TITLE : RURAL RESTRUCTURING IN CENTRAL RUSSIA : PART III : REGIONS OF CENTRAL RUSSIA

AUTHOR: GREGORY IOFFE & TATYANA NEFEDOVA Radford University

THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEA N RESEARC H

TITLE Vlll PROGRA M

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W . Washington, D .C. 20036

NCSEER NOT E

This is the third of three reports on Rural Restructuring in Central Russia . For the Introduction to the series please see the first report, Part I, "Spacial Perspectiv e on Agrarian Reform in Russia" distributed on August 5, 1996 .

PROJECT INFORMATION : 1

CONTRACTOR : Radford University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Gregor y loffe

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 810-0 4

DATE : August 9, 1996

COPYRIGHT INFORMATIO N

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded by Counci l Contract . The Council and the U .S . Government have the right to duplicate written reports and othe r materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within the Council and U .S . Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies ; but th e Council and U .S . Government do not have the right to distribute, or make such reports and material s available, outside the Council or U .S . Government without the written consent of the authors, except as ma y be required under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U .S.C. 552, or other applicable law .

The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Counci l for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet - Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained i n the report are those of the author(s) . CONTENT S

Executive Summary i

Regions of Central Russia 1

The Province of Pskov 2 Plausible causes of low returns 2 Inside the province 3 Subsidiary plots and private farmers 5 Resettlers: a new diaspora 5

The Province of Kostroma 7 Internal contrasts 8 Demographic trends 9

The Province of Yaroslavl 1 0 The case of the May Day cooperative 1 1 Spatial pattern of rural population change 1 4 The contraction of the activity space 1 5 As compared with 1913 1 7 What have we arrived at by 1995? 1 8 Regionalization 20 The local scale 2 1

Spatial Polarization of the Countryside 22

Endnotes 2 5

Tables

Figures (maps) 31 t

RURAL RESTRUCTURING IN CENTRAL RUSSIA '

Part Three. Regions of Central Russi a

Gregory Ioffe and Tatyana Nefedova

Executive Summar y The spatial polarization of the countryside appears to be the most pervasive geographicall y pronounced trend in Central Russia, a trend that affects all other significant processes and pattern s including those of crisis and reform . Exurban (located in the vicinity of large cities) and outlying areas (located outside two hour accessibility to them) are growing increasingly different ; the transitional belt between them, the semi-periphery, continues to share some characteristics of bot h even as the gap grows more pronounced .

The crisis of the 1990s affected these segments of the countryside differently . Economically weak collective and state farms in the outlying areas were impacted first ; by 1994 the wave of crisi s had reached the strong socialized farms of the exurbia, and by 1995 many technologically advance d poultry and pig-breeding farms located close to large cities came to a halt . At the same time the outlying areas were completing a switch to subsistence farming that survives as a result of it s relationship to socialized farms which exist only nominally in effect receiving centralized supplie s that are passed on to households .

The subject matters of Part One and Part Two are given a geographically more detaile d treatment in this Part III based on three case studies, the provinces of Pskov, Kostroma, an d Yaroslavl. Aside from the rural polarization, specific subjects include : resettlement of ethnic Russian s in the provlnce of Pskov; the evolution of specific socialized farms in various zones of accessibility t o the provincial center ; the newly-emerged phenomenon of rural unemployment ; and comparison of th e agricultural geography of today with that in the beginning of the 20th century .

'For Administrative Sub-Division maps of the European ex-USSR, and of the Russian Federation see pages 47 - 48 . PART THREE: REGIONS OF CENTRAL RUSSI A

The statistics on the death-rate in the villages - what empty things they are, unless on e remembers a certain village near Tambov, a certain house with broken windows an d rotted thatch, and the sound of wailing that went on all night .

- G.T Robinson . "Rural Russia Under the Old Regime "

Agriculturally speaking, "Central Russia" is the agrarian backbone of the Central Industrial Belt . It consists of twenty non-Chernozem provlnces (oblasts) of three macro-economic regions : th e Industrial Center, the Northwest, and the Volgo-Viatka . Characteristic features of the agricultural land use of these areas are shown in Table 1 (p.2'7) . Most of Central Russia is located within the natural vegetation regions of taiga (its southern margin ) and of mixed and broad-leaf forests . Only the southernmost provinces extend somewhat into forest - steppe. Between 10% (in some districts of the province of Pskov) and 70% (in the South) of the tota l land is devoted to agriculture . The spatial patterns of both agricultural and arable land are close correlates of natural vegetation: from minimum open spaces in taiga to maximum in forest-steppe (Fig. 3 .1, p.31) . It is, however, the socio-economic factors that have the most bearing on the current conditio n of the countryside. The most important of those factors has been the spatial concentration of the rura l population (discussed in our Report 2) and the polarization of the inhabited space this concentratio n has entailed. The polarization is aggravated by the fact that the attractive urban cores in most of central Russia are sparse. While Tables 1, 2, and 3 (pp .27-28) reflect a rather low level of spatia l resolution, they clearly show the preeminence of the Moscow province's countryside in terms of roa d network density, residential amenities, and agricultural land use intensity . This area also leads al l ethnic Russian provlnces in rural population density and in retention of rural population . The selection of case study regions in this report was related to the authors' previous regiona l experience; the work on the project itself enabled us to update our background knowledg e substantially and to capture new trends . The three provinces (oblasts) that we will focus on featur e somewhat different yet highly typical patterns of rural life in Central Russia . The descriptions ar e based on our surveys and, unless other sources of reference are mentioned, on data gathered by us i n local bureaus of statistics and in other departments of provincial administrations .

1 THE PROVINCE OF PSKOV (map p .42 ) This province (oblast) is of interest to this study because it is fairly typical, but also because i t has experienced an abrupt change in its geopolitical situation : the emergence of a national border . So traditional rural problems are enmeshed in some new processes . The industrial boom of the late 1800s sidestepped Pskov. Even during the splash of socialis t industrialization the area remained overwhelmingly agrarian . However, during the last thirty years th e proportion of agriculture in the total output of the economy dwindled from 57% to 19% . ' Yet even now the overall value of fixed assets in agriculture exceeds that in industry . Land used in agriculture accounts for 30% of the total land area of 55,300,000 square km (40 % of the area is forested ; the rest is lakes, marshes, urban areas, roads and peateries .) Fifty-eight percen t of the working population of the countryside is engaged in agricultural production units ; 15% mor e work in personal auxiliary farming only . Most of the retirees in the area (35% of the rural population! ) also work subsidiary plots . Thus the overwhelming majority of country folk deal with farming on e way or another. In the 1990s, agriculture absorbed one-third of all the investment in the province. Th e economy of the whole province has been a recipient of federal aid, with the bulk of the subsidie s poured into agriculture . The province of Pskov is one of the most plowed areas in the whole of the Non-Chernozem zone o f Russia'. In terms of the number of cattle per unit of agricultural land, the province is on a par wit h Estonia. Its agricultural output, however, leaves much to be desired . Grain yields are half as high as in the Leningrad province (despite the inferiority of the latter's natural conditions) and almost 2 .5 times lower than in the neighboring Baltics . Potato farming and animal husbandry are also in dire straits . Overall, a peasant in the Baltics feeds four times as many people as a Pskov peasant, who also feed s less than a Leningrad farmer does .

Plausible Causes of Low Returns A productivity drop-off of the kind that exists between the province of Pskov and neighborin g Estonia (a two-to-threefold difference in output per unit of land) has nothing to do with natura l conditions. Pskov is no worse off in this regard. An indicator of those conditions traditionally used in Russia is the yield of grains recorded at state testing stations in a year with statistically norma l weather under mainstream farming technology . For the province of Pskov this level ranges betwee n 15 and 20 centners per hectare, with an average of 19 ; formerly Soviet Estonia was characterized b y exactly the same average. However, in the 1970s the actual grain yield in Pskov's collective and stat e farms was only 12 centners per hectare; in the 1980s, it was 9-11 centners/hectare, and in 1991-94, 8 to 11 . Across the border in Estonia, grain yields in the 1970s and 80s ranged between 24 and 2 8 centners per hectare' . The application of mineral fertilizers per unit of arable land in the '80s in th e province was 60% of the Estonian level. However, in this regard Pskov has been better off than mos t 2 of other non-Chernozem provinces with the exception of Moscow and Leningrad . Pskov is also one of Russia's leaders in capital/labor ratio, that is, in the monetary value of agricultural fixed assets pe r one employee . It is social conditions that are the most significant factor in the province's under-achievement . For example, there are 21 km of paved roads per 1000 square km in the province of Pskov versus 32 8 km in neighboring Estonia . In terms of flush toilets in rural residences, the province is the 52nd i n descending order of Russia's 89 civil divisions, and in terms of central heating it is the 65th . Also i n the past, the province of Pskov stood out for its high number of rural settlements, their smallness, an d the short distances between them . The latter is no longer the case, as rural depopulation took a heav y toll on the countryside, and myriads of vlllages were abandoned . Historically one of the cores of ethnic Russian settlement and colonization, along with the adjoining Novgorod and Tver lands, th e province now has a population density on a par with many areas in Siberia and in the Europea n Russia's north. The rural population density in the Pskov province now is only 5 .3 people per square km, down from 25 in 1926 . Even worse, no other province of the Russian Federation has as large a negative rate of natural increase of rural population as Pskov : in 1993 the difference between th e number of births and the number of deaths in the countryside was -20 .8 (!) per 1000 persons ' -- a clearly "suicidal" gap .

