STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY Department of Economic History and International Relations Master's Thesis in International Relations with specialization in Global Political Economy Spring Term 2020
Student: Elin Lager Supervisor: Gonzalo Pozo Martin
Swedish Exceptionalism in Foreign Policy Discourse
An Analysis of the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy 2002-2018
1 Abstract
This thesis aims to determine if there is a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018. Discourse analysis have been used to analyze eight statements, based on a constructivist framework and the theoretical concept of Swedish exceptionalism. Swedish exceptionalism is the idea of Sweden having a self-image of being superior to others, mainly based on the country’s understanding of itself as being a “moral superpower”.
The research question formulated was: Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism?
To determine if there was a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Statements of Foreign Policy, seven key representations of the concept were established. Those were
Sweden:
1. being military non-aligned 2. having an active foreign policy 3. being pioneering or “leading the way” 4. bringing security, stability, and peace 5. being a champion of human rights and democracy 6. acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder 7. showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small)
The results of the empirical study were that all key representations were present in all of the statements analyzed, which lead to the conclusion is that the Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018 were articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism.
Key words; Swedish exceptionalism, moral superpower, national exceptionalism, discourse analysis, Swedish foreign policy discourse, superiority, Persson government, Reinfeldt government, Löfven government.
2 Table of Content
1. INTRODUCTION 5
1.1. Purpose and research question 6
1.2. Research gap 7
1.3. Disposition 8
2. BACKGROUND 9 2.1. Swedish political system 9 2.2. Swedish political history 1914 - 2002 10 2.3. Persson II 2002 – 2006 16 2.4. Reinfeldt I 2006 – 2010 18 2.5. Reinfeldt II 2010 – 2014 21 2.6. Löfven I 2014 – 2018 22 2.7. Concluding remarks 2002-2018 25
3. THEORY 26
3.1. Constructivism in international relations/foreign policy analysis 26
3.2. Swedish exceptionalism 29
4. METHOD 34
4.1. Discourse analysis 34 4.1.1 Swedish exceptionalism as a discourse 35
4.2. Material to analyze 36
4.3. Analytical procedure 37
5. EMPIRICAL SECTION 39
5.1. Persson II 2002-2006 39 5.1.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2003 39 5.1.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2006 40
5.2. Reinfeldt I 2006-2010 42 5.2.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2007 42 5.2.2 Statement of Foreign Policy 2010 44
5.3. Reinfeldt II 2010-2014 46 5.3.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2011 46 5.3.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2014 48
3 5.4. Löfven I 2014-2018 49 5.4.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2015 49 5.4.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2018 51
5.5. Joint analysis 2002 - 2018 54
6. CONCLUSIONS 56
REFERENCES 59
4
1. Introduction
An important question for any government is how it should interact with other countries. This matter is always on the political agenda before political elections. However, foreign policy is not only something which often characterizes the political discourse in a country - it also has a direct impact on the lives of many people worldwide.
In brief terms, a government’s foreign policy outlines how it aims to deal with, and in relation to, nations other than itself. The foreign policy can include; which countries it should cooperate with in matters of national security, which countries it should trade with, and whether or not it should intervene in conflicts occurring in other countries.
Large nations’ foreign policies have in modern times had a considerable and lasting impact on countries all around the world. Both the World Wars, the Cold War, and the War on Terror have all shaped the political stage of today. Although larger nations are often the ones studied in issues of foreign policy, smaller countries could also have a great impact on their neighbors and the world. In forums like the European Union and the United Nation, as well as in military alliances like NATO, all countries have a vote. Although one’s vote in such forums are proportional to the size of the country, some smaller countries have embarked on a mission of having an even greater influence on others through an active foreign policy.
One such country is Sweden. In the literature, Sweden’s foreign policy has been studied in dept, often taken in to account its’ special stand as pursuing an independent foreign policy while still being heavily involved international cooperation. The country seems to have a more active and participating role than other similar countries, like Denmark or Norway. A question one might ask oneself is why Sweden is different to its neighbors. What kind of self- image does Sweden, in fact, have?
Within the constructivist field of foreign policy analysis, there have long been an interest in state identity and how it shapes countries foreign policy behavior. Within this research area there is the so-called national exceptionalism, the self-belief of a country that it is exceptional in comparison to others. In the literature, American exceptionalism have been extensively
5 studied, with the United States is often understood as having an exceptional self-image, primary based on the country being the world’s only superpower. However, there is also a small research field on Swedish exceptionalism. In this, Sweden’s exceptional self-image is very different from the American, being primarily based on the Sweden being a “moral superpower”.
Although it may not be the cause of divergence of foreign policy in practice, understanding how a country like Sweden views its role in the world, can be important. While the US’ exceptionalism has been characterized by large military operations and having decisive roles in a multitude of wars all around the globe, this must not be the only way a country’s exceptionalism can be defined. For Sweden, some argues that their self-image is rather defined as staying out of conflicts and being the world’s conscious. It needs to be remembered, that in the end, no matter if exceptionalism is based on military or moral strength, is always boils down to one word – superiority.
This thesis seeks to explore how this moral superiority, Swedish exceptionalism, plays out in foreign policy discourse. It will do so by analyzing the Swedish Government’s Statement of Foreign Policy, to see if they are articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism.
1.1. Purpose and research question
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if Swedish foreign policy is articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism. This will be done through conducting a discourse analysis of the transcripts of the Swedish Governments Statement of Foreign Policy, which is a speech held every year by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs in front of the Riksdag.
I wanted to look at contemporary foreign policy discourse and have a time frame that included government consisting of different parties. Therefore, I will analyze statements from four different government terms during 2002-2018.
• Persson II 2002-2006 Social democratic minority government. • Reinfeldt I 2006-2010 Centre-right/liberal-conservative majority coalition government, also known as “The Alliance”.
6 • Reinfeldt II 2010-2014 Centre-right/liberal-conservative minority coalition government, also known as “The Alliance”. • Löfven I 2014-2018 Social Democratic-Green Party minority coalition government.
My research is built on the constructivist framework and theoretical concepts of National exceptionalism, which is built on the work by several scholars but mainly David Jansson and Hilde Eliassen Restad. The concept of Swedish exceptionalism as is built mainly on the work of Jansson and Ann-Sofie Dahl.
Research question: Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism?
1.2. Research gap
In searching for “Swedish exceptionalism” much of the research articles does not use it as a concept, but instead a descriptive term. It also tends to be argumentative and materialist in the sense that Swedish exceptionalism is understood as something, which can be proven true or false through empirical work on events, policy changes, individual politicians or parties and so on. In short, it is about establishing if Sweden is a good country or not based on the state’s action.
If turning to the research on national exceptionalism that focus on the theoretical concept, the majority of academic literature on national exceptionalism focus on American exceptionalism.1 Though there are similarities between American and Swedish exceptionalism, there are significant differences. Which superiority depends on more traditional power structures in the US dominating world politics. Superiority in Swedish exceptionalism on the other hand is based on Sweden being morally righteous. This will be further explored in the theory section.
1 Jansson, David. Deadly exceptionalism, or, would you rather be crushed by a moral superpower or a military superpower?. Political Geography. Vol. 64, 2018: 83
7 To further the national exceptionalism research fields there has to be more research that is not centered around the US. The need for research on Swedish exceptionalism will be especially valuable since its characteristic is in sharp contrast to the US, and therefor will help give a better and broader understanding of the concept. Since Swedish exceptionalism as foreign policy discourse is a rather unexplored field, my research also aims to fil that research gap.
1.3. Disposition
After the research question have been presented, in the background section I will explain how the structure of the Swedish political system as well as cultural norms and customs affect governance. Then, I will offer a brief overview of Swedish foreign policy during the 20th century, as well as looking more closely at events and policies during the four government terms 2002 – 2018. Next, I will present the theoretical frameworks of constructivism, national exceptionalism and Swedish exceptionalism. Thereafter, the method and analytical procedure will be laid out. I will use discourse analysis to analyze the chosen Statement of Foreign policy. The result will be presented in the empirical section. Finally, I will present my conclusions.
8
2. Background
The background chapter will shortly explain the Swedish political system since itis built up both have normative and formal effect on the way foreign policy is carried out. Thereafter Swedish modern political history is commented. This is important to understand the historical events and traditions from which Swedish exceptionalism stems from. Thereafter there will be description of the time frame. This is needed for the reader to understand the discourse analysis on the Statement of Foreign Policy (SOF). It portrays a context and it describe political events or policies, which will be referenced to in the SOF analyzed.
2.1. Swedish political system
Swedes vote for party lists instead of individual politicians, so unless a person manages to get a place on a party's ballot it is impossible to be voted in. This result in politicians being loyal to the party leadership and going against the party line in Riksdag’s voting is very unusual. The fact that going against the party line is so unusual makes it easier for a government to legislate, since they only have to negotiate with leadership of other parties and not individual politicians. In simple terms: negotiations will include a maximum of eight counterparties instead of 349.
The current system was adopted in the 1974 revision of the constitution. The people choose the Riksdag, which then choose the prime minister, who then appoints the government. Thus, the government is responsible before the Riksdag and the Riksdag is responsible before the people. After 1974, it became possible for parliament to dismiss the prime minister. Before 1974 that could only be done through elections.2
Sweden has a so-called "negative parliamentarism". A prime minister can be elected as long as the number of “no” votes are not in majority. The same goes for the passing of legislation
2 Möller, Tommy. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år. (4th edition). Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2019, 298.
9 and budgets.3 The prime minister has far-reaching power and decides the government's working model, which department and ministers there should be in the government, what tasks these shall have and how decisions should be made. He/she can even announce snap elections.4
Minister’s titles and what department they belong to are not fixed and the prime minister’s choice of that can signal the government’s direction and priorities. There are of course certain titles, which in practice are fixed; the Minister of Defense is the head of the Ministry of Defense, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is the head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which also usually includes the Minister for Foreign Aid, but for example the Minister for Trade tends to alternate between Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Finance.
The government too has far-reaching powers. For example, they do not need a Riksdag decision to deploy troops abroad, join international organizations or ratify treaties. However, when it comes to decisions, which will have long-term consequences for the Swedish people, the praxis is to have a broad support in the Riksdag, if possible, even from all parties.
Though the prime minister has far-reaching power, the Minister for Foreign Affairs tends to have more independence than other ministers have. It is the most prestigious position in the government, and it is not uncommon for a politician, who already has high status to be recruited to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and therefor he/she expects to be able to shape the government’s foreign policy. To what degree this is the case has to do with how profiled the minister is and how much leeway the prime minister is willing to give. While in some governments, the Minister for Foreign Affair is just a minister among others, in others it can seem like they have more power over the foreign policy than the prime minister.
2.2. Swedish political history 1914 - 2002
Swedish politics have always been characterized by a pendulous motion between battle and consensus politics.5 Foreign policy during 20th century is characterized by working towards
3 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 211. 4 Ibid., 301-302. 5 Ibid., 149.
10 consensus instead of confrontation. Notably, there were no oppositional foreign policy during the World Wars, and only to a very limited degree during the Cold War.
This consensus culture sometimes failed, such as during the Cold War. Often the debate was on how far Sweden could go in its critic and praise over other countries or coalitions, without breaking the neutrality doctrine. There is endless research regarding which one of the superpowers Sweden “actually” supported, but maybe it is best summed up by former Center politician and Minister of Defense Torsten Gustafsson who in 1981 said “Admittedly, we are neutral. But we know where we belong”.67
According to Dahl, the Moderates and the Social Democrats have traditionally been the main combatants of the foreign policy. There are eight Riksdag parties, which during the time period studied (2002-2018) was divided in to two blocks. The Moderate Party8 was the leader of the center-right/liberal-conservative block, also known as The Alliance, which consist of the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Center Party. The Social Democrats lead of the left-center/red-green block,9 which consisted of the Left Party and the Green Party. An eight party, the Sweden Democrats did not belong to either of the two blocks and was left out of cooperation due to its xenophobia and neo-Nazi history.10
The Social Democrat Party was founded in 1889 and has since universal suffrage in 1921 dominated both domestic and international politics in a way that could not be matched in any other democratic country. During WWII and the Cold War, the Social Democrats were in government for 40 consecutive years (1936 – 1976) and had the same prime minister, Tage Erlander, for 23 years.11 This domination is referred to as the “Social Democratic hegemony” and has had a great impact on Swedish foreign policy.
