Two Instances from Vācaspatimiśra's Commentaries on Sāṅkhya And

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Politics of Interpretation: Two Instances from Vācaspatimiśra’s * Commentaries on Sāṅkhya and Nyāya Texts ______

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE Savitribai Phule Pune University, India ([email protected])

The rivalry among the philosophical schools in India was not purely intellectual, but had far-reaching social implications. The rivalry between vedic and non-vedic schools had a socio-political dimension. This paper claims that commentaries of the source texts of schools on both sides played an important role in development of inter- darśana politics. This paper deals with some of the interpretative moves made by Vācaspatimiśra in his two famous commentaries: (1) Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, the commentary on Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and (2) Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, the commentary on Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara. The paper argues that some of Vācaspatimiśra’s interpretative moves in these commentaries can be called “political moves.” The paper shows how these interpretative moves deviate from the natural or unforced meanings of the texts. It argues that these deviations aim at strengthening the orthodox (“āstika”) front of Indian philosophy.

Key words: commentaries; politics; Sāṅkhya; āstika; āptaśruti; Nyāya; perception; avyapadeśya; vyavasāyātmaka; savikalpaka; nirvikalpaka

The rivalry among the philosophical schools in India was not purely intellectual; it had a social dimension. This social dimension was not always imposed or influenced by extra-philosophical forces. It was, at least partly, rooted in the nature of the philosophical schools themselves. A philosophical school in India, which is termed as darśana, consists of views about epistemology (a view on pramāṇas, means to knowledge), ontology (a view on prameya, the knowable), and axiology (a view on human goals/values, puruṣārthas). Every darśana presents an interconnected whole of the perspectives in these three areas. Among the three perspectives, the axiological perspective is relevant for our purpose. It is concerned with the final goal of life, the path leading to the goal and

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the national seminar on “The Development of Indian Philosophy through Commentarial Tradition,” organized by the Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University on February 11-13, 2020. The section on Sāṅkhyakārikā draws from the author’s Marathi article, “Sāṅkhyakāriketīla sāṅkhya, dona nirīkṣaṇe,” published in Parāmarśa (Vol. XI, no. 4, February 1990). The section on Nyāya is based on the paper “Evolution of the Nyāya Theory of Perception from Gautama to Vācaspatimiśra with Special Reference to the Distinction between Judgmental and Non- Judgmental Perception,” presented at the conference on “Nyaya Theory of Cognition: Issues and Responses” organized by the Department of Philosophy, Hyderabad University on January 9-11, 2019. The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the earlier version of the paper for their encouraging and critical comments. ______Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 61–72 Copyright © 2020 Pradeep P. Gokhale. e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.5.2.05

Journal of World Philosophies Articles/ 62 also with the notion of right conduct. The notion of right conduct presupposes the notion of ideal social order. The issues such as (1) whether other worlds exist and actions aimed at otherworldly achievements are acceptable, and (2) whether the hierarchical social structure, which is based on varṇa, caste, and gender differences is ultimate, become relevant at this level. This is how rivalry among the philosophical schools in India had relevance to their rival social perspectives. The social dimension of the rivalry among the darśanas has been elucidated in the form of two dichotomies. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1976: 213-5, 251) has argued that the major philosophical conflict in India was between idealism and its antithesis, the most radical form of the latter being Lokāyata materialism.1 His writings indicate how the philosophical conflict between idealism and materialism reflects that between religion and science and how law-givers like Manu stood in this conflict against the scientific and rational approach. The other dichotomy, is āstika versus nāstika,2 that is, orthodox versus heterodox, vedic versus non-vedic, or Brahmanical versus non-Brahmanical schools. Orthodox schools differed among each other on philosophical issues such as the one-ness or many-ness of reality, acceptance or non-acceptance of God as the cause, or atoms as the cause and so on. But they were united on the social viewpoint—namely acceptance of a Brāhmaṇa-dominated Varṇa-jāti-system, acceptance of vedic ritualism, and acceptance of Vedas/Upaniṣads as an authority on philosophical matters. Heterodox schools were opposed to the orthodox schools on all these matters. Among the three heterodox schools, namely Jainism, Buddhism, and Lokāyata, Buddhism has played the most dominant role in opposing the Brahmanical standpoint. Hence, the philosophical-cum-social conflict in India sometimes assumes the form of the conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism.3 B. R. Ambedkar, in his incomplete work Revolution and Counter-revolution, says, “[E]veryone who was able to understand the history of India must know that it is nothing but the history of the struggle for supremacy between Brahmanism and Buddhism” (Ambedkar 2014: 267).4 The recent non- Brahmanical thinker and historian Sharad Patil argues that the uniqueness of this struggle in Indian philosophy lies in the fact that it was fought on the issue of the caste system, in his words, the feudal jāti system (Patil 2010: 70).5 Whereas the immediate issue in a philosophical debate between a Brahmanical system and Buddhism was concerned with academic philosophy, the indirect issue or the background issue was concerned with social and ideological domination. Thus, it naturally assumed a political color. Since the philosophical schools in India have grown through the tradition of source texts, commentaries, and sub-commentaries, the commentarial literature plays an important role in this game of domination among the schools. From a purely academic point of view, one might expect a commentator to elucidate the source text by giving an unbiased and fair interpretation without presupposing that the text under interpretation must be an authentic text. However, a general tendency among the commentators of various schools of Indian philosophy seems to be that they start by presupposing that the text they are commenting upon is authentic, internally consistent, and objectively true. A commentator interprets and discusses the text in such a way that the position of the text is defended or strengthened against the rival schools as they are available in his time. The commentator tries to remove apparent inconsistencies by introducing new interpretations, though they may not be natural, but far-fetched. Many a time, a commentator has to adopt some new theories and techniques to defend the work he is commenting upon against the attacks of the rival schools. But to preserve the integrity of his school, the commentator tries to show that the new ideas are already present in the source text he is commenting upon.

______Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 61–72 Copyright © 2020 Pradeep P. Gokhale. e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.5.2.05

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Vācaspatimiśra (tenth century CE) occupies a special place among the commentators. He produced commentaries on the works in five systems: Nyāya (Tātparyaṭīkā on Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara), Sāṅkhya (Tattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa), Yoga (Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra of Patañjali and Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa), Pūrvamīmāṁsā (Nyāyakaṇikā on Vidhidviveka of Maṇḍanamiśra) and Advaita-Vedānta (Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtrabhāsya of Śaṅkara). When he commented on a particular system, he took on the perspective of an orthodox follower of the respective system. Due to his expertise in writing “authentic” commentaries of all these systems, Vācaspati is regarded as sarvatantrasvatantra (one who treated all the systems as his systems). In fact, he should be called sarva-āstika-tantra-svatantra (one who treated all the orthodox systems as his systems), as he presented himself as an advocate for all the major orthodox systems but for no heterodox system. This aspect of his career is particularly relevant for this paper because it suggests that Vācaspati favored orthodox schools, irrespective of their mutual doctrinal differences, without favouring any of the heterodox schools. Through his commentaries, Vācaspati tried to defend and strengthen the orthodox camp against the heterodox schools in the philosophical-cum-social conflict. The present paper deals with some of the interpretative moves made by Vācaspati in his two famous commentaries: (1) Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, the commentary on Sāṅkhyakārikā, and (2) Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā (hereafter, NVTT), the commentary on Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara (hereafter, NV). I will try to argue in this paper how some of Vācaspati’s interpretative moves in these commentaries cannot be called unbiased or fair. They make better sense as political moves than as purely academic ones.

1 Vācaspati’s Appropriation of Sāṅkhya as a Vedic System

Generally, six systems of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta) are called āstika systems, that is, those which accept Vedas as the authority. But were all these systems established as āstika at the time of Vācaspati? Perhaps the status of Sāṅkhya was most dubious. In fact, Śaṅkara (eighth century CE) in his commentary on Brahmasūtra had denied the āstika status to Sāṅkhya. Vācaspati, on the other hand, had a wider agenda of accommodating (or appropriating) Sāṅkhya as an āstika system. Though the sage Kapila, estimated as belonging to sixth or seventh century BCE, is regarded as the founder of the Sāṅkhya system, a source book authored by Kapila is not extant. (Sāṅkhyasūtra or Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtra, which is available and is attributed to Kapila, is a text of the fourteenth century CE, according to scholars.) However, Sāṅkhyakārikā (hereafter, SK) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, a text of the fourth century CE, is regarded as the authentic source text of Sāṅkhya. Hence SK becomes an important ground for deciding whether Sāṅkhya can be regarded as a vedic system. In SK itself, there is no clear indication that it accepts Vedas as authority. SK opens with the problem of three-fold suffering and the discussion of its remedies. Three types of remedies are introduced: 1. empirical (dṛṣṭa), 2. scriptural/vedic (ānuśravika), and 3. discrimination between the manifest, the non-manifest, and the knower (vyakta-avyakta-jña-vijñāna). Out of them, the second means is vedic. But the author of SK describes it as defective, or rather equally defective as the empirical means. For example, medical treatment would be an empirical means to remove suffering; a sacrificial rite would be a vedic means. But the removal of suffering that results from both is

