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Ethnonationalism and Pan- ... 67

Jacob M. Landau

Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism in and the Ex-Soviet

r Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism in Turkey and the Ex-Soviet Republics

ldeological struggles in Turkey, a part ofpoliticallife for at least two gen­ erations, have only recently come into the open in the six newly independ­ ent ex-Soviet Muslim states. This article looks atfour ofthese in Turkey and the new states-communism!socialism, Islamism, ethno­ nationalism, and pan-nationalism-focusing on the last two. Communism/ socialism appears to be in decline both in Turkey and the six states. Jslam­ ism is an increasingly patent factor in Turkey 's internal , but has yet to assert itself meaningfully in the six states. Ethnonationalism in Tur­ key has centered on devetoping the new -, which is one of the reasons for the ethnic tensions between Turks and there, since the

Migration 28/95 68 Jacob M. Landau former perceive the tatter as a danger for the future of Turkey as a nation­ state in its present borders. In the six states, ethnonationalism isa leading cause of rising strife among the numerous ethnies, many of whom are di­ vided among these states, each with its own language and its traditions. This has resulted in several pan-, of which the main ones seem to be Pan-Turkism and Pan-Iranism, promoted by Turkey and , respectively. However, Pan-Azerism, Pan-Uzbekism, Pan-Kazakhism, and other pan-ideologies are becoming potentfactors, alsa, in both the inter­ nal and extemal politics of several of the six states.

Ethnonationalismus and Pannationalismus in der Türkei und den ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken

Ideologische Kiimpfe, die in der Türkei seit mindestens zwei Generationen Teil des politischen Lebens sind, sind erst vor kurzem in den sechs ehe­ maligen muslimisehen Sowjetrepub!iken, diejetzt unabhiingig sind, zutage getreten. Dieser Artikel befaj3t sich mit vier dieser ideologisehen Richtun­ gen in der Türkei und in den neuen Staaten- Kommunismus!Sozialismus, Islamismus, Ethnonationalismus und Pannationalismus, wobei er sich auf die beiden letztgenannten konzentriert. Kommunismus/Sozialismus schei­ nen sich sowohl in der Türkei als auch in den sechs Staaten im Nieder­ gang zu befinden. Der Islamismus gewinnt zunehmend Einfluj3 in der Innenpolitik der Türkei, muj3 sich aber in den sechs Staaten noch wirksam behaupten. Der Ethnonationalismus in der Türkei hat sich auf die Ent­ wicklung eines neuen Nationalstaates konzentriert,. was einen der Gründe für die ethnischen Spannungen zwischen Türken und Kurden darstellt, da die Türken in den Kurden eine Gefahr für die Zukunft der Türkei als Na­ tionalstaat in ihren gegenwiirtigen Grenzen sehen. In den sechs Staaten ist der Ethnonationalismus einer der Hauptgründe für die zunehmenden Kon­ flikte zwischen den zahlreichen Ethnien, von denen viele in diesen Staaten verteilt leben, und die jede ihre eigene Sprache und ihre eigenen Traditio­ nen haben. Das hat zu verschiedenen Pannationalismen geführt, von de­ nen die wichtigsten der Panturkismus und Paniranismus sind, die von der Türkei beziehungsweise dem Iran unterstützt werden. Der Panazerismus, Panusbekismus, Pankasachismus und andere Panideologien gewinnen Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 69 jedoch zunehmend Einjluj3 sowohl in der Innenpolitik als auch in der Au­ j3enpolitik einiger dieser Liinder.

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Introduction

Several ideologies are engaged in lively competition with each other both in the of Turkey, a state established in 1923 in a part of the dis­ membered Ottoman , and in the six ex-Soviet Muslim republics, independent since 1991 1 and marked by the fluidity of their politics, as well as by their efforts to determine their cultural identity and achieve econornic stabilization (for which see Fuller: 1992, pp. v ff.). Open ideo­ logical contest, a hallmark of Western-style politics since the end of the Second World War, has evidently go ne on much longer in Turkey. On the other hand, ideological differences, generally covert under the Soviet re­ gime, have only recently become openly visible in the newly independent Azerbayjan (in the ), as well as Uzbekistan, , Turk­ menistan, Kirghizstan, and (in ). Nevertheless, it is still diffıcult to get a precise idea of what is happening in the six repub­ lics and to interpret it correctly (Critchlow: 1992, pp. 4-6; cf. Olcott: 1992, pp. 108-130). A prelirninary analysis of the ideological context of Turkey and the six republics in recent years, considering the main sirnilar­ ities and differences, may help us to better understand the political climate in these states and societies. Within the limited parameters of thjs article and without touching on local and triballoyalties, we shall try to look at four of these ideologies-socialism/communism; Islamism; ethnonational­ ism; and pan-nationalism (with an emphasis on the last two), and offer some tentative conclusions about their impact.

