 1930s. later Sino-Japanese negotiations. Tl During the first decade of the twentieth century Japan came to exert a notorious Twenty-one Demands, br: major influence-for good and ill-on the course of events in China. Japan with hegemony in China as a whole also came to serve as a model for Qing reforms in education, administra­ they were delivered to the governme tion, and military professionalism and, at the same time, as an incubator national scrutiny and blocked by int of anti-Qing revolutionary sentiment among the thousands of Chinese stu­ their aftermath nevertheless illumin dents who had been sent to Japan to study in Japanese universities. Japan in China. Although those aspiration

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10 10

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9 9

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6 6

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51 51

SEED SEED DRAGON'S DRAGON'S THE THE WAR WAR THE THE OF OF OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE DRA bid for exclusive access to China's resources-their political consequence on a link between a theoretically s1 was titanic, for they provoked the first great tremors of Chinese national­ source of all political legitimacy ar ism, setting off mass rallies, anti-Japanese boycotts, and impassioned pro­ political responsibility. It meant tt tests to the world by Chinese students, intellectuals, and political leaders. could, if it had sufficient practica Even those Chinese who had reason to hope for Japanese amity and assis­ an inviolable and thus as tance now saw such hope betrayed. , for example, had begun With one critical exception, howe" his attempt to reestablish the monarchy with the not unfounded expecta­ constitutional right to do so. The e tion that Japan would supply material support for his quixotic effort. But of supreme command," which m~ Japan's withholding of both funds and recognition played a significant the emperor and not to civil autho: part in the collapse of his schemesY For his part, Sun Yat-sen, desperate legal authority to act and speak in for outside support for his embattled republican effort, compromised Chi­ throne was not constitutionally res nese integrity on more than one occasion in his dealings with the Japanese. the Japanese state, the services Ct He was, however, to be repeatedly disappointed in his efforts to gain their without check or interference from support, though to the end he never resigned himself to the harsh fact of Early in the history of modern J Japanese intentions in China.U in Japan were informally combined To Japanese advocates of a "forward policy" on the continent, the frag­ military and civilian leaders who, ~ mentation of China after the fall of Yuan Shikai appeared to provide fer­ the modern Japanese state and wl tile soil for political and military maneuvering to achieve more gradually men-the malevolent consequence! what the Twenty-one Demands had failed to do at one stroke. For Chinese genro gradually disappeared fron patriots everywhere, Japan was now clearly seen as China's single greatest of age, infirmity, and death in the foreign menace, a view that would last through the next three decades of their functions were split betweer civil war and invasion. Where in the nineteenth century China had been ties, business, the civil bureaucracy an arena of European imperial competition, it now became the battlefield for chaos, particularly in Japanesf between two contending regional forces: an emerging Chinese nationalism obvious and ominous. Of those in and an explosive Japanese expansionism.13 new political landscape, the armed delegation of imperial authority, ht In the immediate postwar years The Institutional Dysfunctions declining political muscle of the ci' of japanese China Policy of political legitimacy and author riven by factionalism; tainted by Ct It would be a mistake, however, to see Japanese policy in China ness; and hampered by a failure to working as a smoothly running juggernaut, guided by a single, clearly mass support and unable to prese1 fixed plan devised over the decades. On the contrary, there were simply of public good, and incapable of < too many Japanese actors and would-be actors on the China stage to effect 1920s, both foreign and domestic,· such a coherent policy. As Marius Jansen has observed, "The scene was political sand. Japanese public sup] full of busy figures. China adventurers, professional patriots, agents of the right-wing nationalists and the inc military and economic establishments, all known to each other, and all nese armed services. contacting the same Chinese, and yet each seeing his purpose in a different The Japanese military was also 14 way." Thus, buffeted by contending interest groups, Japan's China poli­ as a smoothly integrated machine l cies tended to lurch from one objective to another. rivalry. The army and the navy h To begin with, structural and political weaknesses within Japan con­ ent institutional cultures, and cliff fused the development of a clear-cut policy. First among these debilities support, disputes that prevented tl was a lethal flaw in the modern Japanese constitutional system. It centered strategic vision. First and foremos OF THE WAR THE DRAGON'S SEED 53