Journal of World Philosophies Articles/ 64 neither absolute not lasting according to SK. The third remedy is regarded as the best. But there is no indication that this remedy is based on vedic or upaniṣadic statements. A system can be āstika or vedic in a strong sense or weak sense. In a strong sense, a system is vedic if it is rooted in the Vedas. In this sense, only Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedanta are vedic systems. In a weak sense, a system is vedic if it accepts Vedas as an authority even if it is not rooted in the Vedas. So, we can ask: (1) Is the Sāṅkhya of SK vedic in the strong sense? (2) Is the Sāṅkhya of SK vedic in at least the weak sense? In the last few verses of SK, the author records the origin and development of the Sāṅkhya system. He says, “This knowledge of the goals of Puruṣa is stated by the great sage, namely Kapila. He has given it to Āsuri, Āsuri has given it to Pañcaśikha, who has diversified the system” (SK: 69- 70). There is no mention here of Vedas or Upaniṣhads. The statement suggests that Kapila’s own understanding and insight is the root of the Sāṅkhya system, not the Vedas or Upaniṣhads. Now the second question: Is Sāṅkhya vedic in the weak sense of the term? Does the Sāṅkhya system accept Vedas as an authority? For that, we have to turn to the Sāṅkhya theory of the means to knowledge (pramanas). SK accepts three pramanas: dṛṣṭa (perception), anumāna (inference), and āptavacana (SK: 4). The conventional meaning of the word āpta-vacana is a statement made by a reliable person. The author of SK in the next verse defines āptavacana as āptaśruti (what is heard from āpta). It can be doubted whether the word śruti used in the definition refers to Vedas. Gauḍapāda in his commentary analyzes the word āptaśruti as dvandva compound: “āptāś ca śrutiś ca āptaśrutiḥ.” The derivation is grammatically wrong, as in that case, the compound word should have been āptaśrutī. But the question is not just that of verbal discrepancy between definiendum and definiens, but is also theoretical. Can āptavacana as accepted in SK imply the authority of the Vedas? In Indian philosophy, there are two traditions of accepting Vedas as authority:

(1) Following the definition of śabdapramāṇa as āptavacana, Vedas are regarded as authority, because they are authored by God. Here God is regarded as the highest reliable person (parama-āpta). It is supposed to be omniscient. This model of the authenticity of Vedas is accepted by Nyāya and Vedānta. (2) The other tradition is Pūrvamīmāṃsā, according to which Vedas are authority because they are impersonal (apauruṣeya) and eternal.

Now the question is, can Sāṅkhya accept Vedas as authority in any of the above senses? The first possibility is ruled out because Sāṅkhya does not accept the so-called omniscient creator God. It also cannot accept Vedas as authority in the second sense, because it cannot accept Vedas as impersonal and eternal in nature. According to Sāṅkhya, Words (“śabdatanmātra”) are a product of a kind of Ego-principle, called tāmasa-ahaṃkāra, which arises in the course of evolution. So Vedas, which are just a form of words, cannot be “eternal.” Hence it is not fitting to accept Vedas as authority in the framework of Sāṅkhya. Though the classical Sāṅkhya itself may be āstika or vedic neither in a strong sense nor in a weak sense, the commentators of SK have tried to render Sāṅkhya as vedic in some sense. This is seen in Gauḍapāda’s interpretation of āptaśruti as “reliable persons as well as Vedas.”6 But Gauḍapāda is not fully consistent in his interpretation, because while explaining the term āptavacana in the fourth verse he does not bring in śruti. However, the term śruti is used in interpreting the fifth verse. So, the āstika nature of Sāṅkhya system becomes ambivalent at the hands of Gauḍapāda.