6 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 84. 7 Svensson, Alf. Låt Sverige bli medlem av NATO. Svenska Dagbladet. 2013-01-11. https://www.svd.se/lat- sverige-bli-medlem-av-nato (Fetched 2020-07-01) 8 In some research referred to as ”the Conservatives”. 9 In some research referred to as” red-green” or ”left-green”. 10Möller, Tommy. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år. (4th ediction). Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2019, 294. 11 Harrison, Dick. Tage Erlander – Sveriges längsta statsminister. Populär Historia. 2020-04-28. https://popularhistoria.se/politik/politiker/tage-erlander-sveriges-langste-statsminister (Fetched 2020-07-01)
11 The end of the 1990s was the start of the Social Democrats’ downfall, going from having about half of the voter population’s support to 30%: However, it is still Sweden’s largest party. The Moderate Party was founded in 1904 as a conservative party, but since the 1980s, it has gone in a more liberal direction. According to Dahl, the pro-West message is one of the foundations of Moderate foreign policy, dating back to WW I.12 The Moderates are the second largest party in the Riksdag, receiving between 15 and 30% of the votes during 21th century.13
During both World Wars, Sweden declared itself neutral, a decision, which all parties stood behind and it was the start of a consensus driven foreign policy. 14 Before WWI, Sweden was led by the Moderates, but after the outbreak of war, the Liberals joined the government and the Social Democrats promised to not act in opposition.15 During WWII Sweden was, officially motivated by security concerns, run by a national government consisting of the Social Democrats, the Center Party, the Moderates, and the Liberals. In practice, Sweden was in a state of national emergency from 1939 to 1945 during which there was a party truce on even domestic issues, and the goal above everything else was to keep the country out of the war.16
National unity was imbued in all of society, for example; unions and employer organizations were expected to put their conflicts aside until the war was over.17 After Germany invaded Poland in September of 1939, both politicians and the public agreed that Sweden should not intervene. However, there was a bigger split in public opinion when the Nordic neighbors, the “brother people” were invaded. One of the biggest challenges the neutrality doctrine has ever faced, was during WWII when the Soviet Union invaded Finland in November 1939 and Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940. There were especially calls for the government to get involved in the Finnish Winter War. The government decided not to intervene but did sent military equipment and gave leave of absence to all Swedish military officers, who wanted to participate in the battle. A peace agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland was reached in March of 1940, after some diplomatic efforts from Sweden. The
12 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 122. 13 Valmyndigheten. Valresultat. 2020. https://www.val.se/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-07-02) 14 Magnusson, Erik. Neutralitet. ”En politik av eftergifter”. Populär Historia. 2001-05-25. https://popularhistoria.se/politik/neutralitet-en-politik-av-eftergifter (Fetched 2019-04-28). 15 Nilsson, Torbjörn. Hundra år av svensk politik. Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB, 2009, 28. 16Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år,134. 17 Nilsson. Hundra år av svensk politik, 62.
12 harsh conditions of the truce and Sweden's refusal to participate in the war lead to bitterness among Finns.18
Some prominent politicians, most of them Moderates, were critical of the government’s handling of the situation. They saw Sweden as the natural leader in the Nordics and with that followed a moral responsibility to protect the smaller brother people, especially Finland.19 When Denmark and Norway were invaded, the Swedish government was working hard to ascertain Hitler that Sweden was not going to change their policy of neutrality. Assuring him that all parties stood behind the doctrine, which meant that a switch in government would not change Sweden’s position. Only a month later, the Swedish government granted Germany the right to use the Swedish railroad system to transport German soldiers to and from occupied Norway. This of course, was seen as a betrayal and came to effect Swedish-Norwegian relations for decades.20
After WWII ended, Sweden was in a favorable position. The country’s infrastructure was intact, and the means of production had not been destroyed.21 In the end, unlike its neighbors Denmark and Norway, Sweden decided not to join NATO and instead continued pursuing the neutrality doctrine. This policy aimed to distance Sweden from the two superpowers sphere of interest, but the side effect was that the country’s attempts at a deeper Nordic security cooperation was hampered.
As Bjereld puts it for Sweden, “the will to remain neutral was stronger than the will to join a military alliance”.22 For a small nation like Sweden, which during the Cold War was in an exposed position between the superpowers, unity on a national level was deemed necessary to ensure that other countries did not to speculate what a potential shift of government would mean for the neutrality doctrine. Indeed, the four parties, which had been a part of the WWII coalition government, agreed that national unity around foreign policy was desirable. However, demanding unity was not risk free. On an international level, it could be seen as being insincere and avoiding responsibilities, and therefore lack credibility. On a national
18 Nilsson. Hundra år av svensk politik, 63. 19 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 60. 20 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 136. 21 Ibid., 142. 22 Fägersten, Björn and Jerdén, Björn. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011- 2018. Skandinavisk Tidsskrift for Internasjonale Studier. Vol. 76, no. 4, 2018: 344.
13 level, the government could misuse the demand for unity to silence political opponents, which indeed was what the center-right opposition parties accused the Social Democrats of having done during the Cold War.23
Several scholars claim that by the 1950s, the Social Democrats had won the interpretative prerogative of the meaning of the neutrality doctrine. To them, central was trustworthiness, which required that Sweden refrained from any form of cooperation with any military pact to avoid provoking either superpowers. The opposition parties agreed that it was important for the country to stay out of any military cooperation during the Cold War. In contrast, they also claimed that within the neutrality policy there was still room to take a stand in different situations and discuss possible collaboration with individual NATO countries about security policies. The Social Democrats completely refuted that.24
Even though the Social Democrats had dismissed the center-right’s suggestion of international cooperation, by the end of 1950s, the party started to signal a new foreign policy, which would later be referred to as "active foreign policy". Now, prime minister Erlander said that even neutral countries could sometime take a stand on different issues. Within the UN, non-aligned countries, even small ones like Sweden, could play an intermediary role between the superpowers. The small-state realism, which had governed the country through two world war was abandoned for an active and morally based foreign policy, where Sweden was to play the role of a bridge-builder. 25 After establishing that neutrality was compatible with membership in the newly founded UN, Sweden joined the organization in 1946. In the 1960s, Sweden’s foreign policy went into a more activist phase. It manifested itself in support of national resistance movements, acting as a mediator in international conflicts and strong critic of the superpowers’ military interventions in the Third World.26 For example, the Social Democratic governments became increasingly critical of the United States, especially regarding the Korea and Vietnam wars. 27 During the 1960s to 1980s, the Social Democratic government's line was to also brand the country as "the third way", which would attempt improve the relationship between the Cold War superpowers. For center-right, this line was
23 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 136, 165. 24 Ibid., 162. 25 Ibid., 175. 26 Fägersten. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 344. 27 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 165.
14 unacceptable, as they believed that it would imply Sweden standing ideologically neutral between the east and west.28
It is sometimes proposed that the center-right parties objected to the Social Democrat's new activist foreign policy, stressing that Sweden should not take on the role of the world's conscious.29. However, this characterization of history/reality does not hold up to scrutiny. In fact, the center-right block was also favoring an activist policy, but they did this through different arenas and for different causes. This was particularly true for the Moderate Party, who positioned themselves as critics of the human rights abuse in the Soviet Union and a supporter of the liberation of smaller states, which had forcefully been included in the union. Thus, in practice the disagreement was more about, who to criticize and praise, than if Sweden should speak out at all.
Though the country was neutral, Sweden had since WWII expected support from the NATO countries in the event of a major conflict, a policy that later on has been referred to as “the hidden alliance”.30 Though sometimes portraying the US and Soviet as equally evil, to Dahl it was obvious that Sweden was “identifying one of them, the Soviet Union, as the potential attacker, and turning to the other, the US and NATO, for friendly support.31
Behind closed doors, Sweden had developed a top-secret defense cooperation with NATO. This was not revealed until 1994, when the so-called Neutrality Politic Commission released a report detailing how the Swedish public had been misled about the cooperation, which went back to the 1950s, and was so close that Sweden within NATO was referred to as “the seventeenth member country”.32
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Swedish foreign policy went into a new phase, and has since undergone a number of interconnected changes. First, after a public referendum the country became a member of the EU in 1995. The end of the Cold War and the domestic economic crisis in the early/mid 1990s had weakened two important arguments against
28 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 169. 29 Ibid,. 175-176. 30 Fägersten. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 344. 31 Dahl, Ann-Sofie. Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?. International Journal. Vol. 61, nr.4, 2006: 902. 32 Ibid., 24.
15 membership: concerns about credibility of the neutrality doctrine and the fears that a membership would threaten the Swedish model. The membership has since opened up Swedish foreign policy to far-reaching influence from the EU and member countries. However, it has also given Sweden’s foreign policy a new platform, and a large share of the country’s foreign policy is currently conducted through the EU.33 Second, while still being non-aligned Sweden is no longer aiming for neutrality in the case of a military conflict, which was shown already in 1994 when the country joined NATOs Partnership for Peace in 1994.34
2.3. Persson II 2002 – 2006
The Social Democrats were in government, led by Prime Minister Göran Persson, between 1994 and 2006; this was the longest consecutive government constellation since 1976. Since it was a minority government, it had to cooperate with other parties. First with the Center Party 1995-1997, and later with the Left and the Greens.35 This government term was characterized by the War on Terror and the murder of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh.
After the 2002 election, Lindh continued as Minister for Foreign Affair, a position she had held since 1998. Lindh was internationally profiled and described as an exceptional political talent. She was not scared to stick out her neck and sometimes even going against the official stand of the government. In 1999, she refused to critic the NATO bombings to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which was a fundamental departure from the Social Democrats usual demand of military actions always being preceded by a mandate from the UN Security Council.36 During the continued airstrikes the following months, she repeated the same sentence “We do not disassociate or support a NATO military operation. But we understand it is necessary.”37
Sweden was during the early 2000s, like most countries, deeply affected by the War on Terror, because of the country’s close relations to the United States through the EU and on a bilateral level. In 2001, a unanimous Riksdag voted for Sweden to send troops to the Afghan
33 Fägersten. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 345. 34 NATO. Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document. NATO. 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm (Fetched 2020-07-17) 35 Nilsson. Hundra år av svensk politik, 139. 36 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 148-149. 37 Svensson, Gunnar. Natos bomber över Serbien oundvikliga. Aftonbladet. 2003-09-27. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/0EQoXG/natos-bomber-over-serbien-oundvikliga (Fetched 2020-07-10)
16 War by joining the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF was authorized by the UN Security Council and originally lead by the United Kingdom.38 It was, however stressed that the country would only send soldiers as long as ISAF had a UN mandate. 39 It was also decided that every year the government needed to present an updated Afghan strategy for the Riksdag to approve. Those have been passed year after year, though the Left Party has since 2011 demanded a retreat.40
When the US invaded Iraq on 20th March 2003, the government held an emergency debate in the Riksdag with Prime Minister Persson saying that the invasion was a violation of international law since it did not had a UN mandate, and “for this, the United States and its allies must be criticized”.41 Lindh was also a sharp critic of the military intervention and even participated in demonstrations against the war. However, the government was strongly critical of Saddam Hussein’s regime as well.42 Overall the war was widely unpopular in Sweden, and no party supported it. In August the same year, NATO took over ISAF, with little debate over how that effected Sweden’s commitment. At this point, Sweden had only acted under NATO flag once before, which was during peacekeeping efforts in 1995 in Bosnia.43
One month later on 14th September, Sweden was to hold a referendum on whether or not to abandon the Swedish krona for the euro. The Centre Party, Greens and Left were against the euro. The Social Democrats (though individual ministers were against it), Moderates, Liberals and Christian Democrats were in favor of it. Hence, the government had overwhelming parliamentary support to adopt the euro; only 69 out 349 parliamentarians were against it. 44
However, as previously mentioned, Sweden has a tradition of consensus politics on issues, which will have long-term effects for the nation. The solution, just like with the EU membership, was to announce a referendum. In an international context, this was highly unusual and the only other country who held a referendum was Denmark. 42% voted yes and
38United Nations, Security Council Resoulation 1386 (2001) https://undocs.org/S/RES/1386(2001) (Fetched 2020-08-17) 39 Betänkande 2001/02: UFöU2. Svenskt deltagande i en säkerhetsstyrka i Afghanistan. 40 TT. Reinfeldt vill inte se reträtt 2011. Svt nyheter. 2010-10-19. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/reinfeldt- vill-inte-se-retratt-2011 (Fetched 2020-07-01) 41 Protokoll 2002/03:75. Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:75 Torsdagen den 20 mars. 42 Sveriges Radio. Anna Lindh talade vid demonstration mot Irakkriget. Sveriges Radio. 2003-03-22. https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=204237 (Fetched 2020-07-17) 43 Fägersten, and Jerdén. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 345. 44 Ohlsson, Per T. Svensk Politik. Lund: Historiska media, 2018, 552.
