10-2 08-2007

Volume 10, No. 2 ß August 2007 Contents

The purpose of Strategic Assess- 4 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front ment is to stimulate and enrich Meir Elran the public debate on the issues that are, or should be, on Israel’s 11 Wars Aren't Waged in the Summer? How Israel and Syria national security agenda. Might Find Themselves at War Strategic Assessment is written Dani Berkovich by INSS researchers and guests 16 The Syrian Army Buildup and is based, for the most part, Yiftah Shapir on research carried out under INSS auspices. The views pre- 23 A Distorted Self-Image: On the IDF and its Responsibility sented here, however, are those for Civilians of the authors alone. Yehuda Wegman 31 IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept Yoaz Hendel 40 Command and Authority in the IDF: The Winograd Challenge Gabriel Siboni 45 Israel vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Editor-in-Chief Thrust of Force Zvi Shtauber Roni Bart Managing Editor Moshe Grundman 53 At the End of the Day, Hamas Too Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick Editor Judith Rosen 61 Sino-Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Graphic Design Yoram Evron Michal Semo 71 Saudi-Israel Dialogue: What Lies Ahead? Photography Sarah Yizraeli State of Israel Government Press Office 79 Back to the Future on Iran: A Problematic Return to IDF website Getty Images, Image Bank Negotiations Emily B. Landau 82 How Powerful is the Iranian "Oil Weapon"? Nizan Feldman 92 Turkey vs. the Kurds in Northern Iraq: Approaching Military Intervention? Gallia Lindenstrauss

The Institute for National Security Studies 40 Haim Levanon Street ß POB 39950 ß Tel Aviv 61398 Israel Tel: + 972-3-640-0400 ß Fax: + 972-3-744-7590 ß E-mail: [email protected]

The summer of 2007 recalls many memo- could spark a war between Israel and Syria ries and painful experiences of the Second resulting from mistaken intentions, direct or Lebanon War exactly one year ago. Inqui- indirect challenges, or the escalation of the ries abound and reports are submitted, and Palestinian, Iranian, or Lebanese theaters. the Winograd Commission’s final report has Yiftah Shapir then surveys the recent build- not yet been published. In the wake of last up of the Syrian armed forces, arguing that summer’s less than optimal military perfor- for a military that has long been neglected, a mance, the analysis of IDF doctrine, organi- process of this sort is natural and not inher- zation, and military tenets is still underway. ently cause for concern. Both authors agree Joining the soul-searching and the practical that rhetoric and military preparations aside, changes have been rumors of an impending neither Syria nor Israel is interested in a war war with Syria, and the respective prepara- any time soon. tions that the IDF and the Syrian armed forc- The three articles that follow deal with es have taken over the past year – partly with certain IDF-related matters that have come last summer’s experience in mind. These to the fore in the wake of the Second Leba- subjects figure highly on the public agenda non War. Analyzing the military events of and comprise a major portion of this issue of July-August 2006, Yehuda Wegman argues Strategic Assessment. that the IDF was hard-pressed to fulfill its In the opening article, Meir Elran, not- mission due to post-modern and post-heroic ing the recently issued state comptroller’s ideas and operational practices that have fil- report on the preparedness and performance tered into the military but essentially deny it of the home front during the Second Leba- its potential for victory. Col. (res.) Wegman non War, analyzes some of the main issues stresses that any military that shuns ground in Israel’s civilian defense abilities, and pro- maneuvers as a fundamental tool for victory poses a model for overall improvement in and that elevates its soldiers’ lives over the management of future threats. Emphasizing lives of those they are said to protect – which that the traditional distinction between the in his view has happened in the IDF – from civilian rearguard and the battlefront no lon- the outset forfeits the war. The next article, ger holds, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Elran argues that on special units in the IDF, is by Yoaz Hen- a new national authority must be created to del. The author argues that given the impor- prepare the home front adequately for future tant role assigned to special units both in the confrontations. IDF and in the public mind, the IDF must The following two articles touch on the redesign the operational concept behind possibility of war with Syria. Dani Berkovich these units so that they are utilized more ef- sketches some scenarios of deterioration that fectively in the future – certainly more than

in the 2006 war. The third article on the IDF, sures Israel should take to enhance these im- by Gabriel Siboni, challenges the conclusions portant relations. Dr. Sarah Yizrraeli studies of the Winograd Commission interim report the Saudi Arabian political regime and the on command authority in the Israeli military. religious-political constraints that prevent While the commission advises that a sol- the kingdom’s leaders from engaging in of- dier’s loyalty must be first to his profession ficial Israel-Saudi dialogue. and not to his commander, Col. (res.) Siboni The ongoing Iranian challenge is ad- insists this principle is liable to bring about a dressed in the following two articles. Dr. Em- collapse of the norms of command that are so ily Landau observes that events of the recent essential to the IDF. months have once again played into Iran’s August 2007 marks two years since Isra- hands, and instead of a united, determined el’s disengagement from Gaza, yet the Pal- effort to impose heavier sanctions on Iran, estinian issue has clearly not progressed as the international community has agreed yet Israel would have liked. Two articles in this once more to negotiate with Iran, with the issue of Strategic Assessment address Isra- likely outcomes favorable to Iran. In other el’s policy options against the background of words, Iran has succeeded in steering the Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and the develop- situation and fashioning the response of the ments in the Palestinian arena. Dr. Roni Bart West, rather than the other way around. In argues that the current Palestinian political the article that follows, Nizan Feldman stud- situation provides Israel an historic opportu- ies how diplomatic and military efforts to nity both to strengthen Fatah as its potential block Iran’s nuclear ambitions are in the long diplomatic partner and, free of constraints run likely to influence the energy market. necessarily imposed by the Palestinian uni- While future measures against Iran may well ty government, to act against Hamas with drive up the price of oil, the author clarifies a decisive and concerted effort. In contrast, that specific measures can be taken to offset Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick contend the shock to the oil market. that the way for Israel to cultivate a viable The final article of this issue, by Gallia and effective diplomatic partner is to engage Lindenstrauss, considers Turkey’s options in dialogue with Hamas as part of an overall vis-à-vis the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Palestinian framework. opportunities and risks of military interven- The remaining five articles of this issue tion. The decisive victory of the Islamic-ori- look beyond these arenas to other fields of ented Justice and Development Party in the strategic interest to Israel. Yoram Evron sur- recent elections indicates a certain weaken- veys the history of diplomatic relations being of the Turkish military, so that the pres- tween Israel and China, and particularly in sure on the political echelon for military in- light of the past years’ tension over specific tervention in northern Iraq may ebb, at least military sales, recommends specific mea- to a degree.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front Meir Elran

The state comptroller’s report on the preparedness and performance of the home front during the Second Lebanon War1 determined that the State of Israel’s political and military leaders, each within the confines of his/her office, failed in the decision making, preparations, and performances with regard to the home front. The serious defects were defined in terms of neglect and abandonment; or to borrow from the imagery of the state comptroller, “an eclipse” of governmental function.2 In the comptroller’s thick and detailed report, with its incisive survey and harsh criticism of the many serious defects in the home front’s preparedness and the deficient performance of the relevant agencies during the war, few new ob- servations emerged. The problems were apparent during the war itself, and were subsequently investigated and documented in numerous media articles3 and in the reports of public committees. These include the initial (September 2006) and final report of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs sub-committee, headed by Ami Ayalon, which defined the government’s handling of the home front as a “ failure of leadership.” A report by the NGO support group Shatil4 spoke of “the sovereign’s absence,” and described “a serious picture of communities that were neglected, local government systems that collapsed, and a government that did not provide for the needs of its citizens.” Beyond the exposure of the serious findings, there is an important common thread to these reports: they have apparently succeeded, perhaps in greater measure than in the past, in sparking public debate on the issue of civilian defense. Public awareness of the issue’s urgency has grown, even if it is still questionable to what extent it has prompted a sufficient response from the bodies responsible for actual systemic change of the grim situation. A year after the war, the picture is far from optimal, and while words abound, deeds to bridge the gaps between problems and solutions remain few and far between. The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the public debate via an analysis of some of the main issues critical to Israel’s civilian defense abilities, and to propose a model for the overall improvement in management of future threats.

Meir Elran, senior research associate at INSS

Not a Rearguard, but a (Civilian) conventional mili- Front tary encounters are The question of civilian defense in Israel ex- slim. This is particu- poses the fallacy of the conventional distinc- larly the case in a tion between “front” and “rear.” According symmetrical war be- to traditional mythos, our soldiers fight the tween the IDF and enemy on the battlefield, the site of the heroic any one of the mili- action. Their combat demands the staunch taries surrounding support of the public as well as tremendous Israel, or a conven- prior investments. The battlefield is where tional war against a the war is decided. The rear is tradition- coalition of forces. ally considered of secondary importance, a Hence the enemy’s theater that is supposed to be protected by interest in attacking transferring the combat arena swiftly to en- the civilian front, emy territory. According to this logic, man- which enables by- agement of the home front is peripheral, col- passing the direct orless, lacking in glory, and perhaps in the military encounter final analysis not really worthwhile. via long range high In practice, this myth was false in many of trajectory rockets or Israel’s wars. While there was certainly tre- missiles. This logic mendous value and legitimacy to the IDF’s guided the Syrians celebrated image, its glorification came at in building their the expense of the home front, which was missile force, including their chemical weap- Building damaged by ons arsenal. This is the logic that formed the a Katyusha rocket, Bat not warranted. In any case, since the 1991 Galim, Haifa. Gulf War, when thirty-nine Iraqi Scud mis- basis of the Iraqi missile force during Sad- siles transformed the civilian front into the dam Hussein’s rule, as well as Iran’s military principal theater, a process of change has buildup, which is meant both to deter Israel begun. The second Palestinian intifada, par- and to realize its potential military ability if ticularly the period between September 2000 deterrence fails. and May 2002, was essentially a war that was From the point of view Israel’s enemies, conducted on the civilian front. The number attacking the civilian population, Israel’s soft of civilian casualties was far greater than the underbelly, should yield important achieve- number of soldiers killed or wounded. The ments in an asymmetrical war. This was the battle that continues in Sderot and the towns operational logic behind Palestinian suicide surrounding Gaza is also conducted primar- terrorism – which is essentially a chilling ily on the civilian front. Most of all, however, form of standoff weapon – in the second in- the Second Lebanon War was characterized tifada. This was also the logic behind Hiz- by its clear emphasis on the civilian front. bollah’s force buildup in the years prior to This characteristic is not coincidental. It the war and its utilization during the war: is a function of Israel’s enemies’ understand- attacking the civilian population in order to ing that their chances of attaining significant expose the weakness in the social fabric of Is- achievements on the traditional front through rael, as per Nasrallah’s famous “spider web”

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 There is theory.5 This is the scenario that will appar- civilian front, as long as it lasts. The complex particular ently recur in future confrontations. question of what happened to Israel’s deter- For this reason, there is particular impor- rence image due to the Second Lebanon War importance 7 tance to the conceptual positioning of the is beyond the scope of this discussion. It pre- to a civilian “rear” in its appropriate position – as a civil- sumably contributed in important ways to front that is ian front that is prepared, developed, and the strengthening of Israeli deterrence both prepared, ready for war, alongside the military front.6 vis-à-vis Hizbollah and vis-à-vis the Syrians. developed, and Both fronts are important, and both deserve But deterrence on its own can be insufficient. ready for war, special attention. Investing in one while ne- Unexpected developments may spur dete- glecting the other could harm Israel’s strate- rioration and the shattering of stability in an alongside the gic abilities. This essential conceptual change unplanned manner. This is certainly true in military front. by itself will have no significance if the neces- the Middle East, as evidenced by the 2006 sary practical applications do not take place war. in the realms of strategic planning, budget- The third level is prevention, primarily at ing, and actual construction of national and the first stage of the war should it erupt. As local systems. shown by the first phase of the Six Day War, and in a different vein by the first hours of A Multilevel Response to a the Second Lebanon War, the elimination of Multilevel Problem the long range firepower capabilities of the Just as the military front is not composed of enemy is the preferred solution. The IDF has one component and requires various inte- continued to enhance this important capabil- grated solutions, so is the home front, which ity, which is intended to shield the civilian is far from being a homogeneous entity and front from at least a significant portion of the demands a similarly multifaceted response. enemy’s threat. From the experience of the Indeed, the civilian front is more complex Second Lebanon War, however, it is clear that 8 than the military one, and requires far great- preventive capability is not guaranteed. It er creativity and sensitivity in providing ap- depends on high quality, exact, and updated propriate solutions. In essence, defense of intelligence. The enemy is aware of the im- the civilian front is made up of a number of portance of hiding its offensive capabilities layers. and of the need to build its force in a varied The first level is political and diplomatic, manner that enables an attack on the civilian and can be advanced via peace or long term front with mobile or other measures that are ceasefire arrangements with one’s neighbors, difficult to identify and destroy. in order to minimize the risks of war and the The fourth level is the interception of missiles threats against the civilian front. This is the and rockets after they have been launched. ultimate answer, but in Israel’s current situa- Israel’s defense establishment has apparent- tion, not yet realistic. ly managed to find a solution to the threat of The second level is the creation of strategic de- long range ballistic missiles, but this is not terrence, which should establish a situation of the case for primitive short term rockets. The long range military stability, as has been the Katyusha onslaught from southern Leba- case on the Syrian front since the Yom Kip- non in the summer of 2006 and the Qassam pur War. This is an appropriate answer to the rockets launched from the Gaza Strip toward

Sderot show clearly that this dimension has not yet been solved, and create a serious hole in the defensive envelope of the civilian front. Presumably the recent decision to renew the development of the Nautilus and other systems could provide some solution, though only in the future. Moreover, the huge gap between the cost of developing an efficient defense system against the negligible investment involved in building the threat is an ongoing issue. The fifth level is the physical protection of civilian targets, such as sensitive national installations, and shelters in public build- ings9 and residential homes. It is blatantly clear that a comprehensive solution is not about 4000 rockets. Roughly 900 of them hit L-r: Haifa mayor 10 Yona Yahav, Prime monetarily feasible and raises sensitive population centers, more than half (471) in Minister Ehud Olmert, social issues.11 The Sderot experience of the Safed alone. Rockets caused the deaths of and Union of Local Authorities chairman past years provides a fitting reflection of the thirty-nine civilians and seriously wounded Adi Eldar, following problem on the one hand and the difficulty 107 people, with another 138 moderately a tour by the prime in finding solutions on the other. Until now, wounded.13 From these numbers, one can minister in Haifa, July 18, 2007 the state has supplied limited solutions only, perhaps anticipate the risks of an attack on which generally are more a response to polit- the civilian front in a future war,14 mainly if it ical pressures than an orderly assessment of is conducted from the Syrian front (without the real needs.12 Another more problematic assessing what might happen should Iran issue is the civilian protection against chemi- also enter the picture). The amount of direct cal agents. The debate surrounding protec- damage expected in this case will require an tion kits, their distribution, their collection, appropriate solution, different in scope and and all that derives from this testifies that the in kind from that which existed in the last comprehensive solution is not on the hori- war. zon. Israel is still protected in an improvised Another important element is cognitive and partial manner. in nature. In a war where the civilian front The sixth and most basic level is attending to plays an active role, there is added value to the needs of the individual and the community. national resilience as a decisive strategic fac- Once deterrence fails, preventive actions tor in Israel’s ability to withstand the chal- are only partially successful, interception lenges posed by its enemies. There are many has limited effects, and protection remains definitions of national resilience.15 Suffice it lacking, it should be assumed that in a fu- here to suggest that national resilience can ture confrontation the enemy will succeed be measured by society’s ability to react ap- in launching missiles or rockets of one kind propriately to a trauma, and to return to rou- or another and in attacking the civilian infra- tine as soon as possible in a short time after structure. In the last war, Hizbollah launched the event. Alternatively, the lack of resilience

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 will be measured by an inappropriate reac- In practice, the model should be con- tion and the inability to return to routine in structed on the following pillars: due time. In the Second Lebanon War, Israeli n The Defense Ministry will be respon- society demonstrated a reasonable level of sible for the elements of deterrence, preven- national resilience.16 There are those who tion, interception, and protection via the IDF, claim that had the war continued beyond the Home Front Command, and the other the thirty-three days, Israel would have wit- relevant military agencies. nessed a more serious damage to its national n The local governments will be respon- resilience. Perhaps. It is clear, however, that sible for handling the psycho-social care for national resilience is also dependent on con- citizens, as well as for all the physical aspects fidence among the public that the authorities of the emergency and the return to routine, are doing all they can to provide the citizen as per the doctrine that the national author- with the personal security and the psycho- ity will formulate. Only those elected to social treatment required during a war that handle the citizens and communities in daily 17 There must targets the civilian front. Regarding this life can tap the knowledge necessary for the dimension, the public today seems quite activation of the systems during emergen- be a national skeptical.18 In order to strengthen national cies. There is no one who can replace the emergency resilience, there is a need to rebuild the pub- local governments in this task. They should authority lic’s trust in its leaders’ ability and intention be assigned and equipped to ensure coordi- that will be to engage seriously with this important and nation and integration with the other agen- sensitive matter. cies acting in their sphere, such as the Home responsible at Front Command (with an emphasis on shel- the highest level The Proposed Model for the ter, evacuation, and rescue), the Israel police, for the strategic Civilian Front Magen David Adom, the fire department, management The following model is proposed to address and others. Some of the stronger municipali- 21 of the civilian this multilevel problem that demands an inte- ties are already prepared for this task. Oth- grated multilevel solution, to be constructed ers still need to invest heavily in advanced front. and managed by the responsible agencies. preparedness and can be assisted by the na- It is imperative that a national emergency tional authority. Still others, the weaker ones, 19 authority be built, which will be responsible will need assistance for years.22 This is nec- at the highest level for the strategic manage- essary also for narrowing the gap between ment of the civilian front. This will provide a strong and weak,23 with all its ramifications solution for the main deficiency exposed in as to the sense of deprivation of the weak the last war, whereby responsibilities were and its impact on national resilience. blurred and divided among the many entities n The third sector, with its philanthropic involved in the effort. This authority, which organizations, should be integrated organi- 20 must be civilian in nature and backed by ap- zationally within the framework of the lo- propriate legislation, should determine strat- cal authorities. Its contributions are socially egy, long range goals, planning, budget re- beneficial and must be encouraged.24 But it quirements, standards, and supervision mea- is imperative that the situation that existed sures. It must build a model of appropriate during the last war, where the non-profit or- coordination between the various agencies. ganizations and NGOs – with their particu-

lar agendas – replaced the governmental and 8 Giora Romm, “A Test of Rival Strategies: Two municipal authorities be altered. Ships Passing in the Night,” pp. 46-57, in The In conclusion, it is likely that improvisa- Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions. 9 Haaretz, April 29, 2007. An examination of some tion will continue in the future to be a lead- of the local authorities reveals that since the ing factor in the preparedness of the Israel war, there has not been a significant improve- to protect the civilian front. But this will not ment in the state of the shelters – both on the be sufficient. Against the scenarios expected front line and in the large cities. Many public in the coming confrontations, there is no al- shelters in the localities are not equipped for ternative to an orderly constructed system, long periods of refuge. Construction of protected rooms in buildings proceeds slowly. based on a clear multilevel model, in order 10 Haaretz, July 12, 2007. According to the direc- to ensure that alongside the achievements re- tor general of the prime minister’s office, 5 bil- quired on the military front, similar achieve- lion NIS are lacking for protection of the home ments will be registered on the civilian front. front. Avoiding concerted action may exact a heavy 11 Prime Minister Olmert at the Caesaria confer- cost. ence, according to Ynet, June 28, 2007: “We cannot protect ourselves from everything. In the short term, we cannot provide all the per- Notes sonal security we would like.” 1 State Comptroller’s Office, “Preparedness and 12 ”The Great Protection Failure,” Ynet, May 20, Performance of the Home Front during the 2007. Second Lebanon War,” July 2007. 13 According to Health Ministry data quoted in 2 Summary report: concluding chapter and Yediot Ahronot on June 22, 2007. To these must findings, section 4. be added a further 2,442 lightly wounded and 3 See, for instance, the series of articles in Haaretz 2,782 who suffered from shock. by Ruth Sinai about the home front during the 14 Maj. Gen. (res.) Ze’ev Livne, who was the first war, August 2006 – October 2006. commander of Home Front Command: “The 4 Shatil and Kochav Hatzafon, “Civilians at the next war will see a mass of rockets from dif- Front: Summary of the Failures in Handling ferent directions: Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the the Home Front in the Second Lebanon War territories. Tens of thousands of missiles and from the Civilian Viewpoint,” February 2007. rockets will be fired toward Israel during the 5 Speech at the celebration of the Israeli with- war. This is an absolutely reasonable number drawal from Lebanon in May 2000. The exact to expect.” Yediot Ahronot, July 6, 2007. quotation is: “This Israel, which possesses 15 On national resilience and its definitions, see nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in Meir Elran, Israel’s National Resilience: The In- the region, is nothing but weaker than a spider fluence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society, web.” Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 6 The committee to draft Israel’s security doc- Memorandum no. 81, January 2006. trine, headed by Dan Meridor, proposed the 16 Meir Elran, “The Civilian Front in the Second addition of a fourth dimension – civilian de- Lebanon War,” in The Second Lebanon War: fense – to the traditional pillars of deterrence, Strategic Dimensions, pp 101-18. See also “Feel- warning, and decision. See Maariv, August 31, ings and Positions of the Public in Relation to 2006, and Haaretz, October 3, 2006. the War in the North,” National Opinions 12, 7 See Yair Evron, “Deterrence and its Limita- August 2006, B. Y. Cohen Institute for Surveys tions,” pp. 34-45, in The Second Lebanon War: of Public Opinion, Tami Steinmetz Center for Strategic Dimensions, Meir Elran and Shlomo Peace Studies. Brom, eds., Tel Aviv Yediot Ahronot and the 17 Avi Bleich,”Personal Resilience, Social Resil- Institute for National Security Studies, 2007. ience, Regarding Emotion,” Natal bulletin 19,

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 April 2007. See there also Prof. Mooli Lahad, 21 See, for instance, the model of preparedness “You, Me and the Next War.” of the Tel Aviv Municipality, the Population 18 Ynet, July 11, 2007, “CEOs Admit: Israel is not Treatment Headquarters and the “Resilience Prepared for an All-out War.” Also: Haaretz, Center” that was established for the purpose of June 30, 2007: “They are not Leaving the Bun- distributing information on this essential mat- ker.” Residents of the north are convinced that ter to other local authorities throughout Israel. another war is unavoidable, and are preparing 22 See: Miriam Beiling, “Social Capital and its to the best of their abilities. Contribution to Coping with Crisis Situations 19 See the full report of the state comptroller on in the Communities of the Gaza Strip,” Flor- the preparedness of the home front July 2007, sheimer Institute for Diplomatic Studies, Sep- page 4: “The government must quickly inves- tember 2006. tigate the possibility of a national central body 23 The Israel Democracy Institute published in unifying responsibility and authority and able June 2007 the findings of a forum led by Dan to concentrate attention and effort and coordi- Meridor, which dealt with the issue of the nate the handling of the home front in times of home front and the front line communities. Its routine and in times of emergency, including conclusion: “The State’s ability to take care of formulating the concept, building the force, its citizens without depending on economic and training it.” ability has been harmed.” Haaretz, June 17, 20 The government’s decision of April 2007 to as- 2007. sign the Ministry of Defense with the respon- 24 Summary of the state comptroller’s report sibility for managing the civilian front basi- 2007: “The enlistment of the private sector… cally reinforces the current situation. It does contributed significantly to filling the gap left not relate to the establishment of a national by the state authorities. At the same time, the authority and does not meet the need for plac- authorities did not act to organize assistance ing responsibility on the most senior civilian in an orderly fashion and direct it to the places party. most in need of it.”

The Institute for National Security Studies expresses its gratitude to

Joseph Hackmey

for his contribution to the publication of Strategic Assessment.

10 Wars Aren’t Waged in the Summer? How Israel and Syria Might Find Themselves at War Dani Berkovich

Along with the peace feelers put out by Israel and Syria since the end of the Second Lebanon War, the fear of another war on the northern front against Syria has been part of the security and public discourse in Israel. The headline “War this Summer” became a regular feature in the media. Israel has anxiously followed the steps taken by Syria’s army toward increased preparedness and Syria’s tightened links with Iran (especially notable in the recent visit to Syria by Iranian president Ahmadinejad), and it is disturbed by the possibility that the last war harmed Israel’s deterrence image in Syrian eyes. The Syrians are fueling the fears in Israel with belligerent statements, warning Israel that if it rejects the hand offered it in peace, Syria, as President Bashar Asad put it, has “other options” for recovering the Golan Heights. However, there are those who see these declarations – which are intertwined with remonstrations of peace – as an expression of Damascus’s increasing distress and its desire to extricate itself at any price from the international isolation that is closing in on it. At this stage it appears that the Syrian president has no intention of initiating either an attack against Israel to seize the Golan Heights in a snatch operation (the classic scenario attributed to Syria) or any other military move, and that the Syrian deployment is defensive. But while Israel conveys messages to Syria from time to time to assuage its anxiety, Damascus is not laboring to calm Israel. On the contrary, it appears that by using threats of “other options,” it wants to force Israel to renew negotiations for the return of the Golan Heights. It is evident that Syria and Israel share a security dilemma that raises the tension between them. Neither side wants war, but at the same time, neither side feels secure about the intentions of the other side. When one side improves its preparedness and attempts to increase its security, the other side cannot remain calm, fearing a preemptive strike. Thus the combination of heightened mutual suspicion, a potential failure to read the other side’s moves correctly, an improvement in mutual preparedness, and an explosive regional situation requires an examination of various deterioration scenarios that might culminate in an undesired war between Israel and Syria.

Dani Berkovich, visiting research associate at INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 11 Neither Israel Deterioration Scenarios wake of Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip, nor Syria wants Deterioration resulting from distorted per- including the renewal of Qassam rocket at- war, but at the ceptions and mistaken interpretation of the tacks and terrorist actions in Israeli territory. other side’s moves. According to this sce- Syria encourages continued escalation to in- same time, nario, Syria and Israel take various steps that crease the pressure on Israel and imprint its neither side could be interpreted as aggression, and the image as an influential player in the Palestin- feels secure effort to establish a mutual balance of deter- ian realm, in other words, to boost the incen- about the rence only increases each side’s fear of an tive for Israel (and the US) to sit down at the intentions of attack initiated by the other. While Syria is negotiating table. Under Syrian sponsorship accelerating preparations and strengthening the headquarters of the Palestinian organiza- the other. links – including military ties – with Iran as tions in Damascus, chiefly Hamas, continue its strategic hinterland, IDF exercises con- to direct terrorism against Israel. Blaming nected to a confrontation with Syria receive Syria for fanning the flames, Israel warns much publicity, and the possibility of an im- Syria that its self-restraint is not open-ended. pending war with Syria and preparations for Later Israel sends concrete warning signals war are accorded a high profile in the media. in the form of an operation on Syrian terri- In these circumstances the level of suspicion tory, which Damascus interprets as an attack is so high that any unusual move by Syria requiring a response. will convince Israel that Syria has belligerent n The Iranian scenario – an American or intentions, and Israel will consider waging a Israeli military move against Iranian nuclear preemptive strike. Israel in any case attributes installations leads to a wide scale retaliation aggressive intentions to Syria and a tendency against Israel by means of Hizbollah. Hiz- to miscalculate, and the fact that Syria con- bollah, despite its lack of interest in a conflict tinues to aid Hizbollah and Palestinian ter- with Israel given its sensitive status in Leba- rorist organizations does not contribute to non, is committed to blind obedience to the alleviating suspicion. Israel was in a similar Iranian leadership. It makes use of the stra- situation in the summer of 1996, when Syrian tegic weapons the Iranians have prepared Division 14 moved in the direction of Mount for such eventualities and transferred to it Hermon without satisfactory explanation, through Syria, in a way that brings about es- in a way that aroused suspicions that Syria calation in the north. Syria backs Hizbollah, intended to carry out a snatch operation on sending it massive quantities of weaponry, Mount Hermon – though eventually nothing in spite of warnings from Israel and the in- happened. ternational community. Israel, with international backing, attempts to foil the transfer Regional domino scenarios. In the regional of the weapons through attacks on convoys system today there are at least three explo- carrying the weapons in Syrian territory. In sive focal points that under certain circum- response, Syria attacks the Golan Heights. stances and against the existing backdrop of n The Lebanese scenario – Syria and mutual suspicion could position Israel and Hizbollah’s attempts at subversion bring Syria on a collision course: about the fall of the Siniora government and n The Palestinian scenario – a flare-up in strengthen Hizbollah politically in Lebanon. the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Hizbollah exploits the situation in order

12 to render Security Council resolution 1701 meaningless and to reestablish its standing as the “defender of Lebanon,” including strengthening its military presence south of the Litani and along the border with Israel. At the same time, Syrian and Iranian weapons continue to flow freely to Hizbollah. This situation increases the tension between Israel and Hizbollah and Syria and heightens the potential for escalation along the Lebanese border. As in the Palestinian scenario, here too Syria seeks to impress on Israel (and the US) the reason to engage it in dialogue, and n Direct challenge: opening a terror front Prime Minister Ehud labors to demonstrate its influence on events Olmert on a visit to the on the Golan Heights. Against the backdrop Golan Heights in Lebanon. Israel, in an attempt to deter of Syria’s failure to persuade Israel to renew Syria from continued intervention, signals a political negotiations, it fulfills its threats to warning on Syrian territory, which leads to a liberate the Golan Heights through “resis- Syrian response on the Golan Heights. tance.” It establishes a popular and “independent” terrorist organization that adopts Deterioration resulting from direct or indi- Hizbollah’s methods of operation and oper- rect Syrian challenges. ates along the border between Israel and Syr- n Indirect challenge: continued weapons ia, which is generally considered quiet. The smuggling. The smuggling of weapons from goal is to force Israel to renew negotiations Syria to Hizbollah continues, though not in for the return of the Golan Heights. Not only the context of a direct conflict between Israel do these Syrian provocations not bring about and Hizbollah. Neither the Lebanese army the renewal of negotiations; they prompt Is- nor UNIFIL manages to prevent it, and reso- raeli responses on Syrian territory in a way lution 1701 is violated flagrantly. After Israel that brings about a conflagration between has despaired of effective international inter- the two countries. vention, it conveys a warning to Syria that it will not remain oblivious to the ongoing Provocation scenario. An organization or smuggling. The response from Damascus is country wishing to entangle Syria in a con- to deny the charges and warn Israel that any flict with Israel is behind terrorist actions Israeli move against Syria will be seen as ag- against Israel from Syrian territory (terrorist gression and cause for a painful response. infiltration, shooting attacks, and the like). Later, Israel sends Syria warning signals This could be one of the worldwide jihad (for example, an attack on trucks carrying organizations that are already operating on weapons in Syrian territory). Syria, which Syrian territory and are seen as a threat to has already sustained quite a few such warn- the regime’s stability, or in extreme circum- ings from Israel, is not prepared to suffer an- stances, Syria’s friends from the “axis of other, and responds by attacking the Golan evil” (Hizbollah, Iran), which aim to prevent Heights. Damascus’s defection from their alliance in