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On the other hand, Vācaspati’s agenda in his interpretation of SK seems to be quite clear. He wanted to render it as an āstika system in its strong sense. Interpreting Sāṅkhya as an āstika system amounted to an appropriation of the Sāṅkhya system into the āstika camp. It is quite possible that Vācaspati was interested in rendering Sāṅkhya as an āstika system, because if Sāṅkhya is regarded as a nāstika system, then Pātañjala-Yoga, which could be understood as an extension or application of Sāṅkhya to the region of meditative practice, would also be treated as a nāstika system. And such a move would certainly weaken the āstika camp. Vācaspati tried to achieve his goal of appropriation by interpreting terms like āptavacana and āptaśruti in an unconventional way. We have seen that if the term āptavacana is interpreted in a conventional way, that is, as a ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa compound, meaning “statement of a reliable person,” then Vedas cannot be regarded as absolute authority in the Sāṅkhya framework, because God as the author of the Vedas is not accepted in Sāṅkhya. So Vācaspati takes an unconventional route and interprets the terms “āpta- vacana,” “āptaśruti,” and “āptāgama,” used in the verses SK 4-6, as karmadhāraya compounds that mean “a proper statement.” Here Vācaspati interprets the word āpta as “proper” (yukta), which is rather far-fetched. He says, “āptā prāptā yuktā it yāvat,” which is definitely not a normal way of interpreting the word “āpta.” From this, Vācaspati jumps to the notion of the apauruṣeya (impersonal) character of Vedas. He argues that the knowledge derived from Vedas is “proper” (yukta), because it is devoid of all deficiencies. And this is so because it is impersonal. Vācaspati simply claims that the Vedas according to Sāṅkhya are impersonal (apauruṣeya). He does not elucidate this view. When Pūrvamīmāṃsakas accept Vedas as impersonal, they have the whole theory of “eternality of words, meanings, and word-meaning relations” behind it. Can such a theory be available in the Sāṅkhya framework? This question does not strike Vācaspati. Vācaspati wants to locate Vedas as an authority in the Sāṅkhya framework in the strong sense. He wants to claim that Sāṅkhya does not just accept Vedas as an authority, but is rooted in the Vedas. According to Sāṅkhya tradition, the sage Kapila is regarded as the founder of the system. He is also regarded as “Ādividvān” (the first knower). However, Vācaspati does not attribute any originality to Kapila’s authorship of Sāṅkhya. According to him, when Kapila was born in the present aeon, he remembered the vedic knowledge that he had learnt in the previous aeon and formulated the Sāṅkhya system on that basis.7 In this way, the appropriation of Kapila’s Sāṅkhya system as an orthodox vedic system becomes complete. This phenomenon could be understood in a metaphorical way, as a part of what can be called darśana politics in India. Generally, nobody can stand here as an independent candidate. A philosopher can stand as a candidate if he belongs to a darśana, which is, arguably, like a political party. Vācaspati was trying to form a coalition of vedic parties, in which he wanted to accommodate Sāṅkhya (and Yoga). This was possible by removing the ambiguity about their relationship to vedic authority. While doing so, he dethroned Kapila from his status as an independent philosopher- candidate, who would probably be neither āstika nor nāstika.

2 Vācaspati’s Reading of Savikalpaka-Nirvikalpka-Distinction in Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4

As it is well-known, Akṣapāda-Gautama (second century CE) in the Nyāyasūtra defines perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, or rather, pratyakṣa-pramā) in the following words:

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indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam8 (NS 1.1.4)

The definition states five defining features of perceptual knowledge:

(i) It is a cognition. (jñāna) (ii) It arises from the contact between a sense organ and an object. (indryārtha- snnikarṣotpanna) (iii) It is non-verbal. (avyapadeśya) (iv) It does not deviate from the object. (avyabhicāri) (v) It is determinate. (vyavasāyātmaka)

It seems clear from the above definition that all the five features are stated here as the essential features of every case of pratyakṣa (perceptual knowledge) according to Gautama. Let me focus on two features stated above: avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka. We are going to see how the terms are interpreted at the three stages: Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana (fifth century CE) (hereafter, NB), Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara (sixth/seventh century CE) (hereafter, NV), and Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati (hereafter, NVTT). I want to show that in the first two stages, the above two terms indicate the common characteristics of all perceptual cognitions. It is Vācaspati who interprets the two terms as indicating a classification of perception. I want to show that this is a political move on the part of Vācaspati. Let us consider the three stages in more detail.

Vātsyāyana’s Interpretation of “avyapadeśya” and “vyavasāyātmaka”

According to Vātsyāyana, the term “avyapadeśya” refers to the non-verbal character of perceptual knowledge. Through this term, perceptual knowledge is distinguished from verbal knowledge (śābdajñāna), in which the knower refers to the perceptual object by using a word. According to Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, pratyakṣa should be “aśābdam arthajñānam.”9 Accordingly, the verbal designation of the object does not operate at the time of the perceptual knowledge of the object. It can operate at the time of the linguistic activity (vyavahāra) based on the cognition.10 The term “vyavasāyātmaka,” according to Vātsyāyana, refers to the certain or determinate character of perceptual knowledge. Through this term, perceptual knowledge is distinguished from uncertain/indeterminate cognition, for example, when one cannot decide from a distance whether the black line present before him is that of smoke or dust. Here Vātsyāyana talks about two phases of perceptual knowledge: vyavasāya and anuvyavasāya. Vyavaśāya means determination of a perceptual object by a sense organ, which is the sensory phase, and anuvyavasāya means subsequent determination of the perceptual object by the mind, which is the mental phase.11 Hence, the first phase of determination is brought about by the sense-organ itself. In the case of indeterminate cognition, one is not able to determine (for example, whether the object is smoke or dust) at the sensory level itself. And because there is indeterminateness in the sensory phase, there is subsequent indeterminateness in the mental phase also. It can be clearly seen that Vātsyāyana is regarding “avyapadeśya” (non-verbal) character as well as “vyavasāyātmaka” (determinate) character as essential characteristics of all perceptual knowledge.