:sources-their political consequence on a link between a theoretically supreme imperial throne, supposedly the st great tremors of Chinese national­ source of all political legitimacy and authority, and an ill-defined locus of mese boycotts, and impassioned pro­ political responsibility. It meant that any institution in the Japanese state :s, intellectuals, and political leaders. could, if it had sufficient practical power, pretend to act in the name of to hope for Japanese amity and assis­ an inviolable emperor and thus assume a supreme decision-making role. (uan Shikai, for example, had begun With one critical exception, however, no institution could claim an actual :hy with the not unfounded expecta­ constitutional right to do so. The exception was the armed services' "right ll support for his quixotic effort. But of supreme command," which made the services directly responsible to md recognition played a significant the emperor and not to civil authority. It thus gave the army and navy the For his part, Sun Yat-sen, desperate legal authority to act and speak in the name of the imperial throne. As the republican effort, compromised Chi­ throne was not constitutionally responsible to any other institution within ;ion in his dealings with the Japanese. the Japanese state, the services could theoretically act as they pleased, sappointed in his efforts to gain their without check or interference from civil government.15 resigned himself to the harsh fact of Early in the history of modern Japan, when civil and military authority in Japan were informally combined in the persons of the genro-the senior .rd policy" on the continent, the £rag­ military and civilian leaders who, as young samurai activists, had founded Yuan Shikai appeared to provide fer­ the modern Japanese state and who went on to become its elder states­ .neuvering to achieve more gradually men-the malevolent consequences of this flaw were not apparent. As the ailed to do at one stroke. For Chinese genro gradually disappeared from the Japanese political stage because clearly seen as China's single greatest of age, infirmity, and death in the first decades of the twentieth century, Lst through the next three decades of their functions were split between other institutions-the political par­ : nineteenth century China had been ties, business, the civil bureaucracy, and the military-and the possibilities etition, it now became the battlefield for chaos, particularly in Japanese military and foreign policies, became :es: an emerging Chinese nationalism obvious and ominous. Of those institutions contending for power on the ism. 13 new political landscape, the armed services, by virtue of their claim to the delegation of imperial authority, held the strongest position. In the immediate postwar years, the political parties capitalized on the declining political muscle of the civil bureaucracy and acquired a measure of political legitimacy and authority. Yet the political parties were soon riven by factionalism; tainted by corruption, greed, and an innate selfish­ rer, to see Japanese policy in China ness; and hampered by a failure to cultivate a mass constituency. Without ;gernaut, guided by a single, clearly mass support and unable to present the Japanese people with any vision On the contrary, there were simply of public good, and incapable of dealing with the principal crises of the ·be actors on the China stage to effect 1920s, both foreign and domestic, they found that their fortunes rested on ansen has observed, "The scene was political sand. Japanese public support shifted to the one-shot solutions of rs, professional patriots, agents of the right-wing nationalists and the increasingly strident demands of the Japa­ ts, all known to each other, and all nese armed services. each seeing his purpose in a different The Japanese military was also often incapable of planning and acting ; interest groups, Japan's China poli­ as a smoothly integrated machine because of factionalism and interservice •e to another. rivalry. The army and the navy had different strategic priorities, differ­ litical weaknesses within Japan con­ ent institutional cultures, and different claims for public and budgetary t policy. First among these debilities support, disputes that prevented them from shaping a coherent Japanese 1ese constitutional system. It centered strategic vision. First and foremost, fundamental disagreements divided 54 OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE DR, the two services over long-range strategic priorities. The army was focused men plus six battalions of an ind on Russia and the navy on south China and . The attempt to had been divested of its administr rationalize these differences and to develop a joint military/foreign policy defensive responsibilities. By the 1 had begun in 1907 with the drafting of the first Imperial Defense Policy. cers espoused an aggressive expan1 This policy was a three-part document prepared by the armed services and Emboldened by a military comman formally sanctioned by the emperor, but neither this first policy statement field units-to be accountable only nor its subsequent revisions (in 1918, in 1923, and 1936) ever resolved the Army exhibited increasing operati4 basic difference in strategic priorities between the two services. and even from the directives of cer In the 1907 policy statement, the army set forth its basic strategy of not To only a slightly lesser degree t allowing an enemy to violate Japanese soil and its corollary/6 an outward­ other field force in China: the Cl radiating definition of Japan's territorial security from which the army drew posed of about 900 men and terme up plans for forward offensive operations on the Asian mainland. Military rison Army was stationed in nor1 operations called for quick, decisive victories in the opening battles of any protocols following the Boxer Rebe war in order to guarantee Japan's negotiating position at the end of the cal and military upheaval in Chir conflict. This doctrine of "rapid war, rapid decision" (sokusen sokketsu) protocol force in , until, by was an essential element of the first Imperial Defense Policy of 1907.17 men. Its staff adopted the same acti Within each service, rival factions and fiercely contending bureaucracies north in Manchuria and became f hampered coordination. In the army, the factions were regional, genera­ tions and in plans for offensive pre tional, ideological, and personal. The oldest rift went back to the feudal mere protection of Japanese life an origins of the army and the tensions between its three most powerful Finally, there was the Japanese domains-Choshu, Satsuma, and Hizen-which had overthrown the old origins lay in the placement of the feudal order in the mid-nineteenth century. Over time, with the dominance beginning in the late nineteenth of the Choshii Clique in the upper ranks of the army, the bureaucratic ten­ decades, the Japanese navy had dra sions became generational as younger outsiders entered the officer corps. her of naval landing parties (riku These men were contemptuous of the lingering influence of the aging be put ashore when Japanese comn Choshu Clique. More familiar with the new military technology that threatened by violence in times of emerged from , they were impatient with the unwillingness or of these riverine infantry forces, th: inability of their superiors to prepare the army for modern warfare, and presence ashore, adjacent to the Jar they fumed at the apparent incompetence of political party governments close ties with the Japanese comm1 to deal with the problems of social and economic inequity in Japan.18 Some military groups in the city, and in s< younger staff officers pressed for a thorough modernization of the army Japanese belligerence in . z: and the nation's preparation for , by the 1930s seen largely as The autonomy of these field force against the . Others, believing that Japan could not win a from a commander's prerogative t4 technological race against any of the great powers, turned to a restoration own theater of operations in the inte of the Japanese fighting spirit and the indoctrination of all ranks in the right of "field initiative" (dokudan inevitable victory of a Japanese "Imperial Way" (Kodo). was required for the transfer of uni Adding to policy and organizational dysfunctions was the considerable (say from the to the autonomy of Japanese field armies on the Asian mainland, especially the mands needed to obtain imperial ai Kwantung Army, headquartered at Port Arthur in the Kwantung Leased its own jurisdiction. Indeed, the p4 Territory. Established in 1906 for the defense of the territory and for the aggressive officers in the field was protection of Japanese lives and property in Manchuria, which in practice Asian mainland thus provided flash] largely meant defending Japan's , the Kwantung flict and thus contributed significan "Army" was originally little more than one in strength (10,ooo policy in China.25 OF THE WAR THE DRAGON'S SEED 55