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 13 the event of a political settlement with Israel. ing its deterrence vis-à-vis Syria, either in the From Israel’s point of view, Syria is respon- tense uncertainty of today, or in a situation in sible for every attack originating in its terri- which political negotiations are renewed. tory. Israel responds in a manner that leads n As long as Syria and Israel are not in- to a direct Syrian response, and the situation volved in a peace process, let alone in a de deteriorates into conflict. facto peace agreement, is it not appropriate from Israel’s point of view to preserve some It would appear that given the regional vagueness concerning its intentions toward atmosphere and the tension between Israel Syria and not completely allay Syrian fears, and Syria, most of the scenarios are possible. with an awareness of the risk that entails? Less likely are the latter two scenarios: terror- n Should indirect Syrian aggression be ism managed by Syria in the Golan Heights treated like direct aggression? Would the is a dangerous gamble, even by Syria’s stan- transfer of weapons to Hizbollah merit the dards, and it is opposed to Syria’s strategic same response that a Syrian or Syrian-inspired approach, which prefers that its conflict with attack on the Golan Heights would earn? Israel be conducted through proxies (Pales- n Is Israel taking into account that given tinian or Lebanese) and not on Syrian soil. the tension between the two countries, any Thus if Syria does indeed resort to a direct type of warning signal (in words or actions) challenge scenario, this is liable to be an indi- that it would seek to convey to Damascus cation of distress to the point of real despair, because of Syria’s involvement in indirect and a desire to start the peace process at any aggression is liable to be interpreted as an at- price. As for the provocation scenario, it is tempt to drag Syria into a violent confronta- probable that the Syrian security apparatus- tion? es will be quite alert to an attempt of this sort Apparently, the most effective move by and would labor to foil it. Israel to calm the situation is a clear declaration that cognizant of the price of peace, it is The most Significance for Israel and prepared to enter political negotiations with Recommended Courses of Action Syria. Yet until the conditions and atmosphere effective The high level of tension between Israel and are ripe for a renewal of negotiations, Israel move by Syria and the fear of deterioration into an un- (like Syria) fears that a prophecy of imminent Israel to calm wanted war present Israel with a number of war will be self-fulfilling, and therefore a com- the situation dilemmas in coping with this situation. These bined move vis-à-vis Damascus is warranted, is a clear dilemmas entail steps that range between re- which would include a number of elements: assurance, restoring calm, and deterrence, n Reassurance – a clear message to the declaration that and raise the following questions: Syrian leadership that Israel has no inten- cognizant of the n Will taking steps to calm Syria harm tion of initiating an attack on Syria. Here price of peace, deterrence, since such an attempt is liable to Israel must overcome the hurdle of Syria’s it is prepared to be perceived as an expression of weakness suspicion and lack of trust toward Israel, and enter political and a fear of conflict? In other words, would therefore an intermediary trusted by both Israeli attempts at calming Syria strengthen sides must be engaged. Examples are Russia negotiations Syria’s perception of its own deterrent im- (which the United States is liable not to fa- with Syria. age? Israel must not refrain from strengthen- vor), Turkey, or one of Syria’s friends in the

14 European Union (Spain?). It would appear that suspicion and lack of trust will be part of the interaction between Israel and Syria for a long time to come, even if negotiations are renewed. In this situation it is recommended that a permanent secret channel be established for relaying signals, particularly messages of calm. In this context the UNDOF force, stationed in the Golan Heights, can upgrade its role as the mechanism for solving problems on the tactical level (for example, terrorist attacks or incidents over which Syria has no control). However, this is not enough. make a commitment that Israel will respond Prime Minister Ehud any Olmert with Nahal A package of confidence building measures to such move. This should be done in or- soldiers on the Golan on the ground (thinning of forces, announc- der not to create expectations that Israel can- Heights ing exercises in advance) is also likely to be not always live up to and thereby harm its part of the process, with the hope that such deterrent credibility, especially in situations measures would be reciprocated in kind. of acute tension. n Deterrence and clarification of the rules These messages – and especially the latter of the game – Along with messages of reas- ones of deterrence and the rules of the game surance, Israel must convey a clear message – must be acceptable to the key actors in the that if Syria attempts a preemptive attack, international community, particularly the US Israel will respond against Bashar Asad’s (without which effective political negotia- regime in a way that is disproportionately tions are not possible) and European Union painful. This should be done while empha- nations, in order to establish the credibility sizing Israel’s capabilities of dealing Damas- of these moves and the legitimacy of Israel cus a strong blow, and its readiness to wage making them. a wide scale war against Syria, i.e., it would Ultimately, the desirable situation for Is- not make do with a limited move, as Syria rael would be for Syria to seek to mollify Is- would certainly want for the purpose of rael and the international community as to its starting a political process. In addition, Israel intentions, and perhaps to make a concrete must formulate a position on Syria’s indirect move, even a symbolic one, in order to show aggression, from assistance to terrorist or- that it is prepared to sacrifice something for ganizations – including Palestinian terrorist the peace process. Yet in any event, under attacks directed by the leadership of the Da- the existing circumstances it is desirable for mascus-based terrorist organizations or an dealings with Syria to take place through attack by Hizbollah using Syrian weapons. quiet diplomacy and not through the media. Here it is appropriate to leave margins of The credibility of Israeli deterrence and mes- vagueness: to make clear to the Syrians that sages of calm will be stronger if Israel speaks such moves will be considered direct Syrian in one clear voice, since multiple voices and aggression against Israel and will therefore a great deal of background noise certainly do merit retaliation, but at the same time not to not contribute to building trust.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 15 The Syrian Army Buildup Yiftah Shapir

In recent months much has been made in the media of concern over an imminent war with Syria. The basis for these assessments is three- fold: first, preparations taken by the Syrian army; second, the range of political statements by Syria, Israel, and the United States; and third, the backdrop of a buildup process that has been underway in the Syr- ian army for approximately two years. This essay will survey developments in Syria, both in terms of the military buildup and preparation measures. It will present three main arguments. First, the buildup underway in the Syrian armed forces is a normal process for a military. After a long period during which Syria was forced to neglect procurement and buildup operations totally, previously closed doors were suddenly opened and it is making the most of this opportunity. Second, the buildup process is focused on defense and deterrence means. Third, tension of this sort does not necessarily indicate intent to launch an offensive, but it does entail risks of escalation that can lead to a war that neither side wants.

Background Hizbollah leaders who told the Syrian pub- After the Second Lebanon War, President lic that liberating the Golan through military Basher al-Asad called on Israel to begin talks means would be an easy task. More recently, on liberating the Golan Heights. It appears Syrian prime minister Otari visited Kuneitra that there were also secrets contacts on the and announced the Golan Heights Festival. matter between Israeli and Syrian officials. In Israel too there were gloomy assess- At the same time, aggressive rhetoric re- ments. The IDF intelligence assessment in garding the liberation of the Golan Heights early July maintained that Asad had yet to through military means increased. President decide on war, but that there was a percep- Asad himself declared immediately after the tible increase in hostility from Syria. Similar war in Lebanon that “there are alternatives concerns over war with Syria were expressed to diplomatic options,” and even explicitly by senior Israeli spokespeople: the Israeli claimed that Syria is liable to attack Israel if ambassador to Washington, Sallai Meridor, Yiftah Shapir, senior the latter does not withdraw from the Go- noted in an interview that Israel is facing research associate at lan, such that “even [its] atomic bomb won’t the largest military buildup along the Golan INSS save [it].” Syrian state television interviewed Heights border since 1973.

16 Military Buildup interest in the Middle East and the Mediter- For many years following the collapse of the ranean. As part of these renewed ties the Syr- Soviet Union, the Syrian armed forces were ians agreed to allow the Russian fleet to oper- plunged into a crisis, given the loss of their ate from the port of Tartous, as was the case patron that had supplied them with arms during the Cold War. Periodic infrastructure and technical support. Unlike the Soviet work at this port (including deepening the Union, Russia was not prepared to provide harbor) will allow the Russian fleet to oper- Syria with arms and technical support gra- ate from there freely. tis. Moreover, Russia asked Syria to pay its The Syrian buildup is not limited to ac- debt for weapon systems it had received pre- quisitions from Russia. Two aspects in par- viously, a debt that totaled about $11 billion ticular are noteworthy. One relates to the and has increased over the years. As a result, special security ties between Syria and Iran: Syria stopped acquiring weapon systems, the two states have maintained close secu- and over many years its military prowess rity cooperation for many years, and they decreased as its arms became obsolete and it jointly develop weapon systems, such as suffered a severe shortage of spare parts. ballistic missiles. Syria’s current buildup in- The buildup This situation notwithstanding, there cludes both Iranian financial aid for Syria’s underway in the purchases from Russia, and trilateral deals of were repeated reports of major arms deals Syrian armed between Syria and Russia. Ultimately, the joint acquisitions of arms and purchases of only significant deal that was completed was Iranian manufactured weapons – weapons forces is a Syria’s purchase of Metis-M and Kornet-E that are generally a licensed copy or produc- normal process anti-tank missiles in 2000, some of which tion of arms designed by Russia, China, or for a military, were passed on to Hizbollah. even the US. The July visit to Syria by Iranian and is focused The breakthrough in acquisition and tech- president Ahmadienjad was accompanied on defense and nical assistance relations with Russia came by reports – denied by Tehran – of an agree- in 2005, when Russia agreed to write off 73 ment by Iran to finance weapons to Syria to deterrence percent of the Syrian debt. A settlement was the tune of one billion dollars. measures. also reached over an installment plan for the The second aspect is connected to the Syr- outstanding debt, part in cash and part in ian defense industry itself. The industry, de- goods. The end of the debt affair generated spite lagging far behind the Iranian industry, a wave of reports about large weapons sales has been assembling Scud missiles for sev- to Syria. At the same time, the US and Israel eral years (in cooperation with North Korea applied pressure on the Russian government and Iran). The industry also manufactures to refrain from providing systems that once rockets, notably the 220 mm and 302 mm in Syrian hands could upset stability in the rockets, which are of Syrian design and have Middle East. In particular, the Iskander-E been absorbed by the Syrian forces in recent surface-to-surface missiles and the S-300 years and even passed on to Hizbollah. anti-aircraft missile system were mentioned in this context. Details of the Buildup The breakthrough in Syrian-Russian re- What, then, does the buildup process incor- lations was not a result of Russian altruism. porate? The Syrian buildup is particularly The Russia of Vladimir Putin has revived its noticeable in the area of anti-tank missiles,

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 17 air defense for ground forces, and naval successor to the Tunguska system, includes a forces. vehicle that carries missiles and canons. The system was developed for and funded by the Anti-tank Missiles United Arab Emirates. Development of the After the end of the Second Lebanon War system was recently completed. there were reports of Syrian transactions for With regard to the older air defense sys- additional large numbers of Metis-M and tems, there are unsubstantiated reports of Kornet-E anti-tank missiles. These missiles, Syria’s intent to upgrade its SA-3 systems, which were acquired by Syria in the past, similar to the upgrade that was carried out made their way to Hizbollah. Syria also pur- by Egypt. The air defense systems that were chased for the first time the most advanced purchased were designed to enhance the Syr- anti-tank missile produced by the Russian ian ability to defend against aerial attack and defense industry – the Khrizantema system. thereby attempt to neutralize the supremacy The new anti-tank missiles will enable Syria of the Israeli air force. Most of the systems to defend itself against tanks and other ar- that were purchased are mobile, and their mored vehicles from great distances, up to main purpose is to protect the ground forces, six kilometers. The Second Lebanon War also including forces in motion. showed that the missiles are effective against a range of targets, such as buildings. The Navy The Syrian navy has been badly neglected Air Defense over the last decade, and its fighting ability In the area of air defense the Syrians concen- and the usability of its ships have deteriorat- trated on mobile systems for point specific ed. The buildup process began with Iranian defense and on portable missiles. The first aid only recently, and is mainly based on Ira- deal that attracted attention was Syria’s plan nian imports. The most important weapon to purchase advanced Igla-S (SA-18) shoul- system acquired by the navy is the C-802 der-held missiles. The deal, which was ini- missiles – a Chinese sea-to-sea or shore-to- It appears that tiated in 2003, was blocked by international sea missile manufactured in Iran. These mis- pressure on the Russian government due to siles were passed on to Hizbollah, which the Syrians concern that these missiles would make their used them during the Second Lebanon War. have applied way to terror organizations, in particular to Following the war, it became known that the lessons of Hizbollah. The solution arrived at was to Syria acquired very large quantities of these the Second develop a new system specifically for Syria missiles. It appears that most of the missiles – the Strelets system. This is a light armored are shore-to-sea missiles, and their main pur- Lebanon War vehicle that carries four Igla-S missiles that pose is to protect Syria’s coastlines. However, and have cannot be removed and held on the shoulder. the missile’s long range will also enable Syria deployed The deal was completed in 2006, although to hit ships far from its coast. rockets in there may be another deal for more of this Furthermore, Syria has increased the num- camouflaged type of vehicle. ber of ships in its possession, although there Another deal in the field of air defense is no information about the type and number underground includes thirty-six (some reports say fifty) of ships acquired. If these were acquisitions installations. Pantsyr S-1 systems. This system, which is the from Iran, it is reasonable to assume that the

18 Iranians sold Syria MIG-S-1800, MIG-G-1900, and MIG-S-2600 rapid patrol boats, all manufactured by Iran. Similar types of patrol boats are used for coastal patrol missions all over the world, although Iran developed a special operational approach whereby a large number of small and rapid craft attack far larger vessels. The Syrian navy may also want to adopt this tactic, which enables a weak fleet without heavy vessels to strike and cause se- GOC rious damage to a more powerful enemy. Northern Command Maj. Gen. The Air Force Gadi In June, there were reports – and denials – in Eizenkot the Russian press of a deal for the acquisition of five MiG-31E aircraft. This aircraft, ed up acquisitions of short range rockets which was developed in the mid 1980s, is an (such as the Grad). In the field of long range advanced version of the MiG-25 used by the missiles, over the past year the Syrians have Syrian air force for many years. It is a fast in- accelerated production of the Scud D and terception plane capable of intercepting tar- Scud C missiles. This past February, the Scud gets beyond the horizon using R-33 missiles. missile was test fired and there was a report However, its other capabilities – including of construction of underground launch bases attack of ground targets and even close aerial for Scud missiles in the area of Homs and combat – are very limited. If this aircraft is Hamat. obtained by the Syrian air force it will pose a It is difficult to relate to reports about the threat to the operational ability of the Israeli Scud as a development of immediate deter- air force, particularly in the collection of in- rence significance, as the processes of devel- telligence against Syria. opment and production of systems like the Scud are long term and take many years. Missiles and Rocket Weapons Generally, important milestones of such The Syrian armed forces have worked for projects are represented by a gradual, cumu- many years to improve their surface-to-sur- lative process and not by a single event with face missile capacity, and the Syrian industry, immediate impact. On the other hand, de- with Iranian and North Korean cooperation, ployment of rockets along the border may be is trying to develop enhanced models of the a deterrence development. Such deployment Scud missile. In addition, in recent years the can also be interpreted as the application of Syrians have acquired locally produced un- lessons learned from the use of rockets dur- guided 220 mm and 302 mm diameter rock- ing the Second Lebanon War. In the event of ets, which were also used by Hizbollah dur- a war, it can allow the Syrians to inflict ongoing the Second Lebanon War. ing damage on the Israeli home front, similar After the war the Syrians began a process to the damage caused by Hizbollah rockets of accelerated buildup of rockets and speed- in the summer of 2006.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 19 Syria has Recent Preparation Measures not noticed any military moves and that the recognized In the past year, the Syrian armed forces took situation there is calm. the advantage a number of measures that increased their readiness for war. The most prominent move Not Included in the Buildup Process to be gained was advancing large scale exercises. This The Syrian army was neglected for many from anti-tank year, the exercises, which are normally car- years, and its equipment acquisition pro- missiles as well ried out in the fall as part of the culmination cess stalled after the collapse of the Soviet as the damage of the Syrian military’s training year, were Union. It was natural to expect, as the ac- that can be held in the spring. In addition: quisition process resumed, that the armed n There have been reports of increased forces would replenish their weapons with inflicted on the rocket deployment along the Golan Heights major weapon systems, but this did not hap- civilian front front. It appears that the Syrians have also ap- pen. For example, one of the most notice- using rockets. plied the lessons of the Second Lebanon War able absences is main battle tanks. The Syr- and have deployed rockets in camouflaged ian army uses T-72 tanks, yet except for one underground installations, which Hizbollah brigade, whose tanks were upgraded with did with great success. Italian-manufactured fire-control systems, n Forces were moved from deep inside there have been no reports of new tank ac- the country and from the Syrian-Iraqi border quisitions or upgrade kits. There is also no towards the Golan Heights front. Particu- information about any buildup of any other larly noticeable was the reinforcement of the armored combat vehicles. 14th commando division in the area near the The air force is in a similar situation. It ac- northern Golan Heights and Mt. Hermon. quired MiG-29 aircraft at the end of the 1990s, One report suggested that the division was and since then has not made any purchases. reinforced with an entire brigade that was It continues to use outdated MiG-23 and moved from inside the country. MiG-21 aircraft. It is natural for the air force n Logistical infrastructures, including to want to build up its equipment – with the storage facilities that can provide arms, and new versions of the MiG-29 jets, by upgrading fuel resources were transferred to the south its aircraft to more advanced configurations, of the country. or with Su-27 jets and its more advanced ver- n “Villages,” some inhabited and some sions. However, this process is not taking not, were constructed near the Golan Heights place. Even if MiG-31 jets are acquired, it will front. These were designed to force the IDF, only be in small numbers and for very special if it attacks, to fight in a built up area where, missions. Such aircraft cannot provide the the Syrians believe, the IDF will be in an in- backbone of a multi-task air force. ferior position. The Syrians might also be interested in These measures, however, do not involve acquiring other systems, for example, long the advance of major conventional army range air defense systems such as the S- forces to the actual frontline. The disengage- 300PMU-1/2 and medium range mobile air ment agreements between Israel and Syria, defense systems that would replace the out- drawn up in 1974, limited deployment of dated SA-6 model, systems such as the Buk- forces in the region. General Jilke, command- M1 (SA-11) or Buk-M1-2 (SA-17). er of the UNDOF force, said his forces had

20 Conclusion against the Israeli navy. In any case it prefers The renewed links between Syria and Rus- guided weapons that will enable it to inflict sia provide the Syrian army with a means damage on Israel’s main weapon systems. of reinforcement and renewal that the Syr- With regard to rockets and surface-to- ian leadership believes is long overdue. The surface missiles, it appears that the Syrians’ purchase and installation of new weapon main advantage is deterrent. It would allow systems is a long though essential process the Syrians to respond to an Israeli attack for the Syrian armed forces, as it would be in a manner that will make it very difficult for any military. As such, the buildup process for Israel to defend itself, as proven by the should not be viewed as a development with Second Lebanon War. On the other hand, immediate deterrence-related significance. rocket weapons as used by Hizbollah cannot The Syrian leadership opted for a buildup constitute an almost exclusive means of at- tailored specifically to its needs and based on tack. This is because Syria is a sovereign state the view that it is not able to stand up to the where there is “an address” that the Israeli IDF in a conventional battle – tanks versus response can target. As a state, Syria can be tanks, air force against air force. The lessons deterred, in contrast with a sub-state organi- learned from the Second Lebanon War accen- zation such as Hizbollah that has no respon- tuated this trend in Syria’s strategic military sibility towards the citizens of the country in approach. It understood the limitations of which it lives and operates. the IDF and recognized the advantage to be The buildup process and preparatory gained from anti-tank missiles as well as the steps taken by the Syrian army are thus de- damage that can be inflicted on the civilian signed to allow the Syrians to protect them- front using rockets. selves against Israeli attack: on the one hand The focus of the Syrian buildup is defen- the Syrian army will be able to inflict heavy sive: air defense systems are naturally used damage on the IDF if it attacks, and on the as defense systems against an attacking air other hand, it can threaten the Israeli home force. The various types of anti-tank mis- front in the case of such an attack. siles are also used principally for protection A more problematic issue is whether the against offensive armored forces, and are Syrians are taking these steps due to concern basically not an attack weapon. In the navy, over an Israel-initiated attack, or they are too, the emphasis is on surface-to-sea mis- preparing to launch a war themselves. Such siles fired from small coastguard vessels and a war could start with a surprise move by a used to protect the coast, not as a means of Syrian commando unit on Mt. Hermon or on attack. The situation is the same with the air the Golan Heights, and could evolve into a force. If the Syrians do acquire the MiG-31, war in which the IDF is drawn into fighting this aircraft will almost certainly be used to in difficult conditions: in built up areas and thwart operations of the Israeli air force. against anti-tank missile facilities and heavy The nature of the Syrian buildup indi- surface-to-air missiles, while the Israel home cates the asymmetric character of the weap- front is attacked by rockets and long range ons acquisitions. Syria is not acquiring tanks missiles. to combat Israeli tanks, or fighter jets to en- There is no way of knowing precisely gage Israeli jets, or missiles ships to be used what the Syrian leadership has in mind. On

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 21 the one hand, the voices coming out of Da- generate a process of escalation in the form mascus are certainly cause for concern, and of declarations and military moves that may may indicate preparations for a proactive spark acts of hostility at stages undesirable war aimed at jumpstarting a process that will to both sides. restore the Golan Heights to Syria on com- Finally, one cannot examine the Syrian fortable terms. On the other hand, such calls buildup on its own without also addressing may be deterrent messages designed to pre- the other forces that come into play here. On empt an Israeli attack. Moreover, examina- the one hand, there are the close ties between tion of the Syrian buildup indicates that the the current Syrian regime and Hizbollah process is in its early stages. Some of the new in Lebanon and Iran, ties that may embroil weapon systems have yet to reach Syria, and Syria in a conflict that is intertwined with the Syrian military needs more time in or- Iranian or Lebanese domestic interests. On der to absorb the new systems. It is difficult the other hand, Russia’s increasing involve- to assume that the military considers itself ment may actually act as a restraining factor, ready to take on a proactive confrontation as Russia’s main interest is to maintain a base at the moment. However, the tense situation in the Mediterranean that will enable it to re- that has arisen following the developments new its influence in the Mediterranean basin. on the Syrian side and on the Israeli side may War in Syria could damage that interest.

22 A Distorted Self-Image: On the IDF and its Responsibility for Civilians Yehuda Wegman

The official mission of the IDF is “to defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Israel. To protect the inhabit- ants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten the daily life.”1 The essay below contends that the Second Lebanon War was another milestone in the deconstruction process of the IDF’s self- image. More precisely, the IDF has come to see itself as less and less obligated to fulfill its mission. The essay also argues that the IDF was hard-pressed to protect the state’s citizens during the summer of 2006, due to four primary causes: extensive IDF involvement in diplomatic negotiations; the infiltration of post-modern and post-heroic concepts into the IDF; casting the protection of soldiers as the highest value, in place of the value of mission fulfillment; and the neglect of ground maneuvers as a tool for military victory.

In the early 1990s, in part in response to the tive, senior IDF officers embraced these ide- end of the Cold War, ideas arose in Europe ological trends, as well as the ideas created about “the end of history”2 and the “end of in their wake. In his forthcoming book Mili- wars.” These ideas also influenced the think- tary Fights Peace – Military and Peacemaking, ing of leaders, senior academics, and military Kobi Michael writes that in contrast to the personnel in Israel. However, the gap be- norm, whereby diplomatic negotiations are tween these concepts and the mid-1990s se- headed by representatives of the diplomatic curity reality of an Israel beset with terrorist echelon who are assisted by professionals, attacks created the cognitive dissonance that including security and military experts, the Yehuda Wegman, is the product of tension between reality and negotiations process toward the first Oslo IDF colonel (res.), desire. The response to that tension was to agreement was initially led by the military former armored ignore it, as Yitzhak Rabin did, for instance, echelon, where then-Deputy Chief of Gener- corps brigade when he defined the impossible situation al Staff, General Amnon Lipkin Shahak, was commander and deputy division in which declarations of peace and a “new appointed by Prime Minister Rabin to head commander; senior Middle East” were supposed to mesh with the Israeli delegation. The civilian diplomacy IDF instructor 3 terrorist attacks in the “war for peace.” was conducted by an officer in uniform in ac- and researcher of Though not always at their own initiative service, and was, to a certain extent, “di- military history

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 23 Rather than plomacy in uniform.”4 Michael also quotes report for 2006, however, as well as from the trying to Carmi Gillon, at that time head of the Gener- way the forces were operated during Opera- dispel as best al Security Services, who said: “With all due tion Defensive Shield and Operation Change respect to the diplomatic work done by Uri of Direction (the Second Lebanon War), it be- as possible Savir and Yoel Zinger from our side and Abu came clear that little was learned in the Insti- the vagueness Ala on the Palestinian side, who together tute in relation to professional military sys- inherent in the produced the framework for an agreement, tems that would allow commanders to plan battlefield, the the contents were supplied by members of and operate military systems that defeat the 7 new military the military and the GSS.” enemy quickly and decisively. When the deputy chief of staff heads a However, though it failed to formulate language has delegation to diplomatic negotiations, he any active combat doctrine, the Institute compounded will naturally use the General Staff for the succeeded in imparting – all too well – that the obscurity. staff work related to this task. Thus, senior language in general, and accepted military General Staff personnel found themselves language in particular, limits the creative increasingly occupied by the processes and thought of combat planners. With the bless- 8 work of a diplomatic staff in place of their ing of the chiefs of staff, the commanders traditional jobs – preparing the force for learned a new language that generated new combat. This was one of the central reasons processes in the IDF that were seemingly that the IDF very quickly fell into line with progressive but in reality created practical the ideas prevalent among the political ech- and intellectual anarchy. Such an orientation elon. From here, the path was short to the was well described by John Ellis in his book publication by the General Staff’s training Against Deconstruction, which deals with the directorate of a booklet called “The Limited language of post-modern philosophers. El- Confrontation,” which deals with combating lis argues that what was achieved was not a terrorism. The booklet explains to the IDF more intelligent logic, but the image of intel- that “the diplomatic consideration in a lim- ligence and complexity; any task undertaken ited confrontation is the dominant consider- made use of rhetorical means in order to ation, while the military-operational consid- create the illusion of intelligent analysis at a 9 eration is secondary.”5 This was the first time time when there was no such analysis. that a professional IDF handbook instructed The first casualty of the new language that the responsibility for combat and battle was the main principle in war: adhering to success is not the IDF’s exclusive interest. the mission. As formulated, the mission became meaningless and devoid of actual oper- ”Looking Smart” ational content, which made it impossible to The Operational Theory Research Institute plan, undertake, and complete. The second reinforced the lack of clarity created within and no less important casualty was the situ- the IDF in relation to its role. The aim of the ation assessment process, which became im- Institute, which was founded in 1993 within possible to carry out due to the commanders’ the framework of the military colleges, was unfounded intellectual basis. These process- to serve as a research unit that would study es created a situation that caused confusion and teach the principles of systemic thought among the officers and left them without to IDF officers.6 From the state comptroller’s solutions to the problems that were created

24 from that confusion. For the troops in the a complete neglect of the ground forces and field, the result was disastrous. Rather than its maneuvering units, which were deemed trying to dispel as best as possible the vague- an item whose time was up. Thus, the four ness inherent in the battlefield, the new mili- divisions that were mobilized in the summer tary language compounded the obscurity. of 2006 – and this only after heavy pressure Thus the IDF reached a situation whereby on the chief of staff – were untrained for the it was both heavily involved in diplomatic combat that was demanded of them, joined processes that diverted it from its fundamen- the combat after a two week delay, and in tal task and was at an entire loss as to the ter- the end barely saw any combat. Similarly, minology connected with military force op- the phenomenon, unprecedented in the IDF, eration – and the concepts behind them. An in which regular battalions went out for “re- additional area in which the IDF lost its clar- freshers” during the war and before the IDF ity of thought was the ranking of the military had met its main task in its only theater of mission on its list of priorities. combat, was also the direct extension of the outlook that the life and comfort of the sol- From “Mission as Central” to dier are at the center of the military industry, “Soldier as Central” rather than what is actually the main task In one of the discussions on the feasibility of – the protection of civilians.13 It would not be ground maneuvers during the Second Leba- an exaggeration to conclude that this belief non War, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz said that is what created the situation whereby during a move of this sort could cause “fatalities the Second Lebanon War it seemed that the among soldiers in Lebanon,” and that “the soldier’s family became of secondary impor- people in Israel do not want to go into Leba- tance to the soldier who was meant to protect non.”10 The Chief of Staff expressed a feeling it. reflective of the post-modern ideas that per- Not surprisingly, the next conceptual link, meated the IDF and in any case also allowed the need for a rapid victory – long a corner- the penetration of post-heroic ideas into its stone of Israel’s security concept – was like- midst.11 Consequently, the traditional and wise eroded by the innovative ideas that had During the declared combat values of the IDF under- infiltrated the IDF. went a deep and uncontrolled transforma- Second tion, primarily vis-à-vis the basic value of ad- From the “Image of Victory” to the Lebanon War hering to the mission. Yet without realizing “Staging of Victory” it seemed that this basic value in contact with the enemy, A decisive victory is a situation in which the the soldier's and without ignoring the price demanded defeated side loses its will to fight or is not family members for this purpose, no victories in any type of able to realize this will. It is important to dis- combat can be achieved.12 tinguish between the decisive military victo- became of The primacy of adhering to the mission ry required of IDF officers over the military secondary was overtaken by other values, led by the or quasi-military expression of a certain ide- importance to protection of the lives of the soldiers over ology, and the demand, which is not always the soldier who all else. These attitudes complemented the realizable, to defeat the ideology itself that enticing idea of decision by standoff fire as underlies any terrorist organization or mili- was meant to an alternative to maneuver. The result was tary opposing the IDF. protect them.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 25 Testimony by the chief of staff to the Win- this gibberish, what kind of nonsense ograd Commission regarding the purpose was this? Whom exactly are we de- of the war that he himself conducted shows feating? What does it mean to defeat? clearly the confusion that reigned in the IDF What is the meaning of this? We tried in this regard. Halutz told the commission: to create alternatives to defeat. At first, “The entire purpose of the operation was to I talked about “‘the image of victory,” create an entirely different reality for.…the that is, victory for the sake of appear- Israeli home front.”14 Earlier, however, he ance. Afterward, this became staging testified: “I personally believe that the words the victory.18 ‘decisive victory’ and ‘defeat’ against a guerrilla or terrorist organization are not rele- The Redesign vant….It is impossible to defeat an ideology. Ofer Shelah’s book The Israeli Army: A Radical It is impossible to defeat a terrorist organiza- Proposal (2003) is the clearest evidence of the tion that has woven terror into its flag …This operational concepts that developed in the is our experience and the experience of oth- IDF in the wake of the processes described ers.”15 above. For the purpose of the book, Shelah When a military commander automati- interviewed Amnon Lipkin Shahak, Uzi cally makes the mistaken assumption that he Dayan, Moshe Arens, and Haim Ramon, as is unable to physically defeat the expressions well as other senior figures. The discussions of ideology – because it is impossible for him he held with Dov Tamari and Shimon Naveh, to vanquish the ideology itself – he has con- the heads of the Operational Theory Research tributed significantly to the IDF’s not fulfill- Institute, “opened [for him] a new world of ing its sole mission: the protection of the citi- looking at and understanding military af- zens. Halutz was not the first to claim thus. fairs,” and “as the fate of the IDF would have At a conference in January 2001, General it, they are bequeathing this world to a new Moshe Ya’alon described his concept of vic- generation of officers today.”19 tory in the war on terrorism: “This struggle Shelah claims that then-Chief of Staff will be decided through attrition. We refer to Ehud Barak was the one who in the early this today as ‘tiring.’ Each one of the sides 1990s began to design the concept whereby is trying to tire the other….We are not talk- “the emphasis will be on fire and not on ma- ing about a military victory.”16 At the same neuver, on neutralizing the enemy and not conference, then-Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, on decisively defeating it via conquest of ter- later the minister of defense, said: “In a situ- ritory.”20 The commanders of the army, se- ation of limited confrontation in the context nior academics, and those who set the tone of all-out war, I think that the term ‘decision’ in the media were captivated by the idea that is no longer relevant.”17 the post-modern warfare era had arrived, in In early 2004, the head of the Strategic which, according to Shelah, “war takes place Planning Branch, Brig. Gen. Eival Giladi, and is decided not by physical destruction on said: the battlefield, but by the collapse of systems When I began this job, IDF plans in- and by the change in the people’s mindset.” cluded the concept “to defeat the Pal- Proponents of this doctrine ignored the fact estinians.” I asked myself what was that in the very first days of the IDF and