Inside the Provinc e The province of Pskov is bi-central . One principal focal point is the city of Pskov located in th e northwest, with 207,000 residents in 1994 . The city of Velikiye Luki with its 107,000 residents is th e second-ranked center ; located in the south it used to preside over a separate province . Only 15% of the province's land is plowed . The area in between Pskov and Velikiye Luk i stands out in terms of its proportion of arable land . Historically it has been the main agricultural are a of the province, holding almost one half of its total arable land . The Pskov district (rayon) leads the 24 other districts of the provlnce in livestock production . It contributes 16% of the meat and about 10% of the province's milk . Ostrov, Palkino, and Pechory districts adjoining that of Pskov are also significant producers . Together these four districts produce 28% of the meat and 34% of the provlnce's vegetables while having only 21% of the agricultural land . Yields per unit of land depend upon proximity to the two main urban centers . In the late 1980s the highest grain yields occurred in the immediate vicinities of these centers and along the border wit h Estonia (Fig . 3 .2, p.32). About 15 to 20 years ago, the output per unit of land closely correlated with natural conditions, which are more favorable in the southern part of the province . In the meantime , however, yields dropped everywhere except in the districts of Pskov, Velikiye Luki, and along th e western (now national) border . In the 1990s the pace of decline has picked up appreciably, and onl y

3 two districts, those of Pskov and Velikiye Luki, now sustain yields in excess of 15 centners pe r hectare . It is important to note that the local investment policy has not altogether favored exurban area s (the so-called cities' countrysides) . On the contrary, an attempt has been made to disperse fund s equitably or even to the benefit of outlying districts (or the periphery) struggling to survive . In thi s regard the province of Pskov has differed from many other non-Chernozem provinces, such as th e province of Yaroslavl, where the investment policy has favored the most productive districts . However, rural population dynamics proved to be a stronger factor than investment . The districts of Pskov and of Velikiye Luki have lost fewer people through migration and negative natura l increase of population than any other district in the last twenty years (Fig . 3 .3, p.32). On the other hand, the outlying districts have lost half of their rural population . Out-migration has also impacte d the two northern districts, Plius and Strugi Krasnye, whose residents have gravitated toward Sain t Petersburg. It is in the cities' countryside where rural population density (10-12 people per square km ) is at its highest in the province, while in the outlying districts it is only 2-5 people per sq km . Asid e from proximity to the urban areas with their jobs and retail outlets, the exurbia appears to be relativel y attractive because of a higher quality of rural infrastructure . In the Pskov district, for example, abou t half of all rural residences enjoy flush toilets and central heating . By comparison, in the district s located in the middle of the provlnce, only 20-40% of residences have these facilities, and in th e north, only 10-20% . Also the relative well-being of collective and state farms in the cities ' countryside, including higher wages, helped sustain the rural population . A peculiar contraction of the formerly viable and robust agricultural space has been under wa y throughout this century . However, the process has accelerated during the recent twenty years . Throughout the century, the key factors in the spatial differentiation of agricultural output per unit o f land changed several times . In the early 1900s, under a spatially even rural population density of about 25 people per sq km, two factors played a key role: the natural fertility of the soil and proximity to urban markets . Consequently, the most productive districts were those of th e northwest and middle of the province . By the mid-1900s, social cataclysms had temporarily turne d the social factors off: on the one hand, in the wake of collectivization, closeness to urban markets n o longer mattered and, on the other, the social mobility of the rural population remained low . As a result, the middle and the southernmost districts led the rest because they are better endowed by nature . By the 1970-1980s, social mobility had already set outlying districts (periphery) and th e cities' countryside (exurbia) far apart, so the areas around Pskov that sustained the smallest losses o f rural population began to stand out . As for the space in between Pskov and Velikie Luki, historicall y the main agricultural zone of the province, it has suffered the most . Finally, in the crisis-ridden 1990 s marked by confusion and disarray in agriculture, only the areas in the immediate vicinity of the tw o principal urban centers have fared well . 4 Subsidiary Plots and Private Farmer s According to official statistics, in 1993-94 subsidiary (personal auxiliary) farming was conducted on 2-5% of all the agricultural land: in reality it was conducted on about one-fifth of the land, and in some outlying districts and in the middle of the province the proportion was even higher . Needless to say before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, personal auxiliary farming (PAF) coul d not use that much of the agricultural land, even though abandonment of collective and state farm lan d due to rural depopulation had been affecting the province since the 1960s . Not only has PAF increased its landholding in the 1990s, during the recent dramatic decline of socialized farming , subsidiary plots have doubled their output, including a sixfold increase in vegetable produce . Currently, half of all milk produced in the provlnce and one-third of its meat are being contributed b y PAP . There is, however, a substantial spatial disparity . The emphasis on PAF is especially strong i n the province's middle and in its south (Fig . 3 .4, p.32). In the south the proportion of PAF in produc e is such (40-50% of total meat, over 50% of milk, and over 80% of potatoes) that local agriculture can no longer be considered "predominantly socialized" (per Sovlet terminology) . Rather it is a symbiosis of PAF and its socialized "roof' (see our Report 1), which has to be taken into account in any analysi s of reform . Figure 3 .5 (p.32) shows the spread of private farming, whose current share of agricultural lan d is about 10% . However, the conservative south seems to reject independent farming, while the nort h embraces it with enthusiasm . Another area with visible emphasis on private farming stretches alon g the western border . Thus, PAF and private farming appear to diverge spatially in the province of Pskov .

Resettlers : a New Diaspora ? As was already mentioned, the province of Pskov is among Russian subdivisions with th e heaviest decline in rural population . The 1994 rural population was 25% of what it was in 1897, an d 19% of that in 1926 . For comparison, the neighboring Leningrad province and the Baltics hav e retained 55-60% of their 1926 rural population figure . However, in the 1990s the province of Pskov, for the first time in decades, began to attrac t migrants. In terms of the actual number of in-migrants per 10,000 population, the province does no t stand out: in 1989-93 the migration inflow was about 35 people per 10,000 . It is no Belgorod , Kaliningrad, or piedmont provinces of the Northern Caucasus with their 100-120 in-migrants pe r 10,000 population'. Nevertheless, a government-sponsored "Resettlement" program has been give n high priority by the provincial administration because of the general consensus that the province i s too thinly populated .

5 The program includes five components entitled: Individual Migration; Communal Migration ; Ethnic Germans of Russia; Northerners ; and Job-Creation for Resettlers . According to the planners ' design, the principal emphasis was to be put on communal migration, that is re-allocation of close - knit groups of mainly ethnic Russians from the ex-Soviet republics . However, it is actually "individuals," that is, unrelated persons that generate the bulk of the incoming flow. Though the communal resettlement segment of the program envisioned only about 2000 migrants a year in 1993 - 95, as many as 30,000 individual volunteers registered annually . By and large, the resettlers must rel y on themselves. The only asset that the province of Pskov supplies them with is land : two hectares pe r volunteer, and twenty hectares in case a newcomer wants to establish a private farm . Land is being assigned free of charge . About one-half of the actual resettlers are from other provinces of Russia . In 1991-93, th e proportion from the Baltics increased fourfold and now accounts for 25% of the whole inflow; together with migrants from the non-Russian Slavic republics, the flow of predominantly ethni c Russians accounts for over one-third of the migrants . Fifteen percent of the newcomers originate fro m southern republics . This all sounds impressive, but there is a rub: 80% of the migrants from other ex-Sovie t republics are urbanites . And it is they who are being offered land . Those who have no othe r resettlement option take it . During only nine months of 1993, about 7000 people arrived in the urban areas of the province and about 6000 in its countryside . The rural population was thus substantiall y replenished. Compared with this increase from outside the province, the net urban-to-rural migratio n within the province itself was minuscule : +754 persons in 1993 . Overall, whereas in 1979-1989 th e countryside experienced a net outflow of 67 people per 10,000 rural population, in 1989-1993, ther e was a net inflow of 34 people per 10,000 . 6. Every cloud has a silver lining, that is, only a crisis of truly national proportions was able t o turn the tide of migration . In the past many efforts to recruit resettlers proved fruitless . Contract agents used to make forays into the labor-surplus Northern Caucasus, selecting the most promisin g volunteers. Some of them got lost en route after receiving cash a advance to cover moving expenses ; others vanished later . Everything changed in 1992 when a provincial Office of Employment in Pskov was besieged b y refugees from all corners of the fallen empire . The flow soon subsided, since the province was unabl e to finance residences for all those interested . The resettlement allowance itself was highl y insufficient : in 1992 it was 3500 roubles per household head plus 1700 roubles per househol d member. Compare these with the 10 million roubles construction cost per cottage . The ability o f newcomers to cover these costs by selling their homes in the areas of exodus were and still are fairl y limited, as both in the Baltics and in the southern republics demand for housing is short of supply, which translates into low prices . 6 Under such conditions the "Resettlement" program aims at construction of cottages by th e potential migrants themselves . They work in stints with one brigade giving way to another . Smal l industrial enterprises are being incorporated into the physical plans of the newly-emergin g settlements . Nine such settlements are already under construction, twelve more are being projected . Where they are located is a crucial question in terms of their prospects for taking root and surviving . Unfortunately the answer is : the provincial Administration has located them in outlying site s inconducive to new settlement. Their average distance from district centers is 35 km . They are bein g built by construction teams from Latvia and Murmansk composed of people still holding onto thei r current residences in their home areas . This is understandable as for the time being there is no othe r place for these people to live. But the local officials suspect that in the future there will still be no rea l replenishment of farming labor ; what the province is likely to receive, in their view, is new dachniks , or owners of second, usually recreational, dwellings . And that, for local officials, is no good at all . However, in all fairness, the construction teams build residences for the locals as well . For example , the "Latvians" (ethnic Russians from Latvia) have recently bought from a collective farm in th e Ostrov district eighteen shells, seven of which they have finished and sold back to the farm while th e remaining ones they are finishing for themselves . Still, as our survey has shown, no less than 60% of the resettlers would like to take root either in the city's countryside or in the westernmost districts o f the province, which they or their ancestors had left for the Baltics, and only an insignificant portion o f these returnees have retained skills in working land . Some features of the diaspora are evident in the attitudes of these ethnic Russian returnees - newcomers: their close-knit communities, impenetrable by the locals, a peculiar combination o f pariah and superiority complexes, and an acute sense of purpose . Their way of living is different fro m that of the locals, and their labor productivity is much higher . However, it is exactly this set o f features that has traditionally alienated the Russian peasant, just as he turned away from the classi c diasporas in Russia of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews . While urban areas of Russia are no longer totall y hostile to them, a Russian village is still in the habit of rejecting "aliens" even if they are actuall y ethnic Russians. It would be regrettable if local authorities fail to tap into the energy of newcomers and not help turn it to the benefit of the Russian countryside .

THE PROVINCE OF KOSTROMA (map p .43) The province of Kostroma is located at the crossroads between three macro-economic region s of Russia: the Industrial Center, the North, and Volgo-Viatka . One could say that the province looks like a miniature model of Russia as a whole . Like Russia at large, it has a sizable southwest-northeas t climatic gradient and is colonized fairly unevenly . The city of Kostroma (304,000 residents in 1994 ) located in the southwestern corner holds 37% of the total population, and together with the thre e nearby districts stretching along the Volga river, over 50% of it . Just as in the Russian heartland as a 7 whole, which gravitates to meridional waterways leading from the Varangians to the Greeks (i z variagov v grieki),the west-leaning historical core of this province focuses on north-south trendin g rivers . Also the vast forested area to the northeast of the Volga is a miniature copy of Siberia, and just as in the "original," a latitudinal railway line crosses rivers . Even the structure of the economy is clos e to the overall Russian economy, although the proportion of the rural population in the province o f Kostroma (34%) is higher than in the nation (27%) ' . Kostroma has sundry local problems that are typical for Central Russia. However, one of th e peculiarities of the province is that only 38% of the economically active rural population works i n agriculture. For comparison, in the province of Pskov 58% do farming work, and in Russia as a whole, 53%. There are three pivotal economic sectors in the countryside of Kostroma : flax-textile , dairy, and forestry. All three are crisis-stricken in the 1990s so that the province's overall economi c health is partially dependent on enterprises not as consistently aboriginal as the above three, that is , on power engineering, and, to some extent, on machine-building .

