The Syrian Army Buildup

Yiftah Shapir

In recent months much has been made in the media of concern over an imminent war with Syria. The basis for these assessments is three- fold: ﬁrst, preparations taken by the Syrian army; second, the range of political statements by Syria, Israel, and the United States; and third, the backdrop of a buildup process that has been underway in the Syr- ian army for approximately two years. This essay will survey developments in Syria, both in terms of the military buildup and preparation measures. It will present three main arguments. First, the buildup underway in the Syrian armed forces is a normal process for a military. After a long period during which Syria was forced to neglect procurement and buildup operations totally, previously closed doors were suddenly opened and it is making the most of this opportunity. Second, the buildup process is focused on defense and deterrence means. Third, tension of this sort does not necessarily indicate intent to launch an offensive, but it does entail risks of escalation that can lead to a war that neither side wants.

Background Hizbollah leaders who told the Syrian pub- After the Second Lebanon War, President lic that liberating the Golan through military Basher al-Asad called on Israel to begin talks means would be an easy task. More recently, on liberating the Golan Heights. It appears Syrian prime minister Otari visited Kuneitra that there were also secrets contacts on the and announced the Golan Heights Festival. matter between Israeli and Syrian ofﬁcials. In Israel too there were gloomy assess- At the same time, aggressive rhetoric re- ments. The IDF intelligence assessment in garding the liberation of the Golan Heights early July maintained that Asad had yet to through military means increased. President decide on war, but that there was a percep- Asad himself declared immediately after the tible increase in hostility from Syria. Similar war in Lebanon that “there are alternatives concerns over war with Syria were expressed to diplomatic options,” and even explicitly by senior Israeli spokespeople: the Israeli claimed that Syria is liable to attack Israel if ambassador to Washington, Sallai Meridor, Yiftah Shapir, senior the latter does not withdraw from the Go- noted in an interview that Israel is facing research associate at lan, such that “even [its] atomic bomb won’t the largest military buildup along the Golan INSS save [it].” Syrian state television interviewed Heights border since 1973.

16 Military Buildup interest in the Middle East and the Mediter- For many years following the collapse of the ranean. As part of these renewed ties the Syr- Soviet Union, the Syrian armed forces were ians agreed to allow the Russian fleet to oper- plunged into a crisis, given the loss of their ate from the port of Tartous, as was the case patron that had supplied them with arms during the Cold War. Periodic infrastructure and technical support. Unlike the Soviet work at this port (including deepening the Union, Russia was not prepared to provide harbor) will allow the Russian fleet to oper- Syria with arms and technical support gra- ate from there freely. tis. Moreover, Russia asked Syria to pay its The Syrian buildup is not limited to ac- debt for weapon systems it had received pre- quisitions from Russia. Two aspects in par- viously, a debt that totaled about $11 billion ticular are noteworthy. One relates to the and has increased over the years. As a result, special security ties between Syria and Iran: Syria stopped acquiring weapon systems, the two states have maintained close secu- and over many years its military prowess rity cooperation for many years, and they decreased as its arms became obsolete and it jointly develop weapon systems, such as suffered a severe shortage of spare parts. ballistic missiles. Syria’s current buildup in- The buildup cludes both Iranian financial aid for Syria’s This situation notwithstanding, there underway in the were repeated reports of major arms deals purchases from Russia, and trilateral deals of Syrian armed between Syria and Russia. Ultimately, the joint acquisitions of arms and purchases of only significant deal that was completed was Iranian manufactured weapons – weapons forces is a Syria’s purchase of Metis-M and Kornet-E that are generally a licensed copy or produc- normal process anti-tank missiles in 2000, some of which tion of arms designed by Russia, China, or for a military, even the US. The July visit to Syria by Iranian were passed on to Hizbollah. and is focused The breakthrough in acquisition and tech- president Ahmadienjad was accompanied nical assistance relations with Russia came by reports – denied by Tehran – of an agree- on defense and in 2005, when Russia agreed to write off 73 ment by Iran to finance weapons to Syria to deterrence percent of the Syrian debt. A settlement was the tune of one billion dollars. measures. also reached over an installment plan for the The second aspect is connected to the Syr- outstanding debt, part in cash and part in ian defense industry itself. The industry, de- goods. The end of the debt affair generated spite lagging far behind the Iranian industry, a wave of reports about large weapons sales has been assembling Scud missiles for sev- to Syria. At the same time, the US and Israel eral years (in cooperation with North Korea applied pressure on the Russian government and Iran). The industry also manufactures to refrain from providing systems that once rockets, notably the 220 mm and 302 mm in Syrian hands could upset stability in the rockets, which are of Syrian design and have Middle East. In particular, the Iskander-E been absorbed by the Syrian forces in recent surface-to-surface missiles and the S-300 years and even passed on to Hizbollah. anti-aircraft missile system were mentioned in this context. Details of the Buildup The breakthrough in Syrian-Russian re- What, then, does the buildup process incor- lations was not a result of Russian altruism. porate? The Syrian buildup is particularly The Russia of Vladimir Putin has revived its noticeable in the area of anti-tank missiles,

