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The Syrian Army Buildup

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The Syrian Army Buildup The Syrian Army Buildup Yiftah Shapir In recent months much has been made in the media of concern over an imminent war with Syria. The basis for these assessments is three- fold: first, preparations taken by the Syrian army; second, the range of political statements by Syria, Israel, and the United States; and third, the backdrop of a buildup process that has been underway in the Syr- ian army for approximately two years. This essay will survey developments in Syria, both in terms of the military buildup and preparation measures. It will present three main arguments. First, the buildup underway in the Syrian armed forces is a normal process for a military. After a long period during which Syria was forced to neglect procurement and buildup operations totally, previously closed doors were suddenly opened and it is making the most of this opportunity. Second, the buildup process is focused on defense and deterrence means. Third, tension of this sort does not necessarily indicate intent to launch an offensive, but it does entail risks of escalation that can lead to a war that neither side wants. Background Hizbollah leaders who told the Syrian pub- After the Second Lebanon War, President lic that liberating the Golan through military Basher al-Asad called on Israel to begin talks means would be an easy task. More recently, on liberating the Golan Heights. It appears Syrian prime minister Otari visited Kuneitra that there were also secrets contacts on the and announced the Golan Heights Festival. matter between Israeli and Syrian officials. In Israel too there were gloomy assess- At the same time, aggressive rhetoric re- ments. The IDF intelligence assessment in garding the liberation of the Golan Heights early July maintained that Asad had yet to through military means increased. President decide on war, but that there was a percep- Asad himself declared immediately after the tible increase in hostility from Syria. Similar war in Lebanon that “there are alternatives concerns over war with Syria were expressed to diplomatic options,” and even explicitly by senior Israeli spokespeople: the Israeli claimed that Syria is liable to attack Israel if ambassador to Washington, Sallai Meridor, Yiftah Shapir, senior the latter does not withdraw from the Go- noted in an interview that Israel is facing research associate at lan, such that “even [its] atomic bomb won’t the largest military buildup along the Golan INSS save [it].” Syrian state television interviewed Heights border since 1973. 16 Military Buildup interest in the Middle East and the Mediter- For many years following the collapse of the ranean. As part of these renewed ties the Syr- Soviet Union, the Syrian armed forces were ians agreed to allow the Russian fleet to oper- plunged into a crisis, given the loss of their ate from the port of Tartous, as was the case patron that had supplied them with arms during the Cold War. Periodic infrastructure and technical support. Unlike the Soviet work at this port (including deepening the Union, Russia was not prepared to provide harbor) will allow the Russian fleet to oper- Syria with arms and technical support gra- ate from there freely. tis. Moreover, Russia asked Syria to pay its The Syrian buildup is not limited to ac- debt for weapon systems it had received pre- quisitions from Russia. Two aspects in par- viously, a debt that totaled about $11 billion ticular are noteworthy. One relates to the and has increased over the years. As a result, special security ties between Syria and Iran: Syria stopped acquiring weapon systems, the two states have maintained close secu- and over many years its military prowess rity cooperation for many years, and they decreased as its arms became obsolete and it jointly develop weapon systems, such as suffered a severe shortage of spare parts. ballistic missiles. Syria’s current buildup in- The buildup cludes both Iranian financial aid for Syria’s This situation notwithstanding, there underway in the were repeated reports of major arms deals purchases from Russia, and trilateral deals of Syrian armed between Syria and Russia. Ultimately, the joint acquisitions of arms and purchases of only significant deal that was completed was Iranian manufactured weapons – weapons forces is a Syria’s purchase of Metis-M and Kornet-E that are generally a licensed copy or produc- normal process anti-tank missiles in 2000, some of which tion of arms designed by Russia, China, or for a military, even the US. The July visit to Syria by Iranian were passed on to Hizbollah. and is focused The breakthrough in acquisition and tech- president Ahmadienjad was accompanied nical assistance relations with Russia came by reports – denied by Tehran – of an agree- on defense