:egic priorities. The army was focused men plus six battalions of an independent railway garrison). In 1919, it 1a and Southeast Asia. The attempt to had been divested of its administrative role in order to concentrate on its levelop a joint military/foreign policy defensive responsibilities. By the 1920s, however, its ambitious staff offi­ ~ of the first Imperial Defense Policy. cers espoused an aggressive expansion of Japanese interests in Manchuria. n.t prepared by the armed services and Emboldened by a military command system that allowed the army-and its but neither this first policy statement field units-to be accountable only to the Japanese emperor, the Kwantung , in 1923, and 1936) ever resolved the Army exhibited increasing operational independence from civilian control ; between the two services. and even from the directives of central army headquarters in Tokyo. 19 umy set forth its basic strategy of not To only a slightly lesser degree the same stance was taken by the army's ;e soil and its corollary, 16 an outward­ other field force in China: the China Garrison Army.20 Originally com­ ial security from which the army drew posed of about 900 men and termed the Tianjin Garrison, the China Gar­ :ions on the Asian mainland. Military rison Army was stationed in north China as a result of the diplomatic victories in the opening battles of any protocols following the . 21 Over time, with each new politi­ 1egotiating position at the end of the cal and military upheaval in China, the Japanese army strengthened its r, rapid decision" (sokusen sokketsu) protocol force in Tianjin, until, by the mid-1930s it had grown to 4,ooo mperial Defense Policy of 1907Y men. Its staff adopted the same activist coloration as their colleagues to the and fiercely contending bureaucracies north in Manchuria and became far more involved in intelligence opera­ y, the factions were regional, genera­ tions and in plans for offensive preparations in north China than with the le oldest rift went back to the feudal mere protection of Japanese life and property there.ZZ ns between its three most powerful Finally, there was the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Shanghai. Its izen-which had overthrown the old origins lay in the placement of the navy's gunboats on the River ntury. Over time, with the dominance beginning in the late nineteenth century. Over the next two or three nks of the army, the bureaucratic ten­ decades, the Japanese navy had drawn from this small river flotilla anum­ er outsiders entered the officer corps. ber of naval landing parties (rikusentai)-naval infantry-which could the lingering influence of the aging be put ashore when Japanese communities and businesses appeared to be h the new military technology that threatened by violence in times of Chinese upheaval. In 1932, the largest ·e impatient with the unwillingness or of these riverine infantry forces, that in Shanghai, was given a permanent ·e the army for modern warfare, and presence ashore, adjacent to the Japanese quarter in that city. It developed ~tence of political party governments close ties with the Japanese community, particularly with Japanese para­ 1d economic inequity in Japan.18 Some military groups in the city, and in so doing became the fist for an emerging thorough modernization of the army Japanese belligerence in ShanghaiY :al war, by the 1930s seen largely as The autonomy of these field forces on the Asian continent also benefited 1elieving that Japan could not win a from a commander's prerogative to move a subordinate unit within his great powers, turned to a restoration own theater of operations in the interests of security. This privilege was the :he indoctrination of all ranks in the right of "field initiative" (dokudan senko). While the emperor's approval >erial Way" (Kodo). was required for the transfer of units from one field command to another 11al dysfunctions was the considerable (say from the Kwantung Army to the Tianjin Garrison), none of these com­ m the Asian mainland, especially the mands needed to obtain imperial approval for the shifting of units within Port Arthur in the Kwantung Leased its own jurisdiction. Indeed, the potential for abuse of this privilege by te defense of the territory and for the aggressive officers in the field was manifest. 24 Japanese garrisons on the >erty in Manchuria, which in practice Asian mainland thus provided flashpoints for potential Sino-Japanese con­ :h Manchuria Railway, the Kwantung flict and thus contributed significantly to the fractured nature of Japanese han one division in strength (10,ooo policy in China. 25 OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE DI<