17 55,9% no, with the implication that Sweden kept the krona. Being a representative democracy, in this case the Riksdag was definitely not representative of the public’ wills.45
When the results came in, the country was still in chock after the murder of Lindh. Four days earlier, she was stabbed while shopping in central Stockholm and she passed away on the 11th September 2003 due to her injuries. Lindh was one of the most popular politicians among the public and seen as Persson’s natural successor.
Another event during the War on Terror was what came to be known as The Egypt Repatriations, a scandal, which deeply tarnished Sweden’s reputation as a human rights champion. In 2004, the investigating tv program Kalla Fakta (English: Cold Facts) uncovered that the Swedish government back in 2001, after requests from the United States, had allowed the CIA to travel to Sweden to bring two Egyptian asylum seekers and fly them on an
American plane back to Egypt for interrogations. The men were suspected of being terrorists, but neither were ever convicted of any crime and both became subjects of torture in Egyptian prisons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs were deeply involved in the case and there was enormous pressure from the US on then Minister Lindh to comply with their request. It has been reported that it went as far as the US threating to put trade embargo on the EU.46
Much suggest that Lindh was not working alone on the issue, but that the prime minister and Minister of Justice Thomas Bodström was involved, or at least informed about the case, which both have denied. However, since Lindh was tragically killed back in 2003, it was easy to put all blame on her. 47 In 2005, the UN Committee against Torture ruled that the repatriations were in violation with the Torture convention.48
2.4. Reinfeldt I 2006 – 2010
45 Europaportalen. Folkomröstningar om EU. 2020. https://www.europaportalen.se/teman/folkomrostning (Fetched 2020-07-02) 46 Cantwell, Oisin. Hotad – av USA. Aftonbladet. 2009-01-18. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/3j1LgA/hotad--av-usa (Fetched 2020-07-01) 47 Leffler, Tove and Truedson, Lars. Egyptieravvisningen (Radio programme). Stockholm: Sveriges Radio. 2010. https://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/71208?programid=2519 48 UN Committee against Torture (CAT). Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden. 2020. https://www.refworld.org/cases,CAT,42ce734a2.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
18 In 2004, the center-right parties the Moderates, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Center Party formed “the Alliance”. In the 2006 election, the Alliance won 179 of the 349 seats in the Riksdag, which meant that they could form a majority government; something that Sweden had not had since Palme I 1969-1970.49
The government was led by Moderate Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, who appointed Carl Bildt has the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bildt was the head of the Moderate party 1986- 1991 and Sweden’s prime minister between 1991-1994. Many was surprised since going from prime minister to an “ordinary” minister was seen as a step down. But Bildt had always enjoyed the international issues and now he could got work with those full time. 50
According to Dahl, Prime Minister Reinfeldt had never had a strong interest in foreign policy, instead his focus was on domestic politics, especially the job market. This in combination with Bildt’s status and experience lead the prime minister to pretty much handing over the sole responsibility of Sweden’s foreign policy to Bildt. This solution was not unequivocally liked among either the Moderates, the Alliance or the employees at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.51
Carl Bildt has been called a hawk, and as young member of parliament in the 1980s, he was one of the strongest critics on the Soviet Union, often in regard to Moscow’s oppression of forced unions with smaller countries. In 2007 he said, “We are going from a foreign policy that has been observing and commentary, to one that will be analytical and acting”.5253
During his time as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he made it clear that the area of the Soviet forced unions was still a priority of his. When Russia in August 2008 for the first time invaded a neighboring country through the attack on Georgia, Sweden, or rather the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bildt, expressed his opinion internationally in exceptionally high pitches
49 Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2006. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2006.html (Fetched 2020-07-02) 50 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 154. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Olsson, Lova. ”Kan vi hjälpa till så ska vi göra det”. Svenska Dagbladet. 2007-11-06. https://www.svd.se/kan- vi-hjalpa-till-sa-ska-vi-gora-det (Fetched 2020-07-01)
19 and harsh formulations. In addition, the Reinfeldt government froze bilateral military contacts with Russia for some time.54
In 2008, Sweden, together with Poland, presented the Eastern Partnership program, which was joint initiative between EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, all six being former Soviet Union states. The aim of the partnership was to strengthen the relations between the countries in terms of trade and economics, as well as the promotion of democracy and stability.55
The Moderates had for decades pushed for Sweden to join NATO and the other Alliance parties were also in favor of this. Now, they had a golden opportunity to start the process, however, not surprisingly the prime minister stuck to the consensus tradition and said that “such a decision requires a popular support and a very wide parliamentary support”, and that it also should be done in coordination with a Finnish membership.56
Instead, the Alliance continued the tradition of placing Sweden as close as possible to NATO, but with no intention of abandoning the country’s formal policy of non-alignment.57 However, to show Sweden’s solidarity with NATO and the EU, the Riksdag worked during 2007-2009 to formulate a “Swedish Declaration of Solidarity” which became an important part of Sweden’s “new” security policy doctrine. The declaration was unanimously adopted in the Riksdag and reads “Sweden is not a member of any military alliance. Threats to peace and our security can best be avoided collectively and in cooperation with other countries. It is impossible to imagine military conflicts in our region that would affect only one country. Sweden will not remain passive if another EU member state or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected. Sweden should therefore be in a position to both give and receive military support.”58
54 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 38-39. 55 European Union External Action. Eastern Partnership. 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- homepage_en/419/Eastern%20Partnership (Fetched 2020-08-17) 56 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 110. 57 Ibid., 111. 58 Ambassador Malmqvist. Sweden and NATO – 23 years down the road. NATO Review. 2018-01-11. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/01/11/sweden-and-nato-23-years-down-the-road/index.html (Fetched 2020-07-15)
20 In 2009 the Riksdag had, for the eight time, renewed the mandate for Sweden’s participation in ISAF.59 Though it was unanimous, it did not go without debate. Six months earlier, on February 7th , the Supreme Commander for the Swedish Armed Forces held a press conference to report that two Swedish soldiers, Gunnar Andersson and Johan Palmlöv, and their local interpreter Mohammad Shahab Ayoulay, had been killed when a single gunman attacked their convoy in Charbolak, Afghanistan. The death of the two soldiers was widely reported and raised debate regarding if Swedish soldiers should operate in unsafe areas in Afghanistan, or even if Sweden should retreat completely from the country.60
2.5. Reinfeldt II 2010 – 2014
After the 2010 elections, the Sweden Democrats entered the Riksdag with 5,7% share of the votes (20 seats). As mentioned earlier, this event has in research been seen as the end/decline of the Swedish Exceptionalism. The reason was that up until this election, Sweden was one of few European countries without a populist anti-immigrations party in its parliament.6162
The Sweden Democrats has its roots in the 1990s neo-Nazi and white power movement.63 A central theme for the party is to preserve the country as an ethnic "Swedish" (white) nation”.64 Since none of the political blocks wanted to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats, neither had majority in the Riksdag. Instead, the seven parties decided that the block, which got the most votes, was to form a government. As the Alliance got most votes, Reinfeldt could continue as prime minister. Carl Bildt also continued as Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as representing Sweden’s active role as a Russia critic.65
As mentioned, Sweden has over time become closer and closer with NATO. When NATO got a UN mandate to intervene in the Libyan Civil War, NATO sent an informal request to
59 Proposition 2009/10:38 Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i en internationell säkerhetsstyrka i Afghanistan. 60 Sundell, Camilla. Håkansson, Catarina. Balksjö, Jessica and Aziz, Linda. Två svenska soldater döda. Aftonbladet. 2010-02-07. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/wERPd5/tva-svenska-soldater-doda (Fetched 2020-07-01) 61 Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2010. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2010/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-08-30) 62 Ohlsson. Svensk Politik, 556. 63 Ibid. 64 Möller. Svensk politisk historia – Strid och samverkan under tvåhundra år, 294-295. 65 Ibid., 40.
21 Sweden to participate in Operation Unified Protector by upholding a no-fly zone.66 The government decided to send eight combat aircrafts, though the aircrafts were only to be used for surveillance and not to engage in combats operations.67 NATO cooperated with the League of Arabs States and Sweden was the only country, which participated in the intervention without belonging to either coalition. 68 As previously mentioned, governments do not need the support of the Riksdag to engage in military operations, but as usual the Riksdag voted on the proposition, and as usual it was almost unanimously approved, with only the Sweden Democrats voting against it.69
Just like during the Russo-Georgian War, Sweden became one of Russia’s harshest critics when the country invaded the Ukraine in February 2014. Just like in 2008, this was much due to Minister for Foreign Affairs Bildt’s personal engagement. The issue of a people's and a nation's liberty to be in charge of their own destiny became a recurring and central theme in the government’s statements. 70 From the very first days of the conflict, Sweden put in place a broad and strong action package to support Ukraine’s right to independence. The Russian ambassador was called up to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to explain his country’s actions, election monitors were sent to Ukraine and extra foreign financial aid was put in place.71
2.6. Löfven I 2014 – 2018
After the 2014 election, the Social Democrats and the Green Party formed a minority government, led by Social democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. While the Social Democrats was the biggest party with 31% of the vote, the Greens were one of the smallest with 7% of the votes.72
66 Benigh, Love and Magnusson, Örjan. Nato har frågat Sverige om Jas-plan till Libyen. Svt Rapport. 2011-03- 28.https://web.archive.org/web/20110401104642/http:/svt.se/2.22584/1.2374883/nato_har_fragat_sverige_om_j as-plan_till_libyen (Fetched 2020-07-01) 67 Pehrson, Josefin and Holmström. Svenska Gripenplan ska skickas till Libyen. Svenska Dagbladet. 2011-03-29. https://www.svd.se/svenska-gripenplan-skickas-till-libyen (Fetched 2020-07-01) 68 Fägersten, and Jerdén. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 345. 69 Betänkande 2010/11: UFöU3. Svenskt deltagande i den internationella militära insatsen i Libyen. 70 Dahl. Du gamla, Du fria – Moderat utrikespolitik från Högerparti till Alliansregering, 16-17. 71 Ibid., 40. 72 Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2014. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2014/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
22 The Löfven government declared itself “the World’s First Feminist Government”, and that it would pursue a “feminist foreign policy”.73 In short, the foreign policy is described as “in all its parts, shall strive to strengthen all women’s and girls’ Rights, Representation and Resources, based on the Reality in which they live. Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is a transformative agenda that aims to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors.”74
Just like her predecessor Carl Bildt, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström was high profile and internationally known and respected. She was the first United Nations Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict and she came to have strong normative effect on the government’s foreign policy.75
Just before the 2014 election, Sweden, once again, took a step closer to NATO by signing an agreement to become a “Enhanced Opportunity Partners”, which were to be confirmed 2016. At this point, under the lead of the Social Democrats, a “Host Nation Agreement” had been added. It would mean ”allowing for NATO forces to conduct joint training exercises on Swedish soil and for NATO member states' forces to be deployed in Sweden in response to threats to Sweden's national security.” 76 All parties except The Sweden Democrats and the Left, voted to ratify the agreement. However, while the Sweden Democrats voted against it, the Left party just refrained from voting.77
In 2014, Sweden became the first Western country in the EU to recognize the State of Palestine. The government motivated the decision by that this would make the two parties in the Israel-Palestine conflict more equal, which in turn would help to facilitate a peace agreement. 78 The only party that supported the government was the Left Party, meaning that majority of the Riksdag, and therefore the Swedish people, were against the decision. Because
73 Government Offices of Sweden. A Feminist Government. https://www.government.se/government-policy/a- feminist-government/ (Fetched 2020-07-02) 74Government Offices of Sweden. Handbook Sweden’s feminist foreign policy. 2018. https://www.government.se/reports/2018/08/handbook-swedens-feminist-foreign-policy/ (Fetched 2020-08-17) 75 Aggestam, Karin, and Bergman-Rosamond, Annika. Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making: Ethics, Politics, and Gender. Ethics & International Affairs. Vol. 30, no. 3, 2016: 325. 76 Sveriges Riksdag. Yes to memorandum of understanding with NATO on host nation support. Sveriges Riksdag. 2016-05-27. https://www.riksdagen.se/en/news/2016/maj/27/yes-to-memorandum-of-understanding- with-nato-on-host-nation-support-ufou4/ (Fetched 2020-07-17) 77 Betänkande 2015/16: UFöU4. Samförståndsavtal om värdlandsstöd. 78 Government Offices of Sweden. Sweden recognises Palestina and increases aid. 2015. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2014/10/sweden-recognises-palestine-and-increases-aid/ (Fetched 2020-08-17)
23 of the consensus praxis concerning foreign policy, the opposition parties were deeply critical of the government for not seeking broad political support before announcing the decision. The Palestinian president called the decision “brave and historic”, while the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affair said it would strengthen extremists in Palestine and that “The Swedish government must understand that relations in the Middle East are much more complicated than assembling an Ikea furniture and that Sweden must act responsibly and sensitively.”79
The government’s biggest success was succeeding in their bid to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2017-2018 term.80 The government said that their tenure were to be built on “international law, human rights, equality, and humanitarian perspective”.81 However, it has been a challenge for the government have been to explain how they can that associate the feminist policy with Swedish extensive arms export, not seldom to authoritarian and war faring states like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.82
Probably the most difficult issue the government faced was the refugee crisis of 2015. Since the early 2000s Sweden has been the OECD country that has granted international protection to the most person per capita, and in 2015-2016 Sweden saw the largest per capita inflow of refugees that had ever been recorded in any OECD country.83 In 2015 the Swedish Migration Board saw asylum application from 160 000 persons, which represented 12,4% of all asylum applications in the EU and was six times more than the EU per capita average.84 The Greens first threatened to leave the government when the Social Democrats wanted to put in measures to stop more refugees to enter the country, but in October 2015 the government and the four center-right parties reached an agreement to reduce the number of asylum-seekers. The strategies were to limit access to the country’s territory with border controls, and to reduce the appeal of Sweden by for example only granting temporary residency instead of permanent.85 Though the Greens stayed in the government the party was obviously not satisfied with the agreement. When prime minister Löfven and vice prime minister Åsa
79 Rohwedder, My, and Knutsson, Johan. Sveriges erkännande av Palestina väcker reaktioner. 2014-10-30. https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/6005306 (Fetched 2020-08-17) 80 Government Offices of Sweden. Sweden in the UN Security Council. https://www.government.se/government-policy/sweden-in-the-un-security-council/ (Fetched 2020-07-02) 81 Ibid. 82 Svenska Freds. Snabba fakta om vapenexport. 2020. https://www.svenskafreds.se/vad-vi- gor/vapenexport/snabba-fakta-om-vapenexport/ (Fetched 2020-07-10) 83 Emilsson, Henrik. Continuity or change? The refugee crisis and the end of Swedish exceptionalism. Malmö Institute for Studies of Migrations, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) Working Papers Series 18:3, 2018, 2. 84 Emilsson, Henrik. Continuity or change? The refugee crisis and the end of Swedish exceptionalism, 9-11. 85 Nilsson. Hundra år av svensk politik, 10.
