DOCSLIB.ORG

10-2 08-2007

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
10-2 08-2007 Volume 10, No. 2 ß August 2007 Contents The purpose of Strategic Assess- 4 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front ment is to stimulate and enrich Meir Elran the public debate on the issues that are, or should be, on Israel’s 11 Wars Aren't Waged in the Summer? How Israel and Syria national security agenda. Might Find Themselves at War Strategic Assessment is written Dani Berkovich by INSS researchers and guests 16 The Syrian Army Buildup and is based, for the most part, Yiftah Shapir on research carried out under INSS auspices. The views pre- 23 A Distorted Self-Image: On the IDF and its Responsibility sented here, however, are those for Civilians of the authors alone. Yehuda Wegman 31 IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept Yoaz Hendel 40 Command and Authority in the IDF: The Winograd Challenge Gabriel Siboni 45 Israel vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Editor-in-Chief Thrust of Force Zvi Shtauber Roni Bart Managing Editor Moshe Grundman 53 At the End of the Day, Hamas Too Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick Editor Judith Rosen 61 Sino-Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Graphic Design Yoram Evron Michal Semo 71 Saudi-Israel Dialogue: What Lies Ahead? Photography Sarah Yizraeli State of Israel Government Press Office 79 Back to the Future on Iran: A Problematic Return to IDF website Getty Images, Image Bank Negotiations Emily B. Landau 82 How Powerful is the Iranian "Oil Weapon"? Nizan Feldman 92 Turkey vs. the Kurds in Northern Iraq: Approaching Military Intervention? Gallia Lindenstrauss The Institute for National Security Studies 40 Haim Levanon Street ß POB 39950 ß Tel Aviv 61398 Israel Tel: + 972-3-640-0400 ß Fax: + 972-3-744-7590 ß E-mail: [email protected] Strategic Assessment is a quarterly published in English and Hebrew. The full text of Strategic Assessment is available on the Institute’s website. © All rights reserved. ISSN 0793 8942 Editors’ Note The summer of 2007 recalls many memo- could spark a war between Israel and Syria ries and painful experiences of the Second resulting from mistaken intentions, direct or Lebanon War exactly one year ago. Inqui- indirect challenges, or the escalation of the ries abound and reports are submitted, and Palestinian, Iranian, or Lebanese theaters. the Winograd Commission’s final report has Yiftah Shapir then surveys the recent build- not yet been published. In the wake of last up of the Syrian armed forces, arguing that summer’s less than optimal military perfor- for a military that has long been neglected, a mance, the analysis of IDF doctrine, organi- process of this sort is natural and not inher- zation, and military tenets is still underway. ently cause for concern. Both authors agree Joining the soul-searching and the practical that rhetoric and military preparations aside, changes have been rumors of an impending neither Syria nor Israel is interested in a war war with Syria, and the respective prepara- any time soon. tions that the IDF and the Syrian armed forc- The three articles that follow deal with es have taken over the past year – partly with certain IDF-related matters that have come last summer’s experience in mind. These to the fore in the wake of the Second Leba- subjects figure highly on the public agenda non War. Analyzing the military events of and comprise a major portion of this issue of July-August 2006, Yehuda Wegman argues Strategic Assessment. that the IDF was hard-pressed to fulfill its In the opening article, Meir Elran, not- mission due to post-modern and post-heroic ing the recently issued state comptroller’s ideas and operational practices that have fil- report on the preparedness and performance tered into the military but essentially deny it of the home front during the Second Leba- its potential for victory. Col. (res.) Wegman non War, analyzes some of the main issues stresses that any military that shuns ground in Israel’s civilian defense abilities, and pro- maneuvers as a fundamental tool for victory poses a model for overall improvement in and that elevates its soldiers’ lives over the management of future threats. Emphasizing lives of those they are said to protect – which that the traditional distinction between the in his view has happened in the IDF – from civilian rearguard and the battlefront no lon- the outset forfeits the war. The next article, ger holds, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Elran argues that on special units in the IDF, is by Yoaz Hen- a new national authority must be created to del. The author argues that given the impor- prepare the home front adequately for future tant role assigned to special units both in the confrontations. IDF and in the public mind, the IDF must The following two articles touch on the redesign the operational concept behind possibility of war with Syria. Dani Berkovich these units so that they are utilized more ef- sketches some scenarios of deterioration that fectively in the future – certainly more than in the 2006 war. The third article on the IDF, sures Israel should take to enhance these im- by Gabriel Siboni, challenges the conclusions portant relations. Dr. Sarah Yizrraeli studies of the Winograd Commission interim report the Saudi Arabian political regime and the on command authority in the Israeli military. religious-political constraints that prevent While the commission advises that a sol- the kingdom’s leaders from engaging in of- dier’s loyalty must be first to his profession ficial Israel-Saudi dialogue. and not to his commander, Col. (res.) Siboni The ongoing Iranian challenge is ad- insists this principle is liable to bring about a dressed in the following two articles. Dr. Em- collapse of the norms of command that are so ily Landau observes that events of the recent essential to the IDF. months have once again played into Iran’s August 2007 marks two years since Isra- hands, and instead of a united, determined