Internal Contrast s About one-half of all the province's districts have dramatically reduced their agricultural outpu t in the 90s, with the northwest being hardest hit by the crisis . On the other hand, in the southwestern districts gravitating to the city of Kostroma, the decline is no more than 20%, and in the most remot e east the output has even grown (in the Oktiabrski district), entirely due to PAF (Fig . 3 .6, p.33) . The proportion of arable land in the province ranges between 41% in the southwest and 4% i n the north. The spatial layout of the rural population density is a close correlate of land under plow : from 26 people per sq km around the city of Kostroma and 21 in the district of Krasnoye Selo, to jus t 3 in the north. However, the extreme northeast includes some arable "islands" in the "ocean" of th e forest vastness : the proportion of arable land here is 12-14% . Districts close to the city of Kostroma have been given priority in terms of fertilizers and other investment, a factor that has influenced returns . For example, in 1986-90, the district of Kostroma le d in grain yields (26 centners per hectare), with other southwestern districts close behind (2 0 centners/hectare) . At the same time, in the south and southeast grain yields ranged between 10 and 1 4 centners, and in the north they were merely 7 to 9 centners . In the 1990s only the southwest ha s retained decent grain yields (Fig . 3 .7, p.33). The output of other crops per unit of land correlates wit h that of grain . Heightened capital inputs by themselves have not led to higher returns . Labor supply , amenities, and other factors matter . For example, only the southwest has stable, 4-to-5- centners/hectare yields of flax fibers ; in the majority of other districts yields range between 1 and 2 centners, although capital inputs per hectare of flax-sown land in the southeast exceed those in th e northwest. As a result, flax turned out to be most profitable in the southwestern corner of the provinc e 8 where it covered 6-7°'o of arable land . In the districts of Kostroma and Krasnoye Selo, milk appears t o be profitable as well (Fig . 3 .8, p .34) : its production costs here are below the average for the province , while milk yields per cow are 1 .5 times higher. Overall, in 1993 the five southwestern district s contributed over half of the grain, over 60% of the flax, and about 90% of the potatoes produced by the socialized sector (collective and state farms that either retained or changed their status) of th e entire province's agriculture . Only in this part of the province does the output per unit of lan d approach or match the technological norms set for the region's natural environment, that is, 20-2 5 centners of grain, at least 5 centners of flax fibre per hectare, and 5-6 tons of milk per cow of th e local, Kostroma breed . It is very unclear, however, what will befall the remaining nineteen districts . Should the provincial administration stop writing off their outstanding debts, most existing collective and stat e farms will go out of business . And that would orphan PAF, which in most places depends on it s symbiotic connections with the socialized sector . Stephen Wegren, who has devoted several highly informative publications to the province o f Kostroma, has shown that in 1993 the province had the fewest number of private farmers in th e Industrial Center s , no willingness on the part of local authorities (and, possibly, on the part of th e rural population itself) to allocate land to individual farming, and fairly insignificant (by July 1995 ) ]and transactions both in terms of the number and of the size of parcels involved 9 . As for forestry, another major employer in the countryside of the Kostroma province, it does no t fare well either . Seventy percent of the province is forested. Felling activity goes on but shipments o f timber are on the decline. In 1993, for example, only 4 million cubic meters of lumber were sold i n the province, well under the amount of lumber that annual growth would make available fo r harvesting that year, that is, 7 .5 million cubic meters . The most remote timber industry enterprises ar e in the worst straits; they are obliged to take advantage of a fairly short period of high water in loca l rivers for timber floating and then their customers drag their feet in paying them . As a consequence , many have curtailed their timber activity and others have simply left the area .

Demographic Trend s In 1989, the rural population of the province was only one quarter of what it was in 1926 . As in many other Russian provinces, a long lasting rural population decline came to a halt in the early 90s : whereas in 1989, the rural population here amounted to 255,000, in 1993 it was already 278,000 . However, by 1994, there were only 277,000 rural dwellers in the province ; the decline, thus, re - emerged. Although in 1989-93, the net migration inflow was not high, 19 people per 10,000, i t represented a sharp break with the past . After all, in 1979-89, the countryside of Kostroma had ha d one of the highest rates of migration outflow, 116 people per 10,000 . Not just the countryside was affected, the province as a whole was annually losing 12 residents per 10,000 of its total population . 9 The rural population of the province has had a negative rate of natural increase since the early 1970s . As in Russia as a whole (see our Report 2), the gap between the numbers of births and deaths in fac t widened, from -2.3 per 1000 persons in 1990 to -6 .8 per 1000 persons in 199210, and that widenin g occurred when the incoming migration provided, for the first time in decades, for rural populatio n growth. The negative natural increase was clearly the accumulated result of the prior long-lasting out - migration and the ensuing aging of the remaining residents : in 1992, 28% of the rural population wer e retirees " . The negative natural increase already amounted to -9 .4 in 1993 12 , still not as high as in th e province of Pskov but fairly high indeed as it has the potential of undermining any promisin g endeavors in the province . In the 1980s, the Northwestern corner of the province and its southeast experienced the heaviest outflow of rural population . Conversely, the district of Kostroma received som e replenishment (Fig . 3 .9, p .34). So, like virtually everywhere in Central Russia, a core-peripher y pattern is evident in the area's rural population change . This underlying pattern, however, is subject t o local variation. Specifically, in the province of Kostroma, a band diagonally stretching from th e southwest to northeast (Fig. 3 .9) fares better than the rest of the province . Whereas the southwest i s the viable core of provincial agriculture, the middle and the northeast are dominated by timberland s and their generally younger population . And yet even in the districts with a current relatively stable rural population, the conditions o f rural amenities leave much to be desired : only one-third of rural houses are served by piped water , only 2% of rural houses enjoy flush toilets and hot water . As would be expected, the area in immediate proximity to the city of Kostroma, fares the best in this regard .

THE PROVINCE OF YAROSLAVL (maps pp .44-46) The province of Yaroslavl is one of the most urbanized in Central Russia : 81% of its 1994 population are urban ; however, 43% of all provincial residents live in just one city, Yaroslav l (631,000). Rybinsk is the second-ranked urban center (249,000) ; together these cities have 60% o f the province's entire population . However, in view of the city of Yaroslavl's central location, th e province is not as markedly bi-central, in the sense of its rural hinterland's diverging socia l gravitation, as the province of Pskov . Our experience with Yaroslavl has been the most long-term of the three subdivisions involve d in this Report . Our most recent field observations were in July 1995 when we interviewed loca l officials in the exurban vicinity of Yaroslavl and local officials in one of the most remote areas, th e Nekouz district, whose center is 150 km from the city of Yaroslavl. Covering this distance in a Volg a car was an experience valuable in itself Upon leaving the provincial center we were observing a landscape fairly typical for a large Russian city's countryside : vast fields, girded by thin woodlan d belts, neat looking dwellings belonging both to urbanites and to country folk . As we drove, the 1 0 woodlands were visibly expanding and the fields shrinkin g, turning into islands in a forest vastness . Close to Nekouz, abandoned fields turned up already overgrown by bushes and trees . The patches of land still under cultivation drew closer to villages, while the remaining open spaces looke d dishevelled and neglected, as if their proprietor was long past his prime and could not keep this muc h land in check any more .

