KyotoKyotoUniversity University

Elowtheast Asian Studles, Vel. 27, No, 2, September 1989

Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of SoutheastAsia

Introduction

YosHIHARA Kunio*

Oei Tiong Ham Concern was a sugar-based Tiong Ham started tapioca production by set-

conglomerate in the Netherlands Indies (or In- ting up a plantation and a fiour mill. In addi-

donesia in the postwar period), founded by a tion, he went into property development and peranakan Chinese named Oei Tiong Ham management (mainly to provide housing for <1866-1924). N.V. Handel Maatschappij the workers on the plantations).i} was a sugar-centered international A plantation in Java was quite different trading company, and N.V. Algemeene from what we usually know of as a 'Tiong plantation. Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der Oei For example, Oei Tiong Ham Concerp did not

Ham Suikerfabrieken was a sugar production own the land it used to grow sugar cane.

company which operated five sugar planta- Agricultural land belonged te indigenous tions and mills in Java. From sugar, Oei peasants, and no corporation was allowed to

Tiong Ham diversified into other products. buy it. Thus, it had to be leased from Kian Gwan became over time a general peasants. Furthermore, no manual labor

trading company with oMces abroad. In the could be brought frorn outside. It had to

early 1930s, it had Kian Gwan Western Agency, come from the peasants in the area where the Ltd., in London, Kian Gwan (Malaya), plantation was located. A corporation could

Ltd., in and Kian Gwan Company, invest in land improvement and infrastruc-

India, Ltd., which covered British India and ture, and organize and manage agricultural

China, with oMces in Calcutta, Bombay, production on the land it leased. So, in this

Karachi, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Amoy. respect, it was not a sub-contract system, but

And to facilitate trading as well as to expand it differed from a typical plantation-an ex-

business interests, the warehousing cornpany panse of contiguous land over which the

N.V. Midden Java Veem, the regional ship- owner had complete control. ping company N.V. Heap Eng Moh Steamship In the prewar period, Oei Tiong Ham Con-

Co., and the bank N.V. Bank Vereeniging

1) For an overview of Oei Tiong Ham Concern in the OeiTiongHamweresetup. Furthermore,in "The early 1930s, see Story of Krebet," Krebet, Malang in East where a sugar Java, [Semara.ng], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan, `The 1932 and Oei Tieng Harn Concern: A Short plantation and a sugar mill were operated, Oei Survey of its Development and Progress," " "tnAt:ft, The Center for Southeast Asian [], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan, Studies, Kyoto University 1934,

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cern was the first as well as largest Chinese- later).Z)

owned business empire in the region we call The trading company Kian Gwan was

today the ASEAN. It started growing rap- founded by Oei Tiong Ham's father, Oei Tjie

idly in the 1890s, and had become a diversified Sien (1835-1900>, an immigrant from Tong-an business group by the early 1910s. In the in Ch'uanchou District, Fukien Province.

prewar peried, Thailand was the backwater of Unlike most of the Chinese who came to

Southeast Asia, and it was not until the 1930s in the 19th century, Tjie Sien

that a modern business conglomerate began seems to have had a basic Chinese classical

appearing there in its embryo form (for exam- education in his youth. For some reason, he

ple, the Wang Lee group>. In the Philippines, became involved in the Taiping Rebellion,

a modern business appeared earlier than in and had to flee the ceuntry. Around 1858 he

Thailand, but it was confined largely to a came to Semarang in , where he single industry (for example, China Banlcing started petty trading. His granddaughter,

Corporation), and no modern business con- Oei Hui Lan, describes his position at this

glomerate appeared there in the prewar stage as follows: period. In British Malaya, since it became an important supply source for the West and the With his small hoardings he purchased

Chinese were given a great deal of freedom in cheap porcelain saucers and bowls which he

the economy, as in the Netherlands East In- peddled from door to door in baskets hung

dies, modern business conglomerates ap- from a bamboo yoke. He bargained dog-

peared relatively early, but none equaled the gedly, haggled shrewdly over each copper

size of Oei Tiong Ham Concern. The coin, then re-invested infinitesimal profits in business fortunes of such successful tin more bowls and saucers and smal1 packets

miners as Eu Tong Sen and Loke Yew were of rice. Slowly, painstakingly, Tjie Sien

more limited in size as well in scope, and also managed to save [Koo 1943: 6].

they were short-lived. The Ho Hong group

built by Lim Peng Siang in the 1910s was the Semarang was a good place for a Chinese to

most diversined group in Malaya at that time, settle. It being the major harbor for Central

but it could not have been larger than Oei Java, such native produce as sugar and gam-

Tiong Ham Concern (which, after all, man- bir were brought there to be shipped outside,

aged five sugar plantations and owned five sugar and Chinese wares and other foreign products

mills, ameng others), and, since it started to passed through there for distribution in the

decline after the First World War, its life was city and its hinterland. In fact, at the time Tjie

short. Tan Kah Kee's business empire, Sien arrived, Semarang was the largest com-

which reached its peak a little later than the mercial city in all Java. Batavia did not have

Ho Hong group, was also 1imited in scope and, much hinterland trade, and in the case of

as in the case of the Ho Hong group, short- Surabaya, it was after the advent of corporate

lived began facing financial trouble in the (it 2> For fumher discussion on Chinese capitalism in this late 1920s and went bankrupt several years period, see [Yoshihara 1988: Ch, M]. 138

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YosmHARA K.: Introduction

capitalism and the age of steamships that it claims, but it is diMcult to take what they say

became the premier city of Java [Onghokham at face value since they may be unconsciously

1989: 160]. exaggerating the modernness of Kian Gwan

In the mid-19th century, when Tjie Sien at that time, projecting into it the modern em-

arrived in Semarang, the production of export bryo of what later came to be known as Oei

crops was still under the government-super- Tiong Ham Concern. Undoubtedly,

visedculturesystem. Thus,despiteitspremier however, with Kian Gwan, Oei Tjie Sien

position in trading, Semarang did not have became a wholesale trader (a considerable im-

such vitality as it would enjoy in the late 19th prevement of his fortune from a peddler), and

century. It was with the passage of the in the next few decades, with hard work and

Agrarian Law in 1870 that Dutch private business acumen, he made it a respectable

capital began pouring into Java to set up plan- trading company.

tations and processing facilities (sugar planta- It is most natural to think that Kian Gwan

tions and mills in panicular). As a result of formed the basis for Oei Tieng Ham's

such large inflow of capital from the business career. In fact, Tjoa Soe Tjong and