26 due to the general balance of power that those he interviewed: was always to the IDF’s detriment, the IDF The true threats facing the IDF are taught its commanders that decisive victory different today: low intensity warfare is a cognitive situation in which the enemy against the Palestinians….the Hiz- loses its will to fight. However, and in con- bollah missile threat that could cause trast to the contemporary opinion makers in tremendous damage to the home the IDF, they also understood, based on an front…despite its not being a threat to acute sense of the nature of warfare and the the territorial borders…the possibility nature of mankind, that the essential condi- of regular army actions for a localized tion for the creation of such a situation – both purpose, along the lines of the kid- on the tactical and the operational levels – is napped soldiers. the performance of rapid and deep ground Those interviewed believed that in light of maneuvers that will bring about the collapse these threats, “a large, uniformed people’s of the enemy.21 Ignoring both basic IDF doc- army acting in armored units does not provide trine and the IDF’s own positive experience a solution to any of them,” and that “in any The Second in the operational arena created the situation scenario, the most important elements of such that in place of learning, for instance, about a confrontation are the lack of significance of Lebanon War the maneuvers that brought about the cogni- territorial conquest and the lack of ability of manifested 23 tive collapse and physical defeat of the Arab any side to achieve decisive victory.” once again armies in Israel’s wars, the trend in the IDF Three years before the Second Lebanon the simple became internalizing “the lessons of the US War, which demonstrated to the Israeli pub- military in Iraq.” The IDF ignored the fact lic that the IDF had neglected ground ma- historical that the lessons learned from the wars in Iraq neuvers as a method for defeating the enemy, lesson: if you and Kosovo are not necessarily relevant to Is- Shelah wrote: strive for zero rael, since these were wars by a superpower The concept of “moving the war to the casualties, you that was not subject to time, financial, or in- enemy’s territory” has gone bankrupt. will score zero ternational diplomacy constraints, and most The Northern Command, with regu- important, whose civilians’ routine lives lar forces and aerial support and ad- achievements. were not at all disrupted while the military vanced weaponry is supposed to deal was pounding the enemy from the air over with a [ground] threat of this sort rap- the course of many weeks. idly and efficiently. The proper way to Shelah writes: “The practical meaning of deal with Hizbollah passes through the revolution in military affairs… is that the Washington, or through a campaign in era of conventional symmetric warfare is es- which the proper force is regular and sentially over. No longer will similarly armed not large. The threat to Syria…will in militaries confront each other and engage in any case be made by aerial forces…. battles of maneuvering and attrition….Under No longer is it the firepower and ob- these conditions there is no need for the IDF’s sessive striving to conquer territory, huge armored forces.”22 Without critique or but the analysis of the enemy as a sys- investment of additional thought, the writer tem, understanding of its weak points, presents the basic assumptions regarding the and sporadic attacks of fire are what IDF’s force structure as he gleaned it from will silence it.”24

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 27 The attitudes and beliefs described obvi- signed a commensurate budget level. That ously had a significant effect on what actually same low priority is given to the expecta- occurred in the IDF. Between 1990 and 2005, tions of those forces, and that was also – not a revolution took place in the organization surprisingly – the outcome of many ground in everything connected with equipment, forces operations during the war. training for force operations, and most important, the IDF’s foremost values. However, The Drive for Zero Casualties will this revolution ignored the ramifications of Yield Zero Achievements the changes on the lives of Israel’s citizens, Edward Luttwak writes that when political which are the IDF’s only raison d’être. More- institutions and leaders and societies are pre- over, other than a few individuals whose pared to suffer casualties in combat, they are voices were not heard, no one dealing with also able to fight out of insignificant reasons. state security in the media or in academia Yet when they are not prepared for this, they Fundamental paid attention to this revolution or to its con- create various and sundry claims in order to 25 principles must sequences for Israeli security. explain the reasons why the combat about not be allowed In the months before 2006, the IDF de- to take place is not worth the expected sac- leted from its set of plausible scenarios the rifice.27 The Second Lebanon War manifested to unravel and possibility that any war would be decided by once again the simple historical lesson: if you assume the likes maneuvering armor assisted by infantry, ar- strive for zero casualties, you will score zero of transient, tillery, and engineering. This in turn spurred achievements. fashionable the processes that led to the closure of some Another issue that was proven critical ideas borrowed of the reserve units, the reduced ground during the terrorism war of 2000-2005 and forces training to the point of its complete 2006 is that decision makers in the govern- from realms cessation, and discussions about shortening ment and the military must properly assess and disciplines compulsory service in the IDF. There even the point at which anti-Israel terrorism turns that share began a process of presenting the “reservists from what has been called a “limited con- no common law” for approval in the Knesset. This law frontation,” which requires a response by a was, in practice, a bill to deplete the reserves. relatively small part of the force, into activity ground with the The claims regarding “a lack of resources” that requires a full scale war against terror- IDF. that the commanders used to explain the end ist bases. Israel’s reactions to the terrorist at- of ground forces training do not stand the tacks that began in 2000 and to the rocketry test of reality. An editorial in Haaretz stated: terrorism in 2006 show that faulty assessment “Completely contrary to the claims of the brought it to the operation of a military force military, the Brodet Commission determined in a manner and extent that did not match that the results of the Second Lebanon War the threat. The decision makers ignored the did not derive from a lack of resources. The fact that above a certain level, civilian dam- army did not lack resources at any stage. It ages of terrorism, in terms of morale and eco- lacked efficient management of resources nomics, exceed the damage of a regular war and an understanding that management is between armed forces.28 a major factor in military power.26 When the In considering when a limited confronta- maneuvering ground forces are declared by tion shifts to all-out war against terrorism of the IDF as anachronistic, they are also as- various types and intensities, the words of

28 Yigal Allon, one of Israel’s military giants, – its military values. It is not intended to de- come to mind: scribe the situation prevalent today whereby The lesser war that produces trifling the military enlists in the civilian population results is a function of an actual state and then internalizes, albeit incidentally, its of war, and it must be defined from civilian thought processes. Third and most a political standpoint and from the important, the IDF must return to its tradi- standpoint of the right to fight it with tional combat values, high demands, disci- appropriate tools, including the use of pline, structure, and organization that derive full power, if there remains no other from the authentic and comprehensive set of option to quash it. Moreover, if it is not threats facing the State of Israel. restrained in time and with sufficient The processes described in this essay assertion, we must be concerned that demonstrate that another situation in which in addition to the intensive suffering fundamental IDF principles unravel and as- caused to the population that is within sume the likes of transient, fashionable ideas the range of attack, Israel’s moderation borrowed from realms and disciplines that will be interpreted as military or dip- share no common ground with the IDF must lomatic weakness and will encourage not be allowed. the enemy to strengthen its actions, which could snowball into an all-out Notes war.29 I would like to thank Yagil Henkin and Gadi Evgi Those who viewed the various forms of ter- for their important comments, as well as members of the INSS research staff for their enlightening rorism as a non-existential threat were mis- critique. taken, and it was wrong to derive far-reach- 1 IDF website: http://dover.idf.il/IDF/Eng- ing conclusions regarding the IDF’s values lish/about/doctrine/default.htm. and appropriate preparations for war. For 2 An expression of these ideas appears in Fran- the IDF to once again realize its goals, the cis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last military must undergo a multi-faceted recov- Man (New York: Penguin, 1992). 3 Speech by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the ery process. First, beyond the professional US Congress, July 26, 1994. opinions required of it, the IDF must discon- 4 Arie M. Cacowicz, “Rashomon in Jerusa- nect itself from any involvement in diplo- lem: Mapping the Israeli Negotiatiors’ Posi- matic negotiations, and it must certainly be tions on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, banned from repeating the mistake of lead- 1993-2001,” International Studies Perspectives 6 ing those negotiations. Second, the IDF must (2005): 252-73; quoted by Kobi Michael, Mili- tary Fights Peace – Military and Peacemaking: The review seriously the concept of the “people’s Influence of the IDF Over the Transition Process army,” its practical ramifications, and how from Peace to War – The Israeli Case (Tel Aviv: Tel much this term allows the IDF to adopt for Aviv University Press, 2007, forthcoming). itself civilian ideologies that impair the es- 5 ”The Limited Confrontation,” IDF Doctrine sence of a fighting organization. The term and Training Unit, p. 64 . “people’s army” was originally intended to 6 According to the state comptroller’s review, in December 1993 the deputy chief of staff ap- describe a situation in which the population proved the proposal of the Doctrine Training is temporarily mobilized in war time, and Unit to establish a research group whose first for this purpose, it adopts – also temporarily goal was to “draft a combat doctrine for the

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 29 systemic level, research this doctrine, develop at the conference by the Center for National it, and implement it in the IDF,” State Comp- Security Studies and the National Security troller’s Report 57A, 2006, p. 61. College, January 28, 2001, published by the 7 Ibid. The comptroller found that from the day University of Haifa, The Center for National the Institute was established in 1993 to the day Security Studies. of the review’s completion in 2005, the Insti- 17 Ibid. tute did not issue a single publication in the 18 Maariv, January 2, 2004. field of systemic doctrine (p. 61). The head of 19 Ofer Shelah, The Israeli Army: A Radical Propos- the Institute explained the lack of publications al (Kinneret Zmora-Bitan, 2003), Acknowledg- that “systemic knowledge is undergoing con- ments. stant change,” and that “the language in the 20 Shelah, The Israeli Army, p. 37. operative field changes with great frequency, 21 Israel, Military, General Staff, General Collec- which creates didactic difficulty in instruction, tion, Battle Doctrine (1964), vol. 1: “Attack, Ad- implementation, and writing,” p. 62. vance, and Pursuit, Descent, and Ambush”; 8 See Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Captives of see introductory chapter. Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2007), p. 22 Shelah, The Israeli Army, pp. 40-41. 197. 23 Shelah, The Israeli Army, pp. 58, 59. 9 John M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princ- 24 Shelah, The Israeli Army, pp. 60, 129. eton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 25 The only warning calls in the military periodi- 10 Winograd Commission interim report, p. 98. cal Ma’arachot, which is distributed to all IDF 11 Edward Luttwak coined the term “post-heroic officers, were those of General Yaakov- Ami war” in order to reflect the shift from a type of dror and myself, the last of which was pub- war where a soldier requires heroism to win at lished in December 2005, just seven months combat, to a war among whose main goals is before the Second Lebanon War. (Additional the prevention of losses, and in which heavy publications by the author appeared in Nativ, losses are essentially not acceptable. Edward Military Technology, Makor Rishon, and in an N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” article in Limited Confrontation [Ma’arachot, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995). 2004]. The military researcher Yagil Henkin 12 The principle and value of “adhering to the also warned about the issue.) mission” should not be understood as permit- 26 Haaretz, June 1, 2007. ting commanders to use their force in an unin- 27 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War telligent manner as took place in the 2006 war. and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University In order for the task to be completed with a Press, 1987). low number of casualties, additional war prin- 28 The cost to the Israeli economy of the years of ciples, which are essential conditions for suc- terrorism that began in September 2000 was cess, support this higher value, including the higher than what was caused it by the Yom concentration of effort, stratagems, security, Kippur War. In the first two years of terrorism, constancy, continuity, and so on. the Israeli economy lost 45 billion shekels, or 13 See Lt. Col. Yariv Elbaz and Maj. Eyal Asraf, about 10 percent of its GDP. In place of annual “The Development of Anti-Terror Combat in GDP growth of 4 percent, Israel had a negative the Golani Brigade,” Insight into Events 4, p. 19. growth rate of -1 percent. The unemployment “There is evidence of actual damage caused to rate also rose steadily. In Israel’s economic the process of training IDF troops….We must history there was no example of a significant find the balance…between the version in decline in GDP due to any war. See the study which ‘we place the soldier at the center’ and of Dr. Michel Stravichensky of the Bank of the version in which ‘the mission is central.’” Israel’s Research Department, published in 14 Winograd Commission interim report, p. 62. advance of the Caesaria Conference in 2002. 15 Winograd Commission interim report, p. 52 29 Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand, (HaKibbutz 16 ”Between ‘Decision’ and ‘Victory’”– lecture HaMeuhad, 1959), p. 18.

30 IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept Yoaz Hendel

The intense soul-searching in the IDF in light of the operational problems exposed in the Second Lebanon War has reinvigorated a process already underway for a few years as to the role of special units, both in routine times and in times of emergency. The belated inclusion of special units in the Second Lebanon War, the operations in Baalbek and in Tyre that earned broad media cover- age, and the high capabilities demonstrated in the twenty-four special operations that were not exposed in the media1 highlighted the gap between the potential of the special units and their limited use during the war. A significant percentage of the quality manpower of these units in the regular forces and the reserves, the expensive equipment, and the combat skills acquired during many years of training were ex- cluded from the combat in Lebanon due to a lack of operational plans for times of emergency and the small number of actual missions. The purpose of this essay is to review the operational concept of the special units in the IDF, their assignments, and the possible alternatives for change, against the background of both the limited combat that Israel has faced in recent years and the challenges of conventional warfare that have once again become part of future scenarios.

What is a Special Unit? with an enemy that is outside the bounds of In the IDF, as in any other regular military, the recognizable “playing field.” The role of there is a structural tension between the de- the special units is to provide an operational sire for quantitative power, which enables solution to the military needs of the intersec- an easier victory on the battlefield, and the tion of what is known and what has disap- burden of a multi-dimensional entity.2 The peared from the strict, traiditional military 3 “large military” is not designed to deal with view. According to the IDF definition, spe- Yoaz Hendel, non-routine tasks or threats, and the princi- cial units forces require varied combat train- Neubauer junior ples of initiative, flexibility, and stratagems ing. They have a high level of basic combat research associate at are not sufficiently expressed while dealing skills, and since their assignment is the per- INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 31 The effect of formance of special operations, they are or- their aura of forces with unlimited abilities military sting ganized to operate in small units. have often directly influenced the national operations in World War II was the final catalyst for the mood (for instance, the boost in morale fol- establishment of special units. The need for a lowing the Entebbe affair, versus the “Leba- key areas in the force that would carry out special operations non effect,” which intensified following the enemy's home in which air, land, and sea capabilities were navy commando disaster in 1997), public front often combined pushed Col. Hadley Clark, one of opinion of the IDF, and motivation among 7 translates into the assistants to the British military’s chief of the new recruits. greater damage staff, to establish an independent force with- Over time, the IDF cast three central in the British armed forces. The success of the units as leaders of the “specials”: Shayetet than the forces that were established on the basis of (“flotilla”) 13, the naval commando unit; the destruction of this idea injected new blood into the veins of General Staff special reconnaissance unit, at- large forces on the British military’s attack capability – an tached to military intelligence; and Shaldag, the battlefield. ability that had been seriously damaged by the air force commando unit. From a com- the German advances in those years.4 mand standpoint the three units are subject In August 1953, Unit 101 was established to the branch headquarters (air, sea, intel- in the IDF. Similar to the British special forces, ligence), and not to an operational brigade. Unit 101 operated with incursions, meaning There are other select units in the IDF, both in the penetration of forces into enemy territory, reconnaissance roles under the command of the performance of a task, and the return of the various brigades, and in specialty roles, the forces to IDF bases. The unit operated un- such as the bomb unit of the engineering til January 1954, but its unique character, its corps. The high quality of these units and the operational achievements, and the training of desire of the IDF’s senior command echelons its personnel established norms and became to use them in routine times as well have at part of the combat doctrine of the IDF.5 When times blurred the structural separation be- Unit 101 was created, the State of Israel had a tween them and the units the IDF defines as naval commando unit that was composed of “special units.” For this reason, particularly troops coming out of the navy (Palyam) and in recent years, the three leading special units troops from the Palmach’s Shahar division,6 perform tasks similar to those placed upon who served mostly in Military Intelligence. the top units in the territorial command sys- Nonetheless, the establishment of 101 was a tem, and vice-versa. A specific example is watershed event from the point of view of the the special task assigned to the Maglan unit IDF’s operational concept. The unit’s activi- (which is not included in the military defini- ties succeeded in creating a significant cogni- tion of the special units) in the Second Leba- tive effect among the enemy, and even more non War, the same task that was carried out important, its soldiers succeeded in building by the Shaldag unit in Operation Grapes of a new ethos of the fighting Zionist, which ap- Wrath ten years earlier.8 Nonetheless, for pealed highly to the Israeli public. special tasks that require a non-routine mili- From then until today, the IDF has man- tary solution, depart outside the command aged to maintain the unique image of the jurisdiction, or have the potential of systemic special forces. Their secret activities, the tre- repercussions, the General Staff is careful to mendous curiosity they have aroused, and use the special units as the main force.9

32 Thus there are tasks whose nature deter- its tasks, but as opposed to them, they are not mines the assignment to a particular unit, subordinate to this command authority. and there are tasks placed on a wide variety The command assignment of the units for of elite units. Other than the fact that the la- the most part prescribes their traditional mis- bel “special tasks” carries with it tremendous sion, whereby the naval commando is tasked prestige, the special units also enjoy material to attack harbors and ports; the Shaldag unit benefits. The IDF invests tremendous re- is tasked to provide assistance for air force sources in maintaining special abilities, far missions; and the General Staff special recon- more than investments in other top units. naissance unit carries out intelligence opera- Hence the covert struggle among the units tions deep in enemy territory. Some of these over the right to enter the prestigious club of missions are planned in advance to be car- the special units and to earn a greater piece ried out on the first night of a war, and some of the budget pie. are intended to be carried out on a routine Despite the variety among challenges basis. faced by the IDF special units, the similari- Over the years, the weight of the core roles ties between the special units can be sketched has shifted due to intensive development of along general lines: long range combat equipment (which con- n The tremendous resources, which stitutes a more efficient and less dangerous translates into the ability to cull the highest alternative for the forces), until the center of quality manpower from the pool of new re- gravity of the special units leaned to the per- cruits, to invest time and money in training, formance of complicated actions both in the and to maintain the unit with regular train- various command areas and outside them ing activity over a more prolonged period during routine times. Another associated than in other military units. role that has developed since the 1980s is op- n The operational envelope.10 The three eration during terrorist attacks, which means units mentioned have long range transporta- maintaining tactical readiness for hostage at- tion tools that enable them to move secretly tacks. to reach distant targets. They have special combat equipment that allows them com- The Operational Concept bat fitness and survivability in the field over As per the army’s definition, the special units time; they also have a unique intelligence en- are permanently subordinate “to the General velope that enables operational precision. Staff or the highest military headquarters or n These first two characteristics give rise the war theater headquarters or a chief head- to the special nature of the tasks placed upon quarters (such as the air force or navy head- these units and their position in the com- quarters), and during non-war times they are mand hierarchy. The three special units are generally used at the initiative of the govern- not directly subordinate to the ground forces ment and the minister of defense, or with command or the operational brigades, even their approval.”11 The multiplicity of sub- though a significant portion of their activities ordinations that appears in the definition is is performed on land. Similar to all the top not coincidental; the special units lack a per- units of the army, they maintain a tight recip- manent command and work for a number of rocal relationship with the ground force and “commander-managers.” While a structural

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 33 assignment exists, the operational possibili- tion is to the responsible branch. Consider, ties of the units do not match the ability of for instance, the commando takeover of the the organizations to which they are attached. Karine A ship. For the purpose of the ex- The significance of this is that in many cases, ample: the geographical theater boundary of from a professional standpoint, the corps the Southern Command passes through the that is in command over a special unit has Straits of Tiran, while the takeover plan was difficulty serving as the overall authority, to have been conducted south of this bound- and thus requires external operational assis- ary, so the geographic operational space for tance from outside the said corps. the mission was under the responsibility of For example: an idea for an operation or the General Staff. In general, as in this opera- attack by the naval commandos connected tion, the General Staff is interested in having to a ground-based operation would presum- command input in such a sensitive operation, ably be approved at the naval command and therefore also takes part in the approvals headquarters, which is almost completely process and even in the planning process. In The summer composed of naval personnel, i.e., sailors by wartime, however, an operation of this type of 2006 training. However, the ability of this staff to could take place in the General Staff sphere demonstrated assess ground-based attack actions, the size without the General Staff being involved in once again of forces, equipment, and additional mea- it at all, since at that time command attention sures is limited, since it has little or no experi- turns to the larger battle. the urgency ence with these criteria. Therefore, approval At the second level the special units are of devising of a plan for distant ground operations, even used in the “classic” manner for the pur- alternatives if it begins with naval activity, must involve pose of carrying out special missions. These to the present additional professionals. Similarly, the air actions are undertaken in the General Staff organizational force headquarters would find it profession- sector with the approval of the General Staff ally difficult to supervise the ground-based and at its direction, and for the most part, the status of the actions of Shaldag, and Military Intelligence General Staff initiates/leads the process. An special units. would be hard-pressed to assess operations example is Operation Sharp and Smooth in by the General Staff special reconnaissance Baalbek from the Second Lebanon War. In unit. this operation, the General Staff special re- For this reason, operation of special forces connaissance unit and the Shaldag unit were during wartime is concentrated at three cen- sent to an area outside the operational sphere tral levels. At the first level the special forces of Northern Command. The initiative for the are operated under corps or branch command operation came from the General Staff eche- with the intention of carrying out special op- lons, which believed that such an action had erations. The purpose of these operations is the potential to positively affect the military to provide solutions to complicated problems and the Israeli public. At the time of the oper- facing regular forces (many times this diffi- ation, a dispute developed regarding the ap- culty derives from the mission’s distance from pointment of a commander for the operation. Israel). These operations are undertaken un- The authority for the appointment was held der the purview of the General Staff, meaning by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who ultimately outside the theater boundaries of the territo- awarded it to the commander of the air force rial commands, but the command subordina- as a representative of the General Staff.12

34 At the third level, the special units are di- The forces were made rectly subordinate to the command spheres, subject to the divisional either during wartime, but for the most part, commands, which oper- during times of routine. For example: in the ated them in the combat Northern Command, until the IDF’s with- zones. These operations drawal from Lebanon, the special units were were certainly not consid- activated from time to time for “red line infil- ered special operations, tration” missions, which is to say beyond the but they were a dimen- northern edge of the security zone. From a sion within the operation command standpoint, these operations were of the special forces in this conducted by the territorial divisions; the war. relevant corps “loaned” the unit to the terri- The success of the op- torial command for the entire period of con- erations (mainly at times ducting the combat. Accordingly, the expens- of limited confrontation) es of the action were divided evenly between also caused the General the command and the relevant corps. Upon Security Services (which completion of the operation and its review, acted in the field on an the units would return to the command sub- ongoing basis) to develop modes of commu- Rockets launchers, ordination of the corps from which it came. nication with the relevant units, creating an explosive charges, and stocks of ammunition Since the beginning of the limited con- operational triangle that reduced the roles seized by the IDF's frontation in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza of the appointed corps commands. Together naval commando unit in the Karine A Strip, this temporary loan has become more with the broad actions in the limited combat takeover. The cargo routine. The special units (mainly naval com- and in “non-special” operations, the units was intended for the mando and Shaldag) have been integrated continued to carry out targeted operations. Palestinian Authority in Gaza. quite frequently into targeted operations Since special operations generally requires against terrorist organization. There is a long term (many months) combat guidelines shared interest in the integration: the special and a prolonged chain of approvals, the num- units want to maintain the operational ten- ber of “traditional” operations was reduced sion and the high level of training, and main- while routine security operations became a ly take part in the general effort, while the central portion of the activities. commands involved, mainly the territorial The result was that the appointed corps brigades, benefit from quality manpower, continued to supervise the force buildup and high abilities, and the creation of deterrence maintenance while the territorial commands in daring operations deep into Palestinian received the principal product. This phenom- territory. enon has not disappeared over the years, and This kind of joint work effected direct attempts have been made to find a unifying communication between the senior com- factor that would handle the operation of the mand echelons in the special units and the special forces. For this purpose, the Special territorial division and brigade commands. Operations Control Headquarters was estab- During the Second Lebanon War as well, the lished in the General Staff. According to IDF forces of the three special units were oper- definition, this headquarters is intended to ated in the Northern Command districts. be the General Staff body in charge of the ini-

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 35 tiation, undertaking, and control of special in a distant campaign is operations with a operations during emergency periods.13 In cognitive effect. The effect of military sting practice, struggles for prestige and the reluc- operations in key areas in the enemy’s home tance among the forces commands to forfeit front often translates into greater damage the prestigious units, the many resources, the than the destruction of large forces on the quality manpower, and the accompanying battlefield. The damage is not just physical, media attention defused the idea. In 1997, but mainly psychological. the headquarters was combined with a spe- The understanding that in future wars cial infantry division, and thus lost its main special units will have a central role prompt- purpose. ed the General Staff to appoint (during the The increased popularity of the idea of Second Lebanon War) an officer at the rank standoff firepower14 has led to a change in of brigadier general for the purpose of draft- the traditional thought processes in the IDF. ing optimal operating procedures.16 After a The approach of the former chief of staff who long investigation it was also decided to re- heralded the operation of aerial and artillery vive the Special Operations Control Head- force at the beginning of the Second Lebanon quarters. The plan stipulates that the special War was the strongest tangible expression forces remain within the rubric of the Special of this. According to this concept of com- Operations Headquarters, and the special bat, decisive victory would be achieved via units are supposed to be added to it. a cognitive effect while minimizing friction, In practice, during the Second Lebanon meaning with a strike to the soft underbelly War, the Special Operations Headquarters of the enemy in its deep defensive territory, was a body empty of content, a headquarters but without including massive forces. The without troops. It planned and initiated op- concept of standoff warfare includes air and erations, and in certain cases even executed artillery forces, and low signature ground them with division troops, but the special forces.15 The ground forces are required to units themselves were not integrated as be in the attack zones, to supply intelligence, was planned, but rather were operated as in and to assist in directing air and artillery routine times – waiting for the orders of the forces. For this purpose, this force is meant relevant command. However, the Northern to possess long range transport vehicles, and Command, the said territorial command in to have combat abilities and the training to the 2006 war, found it difficult attend prop- survive in the field. erly to the special units. The core of the war Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996 was, from the command standpoint – and jus- is a tangible example of the use that can be tifiably so – “the large military,” the ground made of special units in a standoff fire cam- forces and the air force. The units initiated paign. At the time of the operation, most of operations in conjunction with the corps the “large army” remained between the Blue headquarters and the General Staff along Line (the border fence) and the Red Line (the the lines of past wars, and even enlarged the boundary of the security zone), while the “product output.” At the same time, it seems special units were scattered in the field and that they didn’t manage to achieve the requi- provided solutions for military needs. An site military sharpness in time of war. additional role placed upon the special units

36 Possible Operational Alternatives

Realizing force potential is a fundamental IDF principle of combat, and yet precisely the special units that according to all military principles were equipped to achieve high standard results failed to reach their potential during the war. The summer of 2006 demonstrated once again the urgency of devising alternatives to the present situation.

The first alternative is to draw on the experience of establishing a joint headquarters for all the forces. According to this method, a clear division 1would be made between force buildup, which will be left to the responsibility of the commands, and routine and wartime operation. Instead of the air force receiving instructions from the General Staff to assign Shaldag one operation or another, the air force would request of the joint command that the unit it oversees – Shaldag – carry out an operation. The joint command would be tasked with the matter of intelligence, professional guidance, combat materiel, training development, and developing plans for war time. The benefits of this method are, first of all, improved ability. Until now, there is a built-in compartmentalization between the special units; despite convergence in many areas, the units are careful not to expose “too much” to the “rival” units. This is true in matters of combat materiel, lessons learned from operational activities, and operational information. The establishment of a joint command would put an end to this unneces- sary practice and would enable reciprocal exchange while maintaining the uniqueness of the units (their particular roles). Another clear benefit is the multiplication of forces during war time – the number of troops in the regular and reserve special units is sufficient to carry out decision- related roles. Thus far the military has found it difficult to make such in- tegrations during war time since it requires long term combat directives, training, and joint exercises. A joint command would enable routine joint preparations and joint operational activities during war time. The primary drawback of this method regards the relations between the command appointed over the force buildup and the headquarters appointed for force operation. A joint command could harm the direct monitoring that exists between the designated corps/branches and the units themselves.

