Volume 10, No. 2 ß August 2007 Contents The purpose of Strategic Assess- 4 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front ment is to stimulate and enrich Meir Elran the public debate on the issues that are, or should be, on Israel’s 11 Wars Aren't Waged in the Summer? How Israel and Syria national security agenda. Might Find Themselves at War Strategic Assessment is written Dani Berkovich by INSS researchers and guests 16 The Syrian Army Buildup and is based, for the most part, Yiftah Shapir on research carried out under INSS auspices. The views pre- 23 A Distorted Self-Image: On the IDF and its Responsibility sented here, however, are those for Civilians of the authors alone. Yehuda Wegman 31 IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept Yoaz Hendel 40 Command and Authority in the IDF: The Winograd Challenge Gabriel Siboni 45 Israel vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Editor-in-Chief Thrust of Force Zvi Shtauber Roni Bart Managing Editor Moshe Grundman 53 At the End of the Day, Hamas Too Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick Editor Judith Rosen 61 Sino-Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Graphic Design Yoram Evron Michal Semo 71 Saudi-Israel Dialogue: What Lies Ahead? Photography Sarah Yizraeli State of Israel Government Press Office 79 Back to the Future on Iran: A Problematic Return to IDF website Getty Images, Image Bank Negotiations Emily B. Landau 82 How Powerful is the Iranian "Oil Weapon"? Nizan Feldman 92 Turkey vs. the Kurds in Northern Iraq: Approaching Military Intervention? Gallia Lindenstrauss The Institute for National Security Studies 40 Haim Levanon Street ß POB 39950 ß Tel Aviv 61398 Israel Tel: + 972-3-640-0400 ß Fax: + 972-3-744-7590 ß E-mail: [email protected] Strategic Assessment is a quarterly published in English and Hebrew. The full text of Strategic Assessment is available on the Institute’s website. © All rights reserved. ISSN 0793 8942 Editors’ Note The summer of 2007 recalls many memo- could spark a war between Israel and Syria ries and painful experiences of the Second resulting from mistaken intentions, direct or Lebanon War exactly one year ago. Inqui- indirect challenges, or the escalation of the ries abound and reports are submitted, and Palestinian, Iranian, or Lebanese theaters. the Winograd Commission’s final report has Yiftah Shapir then surveys the recent build- not yet been published. In the wake of last up of the Syrian armed forces, arguing that summer’s less than optimal military perfor- for a military that has long been neglected, a mance, the analysis of IDF doctrine, organi- process of this sort is natural and not inher- zation, and military tenets is still underway. ently cause for concern. Both authors agree Joining the soul-searching and the practical that rhetoric and military preparations aside, changes have been rumors of an impending neither Syria nor Israel is interested in a war war with Syria, and the respective prepara- any time soon. tions that the IDF and the Syrian armed forc- The three articles that follow deal with es have taken over the past year – partly with certain IDF-related matters that have come last summer’s experience in mind. These to the fore in the wake of the Second Leba- subjects figure highly on the public agenda non War. Analyzing the military events of and comprise a major portion of this issue of July-August 2006, Yehuda Wegman argues Strategic Assessment. that the IDF was hard-pressed to fulfill its In the opening article, Meir Elran, not- mission due to post-modern and post-heroic ing the recently issued state comptroller’s ideas and operational practices that have fil- report on the preparedness and performance tered into the military but essentially deny it of the home front during the Second Leba- its potential for victory. Col. (res.) Wegman non War, analyzes some of the main issues stresses that any military that shuns ground in Israel’s civilian defense abilities, and pro- maneuvers as a fundamental tool for victory poses a model for overall improvement in and that elevates its soldiers’ lives over the management of future threats. Emphasizing lives of those they are said to protect – which that the traditional distinction between the in his view has happened in the IDF – from civilian rearguard and the battlefront no lon- the outset forfeits the war. The next article, ger holds, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Elran argues that on special units in the IDF, is by Yoaz Hen- a new national authority must be created to del. The author argues that given the impor- prepare the home front adequately for future tant role assigned to special units both in the confrontations. IDF and in the public mind, the IDF must The following two articles touch on the redesign the operational concept behind possibility of war with Syria. Dani Berkovich these units so that they are utilized more ef- sketches some scenarios of deterioration that fectively in the future – certainly