Netherlands, the commercial landscape of Liem Thian Joe expect us to believe that [Tjoa

Java (as well as Sumatra later on) went 1963: 604-6e5 ; Ceppel 1989: 184]. But Liem through a dramatic transformation. In par- Tjwan Ling and Oei Hui Lan, though they do

ticular, Central and emerged as the not deny this interpretation, tell us, in pass-

major center of sugar production in the ing, a legend which can throw a different light world. As the port of Central Java, on it. This is about a retired German consul

Semarang began experiencing a rapid in- who decided to spend the rest of his life in

crease in business activities, especially in Java. He leased a house from Tjie Sien and

sugar and sugar-related trading, in the 1870s. came to know his son, Oei Tiong Ham, who

Oei Tjie Sien was well prepared to take ad- oftenvisitedhimtocollectrent. TheGerman･ vantage of this expansion [Liem 1979: 8-18]. subsequently became quite impressed with After several years of hard work, he set up the his ability, and offered a substantial sum of

trading company Kian Gwan in 1863. At this money (Oei Hui Lan says it was 300,OOO

stage, it may have been an ordinary trading guilders, whereas Liem Tjwan Ling says it

company, but Tjoa Soe Tjong and Liem was 300,OOO dollars) for Oei Tiong Ham to

Tjwan Ling tend to give us the impression start a business. Oei Tiong Ham used this that at that time, Kian Gwan was already a money to buy sugar mills in the 1890s [Koo

large, modern company. Liem Tjwan Ling 1943: 12; Liem 1979: 48].

says that Oei Tjie Sien had saved three million This may be regarded as sheer legend, but

guilders by that time [Liem 1979: 10], Oei Tiong Ham may have first gone into

whereas Tjoa Soe T;jong says that it was formed business on his own, become fairly successful

as a limited liability company and managed in this way, and taken over his father's

by an outsider named Ang Tai Lion [Tjoa business,KianGwan. Hislifephilosophyand 1963: 604]. There is no data to refute these method of business seem to have been quite

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different from those of his father. Tjie Sien himchafewithimpatience. Increasingfric-

was proud of being a traditional Chinese. He tion seemed unavoidable unless Tiong Ham spoke Chinese at home, wore a Chinese dress launched out on his own [Koo 1943: 11]. and a pigtail, and ate Chnese (>

food. And he insisted on having his family In the mid-1890s, when Oei Tiong Ham was follow a Chinese life style [Liem 1979: 17- stil1 in his mid-twenties, which was several 18]. In contrast, Oei Tiong Ham was more years before his father died, he began buying

modern-oriented. On the difference between sugar mills. If he became independent

them, his daughter Hui Lan rnakes the follow- because of his diffbrences with his father and

ing observation: thus without his help, how did he amass such

a large sum of money as.needed to buy five

He [Oei Tiong Ham] was out of sympathy sugar mills at that time? He may have been an

with the narrow, conventional Chinese of extraordinarily clever trader and made a for-

Semarang [to this group Oei Tjie Sien tune in a short time, but it may be more

belonged] and wanted to be entirely in- reasonable to think that he had a financial

dependent. Though it was impossible to backer, such as the former Gerrnan consul as

break his racial ties, he adopted as many oc- told in the legend.

cidental ideas as possible both in his private This legend becomes more credible as we 1ife and in his business affairs [Koo 1943: start questioning how Oei Tiong Harr) carne to 32-33]. know the Western method of business. He

went to a Chinese school, and did not speak

He had loathed his queue, found it both Dutch. LiemTjwanLingsaysthatOeiTiong

incongruous and embarrassing, but was Ham understood some Dutch since he signed

forced to keep it as long as Grandfather Tjie letters in,Dutch without getting them

"he Sien was alive . Once Papa's hair was cut in translated. But Oei Hui Lan says that

European style he sprayed his head each never succeeded in learning a word of Dutch"

morning with Pinaud's hair lotion... [Koo 1943: 33], and this is confirmed by Oei [Koo 1943: 34]. Tjong Ie [interview : Oei Tjong Ie 1989 : 191].

About signing letters, if they were ordinary

This diiference in 1ife philosophy between letters, Oei Tiong Ham may have trusted his

father and son must have caused confiicts be- subordinates, and thus, it could not be taken

tween them in doing business together, and as evidence of his understanding of the Dutch

may have eventually resulted in his son's in- language.

dependence. OeiHuiLanstatestheproblem If he did not understand Dutch, how did he

as follows: talk to I]hatchnen? There is no question that

he did talk with some Dutchnen on intimate He [Tiong Ham] was soon plunged into terms. Nthough Oei nyong Ie denies this ' funher conflict with his father, whose nar- [Interview: Oei Tjeng Ie 1989: 191], his half- row, old Chinese business methods made sister Hui Lan tells us about Sijthof, the 140

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YosHIHARA K.: Introduction

Dutch Resident of Semarang, who became an bid. Under this system, for about ten years

intimate friend of Oei Tiong Ham's. Unlike starting in the early 1890s, Oei Tiong Ham

in British Malaya, where few British othcials became a major license holder in Central and

spoke Malay and Chinege businessmen had to East Java (in Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakar-

know English if they wanted to talk with ta, and Surabaya), and seemed to have made a

thern, many Dutch ethcials and businessmen profit of about 18 million guilders [Coppel

spoke Malay well, and could talk to Chinese 1989:185;Liem1979:31-32]. TjoaSoeTjong

who learned the language. Although it may argues that Oei Tiong Ham and some other

not have been on intimate terms, Oei Tiong Chinese traders at that time used profits from

Ham must have discussed in Malay com- opium trading for business modernization plicated legal problems with his Dutch [Tjoa 1963: 604]. lawyer, Baron van Heeckren [Koo 1943: 50]. A Chinese business usually remained small, wnen Oei Tiong Ham was still struggling, being family owned and family managed, but

contacts with Dutchmen must have been dith- Oei Tiong Ham was an exception. To under-

cult. The two contacts cited above came stand what made him different from a typical

after he became a successfu1 businessman. Chinese businessman, we should first note

So, a person like the former German consul some ef his personal attributes. As Liem

becomes important in understanding his early Tjwan Ling points out, he was a bright person

years. He was retired and had a lot of free and a hard worker [Liem 1979: 28-29]. When

time; he was educated enough to tell about the he was studying in a Chinese school in