24 Romson held a press conference to present it, Romson had tears in her eyes and called the proposals in the agreement “horrible”.86
2.7. Concluding remarks 2002-2018
During these years, there have been continuous steps during all administrations to work more toward EU integration and closer relations to NATO. These have not been partisan issues, but instead decisions have been made in accordance with the praxis of consensus politics. The same can be said of other issues like the deployment of troops to Afghanistan, and the stricter migrations policies adopted during the refugee crisis.
What is also notable is that there have been high-profiled Ministers for Foreign Affairs during all four terms. And as previously mentioned, this can have an impact on the government’s foreign policy since the ministers might insert personal beliefs and interests in respect of what areas should be given priority. We can see this especially in Carl Bildt and Margot Wallström, but also in Anna Lindh. Bildt and Wallström both pursued an activist agenda; Bildt focusing on solidarity and cooperation within the EU and its neighboring countries, and Wallström on the pursuit of a feminist foreign policy and strengthen Sweden’s role in the UN.
86 Liebermann, Andreas. Romson i tårar: ”Fruktansvärda beslut”. Svt Nyheter. 2015-11-24. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/romson-i-tarar-det-har-varit-tufft (Fetched 2020-07-01)
25
3. Theory
The theoretical portion of the thesis will present constructivism in foreign policy, which have been chosen as the theoretical framework for the thesis. Thereafter I will explain Swedish exceptionalism as a theoretical concept, how it has grown out of events named in the background section, and its characteristic and expressions in present time.
3.1. Constructivism in international relations/foreign policy analysis
The end of the Cold War is often named as a breakthrough moment for constructivism. The failure of the two mainstream theories, realism, and liberalism, to predict or explain the sudden end of the Cold War is often hailed as constructivism’s breakthrough-moment in the IR discipline.87 However, constructivism’s origin can be traced back to the early 1980s, with the rise of critical and post-modern theories, which questioned the then established and accepted understandings of concepts of IR and the study of foreign policy. 88
Some argue that constructivism is not a theory but rather an approach. Such scholars claim that unlike realism and liberalism it offers no solutions to specific problems nor does it prescribe particular directions and is therefore just an “empty vessel”. Flockhart writes that constructivism is indeed “empty” in that sense that it does not challenge the ideological convictions of liberalism or realism, nor is it neither pessimistic nor optimistic. However, she stresses that constructivism does offer alternative understandings of some of the most central themes in international relations, like the relationship between state identity and interest, the prospect of change and the meaning of balance of power and anarchy.89
Regarding the latter, prominent constructivism Alexander Wendt published the influential article “Anarchy is What States Make of it”. There, he dismisses the realist suggestion that the political authority in the international system will force states into patterns of behavior based
87 Smith, Steve; Hadfield, Amelia and Dunne, Tim (editors). Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases. Second. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 79 88 Smith et. Al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 80. 89 Ibid., 80.
26 on self-help. Instead, he argues that self-help and power politics is not a logical follow of anarchy, but instead a result of subjective understanding about self and others that are then reinforced through agent’s practice. 90
The implication of this, Wendt argues, is that not only is anarchy what states make of it, but also that the cultures of anarchy can be changed. His argument is built on one of the central features of constructivism; that people's actions towards objects, including other people, are based on what meaning the object, or person, has to them. That is, a state will react differently to the same actions by different states based on its relationship with them. An action can see as threatening if performed by an “enemy”, but not if it came from a friend.91 Flockhart takes the example that a North Korean nuclear warhead may look similar to a French one, and both would have the same devastating consequences, but from an American standpoint, they would attach different meanings to each.92
Flockhart writes that the essentials of constructivism can be divided into four core propositions. 1. A belief in the social construction of reality and the importance of social facts. All constructivists share a focus on the portions of the world that are treated as if they were real. Many crucial concepts and understandings in international relations are not brute facts, but social facts. “Social facts” exist only through agreements and a mutual understanding, which is reinforced through practice. One of the most common examples of this is money. What material a 100-dollar bill is made of is not what gives it value, but the shared meaning humans have attached to it. Without the shared agreement that a piece of paper can be swapped for goods and services, money would see to exist since it currently exists only through practice. Similarly, international relations consist of social facts. Even states themselves are social constructs since there is a common understanding of what makes a geographical territory a sovereign state.
2. A focus on ideational as well as material structures and the importance of norms and rules. The idea of the world as socially constructed is linked to the second core
90 Smith et. al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 83. 91 Ibid., 81. 92 Ibid, 83.
27 proposition of constructivism; that structures cannot be understood only as material forces like military power or economic strength, but that it also consists of ideational factors. Shared knowledge about rules, symbols, language, and indeed material factors, shape how actor’s interpreter the world and actions of others. In turn, these constitute structures, which in turn organize actions. Wendt writes that structures are often codified into norms or even formal rules, which agents are socialized into following. The structures can be formal rules, which exist in written or spoken form. It can also be norms, which are non-formal rules that are usually taken for granted and not questioned. Norms are a shared understanding among those with a specific identity, community, and/or social groups, on what constitutes appropriate behavior. The empathize on ideational factors within constructivism directly challenges the materialism of neoliberalism and neorealism since they see the distribution of material forces as the most fundamental feature of society.93
3. A focus of identity in shaping political action and the importance of “logics of actions”. An agent’s identity is its understanding of itself, its relationships with other agents, and its place in the world. Although the identity is relatively stable, it is always in a process of reconstruction and supported by a narrative to ensure that any changes seem “natural”. By conceptualizing agents as strongly influenced by their identity, constructivists also acknowledge the importance of the social, cultural, political, and historical context of the agents since these are what contributed to the identity in the first place. The reason constructivists place such importance on identity is because it believes that identities strongly imply a specific set of preferences or interests in choice of action. Flockhart takes the example of Denmark and Sweden. In a materialist interest-based analysis, the two countries would be assumed to be “like units” since they are both small states. It could, therefore, be assumed that the countries would display a similar pattern of actions, but they do not. According to Flockhart, that is because Sweden’s self-understanding as middle power have had profound effects on the country’s policy choices, for example, a long tradition of armed neutrality, as well as an expectation of “being heard” in international negotiations. This is in stark contrast to seemingly similar state Denmark, which sees itself as a small state, which has led to a foreign policy based on protection through
93 Smith et. al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 84.
28 alliances and military cooperation with other states. 94 Liberalism and realism assume that actors consider their choices based on rational cost-benefit calculations, what March and Olsen refer to as “logic of consequences”. In this logic, agents are assumed to choose the action that offers them the most liberty. Constructivism believes that actors too will be led what action is appropriate for their identity. This is referred to as “logic of appropriateness” and assumes that actors a rule follower and will try to follow rules which are associated with a particular identity to a particular situation. Based on that, they will decide on the action that is the most appropriate behavior.95
4. A belief in the mutual continuativeness of agents and structure, and a focus on practice and action. The claim that structures and actors are mutually constituted is based on the work known as “structuration” by Anthony Giddens. Structuration is the understanding of that structures influence actors, but that actors are also, through practice, able to influence structure. Constructivists place great importance on the role of routinized practice, which can be seen in all four core propositions. This is because it is through practice social facts are habitualized and externalized, which in turn leads to the social facts existing independent from the actors who first constructed them. Consequently, it is through practice a stable environment is ensured, which then self- reinforce the actor’s identity and provides them with confidence that their cognitive world will be reproduced. However, even though actors and structures are seen as mutually constituted, constructivism places a greater focus on the later. Even though structuration implies the possibility of change through actors’ practice, they also assume that agents reproduce their own limitations through continuing practice. Therefore, constructivists determine that although change is possible it is difficult to achieve.96
3.2. Swedish exceptionalism
There is no clear definition of Swedish exceptionalism, but the foundation is the establishment of Sweden being a superior state. Through research on the field, I have identified two main separations; that it is expression or descriptive term, or a theoretical
94 Smith et. al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 86. 95 Ibid., 86. 96 Ibid, 87.
29 concept tied to state identity. This thesis will use the latter. Within foreign policy analysis, Swedish exceptionalism can be included in the research field of national exceptionalism. Therefore, this section will commence with that.
According to David Jansson, the majority of academic literature on national exceptionalism focus on American exceptionalism.97 International relations scholars conceptualize American exceptionalism as a concept, which is either an objective reference to difference/uniqueness, or whether exceptionalism is meant to convey a normative claim of superiority. Hilde Eliassen Restad refers to the idea of an objective definition as ”nonsensical” and points out: “Why use the term “exceptional” if one does not mean normatively superior? American exceptionalism cannot simply mean different, because all nations are different.” Some researchers, like K.J. Holsti, view exceptionalism as a foreign policy tool, while others, like Restad, understands it as a belief system, more specifically a country’s “subjective self- understanding”.98
Even though this has been mentioned concerning American exceptionalism, the division is likely to be similar to analyzing other countries as well. Here, Restad’s definition will be used, as the purpose of this thesis is to analyze if Sweden articulates its foreign policy through a discourse of exceptional. Most scholars, both those who understand exceptionalism as a belief system and as a type of foreign politics, stress that national exceptionalism relies on the nationalist ideology. 99 Like other social facts, national exceptionalism is reproduced through routine practices to become an objective reality independent from what was constructed it in the first place.100. There will be a collective sense among power elites and the general public of being superior to other countries. In this notion of superiority also lies an understanding of “newness”, that the country is more modern and pioneering than others. The country will understand itself having a special role and mission in the world.101
97 Jansson, David. Deadly exceptionalism, or, would you rather be crushed by a moral superpower or a military superpower?. Political Geography. Vol. 64, 2018: 83 98 Jansson. Deadly exceptionalism, or, would you rather be crushed by a moral superpower or a military superpower?, 84. 99 Ibid., 84. 100 Ibid., 83. 101 Agnew, John A. An excess of ’national exceptionalism’: towards a new political geography of American foreign policy. Political Geography Quarterly. Vol. 2, no. 2, 1983: 151.