Migration 28/95 70 lacob M. Landau

Socialism/Communism

Leftist ideologies, chiefly communism and various trends of socialism, have on the whole occupied a peripheral position in Turkey (cf. Landau: 1974, chs. 2 and 3). Communism, outlawed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, operated mostly underground until the early 1990s. Leftist trends have generally been frowned on by offıcial circles, and the few, short-lived, Ieftist organizations, initiated and led mostly by intellectuals, attracted only minimal public support. This is largely true also of the relatively longer-lasting Labour Party of Turkey, a Marxİst grouping active from 1961 to 1971, which even gained several parliamentary seatsin 1965 and 1969 (for which see Landau: 1974, ch. 4).

In the six republics, on the other hand, until the disintegration of the So­ viet Union in the Iate 1980s, communism was the offıcial , imple­ mented by party, bureaucracy, police, and KGB, and strenuously prop­ agated by all the state media and the educational system. Its ub!quitous presence has been only moderately affected in the offıcial circles stili rul­ ing each of the six independent republics. The only with political experience, the communist bureaucrats, form the core of the administra­ tive elites of the republics (As kar Akayev, preside nt of Kirghizstan, is the most notable exception; Hyman: 1993). However, though their past expe­ rience and that of their close associates, together with their future inter­ ests, maintain them as a tightly-bound clique, their ideologkal commit­ ment is less than passionate. Indeed, one has the impression that, as a popular ideology, communism is increasingly less relevant than some other in all six republics.

Islamism

Islarnism, that is, the political involvement of Islarnic circles, seems to be ideologically more significant in the present and very possibly for the fu­ ture (Mardin: 1969). Although it is not yet as successful elsewhere as in Iran and the Sudan, it is gaining ground visibly in other states as well. This seems to be the case lately in Turkey, at least. Institutionally dises­ tablished by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s, Islamism has been Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 71 spreading gradually not only in the rural areas but also in the towns and cities, arriving together with the numerous villagers who have been set­ tling in urban centers. Substantial increases in the wearing of traditional garb, participating in mass prayers, and turning to religious education are some of the external signs. Furthermore, Islamism left the political desert to returo to the mainstream with the establishment of an Islamist organiza­ tion, the Party of National Order, in 1970, followed by the National Sal­ vation Party, and later by the Prosperity Party (Landau: 1976). It isa sign of the times that the Islamist party, which had generally won from 8 per cent to 12 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections, received almost 20 per cent in the 1994 municipal elections, winning the mayoralties of the two largest cities, and Ankara, and more than 21 per cent in the December 1995 parliamerttary elections. Although the Islamists in the party and those of other organizations adopt various ideologkal positions, the differences are mostly tactical. Strategically, their common goal is to oppose the secularist expressions of Western-style modernism and to strive to transform society and state into a theocracy govemed by the ten­ ets of Islam.

The presence of Islamism differs in the six republics and cannot always be accurately gauged outside them. Ideological activities vary from one state to another. Thus, Islamism is less a major political issue in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizstan, which were Islamized relatively Iate, in the 18th and 19th centuries. Unremitting propaganda by the state machin­ ery of the , over close to seventy years, forced Islam down to similar levels of semiclandestine popular belief and practice in all six republics, and the official version was entirely subservient to the policies of the state authorities. Appearances notwithstanding, Michael Rywkin correctly predicted a dozen years ago that in the struggle between commu­ nism and Islam the latter would win (Rywkin: 1982, p. 91). Interest in Islam seems on the increase nowadays in all six republics: male circumci­ sion is almost general, the mosques are full, many Muslims fast during the month of Ramadan, and so forth. It seems that militant Islam has been making some inroads in the towns and cities, too, as several Islamic-mind­ ed publications attest.