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Nowhere does he give any indication that he or the author of the Nyāyasūtra wanted to classify perception in terms of these characteristics.

Udyotakara’s interpretation of “avyapadeśya” and “vyavasāyātmaka”

Before Udyotakara, we have Diṅnāga (fifth/sixth century), the Buddhist epistemologist, who had appeared on the scene with his works like Pramāṇasamuccaya, in which he criticized Nyāya epistemology and also Vaiśeṣika ontology. According to Diṅnāga, the objects like substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), motion (karma), and universal (jāti) are all mental constructs (vikalpa or kalpanā), and they cannot be the objects of perception. Perception as pramāṇa must be free from mental constructions. It can be clearly observed in Nyāyavārtika that Udyotakara is aware of this challenge, and he tries to meet it rigorously in this work. In explanation of the contact theory of perception, Udyotakara makes an explicit statement of the six-fold sense-object contact (ṣaḍvidha sannikarṣa) and implies thereby that the Vaiśeṣika categories such as substances, qualities, motions, universals, inherence, and in addition to them, absences can be directly perceived, if they fulfill relevant conditions. He also criticizes Diṅnāga’s definition of pratyakṣa. According to Diṅnāga, perception as pramāṇa must be non-judgmental in nature. It seems that according to Udyotakara, every perception is judgmental, though it is not explicitly verbal. Now, coming to Udyotakara’s interpretation of the terms “avyapadeśya” and “vyavasāyātmaka,” we don’t find Udyotakara deviating from Vātsyāyana’s interpretation. Hence, to say that perception, by definition, is avyapadeśya is to say that it is not a cognition in which a word is being used for indicating the object. And that perception, by definition, is vyavasāyātmaka means that it is other than indeterminate cognition. According to Udyotakara, the term vyavasāyātmaka does not exclude perceptual knowledge from saṁśaya (doubt). The latter is a mental cognition and hence is excluded by the expression “indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam” itself. The important point for our purpose is that like Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara too regards both the features—avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka—as the defining features applicable to every case of perceptual knowledge. He explicitly says, “The definition of perceptual knowledge has been stated by adopting the five terms. When any one of the terms does not apply to a cognition, it is a pseudo- perception.”12 This also shows that Udyotakara does not treat Diṅnāga’s definition of perception, namely that it is cognition devoid of name and class-concept, etc., as a challenge to the Nyāya theory of perception that calls for its modification.

Vācaspati’s Interpretation of “avyapadeśya” and “vyavasāyātmaka”

After Udyotakara, we have Dharmakīrti (seventh century CE), who revized, sharpened, and elaborated Diṅnāga’s theory of perception. This seems to have led Vācaspati to take the Buddhist theory seriously and modify and expand the Nyāya theory of perception in order to answer the Buddhist challenge. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti regarded perceptual knowledge as the non-judgmental direct awareness of a unique particular. According to them, this direct awareness was followed by a judgmental cognition, which was just a mental construction. This judgmental cognition was not “perceptual knowledge.” Strictly speaking it was not even knowledge (pramāṇa/pramā), because it involved false construction of the categories such as substance, quality, universal, and name.

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This view was not acceptable to Naiyāyikas because these categories were believed to be objectively real, and hence perceiving them in the outside world was a case of veridical perception. But again, due to Dharmakīrti’s influence, Vācaspati seems to have been inclined to think that before judgmental cognition there must occur a non-judgmental cognition. This leads Vācaspati to construct a two-stage theory of perception, which he describes in the same or similar terms that Buddhists would use for describing two stages of the cognitive process—nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. Hence, from Vācaspati onwards, Nyāya has a two-stage theory of perception in place of the traditional monolithic theory. But at the same time, Vācaspati as a loyal commentator of the Nyāya tradition, had to show that this new theory of perception was not really new and was already present in the Nyāya tradition. In my view this exhibits a political side of the commentarial tradition in Indian philosophy. Hence, we find Vācaspati “deriving” the classification of perception into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, from the Nyāyasūtra itself. Vācaspati does this in the following steps:

(1) Vācaspati claims that Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4 not only defines perception, but also gives the classification of perception into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka.13 (2) To explain this further, he gives a new meaning to the term avyapadeśya. Vatsyāyana’s interpretation implied that vyapadeśa means śabda (a verbal expression), vyapadeśya means śābda (verbal), and avyapadeśya means non-verbal (aśābda), which can be derived as a nañ-tatpuruṣa compound. Vācaspati extends the scope of the term vyapadeśa from “verbal expression” to other categories such as jāti and interprets vyāpadeśya as viśeṣya (the qualificandum). He then derives “avyapadeśya” as nañ-bahuvrīhi compound—“na vyapadeśyaṁ yasmin tad avyapadeṣyam” and interprets it as that in which there is no qualificandum-qualification-relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva). In this way, for Vācaspati, nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa is that in which the objects such as jāti are cognized, but they are not cognized as qualificandum or qualification.14 It is in the savikalpaka stage that they are cognized as related by the relation of viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva.15 (3) While explaining the term vyavasāyātmaka, he equates vyavasāya with vikalpa and interprets vyavasāyātmaka as savikalpaka.16 In fact the term vikalpa has a special connotation of “mental construction” or “false construction” in many other systems such as Buddhism, Pātañjala-yoga, and Advaita-Vedānta. But Vācaspati seems to ignore this fact. (4) While commenting upon the term vyavasāyātmaka, Vācaspati discusses Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Nyāya theory of perception in detail and establishes the Nyāya doctrine of savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

It should be noted here, however, that though Vācaspati introduces the two-stage theory of perception, and though like the Buddhist theory of two types of cognition, it is expressed in terms of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, it is radically different from the Buddhist theory.

1) In both the theories, something is “given” in the first stage and is judged or determined to be something at the second stage. But what is given and what is determined and how it is determined in the second stage differs depending on the theory adopted.

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2) What is constructed at the second stage according to the Buddhist theory is given in the first stage according to Nyāya theory. And what exactly is done at the second stage is also not the same for the two theories. Buddhists explain what is done by using the model of construction and superimposition. Naiyāyikas explain it by using the model of “putting the matter in a framework.” According to Vācaspati, all the elements of reality that are determined at the second stage are given in the first stage; only they are put in the framework of viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva at the second stage.

The above distinction between the Buddhist approach and Vācaspati’s approach may have many philosophical implications. What is more important for our purpose is that Vācaspati introduces this classification as a response to the distinction between pratyakṣa and vikalpa made by the Buddhist philosophers Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. I suggest that Vācaspati does this with the mixed process of criticism and appropriation. Vācaspati appropriates the Buddhist distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka by suitably modifying it so as to make it consistent with the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Having appropriated the Buddhist distinction, Vācaspati claims that it is not a new distinction. It is already present in Nyāyasūtra, and it was also known to Bhāṣyakāra and Vārtikakāra. On the question as to how these two commentators did not declare it explicitly if they knew it, Vācaspati simply says that it was too obvious and that their disciples could easily understand it.17 This clarification given by Vācaspati was problematic. It can be seen that Vācaspati not only makes significant additions to the interpretation of Gautama’s definition of perception as given by Vātsyāyana and Udyotakara, but also at times deviates from them, while claiming that this is not the case. The classification of perception into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka may not be Vācaspati’s own contribution even within the Nyāya tradition. It could go back to Vācaspati’s teacher Trilocana (ninth/tenth century CE), whom Vācaspati acknowledges in this context.18 But despite Vācaspati’s claims to the contrary, this classification of perception was definitely neither meant by Gautama nor by Vātstyāyana, nor even by Udyotakara.

3 Concluding Remarks

The above instances from Vācaspati’s commentaries on Sāṅkhya and Nyāya texts expose the political side of the commentarial tradition in Indian philosophy. As suggested before, from a purely academic point of view in which one is solely motivated by rational pursuit of truth, a commentator is expected to elucidate the source text by giving an unbiased and fair interpretation of the target text. A commentator can also be a philosopher, and as a philosopher, he can introduce new ideas for modification or development of the system. It is desirable in this context that the commentator- philosopher maintain the distinction between elucidation of the target text and the introduction of new ideas. But we often find in the commentarial tradition in India that the commentator- philosophers introduce new ideas not as new ideas, but as new interpretations of the target text. This is what Vācaspati does with respect to the savikalpaka-nirvikalpaka distinction. He seems to do this with the motive of strengthening the Nyāya position in Nyāya-Buddhist controversy. If Nyāya has to combat strongly with Buddhism, it cannot continue with its monolithic theory of perception. It should have a strong epistemological tool like the savikalpaka-nirvikalpaka distinction within it. But if

