An Invasion by Any Other Name: the Kremlin's Dirty War in Ukraine

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An Invasion by Any Other Name: the Kremlin's Dirty War in Ukraine An Invasion by Any Other Name: The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine By James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, and Michael Weiss The Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) is a public policy think-tank that strives to establish an intellectual framework for building a democratic Russia governed by rule of law. IMR promotes social, economic, and institutional development in Russia through research, analysis, advocacy and outreach. Our goal is to advance Russia's integration into the community of democracies and to improve its cooperation on the global stage. Founded in 2010, IMR is located in New York City and is an affiliate of the Open Russia movement. IMR is a federal tax-exempt Section 501(c)(3) public charity, incorporated in New Jersey. The Interpreter is a daily online journal dedicated primarily to translating media from the Russian press and blogosphere into English and reporting on events inside Russia and in countries directly impacted by Russia’s foreign policy. Conceived as a kind of “Inopressa in reverse,” The Interpreter aspires to dismantle the language barrier that separates journalists, Russia analysts, policymakers, diplomats and interested laymen in the English-speaking world from the debates, scandals, intrigues and political developments taking place in the Russian Federation. CONTENTS Foreword .................................................................................... 4 Kostroma POWs, KIA, and MIA, and the First Demonstrations ........................................53 Overview and Methodology ............................................. 5 Soldiers’ Mothers Go Public in Russia ...........................56 Executive Summary .............................................................. 6 Soldiers’ Mothers Vilified by Blogger ...........................57 Introduction ...........................................................................10 Meeting of Defense Ministry and Ivan Get Your Gun: Evidence of Russian Military Soldiers’ Mothers .............................................................57 Equipment in Ukraine ........................................................12 Activists’ Interview with Reuters ...................................58 First Stages of War in Eastern Ukraine .........................12 Muted Public Response ..................................................59 The First Battle of Donetsk International Airport ......13 Arrest of Stavropol Soldiers’ Mothers Leader The First Appearance of “Separatist” Tanks ................14 Ludmila Bogatenkova .....................................................60 T-64 Battle Tanks Arrive ..................................................16 Reprisals Against Journalists .........................................60 Moscow Deploys Advanced Anti-Aircraft Assault of TV Rain Producer ..........................................60 Systems to Protect Assets in Ukraine ...........................17 Attack on BBC Crew ........................................................61 Sophisticated Surface-to-Air Missile Systems Appear Attack on Lev Shlosberg .................................................61 on the Streets of Lugansk and Russian Troops Russia Tries a “Limited Hangout” on News Build on the Border .........................................................18 of Soldiers Killed ..............................................................62 Russian Military Shells Ukraine from Russia ................22 Putin Issues Awards to Army Units for “Heroism The T-72 Main Battle Tank in Separatist Hands ..........25 and Bravery in Combat” ..................................................62 Ukraine Advances in the West, Russia Attacks Putin’s Decree Banning Disclosure from the East ....................................................................27 of Casualties During “Special Operations” ..................63 The Russian Invasion of Lugansk ...................................32 The Limits of Mining Social Media for Cases of Minsk Ceasefire Gives Way to the Second Battle Russian Soldiers Killed in Ukraine .................................64 for Donetsk Airport .........................................................35 Bloggers Find Graves of Three GRU Officers ..............65 The Battle for Debaltsevo ..............................................36 Reports on Twitter ...........................................................66 The Southern Front: The Summer of 2015 .................41 News from Russian Ultranationalist Groups ...............67 “Cargo 200”—Russian Soldiers Killed List Maintained by Open Russia of Russian Soldiers in Action in Ukraine ............................................................45 Confirmed Killed in Ukraine ...........................................67 First Battle at the Donetsk Airport, May 2014 ...........45 The Most Active Facebook Group: “Gruz-200” ............68 The Battles of August 2014 ............................................46 Latest Lists of Russian Soldiers Killed and Missing ....69 Separatists’ Admission of Russian Presence ...............48 Putin.War ...........................................................................70 The Curious Case of Leonid Kichatkin ..........................48 OSCE Reports of Cargo 200 ...........................................71 Secret Funerals for the 76th ...........................................49 Reports of Mass Burials of Russian Soldiers ...............72 The Missing Paratrooper Company ..............................50 Wounded Russian Soldiers .............................................73 The St. Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers and How Many Russian Soldiers Have Been the Missing Soldiers from the North Caucasus ...........51 Killed in Ukraine? ..............................................................77 Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers Conclusion ...............................................................................79 of Stavropol Territory ......................................................53 Appendix ..................................................................................80 3 Foreword ince February 2014, Russian president Vladimir if a rampaging major nuclear power can be effectively Putin has been conducting a war against Ukraine. managed by the EU! SHe first seized Crimea using unidentified Russian Distracted by the less critical security challenges of troops whom he later acknowledged as his soldiers. He the Middle East, the United States and other Western then began a hybrid war in Ukraine’s east, which he powers have not devoted enough intelligence resources still denies waging. to Moscow’s excellent adventure in Ukraine. And even If Putin is going to continue his war policy toward when they have the intelligence capability, they have Ukraine, it is very much in his interest to maintain this been slow to release it or characterize it properly. So air of deniability. This helps him deal with the two even as Russian troops crushed Ukrainian forces at major problems that his own policies have created. Ilovaisk in the late summer of 2014, the White House The first is the Western sanctions that a reluctant chose not to refer to Moscow’s action as an “invasion.” European Union has imposed on him for aggression in Instead, it chose an old weasel word from the vocab- Ukraine. Hoping that the Kremlin’s seizure of Crimea ulary of President Nixon, who described an American was the end of Putin’s aggression, the EU was slow military operation in Cambodia as an “incursion.” to react to Moscow’s aggression in the Donbass. The American reluctance to devote the necessary EU ignored the fact that Kremlin agents such as FSB intelligence to Kremlin aggression in Ukraine and to Colonel Girkin (also known as Strelkov) and Moscow speak frankly about it is a problem, yet in Europe the political consultant Aleksandr Borodai organized the problem is worse. So when the Obama administration Donbass rebellion. When Moscow sent the Vostok and NATO Supreme Commander Breedlove late last Battalion to Ukraine in late May and T-64 tanks and winter spoke of the introduction of major Russian advanced anti-aircraft weapons in June and July, the weapons systems into the Donbass, the German chan- EU still declined to notice and to impose serious, cellor’s office briefed German papers that the United sectoral sanctions. Those sanctions only came after a States was exaggerating developments. Russian-supplied Buk anti-aircraft system shot down In this environment, the work of independent MH17, a commercial airliner carrying nearly 200 researchers has become extremely important. If the Dutch passengers. governments of the West are slow to identify the The second problem Putin faces is the strong danger, private individuals and institutions need to pick opposition of the Russian public to the use of Russian up the challenge. troops in the war. Numerous polls by the Levada One such institution is The Interpreter, which has Center, a prestigious Moscow think tank, have made been covering Moscow’s war on Ukraine doggedly and this sentiment clear. Putin is afraid that his popularity in detail since the start. This report—An Invasion by and support might suffer if it becomes clear that he has Any Other Name: The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine, sent troops to fight and die in the Donbass. by James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, If Western governments were clear-eyed in regard and Michael Weiss—is an important culmination of to Putin’s aggressive designs, Kremlin efforts to hide many months of work. its hand in the war with Ukraine would not
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