Migration 28/95 72 Jacob M. Landau

However, disparities in attitudes toward Islam (traditionally, it is stronger in the rural areas; organizationally, it is more conspicuous in the urban areas) hamper its advance asa political force evenin the republics where it is more visible, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the former, there are groups demanding the establishment of an Islarnic republic, sponsored by the smail Namangan Islamic Party, set up in 1990. In any case, this presence induced the president of the republic, Islam Karimov (not a reli­ gious person), to take the oath of office on the Koran. In Tajikistan, the impact of the 1979 revolution in Iran and of Soviet intervention in neigh­ boring soon afterward was very powerful. Since 1983, samiz­ dat (self-issued) publications of a fundamentalist Islarnic character have multiplied in print, cassettes, and so on, a situation provoking strong So­ viet reaction. Since independence, the Party of Islamic Renaissance, founded in 1990, has been championing the Islarnization of the bases of society (on which see Roy: 1991, esp. pp. 140-141; Hetmanek: 1993, pp. 367-374). The civil war thatstartedin the spring of 1992-checked only by the presence of Soviet troops, invited to establish order-is evidence of the powerful involvement of militant Islam in Tajikistan politics (further de­ tails inHetmanek: 1993, pp. 365-378; Atkin: 1989, pp. 1-66). However, seen as a whole, the present political power of Islam in all six republics is rather limited, although informed observers predict its future advance (e.g., Poujol: 1993, pp. 171-180), a possibility that many of the current political leaders in the six republics would seem to dread (for Islam and Islarnism in recent Kazaklı and Kirghiz politics, see !mart: 1990, pp. 27- 36).

Ethnonationalism

In W estern , religious and cultural differences have rather declined as specific focuses of attachment since the end of the Second World W ar. In some countries, at least, they have tended to become merely symbolic. In the Republic of Turkey and the six new Muslim republics, however, these elements are stili powerful enough to serve, in varying degrees, to mobilize people toward interethnic rivalries. An , or ethnie (a term frequently employed by A.D. Smith, in his important studies of na­ tionalism; see, e.g., Smith: 1981, p. 17 and passim), can be defined asa self-perceived community of people upholding in common a set of tradi- Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 73

tions not shared with others, such as religious beliefs, culture (chiefly language), a sense of histarical continuity, cornınon ancestry and place of origin, or comman territory. One or several of these characteristics may be present; sametimes history trails into mythology. Whether based on reality or imagination (Anderson: 1990), the self-perceptions of the eihnie are frequently emphasized in the effort to establish a sense of collective dignity or in the pursuit of certain group interests. Ethnonationalism (a term introduced and elaborated by Connor: 1973, pp. 1-21) has often been discussed from the perspective of political strife for territory rather than the psychocultural standpoint of what occurs within ethnies when they are confronted with a new situation compelling them to switch their alle­ giances or to promote new goals. This is true of Turkey and the s ix repub­ Iics, with variations deriving from the specific historical, geographic, and economic circumstances determining the assertiveness of each single eth­ nie.

Ethnonationalism in the Republic of Turkey was focused on developing a new and comman identity for a nation-state in the making. Whereas Otto­ man identity (on which see Timur: 1986, pp. 29-52) in the 19th century was so defined as to minimize nationalİst group attachments in order to discourage ethnic breakaway movements, Turkish republican policy was to promote the comman nationalİst identity. Although the nations of group identity and belongingness cannot be reduced to simple formulas, the defi­ nition by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his supporters, based on the com­ mouality of the Turkish ethnie, was to the point and easy to grasp (Lan­ dau: 1984). Although public perceptions changed sornewhat in subsequent years, the emphasis on both territorial and cultural ethnonationalism re­ mained. Hence the official Turkish insistence on refusing to acknowledge any minorities except the religious ones, which means Greeks, and Jews, but not the Kurds, who are Muslims. Hence, also, the enthusi­ astic promoting of the Turkish language as the single medium of instruc­ tion (with extremely rare exceptions) as well as imposing it as the sole legally permitted medium of public communication (Landau: 1990a, esp. pp. 144-147).