Journal of World Philosophies Articles/ 70 the distinction is overtly derived from Buddhism, it will affect the integrity and purported purity of the system; it will politically weaken the system. This was the dilemma, Vācaspati, the advocate of Nyāya, faced. His solution was to derive the distinction from Nyāyasūtra itself, which was a politically proficient way, though academically unsound and unjustified. If considered from a purely academic point of view, Vācaspati, by “deriving” nirvikalpaka- savikalpaka classification from Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4, seems to do injustice to himself and his teacher Trilocana, who seems to be the real author of this classification. He does injustice to the authors of sūtra, bhāṣya, and vārtika, to whom he is falsely attributing the authorship of this classification. And he also does injustice to Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti by not acknowledging their foundational role in this classification. Similarly, the SK itself does not regard Sāṅkhya as a vedic (āstika) system either in a strong sense or weak sense. But leaving the Sāṅkhya system like that was not politically prudent on the part of Vācaspati, as that would weaken the Brahmanical front in the conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Philosophically, Sāṅkhya categories and doctrines had provided a basis for the other schools such as Vedānta and Yoga. Moreover, the Sāṅkhya theory of three strands of Prakṛti was a useful device for supporting the varṇa-caste system. Hence Vācaspati appropriates the Sāṅkhya school as a member of the āstika front through his unconventional interpretation of terms like āptavacana and āptāgama. However, by doing this he does injustice to Kapila by denying his originality as a philosopher. In these matters, Vācaspati appears more as a politician or an advocate than as a philosopher, due to which it becomes difficult to determine his own philosophical affinity. The purpose behind this paper is not to criticize Nyāya and thereby defend Buddhism. I am not saying that this political dimension of the commentarial tradition in Indian philosophy is to be found only in Nyāya tradition. It encompasses all the systems of Indian philosophy. For example, as I have shown elsewhere,19 though Dharmakīrti in his theory of sound inference in fact deviates from the doctrine of three characteristics of good hetu presented by his grand-teacher Diṅnāga, he presents his own theory not as a deviation from Diṅnaga, but as an elucidation of Diṅnāga’s theory. He does this probably with the intention of strengthening the Buddhist Pramāṇa school in the controversy with Brahmanism in general and Nyāya in particular. Though such a practice of disowning one’s own innovative contribution and attributing it to the author of the source text expresses humility on part of the commentator, how far this practice can be called just and healthy is a question, as it also expresses dishonesty. It can be called a case of “reverse plagiarism.”20 Deviating from the viewpoint of one’s teacher or an ancestor is not wrong in itself. It is rather a part of the development of thought. The problem arises if one, while deviating, refuses to acknowledge that one has deviated. What should be one’s attitude towards one’s deviation from the teacher or ancestor? Aristotle is said to have stated about his guru, Plato, “Plato was great, but truth is greater than Plato.” One doesn’t generally find a commentator in the Indian tradition openly claiming that the author of the source text may be great, but truth is greater than the author in question.21 It would have been more honest and appropriate on the part of Vācaspati to say, “Gautama was unaware of the two-stage theory of perception. The authors of Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāyavārtika were also unaware. But, the Buddhist theory of two-stage cognitive process is inspiring. I partly accept it. But, being a realist, I present it in a different way.” Similarly, in his commentary on SK,

Journal of World Philosophies Articles/ 71 instead of questioning independent philosophical authorship of Kapila, he could have appreciated the philosophical aspects of the work as the contributions of Kapila as an independent philosopher. One moral of the above discussion is that we should not be carried away by the naïve belief that the commentaries are always reliable guides to the meaning of the original text. It is always possible that the commentator is superimposing his own view on the original text. Consequently, we should be more vigilant and careful while reading the commentaries. We should keep in mind that, in addition to purely academic exercise, a lot of darśana-politics might be going on in the name of authentic interpretation and justification of the source texts.

Abbreviations

NB Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana as included in ND. ND Nyāyadarśana with bāṣya, vārtika, tātparyatīkā and vṛtti, ed. by Tārānatha Nyāyatarkatīrtha and Amarendra-mohana Tarkatīrtha, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, second ed. 1985. NS Nyāyasūtra as included in ND. NV Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara as included in ND. NVTT Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra as included in ND. SK Sāṇkhyakārikā as included in Sāṇkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (with Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra), Jaya Krishna das Haridas G, Benares, 1937. SKG Gauḍapāda’s Commentary on SK as included in The Sāṅkhyakārikā: Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Memorable Verses on Sāṅkhya Philosophy with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya by Dr. Har Dutt Sharma, Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1933. STK Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra as included in SK.

Pradeep P. Gokhale retired as professor of philosophy from Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune (India) after 31 years of post-graduate teaching experience. Subsequently, he worked as Research Professor in the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi). Presently he is an Honorary Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Pali in Savitribai Phule Pune University. His research areas include classical Indian philosophy, moral and social philosophy, and modern Buddhism. His recent publications are: The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: A New Introduction to the Buddhist Roots of the Yoga System (Routledge, 2020) and edited Classical Buddhism, Neo-Buddhism and the Question of Caste (Routledge, 2020).