The second alternative is the American model, which is the establishment of a force of special units. According to this model, the joint command 2would supervise force buildup and operation. The supervisory com-

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 37 mand would be given the required tools, training bases, and envelope as per the special forces’ areas of operation. For example, in the United States military the special forces command maintains a helicopter fleet of its own, which is responsible for training the troops and transporting them in time of need. It is reasonable to assume that this alternative will not be implemented in the IDF since it requires a significant structural change in the entire military. The benefits of this method, similar to the prior method, are mostly in improved abilities. Its main drawback is in the massive resources required for its implementation.

The ostensible third alternative, leaving the situation as it is, is the simplest and easiest for the General Staff. Despite the command and control 3problem, the difficulty in reciprocal exchange, the lack of professional supervision, and the weakness in utilizing the force during war time, it is difficult to dispute the claim that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The special units have until now met the goals defined for them. No one expects them to decide battles; they operate at levels where silence is golden, and they assist in ongoing security. However, the special units also have a role that accompanies their operational occupation that from a certain point of view is no less important than their main assignment. From a public opinion point of view, they bear the flag, blazing the trail for the other military units. Their obligation is to show high norms of behavior, special abilities, and active participation in the national endeavor. When the entire military is mobilized for war and when reservists are sent onto the battlefield without materiel, as happened in the Second Lebanon War, it can be expected that the special units will recruit all of their people, and disperse the materiel and knowledge in the combat zones in order to influence and to participate in the national effort.

In the 2006 war, and overall even in Is- tary is heading, is bound up in difficult birth rael’s other wars, despite their strong moti- pangs, struggles of prestige, and the slaugh- vation, most reservists were left outside the ter of sacred cows. However, since the lead- realm of contribution. The special units must ership role of the special units is only becom- constantly improve themselves, as must the ing stronger, it is reasonable to assume that entire military. A change in the operational if the opportunity is given, they will prove concept will enable this in the optimal man- themselves in the coming test. ner. The first alternative, to which the mili-

38 Notes Brown in which soldiers who were not part 1 Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Captives of Leba- of the special units also participated, this was non (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2007). more of a gesture to those participants and not 2 Tomer Brosh and Yotam Amichai, “Special a change in command concept. Units in the IDF: Past and Present,” Ma’arachot 10 Mem B, “The Special Forces,” Ma’arachot 297 411 (2007): 14-22. (1985): 4-7. 3 The Dictionary of IDF Terms, IDF Operations 11 Brosh and Amichai, “Special Units.” Branch Training Doctrine, 1998. 12 Yoaz Hendel, “The Division Commander is 4 Yaron Flint, “Development of the Special Forc- Judged by Results, I failed,” Makor Rishon, es in the Second World War,” Ma’arachot 408 June 11, 2007. (2006): 28-33. 13 Dictionary of IDF Terms. 5 Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt, Andrew 14 On standoff warfare, see Ron Tira, The Limita- Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel’s tions of Standoff Firepower: On Standoff Warfare, Security Revolution, Begin-Sadat Center at Bar- Maneuver, and Decision, Tel Aviv: Institute for Ilan University, 1999, pp. 21-24. National Security Studies, Memorandum no. 6 The unit that masqueraded as Arabs to go be- 89, 2007. hind enemy lines under cover. 15 Tira, The Limitations of Standoff Firepower, pp. 7 Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, p. 15. 35-38. 8 Shelah and Limor, Captives of Lebanon, pp. 260- 16 Amos Harel, “Brig. Gen. Russo – Advisor to 61. the General Staff for the Activation of the Spe- 9 While there were special operations such as cial Forces,” Haaretz, July 25, 2006. Operation Entebbe or Operation Blue and

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 39 Command and Authority in the IDF: The Winograd Challenge Gabriel Siboni

Whoever casts a discerning eye over the Winograd Commission interim report will uncover a minefield of puzzling questions. It would be enough to point to the conclusions of the Commission regarding decision making processes, which in most cases reflect a simplistic approach to the human and psychological processes embedded in a decision.1 Elsewhere in the report the Commission implicitly asserts its own position regarding the decisions that led Israel to the Second Lebanon War.2 However on one matter the Commission exceeds all boundaries – when it delivers its far- reaching pronouncement on the concept of the authority of command in the IDF. On this issue the Commission wrote: It is important to stress that the supreme loyalty of professionals must be to their profession and to their duties, not to their superiors or the organization they serve. To be sure, a commitment to superiors and commanders and to the organization in which a person works is an important component of the professional ethos. A measure of trust and faithfulness between people working together is essential to the proper functioning of any team or organization. It is always preferable to begin by alerting and deliberating within the organization by using accepted practices. However, when in the opinion of professionals the person in charge or the organization is acting in a manner liable to cause actual damage, they must warn others and not shy away from a confrontation with their superiors. In the event of serious damage that harbors dangerous consequences, it is the obligation of professionals to warn the higher echelons of authority.3

Gabrial Siboni, research associate at INSS

40 One must not minimize the importance of or the headquarters – instead of the person at internal discussion and dialogue within the the helm – at the center. This is by no means IDF, yet here the ruling of the Commission a question of semantics; it is a manifestation raises a significant challenge to future IDF of an ongoing process of the shedding of the commanders. This article seeks to examine personal responsibility of commanders in fa- the far-reaching implications of the Commis- vor of the fuzzy notion of organizational re- sion’s statements regarding authority of com- sponsibility or the headquarters’ responsibil- mand within the IDF. It will argue that the ity. Consequently, debates in the IDF and in Commission’s approach is extremely prob- the public discourse include statements such lematic, and if implemented, is liable to harm as, “The position of the army is…” or “The significantly the ability of the IDF to function air force’s position is…” and so forth. Yet the as an effective military organization. hierarchal structure of military command is

One of the most basic foundations of by nature and in essence a personal hierar- Chief of Staff the military is the concept of command and chy that flows from the fundamental princi- Lt. Gen. Gabi chain of command. Obedience based on a ple of decentralized authority, from the chief Ashkenazi hierarchy of command is the cornerstone of of staff as commander of the army to subor- any military organization. As to the IDF, “an dinate commanders. As such, it decidedly ominous pattern has been evident for years: does not recognize the concept of authority command procedures in the IDF have be- and responsibility of organizations or head- come more and more like work procedures in quarters. Authority is personal and by na- bureaucratic civilian organizations, and less ture is sufficient to carry out a given task. In like those necessary in a military hierarchy the same vein responsibility is also personal. 4 environment.” Military culture demands Therefore the position of the head of the or- the existence of an official as the source of ganization or unit and his decisions instantly authority at any given time. It should al- determine the position of the command unit ways be remembered that the tasks imposed that assists him and are taken as strict, bind- on the IDF (and on any military organiza- ing orders. It follows that the position of the tion) are imposed on commanders who are IDF in government discussions will always allotted resources to complete them. These be the position of the chief of staff, and so on commanders are personally responsible and down the line of command. accountable for the tasks. At the top of this The Commission comments on the culture hierarchy is the chief of staff, commander of discourse in the IDF during the war, high- of the IDF, who is given the authority to call lighting “the chief of staff’s directive during In the world of all of the army’s resources into action. Each the forum of senior officers, stipulating that military terms, commander is naturally assisted by a head- military personnel must avoid voicing ‘per- quarters to exercise his authority; however, sonal’ opinions in places where the position obligation to the headquarters itself has no command au- of the military is called for.”5 It seems that the the commander thority. chief of staff understood fully what the Com- is not a Over the years we have been witness to a mission did not, i.e., the absolute separation professional continued blurring of the personal authority between: (1) the need to conduct discussions of the commander, brought about by com- as part of the army’s decision making pro- ethos: it is a mon discourse that places the organization cesses and (2) the obligation to ultimately legal duty.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 41 den of discipline within the Israel Defense Forces, to obey all commands and instructions given by authorized commanders, and dedi- cate all of my strength and even sacrifice my life in order to defend the homeland and freedom of Israel.” The idea that a professional duty exists above the duty to obey is groundless and indicates a total lack of understanding of the foundations of a mili- Members of the reach a decision and present it to the political tary organization. Shall the division com- Winograd Commission echelon, assuming full responsibility for that mander who receives an order now check decision as commander of the armed forces. whether the order measures up to his own The chief of staff may present a number of al- professional standard? Shall the staff officer ternatives (though it his duty to recommend given an order now examine it in light of his one of them) or on rare occasions present personal professional analysis? positions opposed to his own; however, this The Commission report continues by en- is always within the framework of his deci- couraging IDF commanders and officers to sion and preferences as the IDF’s exclusive insist on their positions within the organi- authority. zation. However, the Commission proceeds What does the Commission actually say to make an astonishing pronouncement: if in this context? In the paragraph quoted the opinions of officers are not accepted, it above, the Commission contends that the is their duty to protest to the higher echelons loyalty of members of the military echelon (”they must warn others and not shy away is to their profession and military duties, from a confrontation with their superiors”). and they accept their obligation to the com- Just that! In other words it is the duty of the mander as part of their professional ethos. commander to turn to higher bodies and Herein lies the Commission’s first mistake. protest. Now that same division, brigade, or In the world of military terms, obligation to battalion commander; that same staff com- the commander is not a professional ethos: mander is allowed to understand that his it is a legal duty! The duty to obey (legal) professional reasoning goes beyond his le- commands of the command echelon applies gal duty to obey and that the door is always to all army personnel and units. In the IDF, open to appealing to higher echelons. This each soldier pledges to “unconditionally and norm of behavior,6 if realized, will place the without limitation take upon myself the bur- IDF in an intolerable situation.

42 The foundations of command in the IDF from it would likely cause total chaos in the were established on the sound and univer- command apparatus. sal foundations of war. The principle of Here the Commission has failed severely. It command hierarchy is based on thousands would have been fitting for the Winograd of years of war and in the final analysis, Commission to work towards setting a norm on the cost/benefit ratio of the principle’s demanding commanders to take full respon- application. True, it cannot be denied that sibility for their actions, to resign, and be there have been cases where commanders ready to pay the price if they are incapable led their soldiers to crushing failures. The of fulfilling orders given them, or of acting ultimate shield against faulty decisions by according to decisions in total opposition to commanders and military leaders has not their professional views. It was the Commis- yet been invented, this despite the magical sion’s obligation to invalidate the claim of notion there are processes that if realized “I opposed it in real time…but they didn’t would improve the quality of decisions. It is accept my opinion.” The norm must be that important, however, to distinguish between the moment a commander decides not to be discussions aimed at improving the knowl- released of his duties, he becomes a full part- edge and learning of decision makers, and ner in the action, as if it was he who initiated deliberations where professional figures it. The potency of the report’s words and the present their alternatives for action. This is weight ascribed to the report’s content by a broad issue and lies beyond the scope of the public and the military are liable to bring this article. about a collapse of the norms of command The state has given IDF commanders that are so essential to the IDF. As such, it is and the chief of staff an enormous amount the Winograd Commission that is liable to of authority. The process of supervising the be the body that removes the keystone from implementation of authority must be car- the delicate structure of the army’s author- ried out in accordance with the command ity and responsibility of command. It would hierarchy. The authority to alter decisions of be fitting if the contention of the - Commis a given commander is always in the hands sion contained in its draft report would be of his superior commander. The responsibil- removed from the final report so as to pre- ity – in fact the duty – of a commander is to vent a deepening of the crisis of command supervise his subordinates; if his supervision in the IDF. is not sufficient, he must replace them with other subordinates. This is the art of military Notes command. Conversely, it is the duty of sub- 1 The Winograd Commission, interim report, ordinates to implement the orders given to page 133 (Chapter 7, “Conclusions,” article 120) in which Commission members state: “It them and carry out the tasks assigned to is our impression that in those days the prime them. In the event these tasks are contrary minister came to decision making meetings af- to the solders’ professional conscience, it is ter the decisions had essentially been shaped their duty to request to be released of their and formulated” (all references are to the He- duties and be willing to pay the price, and brew transcript). Does the Commission expect only then protest to the higher echelons. This that the prime minister would arrive at such critical government discussions without a def- principle is fundamental, and any deviation inite position?

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 43 2 For example, on page 118 (Chapter 7, “Conclu- whatsoever in a determination of this sort. sions,” article 25) the Commission states: “We 3 Page 107 (Chapter 6, paragraph C, article 22). expect public leaders and the senior profes- The professional echelon referred to is the mil- sional military echelon to have also examined itary echelon, and the organization referred to whether a harsh response would indeed serve is the IDF. the entire range of interests of the state and the 4 Gabriel Siboni, “Command in the IDF,” Strate- public they serve. Such an examination would gic Assessment 9, no. 4 (2007): 72. have likely shown that based on existing 5 The Winograd Commission, interim report, knowledge and the evaluation of plausible sce- page 128 (Chapter 7, “Conclusions”, article narios, the dangers of an immediate harsh re- 83). sponse would outweigh the advantages.” The 6 Note, however, that this norm of behavior is risk analysis that was performed in hindsight illegal. Military-Justice Law, article 123, stipu- reflects the Commission’s assessment regard- lates the penalties for not fulfilling the orders ing the strategic reality that was achieved ver- of a commander: “Any soldier who does not sus the price paid for its achievement. There are carry out an order given by a superior is sub- different assessments of Israel’s overall strate- ject to imprisonment of two years; if this of- gic situation after the war; however, these can- fence is committed while the transgressor’s not be measured, and therefore the members unit is in combat, he/she shall be liable to im- of the Commission have no relative advantage prisonment of ten years.”

44 Israel vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Thrust of Force Roni Bart

The Limitations of Force Hizbollah’s harassment. Similarly, it is fair to ”There is no military solution” is an oft- state that Israel succeeded in implementing spouted mantra, albeit somewhat non-spe- a military solution to the problem of Pales- cific. Exactly which problem has no military tinian terrorism in the Gaza Strip in 1969-70, solution? There is no military solution to the as well as in Judea and Samaria since 2003, Israeli-Arab dispute; neither is there one to meaning that “there is a military solution” the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. There is also to the immediate military problem, but not no military solution to terrorism, if what is to the basic diplomatic problem. If so, the meant is a classic decisive military victory: role of Israel’s military force is to serve as an the eradication of ideology or the uprooting “iron wall” that proves to the Arabs the price of basic terrorist motives; or the capture or of their diplomatic intransigence and in turn death of all the terrorists; or the total preven- provides Israel the impetus and wherewithal tion of terrorist attacks. But there is a military to resolve the diplomatic problem. In other solution to terrorism, if the term “decisive words, at work here is an iron wall with op- victory” is adjusted to refer to a new type of portunities for dialogue. low intensity war: a reduction of terrorism to a level that does not impede the daily rou- The Limitations of Dialogue tine of the targeted country, and that there- In contrast to its frequent recourse to the mil- fore does not figure as a political constraint itary version of the phrase, Israel is not wont in government calculations. to say “there is no diplomatic solution.” The The limitations of Israel’s power were nearest slogan is “there is no partner,” a re- prominently revealed in the two wars in Leb- frain that has drawn increasing disparaging anon. In the first, the use of power in imposing criticism. According to the Western view, to a new pro-Israel order failed; in the second, it which perhaps most Israelis and certainly failed in releasing the captives, in implement- most of the Israeli elite subscribe, the sanc- ing Security Council resolution 1559, and in tity of life is an overriding value, and there- removing the rocket threat from the north of fore dialogue is always preferable to force as the country. At the same time, in the first war, a tool for resolving disagreements and con- Israeli power succeeded in expelling the PLO frontations. Consequently, Israel, the more from Lebanon; and in the second, it succeed- moderate, democratic, and “Western” side, Roni Bart, research ed (perhaps) in placing certain limitations on has the responsibility to initiate and conduct associate at INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 45 Dialogue ongoing dialogue, even at the cost of repeat- act of dialogue strengthens Syria’s ability to is certainly ed rebuffs and excessive concessions. This is undermine the government in Beirut. preferable how the West behaved in the past vis-à-vis Third, dialogue rewards criminality. Dip- Hitler and Milosevic, this is how the world lomatic dialogue driven by the problematic to the use of today deals with Iran and Sudan, and this conduct of an international actor almost inforce, but even is how Israel has acted vis-à-vis the Pales- evitably rewards it, since as per conventional dialogue has tinians, at least since 1993. Again and again, Western dialogue, the carrot is more domi- limitations, the ineffectiveness of this approach has been nant than the stick. Every conciliatory mea- disadvantages, proven, not to mention its immorality (from sure justifiably convinced Hitler that aggres- this standpoint it can be said that the means sion was worthwhile, and the nuclear prolif- and a price. destroy the ends since the obsession with erator who is bought off with carrots proves dialogue has always claimed many casual- to others that nuclearization pays. The mes- ties). The frequent use of the term “limita- sage of “good things happen to bad people” tions of force” overshadows the notion of is a destructive message in the international “limitations of dialogue.” Dialogue is cer- sphere. tainly preferable to the use of force, but even Fourth, dialogue takes time, and time dialogue has limitations, disadvantages, and claims lives (Bosnia, Sudan), or scores fail- a price. ures (North Korea, Iran?), or causes weak- First is the limited ability to influence. ness (southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip). Dialogue can change the external interna- This difficulty can presumably be overcome tional behavior of those engaged in it; this by setting deadlines for the diplomatic ef- is its intention. Sometimes it is also able to forts, but in practice this happens very infre- influence intra-state conduct. For the most quently or very late, both due to the Western part, however, dialogue, is not able to change anti-force philosophy and because intelligent essence or character. The more dictatorial a adversaries propose a small concession at the regime or the more ideological an organiza- last minute, which enables (if not requires) a tion, the more difficult it is to effect a shift continuation of negotiations. in its behavior. In extreme cases, the absence Given the price of dialogue, it is worth- of a fundamental change also means the lack while to remember what should be self-un- of change in behavior or a temporary, tacti- derstood. The statement that “it is better cal, or superficial change alone. This is tanta- to talk than to fight” is usually, but not al- mount to fraud on the part of the particular ways, valid. Against certain adversaries, if dialogue partner. we choose dialogue, in the final analysis, we Second, dialogue provides legitimacy for get war under worse circumstances. Experts actors whose starting positions are not ac- and diplomats have the responsibility to de- ceptable to the international community. For cide when to stand up to such adversaries. example, as long as Syria does not recognize In practice, this happens very infrequently the independence and sovereignty of Leba- because choosing the military option repudi- non, the refusal of the United States to en- ates the accepted ethos. Intelligence experts, gage with it in dialogue on this issue is justi- researchers, and diplomats are expected to fied. American and Syrian goals for Lebanon analyze critically the smallest details in any are completely contradictory, and the very problem and thereafter propose well-con-

46 sidered alternatives. Concluding that there Israel is the strong side in the confronta- is no path other than the use of force is con- tion, and it therefore must take the first steps sidered simpleminded to the point of being in the attempt to reinvigorate the dialogue. primitive, but at least sometimes we must act Israel must meet Abu Mazen at least halfway according to “Occam’s razor,” that all things in almost anything he wants, i.e.: release all being equal, the simplest explanation tends Palestinian Authority funds that were fro- to be the best one. zen; release as many eligible prisoners as Israel’s almost instinctive reaction to the possible; “whitewash” some of the wanted results of the civil war in Gaza was a call to operatives; significantly reduce the number separate between Fatahland in the West Bank of roadblocks; implement maximum civil- and Hamastan in the Gaza Strip, and there- ian-economic-humanitarian relief; remove il- upon embrace the former while boycotting legal outposts; enable total freedom of move- the latter. The right immediately opposed the ment for Palestinian security forces; approve first clause and the left rejected the second, the transfer of weapons and ammunition to basically with the common claim against the these forces and allow the entry of the Badr over-simplicity of the proposed policy, which brigade from Jordan; and immediately begin is expected to fail. This is precisely the time diplomatic negotiations on a permanent so- to remember the basic logic of Friar William lution. The manner of implementing this pol- of Ockham. icy is no less important: preconditions must be avoided; Abu Mazen must not be pushed A Carrot for Fatahland to do what he does not want; and he must Even before the Hamas victory in the elec- not be embraced with a bear hug. The im- tions and the establishment of the unity pression that Abu Mazen is Israel’s yes-man government, Israel justifiably did not agree cannot be created or substantiated. These to advance the diplomatic process with Abu steps should not be implemented bit by bit as Mazen due to his unwillingness or inability isolated measures of good will. Rather, this is to implement the security measures he was the time for a dramatic event, such as a meet- committed to in accordance with Phase I of ing at Abu Mazen’s office in Ramallah or a the roadmap, chief among them dismantling direct appeal to the Palestinians in Arabic (in the terrorist organizations. His main consid- a dubbed speech or a translated article). Is- eration was apparently preventing a fitna – a rael must demonstrate actual progress to the civil war. Today the fitna is a fact, and it is Palestinians, both in improving the fabric of Taking risks is blatantly clear to Fatah members how justi- their lives and advancing toward diplomatic justified due to fied the warnings were that a strengthened independence. the possibility Hamas is a threat not only to Israel but first Such dialogue neither redeems the dis- of all to them. There is reason to assume that graced nor rewards criminality. There is no that Hamas Abu Mazen will be prepared to implement diplomatic risk in adopting this line. If, after aggression belatedly the obligatory security measures; some months, it becomes clear that Abu Ma- has actually and indeed, hundreds of Hamas members zen is not “delivering the goods,” there will changed Abu have been arrested in the West Bank and a be no lack of pretexts or reasons to change prohibition has been issued, mainly directed direction. The security risks entailed by this Mazen's basic at Hamas, against carrying illegal weapons. policy can be managed. Even if the day comes approach.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 47 when Palestinian weapons and ammunition Why should the world be reminded of are turned against the IDF, strengthening the what it already knows? Because of the voices Palestinian security forces now will not sig- that for some time have been calling for dia- nificantly alter the power balance between logue with Hamas (as if it was interested in the sides (as long as Israel continues its con- dialogue with Israel), and that are now op- trol to prevent the possibility of high trajec- posed to a boycott of Hamastan. According tory fire from Judea and Samaria). What is to this line of thinking the hudna that began much more serious is the risk of renewed in 2004 proves that an understanding can be terrorist attacks in Israel, due both to the re- reached with Hamas on creating a situation moval of roadblocks and to the motivation of of calm; the movement is not monolithic, Hamas to disrupt the situation. The solution and since its victory in the 2006 elections, a here is the rapid completion of a hermeti- moderate stream has developed within it; cally sealed barrier, including via temporary Israel must take risks in order to encourage manpower. In any case, taking these risks is this pragmatization; and in any case “there is justified due to the possibility that Hamas no military solution.” Therefore, Israel must aggression has actually changed Abu Ma- talk with the movement, and perhaps even zen’s basic approach. There is obviously no be happy that there is now “an address” in guarantee that such a policy will succeed; as Gaza. This approach ignores the limitations per the limitations of dialogue, Israel’s abil- of dialogue. ity to strengthen Abu Mazen and Fatah in the First, even though Iraq has been burn- intra-Palestinian sphere is limited. However, ing for the past four years, with the flames it is incumbent on Israel to do all it can in perhaps raging more now than before, the order to promote a diplomatic solution with Israeli-Palestinian dispute is the most acute the Palestinians, even if the efforts’ final re- problem in the Middle East and in the con- sult yields little more than proof to those at frontation between radical Islam and the home and abroad of a serious pursuit of di- West. As if this were not sufficient, Hamas plomacy. Such a policy of carrots will also as- stridently emphasizes the religious element sist in legitimizing the policy of sticks to be in the dispute, and the creation of Hamastan implemented in Gaza. strengthens the importance of the regional context. What exactly is at issue? Both region A Stick in Hamastan and religion are going through a trend of First: basic facts. The interim goal of Hamas radicalization. It is difficult to expect that at is the destruction of the State of Israel (as a this volatile nexus Israel of all parties would step toward the establishment of a state that succeed in encouraging pragmatization. will be part of the Islamic caliphate), and its Second, any dialogue – including indi- preferred strategy is the murder of civilians. rect – with Hamas grants legitimacy to the Its use of force as a tool for solving disputes, movement, whose very essence contravenes even in relation to its fellow Palestinians, is even the lowest common denominator of the the current norm in Gaza. Moreover, the cre- international community. For over a genera- ation of Hamastan enhances the radical Iran- tion Israel has proclaimed the perils of terror- led Islamic axis, an anti-Israel/West alliance ism, and for the past six years, Israel has also that is steadily gaining strength.1 been warning against the threat of radical Is-

48 lam. Hamas is correctly considered the local the Palestinians that choosing and support- Dialogue incarnation of these two threats. Today, even ing Hamas means total isolation and living with Hamas the relatively moderate Palestinian stream is on no more than basic subsistence levels would show not prepared to engage it in talks, at least not n Ending the process of Hamas’s mili- the movement publicly or officially. Israel’s readiness for di- tary buildup, and even weakening it in order alogue would show the movement that Qas- to prevent a future threat along the lines of that Qassam sam barrages and military conquest warrant Hizbollah barrages n reward, and would demonstrate to its allies Defeating Qassam terrorism, i.e., a re- and military on the radical axis that adversaries bow to duction of the problem to a “tolerable” level conquest aggression. (as per the definition of “decisive victory”) Third, any agreement arrived at, either n Drawing a red line vis-à-vis the enemy warrant reward, tacitly or through dialogue, and certainly a and unacceptable positions, reinforcing Is- and would hudna would enable Hamas to become stron- rael’s deterrent capability, and defeating the demonstrate to ger politically and financially, and above all radical axis. its allies on the militarily, just as the hudna of 2004 did. Israel In order to achieve these goals, Israel radical axis that suffered the results of a similar process last must take the following actions: year on the northern border. Its adversaries n Avoid all direct or indirect contact with adversaries bow are working to duplicate their success in the Hamas figures. Israel must not speak with to aggression. Gaza Strip, particularly since Israel gave up those who seek Israel’s soul, and it must not control first of what lies under the Philadel- reward the radical axis. phi route and afterwards of the route itself. It n Cease all traffic and passage from- Is is unreasonable to take this high risk in the rael to the Gaza Strip other than food, water, hope that the slim chance of pragmatization and medical relief. Use can be made of inter- will be realized. rupting electricity and fuel for the purposes Israel must wage an uncompromising of pressure, bargaining, and image. war against Hamas in order to prove to the n Paralyze the internal telephone infra- Palestinians and to the world at large that structure in the Gaza Strip in order to inter- Hamas advances “won’t wash.” As opposed rupt government functions, and block inter- to previous short term efforts, this time the national telephone connections in order to effort must be sustained until the movement cut Hamas off from its external supporters. loses its ability to attack, or until its changes n End visitation for Hamas prisoners and its spots, or until the Palestinian Authority cut off their contact with the outside world, succeeds in preventing the export of terror even if there is need for legislation of a basic to Israel. In any case, at issue here is a sub- law for this purpose. stantial period of time. Hamas’s takeover of n Sever the banks in the Gaza Strip from Gaza is an opportunity, since it undermines the international banking system in order to the reservations of both Abu Mazen and make financing difficult. the international community toward such a n Appeal to international actors (Egypt, process. Such a campaign has a number of the Arab League, the Union of Muslim Coun- goals: tries, the European Union, NATO, the United n The neutralization of the governing Nations) to assume security responsibility of ability of Hamas in Gaza in order to clarify to the Gaza Strip, or at the very least over its

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 49 Determined border with Egypt. There is no chance that First, Israel must fully exploit the unique military force such appeals will be accepted, and their pur- 1advantage it has in dealing with Gazan ter- that does pose is to preempt objections. After a month, ror. It appears that there is no parallel in the Israel will announce that in the absence of in- world where the struggle against terrorism not falter in ternational resolve, it is free to guarantee its is geographically limited to such a small and the face of security on its own. containable territory. On the one hand, this Palestinian n Take control of the Philadelphi area, situation enables Israel to implement fully the steadfastness clearing a corridor that is at least a kilometer principle of concentrated effort. For example, must be used. wide for the length of the border (even at the Israel would not find it difficult to maintain price of tens of thousands of refugees) and full intelligence capability over the theater of digging a canal against the tunnels. This pro- action. On the other hand, the terrorists are cess will at once stop the smuggling of arms, certainly able to integrate into the civilian ammunition, money, other tools, terrorists, population, yet they cannot escape and also and training personnel from Hizbollah, Iran, cannot receive reinforcements (at least not af- and al-Qaeda. ter the takeover of the Philadelphi area). n Stop all commercial traffic even via the Egyptian border. Israel will declare that A second, unique advantage that Israel en- it does not intend to convert the Strip into a 2joys is in public diplomacy: Gaza is the only giant prison, and that the Gazans are free to case where the government is part of the ter- enter Israel and leave it as they wish subject rorist organization that is under attack.2 The to Israeli security inspections. Israel will also government, which is responsible for its citi- declare that it is not interested in maintain- zens, will be blamed by at least some of the ing control over the border area, and that population for the deterioration, particularly it would be happy to transfer it to an inter- due to Hamas’s military takeover of the Strip, national party that would establish security and popular support of Hamas will therefore control as required. be limited. Israel needs to encourage such a If Hamas doesn’t react, Israel could be trend by maximum humanitarian consider- satisfied with these steps and wait out this ations and by instituting positive measures situation for a long time. But this will likely (such as in the field of health or education) not happen. At a certain stage, if not before via the Palestinian Authority. the takeover of the Philadelphi area then certainly afterward, the massive Qassam fire Third, even ideological terrorist organi- will be renewed (as part of the diplomatic- 3zations have what to lose, and they can be publicity campaign, it is highly desirable that deterred. Instead of merely chasing terrorists Israel not intensify military activities before and thwarting actions, the opponents of ter- Hamas initiates this reaction). Israel must rorism must estimate the price that the orga- open a military campaign in order to reach nizations are not willing to pay, and make decisive victory, specifically, a campaign and this the point of victory. In the case of Hamas, decisive victory that are appropriate for a this is apparently its social-ideological stand- low intensity conflict. This campaign must ing among the population via its civilian arm be based on a number of principles. and the survival of its senior leaders. If so, these need to be the focus of IDF actions.