Whenever the military, who regard themselves as the guardians of Tur­ key' s ethnonationalism, felt that it was in serious danger, they intervened:

Migration 28/95 74 Jacob M. Landau

in 1960, when it seemed to them that the system of was threatened; in 1971, when they crushed political violence, chiefly span­ sored by the radical left; and in 1980, when they perceived danger from renewed violence and an increase in the power of Islarnism. It is, of course, no coincidence that they perceived fırst the extrernist left, then Islarnism, as a threat to nationalism. The fact that in all three instances the rnilitary returned to barracks, handing authority back to multiparty civilian government, has been correctly interpreted as a sign of the durability of Turkey's essentially democratic system. Indeed, the Republic" of Turkey is a rare ·example of the coexistence in one state and society of widely accepted pluralism along with strong ethnonationalism.

That this is not the case with the six republics' ethno-nationalism is hardly surprising, considering their different background and their heterogeneous ethnic makeup, which is practically an open invitation to conflict (Wheel­ er: 1977; Nowikow: 1991; Dawydow!Trenin: 1993). Tsarist and, Iater, the Soviet Union were prirne exarnples of states with persisring ten­ sions deriving from territorial expansion and unsuccessful attempts to in­ corporate widely divergent groups. The six republics, both beforı~ and after independence, share many of the resulting interethnic tensions, par­ ticularly since the borders of each had been designed by the Soviets to include several groups. Liberal pluralism was never a part of political and social culture in the Soviet Union and it is hardly fostered in the newly independent six republics, where technologkal modernization, rather than political democratization, is the order of the day. N or is cultural pluralism encouraged there, so that some ethnic groups have to contend with an underprivileged status-whether through legalized downgrading of their specific culture, or practical issues, such as econornic favoritism shown to other groups. The need to submit to the heirs of the Russian rulers has been galling to many ethnic minorities. For exarnple, in the Soviet Union all local Ianguages were more or less secondary to Russian; in the new situation, only one of these languages has been granted official status in each republic (only in Kazakhstan does the competition between Kazaklı and Russian continue), a move seen by speakers of minority languages as unjust and offensive. However, sentiments of ethnonationalism affect the majorities as well. As in some other parts of the world, the population makeup does not even approach ethnic homogeneity; the defınition of na­ tional frontiers in the six republics, following the pre-independence Soviet lines, does not coincide with territorial ethnic boundaries; and ethnic di- Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 75 versity is widely seen as a threat to national unity, even to the smooth formation of the nation-state. The majority ethnie thus presents itself as closely identified with the interests of the respective republic. ·

Ethnonationalism in the six republics is pervaded by deep affectivity; many inhabitants insist on the significance of their ethnic identity and group distinctiveness. Many of the proponents of such attitudes apparently prefer con:flict to accommodation. Indeed, with the disintegration ef the Soviet Union and the consequent disappearance of state, bureaucracy, party, KGB, and police control, ethnic con:flict has increased in the six republics both in frequency and in intensity. As one receives better and more precise information about what goes on in each of these republics, one gets the impression that the riva! ethnies are not merely moved by considerations of their particular origins, culture (most particularly lan­ guage, history, and mythology), religion, or territory, that is, by ethno­ nationalism, but also by their own group interests. This is especially evi­ dent when these clash with the interests of other ethnies or the subjective perceptions of rival interest groups. To some extent these interests are socioeconomic; thus, Russians and Ukrainians, having had a privileged status in the six republics while they were stili part of the Soviet Union, are now the object, in several of the republics, of determined efforts to force out these "foreigners"-albeit without fanfare, so as not to unduly antagonize Russia and give it a pretext for intervention.

Pan-nationalism

Pan-nationalism, which may be perceived asa more intensive or, anyway, a more comprehensive form of nationalism, aims at promoting the co he­ si on of people of the same origin, culture, or territory, with the ultimate objective of establishing some sort of among them. In our context, we shall attempt to analyze and compare this trend in Turkey and in the six republics.