30 The understanding of an exceptional country’s superiority is often expressed by the country trying to “export” its values and political system. This is due to that the country feels like it is the only, or at least one of few, which has “seen the light”. Therefore, it is responsible to act as a political guide and offer guidance to, what they see as, the less fortunate and with less insight. This aspect of exceptionalism is an absolute key to understanding the concept : the country is not only an activist but sees itself as being on a mission to “spread the light” to others.102 Humphreys calls this “missionist exceptionalism”, which refers to “a sense that a certain country is felt by its power elite – and probably many of its population – to have a unique place in the world, a distinct role to play, and importantly, due to the gravitas of this role, ordinary restraints – such as the rule of law – do not apply.” 103
Exceptionalism can also result in immunity to external or internal criticism because of a collective sense among power elites and the general public of being “morally clean” and/or ultimately being innocent of wrongdoing. It can also be justified in terms of a country’s unique character. 104 Moreover, this can also lead to a normalization of things/occurrences that does go against the foundation of the country’s exceptionalism.
Jansson writes that in the context of international relations, the concept of Swedish exceptionalism is primarily based on the understanding and perception of the country as a “moral superpower”.105 Restad defines American exceptionalism as “the belief in America’s difference, superiority, and national mission.”106 This is also present in Swedish exceptionalism; with the country’s’ destiny is in part to spread what is understood as Swedish ideals; democracy, equality, LGBTQ+ rights and anti-racism, and part to function as force for international unification, solidarity, stability and peace. Sweden’s voice for influencing the world goes to primary through organizations through like the EU and UN.
Constructivism highlights the need for historical context to understand a state’s identity. The Swedish exceptionalism we see today is a result of the image of a moral superpower that was
102 Dahl. Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?, 898. 103 Jansson. Deadly exceptionalism, or, would you rather be crushed by a moral superpower or a military superpower?, 86. 104 Agnew, John A. An excess of ’national exceptionalism’: towards a new political geography of American foreign policy., 151. 105 Jansson. Deadly exceptionalism, or, would you rather be crushed by a moral superpower or a military superpower?, 86. 106 Ibid.
31 established during the 20th century in general, and in particular during the Cold War. The expression moral superpower was coined by Swedish Social Democratic undersecretary Pierre Schori. This was during the Cold War, and the label was a way of distancing Sweden from the two “real” superpowers at the time, which was perceived as driven by primitive power politics. The United States’ and the Soviet Union’s allies were seen as fueling the conflict, and therefore also a part of the problem. Sweden on the other hand was a modern and civil enough to not engage in primitive behavior like warfare.107
According to Schori, another reason for Sweden being worthy of the title was the country’s continuing pursuit of “The Third Way”; an alternative to the main two ideologies at the time, capitalism and socialism. Social democracy was a middle ground and hailed as the perfect in combination of the best features of both ideologies. The third way also referred to the Swedish decision to not join either of the military alliances. With the end of the Cold War the Swedish third way both in terms of political/financial system and security policies needed to either be left behind or to have a new meaning. 108 The Third Way regarding the financial system have been left behind after liberalizations reform of the market. Sweden is now just an ordinary capitalist Western society, though with particularly strong and developed welfare sector.
In terms of neutrality, Sweden’s identity is still alive, but in a different form. As mentioned in the earlier section on constructivism, if an agent’s identity changes, it does so through a process with a narrative to make these changes seem “natural”. This, we can see in in the evolvement of the Swedish neutrality, which during the 1990s became “military non- alignment”. In turn, the meaning of military non-alignment has also evolved to Sweden currently being more active in NATO than several of its actual members.109 Westberg also claims that the neutrality doctrine has been replaced by a “policy of solidarity”, which is indeed the case if looking at the announcement of the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity in 2010. 110
107 Dahl. Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?. 895-899. 108 Ibid., 896-897. 109 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Relations with Sweden. 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_52535.htm (Fetched 2020-07-05) 110 Fägersten, and Jerdén. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 344.
32 Historically in its foreign policy, Sweden have perceived itself as being in the middle of two Others. In WWI it was Allied Powers and the Central Powers; in WWII the Allies and the Axis; in the Cold War it was NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In a unipolar world there are no longer two concrete Others, but Sweden still understand itself as the middle alternative, though maybe in a more abstract way. The country has what is close to unique customized partnership with NATO but is not actually a member. Sweden is a EU-member, but has rejected to adopt the euro. This role has been crucial, since it is closed attached to another feature of Swedish exceptionalism, which is Sweden’s role as a bridge builder/mediator. Sweden also uses its brand as military non-aligned to promote the idea of the country being an objective observer/critic in international politics.111
Another important part of Sweden feeling superior and unique is the notion of the country as having the longest consecutive time of peace by not officially being in battle since 1812. This has resulted in Sweden being one of few countries with no collective memory of war. The neutrality doctrine under the World Wars confirmed and reproduced the power elites and the public’s understanding of the country as peaceful. As mentioned earlier, Sweden understood war as primitive and since Sweden did not take part in any of the World Wars, it was one of the few, perhaps the only, truly civilized country in the world.112
This came to have big effect on Sweden’s reputation in the world, but maybe even a bigger impact for its citizens. According to Nilsson, for long there was a self-righteousness regarding the neutrality doctrine during the war. that Sweden stayed outside the war was its contribution to the fight against Nazism, as well as humanitarian aid and taking in refugees. It took time before the research community starting to deal with the war from a critical perspective. Partly because a lot of documentation was classified, but perhaps also because the self-image was deeply rooted in the Swedish folk soul.113
However, as described earlier, Swedish troops have very much been in battle. This, of course, has become sort of a cogitative dissonance for the Swedish public. As described in the previous section, a part of exceptionalism is to normalize or change the narrative on issues,
111 Brommesson, Douglas. ”Nordicness” in Swedish foreign policy – from mid power internationalism to small state balancing?. Global Affairs. Vol. 4, no. 4-5, 2015: 394. 112 Nilsson. Hundra år av svensk politik, 70-71. 113 Ibid.
33 which goes against the actor’s identity. In Sweden, military operations are not warfare, but “peacekeeping” and though NATO’s missions are rarely branded as peacekeeping, Sweden still describe them as such. This is reproduced through the public confirming the political elites framing of the role of the military.114
To summarized, Swedish exceptionalism are built on the understanding of Sweden being a modern, equal, military non-aligned, and bridge-building peaceful country.
4. Method
This chapter will start by presenting the chosen method of discourse analysis. It will then operationalize Swedish exceptionalism as a discourse. It will then outline the chosen material of Statement of Foreign Affair and the sampling. Lastly it will describe the analytical procedure, including how it will be presented in the empirical section.
4.1. Discourse analysis
Discourse analysis (DA) origins from the work of Michael Foucault during 1960-1970s. Foucault did not see discourse analysis as an independent method or theory but demonstrated how language through discourse analysis could be turned in to an empirical object to study. 115 DA investigates, in spoken or written words, if it is possible to establish any regularity in the chosen objects, to designated subjects as actors and relations between objects and subjects.
DA is used within several theoretical frame works, including Constructivism and Post- structuralism.116 In fact, Jennifer Milliken suggest that in studies using DA, the lines between constructivists, post-modernists, poststructuralists and some feminists are often blurred and can therefore all be referred as belonging to the “discourse community”.117 DA in foreign
114 Berndtsson, Joakim. Dandeker, Christopher, and Ydén, Karl. Swedish and British Public Opinion of the Armed Force safter a Decade of War. Armed Forces & Society. Vol. 41, no. 2, 2015: 307-328. 115 Pedersen, Ove K. Discourse Analysis. International Center for Business and Politics Working paper no 65, 2009, 4. 116 Pedersen. Discourse Analysis, 3. 117Milliken, Jennifer. The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods. European Journal of International Relations. Vol., 5, no. 5, 1999: 233.
34 policy is based on the belief of language not only being a spoken description of an empirical reality, but that it has “political power”.118
Some scholars see the study of discourse as a method to discover the “truth”, as the discourse is suggested to represent material reality. However, DA is also useful to understand chains of events and its context, and to study country’s or other actors’ identities.119 Hansen argues that DA aims to provide a “road map” which displays the main foreign policy positions and which representation that sustains those. This is done by identifying the “key representations” of a subject.120
Key representation does not necessarily equate the words or sentences that are used the most, instead key representations are those expressions that allow us to identify the main representations of the policies of the subject being observed. Hansen refers to these representations as “building blocks”, which around other expressions can be placed in different variations. 121
One single text is not enough to establish a discourse on a certain subject or event. Instead it should be based on a set of texts by different people, who can be understood as representative speakers or writes of a dominant discourse, or the alternative discourse. 122 A text will never construct just one representation, instead, through direct or indirect parallels to other subjects or themes; these will also be noted and given importance. 123
4.1.1 Swedish exceptionalism as a discourse
As described in section 3.2. on Swedish exceptionalism, countries with an exceptional self- image understand themselves as having a unique role to play, and a destiny to fulfill, in global politics. Having this role means having a positive influence on the world and a responsibility to do good. To operationalize Swedish exceptionalism as a foreign discourse there is a need to
118 Smith et. al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 95. 119 Lupovici, Amir. Constructivist Methods: A Plea and Manifesto for Pluralism. Review of International Studies. Vol. 35, no. 1, 2009: 202. 120 Lupovici. Constructivist Methods: A Plea and Manifesto for Pluralism, 102. 121 Smith et. al. Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, 102. 122 Milliken. The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods. 233. 123 Ibid., 232.
35 establish key representations. Based on current research on Swedish exceptionalism the following seven have been established.
Sweden: 1. being military non-aligned 2. having an active foreign policy 3. being pioneering or “leading the way” 4. bringing security, stability, and peace 5. being a champion of human rights and democracy 6. acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder 7. showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small)
4.2. Material to analyze
For the empirical section of this thesis, I have chosen to analyze Utrikesdeklarationen; in English, the Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs (from now on referred to as Statement of Foreign Policy or SOF). Fägersten and Jerdén who did a comparative study on the Statement of Foreign Policy, calls it the ”most important foreign political expression of will in Swedish politics”. 124
The Statement of Foreign Policy is a speech held every year in February, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Riksdag. It also streams online on the Riksdag’s website. The function of SOF is two folded; a) looking forward presenting the governments priorities and goals, and b) looking backwards by stating what has been done during the last year. The day after the speech, its transcript is published on the government’s website. SOF is available in English translation for the years 2007, 2009 and 2010-2018. For 2003-2006 and 2008, it is only available in Swedish. Though the time frame for the thesis is 2002 and 2018, Persson II term started October 2002, which is why the Statement of Foreign Affair from February 2002 fall outs of the government term.
124 Fägersten, and Jerdén. En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011-2018, 346.
36 Appropriate material to be used to establish foreign policy discourse should be the type, which are communicated to both their own citizens (reinforcing Swedish exceptionalism) and other countries. Since anyone can visit the Riksdag website during the speech or watch it online it is in theory communicated to the public. However, one can assume that the majority of the public does not follow politics that closely. However, since the speech is usually widely reported in the news media, many will be reached by its message through secondary sources.
From February 2003 to February 2018, there are sixteen Statement of Foreign Policy, which transcripts in total consists of 175 pages. Analyzing all the documents is beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, a sample of the SOF’s have been chosen. To limit bias, I will decide on the sample method before reading the material. My belief is that the first SOF for each government term will to some degree lay out the priorities and goals for the whole term. Likely I believe that a government’s last SOF will to some degree summarize what has happen during the term. Therefore, I believe that sampling the first and last SOF for each term will be the best representation for the whole term. That means that eight transcripts will be analyzed; 2003 and 2006 in Swedish, and 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2018 in English.