50 Fourth, guerrilla and terrorist organiza- stage, there will be a need to deal with Beit 4tions use the civilian population as camou- Hanoun or Beit Lahiya in a similar manner, flage for their operations, as refuge after the including the expulsion of residents, prefer- operations, and as a publicity tool if the pop- ably without destroying their homes. This ulation is harmed by the enemy. Two ways is a problematic step from both ethical and of dealing with this are to encourage oppo- public-image standpoints, but it is preferable sition among the civilians to terrorist activi- to its two alternatives: the continued firing ties by immediately and directly connecting of Qassams or return fire that will harm ci- them to the price their support exacts from vilians. Expulsion is a reversible step; killing them, and to remove the population from the is not. It is possible that there will be a need combat arena as much as possible. in the third stage to take a similar step regarding the northern neighborhood of Gaza Fifth, a standing army is generally at a City. If this too does not bring about a cessa- 5disadvantage in relation to a terrorist or guer- tion of the firing, this policy will be stopped, rilla organization since its size and weight do but even in this situation, there will be two not enable a decisive victory against a flexible achievements: the launch areas will be dis- and fleeting opponent that excels at - blood tanced from the border, thus shortening the shed and attrition. However, when such an target range, and the public’s pressure on opponent is embodied in a public and there- Hamas will increase. fore vulnerable government, its modus ope- n Applying pressure via the fuel and randi can and must be copied. Instead of re- electricity supplies sorting to large and ordered military forces, n Defining all Hamas fighters and their commando forces should be used. political leaders as legitimate assassination On the basis of these principles, upon targets, as in the (all too brief) move adopted renewal of massive Qassam fire, the Israeli in the period of Sheikh Yassin’s assassina- military campaign must include the follow- tion ing steps: n Arresting thousands of activists from n As an immediate and direct measure Hamas’s civilian arm and those who are to stop the firing: the “expropriation” or neu- identified with it: imams, union heads, social tralization of the launching areas. The inten- and educational workers, public servants, tion is not permanent conquest and certainly and so on not resumption of long term control over the n Destroying all Hamas installations, Palestinian population. In the first stage, Isra- from training camps to weapons factories el must take over the unpopulated northern and welfare offices area, expose it completely, mine its southern- n Destroying all government installa- most border with the rest of the Gaza Strip, tions withdraw IDF forces to positions where they n Confiscating all money, in homes,- of can control the area by fire, declare it a killing fices, and banks, belonging to any person zone and prohibit entry, and warn that this or organization suspected of support for will also be done to other launch areas if the Hamas rocket fire continues. Presumably this pack- n Broad use of surprise, fraud, deceit, age of steps this will not suffice. In the second and psychological warfare

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 51 The time n Using large and vulnerable units and that Abu Mazen may actually want and may has come to attacks on a limited basis only, depending on gradually even need to progress with Israel reduce the the task at hand. Most of the operations will along a diplomatic course while taking secu- be carried out by combat helicopters, recon- rity steps that were until now prevented by compromises to naissance teams, sniper cells, ambush teams, fear of Hamas and a fitna. To this end, Israel a minimum. and undercover squads. Any masked person, must take risks and act with the utmost dip- any procession or gathering, and any figure lomatic generosity. On the other hand, Israel who is identified in any way with Hamas today, free of some of the significant limita- will be targeted. In essence, the roles must be tions levied on it previously, has the ability to reversed: Hamas will be the stationary and act against Hamas. To this end, determined exposed target, and the IDF will function as military force must be used that does not fal- an exhausting sting, surprise, and guerrilla ter in face of Palestinian steadfastness. In the force. current circumstances of a Palestinian split Described here is the military solu- – and not as in the past – the use of force will tion, not to the dispute but to terrorism, to contribute to the advancement of the diplo- Hamas, and to the extension of the radical matic process instead of its regression. Pre- axis. Even though there is obviously no cer- cisely those who desire peace must support tainty regarding the outcome, the attempt the use of targeted force over time against is worthwhile. Slogans that senior military the Hamas and Qassam threats. Without a and diplomatic echelons have been spout- show of ability on the part of Israel to stop ing for years regarding “an uncompromising these threats, the Israeli public will not sup- struggle against terrorism” have proven to port diplomatic steps toward a resolution to be baseless words. There have always been the conflict. compromises, some justified and others not. The time has come to reduce the compro- Notes mises to a minimum. For instance, due to the 1 Implied here is not a monolithic axis. There is sensitivity in the north, Israel could compro- no absolute convergence of interests between mise and not attack Hamas in Syria. all the actors in the radical Islamic camp, which is divided both religiously and nation- Conclusion ally. However, all these actors share the desire to weaken Israel, the United States, and the The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip pro- pro-Western Arab governments. vides Israel with not one but two opportu- 2 The Taliban in Afghanistan was a similar nities. On the one hand, there is a chance case.

52 At the End of the Day, Hamas Too Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick

The upheavals of recent weeks in the Pales- need not be an insurmountable obstacle, if tinian arena have been rapid and dramatic, as a partner in a potential unity government even for the dizzying pace of the Middle – in a coalition with Fatah and perhaps other East. Hamas’s violent military coup in Gaza parties – Hamas will renounce its terror- reshuffled the Palestinian cards and dealt ist ways and will cooperate with others to a new hand to replace what many had as- prevent terror, but does not recognize Israel sumed were permanent Palestinian cards. publicly. This contention may smack of theo- The bloodshed caused by Hamas’s takeover retical constructs that lack any practical re- of Gaza added a new dimension to the idea alism, given the situation in the wake of the of a fitna(civil war). Until then the prevailing Gazan takeover and the tension with Abu opinion was that despite local flare-ups and Mazen’s administration. Yet if as is likely the confrontations between Fatah and Hamas, ties between Hamas and Fatah are severed antagonism would not reach the level of a only temporarily, the question will reappear civil war, both due to the religious prohibi- at Israel’s doorstep. Since Hamas as a politi- tion and to the declared interests of the two cal movement is not likely to disappear from sides that the situation not deteriorate to that the Palestinian arena and rather is likely to point. The ensuing violent reality, however, be a significant political power, it will wield escalated the confrontation and spurred the substantial ability to impede any future po- division of political control in Palestinian litical process if it is ostracized. However, if society between Hamas and Fatah in sepa- it is engaged, its contribution to attaining a rate geographic regions. Today Hamas alone long term hudna at a price acceptable to Israel controls Gaza, and Fatah and the Palestinian could in fact be highly valuable. Authority are dominant in the West Bank. The new reality that has been formed in For its part, Israel is now faced with a Gaza, the rapid pace of the changes in Pal- situation whereby Gaza is controlled by an estinian politics, the inter-generational strug- adversary it regards as illegitimate and a gle in the organizations’ leaderships, and the non-viable interlocutor. On the other hand, power struggles between the internal and the governing element in the West Bank is external leaderships have created a compli- Yoram Schweitzer, considered a possible partner, but its ability cated challenge for Israel. The question of senior research to meet Israel’s minimum security require- how to confront it is even more difficult in associate at INSS; ments remains an open question. light of the multiple sources of power in the Amir Kulick, junior This essay contends that Hamas’s fail- Palestinian sphere. The fact that the respec- research associate at ure to recognize Israel, at least at this stage, tive abilities of these elements to meet Isra- INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 53 el’s security and diplomatic needs is largely ests. Yet even if this does not happen, Israel unknown only adds to the complexity of the will need to decide with whom to speak, challenge facing Israel’s leadership. what to speak about, and how to conduct the Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians has dialogue. also undergone numerous changes since the The situation that exists today between Oslo accords, in part due to developments Fatah and Hamas, and the latter’s uncom- in the Palestinian arena and the inability promising position not to recognize Israel, among the Palestinian themselves to meet strengthen the Israeli resolve not to view Israel’s minimum security requirements. For Hamas as a political interlocutor. Challeng- its part, Israeli society is still hesitant and ing this consensus, this essay urges a reex- divided regarding the modes of resolving amination of the Israeli position in order to the dispute with the Palestinians. Opinions advance a political process with an effective range between support for far-reaching ter- Palestinian partner. This approach requires ritorial compromise and the refusal to re- a readiness to accept even Hamas as a part- linquish large areas, mainly due to a lack of ner, alongside Fatah, in a joint coalition. Only faith that even the more moderate Palestin- in this way can a long term ceasefire with a ians recognize the existential rights of the Palestinian partner be achieved and an effec- State of Israel and support the decision to tive diplomatic process be initiated. Hamas’s renounce terrorism. acceptance as a partner should not be auto- In any case, the prevalent opinion in Is- matic, but must be conditioned on the move- rael, at least at this stage, is that under no ment’s commitment to avoid terrorist attacks circumstances can Hamas constitute a part- and to join with Fatah in preventing terror- ner to a political agreement with Israel due ism from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. to its extreme ideological positions that reject However, the categorical rejection of Hamas the right of Israel’s sovereign existence. Con- because it does not recognize the State of Is- versely, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority rael will unquestionably prevent the possi- is considered an eligible partner in light of bility of establishing an effective diplomatic its recognition of Israel; this too, however, is process between Israel and the Palestinians, conditioned on the PA’s ability to prevent the and will perpetuate the use of terrorism as a export of terrorist attacks from its territory. central tool in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, Israel demands that the PA change its management patterns and build Hamas as a Partner within a its sovereign institutions in a manner that Palestinian Coalition: will allow it proper governmental function. Basic Assumptions At this stage these conditions seem far from 1. The developmental process of organizations realization. struggling for national freedom. In ethno-nation- In the current internal Palestinian politi- alist conflicts and also in conflicts that involve cal arena, the rift between Fatah and Hamas religious discord such as the conflict between appears difficult to repair. However, it seems Israel and the Palestinians, organizations that that in the final analysis, these actors will find use terrorism as a tool to advance their strug- a way to bridge the divide between them in gle can be expected to undergo processes of order to advance Palestinian national inter- pragmatization. Organizations that launch

54 their struggle using terrorism and violence as Masha’al, was a move to become a partner Only by a central and exclusive weapon in achieving in Palestinian decision making.2 Moreover, accepting their goals evolve toward a strategy that also after many years in which it had boycotted Hamas as a incorporates a political-diplomatic process.1 the political process, the movement decided partner in a Once engaged in this process, the organiza- to plunge in with maximum effort and take tions are forced to gradually forfeit the use part in the parliamentary elections. Hamas joint coalition, of the terrorism tool and ultimately to even also made substantial efforts to earn legiti- alongside Fatah, reject it. This process is not necessarily linear, macy for its government, from its constitu- can a long term and there can be regression along with ad- ents, from the Arab world, and from the in- ceasefire with vances. The central goal in the fight against ternational community. Its leaders expressed terrorism in struggles of this kind is to draw a willingness to govern pragmatically, and a Palestinian the terrorist organization toward the politi- even to pay the price of suspending terror- partner be cal path while helping to wean it as quickly ist attacks, despite their refusal to publicly achieved and as possible from terrorism as a legitimate reject the option of returning to terror in the an effective course of action. Hamas is no different. As a future. diplomatic social, religious, and political movement that 3. Hamas’s unlikely disappearance as a so- is notorious for its armed terrorism-oriented cio-political phenomenon. Hamas constitutes process be apparatus, Hamas uses various strategies to a significant political and social power, and initiated. attain its political gains. Terror is one of the represents a broad sector of Palestinian so- tools in its repository. Therefore, Hamas, as ciety. This was given greater credence by with Fatah in its time, should also be pulled the movement’s victory in the January 2006 into the political-diplomatic process, rather Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is thus than distanced or ousted from it. The process clear that Hamas is not likely to disappear of inducting organizations such as these into or to be ousted from the Palestinian politi- the political sphere, which then becomes the cal arena, even if Israel manages to break its sole legitimate playing field, is a painful pro- military backbone or cause its isolation in the cess for them; how much more so for a move- regional and international spheres. ment such as Hamas, which does not envi- 4. Hamas’s ability to disrupt and destroy dip- sion significant political achievements and lomatic processes forged without it. Hamas has organizational benefits that will justify to already proven its ability to damage any at- itself and its supporters the dramatic change tempt to establish a peace process that it has in its position. not helped design. The movement used ter- 2. Hamas’s interest in joining the political rorism to subvert the currents of the Oslo game as a legitimate player. In order to become process, even when its political and military an accepted player in this game, the move- power was far smaller than today and its ment is eager to reduce the suffering of the principal rival, Fatah, was the hegemonic Palestinian people and to advance Palestin- power in Palestinian society. It is therefore ian interests as it grasps them – and on the clear that its current political and military basis of a national religious platform. This power enable it to disrupt any attempted of course must complement its interests as political negotiations with Israel if it has not a movement. Consider Hamas’s agreement been a partner to this effort. to the tahdiya, which, as noted by Khaled

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 55 Fatah as an Effective Partner lic. In practice, this layer blocks the move- The common assumption in current Israeli ment’s renewal process and prevents the rise discourse in relation to Fatah (particularly of new and young forces among the Fatah in light of the absolute rejection of Hamas) leadership. As a result, it seems that if Abu argues that the Fatah-led Palestinian Author- Mazen does not carry out the organizational ity is the only partner with which Israel can reforms required in Fatah and fails to estab- reach a peace agreement via a diplomatic lish effective PA civilian and military institu- process that is not accompanied by violence. tions, its leadership will not be able to win This assumption is intertwined with a de- legitimacy from the public, including from mand for change in PA management style, its own supporters. Therefore, these changes most notably in everything related to control are essential in order to turn Fatah into an of the security apparatus. However, it seems effective partner for reaching an agreement that given Fatah’s present experience of a with Israel. Should there be no changes in deep organizational and leadership crisis Fatah and the PA, the Palestinian leadership and the current public widespread denial of will be forced to continue relying on Israel’s Hamas, as with its legitimacy, the chances of this occurring impetuses and international support in order Fatah in its are quite slim. This derives from Fatah’s fail- to establish its control in the West Bank. time, should ure to meet the expectation of the Palestin- Is it within Abu Mazen’s power to carry ian public on two levels: first, in connection out these changes? Judging by his manage- be pulled into with realizing Palestinian national aspira- ment until now, it is doubtful whether he can the political- tions to establish a viable sovereign state; carry out essential reforms, especially if these diplomatic and second, its failure to offer the Palestin- threaten the status of Fatah’s older genera- process, rather ian population a reasonable daily existence tion (internal elections, removal of the heads of the security establishment and unification than distanced that includes personal safety, livelihood, and freedom of movement. Already under of the militias into an efficient force, cancel- or ousted Arafat’s leadership Fatah failed to undertake lation of economic monopolies, and so on). from it. the institutional changes required in the shift Therefore, external actors such as the United from a revolutionary movement to a ruling States and the heads of the European com- party that heads the Palestinian Authority. munity must encourage, assist, and perhaps Thus, the operation and management styles even pressure him to carry out the required that characterized the PLO during the years changes. In this context, Israel’s power to in- of struggle when it operated in the diaspora, fluence is doubtful, and in fact it behooves such as the split between the military ap- it to remain on the sidelines so as not to re- paratuses, nepotism, personally motivated inforce the already problematic image in the financial allocations, and corruption among Palestinian public of Abu Mazen as Israel’s senior people, were grafted into the nascent yes-man, if not an outright collaborator. state institutions. Against this background, the test of This situation grew even more serious as Abu Mazen and Fatah is twofold: to quash a result of the stagnation in Fatah’s leader- Hamas’s attempts in the West Bank to imitate ship. The older generation, which includes the movement’s successful takeover in Gaza Abu Mazen, the current chairman, is consid- and prevent it from harming the renewal of ered corrupt by most of the Palestinian pub- dialogue with Israel (by carrying out terror-

56 ist attacks in Israel and/or assassinations of ment prepared to compromise on the path to senior PA figures; and to initiate significant “peace”? All these require in-depth exami- reforms that will turn the PA into an effec- nation. Such an examination can take place tive government and a serious partner for a only in the framework of secret or open con- permanent arrangement. tacts, and as part of bilateral or multilateral discussions. Expectations of Israel: In any case, what is the difference between Fatah vs. Hamas Fatah and Hamas? Essentially it lies in their It is a common assumption in Israel that respective willingness to show flexibility, for Hamas’s immovable and uncompromising instance on the issue of settlement blocs and core principles, which categorically reject exchange of territory or in the drive to find the existence of the State of Israel, essentially creative solutions, for instance to the refugee deny the possibility of reaching an accept- problem and the issue of Jerusalem. At the able arrangement with the Palestinians in co- same time, since direct political negotiations operation with Hamas. Indeed, on the ideo- have never been conducted with Hamas on logical level Hamas considers all of Palestine the core issues, the movement’s degree of as Islamic wakf lands that cannot under any flexibility remains unknown. It is entirely circumstances be forfeited. This allegedly natural that prior to negotiations, one keeps summarizes the movement’s maneuvering one’s cards close to the chest. space. At the same time, a slightly deeper The one clear difference between Fatah view reveals that the gaps between Fatah and and Hamas lies in the willingness to declare Hamas regarding compromise on the central recognition of the State of Israel. Fatah, led issues are not so wide. The core issues of the by Arafat, recognized Israel’s existence, al- Palestinians include the demands for an Is- though many in Israel remain skeptical as raeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines including to Fatah’s sincerity and the specific wording in eastern Jerusalem, which would become of this recognition. Hamas refuses to make the capital of the Palestinian state; sovereign- a similar step, certainly at this stage, yet the ty over the holy sites; and a solution to the movement is prepared to recognize Israel de refugee problem. In return for fulfilling these facto.4 Israel, however, demands official and demands, Fatah’s leadership is prepared to declared recognition. Thus, despite the com- end the historic conflict with Israel. plete legitimacy of Israel’s demand for such On various occasions Hamas spokesmen recognition as a condition for its prepared- have emphasized that they too want a reso- ness to talk with the Palestinians, the ques- lution of these issues. For instance, already tion is whether the lack of such a declaration in March 2006 Masha’al declared that Israel is a valid reason to refuse to engage in dia- must withdraw to the 1967 borders, includ- logue. It seems that given Hamas’s current ing in Jerusalem, implement the right of re- political developmental stage, a public decla- turn for the refugees, and free Palestinian ration on recognition of Israel constitutes an prisoners. In return, Masha’al promised “to inviolable obstacle and perforce prevents its carry out real steps to establish true peace.”3 involvement in the political process. What does “true peace” include? How flex- Prior experience proves that the signifi- ible is Hamas? To what extent is the move- cance of mutual declarations of recognition

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 57 in any case is limited. Recognition of Israel concern day-to-day routine in the West Bank did not prevent the PLO and Fatah from re- and Gaza: the opening of border crossings, newing terrorist attacks in Israel when they export of goods, and so on. In the second decided that terrorism would serve their in- stage, it will be possible to begin contacts to terests or, as per their narrative, when it was achieve a long term hudna. For this purpose, forced upon them, such as during the al-Aqsa the indirect contacts that already exist with intifada. Thus, the question is asked whether the Hamas leadership regarding the kid- Israel must condition any diplomatic prog- napped soldier Gilad Shalit can be used. In ress with Hamas on a public declaration of the past Hamas conditioned security quiet on the legitimacy of its existence. far-reaching demands: release of all prisoners, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Is it Possible to Talk to Hamas? and more. Now that the movement has taken Even before Israel begins to test Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, the motivation of readiness to advance toward resolution of the its senior operatives to reach a ceasefire may dispute’s core issues, the question arises as to significantly increase, clearly based on the whether Hamas itself wants to talk to Israel, assumption that Hamas requires quiet in or- and if so, about what and in what way. Vari- der to stabilize its control, and that it wants ous Hamas spokesmen, from former prime to ensure a reasonable routine for the Gaza minister Ismail Haniyeh to Khaled Masha’al, population. the movement’s Damascus-based leader, In the third stage, it will be possible to have declared they are to prepared to con- open fundamental diplomatic contacts and duct direct5 or indirect contacts with Israel.6 thereby clarify Hamas’s flexibility regarding This principle was officially approved by the the core issues. Such negotiations will need movement in the framework of the Palestin- to be conducted in a broader framework and ian unity government’s platform.7 with the cooperation of Fatah. The move- The Hamas takeover of Gaza and the re- ments will presumably find ways to renew sponse by Abu Mazen, which denies the le- the dialogue between them on their own. If gal standing of the Hamas government, al- not, this problem can be solved via conduct- lows Israel to wait to see how the relations ing negotiations under broad regional or in- between the Palestinian factions evolve. In ternational auspices. Contacts in the frame- the final analysis, these two actors will pre- work of a broader umbrella can also solve sumably find a way to renew their coopera- the need for mutual recognition between tion. Therefore, an Israeli decision regarding Hamas and Israel. a change of direction vis-à-vis Hamas can be made in principle, with the necessary delib- Risks and Opportunities for Israel erations and free of time pressures. Should Many fear that once it is proven – as expect- Israel opt for this channel, it can pursue se- ed – that Hamas cannot be a partner under cret channels and publicize the matter grad- any condition, two central, irreversible risks ually at later stages. will be realized. First, Israel’s readiness to If such an agreement is reached, it will be engage in dialogue with Hamas will grant possible in the first stage to establish contacts the movement international legitimacy. As with authorities on municipal issues that a result, various parties that until now have

58 shunned contact with Hamas due to Israeli contacts with it, whereby the price of nego- and American pressure will begin holding tiations will be the sanction of these contacts. regular discussions with its representatives. If Hamas actually does integrate into the po- In this way, the external ability to influence litical process vis-à-vis Israel, it will be pos- Hamas to moderate its belligerent positions sible to mobilize these same actors to deepen toward Israel will apparently be reduced. Hamas’s rejection of terrorism and commit- Israel will thereby, even if indirectly, em- ment to prevent it. Should Hamas return to power and legitimize the use of terrorism far terrorism, Israel would not be limited in its beyond the limits of the local dispute. This battle despite Hamas’s already having won will weaken the West’s position in its war on international political recognition, since this global terrorism. was awarded for the movement’s political Second, if Israeli and international pres- steps and not for violence. sure on Hamas is mitigated or withdrawn, The process of arming and establishing Hamas will not be subject to monitoring Hamas’s military power is already taking and will be free to arm, equip, and prepare place, despite the Israeli blockade of Gaza, itself toward continuing the military-terror- although its scope is apparently limited at A careful ist campaign. According to various elements, this stage. The risk of accelerating the rate of look reveals resumption of the armed struggle is expect- Hamas’s arms buildup and military organi- that the gaps ed in any case, once Hamas senses that the zation under the cover of political dialogue is diplomatic process has stopped serving its clear. Indeed, a similar concern exists regard- between Fatah plan to bring about Israel’s elimination as an ing the buildup of Fatah’s forces and those and Hamas independent sovereign state. Therefore, any of the Palestinian Authority. Should agree- regarding future confrontation with it will begin from ments between Israel and the Palestinians compromise a much more difficult and complicated start- be reached, it may perhaps be possible to on the central ing point for Israel than that which exists to- monitor these processes, even if they are not day, and will lead to many Israeli casualties. prevented fully. In any case, Israel will need issues are not Moreover, a Hamas released from pressures to prepare for dealing with this improved so wide. and boycotts will enable other external ex- Palestinian military capability if political ef- tremist actors who reject Israel’s existence, forts fail. Since its establishment, Israel has such as Iran and al-Qaeda, to gain a foothold been forced to be prepared for responses of alongside Israel’s borders. This will further this sort. strengthen the danger to Israeli security, and In addition, including Hamas in the po- perhaps even endanger its future survival. litical process is likely to undermine the Undoubtedly engaging with Hamas in- Hamas-Iran and Hamas-al-Qaeda connec- deed incurs costs and risks, but it also pres- tions. These political ties are by no means ents important opportunities. natural or permanent, and they are likewise The current international boycott of inherently different. Sunni Hamas’s choice of Hamas is not comprehensive, and it is clear Shiite Iran stems from the lack of diplomatic, that many actors in the world, including military, and economic alternatives, and it among Israel’s friends in the European Union, could well weaken should other alternatives are interested in contacts with Hamas, and present themselves. For its part, the link with are already holding secret or partially secret al-Qaeda is certainly not natural, and for that

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 59 Engaging with matter there is little tangible evidence of it. 2 Hamas leader Khaled Masha’al declared in Hamas indeed Hamas is not interested in it, and certainly response to the tahdiya agreement that “what not in allowing the territory it controls to be- was achieved constitutes a serious step toward incurs costs political participation in the Palestinian deci- come a frontline for the organization whose and risks, but sion-making process,” al-Quds, March 18, 2005. "خطوة جادة نحو الشراكة السياسية في »صنع« القرار .touch is far more damaging than beneficial it also presents الفلسطيني" important Conclusion 3 Khaled Masha’al at a press conference in Jed- opportunities. It thus seems that in the balance of risks and dah, al-Quds, March 15, 2006. Masha’al repeated opportunities, the possibility of dialogue this statement a month later. See al-Quds, April with Hamas within a general Palestinian 22, 2006. In November 2006, in response to a question at a press conference in Cairo wheth- framework should be considered. Conduct- er his organization would recognize the State ing contacts with Hamas in the framework of of Israel within the 1967 borders, Masha’al de- a coalition with Fatah may likely yield some clared that “Hamas has announced more than important benefits: stabilization of a Pales- once that it is acting to establish a Palestinian tinian partner with public legitimacy and state in the 1967 borders.” When he was asked the ability to uphold agreements; a strength- what the movement’s demands were in this context, he answered: “First, we demand an ened pragmatic current within Hamas over end to the occupation and the establishment the militant pull; stabilization of a prolonged of a state in the 1967 borders that will include ceasefire with the Palestinians; a weakened Jerusalem. We demand true sovereignty, in- Hamas-Iran connection and less associa- cluding border crossings. Second, we will not tion with al-Qaeda and global jihad ele- accept agreements in stages as in the past.” ments; and in the longer term, a change in Quoted in Ynet, November 25, 2006. 4 See, for instance, Masha’al’s declaration in an the movement’s approach toward possible interview with Reuters, as quoted in Haaretz, coexistence Israel as required by reality, and January 11, 2007, as well as the declaration by a rational choice of the political path over the Ismail Haniyeh’s economic advisor to Chan- terrorist-military option. Should these posi- nel 10 regarding the movement’s readiness to tive changes not emerge and should Hamas open contacts in order to enable the renewed return to its violent origins, Israel will be able opening of the border crossings in Gaza. Quot- ed by the Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2007. to grapple with the movement using its full 5 See for example the remark by Haniyeh, “We military capability and with the knowledge have no problem with negotiating with Israel, that it indeed has no alternative. but it is Israel that must decide if it is prepared to give the Palestinians their due,” Haaretz, Notes August 14, 2006. 1 See for example the statement by Hamas 6 See, for instance, Haniyeh’s remark that leader Khaled Masha’al, who explained the “President Abu Mazen, in the authority of his rationale for the tahdiya in March 2005 thus: office…can negotiate with any party,” Rama- “Resistance is still our choice. . .yet we want to than news agency, May 1, 2006. enable other regional and international pres- 7 Article 3 states that “negotiations are under sures on the occupation in order to realize Pal- the authority of the Palestinian Liberation Or- estinian national interests,” al-Quds, March 18, ganization and the president of the Palestinian 2005. National Authority,” al-Quds, March 16, 2007.

60 Sino-Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Yoram Evron

The visit by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to Beijing last January did not create major shockwaves in Israel or in China, but it indicated a thawing of the frosty relations that have existed since Israel canceled the Phalcon deal in 2000. This is a matter of no small importance, since the increase in China’s presence in the Middle East and the international arena obliges Israel to consolidate its ties with this Eastern power. However, strengthening relations with China entails challenges that Israel has not always met successfully. The crux of the problem is dealing with a dominant actor that lives and breathes a non-West- ern culture, and whose goals and moves are shrouded in secrecy: it is hard to know what its aims are, how it behaves, the nature of its relations with other actors, and its attitude towards Israel. Insights of this sort, which Israel has acquired in relation to the United States and European countries, are also necessary to understanding China. Without them, Israel may overlook valuable potential, and may even pay a considerable price for missed opportunities. This article aims to present the common interests of the two countries, and to suggest ways whereby Israel can enhance its relations with China.

A Historical View of China’s nologies in the civilian and military fields. Position on Israel In 1979, Eisenberg arranged a secret meeting The Israeli-Sino relationship is characterized between the heads of the Israeli defense in- foremost by the pragmatic and flexible ap- dustry and Chinese defense leaders, which proach adopted by China. The relationship paved the way for several large arms deals. began when business tycoon Saul Eisenberg The ensuing military cooperation served forged ties with the Chinese leadership in the both countries well and created close ties and 1970s and succeeded in interesting China in great trust that still, at least to a degree, exists Yoarm Evron, Israeli technology. China, which was heavily today. Neubauer junior involved in building its national infrastruc- The relationship grew gradually, although research associate at ture, was eager to import advanced tech- China rejected Israel’s requests to advance INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 61 official ties due to concern over its relations supplier. In the meantime, Sino-American with the Arab world. It was only in the early relations continued to deteriorate, culminat- 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, ing with a military incident over the Taiwan the PLO recognition of the State of Israel, issue (1995-96). This led to reduced Chinese and the Madrid Peace Conference that con- demand for Israeli products and intensified ditions were ripe for formalizing relations, American objections to Israeli defense ex- and in January 1992 full diplomatic ties were ports to China. These developments were established. These relations were extremely apparently not fully understood by decision warm; high level diplomatic visits took place makers in Jerusalem.4 In 1999, after details of between the two countries, including a visit the Phalcon transaction were exposed in the by the president of China to Israel in 2000, Israeli press, the United States began to ex- and numerous cooperation agreements were press opposition to the deal, despite Israeli signed. 1 claims that the US had known about the deal However, other than the actual diplomat- and had even approved it in advance. Israel, ic achievement, establishing ties advanced which believed it could parry US pressure, Israel’s objectives only to a limited degree. promised the Chinese it would fulfill the China, for instance, did not stop selling arms transaction, but then in 2000 announced can- to Israel’s enemies. Despite its promises to Je- cellation of the deal. rusalem, it continued exporting missiles and The unpleasant end to the deal generated technology to Middle Eastern countries and pessimism in Israel with regard to contin- in the 1990s even sold nuclear technology ued relations with China. There were those to Iran. While China moderated its rhetoric who thought Beijing would suspend the op- against Israel with regard to the Israeli-Arab erations of Israeli companies in China, freeze conflict, it did not change its pro-Arab stance the possibility of future trade with Israel, and did not become involved in the political and accelerate the proliferation of weapons 5 Notwithstand- process. In contrast, Israel kept adhering to to the Middle East. In practice, the forecasts ing a cooling of China’s position on Taiwan and Tibet. Simi- were far different from the reality; notwith- larly, in the technology sphere, China was standing a cooling of diplomatic relations, diplomatic rela- the principal beneficiary in its acquisition China continued to sustain a pragmatic ap- tions following of technological and scientific information,2 proach and cooperate with Israel in the ar- the cancelled while there were only meager accomplish- eas it considered beneficial. (For example, it 3 Phalcon deal, ments on an economic level. asked Israel to repair the Harpy UAV it had At the beginning of the 1990s the pat- purchased from Israel several years earlier.) China contin- tern of defense trading between Israel and Rather, it was Israel that led to a termina- ued to sustain China shifted. Following the Tiananmen tion of the defense relations when it failed a pragmatic Square episode in 1989 and the collapse of to comprehend the gravity of the US stance approach and the Soviet bloc, relations between Washing- on China’s acquisition of arms, and in 2005 it cooperate with ton and Beijing cooled and the United States was forced to establish a tight control mecha- imposed a military embargo on China. At nism of defense exports and ban military Israel in the the same time, China and the Soviet Union trade with China.6 areas it consid- renewed ties, and with the breakup of the Israel-China commercial relations were ered beneficial. USSR, Russia became China’s main arms also untouched. Between 2000 – when the

62 Phalcon deal was called off – and 2005, trade between the countries tripled, and in 2006 trading rose 40 percent over the previous year.7 Trade relations are in China’s favor, and China enjoys a trade surplus of several dozen percent. With regard to proliferation of Chinese arms to the Middle East, from the outset relations with Israel had only limited impact in this area, as while the Chinese were careful not to engage in proliferation of Israeli technology,8 they did not curtail their extensive arms sales to states in the region.