The Case of the May Day Cooperativ e Under Soviets many socialized farms were named after May 1, the so-called International Da y of Working Class Solidarity. For this reason, and because May in general is regarded as th e springtime of life, youth, and prime, anything that bears its name but looks shabby and run down smacks of acute irony . The "First of May" cooperative is located ten kilometers away from the small town of Nekouz . It has 3000 hectares of agricultural land with fifteen villages attached to it. In the 1970s it was still a large state farm composed of two subdivisions . Gradually the whole business fell into decay, and b y the 1990s it was already one of the worst production units in one of the province's least agriculturall y efficient peripheral districts . Suffice it to say that milk yields in the cooperative are a slight 1000 k g per cow and grain yields are 5-9 centners per hectare . As of now 70 workers are employed by th e "First of May," while the number of shareholders is over 200, which means that the majority of the m are retirees. Major specialists in charge of the cooperative (the agronomist, the animal technician, an d the bookkeeper) are fresh, seem to have good educational backgrounds, and are not afraid of har d work. But the kind of problems they face would discourage even a zealot . By the time of our arrival (14 July 1995) the 200 cows on the farm (down from over 500 in th e 1980s) had not been milked for three days . Three days earlier employees had received their long - delayed pay. Since then the dairymaids had been dead drunk and had not shown up for work . There was nobody around to replace them, a situation highly typical of a depopulated outlying area . Actually, some retirees would have volunteered, but only for instant cash . However, cash was unavailable: even staffers' scheduled pay was delayed and thus devalued by on-going inflation . The stockpiled animal feed was being stolen by shareholders for the benefit of their own cattle . Th e cooperative attempted to assign part of its calves to households (together with a part of the necessary feed), to get them back at maturity when the cooperative would pay for labor -- to no avail : such is the level of apathy that nobody is willing to help out, even in summer . As a result calves are bein g slaughtered, at a huge disadvantage for the farm . Not that people are so lazy . Machine-operators can work fervently on occasion. But almos t everybody has fits of hard drinking, and one had better stay away from them during these times . Those of a different persuasion are long gone. Only alcoholics and retirees remain, and a few other s attached to the area due to uncontrollable circumstances . Still, up until 1995 the cooperative used t o 1 1 make ends meet, but only because of subsidies . In the 1990s, as a result of the crisis in cities peopl e began to take to villages, but the local resettlement "boom" soon subsided without tangibly benefitting the farm : the few newcomers either do not work in agriculture or go to seed through drin k after having joined the local environment . So they continue to languish, trashing their cooperative yet unable to do without it . Who els e indeed would sell meat at a discount? Who else would lend a hand in one's own vegetable garden? Who would plow it up? Who would help with animal feed? And should help not be given, people will take what they need, since whatever-is-the-kolkhoz's-is-mine psychology has proved to b e tenacious. There are indeed many things available nowhere except from the farm cooperative on e belongs to. Nobody in the "First of May" has volunteered to become an independent farmer . People are already basically working for themselves anyway . Every third cow in the whole district of Nekou z is private . And yet everybody keeps an eye on the cooperative's profits . When it actually succeeds at something, discussions on how to distribute the gain never end . Some even propose to distribute i t according to the number of mouths in a household . Ideas of that kind nip in the bud any residua l initiative to go private or to organize in small collectives . Because ten people, say, would work whil e the remaining sixty would see their profits and swell with envy . And that would not be the worst cas e scenario: the sixty may set the property of those ten on fire . In such an environment a growing number of people opt for unemployment benefits . They resign from their cooperative and live off the dole and PAF . In the district of Nekouz, 11% of th e people of working age are registered unemployed, of which over half resigned from their jobs of thei r own accord . Moreover, employment officers have begun to deliver benefits themselves so one nee d not make a trip . If the welfare benefit is supplemented by what a cow or two can give, one can easil y make ends meet . Not everything, though, is so hopeless in outlying areas . In the nearby village Danilovo is th e cooperative "Lnovod" (Flax-grower). It is in much better shape . There is even a bus between it and th e district center twice a day. Aside from flax itself, the cooperative runs a dairy farm producin g sufficient animal feed of its own in 1995 ; recently mineral fertilizers were purchased with borrowed money. People say that this relative well-being is due to a dynamic chairman . Indeed, almost all th e indicators of output are twice as high as in the "First of May ." It looks as if "Lnovod" will make i t through reforms unless it is stifled by non-payments for its produce, a scourge afflicting Russia' s economic life . However, in many respects life on this cooperative is not different from on it s neighbor. People drink a lot and mostly survive on their PAF, not on earnings from the enterprise . The situation in exurban areas around the city of Yaroslavl could not differ more greatly fro m the above. A typical example would be the partnership Kurba, a former state farm on 4000 hectares . While it, too, experienced a downward trend, the enterprise's entire setting is different and so are th e repercussions of the setting . For example, a cow herd was reduced because the arable land was 1 2 redistributed in favor of PAF so that each family has one hectare at its disposal ; even so the reductio n was partly made-up by the growing number of cows in PAF . What is more important the number o f employees was reduced, from 530 people in 1990 to about 400 in 1995, mostly because drunkards , pilferers, and truants were fired. And yet there are many fewer rural unemployed here than in th e reportedly labor-deficient outlying areas . Our brief and unsystematic survey of the situation in the field suggests the followin g conclusions . 1. Despite attempts to emasculate and hinder reform in the countryside, the actual busines s environment that former collective and state farms face has changed . Before, the principal driving force of productive work was district and provincial Party bosses : oblast operatives pressured rayon officials, who in their turn put pressure upon the farms' chairmen and directors, who issue d commands to the rank-and-file, who could either comply fully or partially, or exercise their right t o flee the countryside, which many did . Now this purely executive system is evolving into a mor e complex economic system in which such factors as money earnings, sales, and production costs ar e gaining weight. However, it is still far from a genuine market-driven system, if only because payment s for produce, distribution of discounted loans, and many other activities depend on administrators . These are no longer Party bosses but provincial executives ; since the district executives no longe r wield real power, the chain of command has gotten shorter on both ends . 2. The degree to which this economic-administrative system adopts market elements depend s upon the political preferences of the variously ranked bosses . When a critical mass of executive s dedicated to central planning (or to reform) forms, the result is regional variation of the kind we wrote about in our Report 1, wherein such phenomena as the Red Belt of European Russia's mid-south wer e described . As for the variation within provinces, it is usually linked not so much to the politica l preferences of the bosses as to location relative to a provincial center. The principal difference between peripheral (outlying) and exurban (centrally located) socialized farms is that the former have in fact long since ceased to be economic entities in the true sense of the phrase . A notice of dismissal would not work here because people are in large measure already confined to their subsidiary plots , and there is nobody available to take over their obligations on the farm . Economic sanctions woul d also not work because payments arrive after a long delay and, given their size, do not matter muc h anyway. Such farms actually work for themselves, supporting their own members, rather than bein g assets to the Russian economy, even though the farm members may not quite understand or appreciat e that fact. On the other hand, the exurban farms like "Kurba" are more similar to regular productio n units using hired labor who can be affected by regular economic incentives and administrativ e sanctions. As a matter of fact, the 1994 grain yield in Kurba, where mineral fertilizers were not use d that year, was 26 centners per hectare, which is five times that of the "First of May," while milk yield s

1 3 per cow were 2600 kg, three times the "First of May" level . The differences in natural conditions ar e negligible . Finally, the above observations call into question the traditional Russian view that urbanizatio n has caused the shortage of agricultural labor . The number of unemployed in the periphery and th e number of people employed outside agriculture in a city's countryside testify to the opposite .

Spatial Pattern of Rural Population Chang e In 1959-1989, the rural population of Yaroslavl province almost halved (582 versus 27 0 thousand people), the heaviest demographic losses occurring in the northern outlying districts and i n the district of Niekrasovo situated between the cities of Yaroslav and Kostroma (Fig . 3.10, p.35). The district of Pereslavl adjoining the province of Moscow also lost over half of its rural population . On the other hand, the two districts headed by the two largest cities of the province, Yaroslavl an d Rybinsk, have become only 20% and 30% less populous. Whereas the population density in th e district of Yaroslavl is 27 persons per sq km, it is merely 8-11 persons per sq km in neighborin g districts, while in the northeast it is only 4-5 persons . One-fifth of the entire rural population of th e province now lives on 5% of the land, around the city of Yaroslavl . Rural population dynamics have been influenced in part by rural amenities . For example, Figure 3 .11 (p.35) shows the proportion of the rural population served by piped water . Only in the Yaroslavl and Rybinsk districts do over half of the country folk have this rudimentary service at their disposal ; in the northern districts only 10-15% of the rural population enjoy piped water . In the 1990s, the tide of rural population change reversed . The rural population, in thousands , over the last half century looks like this : 1939 : 995 ; 1959: 582; 1970 : 419 ; 1979 : 316; 1989: 270 ; 1993 : 274; and 1994 : 282 .13 The rate of the rural population's natural increase in the province o f Yaroslavl has been negative since the late 1960s. However, in 1992, the gap between deaths an d births began to grow explosively, and by 1995 the rate of natural increase in the districts range d between minus 10 and minus 25 persons per 1000 population . So on the surface, depopulatio n ceased, but as defined be vital rates it only deepened . Migration, therefore, was a factor in reversin g the tide of population dynamics : whereas in 1979-1989 the net migration amounted to minus 7 1 persons per 10,000 rural population, in 1989-1993 it was plus 17 . At the same time the net migration inflow to the provincial urban areas shrank from 43 to 32 per 10,000 population14 . However, as the above figures indicate, migration could not change the rural population dynamics alone, th e settlement re-classification contributed to that : in other words, change of status . Whereas up until the 1990s settlements changed from rural to urban, in the 1990s, the opposite became true : because of population decline in the previous years many small towns (poselki gorodskogo typa) have bee n recently renamed villages .

1 4 Migration to the countryside was at its hi ghest in 1991-1992. At that time it more than covere d the effects of the "natural decrease" in many districts . In relative terms, the semi-periphery, that is , districts not quite outlying but not exurban either (Bolshoye Selo, Rostov, and Uglich) and the eastern periphery led the way, with a net inflow of 10-14 persons per 10,000 residents . Most of th e newcomers were first generation urbanites escaping the empty shelves of urban food-stores and the threat of hunger. However, when by 1993 it became clear that it was possible to survive in cities an d towns, the inflow to the countryside lessened to 5-7 persons per 10,000 residents. Simultaneously th e composition of newcomers changed : the proportion of migrants from within the province grew smaller while the proportion of resettlers and refugees from outside the province, including thos e from other post-Soviet republics (44% of all "outsiders" in 1993), increased . Ethnic Russians fro m Central Asia account for 47% of the migrants from the republics . Rural districts receive between one - half and three-quarters of all "outsiders" coming to the province . Most of them are coming to the two southern districts, Rostov and Pereslavl, and to other districts stretching along the Volga-river (Fig . 3 .12, p.35) . Settlement re-classification affected districts of the province to a variable degree . For example , in the Nekouz and Pereslavl districts rural population increased 30% due to re-classification only , while the district of Bolshoye Selo almost doubled its rural population due to the same reason . The combined influence of all the growth factors in Figure 3 .13 (p.35) shows that in the 1990s, rura l population grew dramatically only in the districts which experienced settlement re-classification . S o in real terms it grew only in the districts of Yaroslavl and Rostov . In all other districts it continued to decline, though not as fast as before .

The Contraction of the Activity Spac e The public sector's agriculture is unprofitable everywhere in the province but in the districts o f Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, and Tutayev . Animal husbandry is in especially dire straits . In 1994 the ratio of revenues minus production costs to production costs (so-called rentabelnost) in animal husbandry ranged from -0.07 to -0 .40 across the 17 districts of the province . The most striking aspect of the geography of crop harvesting is the supremacy of the Yaroslav l district: it tops the remaining 16 districts in the yields of all grains, potatoes, and root plants . For example, in 1986-90, yields of winter wheat in the district of Yaroslavl exceeded that in periphera l districts by a factor of 2 .5 . Even in the areas adjoining the capital district of the province, grain yield s were in some cases substantially lower than in it . However, by and large the geography of agricultural output is characterized by relatively gentl e core-periphery gradients, meaning that the output declines smoothly outward from the city o f Yaroslavl and, to a less extent, from the city of Rybinsk . Figure 3 .14 (p.36) captures these gradient s based on data from the mid-1980s . Today the situation is roughly the same, except that the gradient s 1 5 have become steeper. By 1995 . for example, the gap in the grain yields between the district o f Yaroslavl and those of the northeast periphery of the province had reached the 4 :1 level, whereas i n the mid-1980s it was only 2 .5 :1 . Such a drop-off in output per unit of land is e q uivalent to the spatia l concentration of farming output or, in other words, to the contraction of the activity space . A study conducted by one of the authors of this report in the late 1980s revealed that the process i n question had already by then reached its mature stage . For example, whereas in 1968-1970, the districts of Yaroslavl and Rybinsk accounted for 16 .7% of all of socialized agriculture's output in th e province, by 1981-1983 these districts' share had grown to 26% 15 . For comparison, in 1994-1995 th e same share was at the level of 40 % . As for the percentage of agricultural land in the same areas, i t was only 11% in the mid-1980s and 13% today . According to the provincial statistics of the late 1950s, the variation in milk output per distric t did not hinge so much on the milk yields per cow as on the number of cows . At that time the ratio o f the yields of the lowest and the highest districts was 1658 kg (in Breitovo) to 2361 (in Tutaev) , whereas the ratio of the lowest and highest number of cows per 100 hectares of agricultural rate was 4.3 (Prechistoye) to 9 .1 (Yaroslavl). In other words, the yields differential was, roughly speaking, 2 : 3 while the livestock density differential was 1 :2. Already by the mid-1980s the situation had bee n reversed : while the variation in the livestock density had been substantially levelled (it range d between 13 .8 and 19.8 cows per 100 hectares), the gap in the yields per cow had widened to 1 :2 16 . As far as today's milk yields are concerned, we are witnessing the same gap as in the mid-1980s . However, the gap between exurban and peripheral districts in terms of the sheer number of cattle ha s grown once again ; the core-periphery output gradient has therefore steepened because it is now bein g sustained by both components of the output rather than by just one . Bio-climatic conditions of the province favor the southern districts, and thus offer little if an y explanation for the above trend . In fact, the districts of Yaroslav and Nekouz have very similar natura l conditions . Other production factors differ from place to place more dramatically . For example, the doses of mineral fertilizers per hectare varies (among districts) by up to a factor of three and so does th e monetary value of fixed assets ("capital") per unit of land . Needless to say, the district of Yaroslav l tops the list. However, because the peripheral districts were most affected by out-migration, there i s no appreciable variation in the capital/labor ratio among the districts of the province . There has been , however, an appreciable variation in returns to investment : the districts with the most ample labor supply (in this case exurban districts) showed higher returns already in the 1970s . Since that time these exurban districts have been the preferential sites for agricultural investment . Labor supply has told upon the production of flax, long a traditional staple of the province . Flax offers good returns, bu t is labor intensive. So while in 1958, as many as 57,000 hectares were devoted to flax in the provinc e