el’s disengagement from Gaza, yet the Pal- effort to impose heavier sanctions on Iran, estinian issue has clearly not progressed as the international community has agreed yet Israel would have liked. Two articles in this once more to negotiate with Iran, with the issue of Strategic Assessment address Isra- likely outcomes favorable to Iran. In other el’s policy options against the background of words, Iran has succeeded in steering the Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and the develop- situation and fashioning the response of the ments in the Palestinian arena. Dr. Roni Bart West, rather than the other way around. In argues that the current Palestinian political the article that follows, Nizan Feldman stud- situation provides Israel an historic opportu- ies how diplomatic and military efforts to nity both to strengthen Fatah as its potential block Iran’s nuclear ambitions are in the long diplomatic partner and, free of constraints run likely to influence the energy market. necessarily imposed by the Palestinian uni- While future measures against Iran may well ty government, to act against Hamas with drive up the price of oil, the author clarifies a decisive and concerted effort. In contrast, that specific measures can be taken to offset Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick contend the shock to the oil market. that the way for Israel to cultivate a viable The final article of this issue, by Gallia and effective diplomatic partner is to engage Lindenstrauss, considers Turkey’s options in dialogue with Hamas as part of an overall vis-à-vis the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Palestinian framework. opportunities and risks of military interven- The remaining five articles of this issue tion. The decisive victory of the Islamic-ori- look beyond these arenas to other fields of ented Justice and Development Party in the strategic interest to Israel. Yoram Evron sur- recent elections indicates a certain weaken- veys the history of diplomatic relations be- ing of the Turkish military, so that the pres- tween Israel and China, and particularly in sure on the political echelon for military in- light of the past years’ tension over specific tervention in northern Iraq may ebb, at least military sales, recommends specific mea- to a degree. Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front Meir Elran The state comptroller’s report on the preparedness and performance of the home front during the Second Lebanon War1 determined that the State of Israel’s politi- cal and military leaders, each within the confines of his/her office, failed in the decision making, preparations, and performances with regard to the home front. The serious defects were defined in terms of neglect and abandonment; or to borrow from the imagery of the state comptroller, “an eclipse” of governmental function.2 In the comptroller’s thick and detailed report, with its incisive survey and harsh criticism of the many serious defects in the home front’s preparedness and the deficient performance of the relevant agencies during the war, few new ob- servations emerged. The problems were apparent during the war itself, and were subsequently investigated and documented in numerous media articles3 and in the reports of public committees. These include the initial (September 2006) and final report of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs sub-committee, headed by Ami Ayalon, which defined the government’s handling of the home front as a “ failure of leadership.” A report by the NGO support group Shatil4 spoke of “the sovereign’s absence,” and described “a serious picture of communities that were neglected, local government systems that collapsed, and a government that did not provide for the needs of its citizens.” Beyond the exposure of the serious findings, there is an important common thread to these reports: they have apparently succeeded, perhaps in greater mea- sure than in the past, in sparking public debate on the issue of civilian defense.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Potential for an Assad Statelet in Syria
    THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras policy focus 132 | december 2013 the washington institute for near east policy www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessar- ily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. MAPS Fig. 1 based on map designed by W.D. Langeraar of Michael Moran & Associates that incorporates data from National Geographic, Esri, DeLorme, NAVTEQ, UNEP- WCMC, USGS, NASA, ESA, METI, NRCAN, GEBCO, NOAA, and iPC. Figs. 2, 3, and 4: detail from The Tourist Atlas of Syria, Syria Ministry of Tourism, Directorate of Tourist Relations, Damascus. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Digitally rendered montage incorporating an interior photo of the tomb of Hafez al-Assad and a partial view of the wheel tapestry found in the Sheikh Daher Shrine—a 500-year-old Alawite place of worship situated in an ancient grove of wild oak; both are situated in al-Qurdaha, Syria. Photographs by Andrew Tabler/TWI; design and montage by 1000colors.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism in Ottoman Greater Syria 1840-1914 the Divisive Legacy of Sectarianism
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2008-12 Nationalism in Ottoman Greater Syria 1840-1914 the divisive legacy of Sectarianism Francioch, Gregory A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3850 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS NATIONALISM IN OTTOMAN GREATER SYRIA 1840- 1914: THE DIVISIVE LEGACY OF SECTARIANISM by Gregory A. Francioch December 2008 Thesis Advisor: Anne Marie Baylouny Second Reader: Boris Keyser Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2008 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Nationalism in Ottoman Greater Syria 1840- 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 1914: The Divisive Legacy of Sectarianism 6. AUTHOR(S) Greg Francioch 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8.