West and its way of business (to act as a Ger- Semarang, he was the best student among his

man consul, he must have had some educa- classmates. Atter he started working, he

tion); and since he decided to retire in Java, he rarely left his othce before his employees, and

must have spoken Malay. When Oei Tiong at home, he usually went to bed after mid-

Ham went to collect rent, he may have spent a night. Also,hewasprobablyaveryenergetic

lot of time with him discussing various mat- person. A glimpse of this is given in the

ters in Malay, and paid a number of purely following description of his appetite by his

social visits in addition. daughter Oei Hui Lan:

Another thing to note about Oei Tiong Ham's early years is the fact that he made a Catering for my father was a diMcult task,

substantial sum of rnoney as an opium as he was an enormous eater. .. he started

trader. Until around 1904, when the system off [his breakfast] with a few mangoes or was abolished and the government-operated papayas, followed by a bowl of steaming

opium ragic took over, the Dutch colonial porridge and climaxed with six fried eggs

government divided Java into various districts and several slices of liver garnished with and made opium trading in each district the lavish curls of bacon, al1 washed down with

monopoly of its license holder. The license bowls of tea. To compose his nerves after

was granted on an open-bidding basis to a this exertion father smoked two fat black trustworthy Chinese who offered the highest cigars [Koo 1943: 331.

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Of course, there were possibly many bright, 1argely Qn their supervision and business energetic persons at that time, so this was strategy. hardly a suMcient condition for business suc- About a typical Chinese businessman, Tjoa

"Conservatism, cess. We should, however, keep in mind Soe Tjong says: nepotism,

some of the innate personal attributes which and a limited knowledge of modern finance had bearing on his success. and organization were his weaknesses" [Tjoa

What made Oei Tiong Ham dilferent from 1963: 605]. Even if the last problem was

an ordinary successful businessman was his solved with the spread of education, the first

business method. He built his business very two problems remained as barriers to Chinese

much like an empire builder in the West, by business modernization, especially in the late

building up professional management and 19th century and the early 20th century when

diversifying into related fields. There were Oei Tiong Ham was building his empire.

other businessmen, like Lim Peng Siang, who From the viewpoint of the typical Chinese

created a conglomerate in Malaya ht about the who were accused ef nepotism and conser-

same time (though a little later and not as vatism, modern business techniques such as

diversined as Oei Tiong Harn Concern), but delegation of authority were too rislry, for by

what made him really unique among the suc- trusting outsiders, for example, they were

cessful Chinese businessmen at that time was more likely to be cheated than rewarded.

the creation of professional management. In Although this was true in general, Oei Tiong

his case, it was the recruitment not only of Ham's innevation was to recognize that there

competent Chinese from outside the family were some competent Europeans and Chinese

(for example, he employed many profes- outside the family who could be trusted, iden-

sionals, e.g. engineers who graduated from tify those people and use them in his

universities in the Netherlands), but also of a business. He must have made some mistakes

number of Dutch professionals (engineers and in judgment and suffbred from their conse- managers). In the late 1930s, at the Krebet quences, but he made more right judgrnents

factory alone, several Europeans were work- and from this, reaped large profits, clearly

ing, and at the other four sugar mills, at least much larger than the losses he suffered from

all managers were Dutchrnen [Interview: Oei misjudgments. Tjong Ie 1989: 195]. Certainly, there were It is interesting to ask how he could identify some Chinese companies which employed one competent, trustworthy people, but there is

or two Westerners, but there was none which no light shed on this in past writings. What

systematically employed so many Western has simply been done is to attribute it to his in-

"[he] professionals as Oei Tiong Ham Concern nate or acquired ski11 by stating that had did. Basically, Oei Tiong Ham needed them a knack for finding right people" [Interview:

"he to make up for the lack of skills and know-how Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 191] or that had a

which the Chinese had not yet mastered. He remarkable fiair for choosing bri11iant up-and-

delegated authority to these professionals coming associates" [Koo 1943: 57]. But we (Dutch as well as Chinese), and concentrated can be more specific about the contents of the 142

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YosHIHARA K.: Introduction

skill. Since in hiring or promoting someone, tsu,companies. Itwasbecomingmoreimpor-

it is not certain whether he will ultimately tant for a top Japanese manager to act as the

turn out to be trustworthy, decision has to be coordinator of a management team, which

made with some uneertainty, and seme peeple tried to gather as much relevant information may have the skil1 to reduce it, one which they as possible (if necessary, from abroad) and

have acquired over time in interpersonal rela- base their decision on rational calculation. At

tionships. Explaining how such a skill is ac- the same time, Western business methods

quired or how it has been acquired is not sim- were studied to improve on the incentive

"right ple. But another aspect of finding the system which would best motivate the

people" is identifying the imctions of a post employees. But in the Concern, after Oei

to be filled and looking inte the qualifications Tiong Ham's death, the non-university of a person to be appointed to the post, and graduates 1ike Tan Tek Peng tried to

this can be more easily explained. For exarn- dominate the university graduates by em-

"intuition" ple, Oei Tiong Ham did not appoint a univer- phasizing in doing business and sity graduate to the top post of the trading com- downgrading the importance of up-to-date in-

pany Kian Gwan, because he thought that a formation in decisien making. Oei Tjong

"daring gambler" would fit it better than a Tjay, who took over Kian Gwan from his haif

university graduate who probably lost the brother Tjong Hauw in the early 1950s,

gambling instinct in the process of rational blames Tan Tek Peng partly for the organiza-

education [Tjoa 1963: 606]. This view was tionalmessheinherited. TjongTjayreplaced formed probably through his experience in Tan Tek Peng with university-educated

sugar trading, the major activity of Kian Tjoa Soe Tjong [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay

Gwan, which was quite speculative due to 1989: 226].

wide price fluctuations. A little before he left Oei Tiong Harn was well aware that Chinese

fer Singapore, Oei Tiong Ham promoted a businesses often suffered from the succession bookkeeper without university education problem. One major problem was that in the /(Tan Tek Peng) to the top post of Kian Gwan Chinese family, all sons could claim a roughly

[Liem 1979: 192]J equal share (this was unlike primogeniture Entrusting management to people like Tan practiced in prewar Japan), and often decided

icekPeng had some drawbacks. Tan Tek to split up the business founded by their /Peng "daring may have been a gambler" and father instead of running it together. been good at earning profits for Kian Gwan. Sometimes, the father created as many But he did not probably understand, or if he businesses as the number of sons, instead of

understood, did not attach enough importance concentrating on the expansion of his main

to the need for building a rational business business, in order to make sure that the

organization. In Japan, for example, at the transfer of ownership would go smoothly after

time Tan Tek Peng was promoted, university his death or retirement. Oei Tiong Ham

graduates were becoming dominant among wanted to make sure that this would not hap-

the top managers of major, especiany zaiba- pen.