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 17 air defense for ground forces, and naval successor to the Tunguska system, includes a forces. vehicle that carries missiles and canons. The system was developed for and funded by the Anti-tank Missiles United Arab Emirates. Development of the After the end of the Second Lebanon War system was recently completed. there were reports of Syrian transactions for With regard to the older air defense sys- additional large numbers of Metis-M and tems, there are unsubstantiated reports of Kornet-E anti-tank missiles. These missiles, Syria’s intent to upgrade its SA-3 systems, which were acquired by Syria in the past, similar to the upgrade that was carried out made their way to Hizbollah. Syria also pur- by Egypt. The air defense systems that were chased for the first time the most advanced purchased were designed to enhance the Syr- anti-tank missile produced by the Russian ian ability to defend against aerial attack and defense industry – the Khrizantema system. thereby attempt to neutralize the supremacy The new anti-tank missiles will enable Syria of the Israeli air force. Most of the systems to defend itself against tanks and other ar- that were purchased are mobile, and their mored vehicles from great distances, up to main purpose is to protect the ground forces, six kilometers. The Second Lebanon War also including forces in motion. showed that the missiles are effective against a range of targets, such as buildings. The Navy The Syrian navy has been badly neglected Air Defense over the last decade, and its fighting ability In the area of air defense the Syrians concen- and the usability of its ships have deteriorat- trated on mobile systems for point specific ed. The buildup process began with Iranian defense and on portable missiles. The first aid only recently, and is mainly based on Ira- deal that attracted attention was Syria’s plan nian imports. The most important weapon to purchase advanced Igla-S (SA-18) shoul- system acquired by the navy is the C-802 der-held missiles. The deal, which was ini- missiles – a Chinese sea-to-sea or shore-to- tiated in 2003, was blocked by international sea missile manufactured in Iran. These mis- It appears that pressure on the Russian government due to siles were passed on to Hizbollah, which the Syrians concern that these missiles would make their used them during the Second Lebanon War. have applied way to terror organizations, in particular to Following the war, it became known that the lessons of Hizbollah. The solution arrived at was to Syria acquired very large quantities of these develop a new system specifically for Syria missiles. It appears that most of the missiles the Second – the Strelets system. This is a light armored are shore-to-sea missiles, and their main pur- Lebanon War vehicle that carries four Igla-S missiles that pose is to protect Syria’s coastlines. However, and have cannot be removed and held on the shoulder. the missile’s long range will also enable Syria deployed The deal was completed in 2006, although to hit ships far from its coast. rockets in there may be another deal for more of this Furthermore, Syria has increased the num- type of vehicle. ber of ships in its possession, although there camouflaged Another deal in the field of air defense is no information about the type and number underground includes thirty-six (some reports say fifty) of ships acquired. If these were acquisitions installations. Pantsyr S-1 systems. This system, which is the from Iran, it is reasonable to assume that the