    [Show full text]
  • 132484385.Pdf
    MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOIMIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Diplomityö Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Heinäkuu 2017 MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Kurssi Linja Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Tekijä Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Tutkielman nimi VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOI- MIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Oppiaine johon työ liittyy Säilytyspaikka Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka MPKK:n kurssikirjasto Aika Heinäkuu 2017 Tekstisivuja 137 Liitesivuja 132 TIIVISTELMÄ Venäjä suoritti lokakuussa 2015 sotilaallisen intervention Syyriaan. Venäjä tukee Presi- dentti Bašar al-Assadin hallintoa taistelussa kapinallisia ja Isisiä vastaan. Vuoden 2008 Georgian sodan jälkeen Venäjän asevoimissa aloitettiin reformi sen suorituskyvyn paran- tamiseksi. Syyrian intervention aikaan useat näistä uusista suorituskyvyistä ovat käytössä. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää Venäjän ilmavoimien kyky tukea maaoperaatiota. Tutkimus toteutettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tapauksina työssä olivat kolme Syyrian halli- tuksen toteuttamaa operaatiota, joita Venäjä suorituskyvyillään tuki. Venäjän interventiosta ei ollut saatavilla opinnäytetöitä tai kirjallisuutta. Tästä johtuen tutkimuksessa käytettiin lähdemateriaalina sosiaaliseen mediaan tuotettua aineistoa sekä uutisartikkeleita. Koska sosiaalisen median käyttäjien luotettavuutta oli vaikea arvioida, tutkimuksessa käytettiin videoiden ja kuvien geopaikannusta (geolocation, geolokaatio), joka
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria
    Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria Beginning with dates of a few key events that initiated the unrest in March 2011, this timeline provides a chronological list of important news and actions from local, national, and international actors in response to the situation in Syria. Skip to: [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [Most Recent] Acronyms: EU – European Union PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council CoI – UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria of Europe FSA – Free Syrian Army SARC – Syrian Arab Red Crescent GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council SASG – Special Adviser to the Secretary- HRC – UN Human Rights Council General HRW – Human Rights Watch SES – UN Special Envoy for Syria ICC – International Criminal Court SOC – National Coalition of Syrian Revolution ICRC – International Committee of the Red and Opposition Forces Cross SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights IDPs – Internally Displaced People SNC – Syrian National Council IHL – International Humanitarian Law UN – United Nations ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant UNESCO – UN Educational, Scientific and ISSG – International Syria Support Group Cultural Organization JSE – UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to UNGA – UN General Assembly Syria UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for LAS – League of Arab States Refugees NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization UNICEF – UN Children’s Fund OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of UNRWA – UN Relief Works Agency for Humanitarian Affairs Palestinian Refugees OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation UNSC – UN Security Council OHCHR – UN Office of the High UNSG – UN Secretary-General Commissioner for Human Rights UNSMIS – UN Supervision Mission in Syria OPCW – Organization for the Prohibition of US – United States Chemical Weapons 2011 2011: Mar 16 – Syrian security forces arrest roughly 30 of 150 people gathered in Damascus’ Marjeh Square for the “Day of Dignity” protest, demanding the release of imprisoned relatives held as political prisoners.
    [Show full text]
  • The Aesthetics of Islamic Architecture & the Exuberance of Mamluk Design
    The Aesthetics of Islamic Architecture & The Exuberance of Mamluk Design Tarek A. El-Akkad Dipòsit Legal: B. 17657-2013 ADVERTIMENT. La consulta d’aquesta tesi queda condicionada a l’acceptació de les següents condicions d'ús: La difusió d’aquesta tesi per mitjà del servei TDX (www.tesisenxarxa.net) ha estat autoritzada pels titulars dels drets de propietat intel·lectual únicament per a usos privats emmarcats en activitats d’investigació i docència. No s’autoritza la seva reproducció amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva difusió i posada a disposició des d’un lloc aliè al servei TDX. No s’autoritza la presentació del s eu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de drets afecta tant al resum de presentació de la tesi com als seus continguts. En la utilització o cita de parts de la tesi és obligat indicar el nom de la persona autora. ADVERTENCIA. La consulta de esta tesis queda condicionada a la aceptación de las siguientes condiciones de uso: La difusión de esta tesis por medio del servicio TDR (www.tesisenred.net) ha sido autorizada por los titulares de los derechos de propiedad intelectual únicamente para usos privados enmarcados en actividades de investigación y docencia. No se autoriza su reproducción con finalidades de lucro ni su difusión y puesta a disposición desde un sitio ajeno al servicio TDR. No se autoriza la presentación de su contenido en una ventana o marco ajeno a TDR (framing). Esta reserva de derechos afecta tanto al resumen de presentación de la tesis como a sus contenidos.