4.3. Analytical procedure
The analytical procedure is the following: For each SOF I will look for the key representations of Swedish exceptionalism, which has been established in section 4.1.1. I will do a double reading where I first establish if the key representations are presented, and then see if they are cancelled out by stronger statement that goes against them.
Thereafter the result will be presented in the following way: each SOF will be given an individual section where I first present the speaker and identify if the speech has been on any themes or special focus. Thereafter, I will move on to analyze statements connected the key representations. Since each SOF is between eight and 17 pages it is not possible for me to give a detailed account for every statement connected to every key representation. Instead, I have picked a few which I believe are important to show if the Swedish exceptionalism discourse is presented in the speech. I want to stress that the objective reality the statement refers to is not relevant. For example, if analyzing the statement “Sweden presence in Afghanistan further peace efforts” it is not relevant if Sweden actually brings peace, but that a
37 discourse of Swedish exceptionalism is present in that Sweden is described as bringing peace, stability and security.
Each section on a specific SOF will conclude with short summary of which key representations are present. After each SOF have been presented, there will be a section describing the overall possible presence of a Swedish exceptionalism discourse in the eight speeches. Lastly, the conclusion will be presented to answer the research question:
Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism?
38
5. Empirical section
This chapter will present the empirical results. Each Statement of Foreign Policy will be given its own section and lastly a joint analysis for all eight transcripts will be presented.
5.1. Persson II 2002-2006
5.1.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2003
The 2003 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Social Democratic Minister for Foreign Affair Anna Lindh in the Riksdag on February 12th.
Lindh uses an extended security concept which can be seen in her saying “it is traditionally claimed that security of states is guaranteed by military means…//…But this is too narrow.”125 Here Sweden is position as the opposite to traditional; ergo modern.
Regarding the military non-alignment, she describes it as “having served us well for almost 200 years.”; this refers to 1812, which is the last time Sweden was at war. Hence, the military non-alignment becomes the reason for Sweden being a peaceful, secure and stable country.
In Lindh’s speech, there are notions of an exceptional state’s believing that they have a special responsibility in the world. Lindh says that the Euro referendum vote a few months later is about ”Sweden’s influence in Europe” and the country is ”taking our responsibility when the future Europe is formed”. 126 Here, we can see something, which will be recurrent in close to all SOF; namely that when arguing for a specific international action, the focus is on that Sweden’s action will have a positive effect on others, not what concrete effects it will have for Sweden on a national level. Lindh, for example, do not touch on what effect the adoption of the Euro would have on the Swedish economy.
125 Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:56. Utrikespolitisk debatt, 1. 126 Ibid,. 7.
39 Lindh says that “Sweden will always be at the forefront of the fight against terrorism. However, if we let the fight against terrorism take precedence over human rights, it is we who lose and the terrorists who win. Human rights are at the heart of the tolerant lifestyle we strive and fight for. Therefore, Sweden has enforced that the EU’s efforts against terrorism must be carried out in accordance with human rights.” 127
Here, we can see how several key representations interacts with each other. Sweden will be in the front line to defeat a security threat, and therefore help bring peace, but only in a way, which confirms its role as a human rights champion. This signals just how dedicated Sweden are to human rights, that they will extend them to an enemy. There are also expression of missionist exceptionalism in that Sweden’s “tolerant lifestyle” have been exported to the EU so that they now fight terrorists in a correct way.
Overall, Lindh’s speech is much in line with Swedish exceptionalism. It portrays Sweden as having a responsibility to both individual countries and international organizations. She talks about military non-alignment in positive terms, have a strong focus on human rights and Sweden’s role to bring stability and peace to the world. She does not literally say that Sweden have an “active foreign policy”, but it is implied. There are no statements that obviously goes against the key representations of Swedish exceptionalism.
5.1.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2006
The 2006 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Social Democratic Minister for Foreign Affairs Laila Freivalds in the Riksdag on 15th February.
Freivald’s speech is rather nostalgic with a discourse similar to that of Sweden as a moral superpower during the Cold War, and she also relies on historical events to further the idea of current Sweden being exceptional. For example, in saying, “Fifty years ago, the UN’s first peacekeeping operation succeeded in resolving the Suez crisis by peaceful means. The then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld explained the success of the support from the “middle powers”. Countries large enough to be heard in the international community, but
127 Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:56. Utrikespolitisk debatt, 2.
40 small enough to share insight into the value of international cooperation. Sweden is one such country”.128
Here, we can see glimpses of the exceptional country believing it has “seen the light” in that Sweden, together with some other selected members, are the only ones which have reached important insight. Because of that, this group, where Sweden is the only identified member, is superior to others and have a special role to play in world politics, especially in peace and security issues. This can also be seen as Swedish exceptionalism’s “classical” way of constructing the country identity as in the middle of two Others; in this case small countries, which cannot make their voice heard, and large countries, which not understand the importance of international cooperation.
The military non-alignment is hailed above all other security or foreign policy tools, and by consistently describing it as “the foundation”, Freivalds signals that the country’s foreign and security policies all depends on it. For example; “With the non-alignment as a foundation, we pursue active and safe security police with increasing contributions for military and civilian crisis management and a credible disarmament work.”129
She continues; “Let me make it clear that it is important to have a broad cooperation with NATO within the framework of the partnership in which we participate. We value the cooperation with NATO, but see no reason for a Swedish NATO membership. It has been an advantage for Sweden and for our security that there has been a broad agreement regarding the Swedish security policy line. Now, the two leading opposition parties are advocating for a Swedish NATO membership. It is therefore important that the different Riksdag parties present their views on NATO membership and how they want to pursue that issue in a possible government position” 130
This statement seems to break a social fact, which have been established through mutual understanding among the parties, on how to talk about NATO-membership; we do not in explicit terms dissociate our self from the idea, and we do not mention what position different political parties have on the issue. She also indicates that a change in government might lead
128 Riksdagens protokoll 2005/06:73. Utrikespolitisk debatt, 7. 129 Riksdagens protokoll 2005/06:73. Utrikespolitisk debatt, 8. 130 Ibid,. 4-5.
41 to drastic changes in Swedish security policy, an idea the political establishment has been pushing hard against since World War I.
Freivald’s speech has a strong discourse of Swedish exceptionalism with emphasis on military non-alignment, usage of the expression “active foreign policy”, an overall human right support, solidarity with developing states in Africa and Latin America, and on several occasion she inserts Sweden as a component in liberation and democratic success abroad. All key representations of Swedish exceptionalism are present in Freivald’s speech, and there are few contradictions.
5.2. Reinfeldt I 2006-2010
5.2.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2007
The 2007 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Moderate Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt in the Riksdag on 14th February.
One reappearing expression in Carl Bildt’s speech is “freedom, peace and reconciliation”. In this, we can see two key representations of Swedish exceptionalism; bringing freedom and peace, as well as acting as a mediator in helping actors to reconcile. This expression is often used in combination of Sweden having a responsibility to do so, or it being a task Sweden needs to carry out itself or contribute to. Bildt’s opening is in line with exceptional countries’ will to export their values. He says “Sweden’s foreign policy is to contribute to freedom, peace and reconciliation both in our own and other parts of the world. It proceeds clearly from the values on which our own society is built and from our own interests.”131
Bildt returns to the issues of responsibility when talking about global challenges; “This is ultimately a matter of moral responsibility for our fellow humans and safeguarding the environment we live in.” 132 Here we can see a constructivst world order in that Sweden does not only have a responsibility for their citizens, like in realism, but the whole world. And
131 Government Offices of Sweden. Foreign Policy Declaration 2007. 2015. https://www.government.se/information-material/2007/02/foreign-policy-declaration-2007/ (Fetched 2020-08- 02), 1. 132 Government Offices of Sweden. Foreign Policy Declaration 2007. 2015. https://www.government.se/information-material/2007/02/foreign-policy-declaration-2007/ (Fetched 2020-08- 02), 7.
42 neither does their sympathy stop at the border, instead all people are included through our “fellow human”.
Regarding military non-alignment Bildt says, “The development and formulation of our foreign and security policy must continue to be based on broad national consensus. Sweden is not part of any military alliance”. 133 As described in the background the Alliance, the Moderates and not least Bildt himself want Sweden to join NATO. However, this is in no way expressed in the speech, neither directly nor indirectly. Instead, the discourse rather implies the opposite, which can be understood through the “logic of appropriateness”; an actor’s behavior will depend on what he sees most appropriate based on his identity. The neutrality doctrine/military non-alignment discourse has been present in government foreign policy for so long that it has become an unwritten rule that the individual governments have been socialized in to following.
Bildt says, “Through membership of the political alliance that the European Union constitutes, Sweden has broken away from a tradition dating back to 1812.”134 As mentioned earlier 1812, it is an important symbol, since it refers to the year Sweden was last at war, which coincide with the start of the neutrality doctrine. The official narrative is that Sweden has not stepped away from it since 1812. However, here, Bildt makes it clear that Sweden has indeed done so, though specifying that it’s “political” and not “military” doctrine. Just like constructivism has described in how actor’s need changes to be understood as natural, Bildt does so by literally saying “It was natural for Sweden to join the European Union and, by participating in the Union’s efforts to gradually strengthen cooperation and integration between the democracies of Europe, help build a new order of peace in our part of the world.”135
There is a great focus on how Sweden can promote peace through different channels. Active foreign policy expresses how Sweden takes a “proactive role” in several areas like climate change. Human rights are recurring in the speech, both in terms of individuals and countries. Sweden is also described as both working as a mediator, and pushing the EU to be so. Strong sympathy is expressed with several countries and areas with focus on Eastern Europe and
133 Government Offices of Sweden. Foreign Policy Declaration 2007, 1. 134 Ibid,. 1. 135 Ibid,. 2.
43 Western Balkans. There are also several parts of the speech which tap on the notion of Sweden portraying “newness” in its way of thinking concerning international institutions.
5.2.2 Statement of Foreign Policy 2010
The 2010 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Moderate Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt in the Riksdag on 17th February.
Carl Bildt has a strong focus on Sweden as an EU member and the Swedish state having a European identity. This is done to such a degree that it is sometimes is difficult know if he speaks on behalf of Europe, EU, or Sweden. The key representations of Swedish exceptionalism are indeed presented, but often rather attached to the EU, than to Sweden as an individual country. He also talks about European values, instead of Swedish. Though sometimes saying “Sweden and EU”, mostly it is only “EU”. Therefor it is challenging to do a discourse analysis when the actor, Sweden, has morphed into a union.
Directly in the start of the speech, Bildt says that “Our foreign policy is a part of the common European foreign policy, and a decisive part of our day-to-day work is about being involved in shaping and communicating this.”136 Bildt also describes that he wants to work for a stronger shared EU policy saying; “Sweden’s proactive role in strengthening the European Union’s common foreign and defense policies has contributed towards the EU’s present unique capacity in both civilian and military crisis management.” 137 These statements both include expressions of Swedish exceptionalism, and cancel them out. Sweden are to take a proactive role and strengthen relations between countries. However, it also downplays the arena for Sweden’s independent role to the EU, instead of the world.
Regarding security policies, Bildt does not mention the military non-alignment, so one analysis could be that an important key representation Swedish exceptionalism is not included in the speech. However, Bildt does say, “The government has previously presented and established Sweden’s security policy in the Riksdag. This security policy remains firmly in
136 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2010. 2015. https://www.government.se/information-material/2010/02/statement-of-government-policy- in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2010/ (Fetched 2020-08-02), 1. 137 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2010, 10.
44 place.” 138 This is a peculiar statement since for someone who are not closely following Swedish politics, it would be difficult to know what has been previously been presented . It is possible that this is a way of implying military non-alignment without literally saying it, which is backed up by there are no mention of Sweden joining NATO or in other ways abandoning the military non-alignment.
Notably, this speech is the first after the Riksdag adopted the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity. Bildt quotes “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.”139
“The situation in Belarus is still a cause for concern, not least with regard to respect for human rights. The Government’s support for an open and democratic Belarus continues.”140 What is interesting about this key representation is that in many statements, a country is referred to as both as worthy of solidarity, and to be condemned, sometimes even in the same sentence.