When the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, Pan-Turkism had already been current during the last years of the (Lan-

Migration 28/95 76 Jacob M. Landau dau: 1981, ch. 2). It was a characteristically diaspora ideology and move­ ment, initiated and promoted by several ideologues of Turlde stock, main­ ly Tatars and Azeris, in the Tsarist Empire. These were seeking some support against the and Christianization campaign of the Russian authorities and aimed at a rapprochement, to be followed by a union, with their Turkish and Turlde breiliren (Landau: 1981, ch. 1). Their ideas found favor in the Ottoman Empire only some time later, in the empire's last decade, to no little extent thanks to the activities of Tatar and Azeri emigres. Pan-Turkism even became, though only for a short while, one of the dominant political ideologies within the Ottoman Em­ pire. Like most political pan-ideologies, it had an irredentist component, aiming at setting up a Pan-Turk empire to take the place of the swiftly disintegrating Ottoman state.

In the Republic of Turkey, however, Pan-Turkism continued only latently, as a tiny peripheral and semiclandestine mavement nourished by an ideol­ ogy propounded in a number of irregularly published periodicals, whose brief existences were terminated by lack of funds or governmental clo­ sure. Turkey, with its Kemalist leadership, had become an ethnonational­ ist body politic that could not but discourage competing ideologies such as Pan-Turkism. Although it showed signs of revival, after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's deathin 1938, Pan-Turkism has remained a small elitist mave­ ment in the Republic of Turkey, with no mass support. is no stranger to the Middle Eastern countries (Landau: 1990b), but its aggres­ sive character, opposed by all supporters of the status quo, has been among the main causes of its failure (Landau: 1988, pp. 1-5; Landau: 1991). The lesson seems to have been learned, and when an opportunity presented itself to renew and boister Turkey' s ties with the Turlde popula­ tions in the six republics, a new version of Pan-Turkism, not averse to state ethnonationalism, was adopted by Turkish political leaders, as we shall see below. Slogans like" From the Adriatic Sea to " (Adriya­ tik'ten Çine Türk dünyası), although stili heard, express personal views rather than an official attitude.2

In the Soviet Union, Pan-Turkism was treated asa chauvinist and bour­ geois ideology, and it hardly survived in the six Muslim republics. When these became independent, two sorts of pan-nationalism emerged to com­ pete with the ideologies we have examined above. In several of them one can observe a sort of pan-nationalism that can be understood as an expan- Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 77 sion of local ethnonationalism, chiefly that of the largest ethnie in the re­ public. Thus, Pan-Azerists claim to strive for a union of all Azeris, the seven million in the Republic of Azerbayjan and the nine million south of the border, in the Iranian province be~ring the same name. Maps pub­ Iished by champions of Pan-Azerism, including same government agen­ cies, show all Azerbayjan as one unit (for a solid examination of its cur­ rent politics, see Auch: 1992). In the same way, Pan-Uzbek:ism, with a long history of national awareness (see Baldauf· 1992; Allworth: 1990, pp. 309-315; Critchlow: 1991, pp. 20-38) would !ike to unite all Uzbeks in the diaspora to the mather country; Pan-Tajik:ism aims at annexing Sa­ markand and Bukhara, former centers of Tajik culture, now within Uz­ bekistan. Pan-Kazakhists sametimes express similar views regarding Ka­ zakhs everywhere, as they would !ike to increase their own numbers in Kazakhstan, barely 40 per cent of the entire population; they point out that Russians and Ukrainians are almost as numerous and form the majority in the cities. Not to be left behind, Pan-, again, would !ike to bring the Tajiks in Afghanistan and elsewhere into the fold of the Republic of Tajikistan. In this last case they feel that they need reinforcements to with­ stand what they suspect is the drive of the surraunding Turk:ic populations to engulf them. All these movements have a marked irredentist element, as their ideas of political union comprise the of territories as well as of people.