    [Show full text]
  • Domestic and International Sources of the Syrian and Libyan Conflicts (2011-2020)
    Peer-reviewed Article International Security After the Arab Spring: Domestic and International Sources of the Syrian and Libyan Conflicts (2011-2020) EFE CAN GÜRCAN Asst. Prof. Department of International Relations, İstinye University Efe Can Gürcan is Associate Dean of Research and Development for the Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at İstinye University. He is also Chair of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration and a faculty member in the Department of Inter- national Relations, İstinye University. He serves as Research Associate at the University of Mani- toba’s Geopolitical Economy Research Group. Gürcan completed his undergraduate education in International Relations at Koç University. He received his master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montréal and earned his PhD in Sociology from Simon Fraser University. He speaks English, French, Spanish and Turkish. His publications include three books as well as more than 30 articles and book chapters on international development, international conflict and international institutions, with a geographical focus on Latin America and the Middle East. His latest book is Multipolarization, South-South Cooperation and the Rise of Post-Hegemonic Governance. BRIq • Volume 1 Issue 2 Spring 2020 ABSTRACT The so-called Arab “Spring” may be considered as the most significant geopolitical event and the largest social mobilization that have shaped Greater Middle Eastern politics in the post-Cold War era. The present article examines how this process turned into an Arab “Winter”, having led to the world’s largest humanitarian crises since World War II. Using a geopolitical-economy framework guided by narrative analysis and incorporated comparison, this article focuses on the countries where the Arab Spring process led to gravest consequences: Syria and Libya.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria: Issues for the 112Th Congress and Background on U.S. Sanctions
    Syria: Issues for the 112th Congress and Background on U.S. Sanctions Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs April 28, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33487 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Syria: Issues for the 112th Congress Summary This report analyzes bilateral issues between the United States and Syria. Unrest in Syria and the Asad government’s violent response are adding new complexity to the troubled U.S.-Syrian relationship. The Obama Administration’s policy of limited engagement with Syria to address areas of longstanding concern has been met with criticism from some, including some Members of Congress. Critics believe that the Administration should apply further pressure to the Syrian government and consider implementing harsher economic sanctions against it. The use of violence against Syrian protestors has been accompanied by calls for new U.S. sanctions but also some expression of concern by experts that political unrest in Syria could evolve into a broader civil conflict that in turn could destabilize Syria’s neighbors. Despite its weak military and lackluster economy, Syria has leveraged its geographic location and its foreign policy alignment to remain relevant in Middle Eastern politics. At times, Syria has participated in substantive negotiations with Israel, from whom it seeks the return of the occupied Golan Heights. However, Syria also acts at times as a “spoiler” by hosting U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and facilitating the rearmament of Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. Syria’s long-standing relationship with Iran is of great concern to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S
    Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 14, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33487 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Summary The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. The Obama Administration has signaled a pending expansion of U.S. civilian and military assistance to the opposition in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that President Bashar al Asad’s forces used chemical weapons in limited attacks in recent months. U.S. officials and many analysts have asserted that President Asad and his supporters will be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, or lead to wider regional conflict. Opposition forces are formidable, but regime forces, backed by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian and Russian material support, have initiated successful tactical counteroffensives in recent weeks. The Syrian military continues to use air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing attacks on areas where rebels operate. Some members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis
    ankara round tables ANKARA 2012 Quo Vadis? Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis Ankara Round Tables No: 1 Editor: Ufuk Ulutaş Transcripts: Gülşah Neslihan Demir, Zehra Senem Demir, Dov Friedman, Müjge Küçükkeleş, Saliha Ziya. Event Photos: Volkan Yıldırım Other Photos: AA & Reuters Design&Layout: M. Fuat Er, Ümare Yazar Printed in Turkey, Ankara by Pelin Ofset, May 2012 COPYRIGHT ©2012 by SETA ISBN: 978-605-4023-17-2 All rigts are reserved. SETA, Nenehatun Caddesi No.66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara Turkey Pbx: +90 312 551 21 00 Fax: +90 312 551 21 90 www.setav.org [email protected] twitter: @setavakfi Ankara Round Tables Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis April 3rd, 2012, Ankara A pro-Assad demonstration in Damascus Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis SETA ROUNDTABLE | 16 Content Summary 17 List of Participants 18 1 From Tunis to Damascus: The 20 Road to the Syrian Uprising 4 What is at stake? Regional and 48 Global Positions on Syria 2 The Syrian Crisis: Its Nature, 26 and Domestic and Regional Implications 5 The Moment of Truth: Proposals, 72 Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Syria 3 Syrian Opposition vs. the Assad 32 Regime 6 The Syrian Crisis: An Official 86 Perspective from Turkey Participants 91 Index 96 17 | SETA ROUNDTABLE Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis A massive explosion in Damascus Quo Vadis?: Regional Perspectives on the Syrian Crisis SETA ROUNDTABLE | 18 Summary The demonstrations which broke out in Tunisia the SNC’s progress, the appereance of fragmentation in December 2010 turned into a wave of popular discourages support from the international uprisings.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria's Role in the War in Lebanon | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1139 Syria's Role in the War in Lebanon by Michael Eisenstadt, David Schenker Aug 8, 2006 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Michael Eisenstadt Michael Eisenstadt is the Kahn Fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Military and Security Studies Program. David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Brief Analysis ecent developments related to the war in Lebanon—a warning from Damascus that Israeli forces in Lebanon R should keep away from the Syrian border, the placement of Syrian forces on a heightened state of alert, the explosion of a crude improvised explosive device (IED) on the Syrian side of the Golan, President Bashar al-Asad’s bellicose August 1 Army Day speech, Syrian facilitation of Iranian efforts to resupply Hizballah, and Israeli attempts to interdict these supply lines through air strikes along the Lebanon-Syria border—have prompted concerns that the fighting in Lebanon could escalate to involve Syria. Warnings from Damascus that an international stabilization force for Lebanon would be seen as an army of occupation, and therefore a legitimate target of resistance, have likewise raised the possibility that Syria might sponsor or support attacks on such a force, as it sponsored attacks against the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Beirut in 1982-1984. The ‘Rules of the Game’ Since the 1973 war, Syria and Israel have established well-understood “rules of the game” consisting of a series of unwritten agreements that have limited the scope and duration of the clashes that have sometimes occurred between the two parties and prevented a full-scale war.
    [Show full text]
  • The Struggle for Syria in 2011
    December 2011 Joseph Holliday MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA IN 2011 AN OPERATIONAL AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS Photo Credit: April, 17, 2011—Syrian protesters shouts slogans calling for President Bashar Assad to step down during a protest to express solidarity with Syrian people in front of the Syrian embassy in Amman, Jordan. Photo courtesy of Nader Daoud. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2011 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2011 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036. http://www.understandingwar.org Joseph Holliday MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA IN 2011 AN OPERATIONAL AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS ABOUT THE AUTHOR Joseph Holliday, a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, served as an Infantry and intelligence officer in the U.S. Army from June 2006 to September 2011, and continues to serve in the Army reserves. During his time on active duty, Joe deployed to East Baghdad, Iraq from November 2007 to January 2009 with the 10th Mountain Division, 2-30 Infantry Battalion. From May 2010 to May 2011 Joe deployed to Afghanistan’s Kunar Province as the Intelligence Officer for 2-327 Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division. He has a Bachelor’s degree in History from Princeton University.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S
    Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs July 12, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33487 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Summary Syria is now mired in an armed conflict between forces loyal to President Bashar al Asad and rebel fighters opposed to his rule. Since major unrest began in March 2011, various reports suggest that between 17,000 and 18,000 Syrians have been killed. U.S. officials and many analysts believe that President Bashar al Asad, his family members, and his other supporters will ultimately be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to Syria’s ongoing crisis. Some observers warn that the regime’s staying power may be underrated. Intense violence generated demands from some international actors for an immediate mutual ceasefire and from others for military intervention to protect civilians or support opposition forces. In the face of intense domestic and international pressure calling for political change and for an end to violence against civilians, the Asad government has offered limited reforms while also meeting protests and armed attacks with overwhelming force. Nonviolent protests continue, but their apparent futility has created frustration and anger within the opposition ranks. An increasing number of Syrian civilians have taken up arms in self-defense, although armed rebel attacks alienate some potential supporters. The government accuses the opposition of carrying out bombings and assassinations targeting security infrastructure, security personnel, and civilians in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and other areas.
    [Show full text]