1 Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1976). 2 The term āstika literally means “that which regards something as existent,” and the term nāstika, “that which regards something as non-existent.” In different contexts, the terms assume different meanings. In this paper I am using the terms in the senses “that which accepts the Vedas as authority” and “that which does not accept the Vedas as authority.” 3 An important part of the conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism is the controversy between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism. Hence, D. N. Shastri (1964) gives a detailed account of conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Diṅnāga school. However, Shastri’s account is concerned with the academic side of the controversy; it does not discuss its socio-political angle. See

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Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, a Study of the Conflict Between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Diṅnāga School (Agra: Agra University, 1964). 4 B. R. Ambedkar, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Second Edition, ed. Hari Narke, Vol. 3 (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 151-240. 5 Sharad Patil, Primitive Communism, Matriarchy, Gynocracy and Modern Socialism (Shirur, Dist. Pune: Mavlai Prakashan, 2010). 6 “āptā ācāryā brahmādayaḥ. śrutir vedaḥ. āpāś ca śutiś ca āptaśritiḥ. taduktam āptavacanam iti” (SKG, 5). 7 “ādividuṣaś ca kapilasya kalpādau kalpāntarādhītaśrutismaraṇasambhavaḥ” (STK, 5). 8 This definition was rejected at a later (Navya-nyāya) stage for the reason that it does not apply to God’s knowledge, which occurs without sense-object contact. A new definition was made, namely, “It is a cognition which does not have cognition as a means” (“jñānākaraṇakam jñānaṁ pratyakṣam”). I am not considering this stage of development in this paper. 9 “tasmād aśābdam arthajñānam indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam iti” (NB 1.1.4, p. 111). 10 “tad evam arthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate, vyāvahārakāle tu vyāpriyate” (NB 1.1.4: 111). 11 “sarvatra pratyakṣaviṣaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ paścān manasā’nuvyavasāyaḥ” (NB 1.1.4: 122-3). 12 “pañcapadaparigraheṇa pratyakṣalakṣaṇam uktam. yatrānyatamapadaparigraho nāsti, tat pratyakābhāsam iti” (NV 1.1.4). 13 “iha dvayī pratyakṣajātir avikalpikā savikalpikā ceti. tatrobhayī indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyabhicārīti lakṣaṇena saṅgṛhītā’pi sva-śabdenopāttā. tatra vipratipatteḥ? na. avikalpikāyāḥ padam avyapadeśyam iti savikalpikāyāś ca vyavasāyātmakam iti” (NVTT 1.1.4: 108). 14 “tatra vyapadeśo viśeṣaṇam upalakṣaṇaṁ vā nāma-jātyādi, tatkarma vyapadeśyaṁ viśeṣyam iti yāvat …avidyamānaṁ vyapadeśyaṁ yasmin tad avyapa-deśyaṁ jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi na tu jātyādīnāṁ mitho viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāvāvagāhīti yāvat” (NVTT 1.1.4: 108). 15 “tadyathā ḍittho’yaṁ gaur ayaṁ śuklo’yaṁ kamaṇdalumān ayaṁ gacchaty ayam iti sarvaṁ hi savikalpakaṁ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena vastuṣu pravartate” (NVTT 1.1.4: 108). 16 “vyavasāyātmakapadaṁ sākṣāt savikalpakasya vācakaṁ tathā hi vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa ity anarthāntaraṁ sa evātmā rūpaṁ yasya tat savikalpakaṁ pratyakṣam” (NVTT 1.1.4: 114). 17 “tad etad atisphuṭatvāc chiṣyair gamyata eva iti bhyāṣyavārtikakārābhyām avyākhyātam” (NVTT 1.1.4: 114). 18 “trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ / yathāmānaṁ yathāvastu vyākhyātam idam īdṛṣam //” (NVTT 1.1.4: 114). 19 For the argument to this effect, see Pradeep P. Gokhale, Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic with Special Reference to Nyāya and Buddhism (Delhi: Sat Guru Publications, 1992), Chapters III and V. 20 I owe this phrase to Professor Arindam Chakrabarti, who used it during his presentation in the seminar on “Language: The Instrument of Knowledge” organized by Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, on January 28-30, 2009. 21 Of course, there are important exceptions. The school of Sanskrit Grammar could be an exception, in which Kātyāyana, the author of Vārtika, explicitly deviates from Pāṇini; the Sūtrakāra. Prabhākara, the Pūrvamīāṁsā philosopher, goes against his teacher Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Navyanyāya, to some extent, deviates from the old Nyāya supposed to be based on Nyāyasūtra. Dharmakīrti, in Hetubindu, expresses puzzlement when he has to go against his teacher Diṅnāga on an issue in logic. These are some of the exceptions to the general trend in Indian philosophical tradition.