Anather category of pan-nationalism is Pan-Turk:ism, in five of these republics, and Pan-Iranism, apparently encouraged by Iran in Tajikistan, with its strong cultural ties with Persian culture (Tajikistan, for instance, has officially changed its alphabet from Cyrillic to Arabic, as used in Iran). However, Iran and Pan-Iranism are matters for a separate essay.3 For our own discussion, Pan-Turk:ism is more relevant. The other five republics that have Turk:ic majorities present same signs of revival of Pan­ Turkism (cf. Fuller: 1990, especially pp. 63-64). Their ruling elites, im­ bued under the Soviets with as strong an antagonism toward Pan-Turkism as toward Islamism, further suspect that an emphasis on Pan-Turk:ism, whether in domestic or foreign policies, may undermine the ethnonational­ ism that they currently propound as their main basis for popular support, at least intheir own ethnies. With the exception of Azerbayjan's fırst state president, Abulfeyz Elçibey, a cornrnitted Pan-Turk:ist, all the rulers of the

Migration 28/95 78 Jacob M. Landau

five Turkic republics, although they often ritually extol Pan-Turkism, 4 in practice have striven almost solely for the interests of their own respective states. Strong rivalries continue to affect adversely the relations between the newly independent republics, Turkic or otherwise.

Turkey, on the other hand, has moved ciaser to a Pan-Turk attitude in i ts relations with the six republics. Significantly, successive , formerly suspicious of Pan-Turkism, have now adopted it officially, as a complement to their ethnonationalist ideology. In so doing, they have ab­ jured its irredentist component, which would have embroiled Turkey in conflicts with its neighbors. Instead, they have concentrated on econornic and cultural relations with the six republics,5 aiming at creating a subsys­ tem in which Turkey may well be the senior partner. In fact, its popula­ .tion of close to sixty million approximately equals that of all six republics put together. This seems to worry the ruling elites in the s ix republics: even though political and rnilitary elements are absent, or at Ieast rela­ tively insignificant in Turkish-Turkic relations, the leaders of the republics are reluctant to distance themselves too obviously from Russia (which still claims vital interests in the area), or from Iran, S audi Arabia, and atlıers (which offer help, on religious or economic grounds).

Nevertheless, Turkey has much appeal to the six republics as the only model in the region (Yalçin: n.d. (1992]) of a pluralist democracy, not governed by Islam, with a market economy and well-developed ties to the West. Indeed, it is their only immediate connection to the West, whose advanced technology and economic investments they crave. Thus, in the name of Pan-Turk , they have been accepting considerable aid from Turkey, which, despite its financial difficulties, has been generous. In practical terms (Ehteshami!Murphy: 1993), this means carrying out projects to build factories for processing much-needed staple foods and for utilizing locally available materials; setting up trade Iinks, planning to operate and develop oil fields, build power plants, and install telephone, telegraph, and telecommunications centers. In adrninistration, the trend is mostly expressed by fostering various state institutions and training local people to run them-in the civil service and diplomacy, in health services, agricultural expertise, and certain technical areas.

Cultural and educational assistance, less expensive but at least equally effective, is also offered. Universities in Turkey allocate annual grants to Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 79 up to two thousand students from each of the six republics, and same spe­ cialized schools have been set up in the republics. Great effort is invested by official Turkish agencies as well as private bodies in popularizing the Turkish language in the six republics. The most visible of these efforts are daily television broadcasts in Turkish (and same in simplified Turkish) via relay stations that have been specially set up. Since the Turkic languages of Azerbayjan and Central Asia resemble the Turkish of Turkey in gram­ matkal structures and large parts of the vocabulary, the message comes through quite easily. Evidently, Turkey has to be careful not to offend locallanguage sensibilities, so it mainly campaigns for a linguafranca to facilitate communication-a clearly Pan-Turk step. Linguists in Turkey have invested considerable time in devising an alphabet for such a com­ man language, based on their own, but expanded by several additicnal symbols to suit the Turkic language (Ercilasun: 1993). The basis is to be the Latin alphabet, and considerable effort has been invested in persuading the six republics to adopt it İn Iieu of the Cyrillic. As we have noted, T

Conclusion

While it is difficult if not impossible to measure the relative force of com­ peting ideologies anywhere, one can get a fair impression from internal and external signs. In the case of Turkey and the six republics, the situa­ tion seems, overall, to be typical of ideological strife, with the difference that the former is a developed state and society, whereas the latter are developing ones. In all of them, ideological clashes are inevitable, since the ideologies we have discussed negate one anather and impose conflict­ ing loyalties: communism/socialism negates Islam (but see Malashenko: 1993), ethnonationalism, and pan-nationalism; Islamism opposes not only leftism but, as a universalİst ideology, discourages all versions of national­ ism (Fuller: 1991); ethnonationalism and, even more so, pan-nationalism

Migratian 28/95 80 Jacob M. Landau

fight leftism and take an unfavorable view of Islamism as an ideology even when, for tactical reasons, they refrain from attacking it.