Chinese Foreign Policy Interests The main objectives of the Chinese leadership are to preserve the unity and sovereignty of sources of energy has become one of China’s Israel and Chinese delegations in the Great the country and to increase its international chief concerns, as imported oil now accounts Hall of the People, prestige. These goals are above all debate, for about 40 percent of its energy require- Beijing, January 2007 and China is highly sensitive towards any ments.11 The leadership is anxious that fail- outside intervention in its domestic affairs or ure to ensure continued growth may erode foreign relations. At the same time, it adopts a internal stability. practical approach towards these fundamen- China operates on several levels in order tal issues. When China is faced with strong to realize its objectives. First, it tries to in- external pressures, mostly from the United crease its influence within the international States, whereby staunch resistance could en- community, though without heightening danger its internal stability and continued anxiety among other states. To this end it is growth, it does not ignore these pressures boosting its presence in regional and inter- outright but rather accedes to them, at least national frameworks, tightening its links temporarily,9 for example, as in the case of with alternative poles to the US (Russia and US arms exports to Taiwan, or China’s suc- the EU), making generous use of economic cumbing to American pressure in the area of means to advance its political aims, seem- missile technology proliferation.10 ingly increasing its military transparency The principal means of achieving the (publishing white papers on defense sub- national objectives is sustained economic jects, carrying out military maneuvers with growth, which in the last twenty years has foreign armies), and frequently declaring reached an annual average of about 10 per- that its aim is “peaceful rise,” i.e., growth in cent. At the same time, ongoing growth cre- conditions of peace.12 ates significant challenges, including the Second, China is striving to achieve a se- need to guarantee access to foreign markets nior status in eastern Asia and to solidify re- and outside sources of raw materials, for- lations with its neighbors. It is an active part- eign investment, and advanced technolo- ner in regional organizations, holds meetings gies. Among these, dependence on outside and conducts military coordination with

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 63 armed forces of the region, and endeavors dictates, but endeavors not to adopt absolute to settle old differences with its neighbors. It positions and not to make significant invest- views a stable defense environment as an im- ments (financial and otherwise) in these ar- portant condition for growth, but in addition, eas. its neighbors (including Taiwan) are its main China’s main problem is its relations with economic partners. The foreign direct invest- the United States. Since the 1990s and partic- ments (FDI) that flowed into China in 2004 ularly in the current decade, various Ameri- from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, can elements have tended to view China as and Hong Kong accounted for 59 percent of the US’s main rival.15 For its part, China be- all foreign investment that year, and China’s lieves that the United States is trying to block trade with those countries comprised 41 per- its development and limit its international ac- cent of its foreign trade.13 Nevertheless, the tivity and as such, sees it as its main threat.16 ambition to achieve regional dominance may This feeling has encouraged it in recent years also increase tension between China and In- to intensify its ties with numerous develop- For China, the dia – the other developing giant in the region ing countries – for example, Iran, Sudan, and Middle East is – which, despite mutual moves towards rap- Venezuela – that possess some of the natural the principal prochement, are finding it difficult to bridge resources it needs and share a sense of hostil- areas of strategic dispute between them. ity towards the United States. source of Third, China is looking to tighten links Nevertheless, the mutual suspicion be- energy, a with suppliers of raw materials and energy tween the US and China also accommodates market for its sources, most of which are developing coun- cooperation and mutual dependence. In the manpower tries in Africa, South America, and the Mid- economic arena, for example, around 10 per- and military dle East. To this end, it establishes close dip- cent of China’s total output is exported to lomatic relations, invests in developing their the US market, and about 5 percent of rein- products, and energy infrastructures, and purchases long vestment (as of 2005) comes from the United a source for term franchises from them. States.17 In the diplomatic arena, for instance, investments and China’s basic interests thus oblige it to while the two powers are waging a struggle technology. maintain extensive diplomatic links. Its in- for influence in Southeast Asia, they also co- ternational presence has expanded consider- operate on stemming the developing nuclear ably and it is involved in issues and regions capability of North Korea. where it was not previously active, a reality In these circumstances, Washington and that creates difficult dilemmas. On the one Beijing are entwined in a complex relation- hand, its global deployment is primarily mo- ship in a number of arenas, including the tivated by economic considerations (except Middle East. For China, the Middle East is in Southeast Asia, which it views as “home the principal source of energy, a market for turf”). On the other hand, consolidating its its manpower and military products, and a international standing and increasing its source for investments and technology. Con- outside dependence require it to fill a more sequently, it is consolidating its links with significant political role in the international countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Mean- arena.14 By way of compromise, China in- while, the United States is trying to enlist its creases its involvement in issues that do not support in opposing problematic regimes in directly affect it and follows international the region, although China is trying to avoid

64 taking a stand. In addition, the American dominance in the Middle East is viewed by China as a potential threat to its freedom of naval movement and supplies of raw materials and sources of energy. To date, China has not tried to undermine the US position in the Middle East – it is also not capable of doing so – and is forced to kowtow to its dictates (for example, acceptance of a US freeze of the oil franchises that China acquired from the Saddam Hussein government and consent to sanctions on Iran). At the same time, it is not just waiting in the wings: it is consolidating its position among Persian Gulf states and is gradually raising its political profile in the entire region (for example, strengthening political ties with Saudi Arabia and diplomatic involvement on Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program). These moves, which are affected structures that will ensure its access to gas Premier Wen Jiabao 18 and Prime Minister by other developments in China, the Middle and petroleum for decades to come. Thus it Ehud Olmert review East, and the global balance of power, may is forced to take a stand on regional politics, an honor guard at the Great Hall of the change Beijing’s policy on the Middle East and tends to side with forces that advance People. and thereby impact on Israel. stability in the area. For example, against a backdrop of an escalation in Iran’s nuclear Opportunities and Challenges for position it seems that China is strengthening Israel relations with Saudi Arabia and the United For Israel, the focus is twofold: in which ar- Arab Emirates. 19 eas can China promote Israeli interests, and Under these circumstances, China’s fu- how can China’s help be enlisted in this re- ture conduct in the Middle East depends on gard. The questions divide primarily along developments that are beyond its control. political, defense, and economic lines. First, an increase in tension with the United On the political level, the main issue is States or a tightening of Washington’s domi- whether China will increase its involvement nance over the oil sources in the Middle East in Middle Eastern politics, and how can Israel may force it to step up its involvement in recruit its help. China would prefer to steer regional politics. Second, an increase in ten- clear of the political morass in the Middle sion between the United States and regional East and to focus on the economic benefits. regimes may push these regimes into the Nevertheless, its economic goals, particu- arms of Beijing. Third, Russia’s attempts to larly in the energy field, demand close ties renew its standing in the Middle East can with the relevant regimes and consolidation also impact on China. In such a situation, of its regional presence: China not only buys Beijing would likely try – as tradition has it oil, but invests in developing suitable infra- – to gain from the middle ground and grab

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 65 China would the spoils of the dispute between Washing- ties in the Middle East and provide different prefer to steer ton and Moscow. opportunities for aggression against Israel clear of the Though Israel’s impact on these develop- (for example, the C-802 anti-naval missile ments will be limited, it must follow them launched by Hizbollah against an Israeli mis- political morass 24 closely, as China may become a regular guest sile boat during the Second Lebanon War). in the Middle at the courts of the local rulers. Thus, and in The principal motives for such exports are East and to particular if Israel undertakes a regional po- economic, and thus economics hold the key focus on the litical move, it may be able to gain the sup- to blocking the exports. Like any other field, economic port of China and even find common ground Chinese arms exports are connected to the against extreme Islamic elements, which economic growth objective, and over the last benefits. threaten regional stability and as such, Chi- two decades China has learned that taking nese interests as well. On the other hand, if its place in the international arena and play- a connection between the Islamic minority ing by its rules serve it better than specific in China20 and international radical Islamic arms exports.25 This understanding, in tan- activity exists, a cautious approach should be dem with regular pressure exerted by the taken towards Beijing, which would be hard United States, have made China moderate pressed to acknowledge the connection pub- its exports of non-conventional arms, even licly and would try to manage it on its own. against its will. For example, it published In terms of defense, proliferation of Chi- three white papers on arms control, dis- nese arms and Sino-Israeli military relations armament, and non-proliferation of arms, are the relevant issues. In the 1980s the Mid- and signed related international treaties and dle East was the principal export market for agreements (including the NPT, MTCR, and Chinese defense industries, but there was a CWC). On the other hand, its adherence to gradual decline in the 1990s,21 particularly these treaties is limited, as it has refused to due to the poor quality of conventional Chi- ratify some, has only partly signed others, nese arms.22 Clearly, however, an improve- and has applied some selectively.26 ment in the quality is liable to fuel an upturn. For Israel, a crucial test of China’s con- Overall, advances in Chinese weapons R&D duct and an opportunity to advance coop- in recent years, and a decrease in China’s eration with it is the issue of Iran’s nuclear commitment towards Israel (which in any program. For now, it appears that the region- case was limited) on arms proliferation fol- al tensions fueled by Iran’s nuclear program lowing the severing of their defense ties is and the pressure exerted by the US have per- cause for concern.23 suaded Beijing to withdraw its support for Israel’s main source of anxiety is the pro- Tehran and side with imposing international liferation of non-conventional Chinese arms sanctions. Meanwhile, China is not at the in the Middle East. Since the 1980s, China forefront of the struggle and opposes the use has supplied weapon systems and missile of force. In fact, China appears to be seeking technology and, to an extent, nuclear tech- the golden mean between pandering to US nology and chemical weapons components demands, containing possible hostility from to the Middle East (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tehran, and ensuring oil supplies. In the face Libya, and others). Some of these technolo- of such serious interests, Israel’s scope for ac- gies have also leaked to other political enti- tion vis-à-vis China is considerably limited.

66 At the same time, the Chinese administra- sia, and Washington’s wish to draw China tion has long recognized the fact that short over to its side can moderate its policy in term gains do not prove their worth and is this area. However, even if the embargo is striving to achieve regional stability in the relaxed, Israel will have to operate in fiercely Middle East. Israel must make the most of competitive conditions and adhere to Ameri- the prevalent view in China with regard to can limitations. dealing with the challenges in the Middle Regarding the second question, in view East, and work with the government institu- of the military embargo China is showing tions and semi-official frameworks in Beijing a great deal of interest in dual-use military (research institutes associated with the Chi- technology. It is purchasing communications nese government, corporations), especially and computer systems, units, and compo- given existing ties, which are stronger than nents all over the world, and integrates them they may seem. These contacts are not only in its military developments. Technology is designed to focus Chinese parties on the obtained by purchasing the products through damage that can be caused by the current a variety of channels and acquiring compa- situation, but also to assess the various mo- nies that develop them.27 As China is show- tives and constraints on the Chinese governing great interest in Israeli electronics and ment with regard to the Middle East. This technology companies, not only should the will make it possible to identify areas of com- products’ military potential be considered, mon interest for both countries, and possibly but also the nature of the Chinese companies also for other countries that join the process, involved in the deals. On the other hand, as China can be encouraged to adopt the de- while the defense exports constraints should sired policy only with tangible and defined not be breached – the ensuing economic ben- incentives. efit will in no case whatsoever compensate The reverse side of arms proliferation is for the damage resulting from upsetting re- importing military technology. China’s close lations with the United States – Israel must look at regional wars in order to study mili- not fail to define the boundaries of the new tary developments in the world was joined controls regime. In other words, it must not China appears by its view of Israel as a source of advanced be prevented entirely from engaging with military technology. However, since 2000, China in attractive technological areas or lu- to be seeking the Israel channel has almost entirely been crative deals. Chinese companies and organi- the golden cut off, and thus the relevant questions today zations currently place limited faith in Israeli mean between are how to renew defense trade, and can Is- companies, and rehabilitating this faith is an pandering to raeli military technology continue accessing important condition of advancing coopera- US demands, China. The first question largely depends on tion between the countries. US policy, which itself is dependent on quad- In the economic field, Israel’s objective is containing rilateral relations between China, the US, to increase trade with China while reducing possible Russia, and the EU. The US administration its commercial deficit and encouraging Chi- hostility from 28 is subject to heavy pressure from American nese investment in the local market. This Tehran, and arms manufacturers and European countries means not only improving Israel’s balance to lift the military embargo on China. An es- of payments but also promoting political ties ensuring oil calation in tension between the US and Rus- with China since, as the military field shows, supplies.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 67 Israel must not China is ready to grant considerable rewards companies and the relevant government en- be prevented in return for the technologies it needs. Put- tities in Israel, as otherwise it will be hard to entirely from ting this into practice is not easy, as Israeli achieve results in this area. This cooperation companies have to contend with China in is no trivial matter, and it requires a change engaging very difficult competitive conditions and in existing modes of operation. In particu- with China business environments. On the other hand, lar, the relevant bodies in Israel must start in attractive identifying the unique areas in which Israel viewing economic-commercial activity as a technological can help China (e.g., desertification preven- means (and a goal) of generating diplomatic- areas or tion, alternative energy sources, and water political activity, and not as a separate area of desalination) can serve as an important lever activity. Though not a simple task, this may lucrative deals. for developing relations. This will be enabled pave Israel’s way back to favor with decision by boosting cooperation between Israeli makers in Beijing.

Recommendations n Keeping persons who have been in How Chinese involvement in the Middle touch with China in relevant areas “in the East will evolve is uncertain, but it may be loop,” both because of the valuable knowl- assumed that China is interested in boost- edge they have accumulated and because the ing regional stability and its own influence Chinese attach importance to long term per- in the area. Therefore, Israel should treat sonal relationships. it as a power with regional influence and n Boosting technological cooperation strengthen its ties with it, though not at the with China (including attracting invest- expense of its relations with Washington. ments), with significant involvement in China’s pragmatic approach, to which Israel processes by Israeli diplomatic and political is of little benefit, complicates this challenge. entities. This will advance agreements and Thus, Israel should cultivate measures that will allow use of the economic field to pro- enhance its interaction with Beijing, includ- mote political goals. Relevant areas include ing: communication technologies, utilization of n Holding more frequent high level of- energy sources, water desalination, desertifi- ficial visits between the countries that will cation prevention, and advanced agriculture. address vital issues, particularly stability in Involvement in infrastructure projects and the Middle East. Moreover, Israel’s impor- public tenders in China, such as compensat- tance with regard to regional stability should ing trade agreements, is also of major value. be emphasized to Beijing, and ongoing dia- • Defining military technology bound- logue should accordingly be maintained at aries as part of an export control mechanism, professional levels. and adopting a decisive approach regarding n Appointing persons with political export permits issued to companies. In par- prestige to the role of ambassador to China ticular, a situation in which an export permit (like ambassadors to the US), and not profes- is withdrawn from companies during nego- sionals. This will indicate that China is part tiations should be avoided, as this would se- of the circle of important countries for Israel. verely damage trust and trade relations.

68 n Finding ways of boosting intelligence tween China and India should be closely ex- cooperation between Israel and China, par- amined before extensive defense agreements ticularly if China increases its participation are made with India. This self-restraint need in the international effort against Islamic not be comprehensive, but it should be prag- terror. However, a delicate approach should matic in nature so that it serves Israel as a be taken toward Beijing if a link is found bargaining chip in its contacts with China between the Islamic minority in China and over distribution of arms in the Middle East. radical international Islamic movements. n Establishing ongoing ties and coopera- n Exercising caution over defense coop- tion between Israeli universities, policy cen- eration in eastern Asia, in order to prevent ters, and research institutes and their coun- the appearance of damage to Chinese inter- terparts in China, and in particular those as- ests. In particular, military links should not sociated with the government institutions in be maintained with Taiwan, and relations be- Beijing.

Notes trade/ftmenu_h_v1_new.htm. 1 For a description of the extensive diplomatic 8 Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to activity, see: Moshe Jaeger, The Long Journey to China and Taiwan,” Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): China: A Chapter in the History of Israeli Diplo- 78. macy (Haifa: University of Haifa Press, 2004), 9 Chong-Pin Lin, “Beijing’s New Grand Strat- pp. 280-82. egy: An Offensive with Extra-Military Instru- 2 Examples of this include establishment of a ments,” China Brief 6, no. 24 (December 2006): model agricultural farm in Beijing and profes- 3-5. sional instruction in different fields by Israeli 10 On the subject of missiles, see Wendy Frieman, experts in China. See Jaeger, The Long Journey, China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation (Lon- pp. 280-81. don: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 108-9. The 3 It was only in 1999 that trade between the two facts speak for themselves with regard to ac- countries exceeded half a billion dollars. See ceptance of arms exports to Taiwan. “The Central Bureau of Statistics,” Israeli Sta- 11 International Energy Agency (IEA), www.iea. tistics Yearbook, 2000 (Jerusalem, 2000). org/Textbase/stats/oildata.asp?COUNTRY_ 4 Aluf Benn, “The New Phalcon Laws,” Haaretz, CODE=CN December 25, 2001. 12 See China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: 5 See, for example, Aluf Benn, “Barak Acts to Information Office of the State Council of the Renew the Phalcon Deal,” Haaretz, January 31, People’s Republic of China, 2006),www.china. 2001; Alex Fishman, “Raising the Clause,” Ye- org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm. diot Ahronot, Weekend Supplement, December 13 China Statistics, www.allcountries.org/chi- 24, 2004. na_statistics/foreign_trade_and_economic_ 6 Ze’ev Schiff, “Israel Succumbs – A Team Will cooperation.html. Taiwan and Hong Kong Leave for the US Today to Formulate Restric- are officially separate economic entities from tions on Defense Exports,” Haaretz, June 26, mainland China, and this will remain so even 2005. On the control mechanism established, if Taiwan merges with China. see Uzi Eilam, “Defense Export Control in 14 Lin, “Beijing’s New Grand Strategy,” p. 5. 2007: State of Affairs,” Strategic Assessment 9, 15 Michael T. Klare, “Revving Up the China no. 4 (2007): 58-65. Threat,” The Nation, 24/10/05, internet version: 7 Based on figures from the Central Bureau of www.thenation.com/doc/20051024/klare. Statistics, “The Foreign Trade Statistics Month- 16 Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional ly,” March 2007, www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/fr_ and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, PA:

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 69 SSI, US Army War College, 2007), pp. 27-58. 23 United States Department of Defense, Annual 17 Keith Bradsher, “China Leans Less on U.S. Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Trade,” New York Times, April 18, 2007; The Republic of China 2007 (May 2007), pp. 26-29, US-China Business Council, www.uschina. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523- org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html. China-Military-Power-final.pdf. 18 Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Upsurge: Implica- 24 The missile launched against the Israeli mis- tions for the Middle East,” Israel Affairs 12, no. sile boat, manufactured in Iran and using tech- 4 (Oct. 2006): 678. nology from China, was subsequently passed 19 Shichor, “China’s Upsurge: Implications for on to Hizbollah. See GlobalSecurity.org, www. the Middle East,” p. 677. globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/c- 20 According to official Chinese figures there 802.htm. are about 15 million Muslims in China, most 25 Frieman, China, pp. 56-57. in the province of Xinjiang in the west of the 26 Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weap- country. The Muslim minority in China tends ons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Is- to nationalist separatism, which is occasion- sues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, ally reflected in action. DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 21 On average, arms exports to the Middle East pp. 1-2. in the 1980s accounted for 57 percent of all 27 Annual Report to Congress 2007, p. 29. Chinese arms exports. Between 1982 and 1988 28 While trade with China has grown steadily this rose to 75 percent. In the 1990s, Chinese (in 2006, China, not including Hong Kong, arms exports to the Middle East comprised on was Israel’s sixth largest trading partner and average only 20 percent of total Chinese arms its largest in Asia), the trade deficit is the sec- exports. Estimates are based on data from SI- ond largest and in 2006 was $1.4 billion. See PRI Arms Transfers Database. the Central Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Trade 22 SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament Statistics Monthly, March 2007, www1.cbs.gov. and International Security (Oxford: Oxford Uni- il/reader/fr_trade/ftmenu_h_v1_new.htm. versity Press, 1998), p. 297.

70 Saudi-Israel Dialogue: What Lies Ahead? Sarah Yizraeli

Over the last year there have been reports in the Israeli media about top level meetings between Saudi and Israeli leaders that took place in 2006. At the same time, the media also reported the efforts of Prime Minister Olmert and Shimon Peres, then the deputy prime minister, to meet with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis denied the reports about the high level meetings, and rejected attempts by the prime minister and his deputy to meet with King Abdullah. Against this backdrop, the following essay attempts to shed light on the chances for Saudi-Israeli dialogue, given the internal constraints that limit the Saudi government’s freedom of movement.

The 2006 Meetings and their previous instances where the Saudis ignored Objectives the reports, this time they hastened to deny Last September there were reports in the Is- the reports. Prince Sultan, Bandar’s father, raeli media about meetings between senior was the most prominent voice, saying that Saudi and Israeli figures. The reports inti- it was absurd to think that any Saudi would mated that the meetings were of a political meet with an Israeli, and even more absurd nature, as opposed to meetings relating to to consider a meeting with Saudi leaders. exchange of intelligence information or busi- Notwithstanding the Saudi denials, ness dealings that take place from time to which were designed primarily for inter- time directly and indirectly with Saudi fig- nal purposes, it seems that during 2006 and ures. The reports included items about Prime up to early 2007, there were in fact several Minister Olmert holdings secret meetings meetings between Prince Bandar and Israeli with a senior Saudi figure in Jordan, hinting/ officials. On the other hand and contrary to assuming that the figure was King Abdullah the reports, there was no meeting between himself. There were also reports that there Prime Minister Olmert and Saudi king had been several meetings between Israelis Abdullah. The presumption of such a meet- and Saudis attended by Prince Bandar. Ban- ing indicated more about Israeli aspirations dar, son of Defense Minister Prince Sultan, than about Israeli understanding of domestic served as Saudi ambassador to the United Saudi political dynamics, which would sanc- States for over twenty years, and since Oc- tion such a meeting only if it yielded signifi- Sara Yizraeli, scholar tober 2005 has served as general secretary of cant results for Saudi Arabia. In early 2007, of modern Saudi the Saudi National Security Council. Unlike an opposition Saudi periodical published in Arabian history

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 71 The Abdullah London claimed there had been further con- was lost. Given the circumstances and due to initiative talked tacts in Washington, between Prince Turki al- their reluctance to extend the dialogue with explicitly about Faisal, the Saudi ambassador to the US who Israel beyond the Palestinian issue, it is easy resigned in December 2006, and head of the to understand why the talks with Israel were ending the Israeli Mossad, Meir Dagan. The latter con- suspended. On a side note: since Hamas took conflict, about tacts have not been confirmed and it is possi- control of the Gaza Strip and the subsequent peace treaties ble that this report is connected to the power establishment of a new Palestinian govern- with Israel, struggle in the Saudi court between the Su- ment in the West Bank, the Saudis have yet and about dairi line, of which Bandar is a member, and adhered to the need for Palestinian unity, the faction of King Abdullah, of which Prince and have continued to call for repair of the normalizing Turki is a member. divisions in the Palestinian camp. relations with The main topic raised by the Saudis in Israel as part of the political talks with Prince Bandar was The Saudi Position on Israel a total peace apparently the Palestinian issue. The Sau- Saudi Arabia has come a long way in its dis tried to decipher the Israeli position on stance on Israel. Between the mid-1950s and agreement. King Abdullah’s peace plan, with a view to the late 1970s Saudi Arabia adhered to the advancing a solution to the Palestinian is- line that Israel had no right to exist as a re- sue. Abdullah’s peace plan was publicized in gional state. A change in its position began 2002 and was accepted, with amendments, after the assassination of King Faisal in 1975. at a summit meeting in Damascus that year, Following the peace initiative launched by and reaffirmed at the Riyadh summit in 2007. Egyptian president Sadat in 1977, Egypt was Other areas of discussion that feature highly no longer the driving force of the Arab-Israeli on the Saudi agenda, such as the situation and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The vacuum in Iraq or the Iranian nuclear program, were that emerged in the Arab world was seized not prominent at these meetings. The Saudis temporarily at the Baghdad summit of 1978 do not regard Israel as a relevant partner for by extremist elements in the Arab world, these issues. specifically, Iraq and Syria. The round of talks between Prince Bandar Due to its economic and political ties with and Israeli officials during 2006 was termi- Western states, Saudi Arabia could not allow nated in 2007. The main reason seems to be itself to be led by extremist factions. In 1981, internal Palestinian developments (although Saudi crown prince Fahd (who was crowned there were also reports in the foreign press king in 1982) proposed a surprising initia- that Bandar’s position in the royal family has tive for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. In declined). In the Mecca agreement of Febru- what became known as the Fahd initiative, ary 2007, the Saudi government tried to rec- the Saudis abandoned their policy that had oncile Fatah loyalists with Hamas support- negated the existence of Israel and made it ers, in order to present a unified Palestinian clear that the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict position. This attempt failed, and the draw- was the Palestinian problem. Out of eight ing card of Palestinian unity and a cohesive principles noted by the Fahd initiative, six Palestinian government, which the Saudis addressed the Palestinian issue; only two of would have liked to show Israel ahead of the clauses referred to withdrawal from the generating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Golan Heights. The Fahd initiative declared

72 that in return for Israeli willingness to with- tion 194, in other words, that all the clauses draw to the 1967 borders and the creation of of the resolution were binding). With regard an independent Palestinian state with [Arab] to the issue of what Israel receives in return, Jerusalem as its capital, all the states of the here too the Abdullah initiative reflected re- region would be able to live in peace. cent developments in the Arab-Israeli arena. Twenty years later, in 2002, Crown Prince While the Fahd initiative aspired to the re- Abdullah (who became king in 2005) pro- gion’s states being able to live in peace, the posed a new initiative. The Abdullah initia- Abdullah initiative talked explicitly about tive essentially did not extend beyond the ending the conflict, peace treaties with Israel, principles of the Fahd initiative, although and normalizing relations with Israel as part its wording broke new ground in certain of a total peace agreement. instances. The Abdullah initiative reflected Both the Fahd and Abdullah initiatives the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict were originally publicized by crown princes of the previous twenty years (especially the in interviews with senior American journalists Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the peace (Katharine Graham, owner of the Washington treaty between Israel and Jordan, the Oslo Post, and Thomas Friedman of the New York principles, and the several subsequent agree- Times). These were not incidental interviews; ments that were signed with the Palestinians). rather, they were well planned statements The demand of the Fahd initiative that Israel given before each royal figure became king. withdraw to the 1967 borders remained, as The intention was to improve Saudi Arabia’s did the demand for the establishment of an image in the Western world (the Fahd initia- independent Palestinian state, with [Arab] tive emerged after Saudi Arabia rejected the Jerusalem as its capital. There was a semantic Sadat initiative, in response to pressure exert- King Abdullah of Saudi softening on the matter of the Palestinian ref- ed on Saudi Arabia by radical Arab elements Arabia ugees, whereby the principle of the Fahd ini- who took control of the Arab world at the tiative that guaranteed the right of return for Baghdad Summit in 1978; the Abdullah ini- Palestinians who wished to return and finan- tiative was publicized a few months after the cial compensation for those who preferred 9/11 terrorist attacks) but also, and perhaps it was replaced in the Abdullah initiative by mainly, to hint at the policy that should be ex- the moderate wording of “a just solution” pected from the person who would inherit the to the problem of Palestinian refugees, to be throne, without obligating the king to adopt it agreed on “in accordance with” UN Security as official policy. This approach, though alien Council resolution 194, namely: the solution to the Western world, is designed to bypass to the problems of the refugees must be ac- expected internal objection. Policy initiatives ceptable to Israel, and Israel is not bound of a crown prince in Saudi Arabia do not ne- to comply with all the clauses of resolution cessitate preliminary discussion with internal 194 – hence the moderation. (In the 2002 Da- influential political forces, and certainly not if mascus Summit resolution, which approved the initiatives are offered as part of interviews the Abdullah initiative, the wording on the to the media. This is not the case with policy solution to the Palestinian refugee problem initiatives of a king, which require a consen- was hardened when it stipulated that the sus among powerful groupings or factors in solution be “in conformity with” UN resolu- the administration.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 73 Based on the principles of the Fahd and another sense, an attempt to bypass internal Abdullah initiatives, the Saudis made sev- constraints on such dialogue. eral attempts over the years to advance a solution to the Palestinian problem. This Internal Constraints on Dialogue activity was evident in diplomatic discus- with Israel sions that the Saudis conducted with their Despite the progress in the basic Saudi posi- counterparts in the United States and West tion, the Saudis refused to hold direct talks European countries who were anxious to with Israel and played down any other in- The talks find a solution to the Palestinian problem. volvement in advancing the Palestinian is- between Prince This also took place through more direct in- sue. In the 1980s commentators tended to Bandar and volvement – such as with the involvement associate this approach with Saudi concern of Prince Bandar when he was ambassador over Palestinian terror elements that op- the Israelis to the US – for example, in US efforts to con- posed a settlement with Israel. In line with in 2006 were vene the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, this viewpoint, the commentators also thus in one or the prince’s failed effort to persuade PLO tended to explain the financial aid that the sense a direct chairman Arafat to accept Prime Minister Saudis gave to Palestinian elements as “buy- continuation of Barak’s proposal at the Camp David Con- ing security” to ensure the stability of the ference in 2000. Indeed, to this day Bandar regime. Saudi concern over Palestinian ter- the traditional refers to Arafat’s refusal to accept Barak’s ror was partially relevant to those years, but fundamental proposal as a “crime.” lost much of its significance after the Madrid Saudi stance At no stage did the Saudis see themselves Peace Conference in 1991 and the Washing- that views the as mediators between the Syrians and the Is- ton peace talks that followed, and later af- raelis, but they did see themselves as media- ter the Oslo accords and direct peace talks Palestinian tors between the Palestinians and the US (in between the Palestinians and Israelis in the problem as the the late 1970s, when they worked to achieve second half of the 1990s. With the start of di- nucleus of the recognition of the PLO by the Washington rect talks between the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli administration), and over the last year, as Israelis, the Saudis agreed to the US request conflict and in mediators between the Palestinians and Is- and dispatched official representatives to the rael. Their willingness, even if reluctant, to multilateral talks. Saudi princes, including another sense, act as mediators in contacts between the Pal- Bandar, also displayed a willingness to meet an attempt to estinians and Israel constitutes progress in with unofficial Israeli figures, as a show of bypass internal Saudi diplomacy and the approach towards good will and a means of building trust. constraints on Israel. This willingness should be promoted Naturally, these meetings were not covered such dialogue. sensitively and with an understanding of in- by the media. ternal constraints that impact on Saudi activ- Current Saudi concern that direct con- ity and still prevent Saudi Arabia from agree- tacts with Israelis might be leaked to the ing to an open dialogue with Israel. The talks press does not necessarily refer to the Pales- between Prince Bandar and the Israelis in tinian or inter-Arab arena, but internal Saudi 2006 were thus in one sense a direct continu- politics. This concern is influenced and mo- ation of the traditional fundamental Saudi tivated by three factors that characterize the stance that views the Palestinian problem as internal code of the Saudi government and the nucleus of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in social structure:

74 1. The importance of the religious establish- or other business people) to government em- ment and the entrenched negative Wahhabi ap- ployees, university lecturers, professionals proach towards Jews. The Saudi royal family who share the conservative approach, and sees the religious Wahhabi establishment members of the lower economic class. These as its strategic partner in government and groups adhere to the traditional standpoint a fundamental part of the ruling coalition. of the Saudi society and view any challenge Thus the royal family is forced to consider to this approach as a threat. the positions of this establishment, includ- Therefore, the conservative groups are ing its approach towards Israel and the Jews. more exposed to and more influenced by There are a considerable number of mem- the negative messages in the Qur’an against bers of the religious Wahhabi establishment Jews than other elements in Saudi society. who still consider contact with official Israeli These messages, which are promulgated elements as heresy at worst, but at the very by religious establishment activists, present least as undesirable policy. This opposition Jews and Israelis as elements that “defile” is augmented by opposition from radical re- Islamic society. Over the years the Saudis ligious groups (some of which support the prevented Jews with European and America messages of Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda or- passports from entering the country, claim- ganization) that do not belong to the official ing they represented a threat to the “purity” religious establishment and tend to adopt of Saudi Islamic society and the “purity” of the strict interpretations of the Qur’an and Saudi soil. The American Aramco oil compa- the Hadith with regard to the Jews. Over the ny, which stationed thousands of American years, these strict interpretations have radi- and European employees in Saudi Arabia, calized the approaches among the religious collaborated with this approach of the Sau- Wahhabi establishment, whether based on di government and did not employ Jews in conviction or as a defense against accusa- Saudi Arabia. This general attitude bolstered tions of radical religious groups that doubt- the traditional negative Saudi approach to- ed its religious sincerity and attacked it for wards Jews and Israel. what was presented as succumbing to the The taboo on Jews began to weaken when royal family. the Saudis were forced to meet US secretary 2. A conservative approach among large of state Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. How- sectors of society. In addition to the religious ever, the taboo on recognition of Israel con- groups, some of which are partners in the tinued, theoretically until the Fahd initiative, ruling coalition while others are in opposi- which for the first time implied Saudi recog- tion to the government, there is a wide range nition of the State of Israel, and in practice of groups with a conservative approach. up to the Madrid Peace Conference and the These groups are conceptually close to the Oslo accords. After the Oslo accords Saudi religious establishment or are influenced by princes as well as representatives of various it. They are present in all walks of society, Saudi groups – businesspeople, journalists, from prominent business people (such as the students, and others – displayed a willing- al-Rajahi family that started out as a family of ness to meet with Israelis and some even vis- money changers and today owns an Islamic ited Israel privately to get a closer look at the bank that has branches across the kingdom, business opportunities there.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 75 3. Power struggles in the royal family. The eralization in various walks of life. The royal royal family, which enjoys a monopoly on family, which is united in its drive to main- the government and strives to maintain this tain its hold on government, will have to re- hold for the future, is reluctant to take any spond to these demands for change. It will step that may generate opposition from the be compelled to reexamine its approach to religious establishment and conservative its strategic partners in the ruling coalition, elements in society. This is the main reason or alternately, to reach a sort of compromise why over the years its policy was of a con- with the religious establishment in order to servative nature. Moreover, various factions contend with internal demands for change. among the princes, aiming to advance one of Since the terror attacks of September 2001 their members to a key position in the royal and especially since terror attacks began in- family, maintain open channels of commu- side Saudi Arabia in May 2004, the religious nication with all sectors of the population, establishment has been subjected to persis- especially the religious establishment. As a tent political and public criticism. A promi- result, various princes – including those in nent attack on the religious establishment leading positions – have desisted from direct was apparently initiated by elements within and open contact with Israeli officials. Even the royal family and conducted through the Prince Bandar, who was involved in prelimi- media, which is owned by various princes. nary contacts toward the Madrid Peace Con- This attack has three main focal points: the ference as well as the contacts ahead of and education system, women’s rights, and the during the 2000 Camp David Summit, kept a religion police. In these three areas, the reli- low profile during these talks. It is therefore gious establishment, at least in the last three not surprising that his father, Crown Prince decades, has blocked any move toward liber- Sultan, who is also the minister of defense, alization and modernization. Thus the pub- denied the existence of meetings with official lic education system has been governed by Israeli elements in 2006, partly to offset po- the religious establishment since the 1970s, tential damage to Bandar’s prospects of ad- which prevented the system from training vancing in the government hierarchy. the younger generation to contend with modern life. It expanded areas of religious The Chances of Open Dialogue study and prevented the expansion of gener- with Israel al studies. The education system, still led by The Saudi system of government is based on the religious establishment, is now branded a monopoly of the royal family in the gov- as responsible for encouraging xenophobia ernment system and a strategic coalition and for nurturing a hothouse for breeding with the religious establishment. This system terrorists. With regard to women’s rights, has proven its efficiency in ensuring survival the religious establishment is presented as of the royal family’s power over the last hun- spearheading the segregation of women in dred years, but at the cost of a conservative society and over the years intensifying limi- domestic policy and a hesitant foreign policy. tations on women’s freedom of action, which In recent years, the winds of change have be- constrict large sections of the population, gun to blow in Saudi society, and with them prevent their integration in the workforce, are increasing calls from within for more lib- and contribute to the increase in the foreign

76 workforce in Saudi Arabia. The third focus Israel, particularly open relations, in return of criticism, the religion police – which acts for concessions forced on the religious estab- as the operational arm of the religious establishment relating to domestic areas. lishment’s guidelines – oversees traditional and religious behavioral norms and adopts Conclusion a hard line against any manifestation of lib- Despite an increase in Saudi willingness to eralization, either in the education system or adopt an active role in finding a solution to among women. In recent years, the religion the Arab-Israeli conflict, the kingdom still police has withstood challenges designed to adheres to the viewpoint that the Palestinian There will reduce its freedom of activity and influence problem – whose solution is the creation of likely not be in society. an independent Palestinian state, with Arab an increase in These attacks on the religious establish- Jerusalem as its capital – is the core of the cooperation ment may shorten the octopus’ tentacles but Arab-Israeli conflict. The considerable- up will not obliterate it. It is questionable how turn in the Saudi economy following the rise between Saudi many in the royal family support an end to in oil prices in recent years and the decrease Arabia and the ruling coalition with the religious estab- in the power of radical elements in the Arab Israel in areas lishment. On the other hand, however, many world (Iraq, Syria) have not spurred Saudi of strategic in the royal family believe that the expan- Arabia to take on an independent and open importance, sion of the religious establishment since the role in solving the Palestinian problem, and early 1970s and its increased influence have it continues to search for inter-Arab support such as Iranian damaged the kingdom. The latter are look- for King Abdullah’s peace initiative, even ambitions ing to reduce the influence of the religious if only from moderate states. Moreover, the to obtain establishment, both in domestic policy and rise in oil prices has hardened King Abdul- a nuclear foreign policy. It is still unclear if this attack lah’s bargaining stance further. He will likely on the religious establishment will result in a condition his personal participation in Presi- capability or diminishing of the religious establishment’s dent Bush’s proposed peace conference on the situation in power or a compromise agreement with it. tangible outcomes regarding Palestinian Iraq. However, Under such a compromise the religious es- issues. However, he may allow lower level sporadic and tablishment may be persuaded to relinquish participation in the conference (perhaps covert dialogue its monopolistic hold on certain areas in re- Prince Bandar) in order to avert a confronta- turn for preserving its influence in others. tion with the United States. with Israel will It is not inconceivable that such a compro- Saudi Arabia’s specific regime structure – continue on mise agreement, if attained, would force more precisely, the strategic ruling coalition the Palestinian the religious establishment to relinquish, between the royal family and the religious issue. even partially, its staunch objection to open establishment – determines its shirking of a and official contacts with Israel. This would leadership role vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue be in return for what it views as even more and the Arab-Israeli conflict. As long as this important fundamental tenets – maintain- ruling coalition exists in its current format, ing the religious and traditional values of and as long as the religious establishment Saudi society. By the same token, however, maintains its policy of exclusion towards it is possible that a compromise agreement non-Islamic elements and its anti-Jewish and would include reservations about ties with anti-Israeli messages, it is highly likely that

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 77 the hesitant Saudi policy towards Israel will Extending political cooperation with Is- be maintained, including concern over open rael will become possible only if there is a dialogue and extending areas of cooperation change in the Saudi ruling coalition, which with it. This means there will not be an in- lessens the influence of the religious estab- crease in cooperation between Saudi Arabia lishment on the government and society, and and Israel in areas of strategic importance, increases the influence of domestic forces such as Iranian ambitions to obtain a nuclear looking to promote internal liberalization capability or the situation in Iraq. However, and greater openness towards non-Islamic sporadic and covert dialogue with Israel will elements and states. continue on the Palestinian issue.

78 Back to the Future on Iran: A Problematic Return to Negotiations Emily B. Landau

For over a year the Iranian nuclear file has been in the hands of the UN Security Council, following the failed two-year attempt on the part of the EU-3 to negotiate with Iran over the nuclear issue. The Security Council passed two resolutions on sanctions in light of Iran’s continued defiance of the international community’s demand that it cease uranium enrichment activities; yet Iran’s defiance continued, manifested not only in ongoing but in fact in much accelerated uranium enrichment. In late May 2007, two months after the second set of sanctions was passed, it was – not surprisingly – confirmed that Iran was still not complying, which paved the way for discussions on a third round of measures. But rather than quickly moving to a resolution on stepped-up sanctions, the dynamics of the international approach to Iran has begun to change, and in a manner that will very likely be to Iran’s clear advantage.

The EU and the IAEA have in the past two considering a return to negotiations is if it months returned to the scene, once again was led to believe that the international com- promoting negotiations and possible new munity is willing to back down from this de- deals with Iran. Iran has agreed to work with mand. the IAEA to dispel some of the principal fog The first sign of a possible erosion of the about its past activities, and has allowed in- determination on sanctions that the interna- spectors into its facility in Arak. These might tional community had displayed from late seem to be positive developments, but both 2006 to early 2007 was the meeting that took the history of nearly five years of dealing place between the EU’s Javier Solana and with Iran, as well as the immediate circum- Iran’s nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani in An- stances surrounding these developments, kara in late April. Although Iran remained suggests otherwise. Most importantly, Iran in defiance of international demands, this remains firm in its rejection of the demand meeting was aimed at exploring the prospect Emily Landau, senior that it suspend uranium enrichment activi- of a return to negotiations. The next sign of research associate at ties; indeed the only reason that it may be a pending change came in mid-May when INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 79 Iran is calling IAEA General Director Mohamed ElBaradei Council and Germany) to understand Iran’s the shots and reacted to news that Iran was successfully nuclear realities and achievements. On the actually shaping spinning 1300 centrifuges by explaining that discussions with ElBaradei aimed at address- the rationale for further sanctions “has been ing the still unanswered questions about the response of overtaken by events.” Indeed, rather than Iran’s activities, Hosseini made it very clear the West, rather taking this surprising development as the that the outcome of these talks depended on than the other cue for harsher measures, he maintained that the results of negotiations with Solana. Thus way around. this was actually the time to end all pressure. for Iran, any deal with the IAEA depends on According to ElBaradei’s logic, if Iran already an understanding to be reached with the EU, has this capability and could soon move to and ultimately accepted by the permanent industrial production, there is no longer any members of the Security Council. reason to demand suspension. The tide is moving in the direction of The initial Solana-Larijani meeting, de- probable recognition and acceptance of some scribed by both sides as “positive,” led to a undetermined degree of uranium enrich- second meeting, held in Madrid on May 31. ment by Iran as the basis for a new round At this meeting it was reported that Larijani of negotiations. Attempts are already being had promised Solana that he would talk to made to lay the ground for justifying what the IAEA about information access and co- would clearly be serious backtracking on the operation. Thus began a process with the part of the international community – for ex- IAEA, which led to an agreement on June 23 ample by reinforcing the distinction between between ElBaradei and Larijani to draw up enrichment for civilian needs and enrich- a plan of action on how to resolve questions ment that could be used for military appli- Javier Solana, about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran wanted cations, and underscoring the (false) impres- European Union negotiator with Iran this conditional on an end to the Security sion that these two activities can easily be Council’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear file. kept distinct. Significantly, a third meeting between Solana Three primary factors have facilitated and Larijani was held in Lisbon the very next what is very likely to be a problematic return day. to negotiations: Iran’s determined defiance If the timing of these parallel meetings is for the past two years which has enabled it not evidence in itself, Iran has made it very to achieve significant advances in its nuclear clear in its statements that these two pro- program that are now perceived as irrevers- cesses (with the EU and the IAEA) are close- ible; the international community, which en- ly linked. When asked whether uranium abled this development due to its inability to enrichment was discussed at the Larijani- present a united and determined front, there- Solana meeting of June 24, Iran’s Foreign by reacting with a too little, too late posture; Ministry spokesman, Mohammad Ali Hos- and Iran’s current return to the more sophis- seini, answered that: “the time for discuss- ticated approach that it so skillfully demon- ing the issue of enrichment has come to an strated in the past. This approach mixes defi- end. The issue of recognizing Iran’s right to ance with a little cooperation on the less sig- enrich uranium is the question at present.” nificant aspects of its program, for the sake of He noted that based on ElBaradei’s remarks, maintaining the more important gains that it he expects the 5+1 (members of the Security has made.

80 Negotiations would no doubt be the way never agree to stop all its efforts because of to proceed if Iran was actually looking for Iran's meetings with the IAEA. Nonetheless, a deal. Unfortunately, there is no indication Iran knows that a little cooperation at criti- that this is the case, neither given Iran's past cal points goes a long way toward defusing behavior in negotiations with the EU-3 nor the determination of the international com- its attitude since. All that is evident is Iran's munity to confront it. And in practice, the steady progress through continued defiance, US at present is more concerned with Iraq while the international community edges to- than with the nuclear issue. The result: Iran ward accepting these advances and altering is calling the shots and actually shaping the its positions in kind. The US has been rela- response of the West, rather than the other tively quiet about these developments, al- way around. The unfortunate lesson to all though in late August Undersecretary of State future proliferators is that if they stay the Nicholas Burns did say that the US intends to course with a cool determination, they will push hard for tougher sanctions, and would overcome the international community.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 81 How Powerful is the Iranian “Oil Weapon”? Nizan Feldman

On March 27, 2007, a rumor that an American warship had been hit by an Iranian launched missile spread through stock exchanges around the world. Before the details of the “attack” were clarified, the price of oil jumped more than five dollars a barrel, an increase of over 8 percent in just a few minutes. A few hours later, American authorities denied the report, and the price of oil returned to its previous level.1 Yet March 27 was not an unusual trading day. Since new details on Iran’s nuclear program emerged in the summer of 2002, both rumors and reliable information have consistently signaled increased tension between Iran and the international community, which in turn have unsettled oil trading. Thus, the March 27 phenomenon is also suggestive of how the oil market might react to an intensification of economic sanctions against Iran or to an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.

Understanding the implications of these matic and military attempts to contain the measures for the world economy requires Iranian nuclear program are likely to influ- more than just a reading of oil traders’ gut ence the energy economy in the long term, reactions. It can be assumed that the price of and the potential damage that the world oil would spike in the moments following a economy and the different state economies resolution to impose an oil embargo against might suffer. The essay therefore surveys the Iran or after markets receive indication that current state of the energy economy and de- Iran’s nuclear installations will soon be at- scribes the changes it is likely to undergo in tacked. Nonetheless, the functioning of the three scenarios: removal of Iranian oil from world economy would not be significantly the world oil supply due to an oil embargo affected by an immediate increase in the against Iran or a self-imposed Iranian oil price of oil, but rather by long term trends embargo in response to the imposition of that would likely to continue to impact on sanctions; the Iranian closure of the Straits of the world’s energy economy. Hormuz; and Iranian terrorist attacks or mil- The sensitivity of the world’s energy itary strikes against oil pumping facilities in economy and Iran’s centrality to it will per- the Gulf states in response to a military strike Nizan Feldman, force dictate different policies among differ- against Iran’s nuclear installations. Each of research assistant ent states with regard to the Iranian nuclear these scenarios could boost the price of oil at INSS program. This essay examines how diplo- by dozens of percentage points and signifi-

82 cantly hamper world economic activity. At and altered consumption patterns. Oil price the same time, certain measures may serve increases stemming from supply disrup- to moderate the oil price increases and the tion are also correlated with the adoption resulting damage to the world’s oil supply. of restrained monetary policies.3 Oil price fluctuation influences industrial production The World Energy Economy: costs, and the accumulated impact of these A Piping Hot Oil Market processes could result in an international After many years of a relatively stable world recession. A number of studies have found energy economy, the international economy that price increases caused by supply shocks has been forced over the last four years to sharply decrease world economic growth, in deal with consistent sharp increases in the contrast to price increases stemming from in- price of oil. In early 2003, the price of a barrel creased demand. Most studies place the flex- of oil stood at approximately $30 per barrel. ibility of world GDP with regard to oil prices By July 2006, oil was being traded at an all at between -0.02 and -0.06.4 In other words, a time high of $78 per barrel. 2 1 percent increase in the price of oil can slow The danger of This trend of rising oil prices reflects the rate of world economic growth by 0.06 Iran’s use of the the current state of supply and demand in percent. “oil weapon” the world market. Increased demand, sup- Many states have developed a system of lies not only in ply shocks, and only marginal improvement oil reserves that are meant to serve as a rein world oil production capability have nar- straining factor in the event of supply shock. disruption of rowed the gap between oil supply and de- Since 1975, the United States has been de- its own energy mand. The principal parties responsible for veloping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve supply, but in the increased demand are China, India, and (SPR), an emergency reservoir holding more its ability to other “emerging markets” with economies than 690.3 million barrels of oil.5 The other disrupt the boasting impressive growth rates for the past members of the International Energy Agency decade. Growth of the American economy (IEA) hold some 700 million barrels of oil energy supply and recovery in certain sectors of the Euro- designated for emergency purposes. These of other Gulf pean economy have also contributed to the reserves can be channeled quickly into the states. rise in demand. This new demand, however, international market in order to increase the has not been met by a similar increase in the supply of available oil and moderate price world’s oil production capacity. Most invest- increases. More importantly, they can pre- ments in the oil sector during the 1990s fo- vent an oil shock from instantly paralyzing cused on maintaining and improving exist- a state’s economic activity. Government re- ing production capacity, not on increasing it. serves, in conjunction with the reserves held Under these conditions, increased pumping by private bodies in most OECD (Organiza- rates decrease world excess capacity. In other tion for Economic Co-operation and Devel- words, oil producers’ ability to offset the im- opment) states, can satisfy local demand for pact of supply shocks by pumping oil more more than two months.6 Thus, for example, quickly is extremely limited. even if Iran were to succeed in completely Oil is a main factor in the production and disrupting the flow of oil from the Persian consumption of many economies, and a rise Gulf, these states would not need to change in oil prices generally leads to a rise in prices production patterns immediately.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 83 Figure 1. Influence of Exogenous Events on Oil Prices

A number of geopolitical events over the Iran’s Role in the World Energy past four years have created long term and Economy short term oil supply shocks, including the The sensitivity of oil prices to Iran-related war in Iraq, 7 the disruption of oil produc- developments is no coincidence. Iran is the tion in Nigeria and Venezuela, and irregular world’s fourth largest oil producer with an weather conditions. In 2006, the world’s oil output of 4 million barrels per day, 2.4 mil- demand averaged 84.5 million barrels per lion of which are intended for export.10 Al- day, while world oil production stood at 85.3 though this quantity constitutes only 3 per- million barrels per day.8 When there is such a cent of world consumption, the narrow 2.4 negligible gap between supply and demand million barrel gap between daily supply and and such small excess capacity, every event demand means that removing Iranian ex- that heightens concerns regarding future oil ported oil from the world market could result supply disruption results in a sharp increase in an immediate excess in demand. Further- in the price of oil (figure 1). Actually, current more, 11.5 percent of the world’s proven oil oil prices include a risk premium that reflects reserves are located within Iran’s borders.11 the fear of the supply shock that is likely to Many doubt that Iran will be able to con- coincide with attempts to impede Iran’s nu- tinue exporting oil at the current rate in the clear program.9 Suggestions of the likelihood future. A study published by the National of such events have caused the price of oil Academy of Sciences estimates that the com- to skyrocket. For example, one of the reasons ing years will witness a significant decline that oil prices reached a high point on July in Iran’s production capabilities so that by 14, 2006 was concern that the confrontation 2015 it will no longer be able to export oil at between Israel and Hizbollah would evolve all. This assessment is based on two factors: quickly into a broader military confrontation an absence of investment in the preparation involving Iran. of new oil fields will limit available oil sup-

84 plies; and increased local demand is likely the oil sector in the Iranian economy makes to decrease the quantity of oil earmarked the use of sanctions against the Iranian en- for export.12 Iran’s refining capabilities are ergy economy an effective measure.14 It also extremely limited, and therefore it imports provides instructive insight into the econom- approximately 40 percent of the fuel it con- ic price Iran will be forced to pay if it decides sumes. Little investment in the refinery in- to initiate a reduction in oil exports. These dustry and the continuation of government factors, however, are also responsible for the fuel subsidies are expected to place a burden sensitive interdependence between Iran and on Iran’s energy industry. At the same time, the world economy. other forecasts dispute these predictions of a Increased oil prices have been the main future decline in Iranian oil production ca- factor underlying Iran’s economic growth in pabilities. In fact, many researchers estimate recent years. In 2006, the state’s income from that Iran’s dominant position in the world en- oil exports, which accounts for approximately ergy economy is likely to increase, as it may 80 percent of its total export income, reached exploit the potential of the massive natural $51 billion. During the same year, Iranian gas reserves located within its borders. This income from oil exports was the source of would transform Iran into one of the world’s more than 50 percent of Iran’s total govern- leading gas producers.13 ment budget. Nonetheless, Iran’s economy However, there is no certainty that Iran’s remains vulnerable and suffers from a series oil production capabilities would be the most of chronic macroeconomic problems, such as important variable influencing the world a high budget deficit, double-digit inflation, economy in the event of a confrontation be- and a high rate of unemployment. Every ac- tween Iran and the West. The damage Iran tion impacting on Iran’s ability to export oil can do to world oil production far surpasses is likely to aggravate the situation. The loss the 2.4 million barrels of oil it exports each of foreign currency will impair its ability to day, and any quantity of oil or gas it may ex- import goods and raw materials, reduce con- port in the future. In other words, the danger sumption and production, increase the gov- The blow to of Iran’s use of the “oil weapon” lies not only ernment deficit, and require significant fiscal Iran’s economy in disruption of its own energy supply, but reduction. The decline in state income will in its ability to disrupt the energy supply of damage many government projects, and is is likely to be other Gulf states. also likely to harm the state’s welfare system. even more The blow to Iran’s economy is likely to be serious in even more serious in the event of a self-im- the event of posed Iranian embargo on its own oil exports Scenario 1. The Removal of an Iranian 1 Iranian Oil from the Market in response to a boycott on exports to Iran. In this situation, Iran would sustain damage self-imposed The removal of Iranian-produced oil from both from its loss of export-based income embargo on the global supply could result from an exter- and its reduced ability to import refined oil its oil exports nally imposed oil embargo or from an self- and other products. in response to imposed Iranian embargo in response to at- An embargo on Iranian oil exports and a boycott on tempts to damage its economy and impede Iran’s possible response to an import boy- its nuclear program. The dominant role of cott will also hurt the world economy. Ira- exports to Iran.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 85 Figure 2. Relative Share of Iranian Imported Oil of Total Oil Imports Source: Energy Information Agency

nian oil accounts for a significant portion of This and other models based on past oil many states’ overall oil consumption (figure shocks may not necessarily be suitable for 2). Halting the import of Iranian oil will re- assessing how sanctions against Iran would quire these states to find alternative sources, affect oil prices. Iran can reduce its oil supply and even if they do, changing oil suppliers by much more than the amount it exports, involves high transaction costs. It is there- and concern that it will take actions to do so fore no surprise that some of these states will increase during the period when sanc- are trying to moderate their tone on Iran. tions are imposed. In such a situation, there- Furthermore, there is also no certainty that fore, the risk premium built into the price is states without substantial commercial ties likely to rise steeply. However, all models, with Iran will cooperate with actions aimed including those that ascribe decisive impor- at damaging Iranian oil exports, which will tance to the psychological factor, agree that ultimately result in higher oil prices. finding alternative oil sources can stem price A rule of thumb of the Energy Informa- increases. Although most oil producers are tion Agency (EIA) is that when the price of currently working at maximum production oil exceeds $50 per barrel (as of June 2007, capacity, increased pumping by Saudi Arabia a barrel of oil was traded at approximately and other states could expand the world oil $65), reducing the oil supply by 1 million supply by a quantity similar to that exported barrels per day will result in a price increase by Iran. In April 2007, the excess capacity of of more than $7 per barrel.15 According to OPEC states stood at between 2.4 and 2.9 this model, a boycott of Iranian oil exports million barrels per day.17 These figures refer could cause oil prices to jump more than 27 to the capacity that can reach markets within percent. Such a steep increase would in turn thirty days and quantities sufficient for at result in a 1.62 percent reduction in world least ninety days. economic growth.16 The use of US and IEA oil reserves is

86 another measure that can moderate price weeks.21 Closure of the straits would prevent increases. Cooperation between the United Iran from exporting oil, and there is therefore States and members of the IEA, in conjunc- no certainty that Iran would be able to close tion with the channeling of oil reserves into the straits for more than a few weeks. How- the market as quickly as possible, will help ever, a supply shock could be created even states address a total halt of Iranian oil ex- without total closure of the straits. For in- ports for eighteen months.18 This does not stance, it is safe to assume that a fatal blow to mean that the loss of Iranian oil will not a number of oil tankers would create a crisis damage the world economy. The future need atmosphere and disrupt tanker traffic. to replenish utilized reserves and fear of re- More than 17 million barrels of oil per taliatory Iranian actions will also cause an day enter the international market from the increase in the price of oil. However, the abil- Persian Gulf via the Straits of Hormuz, pro- ity to compensate for the loss of Iranian oil viding approximately 20 percent of world oil for a period of time will moderate the price consumption. The options at the disposal of increase to a certain degree. different states cannot compensate for such a large quantity. Using the reserves of the United States and the IEA as rapidly as pos- Scenario 2: Blocking the sible could only make up for the loss of 12.5 2 Straits of Hormuz million barrels. For this reason, disruption of the movement of oil tankers in the Straits of Iran has repeatedly hinted that it would not Hormuz would compel states to find alterna- hesitate to disrupt the passage of oil tankers tive routes. through the Straits of Hormuz in response to One main bypass route is the Saudi Ara- actions aimed at reducing the purchase of Ira- bian Petroline, a pipeline that can transport nian oil or in response to an attack on Iranian 5 million barrels of oil per day from Saudi nuclear installations. In recent years, Iran has Arabia to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea. improved its operative capability to strike Currently the pipeline is working at less ships by purchasing various types of mis- than half of its maximum capacity, and in- siles from China and Russia. Iran may also creasing the flow of oil in the system could disrupt the movement of tankers through the supply an additional 3 million barrels of oil straits by placing mines in strategic areas.19 per day.22 Another alternative route is the Closure of the Straits of Hormuz could Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, a system of cause the largest oil shock in history, and it is pipes stretching from Iraq through Saudi therefore difficult to imagine that the United Arabia to the Red Sea port of Mu`ajiz. This States would tolerate this scenario. The US pipeline can transport 1.65 million barrels of has declared repeatedly that it would act oil per day. Although it has been out of use with all necessary force to open the straits in since the 1991 Gulf War, there are no techni- the event they are blocked.20 The US navy un- cal difficulties that prevent its reactivation. dergoes training exercises aimed at prepar- Though likewise out of use, Iraq too has ing forces to carry out this task, and official another pipeline, which passes through Tur- American sources express confidence in their key and can carry the equivalent of 1.2 mil- ability to open the straits within a number of lion barrels per day to a Mediterranean port.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 87 This pipeline is also currently out of use.23 In addition, several authorities claim the exis- Scenario 3. An Attack on the tence of devices that can expand the capac- 3Oil Facilities of the Gulf States ity of these oil pipelines.24 Another solution involves integrating the pipelines of Oman If Iran manages to cause significant dam- and the United Arab Emirates with the Saudi age to oil installations in the Gulf states, the Arabian Petroline. This would facilitate the world energy economy is likely to face a real flow of oil from these states in times of crisis, long term oil shortage. Damage to these fa- without the need to pass through the Straits cilities could be brought about indirectly, of Hormuz. However, these contingency with an attempt to conceal responsibility for plans demands adequate preparation time the attack, or by means of an explicit Iranian and cannot be implemented immediately in military attack. a moment of crisis.25 Iran’s influence on Shiite groups in the As of today, alternative routes can com- Gulf will most likely enable Iran to encour- pensate for a loss of 5.5 million barrels of oil age terrorist attacks. Whether such attacks per day. This amount, in conjunction with would cause long term damage to the world the 12.5 million barrels that can be channeled oil supply depends in part on the time it into the market from reserve sources, could takes to repair the damage they cause. This conceivably compensate for the quantity is one reason that Iraqi oil installations are an passing through the Straits of Hormuz. The attractive target for attacks: the combination effectiveness of these devices, however, will of domestic destabilization and terrorist at- decrease as the crisis continues, because after tacks against the faltering Iraqi oil industry a month of drawing oil from the reserves as for an extended period of time has the po- quickly as possible, the flow rate is likely to tential to reduce Iraqi oil exports by some 1.5 decrease. In addition, using this alternative million barrels per day. method is a costly endeavor. Iran is likely to inflict even greater dam- Therefore, pinpoint disruption of oil age if it succeeds in striking Saudi Arabia’s tanker movement that continues for a num- oil facilities. A terrorist attack at Abqaiq – the ber of weeks is likely to impact on the world oil facility responsible for more than half of economy. The loss of a few percentage points Saudi Arabia’s production – could remove of world supply for a few weeks could create more than 6 million barrels per day from the a shortage that would be felt most clearly in international market. The rate at which the states that import a large portion of the oil resulting damage is repaired will influence they consume from the Gulf. Although use long term supply. Any oil producing state of government and private reserves in these in the Gulf might be a target in precisely the states can limit the impact of such a shortage, same way. using oil reserves is expensive and indicates Iran might also carry out a military attack a future demand for oil, which is another fac- directly on oil facilities in the Gulf states in tor that will drive the price up. Furthermore, response to an American attack. Some of the concern regarding additional disruption of Gulf states’ central oil facilities are located oil transport through the straits may ensure adjacent to the coast, making them easy tar- a high price of oil for a long period of time. gets for missiles launched from Iranian war-