Japanese Military Attitudes toward China military code systems, the China c position, strength, and activities , China's abject military defeat in 1894-1895 had accelerated Japa­ the Kwantung Army was able to 1 nese contempt for things Chinese. Japan's general understanding and sym­ tions between the major pathy toward China had reached its nadir by World War I, when China's Japanese field armies a tremendo cultural reputation survived only among specialists in Japanese academic the Japanese military to take the i1 institutions and among small numbers of Japan's intellectual elite. China No doubt some useful politica was now seen as a stage for the personal ambitions of various Japanese nese field units in ChinaY Yet, radical idealists and expansionists, as a resource base for Japanese indus­ outbreak of the war, incredibly, 1 try, as a lucrative field for the profit of Japanese capital, and as territory high command in Tokyo failed for the ever-expanding requirements of Japanese national security. But in development in China: the gather none of these perspectives did the need for specialized knowledge of China belligerent Japanese presence on t appear to be pronounced. The Foreign Ministry and the army's field com­ stunning proportions, one that w~ manders in China had the greatest contact with China, and while each There were several reasons w developed a core of China specialists, with only rare exceptions did China First, as in the case of the Foreign hands reach high rank in the army and the foreign service. The highest army, not the specialist, and certai echelons in both services were essentially occupied by generalists whose who had the decisive voice in the expertise was focused on the institutions of the modern West rather than China. Second, although it has be, on the "backward" countries of Asia. nature of the army's interests in Japanese businessmen believed an expanding economy required depend­ clear that the outlook and activitie able markets and sources of raw materials abroad, and these in turn were were often shaped by their individ1 originally seen as best secured by Japan's full participation in a liberal, assigned to legations, the Genera capitalist, international system. But Japanese policies during World War I up a disparate range of perspecth and the postwar trend to autarky badly hurt Japan's international export by their parochial concerns. In tl trade. Thus Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro's, "whole China policy," army's approach to China was carr according to Akira Iriye, "can be characterized as an attempt to reduce warlord off against the other, the J< obstacles in the way of selling more goods to China."26 Shidehara (a was intent on presenting to the an generalist, not a China specialist) and his allies in the Foreign Ministry that warlord, as it affected the can offered an alternative to the bludgeoning approach of the Japanese mili­ In consequence, the Japanese a; tary in China but still sought Japanese domination, not partnership. But expertise on China, even though c1 even China sympathizers and experts in the Foreign Ministry found their in China and even though some oJ efforts to halt the tide of Japanese belligerence overridden by Japanese ligence during the 1920s and '3os. l military field commanders. 27 military attaches in Peking develo1 An assessment of the Japanese army's understanding of China presents Chinese nationalism. But too often a picture of sharp contrasts. On the tactical level, it is clear that both the by their superiors, who were gener Tokyo high command and the two field armies in China had detailed infor­ ters. Moreover, most Japanese milit: mation on Chinese units and their movements. This was in large part due associated with Chinese-those ap 1 to the effectiveness of Japanese signals intelligence in China. A codes and Chinese warlords and those who w ciphers office (angohan) was established within the Intelligence Bureau of vice organs in China 31-were usual the Army General Staff in Tokyo in 1927 and for a critical period, 193o­ rupt elements in China. They remai I936, was part of its China Section. By the early 1930S, branch signal intelli­ prejudices, which were, in turn, sh gence offices were set up at various places in Manchuria and later elsewhere Too often, they saw the Chinese as~ in China. Because of the ease with which these field units broke Chinese to care about the welfare of their r

Chinese Chinese broke broke units units field field these these would-be would-be which which China's China's view, view, this this In In nation. nation. their their of of welfare welfare the the about about care care to to

elsewhere elsewhere later later and and Manchuria Manchuria in in unwilling unwilling laces laces or or unable unable individuals, individuals, greedy greedy as as Chinese Chinese the the saw saw they they often, often, Too Too

intelli­ signal signal branch branch them. them. 1930s, 1930s, around around early early saw saw the the >y >y they they what what by by shaped shaped turn, turn, in in were, were, which which prejudices, prejudices,

193o­ period, period, critical critical a a for for and and 1927 1927 and and attitudes attitudes own own their their by by blinded blinded remained remained They They China. China. in in elements elements rupt rupt

of of Bureau Bureau

cor­ Intelligence Intelligence and and the the venal venal within within most most ;hed ;hed the the to to exposed exposed usually usually -were -were China China in in organs organs vice vice

31

and and codes codes A A China. China. in in Ser­ intelligence intelligence Special Special tls tls army's army's the the to to attached attached were were who who those those and and warlords warlords Chinese Chinese

due due part part large large in in was was This This various various to to lovements. lovements. advisers advisers military military as as appointed appointed Chinese-those Chinese-those with with associated associated

infor­ detailed detailed had had China China in in armies armies regularly regularly dd dd who who China China in in serving serving men men military military Japanese Japanese most most Moreover, Moreover, ters. ters.