more than in the 2006 war. The third article on the IDF, sures Israel should take to enhance these im- by Gabriel Siboni, challenges the conclusions portant relations. Dr. Sarah Yizrraeli studies of the Winograd Commission interim report the Saudi Arabian political regime and the on command authority in the Israeli military. religious-political constraints that prevent While the commission advises that a sol- the kingdom’s leaders from engaging in of- dier’s loyalty must be first to his profession ficial Israel-Saudi dialogue. and not to his commander, Col. (res.) Siboni The ongoing Iranian challenge is ad- insists this principle is liable to bring about a dressed in the following two articles. Dr. Em- collapse of the norms of command that are so ily Landau observes that events of the recent essential to the IDF. months have once again played into Iran’s August 2007 marks two years since Isra- hands, and instead of a united, determined el’s disengagement from Gaza, yet the Pal- effort to impose heavier sanctions on Iran, estinian issue has clearly not progressed as the international community has agreed yet Israel would have liked. Two articles in this once more to negotiate with Iran, with the issue of Strategic Assessment address Isra- likely outcomes favorable to Iran. In other el’s policy options against the background of words, Iran has succeeded in steering the Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and the develop- situation and fashioning the response of the ments in the Palestinian arena. Dr. Roni Bart West, rather than the other way around. In argues that the current Palestinian political the article that follows, Nizan Feldman stud- situation provides Israel an historic opportu- ies how diplomatic and military efforts to nity both to strengthen Fatah as its potential block Iran’s nuclear ambitions are in the long diplomatic partner and, free of constraints run likely to influence the energy market. necessarily imposed by the Palestinian uni- While future measures against Iran may well ty government, to act against Hamas with drive up the price of oil, the author clarifies a decisive and concerted effort. In contrast, that specific measures can be taken to offset Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick contend the shock to the oil market. that the way for Israel to cultivate a viable The final article of this issue, by Gallia and effective diplomatic partner is to engage Lindenstrauss, considers Turkey’s options in dialogue with Hamas as part of an overall vis-à-vis the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Palestinian framework. opportunities and risks of military interven- The remaining five articles of this issue tion. The decisive victory of the Islamic-ori- look beyond these arenas to other fields of ented Justice and Development Party in the strategic interest to Israel. Yoram Evron sur- recent elections indicates a certain weaken- veys the history of diplomatic relations be- ing of the Turkish military, so that the pres- tween Israel and China, and particularly in sure on the political echelon for military in- light of the past years’ tension over specific tervention in northern Iraq may ebb, at least military sales, recommends specific mea- to a degree. Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 Turning Our Back on the Civilian Front Meir Elran The state comptroller’s report on the preparedness and performance of the home front during the Second Lebanon War1 determined that the State of Israel’s politi- cal and military leaders, each within the confines of his/her office, failed in the decision making, preparations, and performances with regard to the home front. The serious defects were defined in terms of neglect and abandonment; or to borrow from the imagery of the state comptroller, “an eclipse” of governmental function.2 In the comptroller’s thick and detailed report, with its incisive survey and harsh criticism of the many serious defects in the home front’s preparedness and the deficient performance of the relevant agencies during the war, few new ob- servations emerged. The problems were apparent during the war itself, and were subsequently investigated and documented in numerous media articles3 and in the reports of public committees. These include the initial (September 2006) and final report of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs sub-committee, headed by Ami Ayalon, which defined the government’s handling of the home front as a “ failure of leadership.” A report by the NGO support group Shatil4 spoke of “the sovereign’s absence,” and described “a serious picture of communities that were neglected, local government systems that collapsed, and a government that did not provide for the needs of its citizens.” Beyond the exposure of the serious findings, there is an important common thread to these reports: they have apparently succeeded, perhaps in greater mea- sure than in the past, in sparking public debate on the issue of civilian defense.