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A more diMcult problem was to whom was stil1 in the mother's womb at the time of

ownership should be transferred. As a his death). For some reason he decided to let

typical Chinese, he did not want his daughters all of them inherit his business, thus naming

to inherit it. He had 13 sons and 13 nine heirs altogether, They were one son

daughters, so half of his children were left from the third wife, four sons from the fifth

out.3) In the case of an unincorporated firm, wife, and another four sons from the seventh

which was the typical case at that time, this (or second from the last) wife.

could be decided within the family, but in the This decision may not have been final, and

case of such a large company as Oei Tiong he may have wanted to change it as his

Ham Concern, to disinherit the daughters was younger sons got older and worked in his

a problem since it could come under the I]hitch business. He probably wanted to weed out civi1 law, which was more egalitarian than the those he judged incompetent, as he had done Chinese tztlat law and gave the right of in- earlier. But unfortunately, he died suddenly

heritancetodaughters. Originally,suchfam- of a heart attack in 1924 at the age of 57. So,

ily matters as inheritance were settled within this remained as an unfinished job [Interview:

the Chinese community, but when a serious Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 217].

dispute arose concerning 1arge inheritance, it In the beginning, the succession problem

was often taken to a Dutch court and settled did not seem to be too serious. Only two sons

there [Onghokham 1989: 161]. So, even if (Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong Hauw) had Oei Tiong Ham decided to disinherit his reached majority and participated in manage-

daughters or any sons, this could be chanenged ment. Of course, there must have been some

in court. This seems to have been a major friction between the two. But before it got

reason why he finally left for Singapore where worse, ostensively for health reason, Oei

under the Anglo-Saxon law, it was possible to Tjong Swan decided to pull out (he sold his disinherit some children [Interview: Oei share to the other brothers) and left the

Tjong Cr;jay 1989: 224]. Netherlands East Indies for Europe. This

The next thing to do was to decide whether made it possible for Oei Tjong Hauw to

he should choose all his sons as his heirs or become a dominating figure in the farnily.

only some of them. Apparently, he could try As a whole, Oei Tjong Hauw managed Oei

some sons in business, especially those who Tiong Harn Concern fairly well. Under his

had left school by the early 1920s when he management, Kian Gwan extended its interna-

went to Singapore. Among them, appar- tional as well as national network, and Oei

ently, all but Oei Tjeng Swan and Oei Tjong Tiong Ham Concern went into new areas, Hauw were judged to be incompetent, and such as rubber processing in Sumatra, which were disinherited from his business. Then was to become the mainstay of Kian Gwan In- the remaining question was what to do with donesia in the postwar period, when sugar

the younger sons who had not been tried (one ceased to be a viable export commodity under the socialistic govemment of Sukarno. Oei 3) For a list ef his wives and children with birth dates, see the following appendix, Tiong Hauw, however, probably because of

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his limited education (he was educated in view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 207]. As a result,

Semarang and never went to college), did not discipline weakened, the line of authority got

seem to understand well that success in blurred, and the exercise of strong leadership

modern business depends on organizational became dithcult. This is regarded as one ma- development and eMciency. For example, jor reason for the decline of Oei Tiong Ham unlike the pyramid structure of a Japanese Concern in the postwar period [Interview: Oei

zaibatsu, there was no holding company for Tjong Ie 1989: Section 15]. Oei Tjong

the group. With the power he wielded in the Hauw's sudden death in 1950 (due to a heart

1930s, he could have set up a holding com- attack) added to the problem. After this, pany and put an major operating companies there was no overall organizational control:

under it if he had wanted to. Then, he could the branches the brothers controlled became

"fiefs" have peoled the profits of those companies in- their own [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay to the holding company and use these to pay 1989: 258].

dividends to the family shareholders to keep Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that a Japanese

off incompetent brothers from the company zaibatsu avoided the succession problem

[Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: 260]. because it recruited its successor from outside

But he did not set up a holding cornpany, the family [Tjoa 1963: 607], but this is not and no dividends were ever paid during his true. He seems to have mistaken the manag-

tenure. Then in the late 1930s, as the younger ing director for the successor of a Japanese brothers reached majority, problems began zaibatsu. The main reason for its long life

cropping up, because even if some of them did was the separation of management from

not want to get involved in business, since ownership. InthecaseoftheMitsuizaibatsu there were no dividends to their shares, the in Japan's modern period, the owner family

only way to assure a steady income was to rarely interfered in management; they left it

participate in management. Eventually, all to its professional rnanagers. This practice

brothers who received inheritance par- was established in the process of evolution ticipated in management (the last brother who over the preceding few centuries, as a matter

joined the company was Oei Tjong Tjay, the of necessity to perpetuate the family last son of Oei Tiong Ham's, who joined the business. ForayeungconglomeratelikeOei

company in December 1948), and as was usu- Tiong Ham Concern, this sort of tradition

ally the case, some sons turned out to be could not be expected, but Oei Tiong Ham at

incompetent, in particular the three full least could have restrieted the partieipation of

brothers of Oei Tjong Hauw. When they his heirs in management to one, or at most a

started exercising their rights, problems few, by making the rest of his heirs rentiers

became serious, but not much could be done and strengthening the professional manage-

since they had an equal share as the more com- ment. The strength of a Japanese zaibatsu

petentbrothers. Forexample,iftheywanted lay in the independence its professional

something badly, even if it was not a viable management enjoyed.

business proposition, they could have it [Inter- The ownership structure created problems

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and hindered the smooth development of Oei Dutch colonialism.