18 Iranians sold Syria MIG-S-1800, MIG-G-1900, and MIG-S-2600 rapid patrol boats, all manufactured by Iran. Similar types of patrol boats are used for coastal patrol missions all over the world, although Iran developed a special operational approach whereby a large number of small and rapid craft attack far larger vessels. The Syrian navy may also want to adopt this tactic, which enables a weak fleet without heavy vessels to strike and cause se- GOC rious damage to a more powerful enemy. Northern Command Maj. Gen. The Air Force Gadi In June, there were reports – and denials – in Eizenkot the Russian press of a deal for the acquisition of five MiG-31E aircraft. This aircraft, ed up acquisitions of short range rockets which was developed in the mid 1980s, is an (such as the Grad). In the field of long range advanced version of the MiG-25 used by the missiles, over the past year the Syrians have Syrian air force for many years. It is a fast in- accelerated production of the Scud D and terception plane capable of intercepting tar- Scud C missiles. This past February, the Scud gets beyond the horizon using R-33 missiles. missile was test fired and there was a report However, its other capabilities – including of construction of underground launch bases attack of ground targets and even close aerial for Scud missiles in the area of Homs and combat – are very limited. If this aircraft is Hamat. obtained by the Syrian air force it will pose a It is difficult to relate to reports about the threat to the operational ability of the Israeli Scud as a development of immediate deter- air force, particularly in the collection of in- rence significance, as the processes of devel- telligence against Syria. opment and production of systems like the Scud are long term and take many years. Missiles and Rocket Weapons Generally, important milestones of such The Syrian armed forces have worked for projects are represented by a gradual, cumu- many years to improve their surface-to-sur- lative process and not by a single event with face missile capacity, and the Syrian industry, immediate impact. On the other hand, de- with Iranian and North Korean cooperation, ployment of rockets along the border may be is trying to develop enhanced models of the a deterrence development. Such deployment Scud missile. In addition, in recent years the can also be interpreted as the application of Syrians have acquired locally produced un- lessons learned from the use of rockets dur- guided 220 mm and 302 mm diameter rock- ing the Second Lebanon War. In the event of ets, which were also used by Hizbollah dur- a war, it can allow the Syrians to inflict ongo- ing the Second Lebanon War. ing damage on the Israeli home front, similar After the war the Syrians began a process to the damage caused by Hizbollah rockets of accelerated buildup of rockets and speed- in the summer of 2006.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 19 Syria has Recent Preparation Measures not noticed any military moves and that the recognized In the past year, the Syrian armed forces took situation there is calm. the advantage a number of measures that increased their readiness for war. The most prominent move Not Included in the Buildup Process to be gained was advancing large scale exercises. This The Syrian army was neglected for many from anti-tank year, the exercises, which are normally car- years, and its equipment acquisition pro- missiles as well ried out in the fall as part of the culmination cess stalled after the collapse of the Soviet as the damage of the Syrian military’s training year, were Union. It was natural to expect, as the ac- held in the spring. In addition: quisition process resumed, that the armed that can be n There have been reports of increased forces would replenish their weapons with inflicted on the rocket deployment along the Golan Heights major weapon systems, but this did not hap- civilian front front. It appears that the Syrians have also ap- pen. For example, one of the most notice- using rockets. plied the lessons of the Second Lebanon War able absences is main battle tanks. The Syr- and have deployed rockets in camouflaged ian army uses T-72 tanks, yet except for one underground installations, which Hizbollah brigade, whose tanks were upgraded with did with great success. Italian-manufactured fire-control systems, n Forces were moved from deep inside there have been no reports of new tank ac- the country and from the Syrian-Iraqi border quisitions or upgrade kits. There is also no towards the Golan Heights front. Particu- information about any buildup of any other larly noticeable was the reinforcement of the armored combat vehicles. 14th commando division in the area near the The air force is in a similar situation. It ac- northern Golan Heights and Mt. Hermon. quired MiG-29 aircraft at the end of the 1990s, One report suggested that the division was and since then has not made any purchases. reinforced with an entire brigade that was It continues to use outdated MiG-23 and moved from inside the country. MiG-21 aircraft. It is natural for the air force n Logistical infrastructures, including to want to build up its equipment – with the storage facilities that can provide arms, and new versions of the MiG-29 jets, by upgrading fuel resources were transferred to the south its aircraft to more advanced configurations, of the country. or with Su-27 jets and its more advanced ver- n “Villages,” some inhabited and some sions. However, this process is not taking not, were constructed near the Golan Heights place. Even if MiG-31 jets are acquired, it will front. These were designed to force the IDF, only be in small numbers and for very special if it attacks, to fight in a built up area where, missions. Such aircraft cannot provide the the Syrians believe, the IDF will be in an in- backbone of a multi-task air force. ferior position. The Syrians might also be interested in These measures, however, do not involve acquiring other systems, for example, long the advance of major conventional army range air defense systems such as the S- forces to the actual frontline. The disengage- 300PMU-1/2 and medium range mobile air ment agreements between Israel and Syria, defense systems that would replace the out- drawn up in 1974, limited deployment of dated SA-6 model, systems such as the Buk- forces in the region. General Jilke, command- M1 (SA-11) or Buk-M1-2 (SA-17). er of the UNDOF force, said his forces had