88 ships. Iran can also land ground forces in the oil supply will cause a price increase, as these states to damage ports and oil facilities concern regarding a future reduction in oil located close to the coast, as well as launch supply will certainly impact on trading. Psy- medium and long range missiles at oil facili- chological factors are likely to have a major ties located deeper inland.26 Still, there is no impact on trading for an extended period of certainty that Iran will choose to retaliate to time, and will intensify if Iran does in fact at- an American attack with such extreme ac- tempt to disrupt the world’s oil supply. But tions, as this may very well result in a painful neither the price of oil nor world economic American response. Many believe that if Iran activity is shaped by psychological factors chooses to respond to an American attack, its alone. Rather, in the long term they are deter- response will be limited.27 Nonetheless, all it mined in accordance with market conditions takes is one successful attack on an important of supply and demand. The three scenarios oil facility to remove a few million barrels of presented above show that it is possible to oil per day from the market for months. Fur- substantially offset the damage that Iran thermore, the American response to such an could cause to the world oil supply. attack is likely to damage Iran’s oil facilities, American military superiority reduces which will deprive the energy market of a Iran’s chances of closing the Straits of Hor- significant portion of Iranian exports. muz for an extended period of time. It also In this case as well, the use of oil reserves constitutes a deterrent against ongoing at- can be effective. For instance, if Saudi Ara- tacks on the oil facilities of the Gulf states. bia manages to repair damages caused by an In addition to the military option, other mea- attack on Abqaiq within a few months, the sures can reduce damage to the oil supply, use of reserves could completely compensate including increased pumping rates, the use for the loss. In the same way, increasing the of oil transfer routes that bypass the Straits pumping rate in Saudi Arabia and using re- of Hormuz, and the channeling of oil reserve supplies could compensate for the loss serves into the world market. Increasing the of oil as a result of attacks on the oil facili- effectiveness of these measures will reduce ties of each of the other Gulf states. It should Iran’s ability to cause long term damage to be noted, however, that these steps will only the world economy and can take much of the partially moderate oil price increases: once a sting out of the Iranian oil weapon. None- serious terrorist attack is carried out, fear of theless, these steps will involve significant terrorist attacks will cease to be a hypotheti- expenditures and preliminary preparations It is possible cal scenario. This real concern will translate and will not become effective overnight. And into a high risk premium built into the price again, in a time of crisis, they will not com- to offset of oil for a long time to come.28 pletely offset the psychological factors that substantially spike oil prices. the damage Conclusion Decision makers who are concerned about that Iran could Every concrete diplomatic or military effort such effects should ask themselves what will cause to the to contain Iran’s nuclear program will have happen to the price of oil the day after Iran an effect on the world energy market. Even announces it has carried out a successful nu- world oil a crisis that does not involve a reduction in clear test. supply.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 89 Notes puted. The data on oil reserves provided here 1 “Oil Spikes $5 on Rumors of Iran Attack,” is based on BP, The Statistical Review of World CNN Money, March 27, 2007, http://money. Energy (June 2006) and the annual publica- cnn.com/2007/03/27/markets/oil_spikes/ tion of the EIA energy company, http://www. index.htm . bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId= 2 In real terms (after taking into account annual 9015498&contentId=7028087. inflation rates), the price of oil has still not 12 Roger Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and reached the high points of the 1980s. United States National Security,” Proceedings 3 Noureddine Krichene, World Crude Oil Market: of the National Academy of Sciences of the United Monetary Policy and the Recent Oil Shock, Inter- States of America 104 no. 1 (January 2007). An national Monetary Fund, Working paper no. electronic version is available at: http://www. 06/62, March 2006. pnas.org/cgi/content/full/104/1/377#SEC6. 4 The concept of “flexibility” assesses the- im 13 Although Iran holds approximately 15 percent pact of a percentile change in one parameter of the world’s proven natural gas reserves, it on change in another parameter. For an in- is currently responsible for only 3 percent of depth discussion on the relationship between world production. oil prices and world economic growth, see: 14 For a discussion of the different possible ways D. W. Jones, P. N. Leiby, and I. K. Paik, “Oil of imposing sanctions on Iran, see: Shmuel Price Shocks and the Macroeconomic: What Even, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: the Impli- Have We Learned Since 1996?” The Energy cations of Economic Sanctions,” Tel Aviv Notes Journal 25, no. 2 (2004): 1-32; J. D. Hamilton, no. 185, September 2006. “What is an Oil Shock?” Journal of Econometrics 15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Avail- 113 (2003): 363-98; N. S. Balke, S. P. A. Brown, able Oil Can Provide Significant Benefits but and M. Yucel, “Oil Price Shocks and the Econ- Many Factors Should Influence Future Decisions omy: Where Does the Asymmetry Originate?” about Fill, Use and Expansion, August 2006, p. The Energy Journal 23, no. 3 (2002): 27-52. 57, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06872. 5 U.S. Department of Energy, Strategic Petro- pdf. leum Reserve Project Management Office, 16 This calculation assumes that GDP flexibility http://www.spr.doe.gov/dir/dir.html. with regard to price does is in fact range be- 6 In Mexico, Britain, and Belgium, local oil re- tween -0.02 and -0.06. serves can satisfy local demand for slightly 17 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Informa- longer periods. In contrast, Luxemburg’s re- tion Agency, Short-Term Energy Outlook, Wash- serves are only enough for fifteen days. - In ington, D.C., May 2007. ternational Energy Agency, Oil Market Report 18 Based on calculations found in: U.S. Govern- April 2007, April 14, 2007, p. 47. ment Accountability Office, Available Oil Can 7 Iraqi oil production stands at 1.88 million bar- Provide Significant Benefits, 27. rels per day, in contrast to 2.6 million barrels 19 For details on Iran’s military capability of per day in early 2003. blocking the Straits of Hormuz, see: Antho- 8 International Energy Agency, Oil Market Re- ny Cordesman, “Iran, Oil and the Strait of port, March 2007, p. 47. Hormuz,” Center for Strategic and Interna- 9 Oil prices include a built-in risk premium tional Studies, Washington D.C., March 26, reflecting concern about other geopolitical 2007; Simon Henderson, “Facing Iran’s Chal- events as well, such as uncertainty in Venezu- lenge: Safeguarding Oil Export from Persian ela, the possibility of riots in Nigeria, and the Gulf,” The Washington Institute for Near deterioration of the situation in Iraq. Policy, Washington D.C., June 7, 2006; Michael 10 Various sources offer slightly different data on Knights, “Deterrence by Punishment Could Iranian oil production and exports. This article Offer Last Resort Options for Iran,” Jane’s In- uses data provided by the EIA. telligence Review, March 20, 2006. 11 Data on oil reserves has traditionally been dis- 20 For example, see the May 11, 2007 statement of

90 US vice president Cheney at: http://news.ya- 25 Ariel Cohen, James Phillips, and William Schi- hoo.com/s/ap/20070512/ap_on_go_pr_wh/ rano, “Countering Iran’s Oil Weapon,” The cheney_95. Heritage Foundation, November 13, 2006. 21 This estimate was offered by the Deputy 26 Anthony Cordesman, Iran, Oil and the Strait of Commander of American naval forces in the Hormuz, 6. Persian Gulf in a May 2006 interview. See the 27 For example, see Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Bloomberg website: http://www.bloomberg. Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done, com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_ Memorandum no. 87, Tel Aviv: Institute for Aw9B.MGCuY. National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, January 22 Simon Henderson, Facing Iran’s Challenge: Safe- 2007, p. 38. guarding Oil, p. 2. 28 Various financial institutions offer differing 23 Henderson, Facing Iran’s Challenge: Safeguard- forecasts regarding such situations’ potential ing Oil, p. 2. impact on oil prices. These forecasts offer a fig- 24 For more details on this system, see: http:// ure of between $100 and $200 per barrel of oil. www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/ However, none of the available assessments TrendsinMiddleEast_AlternativePipelineS- explain the methodology on which they are trategy.pdf. based.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 91 Turkey vs. the Kurds in Northern Iraq: Approaching Military Intervention? Gallia Lindenstrauss

The Turks are currently in a catch-22 situation vis-à-vis the situation in northern Iraq. There are several impetuses for massive military intervention, but the risks latent in such intervention are many. This essay studies the increased deployment of forces along the Turkey-Iraq border, the concerns regarding an escalation, and the possible ramifications of the various strategic choices facing the Turks. It also considers the impact of the recent elections in Turkey and the widespread support earned by the Justice and Development Party on the likelihood of intervention. Should the Turks become heavily involved militarily in northern Iraq, their goal would be to wipe out the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters who have found refuge there. Beyond the question of whether this objective is achievable, efforts to attain this goal could work against the Turkish opposition to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.

In contrast to other regions in Iraq and against On the one hand, the Turks fear that Iraq’s the background of the problems plaguing political dissolution could result in the estab- the United States in Iraq, the Kurdish area lishment of an independent Kurdish state. in northern Iraq is considered a relatively Doubts regarding the continued American stable area. However, the continued stability military presence in Iraq contribute to the in- in this region is threatened both by internal creasing anxiety in Ankara regarding the cre- Iraqi developments and by the ever-increas- ation of this independent state. The notice- ing chance of massive Turkish military in- able increase in terror activities attributed to tervention against Kurdistan Workers Party the Kurdish Workers Party2 has heightened (PKK) forces (now called KADEK).1 The as- pressure by the Turkish military and among sumption is that about 4,000 PKK fighters are Turkish public opinion for massive military currently hiding in northern Iraq. The Turks, intervention,3 which would engage tens of Gallia Lindenstrauss, weighing which course to pursue vis-à-vis thousands of troops in ground operations Neubauer junior the Kurds in northern Iraq, are in a kind of over a number of weeks. This is all on con- research associate catch-22 situation that contains many oppos- dition that the campaign would not become at INSS ing constraints. bogged down, a situation that could lead to

92 the need for a prolonged Turkish presence in was partially resolved in 1998, though only northern Iraq. The situation in Turkey is even after international mediation. more complicated in light of the tense rela- The overthrow of Saddam Hussein by tions between the military and the ruling Is- the Americans in 2003 brought with it new lamic-oriented Justice and Development Par- opportunities for the Kurds. As the most ty, which peaked with the crisis that resulted trustworthy allies of the United States in Iraq in early elections,4 and there is a concern that today and in light of the political experience this tension could bring about a Turkish of- they accumulated since the 1990s, the Kurds fensive. On the other hand, the Americans are were able to influence the formulation of the cautioning the Turks not to intervene in Iraq. new Iraqi constitution, and they have been Massive Turkish involvement in Iraq could pressing for the transformation of Iraq into undermine US-Turkish relations, which are a federal state. At the same time, the lack of already at a low point in part since Turkey stability in the other parts of the country and did not allow the Americans to launch an at- the heavy interest shown by Iraq’s neighbors tack against Iraq from its territory in 2003, in determining its future have affected the and in light of the Turks’ contention that US Kurds’ room to maneuver. activity against PKK forces in Iraq has been An especially problematic subject in the insufficient. context of the Kurdish issue and Iraq’s future is control of the city of Kirkuk. Whoever con- The “Kurdish Problem” and trols Kirkuk essentially controls 40 percent of Kirkuk Iraq’s oil reserves. Kurdish control of the city The current situation in northern Iraq is in- will enable a Kurdish state, if established, to tertwined with what is referred to as the achieve financial independence. The Kurds “Kurdish Problem.” The Kurds, who are said are demanding the implementation of the to comprise the largest nation on earth that clause in the new Iraqi constitution on a Iraqi Kurds does not have a state, are scattered mainly public referendum in Kirkuk, which would would consider across four states – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and determine the status of the city in the Iraqi a massive Syria.5 In all of these states, Kurdish nation- federation. The Kurds, who constitute the alism is and has always been considered a majority in Kirkuk,6 are expected to decide Turkish invasion problem, which in turn has been contained the referendum and to demand connection of Iraq as an primarily through force. The 1991 Gulf War to the portions of Iraq that are under Kurd- attempt to marked a turning point in Kurdish history: ish control. The referendum is to be held prevent the the Security Council resolution on humani- no later than December 31, 2007, but vari- establishment tarian intervention in northern Iraq and the ous elements, the Turks among them, want declaration of part of northern Iraq as a no- to delay it by at least two years. Beyond of an fly zone paved the way to de facto Kurdish their concerns regarding the power that the independent autonomy in the north of the country. This Kurds will have should they take control of Kurdish state, autonomy was not accompanied by domes- Kirkuk, the Turks claim an historic connec- and not as tic quiet in the region, and the Kurds in Iraq tion of the Ottoman Empire to Kirkuk, and a limited began a violent internal struggle between also argue that the Turkmeni minority in the group led by Masoud Barazani and the the region must be protected.7 At the same operation group led by Jalal Talabani. This struggle time, however, Kurdish control over the oil against the PKK.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 93 reserves does not mean they will be able to already declared a unilateral ceasefire in face transport the oil out of the area without the of the threats of massive military interven- cooperation of neighboring states. Therefore, tion.11 While it is still not clear how well this the Kurds also have an interest in solving the ceasefire will hold up, its very declaration Kirkuk issue through internal Iraqi and in- testifies, at least to a certain extent, to the international agreement. fluence latent in the Turkish threats. Massive military intervention would Turkish Objectives and their also propel the Kurdish issue to the top of Underlying Strategies the agenda, which does not necessarily suit Since 2003 it is possible to identify four Turk- Turkey’s interests, since the international ish objectives with regard to northern Iraq. community, and particularly the European The most important objective is to prevent Union, looks critically on the status of the the establishment of an independent Kurdish Kurds within Turkey, and despite the pas- state that controls Kirkuk. A second impor- sage of several key laws regarding the Kurds, tant objective is to eliminate the PKK forces their actual implementation is still far off. At operating in northern Iraq.8 Other objectives the same time, in light of the recent develop- of less importance are to guarantee Turk- ments in Turkey and in light of the election of ish influence in Iraq, particularly economic Sarkozy – who opposed Turkey’s inclusion in influence, and to protect the Turkmeni- mi the European Union – as president of France, nority in northern Iraq.9 Turkish statements, membership in the EU is a more remote pros- particularly by the heads of the military, re- pect. As such, the EU’s positions regarding garding the possibility of massive military human rights will likely have less influence intervention in northern Iraq10 contend that on Turkish actions towards the Kurds. Even military action is necessary in order to wipe if Turkey realizes its plans to build a security out the PKK forces that have found shelter in zone of up to 15 kilometers from the border northern Iraq. At the same time, misgivings in northern Iraq12 notwithstanding American about such intervention and the possible en- opposition, the plan would not constitute a suing ramifications must be examined in re- complete violation of the rules of the game lation to the other three objectives. and generate the same repercussions as a It is difficult to estimate the magnitude of massive Turkish invasion of northern Iraq. the force deployed recently along the Iraq- Yet despite the advantages of restraint, Turkey border, but it is a sizable force of tens there is a not inconsequential possibility that of thousands of troops. In recent years, small Turkey will become extensively involved in Massive Turkish forces have from time to time infil- the Kurdish section of northern Iraq. Many Turkish military trated behind the Iraqi border in pursuit of commentators have estimated that this even- intervention PKK forces. There are political and military tuality is not likely as long as American is liable to benefits to this limited policy, since it does forces remain in Iraq, since the Americans expedite the not entail a head-on confrontation between view Kurdistan as a relative success story Turkey and the United States over the Kurd- amid the Iraqi quagmire, and it is near cer- dissolution of ish issue. Moreover, Turkey has a series of tain that even if they retreat, they will still what is left of successes with a policy of coercive diplo- want to erect permanent American bases in the Iraqi state. macy toward the Kurds. In fact, the PKK has Kurdistan. At the same time, the security co-

94 operation agreement signed in May between the American-led coalition and the Kurdish regional government could be seen as the beginning of an American detachment from the area. In this agreement, security control over Kurdish regions was transferred to the regional government.13 This transfer of control suggests perhaps that the Americans will not add a direct confrontation with Turkey to their entanglement in Iraq, even if they don’t remove their forces completely from Iraq. Should Turkey become extensively involved militarily in Iraq, it can expect strong Kurdish opposition. After sixteen years of autonomy in Iraq, the Kurds are not expected to forfeit this achievement readily.14 Thus even though there is no significant support capture in Kenya in 1999. Thus it is difficult Demonstrators with Kurdish flag (February among Iraqi Kurds for the violent methods to imagine a step that Turkey can currently 12, 2006) mark the of the PKK, they would consider a massive take against the PKK that would have as dra- anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Iraq as an attempt to take matic an effect as Öcalan’s arrest. capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan control in order to prevent the establishment Massive Turkish military intervention is of an independent Kurdish state, and not as a liable to expedite the dissolution of what is limited operation against the PKK.15 left of the Iraqi state. In this case, interven- Already in 1997 Turkey sent 40,000 sol- tion could create a situation that counters diers into Iraq for an operation that lasted six Turkish interests, particularly if the Shiites weeks. A comparison to Turkey’s prior mas- or extremist Sunni factions take control over sive involvement in Iraq is interesting since the southern portions of Iraq. Thus, instead it not only reflects on the chances of renewed of the Kurdish area constituting a theoretical Turkish intervention, but also points to both buffer state for the Turks, a massive Turkish potential delaying factors and the possible presence could position it directly against the ramifications of such intervention. In 1997, Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis, and also Iran, which Turkey was faced with broad opposition to would try to expand its influence in these ar- its intervention on the part of Arab states, eas. On the other hand, Turkey’s refusal to the European Union, and the United States, let American forces enter Iraq from its terri- but chose to act nonetheless. At the same tory may have cost it its influence over Iraq’s time, in 1997 there was no massive American future. A broad military offensive might thus presence in Iraq. While in the late 1990s the actually catapult it to a central role at the fu- PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire that was ture negotiating table.16 maintained more or less until 2005, this was An additional though less viable scenario mainly a result of pressure exerted by Tur- is that Turkey would agree to a division of key on Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Iraq into two or three states and the Kurdish Öcalan from its territory and his subsequent autonomy in Iraq would receive the status

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 95 of a state. The likelihood of such a scenario Kurdish nationality doesn’t even exist and is slim since Turkey is concerned that the es- Kurds are referred to as “mountain Turks.” tablishment of an independent Kurdish state From this standpoint, despite the traditional could spur its large Kurdish population to Turkish position that invalidates an indepen- join the Kurdish state and even demand the dent Kurdish state, the Justice and Develop- annexation of portions of southeast Turkey to ment Party could adopt a different policy to- the new state. Iran and Syria share Turkey’s ward the Kurdish issue and lay greater em- concerns over an independent Kurdish state, phasis on the Islamic dimension that unites and it is highly likely they would cooper- Turks and Kurds. Moreover, Turkish Kurds ate with Turkey to prevent such a scenario. display more support for the Justice and De- This third scenario, though remote, high- velopment Party than for competing parties. lights the drawbacks to a policy of force. In In the aftermath of the elections, it is recent years, Turkish financial investments not yet clear towards what direction Prime in northern Iraq have grown substantially, Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will lean, such that a Turkish interest has been created or whether he will manage to withstand the in the continuing development and stability military pressure for massive military inter- of northern Iraq. vention. Support for the Justice and Devel- Moreover, while it seems that Turkey has opment Party rose from the previous elec- mainly followed a policy of oppression to- tions’ 34 percent to 47 percent in the recent ward the Kurds, there were also advantages elections, and while because of the nature of to a more benevolent approach to the Kurds. the Turkish electoral system and the entry of Thus, both due to the relatively revolutionary a new party into the parliament this support policy of President Turgut Özal in his final translates into fewer parliamentary seats, the years in relation to the Kurds in Turkey, and elections are still testimony to staunch sup- due to the legislative changes the Turks were port for the ruling party and for Erdoğan forced to make to promote their candidacy himself. In the course of the campaign it was for EU membership, a situation has been cre- not clear if the pressure by the military to in- ated whereby the Kurds in Turkish territory tervene in northern Iraq did not derive from currently enjoy a number of cultural rights, the military chiefs and old elites wanting to such as, for instance, the right to speak in the portray Erdoğan as insufficiently steadfast Kurdish language. Despite the very limited in his struggle against terrorism and reduce nature of these gains, it seems that they have support for his party.18 Thus, for instance, af- helped reduce the support among the Kurds ter Erdoğan declared that before Turkey en- in Turkey for the PKK’s violent actions. In- ters Iraq to deal with the Kurdish terrorists it deed, the widespread support (52 percent) must first complete the struggle against the earned by the Justice and Development Party terrorists within its own borders,19 opposi- in the Kurdish areas of southeast Turkey sug- tion representatives said that Erdoğan’s dec- gest a Kurdish inclination to cooperate with laration indicated that he never truly under- the incoming government.17 stood the struggle against terrorism.20 Furthermore, the Islamic-oriented Justice The tension between the military and the and Development Party is less influenced Justice and Development Party is likely to by Kamalist tradition, according to which a continue, and thus pressure for military in-

96 tervention will likely be maintained, wheth- Turkey, since the strategic logic behind such er it stems from internal political strife or an alliance will be weakened. from authentic security concerns. Nonethe- less, election results indicate that the Turkish Notes military has been weakened politically, and 1 Following the events of September 11 and the therefore Erdoğan might have earned an his- ensuing American struggle with terrorist organizations, the PKK party changed its name toric opportunity to adopt a revolutionary to KADEK (the Congress for Freedom and policy towards a Kurdish state in northern Democracy in Kurdistan). Since the nature of Iraq and towards the Kurds in Turkey. party’s activities has not changed, however, the prior name is still widely used. Conclusion 2 In recent years, the number of those killed in Erdoğan, who must decide how to act vis-à- PKK attacks has risen significantly. Since the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, vis northern Iraq, is confronted with the far- 40-60 people were killed each year. In 2005, the reaching internal and international ramifica- number rose to 200, and in 2006, more than 600 Erdoˇgan may tions that will emerge from any decision on people were killed. S. Peterson, “Tensions on this matter. Erdoğan faces heavy pressure by Iraq Border Rile Turkey,” The Christian Science have earned military leaders and among public opinion, Monitor, June 8, 2007, http://www.csmonitor. an historic and this pressure can be expected to inten- com/2007/0608/p01s04-woeu.html. opportunity 3 J. Gottschlich, “Turkish Military Leaders Push- sify following any future terrorist attack at- ing for Invasion of Northern Iraq,” Spiegel On- to adopt a tributed to the PKK. On the other hand, mas- line, June 8, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/in- revolutionary sive Turkish military involvement could not ternational/world/0,1518,versand-487452,00. only fail to achieve the goal of capturing all html. policy towards the PKK fighters located in Iraq, but could 4 This crisis peaked with the opposition of the a Kurdish state also serve to expedite the final dissolution of military to the candidacy of Recep Tayyip Er- in northern Iraq doğan of the Justice and Development Party Iraq into two or three states – a development for president, and against the background of and towards the that is not desirable to Ankara. The Turk- advancing the parliamentary elections due to Kurds in Turkey. ish dissatisfaction over the lack of sufficient the failure to achieve a sufficient majority for American action against the PKK forces who the election of Abdullah Gül – also from the have found shelter in northern Iraq has led Justice and Development Party – to the presi- to tremendous tension in relations between dency. 5 Various estimates of the size of the Kurd- Turkey and the United States. The cooling ish nation, ranging from 7 million to 25 mil- of relations between Turkey and the United lion, can be found in A. Manafy, The Kurdish States as well as Turkey being distanced from Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey: A the European Union21 influences the chances Critical Analysis, (Lanham: University Press of of cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and America, 2005), pp. 4-5. According to the es- Syria in general and in relation to the Kurd- timates of the CIA World Factbook, there are about 14 million Kurds in Turkey (20 percent ish issue in particular. Turkish-Iranian-Syr- of the population), 4-5.5 million in Iraq (15-20 ian cooperation, even if limited, will have a percent of the population), and 4.5 million in significant effect on regional developments. Iran (7 percent of the population). In relation In particular, the warming relations between to Syria, there is only an estimate regarding Turkey, Syria, and Iran will affect Israel’s the overall non-Arab minority in the country, ability to continue close cooperation with which number about 10 percent, and there

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 97 are no exact numbers regarding the Kurds. 12 U. Enginsoy, “US Cold toward Turkish Buffer A common estimate is that there are roughly Zone inside Iraq,” Turkish Daily News, June 16, 1 million Kurds in Syria. See https://www. 2007, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/ cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact- article.php?enewsid=75950. book; Manafy, The Kurdish Political Struggles, 13 ”Kurdistan Signs Security Accord with US,” p. 4. Middle East Newsline, June 3, 2007. 6 According to the new Iraqi constitution a “de- 14 In an unofficial referendum held together mographic normalization” of Kirkuk will also with the Iraqi parliamentary elections in the be carried out. This means the expulsion (with spring of 2005, 95 percent of those asked re- limited financial compensation) of Arabs who sponded that they support a declaration of were moved into Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein independence of a Kurdish state. K. Katzman in order to try and balance the large Kurdish and A. B. Prados, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam population and the Turkmeni population in Iraq,” CRS Report for Congress, March 14, 2005, the city. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organiza- 7 D. Igantius, “A New Threat in Iraq,” Wash- tion/44128.pdf. ingtonpost.com, April 18, 2007, http://www. 15 M. Ali Briand, “What Should be Done or washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar- Avoided to Enter Iraq,” June 23, 2007, Turkish ticle/2007/04/17/AR2007041701457.html; H. Daily News, http://www.turkishdailynews. J. Barkey, “Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and com.tr/article.php?enewsid=76595. Prospects) of Proximity,” United States Institute 16 H. Ozoglu, “Will Turkey Seize Northern Iraq?” of Peace Special Report 141, July 2005, p. 9, www. History News Network, June 14, 2007, http:// usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr141.html. hnn.us/articles/32032.html. 8 O. Frahm, “Northern Iraq and Its Neighbors: 17 I. Traynor, “Turkey Raises Hopes of Peace with The Regional Dimension of the Kurdish Ques- Kurds,” Guardian, July 24, 2007, http://www. tion,” Insight Turkey 9, no. 1 (2007): 101; Barkey, guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,,2133351,00. “Turkey and Iraq,” pp. 1-2. html. 9 The issue of defense of the Turkmeni minority 18 Y. Schleifer, “Turkish Military Presses for Iraq is a relatively new issue in Turkish foreign pol- Offensive,” ISN Security Watch, June 6, 2007, icy, and surfaced in Turkish statements only www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm? during the 1990s. The Iraqi Turkmen Front id=17707. (ITF), a Turkmeni political party supported by 19 S. Tavernise, “Turkish Premier Opposes Move Turkey, estimates that the Turkmenis consti- on Militants in Iraq,” The New York Times, June tute about 8-11 percent of the Iraqi population, 13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ but according to independent researchers, 06/13/world/europe/13turkey.html. their numbers are only 2-3 percent. Barkey, 20 ”Opposition Outrage at PM’s Remarks,” “Turkey and Iraq,” pp. 6-7. Turkish Daily News, June 14, 2007, http:// 10 For instance, “Turkish General Seeks Iraq www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article. Raids,” BBC News, June 27, 2007, http://news. php?enewsid=75804. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6246484.stm. 21 R. Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, “The US 11 S. Hacaoglu, “Kurdish Rebels Declare Cease-Fire and Turkey: End of an Alliance,” Survival 49, in Turkey,” Washingtonpost.com, June 13, 2007, no. 2, (2007): 129-31, 142. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/06/12/AR2007061202089.html.

98 Memoranda 2005–Present

No. 91, July 2007, Benny Landa and Shmuel Even, The Israeli Economy in the Age of Globalization: Strategic Implications [Hebrew].

No. 90, May 2007, Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007.

No. 89, March 2007, Ron Tira, The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision [English and Hebrew].

No. 88, February 2007, Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran: What Dies it Mean, and What Can be Done.

No. 87, January 2007, Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran: Analysis and Implications [Hebrew].

No. 86, November 2006, Uzi Rubin, The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles.

No. 85, September 2006, Aviezer Yaari, Whom Does the Council Advise? A New Model for the National Security Council [Hebrew].

No. 84, August 2006, Yoram Schweitzer, ed. Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?

No. 83, May 2006, Hussein Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine [Hebrew].

No. 82, February 2006, Ram Erez, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Israel in Times of Military Conflict [Hebrew].

No. 81, January 2006, Meir Elran, Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society [Hebrew].

No. 80, December 2005, Asher Tishler and Yoed Shefi, The Optimal Structure of the Defense Industry in Israel: Significance and Implications [Hebrew].

No. 79, November 2005, Paul Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East.

No. 78, November 2005, Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism.

No. 77, September 2005, Mark A. Heller and Rosemary Hollis, eds., Israel and the Palestinians: Israeli Policy Options [Hebrew].

No. 76, June 2005, Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, Al-Qaeda and the Globalization of Suicide Terrorism [Hebrew].

No. 75, March 2005, Uzi Eilam, L’Europe de la Défense [Hebrew].