the the both both that that clear clear mat­ is is it it China China level, level, in in tactical tactical interest interest little little with with generalists generalists were were who who superiors, superiors, their their by by

presents presents China China of of understanding understanding ignored ignored or or my's my's rejected rejected were were opinions opinions such such often often too too But But nationalism. nationalism. Chinese Chinese

of of rise rise the the on on perspectives perspectives realistic realistic developed developed Peking Peking in in attaches attaches military military

Japanese Japanese by by of of overridden overridden number number a a 1920s, 1920s, belligerence belligerence the the in in early early Indeed, Indeed, '3os. '3os. and and 1920s 1920s the the during during ligence ligence

their their found found Ministry Ministry intel­ Foreign Foreign accurate accurate the the in in :s :s gathered gathered officers officers those those of of some some though though even even and and China China in in

But But partnership. partnership. not not tours tours domination, domination, ese ese lengthy lengthy served served had had officers officers certain certain though though even even China, China, on on expertise expertise

mili­ Japanese Japanese the the of of approach approach oning oning comprehensive comprehensive a a develop develop to to failed failed army army Japanese Japanese the the consequence, consequence, In In

Ministry Ministry Foreign Foreign the the in in himself. himself. allies allies his his adviser adviser nd nd the the of of interests interests career career the the affected affected it it as as warlord, warlord, that that

(a (a Shidehara Shidehara China."

to to of of goods goods interests interests >re >re the the only only

command command high high army army the the to to presenting presenting on on intent intent was was 26 26

reduce reduce to to attempt attempt an an as as warlord warlord haracterized haracterized each each to to adviser adviser military military Japanese Japanese the the other, other, the the against against off off warlord warlord

policy," policy," China China "whole "whole Chinese Chinese one one Kijuro's, Kijuro's, playing playing ara ara passive, passive, comparatively comparatively was was China China to to approach approach army's army's

export export international international Japan's Japan's the the hurt hurt when when tdly tdly example, example, for for 192os, 192os, early early the the In In concerns. concerns. parochial parochial their their by by

I I War War World World during during policies policies shaped shaped Japanese Japanese usually usually views views opinions, opinions, and and perspectives perspectives of of range range disparate disparate a a up up

liberal, liberal, a a in in participation participation full full served served apan's apan's Army Army Kwantung Kwantung the the or or Staff, Staff, General General the the legations, legations, to to assigned assigned

were were turn turn in in these these and and

abroad, abroad, officers officers terials terials The The interests. interests.

bureaucratic bureaucratic individual their their by by shaped shaped often often were were 30 30

depend­ required required policy policy economy economy China China in in expanding expanding active active officers officers army army of of activities activities and and outlook outlook the the that that clear clear

it it has made made has scholarship scholarship I. I. recent recent China, China, in in interests interests army's army's the the of of nature nature

than than rather rather West West modern modern the the of of implacable implacable tions tions the the of of write write to to customary customary been been has has it it although although Second, Second, China. China.

whose whose generalists generalists by by in in occupied occupied policy policy 1tially 1tially military military Japanese Japanese of of making making the the in in voice voice decisive decisive the the had had who who

highest highest The The service. service. foreign foreign one one the the the the and and was was specialist, specialist, China China the the not not certainly certainly and and specialist, specialist, the the not not army, army,

China China did did exceptions rare rare only only Japanese Japanese with with , , the the in in generalist generalist the the Ministry, Ministry, Foreign Foreign the the of of case case the the in in as as First, First,

each each while while and and China, China, with with occurred. occurred. contact contact have have should should blunder blunder this this why why reasons reasons several several were were There There

com­ field field army's army's the the and and the war. war. the Ministry Ministry of of origins origins ~n ~n the the to to fundamental fundamental was was that that one one proportions, proportions, stunning stunning

China China of of knowledge knowledge of of specialized specialized for for blunder blunder !d !d myopic myopic a a was was It It continent. continent. the the on on presence presence Japanese Japanese belligerent belligerent

in in But But security. security. national national the the to to Japanese Japanese of of . . hostility hostility national national of of pressure pressure gathering gathering the the China: China: in in development development

territory territory as as and and capital, capital, critical strategic strategic critical Japanese Japanese of of . . one one the the appreciate appreciate to to failed failed Tokyo Tokyo in in command command high high

indus­ Japanese Japanese for for base base the the and and resource resource a a field field the the in in armies armies Japanese Japanese the the 1S 1S incredibly, incredibly, war, war, the the of of outbreak outbreak

Japanese Japanese various various of of

the the ambitions ambitions before before decade decade the the ~sonal ~sonal in in large, large, and and by by Yet, Yet, China. in in units units field field nese nese

29 29

China China elite. elite. intellectual intellectual Japa­ Japan's Japan's by by of of !rs !rs gathered gathered also also was was intelligence intelligence political political useful useful some some doubt doubt No No

academic academic Japanese Japanese in in

specialists specialists forces. wng wng military military Chinese Chinese against against

initiative initiative the the take take to to military military Japanese Japanese the the 28 28