1 6 of Yaroslav, by 1981 the sown area had been reduced to 30,000 hectares and is now barely 10,000 o r 2% of the cropland . It is clear from the above that relative location vis-a-vis major urban centers matters the mos t for the geography of agricultural output. It matters the most for the specialization in specific kinds of produce as well . Only in grains is the playing field more or less level : grains' share of the area unde r crops ranges only between 35 and 45% among the districts . On the other hand, the districts of Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, and Tutayev lead the others in terms of the percentage share of meat in output. In the six centrally located districts between Rostov and Rybinsk, 70% of all meat is produced, wherea s the share of these districts in the rural population of the province is only 42% . The ratio of socialized versus personal auxiliary farming (PAF) also depends upon relative location. Figure 3.15 (p.36) shows the speediest growth in the number of cattle kept in PAF i n exurban districts and in the district of Pereslavl adjoining the province of Moscow, and Figure 3 .1 6 (p.36) reveals that the reduction of cattle total numbers has been the greatest in most periphera l districts. Yet the PAF's share in the number of cattle is at its highest (almost one-third) in th e peripheral Northwestern and northeastern districts. Recently the same situation held true for pig- breeding. But by 1994 it had changed . Pig-breeding began to markedly gravitate to exurban areas where it is easy to deliver pork to the customer. The pig thus ceased being essential to subsistenc e farmers (though cows still are) and became simply a means of earning money . In the areas most accessible to major cities and towns, from 50-90% of all pigs are kept in PAF, proving that relativ e location not only differentiates the evolution of socialized farms but the evolution of PAF units a s well : only in the most accessible areas does PAF bear a commercial character ; elsewhere it is a form of subsistence farming . All in all, the activity space of provincial agriculture has been contracting like drying rawhide , with exurban and adjoining areas being the only ones that retain vitality in contrast to the decay in th e vast periphery .

As Compared with 191 3 This subheading was a catch-phrase of Soviet agitprop up until the late 1970s, because 191 3 was considered a reference point for many Soviet achievements . In later years this phrase assumed a rather anecdotal meanin g . To be sure, 1913 is no worse a reference point than any other year, especially since the resultan t comparisons do not always present the current situation as an achievement . An excellent 1915 boo k by Gurevich17 is based on statistics circa 1913 . At that time 85% of the provincial population wa s rural, and rural population density was 28 persons per sq km versus 7 today. The area under crops was smaller: 500,000 hectares versus 718,000 in 1991 . Grains accounted for 70% (versus 36% today) of the sown area, but it was mostly rye (40%) and oats (25%), not wheat, an intruder from the sout h 1 7 which prevails today and shows meager yields by current standards. Interestingly enough, the 191 3 grain yields were almost as high as today, 10 centners per hectare on average . At that time thi s represented decent productivity, especially given the geographical location of the province (in term s of bio-climatic potentials it is more or less analogous to central Ontario) . By 1913, the agriculture of the province already bore a quite commercial character . The mai n commercial crops were potatoes and flax . Potatoes accounted for 10% of the whole area under crop s and yielded 414,000 tons a year ; today the yield is about 313,000 tons. The per capita production (fo r the whole province) was 319 kg in 1913 versus 212 kg today . Flax occupied 14% of the sown area i n 1913, now it is 2 .5% . At that time the richest areas of commercial agriculture were the bands stretching along th e major railway lines . There were two major bands with rural population densities and land value s higher than elsewhere: one along the Trans-Siberian line which flows north-south within the provinc e and another the Rybinsk-Tver line flowing west . The former band was mostly potato-oriented, whil e the latter emphasized flax . Flax farming in the district (then uyezd, now raion) of Myshkin has by now almost withered away, yet the culture of flax had diffused southward (Uglich) and northeastwar d (Poshekhonye) . Today the districts of Uglich, Danilov, and Poshekhonye produce 50% of the flax i n the province. Today, as in 1913, flax and potatoes are mutually exclusive, in large measure because o f the high labor intensity of each . It can be pointed out that of the two regions of pronounced commercial farming early in thi s century, the flax-growing northwest and the potato-growing center/southeast, only the latter ha s survived . Other areas lagged behind those two even then . Allowing many fields to be fallow an d cultivating mostly rye, their farming was in large measure of a subsistence type ; they stood out fo r their poverty and the low number of cattle in peasant possession . Today's situation of those district s relative to the axis Rostov-Tutaev-Rybinsk is little changed . The inertia of spatial development appears to have persisted through all the trials of the last 80 plus years : the communist revolution , collectivization, world wars, rural depopulation, and the collapse of communism . And even though i n the meantime the productivity of agriculture grew by fits and starts in the early post-war years and i n the 1970s, its level today is not far apart from 1913 despite revolutionary changes in farmin g technology .

What Have we Arrived at by 1995 ? The issue of the on-going reform in agriculture is addressed in our Report 1 . There is nothin g peculiar about the province of Yaroslavl in this regard as it is neither in the vanguard of reform, nor a part of the "red belt" of Russia flouting all government reforms and grass-root initiatives . As in the nation as a whole, the change of status of collective and state farms is more indicativ e of the general attitude toward reform ("joint-stock company" appears to be a code for a non-committa l 1 8 social endorsement of the very idea of market economy) than of any profound systemic shifts i n farming management . The highest frequency of status chan ge has been in the district of Yaroslavl , some adjoining districts and in the district of Pereslavl which neighbors the province of Moscow . In contrast to that, in the northwestern and northeastern periphery most collective and state farms have retained their status . The districts of Pereslavl, Bolshoye Selo, Gavrilov-Yam, and Rostov are the leaders in terms of private farmers' percentage share of cattle (1 .7 - 4% versus 1 .3% in the province as a whole; in the district of Yaroslavl, 0 .6%) . But while private farming, or whatever it is, is languishing, PAF is on the rise ; by 1994 its share in the provincial output of meat had risen to 38%, in milk to 36%, in potatoes to 76%, and i n vegetables 90% (Table 4, p .28) . The downfall of agricultural output in the socialized sector of the province had commence d already in the 1980s ; in the 1990s its pace has accelerated . It was especially evident in anima l husbandry when it was deprived of imported grain and some habitual types of subsidies . As a result , the number of cattle in the province in all farm categories (socialized farms, PAF, and, since 1991 , private farms) dropped by 23%, although in the 1980s in many districts the number of cattle ha d already been reduced by 10-20% . As in the 1980s, the district of Yaroslavl was all but spared this fate , retaining the number of cattle it had had in the late 1970s . The overall downsizing trend is bein g inhibited by the growth of PAF ; however, the socialized farms in the outlying districts have seen their cattle reduced by one half, while those in the central districts have experienced below 20% reductio n (Fig . 3 .16). In crop harvesting the downward trend has not been as pronounced as in anima l husbandry, with the exception of flax . In the 1990s the area under crops has been restructured in response to the worsening supply of animal feed. Specifically, the sown area under grains was reduced and that under green and succulent feed expanded . Despite all measures taken the economic survival of socialized farms is a haunting problem ; i n two-thirds of them costs exceed revenues and without subsidies many would drown immediately . Th e district of Nekouz tops the list with 78% of its farms being unprofitable ; in contrast, in the district o f Yaroslavl only 8% of socialized farms cannot make ends meet on their own . With subsidies, however , the picture is not so grim ; in 1994 the ratio revenues minus costs to costs ranged between minus seven and plus twenty percent . As shown in our Report 1, the volume and mechanism of subsidizing changed after 1991 . Whereas today subsidies amount to about 50% of the total output of socialized farms, in 1991 this percentage varied between 70% and 200% among the districts of the province . Whereas in the 1980s , subsidies were mostly channeled through farm-specific price mark-ups set at various levels to rescu e sinking farms, today price mark-ups are flat and thus may not rescue the weakest . Additionally farm s receive partial budgetary compensation of their fuel and fertilizer purchase costs, and this form o f support is not tailored to the economic situation of a farm either . So in this regard, the underpinnings 1 9 of the pre-I 991 cradle-to - g rave welfare economy have been abandoned . Not totally, however, becaus e there are forms of indirect bud g etary support. such as writing off debts . that do aid the weakest: and , on the other hand, when the state procrastinates, as it often does, in remitting payment for purchase d produce, the strongest farms are hit the hardest because or' inflation . Nevertheless, the economic differentiation of farms goes on, and there is no special policy of supporting those that have successfully adjusted to the new economic conditions .

Regionalizatio n The preceding discussion points to the existence of different types of agriculture, includin g spatially variable combinations of different farm types, of levels of output per unit of land, and o f relationships with non-agricultural land use . • In the central belt (Rostov - Rybinsk) the output per unit of land is the highest unde r average natural conditions. Labor and capital (fixed assets) per unit of land are also higher tha n elsewhere. Labor fluidity is high given many non-a g ricultural employment options, but the regio n remains the most attractive to those living in outlying districts and to migrants from outside the province. The socialized farms in the region are large, employing between 170 and 270 people . Most socialized farms have changed their status to joint-stock companies and associations. The proportion of unprofitable farms is minimal . Although the socialized farms have retained almost their pre-crisi s level of output, PAF is growing vigorously and is heavily commercialized . • The extreme south (the district of Pereslavl) is agriculturally the best endowed by nature bu t has been very much impacted by rural out-migration because of its location next door to the provinc e of Moscow. That location does not qualify this region as peripheral ; a "semi-periphery " would be a more fitting term . The level of output per unit of land is lower than in the previous region . The extreme south has proved to be very attractive to migrants from outside the province, to privat e farmers, and especially to seekers of summer recreation homes . • In the west (the districts of Bolshoe Selo, Uglich, and Borisogleb) the output per unit of lan d is below-average to average under natural conditions similar to those in the central belt . The west i s the semi-periphery too . In the early 1990s it experienced a short-lived in-migration boom . Althoug h the boom has subsided by now, the region remains attractive to migrants from without the province . • The Trans-Volga northeast is a classic periphery ; in addition it has the worst natura l conditions for agriculture in the province. Pockets of arable land are dispersed and oftentimes hav e limited accessibility. Its rural population is thin and aging most rapidly ; roads are the worst in th e province. In the 1980s small collective farms (employing less than 100) abounded here ; in the 1990s most of them have retained their status . Unlike other regions, rural out-migration has not been reversed here in the 1990s . The output of socialized farms is low and in large measure they functio n as umbrellas for PAF, which is crucial for people's survival in the region . 20 • The northwest (the districts of Nekouz, `-Myshkin, and Breitovo) shares the social condition s of the previous re gion (it is a periphery as well) but is better endowed by nature. The output per uni t of land is, nevertheless, the lowest in the province . In the past it was one of the two most prosperou s agricultural regions of the province, thriving on flax . Attempts to restore flax-growing have bee n unsuccessful . Just as in the previous region, socialized farms mostly ensure the survival of PAF . However, in contrast to the northeast, the region has been attractive for migrants .