Tiong Ham Concern, but a change tn business Under this setting, Oei Tiong Harn Concern climate in the postwar period was possibly a declined, but it was not destined to disap-

more tragic thing for its history. Unlike in pear. Although smaller in size, it could have

the other former colonies in the ASEAN survived the Sukarno period and expanded

region, independence did not come srnoothly again in the New Order period, which revived

in . It had to be fought for, and the capitalisrn and has created a number of new

political leadership which came to power after businessconglomerates. OeiTjongIeargues

independence rejected most of the economic that one important reason for the end of its

institutions which the Dutch had created dur- life was a lack of strong leadership in the Oei

ing the colenial period. It is true that this family after the death of Oei Tjong Hauw in

anti-colonial reaction was moderate in the 1950 [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 199,

beginning, but it accelerated over time as 211]. According to him, the best candidate to

Sukarno gained more power. succeed IZjong Hauw would have been himseif, The most serious change for Oei Tiong but he was bypassed and the youngest brother, Harn Concern was govemment interference in Tjeng Tjay, was selected. But, Tjong Ie the economy. Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that argues, Tjong Tjay was too young at that time this started as early as the 1930s (soon after (he was around 27), and having lived most of

the Great Depression began) [Tjoa 1963: 651], his 1ife abroad, he did not know the Indone- but at that time, it was to regulate production sian lariguage and had diMculties in adjusting

and distribution to overcome the problems to the rough and tumble of postwar Indone-

created by the Depression and was not in- sian politics. He was simply the wrong per-

tended to be long-lasting. That is, it was in- son to head Indonesian operation at that time,

tendedtosavecapitalism,nottodestroyit. In and let it be taken over more and more by pro-

the postwar period, however, the nature of fessional managers 1ike Tjoa Soe Tliong

govemment interference changed. Initially, whose loyalty to the family did not seem too

'Ijong it was used to change the ownership structure strong [Intewiew: Oei Ie 1989: 211]. of capitalism as well as superimpose socialism All this is refuted by Tjong Tjay [Inteiview:

'Iliong 'IZjay igovernment ownership) on capitalism, but Oei 1989: 227]. Although he was later when the government became more inexperienced in the beginning, he sought

disillusioned with capitalism (especially after advice from his nephew Oei Ing Swie ('I;jong

1955 when the Ali Sastroamidjojo govern- Hauw's eldest son) as well as from Tjoa Soe

ment was formed), it was used more and more Tjong. He acted as president director or

to replace capitalism with socialism. Under chairman of the board of directors of Kian

this setting, any capitalist institution had to Gwan Indonesia, but in decision making, he

suffer; Oei Tiong Ham Concern had to suffer always consulted with Ing Swie and Tjoa Soe

more, being the symbol of success of the Tjong, and if there was a difference of opin-

Chinese which the Indonesian government ion, he accepted a decision if the other two

thought of as something of a collaborator of supported it. Tjong Tjay argues that Tjoa

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Soe Tjong was a loyal as well as capable since there were no Oei shareholders left,

manager and that Tjong Ie is not objective management was entrusted to Tjoa Soe

since Tjoa Soe Tjong objected to the way Tjong. This is possibly a sore point for Oei

Tjong Ie wanted to manage Kian Gwan In- Tjong Ie. He argues that if he had been al-

donesia: his way was to use Indonesia as a lowed to head Kian Gwan Indonesia, he could

smuggling base for his Singapore operation. have developed close ties with the military

Tjong Tjay did not stand idle, either, when and depended on them for protection [Inter-

the business environment was ¢ hanging in In- view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 206]. His brother

donesia. Tjong Ie argues that since Tjong Tjong Tjay agrees that he was a super-contact

Tjay could not speak Bahasa Indonesia, he man and that he could have found a patron

could not develop close contacts with the among the military leaders [Interview: Oei

military which, according to Tjong Ie, centrol- TjongTjay1989:240]. Ifhehad,confiscation

led Indonesia [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: might have been avoided. 202]. ButTjongTjayarguesthatinthe1950s, The history of Oei Tiong Harn Concern ended

it was politicians who controlled the govern- abruptly on July 10, 1961, about two years

ment, and that having close ties with the before it was scheduled to celebrate its centen-

military was not as important as his brother nial. On that date, deciding on the suit filed

argues [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: by the government, Pengadilan Ekonomi (the

'Iljong 229]. Tjay approached Partai Sosialis court for economic crimes) in Semarang

Indonesia (PSI) and developed close contacts issued a confiscation order [Tjoa 1963: 677]. with its leaders, such as Professor Sumitro The Indonesian government and the Oei fam-

Djojohadikusumo. In a way, Oei Tiong Ham ily entered into the first legal battle in the

Concern became the financier of PSI. At the Netherlands on a blocked reserve fund held

same time, Tjong Tjay developed close ties by Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam. The fund

with the rnoderate faction of Partai Nasional was originally deposited with the Javasche

Indonesia(PNI). Unfortunately,thepolitical Bank, but after the bank was nationalized and

situation changed quickly in the 1950s, and renamed Bank Indonesia, it became a deposit

once powerful persons were out not only of with Bank Indonesia. The Oei family asked

the government but also of the country (for ex- Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam to release the

ample, Professor Sumitro). In the late 1950s, fund, but the bank refused, so they sued the

politics became too radical for capitalists like bank in the Netherlands. They won the case

Tjong Tjay, and there were no political and got the reserve fund back [Interview: Oei

leaders who were powerfu1 enough to protect Tjong Tjay 1989: 248], but the government

his business. seems to have felt sore about it. Oei Tjong Ie

At this point, as his brother Tjong Ie feels that the suit in Semarang was the Indone-

argues, he should have stayed in Indonesia sian government's retaliation for it.4)

and developed close ties with the military. Many Indonesian Chinese feel that the chief

But by 1958 he had become fed up with In-

donesia and left for the Netherlands. And 4) Letter from Oei Tjong Ie

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tormentor of the Oei family was the public pro the Amsterdam oMce cut down its operation

secutor Gunawan. It is said that beinga fer- drastically, whereas the Singapore oMce

vent nationalist, he hated the Chinese, in par- declined gradually over time and today re-

ticular, Oei Tiong Ham Concern as the sym- mains only as a smal1 engineering firm; Kian

bol of Chinese success. From the Indonesian Gwan(Malaya)nolongerexists. Itisonlythe nationalist viewpoint, however, he was an in- Bangkok othce which did well in the post-con- corruptible nationalist whom Oei Tiong Ham fiscation period [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989:

Concern could not bribe, and took action Section 13].

against it since it had violated law. It is not To those who are familiar with successfu1

clear which view is correct, but he was clearly Chinese business families in Southeast Asia in

the product of Indonesian nationalism which the prewar period and in the early postwar

had a streak of anti-Chineseness at that time. period, the Oei family seems a little odd. A

But it is wrong to think that he acted alone. typical successful Chinese family at that time