China's China's when when I, I, War War World World by by enabled enabled nadir nadir always always almost almost and and advantage advantage tremendous tremendous a a armies armies field field Japanese Japanese

sym­ and and understanding understanding two two general general the the pan's pan's gave gave that that fact fact a a China, China, north north in in warlords warlords major major the the between tions tions

Japa­ accelerated accelerated had had 1894-1895 1894-1895 in in communica­ secret secret the the of of percent percent 70 70 read read to to able able was was Army Army Kwantung Kwantung the the

part, part, its its For For forces. forces. Kai-shek's Kai-shek's Chiang Chiang of of activities activities and and strength, strength, position, position,

China China l l

com­ the the learn learn to to able able was was Army Army Garrison Garrison China China the the systems, systems, code code military military

57 57

SEED SEED DRAGON'S DRAGON'S THE THE WAR WAR THE THE OF OF OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE DR leaders were luxury loving, corrupt, and uninterested in anything other Japan access to Chinese resource! 32 than advancing their own positions and their private concerns. The rough yet demanded. Such accommoda state of the Chinese countryside confirmed Japanese prejudices that the attachment to the pan-Asian visioJ Chinese were a poor, ignorant, superstitious, and dirt-ridden lot, oppressed the difficulties of his position, 3s bt by greedy and rapacious landlords, lacking any aspects of advanced civi­ helped to deepen the interference , lization, and incapable of anything more than a brutish existence. Only a That interference had continue few officers-like Major Ishiwara , who served in in T':enty-one Demands, largely th the 192os-were perceptive enough to realize the possibilities of Chinese With a booming trade free of inter progress and the ominous danger of eventual Chinese retaliation to Japa­ I, and with a large capital surplus, nese bullying. The vast majority of officers, even those in the China Sec­ tal as wedge to accomplish in Chin tion of the General Staff's Intelligence Bureau, smugly spoke of chankoro had failed to achieve. Premier and (Chinks), and their knowledge of China, even of its military geography, 33 money as the avenue to an allian< was stunningly limited. entrenched themselves in Peking­ of events in north China. His will entered into a military alliance w The Rise of Chinese Warlordism instructors, and accepted a huge If the structure of Japanese institutions involved in the making of the northern militarists arranged Japan's China policy can be termed dysfunctional, the nature of Chinese Kamezo. On the surface these schf institutions in the post-imperial contest for power in China was chaotic. 34 the freedom of action in China that Those military figures like Yuan Shikai held power by the force of their Demands and to have lessened 0 ffi, armies but could claim no legitimacy to rule. They were men trapped in a occupation of the Shandong PeniJ period in Chinese history when the traditional sources of political legiti­ Indeed, Marius Jansen has called t macy had collapsed with the monarchy and had not yet been replaced by and expensive plans Japan yet had the legitimacy of popular will based on ideals of public welfare and patri­ But they ultimately came to nat otic principles. For their part, the civilian politicians who had emerged anger in May of 1919 over the failu with the republic may have held various visions of a new political order repudiate the secret treaties confirrr. but had no military power with which to realize them. Such conditions dong shook the government to its c explain the collapse of Yuan Shikai's quixotic attempt to assert his con­ ~ent of Japanese claims to the peni trol by claiming a throne for himself. They also illuminate the difficulties httle good. Japan had wasted its a of Sun Yat-sen in trying to forge a republic based on his famous "Three who were little more than "elabOI Principles." After the failure of the Second Revolution of 1913, aimed at birds of passage"37 and in the proce reestablishing republicanism, Sun fled once more to Japan and there tried ment toward Japanese efforts to col For China the Nishihara loan to reorganize his political party, the , into a tighter politi­ . ' cal structure dedicated to fighting Yuan Shikai's betrayal of the republic. groupmgs in Peking, helped to peq But over the next few years, in his new obsession with "democratic cen­ and thus delay the country's unity , tralism," Sun himself failed to grasp the significance of the rising tide of complex and shifting alliances of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Upon his return to China in 1917, Sun evo~ved in China during the 1920S threw himself into the emerging warlord-parliamentarian struggles and agamst each other can be of interest endeavored to set up his own military government at Guangzhou. But the them significantly affected Sino-Jap< weakness of his position at Guangzhou in relation to the warlord power by the middle of the decade, north holders there led him to take positions that compromised his revolutionary under contending warlord factions. 1 ideals. Desperate for material support for his faltering cause, he offered had fallen under the control of the F Warlord of Manchuria," quondam l

Muk- of of governor governor military military and and bandit bandit quondam quondam Manchuria," Manchuria," of of

Warlord Warlord

offered offered he he cause, cause, faltering faltering his his for for t t

"the "the Zuolin, Zuolin, Zhang of of Clique Clique Fengtien Fengtien the the of of control control the the

under under fallen fallen had had

revolutionary revolutionary his his compromised compromised that that

Shandong Shandong and and area area Peking-Tianjin Peking-Tianjin The The factions. factions.