The Local Scal e We have selected four rural districts, representing four out of five regions distinguished above , for a more detailed analysis of the evolving spatial pattern of agriculture . We used a rural Soviet as th e information unit in order to ensure the spatial match between economic and socio-demographi c indicators. In many cases a land area under supervision of a rural Soviet includes one socialized farm . In some cases, however, there are up to three farms per one Soviet . In such cases we averaged economic indicators for farms grouped in one Soviet . The following economic indicators were used : grain yields (Fig .3 .17, p.37), milk yields pe r cow, monetary output per unit of land, production costs, labor input per unit of produce, and ratio o f revenues minus production costs to production costs (Fig .3 .18, p .38) . The following social indicators were used: population density, percentage share of the elderly in population, 1970-1990 percentag e change in population, and 1990-1994 percentage change in population . Each information unit was ranked on each indicator and fiv e gradations ranging from the "best" to the "worst" were identified . Average ranks for the group o f economic indicators and that of social indicators were calculated . Figures 3 .19 and 3 .20 (pp.39-40 ) reflect these calculations . It should be noted that between 50% and 80% of all the information units in the district s analyzed reveal a perfect or almost perfect match between their rankings on the social and on th e economic scale : the better the social situation, the better the economy . In most of the remaining unit s economic indicators are superior with respect to social indicators, which may reflect a highe r flexibility of the economic sphere . A mismatch of this type is most frequently encountered in th e district of Yaroslavl . In the more outlying districts social and economic spheres correlate very closely . The accessibility of a district center is not a valid predictor of the economic situation inside th e outlying districts, it matters only in the district of Yaroslavl . Whereas in the district of Yaroslavl, the size of farms is positively related to their economi c performance (as larger farms with 300-500 employees fare better), the situation is opposite in th e periphery, where smaller farms (less than 100 employees) seem to have a higher potential for survival .

2 1 SPATIAL POLARIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSID E Based on the above, the spatial polarization of the countryside appears to be the most pervasive , geographically pronounced trend in Central Russia . Exurban and outlying areas are growin g increasingly different ; the transitional belt between them, the semi-periphery, continues to shar e some characteristics of both even as the gap grows more pronounced . The crisis of the 1990s affected these segments of the countryside differently . Economically weak collective and state farms in the periphery were impacted first ; by 1994 the wave of crisis ha d reached strong socialized farms of the exurbia, and by 1995 many technologically advanced poultr y and pig-breeding farms located close to large cities came to a halt . At the same time the outlying area s were completing a switch to subsistence farming that survived as a result of a symbiotic relationshi p between socialized farms and PAF . The extent to which the exurban rings of heightened agricultural land use intensity and core- periphery contrasts are pronounced depends on two major factors : the population's pressure on th e land and the size of an urban center . The former factor is colonization-related, and the historical west - east and the largely natural north-south gradients of population density play the greatest role in thi s regard. In sparsely settled areas, the polarization is reaching a higher level than in the densely settle d ones. The size of the city contributes to the polarization as well, with less accessible segments of th e countryside falling prey to seemingly irretrievable rural depopulation . Overall, in European Russia the core-periphery pattern is less pronounced in agricultural land - use in the south (with the exception of the semi-desert southeast) and is very vivid in the center and i n the north . Central Russia, positioned at the junction between of the historically sparse and dense belt s of rural settlement, follows the pattern of the north with extensive polarization in large measure du e to well-established urban cores and their lasting demand for labor . This influence was considered i n our report 2 . In central Russia it makes a hu g e difference what kind of urban center "presides" over th e neighboring countryside . An urban concentration of around 50,000 people brings to its nearb y countryside a heightened agricultural land-use intensity, including output per unit of land . Larger cities produce more land-use intensity gradients that are steeper and/or stretch over larger chunks o f the countryside. For the delimitation of three spatial zones (exurbia, semi-periphery, and periphery) i n our study we used the following specific indicators : the output per unit of land, the density an d dynamics of rural population, the ratio of agricultural output of the public sector to that of PAF, an d indicators of rural infrastructure (percentage share of houses with plumbing ; paved roadways density, etc.). Each of these indicators typically is a descending function of accessibility to a major urba n center. So on the maps of district averages, the spatial profiles showed up. The delimitation wa s subsequently aided by the location quotients, i .e., ratios of population percentage share to th e percentage share of a specific type of produce (usually milk or meat) . In virtually no case did the 2 2 demarcation of exurbia pose serious problems : even though there is no single threshold criterion fo r all the provinces studied . the drop-offs between exurbia and the rest of the provinces are clear-cut . It was the periphery whose delimitation was in some cases more difficult . Needless to say, the size an d configuration of the exurban ring or zone, in which agricultural output per unit of land normall y peaks, depend not only upon the size of the closest urban center or centers, but also upon the centers ' location relative to each other. For example, in the province of Pskov, where, as was shown above , there are two not very large urban centers, Pskov and Velikiye Luki, there are two separate exurba n agricultural zones, of which the former one includes three rural districts (those of Pskov, Pechory, an d Palkin) and the latter only one . That this is really the case is verified by our spatial analysis using th e above indicators. It shows, for example, that the immediate influence of the city of Kostroma upon th e surrounding countryside is confined to the rural district of Kostroma and the three adjoining rura l districts (of Krasnoye Selo, Nerekhta, and Sudislavl) . There are no other conspicuous urban center s and associated areas of heightened output in the province . The situation is different in the province o f Yaroslavl with the two large urban centers, Yaroslavl and Rybinsk, located not far from each other . This configuration led to the formation of a large exurban agricultural zone including not only th e four rural districts (those of Yaroslav, Rybinsk, Gavrilov-Yam, and Tutayev) situated between the tw o major urban centers, but also the district of Rostov along the railway and roadway leading to Mosco w and the district of Niekrasovo located between the cities of Yaroslavl and Kostroma. An example of the delimitation is shown by Figure 3 .21 (p.41) . The division of the countryside of central Russian provinces into exurban, semi-peripheral, an d outlying (peripheral) zones is characterized in Tables 5 and 6 (pp .29-30). Along with the thre e provinces discussed in this report, these tables include the province of Leningrad (which has retaine d its name even after the name of its capital city was changed) . This has been done to enhance th e representativeness of our sampled analysis . The exurban agricultural zone of Saint Petersbur g includes six districts which emphasize vegetables and house some of the largest stock-raising farms i n Russia. It must be pointed out that while the countryside of that province perfectly matches the others (featured by Tables 5 and 6) in one respect, i .e., the spatial polarization with outwardly o r centrifugally descending land-use intensity, it is different from them in terms of the absolute level of this intensity, especially in the exurban zone . In those terms, the province of Leningrad is one ste p ahead of the others in that its semi-periphery is on a par with the exurbias of the three other provinces . As Tables 5 and 6 show, the spatial contrasts in the most urbanized province of Leningrad ar e the most striking. They are the least pronounced in the least urbanized province of Pskov . Yet there are commonalities as well . Covering between one-tenth and one-third of the overall land areas, th e exurban rings carry about half of the rural populations, about one third of the cattle and the bulk of th e pigs. The spatial proportions shape up differently in the periphery : occupying half of the countryside , it houses between one-tenth and-one third of the rural population, and its contribution to th e 2 3 agricultural output ranges between one-twentieth and one-third . The percentage share of PAF in th e agricultural output is three times as high in the periphery as in exurbia . It seems obvious that any reasonable regional policy has to take those differences into account . The biggest unknown is the type of change that needs to be advocated for the periphery . Rura l depopulation has dealt it a most severe blow, which is why no type of agriculture can be sustained a s a form of land use everywhere in the periphery . In fact, land abandonment and spontaneou s reforestation of formerly arable land and especially of meadows and pastures has been under wa y since the early 1960s . The periphery is ideal for nature reserves, for forest energy plantations, an d perhaps for other experimental forms of land use in open spaces . Within the pockets of survivin g agriculture leasing land to exurban farms could be promoted since the latter are deficient in anima l feed in part because they cannot afford to assign a lot of land to it . However, such links can only be forged when local roads are substantially improved . PAF in the periphery is not likely to surviv e without budgetary aid . At this point such aid is being rendered indirectly by means of keepin g ephemeral collective and state farms from closure . Most of the latter have ceased to exist as commercial enterprises anyway ; but their official closure would deprive PAF of implements , fertilizers, maintenance, etc ., and thus would deal a mortal blow to PAF . Exurban areas require a totally different approach. Large socialized farms that exist here stil l feed urban areas. Under current conditions many such farms can make ends meet only when proppe d up by subsidies . These subsidies, however, ought to support the strongest and promote their takeove r of weaker farms . Zoning ordinances ought to be introduced to restrict selling of valuable agricultura l exurban lands to the "new rich," who build castle-like cottages on them . The semi-periphery forms a special, transitional case . Whereas the periphery contains archai c but robust PAF, and the exurbia boasts of viable socialist agriculture, the semi-periphery seems to b e a no-man's land. Depopulation has affected the semi-periphery to almost the same extent it has th e most outlying districts, leaving myriads of abandoned villages . On the other hand, unlike in exurbi a and the periphery, neither viable collective farms nor robust subsistence economy (for those wh o choose to stay) are available. So the niche is now being filled by two kinds of developments : summer- time recreational land-use (dachas or recreational second dwellings) and, to a smaller extent, privat e family farming . Both developments would in fact gravitate toward exurbs if land were available but since in most cases it is not, the semi-periphery, located 1-2 hour from the provincial centers , becomes the only option . People now populating the semi-periphery tend to be the most open - minded: they are relatively less addicted to archaic communal bonds, or to reliance on stron g leadership and socialist enterprises . Dacha-owners, private farmers, and forced migrants at th e crossroads of their lives may constitute the human capital with which the long-term prospects of th e Russian countryside at large rest. However, the infrastructure in the semi-periphery can hardly b e

2 4 upgraded solely on the basis of private investment . and its current condition is not conducive to economic development . Thus the irony of the situation is that at this formative stage of the market economy in Russia , there is an unavoidably crucial role for the government in creating extrinsic conditions for economi c growth .