As Oei Tjong Tjay argues, the confiscation of was very Chineseoriented: the members

his company was a result of the political spoke Chinese and retained a great deal of

change in the socialist direction which started Chinese culture. If they spoke English or

in the mid-1950s. From the direction in another Western language, they spoke it as

'IZjong which the country was moving, Tjay the second language. In the case of the Oei

argues, confiscation was a matter of time. family, tlie first generation (Oei Tjie Sien) was What surprised him a little was that it came very Chinese, and the second generation (Oei

soonerthanexpected. Andhedoesnotthink Tiong Ham) was still Chinese though his

any particular person masterminded the con- Chineseness was not as much as his father's,

fiscation, but if a single person should be but the third generation Oeis had little

named, it rnust be President Sukarno hirnself Chineseness left. Even Oei T:jong Hauw,

since he was at the vanguard of the political who headed the family for about 25 years

'T;jong change at that time [Interview: Oei since the mid-1920s, did not have a good nyay 1989: 249]. Mter all, he cleared a legal command of a ; he went

barrier by issuing a law which acted against to a Dutch-medium school in Semarang and

the legal defense launched by the Oei family seemed to have conducted business 1argely in

[Interview: Oei Tiong Tjay 1989: 251-252]. Dutch and Malay (to be more exact, Pasar The Indonesian government ceuld not Malay). His half-brother Tjong Tjay, who

touch Oei Tiong Ham Concern's subsidiaries took over after his death, spoke neither

and assets abroad. The oMces in Singapore, Chinese nor Indonesian well. The brothers

Amsterdarn, New York, and Bangkok re- talked to each other in Dutch. In many ways,

mained, but they were seriously affected by the the third generation Oeis were Dutch-

confiscation, because their activities centered oriented. Yet, they were not only accepted in

around the trade with Indonesia. Without the Chinese community but also regarded as ties with Indonesia, it was difficult to sur- its leader [interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: Sec-

vive. The New York oMce soon closed, and tion 13].

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The so-called peranakan Chinese in In- on the surface, since they retained (or were

donesia, to which the third generation Oeis forced to retain) Chinese names, hair and

belong, was a different breed of Chinese in dress styles, and some other characteristics.

Southeast Asia. In the other countries in the This group constituted the peranakan

region, except a smal1 group of baba Chinese Chnese, in contrast with the China-born,

in Malacca, the people who were regarded as Chinese-speaking"singkeh." Inthe1sthcen-

Chinese usually spoke Chinese. Those who tury, it was from this peranakan greup that

did not were quickly absorbed into indigenous the business elites of the Chinese community,

society and were not regarded as Chinese called cahairg atas, came. For example, the

anymore. In Thailand, for example, where tax and revenue farrners and Chinese

there was a constant influx of Chinese from oMcers (such as major and lieutenant) who

southern China over a long period of time, a were chosen from the cabatrg alas group

large number of their descendants seerned to were predominantly peranakan Chinese

"lost" have been to Thai society. In the [Onghokham 1989: 163]. Philippines, too, the assimilation process went There was no strong reason for the Oei fam-

on; the more recently assimilated Chinese ily to remain culturally Chinese. The

were called mestizos and as Filipinos, peranakan Chinese they dealt with usuany

spearheaded economic and social changes in spoke Malay, and their major product, sugar, the country [Wiekberg 1964]. had a stronger linkage with the West than However, this sort of assimilation did not with the Chinese (its market was there and

take place in Indonesia. The Dutch kept the machines necessary for its production came

Chinese separate frem the indigenous popula- from there also). And to carry on a modern

tion by restricting their freedom of residence business conglomerate, there were mere ad-

and traveling. As in other Southeast Asian vantages in being Dutch-oriented than

countries, since Chinese women did not come Chinese-oriented. For example, to handle its

in a large number until the late 19th century, legal problems, Dutch-trained and Dutch-

the Chinese usually took indigenous women speaking lawyers provided better services

as their wives, and their children grew up (and protection), and for trade finance, Dutch

under the cultural infiuence of indigenous (and possibly to some extent British) banks methers. But because of the Dutch policy to had more money to lend and offered a wider

keep the Chinese separate from the in- range of services. And the colonial

digenous population, they remained a cultur- bureaucracy which they had to deal with fre-

allyseparategroup. ButtheywerenotChnese quently, despite its manifestly laissez faire

in the sense that the term is usually policy, was Dutch-speaking. If the Chinese

understood. Instead of Chinese, they usually language skill was really needed, people who

spoke Malay {some even spoke Dutch in addi- spoke Chinese could be hired. But the areas

tion in the late 1sth century), and absorbed a where it was necessary were quite limited

number of indigenous customs. But they (such as the distribution of imported con-

were more Chinese than indigenous, at least sumer goods to retailers).

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Today, it is not unusual for a large Chinese petitive environment, but there is no need to

businessman in Southeast Asia not to speak do this in a relatively early stage of develop-

Chinese. Such a Chinese businessman is ment since accumulated profits and borrow-

usually non-Chinese educated and more ings from financial institutions can easily

familiar with Western business techniques (he make up for the capital which can be raised in

has gone to either an English-medium schoel the stock market. However, family rnanage-

or local language=medium school, and may ment is often a poor substitute for profes-

have even studied in the West). His Chinese sional management. And thus, for a con-

cultural base is weak and, in some eases, siderable period of time, professional manage- dubious, but we consider him Chinese ment is a by far more important parameter

because carrying a or being the defining business modernization than public

son or grandson of a Chinese immigrant, he is ownership. What Oei Tiong Ham did was

regarded as an outsider by the indigenous not fu11-scale but intermediate modernization;

society and has developed some Chinese given the historical circumstances, in- identity. The third generation Oeis are this termediate rnodernization was the only choice

type of Chinese who became more prevalent left and the surest way to fu11-scale moderniza-

among the successfu1 Chinese in the postwar tion. It should be remembered that in

period. Japanese modernization, the zaibatsu did not The Oei family was a precursor of the go beyond intermediate modernization until

Chinese business community in another way. the postwar period.