20 Conclusion against the Israeli navy. In any case it prefers The renewed links between Syria and Rus- guided weapons that will enable it to inflict sia provide the Syrian army with a means damage on Israel’s main weapon systems. of reinforcement and renewal that the Syr- With regard to rockets and surface-to- ian leadership believes is long overdue. The surface missiles, it appears that the Syrians’ purchase and installation of new weapon main advantage is deterrent. It would allow systems is a long though essential process the Syrians to respond to an Israeli attack for the Syrian armed forces, as it would be in a manner that will make it very difficult for any military. As such, the buildup process for Israel to defend itself, as proven by the should not be viewed as a development with Second Lebanon War. On the other hand, immediate deterrence-related significance. rocket weapons as used by Hizbollah cannot The Syrian leadership opted for a buildup constitute an almost exclusive means of at- tailored specifically to its needs and based on tack. This is because Syria is a sovereign state the view that it is not able to stand up to the where there is “an address” that the Israeli IDF in a conventional battle – tanks versus response can target. As a state, Syria can be tanks, air force against air force. The lessons deterred, in contrast with a sub-state organi- learned from the Second Lebanon War accen- zation such as Hizbollah that has no respon- tuated this trend in Syria’s strategic military sibility towards the citizens of the country in approach. It understood the limitations of which it lives and operates. the IDF and recognized the advantage to be The buildup process and preparatory gained from anti-tank missiles as well as the steps taken by the Syrian army are thus de- damage that can be inflicted on the civilian signed to allow the Syrians to protect them- front using rockets. selves against Israeli attack: on the one hand The focus of the Syrian buildup is defen- the Syrian army will be able to inflict heavy sive: air defense systems are naturally used damage on the IDF if it attacks, and on the as defense systems against an attacking air other hand, it can threaten the Israeli home force. The various types of anti-tank mis- front in the case of such an attack. siles are also used principally for protection A more problematic issue is whether the against offensive armored forces, and are Syrians are taking these steps due to concern basically not an attack weapon. In the navy, over an Israel-initiated attack, or they are too, the emphasis is on surface-to-sea mis- preparing to launch a war themselves. Such siles fired from small coastguard vessels and a war could start with a surprise move by a used to protect the coast, not as a means of Syrian commando unit on Mt. Hermon or on attack. The situation is the same with the air the Golan Heights, and could evolve into a force. If the Syrians do acquire the MiG-31, war in which the IDF is drawn into fighting this aircraft will almost certainly be used to in difficult conditions: in built up areas and thwart operations of the Israeli air force. against anti-tank missile facilities and heavy The nature of the Syrian buildup indi- surface-to-air missiles, while the Israel home cates the asymmetric character of the weap- front is attacked by rockets and long range ons acquisitions. Syria is not acquiring tanks missiles. to combat Israeli tanks, or fighter jets to en- There is no way of knowing precisely gage Israeli jets, or missiles ships to be used what the Syrian leadership has in mind. On

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 21 the one hand, the voices coming out of Da- generate a process of escalation in the form mascus are certainly cause for concern, and of declarations and military moves that may may indicate preparations for a proactive spark acts of hostility at stages undesirable war aimed at jumpstarting a process that will to both sides. restore the Golan Heights to Syria on com- Finally, one cannot examine the Syrian fortable terms. On the other hand, such calls buildup on its own without also addressing may be deterrent messages designed to pre- the other forces that come into play here. On empt an Israeli attack. Moreover, examina- the one hand, there are the close ties between tion of the Syrian buildup indicates that the the current Syrian regime and Hizbollah process is in its early stages. Some of the new in Lebanon and Iran, ties that may embroil weapon systems have yet to reach Syria, and Syria in a conflict that is intertwined with the Syrian military needs more time in or- Iranian or Lebanese domestic interests. On der to absorb the new systems. It is difficult the other hand, Russia’s increasing involve- to assume that the military considers itself ment may actually act as a restraining factor, ready to take on a proactive confrontation as Russia’s main interest is to maintain a base at the moment. However, the tense situation in the Mediterranean that will enable it to re- that has arisen following the developments new its influence in the Mediterranean basin. on the Syrian side and on the Israeli side may War in Syria could damage that interest.