warlord warlord

contending contending under under

power power warlord warlord the the to to relation relation in in ou ou

divided divided left left were were China China central central and and north north decade, decade, the the of of

middle middle the the by by

the the But But Guangzhou. Guangzhou. at at government government · ·

Essentially, Essentially, time. time. the the at at relations relations Sino-Japanese Sino-Japanese affected affected

significantly significantly

them them

and and struggles struggles ·lord-parliamentarian ·lord-parliamentarian

of of any any as as insofar insofar only only chapter chapter this this in in interest interest of of be be can can other other

each each

against against

Sun Sun 1917, 1917, in in China China to to return return his his on on

countermarches countermarches and and marches marches the the and and 1920s 1920s the the during during

China China in in

evolved evolved

of of tide tide rising rising the the of of significance significance the the

that that groupings groupings militarist militarist various various the the of of

alliances alliances shifting shifting

and and

complex complex

cen­ "democratic "democratic with with obsession obsession ~w ~w

the the of of identification identification The The stability. stability. and and unity unity country's country's the the delay delay

thus thus

and and

republic. republic. the the of of betrayal betrayal Shikai's Shikai's an an

satrapies satrapies warlord warlord of of pattern pattern a a perpetuate perpetuate to to helped helped Peking, Peking, in in

groupings groupings

politi­ tighter tighter a a into into Kuomintang, Kuomintang,

militarist militarist the the to to money money supplying supplying by by loan, loan,

Nishihara Nishihara

the the

China China

For For

tried tried there there and and Japan Japan to to more more once once l l

loan. loan. their their on on interest interest collect collect to to

efforts efforts

Japanese Japanese

toward toward ment ment

at at aimed aimed 1913, 1913, of of Revolution Revolution ~cond ~cond

resent­ Chinese Chinese renewed renewed a a inherited inherited process process the the in in and and passage" of of birds birds

37 37

"Three "Three famous famous his his on on based based :public :public

political political plumed plumed and and decorated decorated "elaborately "elaborately than than more more little little were were

who who

difficulties difficulties the the illuminate illuminate also also They They

allies allies warlord warlord on on surplus surplus accumulated accumulated its its

wasted wasted

had had

Japan Japan

good. good.

little little

con­ his his assert assert to to attempt attempt quixotic quixotic

Japan Japan did did moreover, moreover, loans, loans, The The peninsula. peninsula. the the to to claims claims Japanese Japanese of of

ment ment

conditions conditions Such Such them. them. realize realize to to ch ch

abandon­ the the to to led led ultimately ultimately and and core core its its to to government government the the

shook shook dong dong

order order political political new new a a of of visions visions ous ous

Shan­ in in gains gains wartime wartime its its in in Japan Japan confirming confirming

treaties treaties

secret secret

the the repudiate repudiate

emerged emerged had had who who politicians politicians vilian vilian

to to Conference Conference Peace Peace Versailles Versailles the the of of failure failure the the over over 1919 1919 of of

May May in in

anger anger

patri­ and and welfare welfare public public of of ideals ideals m m

popular popular Chinese Chinese of of outburst outburst The The naught. naught. to to

came came

ultimately ultimately

they they

But But

by by replaced replaced been been yet yet not not had had and and lY lY

China." for for had had yet yet Japan Japan plans plans

expensive expensive

and and

36 36

politicallegiti­ of of sources sources raditional raditional

coordinated coordinated ambitious, ambitious, most most "the "the them them called called has has Jansen Jansen

Marius Marius

Indeed, Indeed,

a a in in trapped trapped men men were were They They rule. rule. to to

War War I. I. World World of of opening opening the the at at Peninsula Peninsula

Shandong Shandong

the the of of

occupation occupation

their their of of force force the the by by power power held held cai cai

Japanese Japanese the the to to opposition opposition Chinese Chinese official official lessened lessened have have to to and and

Demands Demands

chaotic. chaotic. was was China China in in power power for for st st

34 34 Twenty-one Twenty-one the the in in envisioned envisioned been been had had that that China China in in

action action of of

freedom freedom the the

Chinese Chinese of of nature nature the the lysfunctional, lysfunctional,

with with Japan Japan provided provided have have to to seem seem schemes schemes these these surface surface the the

On On

Kamez6. Kamez6.

of of making making the the in in involved involved ;titutions ;titutions

Nishihara Nishihara agent, agent, secret secret Terauchi's Terauchi's by by arranged arranged militarists militarists northern northern the the

to to assistance assistance military military for for largely largely loan, loan, huge huge a a accepted accepted and and instructors, instructors,

military military Japanese Japanese imported imported Japan, Japan, with with alliance alliance military military a a into into entered entered

who who Qirui, Qirui, Duan Duan Premier Premier was was tool tool willing willing His His China. China. north north in in events events of of

course course the the control control to to them them through through Peking-and Peking-and in in themselves themselves entrenched entrenched

had had who who

warlords warlords

of of

group group the the with with alliance alliance an an to to avenue avenue the the as as money money geography, geography, military military its its of of even even ina, ina,

saw saw

Masatake Masatake

Terauchi Terauchi

marshal marshal former former and and Premier Premier achieve. achieve. to to failed failed had had chankoro chankoro of of spoke spoke smugly smugly Bureau, Bureau, : :

themselves themselves

demands demands the the what what of of much much China China in in accomplish accomplish to to wedge wedge as as tal tal Sec­ China China the the in in those those even even fficers, fficers,

capi­ that that use use to to

position position a a in in was was Japan Japan

surplus, surplus, capital capital large large a a with with and and I, I, Japa­ to to retaliation retaliation Chinese Chinese ~ventual ~ventual