By building a large business based on delega- Oei Tiong Ham was a business pioneer in tion of authority and professional manage- stil1 another way. It is often thought that

ment, Oei Tiong Ham shattered the Chinese capital is commercial and financial

stereotype that the Chinese are tradition- capital, or that since the Chinese do not want

bound and cannot develop a modern business to invest in such long-term assets as industrial

organization. Despite this accomplishment, machinery, Chinese capital cannot become in-

however, critics may argue that he kept his dustrial capita1. But this view is completely

business family owned and in this respect, he wrong. In Southeast Asia today, there are

was not fu11y modern-at least, he was more many Chinese-owned big factories (for exam-

traditional than some of the Chinese ple, Liem Sioe Liong's Indocement in

businessmen today who actively use the stock Cibinong, Indonesia, which is the biggest ce-

market for raising capital. But one should ment complex in Asia) and high-story

note that among the large companies (1ike buildings (for example, OUB Centre in

Japanese zaibatsu) in prewar Asia, a family- Singapore, which is the tallest building in owned company was the norm and that a fam- Asia). And that view was proven wrong by

ily-owned company was often better run than Oei Tiong Ham almost a century ago when he

a public cornpany. A farnily-owned company began investing in sugar mills. Given an en-

may have to become eventually a public com- vironment in which long-term calculation is

pany if it wants to continue to grow in the com- possible, the Chinese are willing to invest in

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"the long-term assets, and thus, Chinese capital nand Braudel would argue, subset of a

can be converted into industrial capital. If this greater set" [Braudel 1979; 458-461]. One

is not done, it is because the Chinese feel in- crucial component of the greater set is the at-

secure in their countries of residence and titude of the government toward business; since they have to take capital with them especially how much freedom the government

when they have to leave, they want to keep gives to business and how political power is

their capital in liquid form. regulated when it is exercised over business.

To get into the manufacturing industry, one In Dutch Java, the Chinese were

major problem the Chinese faced was modern discriminated against in many ways (e.g.

technology. But this turned out not so they were not allowed to travel freely or

serious a barrier as generally thought. It is reside in the place of their choice), but Chi-

true that in order to establish modern industry nese discriminatien becarne less of a problem and spearhead technological progress on a cor- from the late 19th century [Onghokham 1989: porate level, there has to be a well developed 173], as the colonial government created the

technological environment supported by institutional order in which Dutch private

learned institutions, but it is not tenibly difficult capital could play a major role in develep-

to master mature technologies. In the case of ment. Oei Tiong Ham and many other

Oei Tiong Ham Concern, a number of Dutch Chinese benefited from this legal-institutional

engineers were used, but as some Chinese order.

came back with engineering degrees from the Unfortunately, after independence, the

Netherlands, they began taking over technical colonial economic order was rejected in

posts from the Dutch (for example, Yap Kie Indonesia. This was also bound to happen in

Ling, who replaced two Dutch engineers in the Philippines and Malaya, but in Indonesia,

the headquarters in Semarang in the 193es since the people had to fight for in-

[Liern 1979: 218]). Lower levels of dependence, rejection of the colonial order

technical skill had been handled by the came sooner and in a more drastic way than in

Chinese staff much earlier (for example, the the Philippines and Malaya where there were

skil! to work on an engine was probably first no political upheavals in the transition to in-

mastered on a steamship and transferred later dependence. What replaced the colonial

to factories such as sugar mills [Interview: Oei econemic order of Indonesia was eventually a Tjong Ie 1989: 195]). In a way, Oei Tiong government-dominated, autarkic economy.

Ham Concern was a pioneer in the replacement Foreign capital was regarded more and more

of Western engineers with Chinese and the as an instrument for perpetuating colonialism

introduction of new technologies, which became and finally nationalized by the government

more common among the Chinese firms in (Dutch capital in 1957, British capital in 1963,

later, especially pestJwar, years. and American capital in 1965). And also,

The growth and decline of Oei Tiong Ham there was an anti-Chinese feeling as a reaction

Cencern rnake us acutely aware that to Dutch colonialism: Indonesian leaders

businesses are, as the French historian Fer- tended to regard the Chinese as the collabora-

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tors of the Dutch in the exploitation of their One may argue that government interven-

country. Governrnent intervention in the tion is necessary to control Chinese economic

economy was not bad by itself, but Indonesia, power and promote indigenous participation

like many other newly independent countries, in the modern economy. We are well aware

did not know how to rationally contain and that the Chinese are still a political and social

regulate the exercise of government power in problem in Indonesia, but it should be realized

the economy. Like a typical revolutionary il- that economic development is a terribly dirn-

literate in economics, Sukarno, who emerged cult task. In the early postwar period, as a as the dominant leader of Indonesia in the sort of negative reaction to the prewar

1950s, rejected capitalism as a supporting in- ideologies to perpetuate colonial rule, op- stitution of colonialism and in the process of timistic views on the prospect for develop-

replacing it with socialism, destroyed the eM- ment became dominant among the intellec-

ciency of the economy. It was under this tuals in both developed and developing coun-

anti-Chinese and anti-capitalistic setting that tries, but after a few decades of in-

Oei Tiong Ham Concern declined. dependence, economic development (in the

What made the simation worse was con- sense that the masses, being liberated from

siderable skepticism about economic poverty, enjoy a decent standard of living) is liberalism and support for extensive govern- still a distant hope. Optimism still remains

ment interference arnong the intellectuais strong, but if the past records and prevailing

who had been influenced by socialist and economic situation are objectively reassessed,

liberal political ideologies in the West. This ene would get struck with the enormity of the

intellectual atmosphere still remains today developmentproblem. TheChineseproblem

and affects the role of government in the should be dealt with within this context. economy. But one has to realize that when The decline of Oei Tiong Harn Concern in

government is not good government, exten- the postwar period and its confiscation by the

sive government interference can easily Sukarno government in 1961 were undoubt- bankrupt the economy. It may be emotion- edly painful events for the Oei family as

ally diMcult to accept the possibility that one's well as for the people who worked for the cem-

own government is not good, but if it is not pany. At the same time, they were tragic

good, it is better to face up to the reality. To events for the Indonesian economy as a judge whether a particular government is whole. In that period, all ratiomally run geod or not and whether it will improve in per- businesses suffered, being subjected

forrnance in the near future may not be easy, to the abuse of govemmental power. But but in Indonesia, judging from past records this was tolerated because the intellectual

and the miserable standard of living today, climate at that time was such that something

government performance is far from satisfac- was intrinsically wrong with the economic

tory, and the economy seems to considerably liberalism of the colonial period. Fortunately

improve if economic liberalism was restored (from the economic viewpoint), Sukarno was as the dominant economic ideology. ousted from power in 1965, and a new political 152