2 5 ENDNOTE S 1 .The industrial profile of the province is represented by construction materials, agricultural implements, food an d flax processing . After the war sonic machine-building enterprises were put in operation, and most recently , electronics enterprises have been added . However, even now the structure of the labor force is early-industrial in contrast to most provinces of Central Russia where the structure is hyper-industrial (and in the province o f Moscow, transitional to post-industrial) .

2 .The Non-Chernozem Zone of Russia was first distinguished in 1974 as a subject of increased attention in view of the miserable condition of its agriculture . The Zone includes four macro-economic regions (Industrial Center , North. Northwest. and Volgo-Viatka) in full and three subdivisions of the Ural region (Perm and Sverdlovs k provinces, and Udmurt republic) and the free standing Kaliningrad province on the Baltic coast .

3.Selskoye Khoziaistvo SSSR . Moscow . Goskomstat 1988 :136 .

4.Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 : 63 .

5 . Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994:406 .

6 .Demographic Yearbook 406 .

7 .Chislennost Naseleniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 :4 .

8.Wegren, Stephen . New Perspectives on Spatial Patterns of Agrarian Reform : a Comparison of Two Russia n Oblasts. Post-Soviet Geography 1994,35,8 :469 .

9 .Wegren, Stephen . The Development of Market Relations in Agricultural Land : the Case of Kostroma Oblast . Post-Soviet Geography, 1995,36,8 :496-512 .

10 .Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 : 63 .

11 .Wegren, Stephen . New Perspectives on Spatial Patterns of Agrarian Reform : a Comparison of Two Russian Oblasts. Post-Soviet Geography 1994 .35 .8 :460 .

12 .Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994:63 .

13 . Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation .. : 19 .

14.Demographic Yearbook ... :406 .

15.Ioffe, G .V. Selskoie Khoziaistvo Niechernozemia...:80.

16.Ioffe, G.V. Selskoie Khoziaistvo .... : 80 .

17.Gurevich, M .B . Differentsiatsia Typov Khoziaistva Yaroslayskoi Gubernii . Yaroslavl, Statisticheskoi e Otdelenie Yaroslayskoi Gubernii 1915

2 6 TABLE 1 . Land Use and Development Characteristics of Selected Provinces in Centra l Russia (circa 1990 )

Province s % o f % o f % o f Rura l % o f Paye e urban of arabl e hayfield s forests populatio n roadway s land an d density population density i n pastures km pe r 1000 sq . k m

Pskov 17 11 39 5 65 12 4

Vladimir 24 12 51 11 80 15 1

Kaluga 33 12 44 10 74 14 3

Kostroma 12 5 72 5 66 6 2

Moscow 27 10 41 29 80 24 9

Riazan 46 17 26 11 67 12 3

Yaroslavl 22 9 44 8 81 10 6

Nizhn i 19 6 47 11 78 106 Novgorod

Sources : Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1 993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 ; Zemelnyy Fond RSFSR na 1 Noyabria 1989 goda. Moscow, Goskomstat 1 990 .

TABLE 2 . Agricultural Land, and Rural Population and Rural Amenities in Selecte d Provinces of Central Russi a

Provinc e Agricultura l Arable and i n Rura l Rura l % o f of land i n 1 989 as a % populatio n populatio n rura l 1 989 as a of 1960 in 195 9 in 198 9 dwelling s % of 1 960 as a % o f as a % o f with 1939 1959 plumbin g in 199 3

Pskov 78 89 51 45 2 7

Vladimir 96 98 64 56 6 2

Kaluga 99 93 62 56 44

Kostroma 82 82 66 46 2 4

Moscow 90 98 83 66 9 0

Riazan 97 95 59 45 5 8

Yaroslavl 75 95 58 46 4 6

Nizhn i 95 106 72 49 5 9 Novgorod

Russi a 95 100 78 70 3 7 Total

Sources : zemelnyy Fond RSFSR 1961 and 1990: Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federatio n 1993 . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 2 7 TABLE 3 . Productivity and Fixed Assets of A g riculture in Selected Provinces of Central Russi a

Provinc e 1 981 -8 5 1986-9 0 1990 mil k 199 0 198 0 199 0 1990 of grai n grai n yields pe r numbe r agricultura l agricultural applicatio n yields i n yields i n cow i n of cattl e fixe d fixe d of minera l centners centner s kilograms per 10 0 assets i n assets i n fertilizer s pe r pe r hectares thousan d thousan d in kg o f hectare hectare roubles pe r roubles pe r activ e 10 0 100 ingredien t hectares hectares per hectare

Pskov 9 .3 8 .7 2259 36 63 134 16 1

Vladimir 13 .6 16 .3 2880 46 98 190 16 5

Kaluga 9 .8 13 .7 2527 42 74 155 14 5

Kostroma 8 .9 9 .3 2294 33 70 140 10 4

Moscow 19 .1 25 .8 3922 71 225 398 23 0

Riazan 10 .8 16 .3 2881 38 67 116 16 6

Yaroslavl 10 .6 10 .2 2253 45 127 192 10 5

Nizhn i 12 .9 14 .4 2860 43 106 139 15 8 Novgorod

Russi a 13 .0 15 .3 2781 27 52 90 88 Total

Source : Narkhoz RSFSR in 1990. MOSCOW, Goskomstat 1991 Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Regionov Rossiiskoi Federatsii . Moscow, Goskomstat 1994 :17 2

TABLE 4. Percentage Shares of Farms of Different Categories in th e Agricultural Output of the Province of Yaroslavl in 1 99 4

Produce Collectiv e Forme r Privat e Persona l and stat e collectiv e farmers auxiliary farms and stat e farmin g farms that changed their statu s to joint - stoc k companies , etc .

Meat 18 42 0 .2 3 8

Milk 25 39 1 .4 3 4

Grains 34 64 1 .0 0

Potatoes 8 15 1 .2 7 6

Vegetables unavailabl e unavailabl e unavailabl e 9 0 data data data Source: unpublished data of the provincial bureau of statistics .

28

T ABLE E . Size and Percentage Shares or Three Types of Countrysid e

cattle Territory Lan d o f % of rura l ''o of Yo ?o o f % o f area i n an d population o f potat o meat thousan d area pigs output outpu t squar e km

The provinc e 55 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 of Pskov

exurbia 9 16 30 21 22 26 2 8

semi- 25 46 37 49 44 36 3 9 periphery

periphery 21 38 33 33 34 38 3 3

The provinc e 60 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 of Kostroma

exurbia 6 10 27 30 1 47 35 5 1

semi- 28 44 35 38 33 13 3 1 periphery

periphery 26 46 27 32 20 2 1 8

The provinc e 37 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 of Yaroslavl

exurbia 13 35 48 42 78 76 6 8

semi- 10 25 24 24 13 18 1 2 periphery

periphery 14 40 28 34 9 6 2 0

The province 84 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 of Leningrad

exurbia 17 20 53 42 86 60 6 2

semi - 47 44 40 53 13 36 3 4 periphery

periphery 20 36 7 5 1 4 4

Averag e 64 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 Non- Chernoze m province

exurbia 13 20 40 30 60 55 5 0

semi - 23 36 33 45 25 30 3 0 periphery

28 44 27 25 15 15 20 periphery

Source : authors' calculations based on unpublished provincial statistics .

29

TABLE 6 . Selected Characteristics of Exurbia . Semi-periphery . and Periphery Relative to Provincial Averages (Averages fo r each province are taken for 1 .0 )

Territory Rura l Grain yield s Milk yield pe r Tota l Privat e farms Share or PA F populatio n per hectare cow agricultura l per 1000 in agricultura l density output pe r engaged i n outpu t unit of land agriculture

The provinc e of Psko v

exurbia 2 .0 1 .2 1 .1 1 .4 1 .2 0 . 9

semi- 0 .8 1 .0 0 .9 0 .9 1 .3 1 . 0 periphery

periphery 0 .8 0 .8 1 .0 1 .0 0 .7 1 . 2

The provinc e of Kostroma

exurbia 2 .8 1 .6 1 .2 2 .5 0 .7 0 . 6

semi- 1 .0 0 .9 0 .9 0 .8 1 .8 1 . 5 periphery

periphery 0 .7 0 .7 0 .8 0 .5 0 .8 2 . 5

The provinc e of Yaroslavl

exurbia 1 .4 1 .4 1 .2 1 .5 1 .0 0 . 8

semi- 0 .9 1 .0 1 .0 0 .9 1 .5 1 . 2 periphery

periphery 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .5 0 .8 1 . 6

The provinc e of Leningrad

exurbia 2 .6 1 .0 1 .1 1 .7 0 .7 0 . 7

semi - 1 .1 1 .0 0 .9 0 .7 1 .3 1 . 3 periphery

periphery 0 .3 0 .5 0 .4 0 .2 1 .4 2 . 4

Average Non- Chernoze m provinc e

exurbia 2 .3 1 .5 1 .2 2 .0 1 .0 0 . 7

semi- 1 .0 1 .0 1 .0 0 .8 1 .3 1 . 2 periphery

periphery 0 .6 0 .7 0 .7 0 .6 0 .8 2 .0 Source : authors calculations based on unpublished provincial statistics .

3 0 Figure 3 .1 Share of agricultural land as a percentage of the total land in th e Non-Chernozem zone of European Russia (1990 )

1 : Below 3% ; 2: 3-10% ; 3: 10-20% ; 4: 20-35% ; 5 : 35-50% ; 6 : Over 50 %

3 1

.3 Rural population in th e Figure 3 .2 Grain yields in the provinc e Figure 3 a of Pskov in centners per hectar e province of Pskov in 1 991 as 0 11986-1990 ) percentage of that in 1 97

: 60-70% ; 3 1 : 8-10 ; 2 : 10-12 ; 3 : 12-13 ; 4: 13-15 ; 1 :71-80% ; 2 : 61-65% ; ; 5 : 45-55 % 5 : 15-16 4 : 56-60%

Figure 3 .4 Share of personal auxiliary Figure 3 .5 Number of private farms i n farming in the province of Pskov as a the province of Pskov per 100 0 percentage of the total output o f persons engaged in agriculture (1993 ) potatoes 1 : below 40; 2: 41-60 ; 3 : 61-100 ; 1 : less than 75%; 2: 76-85% ; 3 : 86-95% ; 4: 100-14 0 4 : 95-99%

32 Figure 3 .6 Agricultural output in the province of Kostroma i n 1993 as a percentage of 199 1

1 : 100-115% ; 2: 70-100% ; 3 : 60-70% ; 4: 50-60% ; 5 : 40-50 %

Figure 3 .7 Grain yields in the province of Kostroma i n centners per hectare (1 993 )

1 : 5-7 ; 2 : 7-9 ; 3 : 9-11 ; 4 : 11-15 ; 5 : 2 0

3 3 n Figure 3 .8 Milk production cost and profitability of milk i the province of Kostroma (1993 )