The section of the speech dedicated to disarmament and nuclear weapons includes three key representations of Swedish exceptionalism; bringing peace, security and stability through Sweden taking both the lead and acting as a mediator “That is why Sweden has involved itself so clearly in these issues. While we welcome further reductions by the United States and Russia of their strategic arsenals, we have taken an initiative to make the issue of sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons a subject for negotiations and reductions as well.” 141
Sweden is described as taking and “proactive” role in several areas like UN reform and strengthen EU’s crisis management, but also concerning human rights. Moreover, there are a strong focus on “promoting” democracy, especially through foreign aid program. However, since the uniqueness of Sweden is dismissed by Bildt constantly implying the superiority of the EU, the speech cannot be seen as articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism.
138 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2010, 1. 139 Ibid,. 2. 140 Ibid,. 4. 141 Ibid,. 10-11.
45
5.3. Reinfeldt II 2010-2014
5.3.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2011
The 2011 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Moderate Minister for Foreign Affair Carl Bildt in the Riksdag on 16th February
Bildt’s speech has a strong focus on Europe in general, and EU in particular. It is often described as the main arena for Swedish foreign policy, and that Sweden in particular has possibilities and responsibilities in a European context. His opening statement is “European foreign policy is our foreign policy”,142 which would go against Swedish exceptionalism, since the foreign policy is constructed as European instead of Swedish. However, it has made that clear that just like Sweden needs Europe, Europe needs Sweden, with Bildt saying Europe’s voice is needed in the world. “And Sweden’s voice is needed in Europe.” 143
Sweden is also constructed as having, and taking, responsibility in relation to key representations of Swedish exceptionalism. For example; “Sweden – in the context of European cooperation – has a responsibility to contribute to freedom, peace, security and development in our immediate vicinity and globally.”144 “Responsibility” is also featured in the key representation of showing with solidarity with less fortune states; “At a time when other Member States are facing major problems at home, our country has the strength to take on further responsibility to advance European positions.”145 Here we can see typical Othering in that other countries are described as troubled, which Sweden is not since the country can take on more over the responsibility from the of troubled states.
To Bildt, Sweden is also to take the role of a bridge builder between Europe and other actors. For example, “Sweden has strong ties with many African countries and good prospects to promote a cohesive European Africa policy.” 146 However, this statement also goes against
142 Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2011. 2011.https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/48cc26d4fac146b195e41d4af479ea39/statement-of-government- policy-in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2011 (Fetched 2020-08-13), 1. 143 Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2011, 1. 144 Ibid,. 1. 145 Ibid,. 1. 146 Ibid., 8.
46 exceptionalism, since if the goal is that all European countries will have the same African foreign policy, then Sweden is no longer unique or having a special role.
“At the present time, we are seeing how people’s demand for freedom on the other side of the Mediterranean are creating breathtaking new opportunities for hundreds of millions of people in Europe’s immediate neighborhood.” “And our task will once again be to see how we can help, step by step, to build a better future for them all.” 147
Here we can observe how Sweden’s positions itself in relation to major international event, in this case the Arab Spring. First, by describing the events as taking place in “Europe’s immediate neighborhood” instead of the Middle East, Bildt constructs these struggles closer to Europe, and therefore Sweden. We then observed how Sweden, without motivation, assigned itself the task of helping the freedom fighters. The wording “once again” might be an explanation in that Sweden have done (or at least believe they have) so many times before that when this type of event occur. Helping seems to be the obvious and logical thing to do.
“Sweden’s commitment in Afghanistan is strong and long-term. The broad political consensus on our presence in Afghanistan lays a solid foundation for our initiatives to contribute to peace, security and development, and to help the Afghan people build up their country.” 148 There are several key representations here, which interact with each other. Sweden has strong solidarity with a less fortune state and will help its rebuilding by bringing peace and security. This, in turn, is possible due to the praxis of consensus politics in security and foreign policy issues.
“An active role” or “proactive role” is present in for example regard to trade negotiations and EU crisis management. There a strong emphasizes on supporting freedom struggles in what is referred to “our neighbors” in the South and East. Though all key representations are present, just like in the SOF from 2010 there is a strong focus on Europe that Sweden sometimes are consumed by the EU. So, though there are clear sign of Swedish exceptionalism discourse, there are also statements that to some degree cancelled it out.
147 Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2011, 1. 148 Ibid,. 7.
47
5.3.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2014
The 2014 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Moderate Minister for Foreign Affair Carl Bildt in the Riksdag on 19th February.
Like Bildt’s other speeches, there is a strong focus on Europe and the EU. He opens with “The history of Europe – our history – reminds us of the horrors of war and dictatorship, but also of the phenomenal power of cooperation and freedom. And of the duty that our generation – and during the next – has to discharge and cultivate.” 149 As mentioned in the background, Sweden has during the majority of Europe’s modern history been an outsider, neither suffering from war, nor gaining from cooperation within an alliance. This can be seen as efforts to construct Sweden as a normative European state in that it shares similar experiences as the rest of the continent.
“Sweden today is a leading advocate of freedom on the internet – in multilateral negotiations and in the debate with proponents of censorship and restrictions on freedom.”150 There are several representations of Swedish exceptionalism in this statement; Sweden is refer to as “leading” on freedom on the internet, which is a human right. The country also establish itself as mediator by taking part in negotiations.
When talking about trade Bildt says, “We are concentrating our export promotion resources on countries where our engagement makes the biggest difference….”151 Here the main function of trade is the development of other countries, becoming sort of a foreign aid tool. This in turn portrays Sweden as solidary, selfless, and in support of the less fortune.
Bildt concludes his speech by what can been seen as prime examples of Swedish exceptionalism: “…I am strengthened in my conviction that Sweden makes a difference. We make a difference by being a reliable and principled voice for democracy and freedom, a long-term, generous and accountable aid donor, and a patient and consistent voice for free
149 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2014. 2015. https://www.government.se/information-material/2014/02/statement-of-government-policy- in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2014/ (Fetched 2020-08-02), 1. 150 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2014, 6. 151 Ibid,. 10.
48 trade and multilateral cooperation.”152 Here the country is understood as having a strong positive effect on the world by saying; it “makes a difference”. This difference is then broken down into several key representations; human rights champion and bringing peace. He also makes clear that these characterizes are imbedded in the country by both looking back, and forward. “This is how we have acted so far. And this is how we will continue to act.” 153
The key representations of Swedish exceptionalism are also present in the speech. Bildt is talking extensively about freedom, democracy and human rights, and it is within these issues Sweden is described as a mediator and leader. Military non-alignment is not expressively stated but implied since Sweden is described as a partner to NATO, not a member. Solidarity with less fortune states is also present. The main contradiction of Swedish exceptionalism is not that Bildt speak out against the key representation, rather in some instances EU is given a more prominent role than Sweden. This in turn means that the discourse is not as strongly expressed in terms of Swedish exceptionalism.
5.4. Löfven I 2014-2018
5.4.1. Statement of Foreign Policy 2015
The 2015 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Social Democratic Minister for Foreign Affair Margot Wallström in the Riksdag on February 11th.
Wallström’s speech is to tell the story about Sweden’s return as an activist global actor in that she put much effort on the government’s “feminist foreign policy” and that the UN will play a greater role in Swedish foreign policy. The speech seems to describe a global humanitarian actor focused on doing good. However, there are also strong focus on traditional security policies and military actions.
As mentioned in the theory section, there is a notion of the exceptional country as having a destiny. This present itself already in the opening of Wallström’s speech with her saying; ”We
152 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2014, 11. 153 Ibid,. 11.
49 share a common destiny, and we do so at a time of greater insecurity”.154 Here the “we” seems to refer to either the Swedish state or the Swedish people. The “we” is strengthened by the presence of an external threat – in this case insecurity.
Wallström continues: “The Government is determined that, in these unsettled times, Sweden will take global responsibility by being a strong voice in the world.”155 Here, missionist exceptionalism is on display in establishing Sweden’s role to play on a global scale; Sweden have a responsibility to take the lead, especially when world is facing growing difficulties, and it will its opinions are expected to be heard.
In these statements, Wallström seems to attempt to establish Sweden as an activist global actor. Her language goes back to priority of the Cold War active foreign policy in having greater focus on the UN and does in contrast with the previous administration. “At a global level, the United Nations plays an absolutely crucial role for peace and security. It therefore needs to be strengthened – and the UN’s place in Swedish foreign policy is therefore now being restored.”156 With this, it is underlining that previous governments have not prioritized the UN.
Concerning Sweden taking the lead, Wallström says, “For decades, Sweden has led the way on sexual and reproductive health and rights.” 157 She also ties this to “The values that guide Swedish foreign policy still stand out as an uncommonly modern basis on which to organize a community”. The latter statement is very typical of an exceptional state in regards the concept of “newness”; the understanding of the country superiority in grounded in it having managed to create a new, and modern, type of society. This is turn makes the country especially equipped to take an active role in the global community.
“Through our recognition of the State of Palestine, Sweden wanted to demonstrate that the two-state solution is not merely an abstract vision.”158 Here we can see several key representations ; first Sweden shows Palestine solidarity by recognizing the state, then
154 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Policy Affairs 2015. 2015. https://www.regeringen.se/informationsmaterial/2015/02/statement-of-government- policy-in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2015/ (Fetched 2020-08-02), 1. 155 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Policy Affairs 2015, 8. 156 Ibid,. 2. 157 Ibid,. 3. 158 Ibid., 5.
50 Sweden shows the way for other to do the, since it will contribute to a peaceful two-state solution.
There is another statement, which to some degree clash with the key representations of Swedish exceptionalism, in which is that military operations tend to be described in terms of international peacekeeping missions. However,, Wallström says “While the situation in our neighborhood makes it necessary to strengthen Sweden’s defense capabilities, we are continuing to develop our military cooperation: with Finland, with our other Nordic neighbors, with the Baltic countries and with NATO.”159 “The situation in our neighborhood” is most likely a more diplomatic way of saying “Russia”. Either way, here the military is not portrayed as promoting peace; instead, they are given a traditional military role in that their mission is to defend Sweden against a threatening neighbor.
Another notable exception from the peacekeeping discourse comes when Wallström announce that “The Government is looking into the possibility of sending Swedish military personnel to Iraq to help train troops fighting ISIL.”160 This is a highly unusual way of describing the Swedish military’s role. Because as mentioned, Sweden participates in peacekeeping – not “fighting” – and as a peaceful country they should neither help others to do so. To even present the idea of training an authoritarian state’s military for an operation that lacks an UN- mandate, is a notifiable deviation from traditional Swedish security policy discourse.
However, except for the part from that, Wallström’s speech is pretty much textbook Swedish exceptionalism. It is very much representative of the government’s “feminist foreign policy” which promote an activist foreign policy, where Sweden is once again to take on a global leadership role. Like in all SOF, human rights are heavily featured, but here with a very strong focus on women and girls, which can be seen as missionist exceptionalism in that it seeks to export Swedish values on gender equality.
5.4.2. Statement of Foreign Policy 2018
The 2018 Statement of Foreign Policy was held by Social Democratic Minister for Foreign Affair Margot Wallström in the Riksdag on 14th February.
159 Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Policy Affairs 2015, 2. 160 Ibid,. 5.
51 The focus are feminist foreign policy, peace and security, and Sweden’s role in the UN, especially described in terms of the country’s role as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.
In the opening of her speech, Wallström says, “Democracy is at the core of Sweden’s foreign policy. Its task is to create security when the rest of the world is troubled.”161 Here is a case of Sweden seeing itself as having a special role to play in the world, in this case promote democracy and create security. The statement can also be seen as case of Othering in that Swedish democracy is put against the rest of the world, which is “troubled”. Sweden therefor have the responsibility to help the Other by using its foreign policy to make the world safer.
This view of Sweden having a special role is also seen concerning its “feminist foreign policy”, with Wallström saying, “Sweden is one of the largest donors in the area of sexual and reproductive health and rights, through contraceptives, maternity care and safe abortions. We are working to stop female genital mutilation. These are some examples of our feminist foreign policy in action. And other countries are following suit.” 162 This statement consists several representations of Swedish exceptionalism. The country is a leader not just because it has petitioned its policies as pioneering, but also that it now has followers. In addition, since the feminist foreign policy, which is built on Swedish values, the country has managed to export these to other countries.