War War World World

during during competition competition international international of of free free trade trade

booming booming a a With With

Chinese Chinese of of possibilities possibilities the the realize realize ::> ::>

finance. finance.

Japanese Japanese

of of

agency agency

the the

through through largely largely Demands, Demands, Twenty-one Twenty-one in in China China central central in in served served who who mji, mji,

the the

of of

failure failure the the

after after even even

unabated unabated

continued continued had had interference interference That That a a Only Only existence. existence. brutish brutish a a than than ore ore

affairs. affairs.

Chinese Chinese in in Japan Japan of of interference interference the the deepen deepen to to helped helped civi­ advanced advanced of of aspects aspects any any lcking lcking

undoubtedly undoubtedly

they they

China, China, for for critically critically but, but, position, position, his his of of difficulties difficulties the the

oppressed oppressed lot, lot, dirt-ridden dirt-ridden and and itious, itious, 35 35

by by as as

much much as as

contacts contacts

Japanese Japanese his his of of visions visions pan-Asian pan-Asian the the to to attachment attachment the the that that prejudices prejudices Japanese Japanese firmed firmed

Sun's Sun's by by

impelled impelled

been been

have have may may

accommodations accommodations Such Such demanded. demanded. yet yet

rough rough The The concerns. concerns. private private their their d d

32 32

as as had had

Japan Japan that that

anything anything

beyond beyond far far resources resources Chinese Chinese to to access access

Japan Japan other other anything anything in in uninterested uninterested and and

59 59

SEED SEED DRAGON'S DRAGON'S THE THE

WAR WAR THE THE )F )F 6o OVERVIEWS OF THE WAR THE D den (), who came to be known as the "Old Marshal." Although In the south, meanwhile, frorr Manchuria was his home territory, Zhang had given every indication that had begun to reorganize his inc his ambitions were national in scope. Principally opposed to the Feng­ of the process, Sun had begun 1 tien Clique was the Chihli Clique, which held and provinces one foreign element that seemed under Wu Peifu, a former Beiyang Army commander. Some have seen the repeated proposals for Western collision between the Fengtien and Chihli cliques and their factional allies struction had been ignored. We in 1924 as a critical process in China's eventual unification since, by their northward military expedition t< very destructiveness, they opened the way for the emergence of Chinese ture with local warlords, and he , nationalism. , specifically, has seen the "destruction and Returning to Guangzhou in 192 disruption caused by the wars of 1924" as "indispensable pre-conditions" ties with the Chinese Communist 38 to the Nationalist revolution that followed. and political control over his OWl Be that as it may, these were conflicts that led to increasing involvement Looking beyond his tightenet in Chinese affairs by the Japanese military. Against the background of the continued to cherish the vision o shifting fortunes of warlord conflict it is possible to discern an emerging government, an objective that he Japanese strategy to achieve a dominant position in the country. Ever since establishment of an indoctrinated Yuan Shikai and the Twenty-one Demands, the conviction of Japanese to defeat the warlord cliques in Pe leaders, civilian and military, had been that the nation's interests in China such an instrument was to be th generally, and in Manchuria specifically, were best served by the establish­ in 1924, with Chiang Kai-shek a ment of an informal hegemony over the country rather than through an staffed with Soviet advisers, and t attempt to establish direct imperial rule, 39 which after World War I was, Japanese-trained officers. 44 in any event, now excluded by the Washington treaties. To achieve such The establishment of the milit indirect control, Tokyo concluded that it was necessary to identify a power logical training and the inculcati holder (or military faction) best positioned to unify the country and then major accomplishment before his , to influence that power holder through his increasing dependence on Japan the leadership of the party and tht for material and political support. Arthur Waldron probably gets it right ate of Yuan Shikai's military acat when he asserts that "Tokyo hoped for ... a Chinese government at once and "a figure of some importance strong enough to keep order, abide by the treaties, and unify the country, business and revolutionary politic: yet weak enough to conform to Japanese wishes."40 Waldron might have a military campaign to bring the . added that Tokyo's minimum requirement, short of indirect control over control and to unify China. Wha greater China, was a leader in Manchuria through whom Japan could Revolutionary Army, which could work to protect its interests in the region. Initially, Tokyo believed it had Out of the chaos and confusion found such a power holder in the person of . For that rea­ southern China, Chiang Kai-shek, son, in the second Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924, Japan had backed Zhang men, had emerged to seize the lea