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YosmHARA K.: Introduction

order was established. As a result, the view of economic slowdown in recent years in

economy has impreved in the past two decades, the country, now is a good time to reflect on

but a legacy of government intervention the virtue of the old economic liberalism

still remains strong. whieh brought about the rise of such an In-

What a developing country like Indonesia donesian business empire as Oei Tieng Ham

has to do is to restore the old liberal economic Concern. If it is restored, we may be able to

ideology which regards private initiative as witness the rise of dynamic capitalism which

the primary force of economic development. once spearheaded economic development in

Certainly, economic development (as just the country and will undoubtedly do so again

defined above) cannot be brought about in a in the future.

short time, buta great deal can be done to im-

prove the economic situation. For example, References since the gap in wages between Japan and In-

donesia, which is over 40 times,5) can generate Braudel, Fernand. 1979. Civ;'lieatibn atid Cmpilalism; 15 th-18 th Cent#ry. Vol, I; 7)ke PVheel of Com- export, Indonesia can export a nurnber of pro- merce. New York: Harper and Row. more near ductssoon and stil1 in the futureas Coppel, Charles. 1989. Liem Thian Joe's Unpublished

History of Kian Gwari. ll)nan Klendy" more capital is accumulated and more ex- Aiin [Soutiheast Asian Studies] 27(2): 177-187, This increase in exports perience.isgained. Interview: Oei Tjong Ie. 1989, Tonan Ajia KenZrytt

Asian Studies] 27(2): 188-220. win enable Indonesia to reduce the gap in [Southeast Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay. 1989. Ibnan Ajia Kenky" wages and income with Japan and raise its liv- [Southeast Asian Studies] 27(2): 221-265. ing standard. Of course, Indonesia can direct Koo. Hui-lan (Madame ). 1943. An Autoblog7rmpity as 7lold to Mitry Vizn Rensselaer exports to other countries (especially high- Thq)iet: New York: Dial Press.

income ¢ ountries). What is important is to Liem Tjwan Ling. 1979. 0ei 7]iong Hbm: Rnja Gula.

Surabaya: realize that trade can act as the engine of privatelyprinted. Onghokham. 1989. Chinese Capitalism in I]hitch Java. But for this to come about, the growth. Ibnan diia Kbndyu [Southeast Asian Studies] economic system of the country has to 27(2): 156-176. Tjoa Soe Tjong. 1963, O.T.H.C.-100 Jaar: Een restrain and regulate the exercise of govern- Stukje Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesia. ment power in the economy and encourage Eeonomische Slatische Bert'chten, June 26, July 10, and July 17, private initiative. This is essentially what the Wickberg, Edgar. 1964. The Chinese Mestizo in old liberal economic ideology preached. Philippine History, llmmal oj" Sbutheast Asinn

History. March, There is nothing wrong with an old ideology. Yoshihara,Kunio.1988. TheRiseofEVsatzCqPitalism In fact, new ones caused a fiasco and brought in thuthcast Asia. Singapore: Oxiord University economic misery to postwar Indonesia. In Press.

5) According to the most recent issue of Asiaweek available at the time of this writing Uune 3, 1988>, Indonesia's per capita GDP is $500, while Japan's is $22,825.

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Appendix:The Oei Family

I. Oei Djing Poe {1789-1877) wife: Tjan Moay Nio (1792-1857)

sons

1, Oei King Tjien 2. 0ei King Tauw 3. 0ei Wie Sian 4. 0ei Sien Tlo 5. 0ei Ing Soen 6. 0ei Tjie Sien '[jie I, Oei Sien (1835-1900> wife: TZjan Bien Nio (1839-1896)

sons

1. 0ei Tiong Tjhian (1oft in China) 2. 0ei Tiong Harn 3. 0ei Tiong Bing 4. 0ei Tiong An {stiilborn?)

M. Oei Tiong Ham (1866-1924) wife children

a) Goei Bing Nio 1.2.1.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.1.2.L2.3.4.5.1.L2.3.4.5.LOei Tjong Lan (f} <1886- ?) Oei Hui Lan (f)(1889- ) b> The Khiam Nio Oei Djoe Nio (D (1903-- ?) c) The Tjik Nio Oei Tjong Tee (m) (1895- ?) Oei Hwari Nio (f) (1897- ?) Oei Tjong Swan (m) (1899- ?) Oei Oen Nio {f) <1900- ?) Oei C[Zjong Yoe (m) (1903- ?) Oei TZjong Tiong (m) {1904- ?) Clei Liang Nio (f) (1906- ?) Clei Tjong Liarn (m) (1906- ?) Oei Siok Kiong Nio (f) (1910-- ?) d) Ong Tjiang TZjoe Nio Oei Siok ICiong Nio (f) (1907- ?) Oei Bien Nio {f) (1913-- ?} e) Ong Mie Hoa Nio Oei Tjong Hauw (m) (1904-1950} Oei Swat Nio (f)(1908- ?) Oei [:jong Tjiat (m) (1909-1957) Oei TZjong Yan (m) {1912- ?} Oei Tjong lk (m) {1916- ) O Njoo Swat Ting Nio Oei Siek Ing Nio (f) {1915- ?) g) Ho Kiem Hea Nio Oei IZjong Ie (m) {1918- } Oei Twan Nio (f) (1920- ) Oei TZjong Bo {rn) (1922-･ ) Oei T:jong Hiong (m) (1923- ) Oei TZjong Tjay {m) {1924- ) h) Tan Sien Nio Oei Siang Nio (f) (?- ?)

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N. Oei Tjong Tee (M-c-1) children: 1. 0ei Ping Yan (f) 2. 0ei Leodi (f) Oei Tjong Swan (M-c-3) children: 1. 0ei Ing Tjhing {m) 2. 0ei Ing Hing (m) 3, Oei Ing Bian (m} 4, Oei Ing Wan (m) Oei Tjong Liam (M-c-8) children: 1, Oei Ing Siang (m) 2, Oei Ing Ie {m) Oei Tjong Hauw (M-e-1) wife: Be Hien Nio children: 1. 0eilngSwie(m) 2. 0ei Ing Lhie (m) 3. 0ei Ing Gie (m} Oei Tjong Tjiat {M-e-3) wife: B.Betuwe -e-5} Oei Tjong Ik (M wife: L.A. Livain children: 1. 0ei Ing King (m> 2. 0ei Ing Tjiang (m) 3. 0ei Ing Tjee (m> 4. 0ei Lian Hwa (O Oei Tjong Ie {M-g--1} wife: M.S.Mathysen children: 1, Oei Ing Tjien (m) 2. 0ei Ing Kiang (m) -g-4) Oei Tjong Hiong

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