By putting a large focus on that role in connection to Sweden’s position as a member of the Security Council, the country is constructed as a powerful state, which can affect the UN by as whole and promote Swedish values like peace and gender equality. Regarding the Security Council there are many statements in which several key representations are present and often intertwine with each other. For example, ”We are making a difference. Right now, we are negotiating a resolution on a ceasefire in Syria to continue to ensure humanitarian assistance to the millions of people in need. We have a leading role on issues concerning children in armed conflicts. We have considerably strengthened the UN’s work on women, peace and security.”163 Here we can see variations of the key representations on Sweden bringing peace, security, and stability. Its intervened with the belief of being an exceptional country having a
161 Government Offices of Sweden. The Government’s Statement of Foreign Policy 2018. 2018. https://www.government.se/speeches/2018/02/the-governments-statement-of-foreign-policy-2018/ (Fetched 2020-08-02), 1. 162 Government Offices of Sweden. The Government’s Statement of Foreign Policy 2018, 5. 163 Ibid., 4.
52 positive effect on and important role to play in the world. First, peace will come if a ceasefire is agreed on, which Sweden will engage in by being a mediator/negotiator. Secondly, Sweden is leading the way to support children, and human rights, in situations opposite of peaceful. Lastly, Sweden is understood as a powerful state in that it has managed to make significant changes, in line with Swedish values, of the UN.
Regarding the Security Council, Wallström also say, “At Sweden’s initiative, a unanimous Council condemned the violence against the Rohingya people in Myanmar, and we are working for a solution to the crisis and for those who are guilty of crimes against humanity to be brought to justice.” 164 In this statement we can see several key representations working together, Sweden is both a human rights champion, leader and bridge builder since the country managed to unify the Council in condemning human rights abuse.
However, in this speech there is a stronger emphasis of Sweden as a European state, and the crucial role of the EU. For example, Wallström says that “The EU is our most important foreign policy arena. We are working for an EU that is active in the world – with regard to foreign and security policy, and with a policy for free and fair trade.”165 “
Regarding military non-alignment, Wallström says, “Our non-participation in military alliances serves us well and contributes to stability and security in northern Europe.”166 Here, we can also see the key representation of Sweden as bringing peace, stability and security. It also mirrors a notion from WWII when Sweden saw itself as contribution to peace simply by not officially joining a military alliance.
What is present in the speech next to mention of peace, security, and stability; human rights, is leading the way, military non-alignment, Wallström also talks about the government having an “active foreign policy”, which is also backed up by describing Sweden as an active member in other contexts, for example as an EU member. There are also expressions of solidarity with other less fortune states worldwide, for example Afghanistan and Ukraine. Overall, all are strong key representations are present and there are no notifiable contradictions.
164 Government Offices of Sweden. The Government’s Statement of Foreign Policy 2018, 4. 165 Ibid,. 3. 166 Ibid,. 2.
53 5.5. Joint analysis 2002 - 2018
All key representations can to different degrees be seen as expressions of missionist exceptionalism, but it is heaviest featured in regard to being pioneering or “leading the way”. Often, we can see sort of a “leading the way on an issue where Sweden is a pioneer”. This is implicitly strongest stated during 2015 and 2018 with the feminist foreign policy.
Sweden as bringing security, stability, and peace is one of the most frequently featured key representations in all speeches and ties together with many other representations. Bringing security, stability, and peace is often described as the consequence of other representations like Sweden acting as a mediator or being military non-aligned. It often works together with other representations and is attached to many different areas of foreign policy, in part because that all speakers uses an extended security concept. This also signals that Sweden is a modern state, which sees further than just military threats. This is expressed in, for example, having a discourse of climate change and poverty as security threats.
Security is to some degree expressed in terms of the country’s own security, but most often in relation to others. In several speeches, foremost under Social Democratic ministers, the world are portrayed as dangerous and that Sweden is having a responsibility to bring peace. Bringing freedom and peace are explicitly listed as tasks of Sweden’s foreign policy in all of Bildt four speeches. In the Social Democratic speeches, it expressed concerning specific causes, but unlike Bildt, it is not given an intrinsic value.
The second most frequently mentioned key representation is that of Sweden being a champion of human rights and democracy, which in some statements intertwine with “bringing security, stability, and peace”, in part due to the extended security concept. The key representation tends to tie with superiority in Sweden taking the role of a forefront humanitarian nation. This shown by stating the amount of money Sweden spends on development aid, often in comparison with other countries. This is consistent of all speeches.
In all speeches there are strong features of missionism in that close to all relations with other countries are described as an opportunity for Sweden to influence the other country’s values in general and further human rights in particular. This is especially present when describing Sweden’s relationship with China and Russia. There are also strong emphasis on that human
54 rights extends to everyone in all situations, for example by including terrorist, as described in speeches by Lindh 2003, Freivald 2006, Bildt 2007, and Wallström 2015.
Sweden acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder are often connected to the previous two representations, since Sweden is either suited to take on the role because of its values, or that the consequences of Sweden’s involvement will be that peace will come. Sweden is often positioned as either mediating between parties or being a strong participant in general negotiations. The understanding of the exceptional state having a special mission has a strong connection to the role of the mediator. The mission is described in terms of Sweden having a “task” in Bildt’s speeches from 2007, 2010, and 2011, and Wallström’s from 2018, Sweden have the “task” of bringing “reconciliation”.
Sweden engages in several ways showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small). Something that is interesting about this key representation is that in many statements another country is constructed both as worthy of solidarity, and condemnation, sometimes even in the same sentences, which leads to difficulties in determining if these are considered to count or not.
There was also a discourse where a state’s people were shown solidarity, but not the state. In these instances, Sweden was most often portrayed as a champion of human rights and democracy. In fact, in general “solidary” in the speeches is more commonly directed to individuals. These were sometimes identified by nationality, but more often in broad terms like “women”, “children”, “poor”, and “human rights advocates/defenders”.
There were, however, many statements corresponding with the exact meaning of the key representation. The solidarity was mainly described in terms of Sweden showing “support” or “commitment” to a clearly identified less fortune state, or group of states. One of many examples are Sweden’s “commitment” in Afghanistan, and its “support” of the Baltic countries’ security needs. These two are present in all speeches. There are also displays of solidarity with continents or unnamed “developing countries”.
To summarize, there was a strong presence of Swedish exceptionalism discourse in all of the speeches.
55
6. Conclusions
For this thesis Swedish exceptionalism discourse has been dependent on seven key representations, which are:
Sweden:
1. being military non-aligned 2. having an active foreign policy 3. being pioneering or “leading the way” 4. bringing security, stability, and peace 5. being a champion of human rights and democracy 6. acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder 7. showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small)
In the section for each individual SOF it has been established which key presentations are present and, in the overview, I have given an overall assessment and also some comparisons between the speeches.
Regarding the special role an exceptional country has to play, a difference between the speeches is on what arena Sweden is to play on. Bildt to a higher degree focus on Sweden’s role in EU, and its role in the world through the EU, while the Social Democrats puts a larger emphasis on the UN. The main argument against the speeches not being expressed through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism is not that speakers produce statement against the key representations. Rather the issue is the core of national exceptionalism; the uniqueness of a specific country. This is to a certain degree true of Bildt’s speech in 2010, where Sweden is constructed mainly as one among many EU members. However, this speech still had a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in other instances. And regarding the other seven speeches they all had an overall strong discourse of Swedish exceptionalism. With that, I will refer back to the research question:
Research question: Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism? Answer: Yes.
56
Discussion
What have become obvious to me when analyzing these speeches is that in many statements several key representations are present, which can be intertwined with or dependent on each other. For example, “4. bringing security, stability, and peace” often acts together with “5. being a champion of human rights and democracy”, “1. being military non-alignment” and/or “7. acting as a mediator and/or bridge builder”. When it comes to “2. having an active foreign policy” and “3. being pioneering or “leading the way” or these are often sort of a headline for all the other key representations, because obviously there have to be an area which you are active or leading the way on.
What stood out most to me, who have not taken part of these speeches before, was how similar most of the speeches were, even though the speakers came from different government and parties over the stretch of 16 years in which major political changes occurred both on the national and international stage. It was surprising that if you did not know better, it would seem like the Swedish politicians were all on the same page. As mentioned in the empirical section, the constructivist belief on logic of appropriateness, that an actor will do what is most in lined with its identity, might be a reason that speakers sometimes spoke against their own political interest. So not only do these speeches articulated a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism, but they also demonstrate the long tradition of the Sweden showing a united front.
Critical reflection
This thesis has determined that there was a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018. This is based on the result in the empirical section, where the key representations have been present in all of the speeches. If being critical of the result, one reason could be that the key representations have been too loosely defined, and have therefor managed intercept a broad range of statements, which were not necessarily comparative. This is of course not inheritably bad, but it is possible that more narrow definitions, could have led to a different result.
57 Continuing, when researching Swedish exceptionalism there were scholars who referred to one feature being the respect for and furthering of international law, but I chose to not to include that in the key representations since I had to draw some limit. After analyzing the speeches it’s clear that this had a comprehensive presence in all speeches, more so than the key representation “showing solidarity with “less fortune” states”. The latter key representation was the one that was the most difficult to apply since it would had needed to be more clearly defined.
Finally, as mentioned in the analytical procedure, due to the volume of pages, it was not possible to do an analysis of all key representation in each SOF, both those who were in favor and against. Therefore, I had sometime just simply acknowledge their presence, which risk that the empirical section becomes a content analysis instead of a discourse analysis.
58 References
Statement of Foreign Policy
Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:56. Utrikespolitisk debatt.
Riksdagens protokoll 2005/06:73. Utrikespolitisk debatt.
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Government Offices of Sweden. Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2014. 2015. https://www.government.se/information- material/2014/02/statement-of-government-policy-in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign- affairs-2014/ (Fetched 2020-08-02)
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Sveriges Radio. Anna Lindh talade vid demonstration mot Irakkriget. Sveriges Radio. 2003- 03-22. https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=204237 (Fetched 2020-07-17)
Sveriges Riksdag. Yes to memorandum of understanding with NATO on host nation support. Sveriges Riksdag. 2016-05-27. https://www.riksdagen.se/en/news/2016/maj/27/yes-to- memorandum-of-understanding-with-nato-on-host-nation-support-ufou4/ (Fetched 2020-07- 17)
Svenska Freds. Snabba fakta om vapenexport. 2020. https://www.svenskafreds.se/vad-vi- gor/vapenexport/snabba-fakta-om-vapenexport/ (Fetched 2020-07-10)
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Svensson, Alf. Låt Sverige bli medlem av NATO. Svenska Dagbladet. 2013-01-11. https://www.svd.se/lat-sverige-bli-medlem-av-nato (Fetched 2020-07-01)
Svensson, Gunnar. Natos bomber över Serbien oundvikliga. Aftonbladet. 2003-09-27. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/0EQoXG/natos-bomber-over-serbien-oundvikliga (Fetched 2020-07-10)
Säkerhetspolisen. Färre reser från Sverige till terroristorganisationer. 2017. https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/ovrigt/pressrum/aktuellt/aktuellt/2017-06-27-farre-reser-fran- sverige-till-terroristorganisationer.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
SVT Nyheter. Svenska utlandsstyrkan: Från fredsbevarande till fredsframtvingande. Svt Nyheter 2010-11-08. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/norrbotten/svenska-utlandsstrykan- fran-fredsbevarande-till-fredsframtvingande (Fetched 2020-07-02)
The Swedish Institute. The Swedish system of government. 2020. https://sweden.se/society/the-swedish-system-of-government/# (Fetched 2020-07-01)
TT. Reinfeldt vill inte se reträtt 2011. Svt nyheter. 2010-10-19. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/reinfeldt-vill-inte-se-retratt-2011 (Fetched 2020-07-01)
UN Committee against Torture (CAT). Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden. 2020. https://www.refworld.org/cases,CAT,42ce734a2.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
United Nations, Security Council Resoulation 1386 (2001) https://undocs.org/S/RES/1386(2001) (Fetched 2020-08-17)
Valmyndigheten. Valresultat. 2020. https://www.val.se/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2014. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2014/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2010. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2010/valresultat.html (Fetched 2020-08-30)
Valmyndigheten. Valresultat 2006. 2019. https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och- kommun/2006.html (Fetched 2020-07-02)
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