Communism/socialism (and leftism in general) appears to be of rather limited impact in all these countries, especially Turkey. However, in the six republics communism stili has a hold on the governing political elites and, quite possibly, among certain sectors of the society, probably the nine to ten million Russians Iiving in the region. Indeed, some of its re­ pressive practices continue (for examples from Turkmenistan, see Laber: 1993).

Islamism is a potent social and political force, most probably on the as­ cendant as a part of the advance of militant Islam throughout large areas of the Middle East. In the six republics, Islamism is a potential source of power and is consequently see n as a future threat by the secu1arized elites. For Islam is not only a markedly political religion; it provides the only common link between practically all the indigenous inhabitants of the six republics (eve n though the re are s ome differences between Sunnis and Shiites).

Ethnonationalism is stili the most powerful political ideology in both Tur­ key and the six republics. The latter are now, ideologically speaking, comparable to Turkey in the fırst years after the establishment of the re­ public more than seventy years ago. Of course, certain differences are obvious: Turkey has been one republic, inheriting the long state-tradition of the Ottoman Empire, and obtaining its new statehood only after a bloody war against the Greek army in Asia Minor. The newly independent republics, on the contrary, are six in number, and have not experienced, like Turkey, a gradual evolution of national consciousness (a point well argued by Winrow: 1992); they have had Iittle self-governing experience, and have attained independence without fighting for it; as a result, their own nationalİst movements, although not entirely new, have not been forged by the traumatic experience of war. But there are many traits of similarity, nonetheless: Both Turkey and the six republics are composed of ethnies, w hi ch in the early Republic of Turkey were regarded as a threat to the Turkish majority; this feeling stili persists with respect to the Kurds, many of whom perceive themselves as a separate ethnie with its own demands. In the six republics, the strife between the various ethnies arguably forms the main focus of political life, embracing both cultural Ethnonationalism and Pan-nationalism ... 81 and economic aspirations. Ensuing ethnically-motivated violence is not un­ known, of course, both in Turkey and in the six republics. Although some future accommodation is not improbable, for the time being ethnonational­ ist conflict is the order of the day.

Pan-nationalism, apparently supported by all sides in the economic and cultural domains and dutifully praised, does not have the same appeal ev­ erywhere. Pan-Turkism, at least, is promoted ınore by Turkey, very prob­ ably as an appendage to its own ethnonationalism, that is, as a factor fur­ thering its own national interest in becoıning a regional power. But it is lukewarınly upheld in the six republics, and even then ınainly when it does not conflict with their own economic interests and drive for techno­ logical ınodernization, nor clash with their own specific cultural attitudes.

Notes

1) The sources on contemporary Turkey are numerous; several will be mentioned in the following footnotes. The six republics have drawn increasing attention in recent years; several published works are: Türk dünyasi el kitabi: 1976 (this isa volume of 1,460 large­ format pages!); Akiner: 1983; Bennigsen!Wimbush: 1985; Grobe­ Hagel: 1992; Götz/Halbach: 1993. In addition, there are, of course, numerous books and articleson each of the republics. 2) However, this slogan and the ideology behind it appear in school­ textsin Turkey (see Copeaux: 1994). 3) See, on Iran's role in the new Muslim republics, Pipes/Clawson: 1993, pp. 124-141; Ehteshami!Murphy: 1994, pp. 81-95, 104-107. 4) For instance, in a so-called "Pan-Turkist Conference" held in Alına-Ata, Kazakhstan, in January 1992; see Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily), January 23, 1992, p. 9. 5) For details, see Mütercimler: 1993; Artam: 1993; Landau: 1995, ch. 7.

Migration 28/95 82 J acob M. Landau

References

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Jacob M. Landau Department of Political Science Hebrew University of Jerusalem Mount Scopus Jerusalem 91905 Is rael