: Averag e 1 : Low cost and relatively high profit margin ; 2 n for the province) cost ; subsidies provide for a small profi t s margin ; 3 : High cost ; lack of profit even with subsidie

Figure 3 .9 Rural population in the province of Kostroma i n 1990 as a percentage of 1 98 1

1 : 104% ; 2 : 91-100% ; 3 : 86-90% ; 4: 81-85% ; 5: 77-80 %

34 Figure 3 .10 Rural population in th e Figure 3 .11 Percentage of rural province of Yaroslavl in 1989 as a dwellings with pumped water in the percentage of 195 9 province of Yaroslavl (1994 )

1 :80 ; 2:69 ; 3 :46-51 ; 4 :41-45 ; 1 :6-15 ; 2 :15-30 ; 3:30-35 ; 4:36-50 ; 5 :35-40 5 :6 2

Figure 3 .12 Rural net migration pe r Figure 3 .13 Rural population in th e 10000 rural population in the provinc e province of Yaroslavl in 1995 as a of Yaroslavl (1994 ) percentage of 198 9

1 :1-31-0 ; 2:0-2 ; 3 :3-5 ; 4:6-8 ; 5 :10 1 :90-95 ; 2: 96-100 ; 3 : 100-110 ; 4 : 110-130 ; 5 : 130-18 0

35 Figure 3 .14 Gross agricultural output i n the province of Yaroslavl in thousand s of roubles per 100 hectares o f agricultural land (1985) . Source : Ioffe , G . V. Shifts in Rural Population Patterns and Changes in the Agriculture o f the Central Regions of the European USSR. :9 22, 1 6 Geoforum, 1991,

Figure 3 .16 Cattle in the province of FIGURE 3 .15 Cattle in persona l Yaroslavl in 1995 as a percentage o f auxiliary farming in 1995 in th e that in 1990 province of Yaroslavl as a a percentage of 1 99 0 1 :97% ; 2 : 81-90% ; 3 : 75-80% ; 4 : 70-75% ; 5 : 60-70 % 1 : 122-130 ; 2: 130-135 ; 3 : 135-140 ; 4: 140-150 ; 5 : 150-171

36 Figure 3 .17 Grain yields in centners per hectare (1994 )

1 : 2-7 ; 2: 7-9 ; 3 : 9-11 ; 4 : 11-13 ; 5: 13-20 ; 6 : 20-32 ; 7-10: Non-agricultural land, including 7 : built-up areas, 8 : forest ; an d 9 : lak e

A : district of Nekouz ; 8: district of Poshekhonye ; C : district of Pereslavl ; D : district of Yaroslavl

37 n Figure 3 .18 Profitability of socialized farms (percentage ratio of revenues minus production costs to production costs i 1994 )

: minus 85% - minus 50% ; 6 - 1 : 0%-157% ; 2 : minus 20% - 0% ; 3 : minus 35% - minus 20% ; 4: minus 50% - minus 35% ; 5 8 : non-agricultural land, including 6: built-up areas, 7 : forests; and 8 : lak e

A : district of Nekouz ; B: district of Poshekhonye ; C : district o f Pereslavl ; D : district of Yaroslavl

38 .19 Rank order of favorability of the economic situation of the socialized agricultur e Figure 3

; 1-5 : ascending order of favorability (explanation in the text) : fores t 6-7: non-agricultural and . including 6 : built-up areas and 7

l A : district of Poshekhonye ; B : district of Yaroslav

39 uum

Figure 3 .20 Rank order of favorability of the socio-demographic situation of rural Soviet s

1-5 : ascending order of favorability (explanation in the text) ; 6-7 : non-agricultural land, including 6: built-up areas and 7 : fores t

A : district of Poshekhonye ; B : district of Yaroslavl

40 Figure 3 .21 The trichotomy of th e inter-urban space in the province o f Yarosla v

1 - exurbia ; 2 - semi-periphery ; 3 - periphery

4.1 42 43 44 Province of Yaroslav l Province of Yaroslav l District of Yaroslav l District of Pereslav l Rural Soviets Rural Soviet s

1. Bekrenevski y 1. Aleksinskiy 2. Gavrilovskiy 2. Andrianovskiy 3. Glebovski y 3. Veskovski y 4. lvnyakovskiy 4. Glebovski y 5. Karabikhski y 5. Dmitrievski y 6. Kuznechikhski y 6. Dobrilovski y 7. Kurhskiy Dubrovitskiy7. 8. Lutovski y 8. Zagor'evski y 9. Levtsovski y 9. Ropninski y 10.Melenkovskiy 10. Lychenski y 11. Mordvinovskiy 11. Lubimtsevski y 12. Nekrasovski y 12. Nagor'evski y 13. Pestretsovski y 13. Perelesski y 14. Rutnevskiy 14. Ponomarevskiy 15. Teleginski y 15. Ryasantsevski y 16. Tolbukhinski y 16. Skoblevski y 18. Tunoshenskiy 17. Smolenskiy 19. Shirinskiy 18. Troitsk iy

45 Province of Yaroslav l Province of Yaroslav l District of Nekouz District of Poshekhon'e Rural Soviet s Rural Soviet s

1. Vereteiski y 1. Beloselski y 2. Latskovskiy Vasil'evskiy2. 3. Nekouzski y 3. Vladychenski y 4. Novinski y 4. Volodarski y 5. Rodionovski y 5. Voshikovski y 6. Rozhalovski y 6. Gayutinski y 7. Spasskiy 7. Ermakovski y 8. Stanilovskiy 8. Kalininski y 9. Shestikhinskiy 9. Kladovski y 10. Knyazevski y Kolodinskiy11. 12. Krasnovski y 13. Leninski y 14. Oktyabrski y 15. Pogorelski y 16. Priuhrinskiy Sverdlovski y Trushkovskiy17. Poshekhonskiy18.19.

20. Kholmoyskiy Yudinskiy21.

46 Administrative Sub-Divisions of the European ex-USS R Belarus 32. Kalmyk Republi c 33. Republik of Tatarsta n 34. Astrakhan' Oblast 91. Brest ()Mas t 35. Volgograd Oblas t 92. Vitebsk Oblast Penza36. Oblast 93. Gomel' Oblas t 37. Samara Oblast 94. Grodno Oblast 38. Saratov Oblast 95. Minsk Oblas t 39.Ul'yanovsk Oblast Q6 . Mogilev Oblas t 40. Republic of Adygey a 41. Republic of Dagesta n The Ukrain e Kabardino-Balkar42. Republi c 97. Donetsk Oblas t 43. Karachaevo-Cherke s Lugansk98. Oblas t Republi c 99. Kharkov Oblas t 44. Republic of North Osseti a Zaporozh'e100. Oblas t Dnepropetrovsk Oblas t 45. Ingush Republi c 101. 46. Republic of Chechni a 102. Poltava Oblast 103. Sumy Oblast 47. Krasnodar Kra y 48. Stavropol' Kra y Kirovograd104. Oblas t Zakarpatskaya Oblas t 49. Rostov Oblast 105. 50. Republic of Bashkortosta n 106. lvano-Frankovsk Oblast Lvov Oblast 51. Udmurt Republic 107. 108. Ternopol' Oblas t 52. Kurgan Oblast 109. Khelnitskiy Oblast 53. Orenburg Oblas t Perm'54. Oblast 110. Chernovtsy Oblas t 55. Komi-Permyak Okrug 111. Vinnitsa Oblast 56. Sverdlovsk Oblas t 112. Volynskaya Oblas t Kovno Oblast 57. Chelyabinsk Oblas t 113. Zhitomir Oblast 87 . Kaliningrad Oblast 114. 115. Kiev Oblas t Baltic State s 116. Cherkassy Oblas t Chernigov117. Oblas t 88. Estoni a 118. Odessa Oblast 89. Latvi a 119. Nikolaev Oblas t 90. Lithuania Pherson120. Oblast Krymskaya121. Oblas t 47 122. Moldova .Administative Sub-Divisions of the Russian Federatio n

I . Republic o f Kareliya 32. Kalmyk Republi c 62. Omsk ()blast 2. Komi Republic 33. Republi c of Tatarstan 63. Tomsk Oblas t Arkhangelskaya3. Oblas t 34. Astrakhan' Oblas t 64. Tyumen' Oblas t 4. Nenets Okru g 35. Volgograd Oblas t 65. Khanty-Mansiysk Okru g 5. Vologda Oblast 36. Penza Oblas t 66. Yamalo-Nenetsk Okru g 6. Murmansk Oblast 37. Samara Oblas t 67. Buryat Republic 7. Leningrad Oblast 38. Saratov Oblast 68. Republic of Tuv a 8. Novgorod Oblas t 39.Ul'yanovsk Oblas t 69. Khakas Republi c 9. Pskov Oblast 40. Republic of Adygey a 70. Krasnoyarsk Kra y 10. Bryansk Oblas t 41. Republic of Dagesta n 71. Taymyr Okru g 11. Vladimir Oblast 42. Kabardino-Balka r 72. Evenk Okru g 12. Ivanovo Oblas t Republi c 73. Irkutsk Oblast 13. Kaluga Oblast 43. Karachaevo-Cherke s 74. Yst'-Ordyn-Burya t 14. Kostroma Oblas t Republi c Okru g 15. Moscow Oblas t 44. Republic of North Osseti a 75. Chita Oblast 16. Orel Oblast 45. Ingush Republi c 76. Aginsk-Buryat Okru g 17. Ryazan' Oblas t 46. Republic of Chechni a 77. Sakha (Yakut) Republi c 18. Smolensk Oblas t 47. Krasnodar Kra y 78. Primorskiy Kra y 19. Tver' Oblast 48. Stavropol' Kra y 79. Khabarovsk Kra y 20. Tula Oblas t 49. Rostov Oblast 80. Jewish Avtonomou s 21. Yaroslavl' Oblast 50. Republic of Bashkortosta n Oblast 22. Mari Republic 51. Udmurt Republic 81. Amursk Oblas t 23. Mordva Republic 52. Kurgan Oblast 82. Kamchatka Oblast 24. Chuvash Republic 53. Orenburg Oblas t 83. Koryakski y Okrug 25. Kirov Oblas t 54. Perm' Oblast 84. Magadan Oblas t 26. Nizhegorodskaya Oblas t 55. Komi-Permyak Okrug 85. Chukotskiy Okru g 27. Belgorod Oblast 56. Sverdlovsk ()blast 86. Sakhalin Oblas t 28. Voronezh Oblast 57. Chelyabinsk Oblast 87. Kaliningrad Oblas t 29. Kursk Oblas t 58. Altay Republic 30. Lipetsk Oblast Altay59. Kra y 31. Tambov Oblast 60. Kemerovo Oblast 61. Novosibirsk Oblast

48