and in 2005, when Russia agreed to write off 73 ment by Iran to finance weapons to Syria to deterrence percent of the Syrian debt. A settlement was the tune of one billion dollars. measures. also reached over an installment plan for the The second aspect is connected to the Syr- outstanding debt, part in cash and part in ian defense industry itself. The industry, de- goods. The end of the debt affair generated spite lagging far behind the Iranian industry, a wave of reports about large weapons sales has been assembling Scud missiles for sev- to Syria. At the same time, the US and Israel eral years (in cooperation with North Korea applied pressure on the Russian government and Iran). The industry also manufactures to refrain from providing systems that once rockets, notably the 220 mm and 302 mm in Syrian hands could upset stability in the rockets, which are of Syrian design and have Middle East. In particular, the Iskander-E been absorbed by the Syrian forces in recent surface-to-surface missiles and the S-300 years and even passed on to Hizbollah. anti-aircraft missile system were mentioned in this context. Details of the Buildup The breakthrough in Syrian-Russian re- What, then, does the buildup process incor- lations was not a result of Russian altruism. porate? The Syrian buildup is particularly The Russia of Vladimir Putin has revived its noticeable in the area of anti-tank missiles, Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 17 air defense for ground forces, and naval successor to the Tunguska system, includes a forces. vehicle that carries missiles and canons. The system was developed for and funded by the Anti-tank Missiles United Arab Emirates. Development of the After the end of the Second Lebanon War system was recently completed. there were reports of Syrian transactions for With regard to the older air defense sys- additional large numbers of Metis-M and tems, there are unsubstantiated reports of Kornet-E anti-tank missiles. These missiles, Syria’s intent to upgrade its SA-3 systems, which were acquired by Syria in the past, similar to the upgrade that was carried out made their way to Hizbollah. Syria also pur- by Egypt. The air defense systems that were chased for the first time the most advanced purchased were designed to enhance the Syr- anti-tank missile produced by the Russian ian ability to defend against aerial attack and defense industry – the Khrizantema system. thereby attempt to neutralize the supremacy The new anti-tank missiles will enable Syria of the Israeli air force. Most of the systems to defend itself against tanks and other ar- that were purchased are mobile, and their mored vehicles from great distances, up to main purpose is to protect the ground forces, six kilometers. The Second Lebanon War also including forces in motion. showed that the missiles are effective against a range of targets, such as buildings. The Navy The Syrian navy has been badly neglected Air Defense over the last decade, and its fighting ability In the area of air defense the Syrians concen- and the usability of its ships have deteriorat- trated on mobile systems for point specific ed. The buildup process began with Iranian defense and on portable missiles. The first aid only recently, and is mainly based on Ira- deal that attracted attention was Syria’s plan nian imports. The most important weapon to purchase advanced Igla-S (SA-18) shoul- system acquired by the navy is the C-802 der-held missiles. The deal, which was ini- missiles – a Chinese sea-to-sea or shore-to- tiated in 2003, was blocked by international sea missile manufactured in Iran. These mis- It appears that pressure on the Russian government due to siles were passed on to Hizbollah, which the Syrians concern that these missiles would make their used them during the Second Lebanon War. have applied way to terror organizations, in particular to Following the war, it became known that the lessons of Hizbollah. The solution arrived at was to Syria acquired very large quantities of these develop a new system specifically for Syria missiles. It appears that most of the missiles the Second – the Strelets system. This is a light armored are shore-to-sea missiles, and their main pur- Lebanon War vehicle that carries four Igla-S missiles that pose is to protect Syria’s coastlines. However, and have cannot be removed and held on the shoulder. the missile’s long range will also enable Syria deployed The deal was completed in 2006, although to hit ships far from its coast. rockets in there may be another deal for more of this Furthermore, Syria has increased the num- type of vehicle. ber of ships in its possession, although there camouflaged Another deal in the field of air defense is no information about the type and number underground includes thirty-six (some reports say fifty) of ships acquired.
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