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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS REGIONAL FORUM
INTRODUCTION The ARF is the most comprehensive forum for international debate and the fostering of multilateral understanding that focuses on Asian matters. It is an institution that facilitates dialogue and promotes confidence building measures, lacking the power of approving binding resolutions. Instead, it focuses on being quite simply a forum where common grounds can be reached, facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict, especially where there might be a threat of usage of force. On this particular summit, the ARF will debate a crossroads in which Asia finds itself: cooperation or conflict. In this sense, two topics make this crossroads exceedingly clear. On one hand, the various integration processes and multilateral institutions that coexist shall be under a discussion triggered by the ASEAN Vision 2015, focusing on the future of Asian integration. But different projects and visions exist simultaneously, and many have competing means and ends, and the fulfillment of all projects is not necessarily viable, or desirable to all parties involved in the ARF. Therefore, within the very symbol of international cooperation, competition can be gleaned, and all member States must promote cooperation, while keeping their national interests and sovereignty in mind. On the other hand, the most persistent disputes in East Asia, those over small archipelagoes and the important resources and territorial waters they command, seem to become more intense every year. This point epitomizes the dynamics for conflict in Asia, with the rise of powerful actors seeking to solidify their position in the region creating rifts and skirmishes that risk escalation. And yet, amid these disputes, projects for mutual exploration of resources exist, offering a prospect of cooperation in the heart of Asian conflict. Furthermore, traditional alliances seem weakened, and local rivalries are often put aside, when these archipelagoes come into play, showing that these disputes are dynamic, and opportunities for closer articulation between ARF members do exist. Hence, the Asian dilemma: cooperation or conflict. Conflict over how to lead integration, and cooperation in order to ensure key territories against regional opponents. In this conjuncture, the paradigm of the ASEAN Way of conducting diplomacy, and the structure of the ARF, seeking to foster dialogue and mutual understanding, is of paramount importance for the avoidance of hostilities. In this context, Ministers will seek to find viable
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. solutions to their grievances, reaching compromises in order to avoid conflicts, while keeping their national interest and foreign policy at the heart of their negotiations.
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Topic A: ASEAN Vision 2015 and East Asian Integration Bruno Magno and João Arthur Reis
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. The colonial past and the rise of the Japanese Empire The history of the processes of regional integration in East Asia has a deep relation with the history of colonialism in the region. In fact, the first attempts to do something similar to a regional organization date from before World War II, and are related to some kind of struggle against imperialism. Right after the War, the main ideals of uniting the region or creating some kind of international organization were influenced by the decadent European empires trying to maintain their rule in East Asia and the fight of nationalist or communist movements against that. Along the subsequent decades, when some of the regional integration processes had succeeded, the consequences of that recent colonial past were still very alive. Before World War II, great part of East Asia was under the rule of European Empires. Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, was divided mainly between France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The French ruled over great part of Indochina, namely Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; Great Britain possessed Malaysia, Burma, Singapore and some colonies in Borneo; and the Dutch had Indonesia. After the war against Spain, the United States had conquered the Philippines and Guam, becoming this way another power in Asia. Southeast Asia was not the only region suffering from foreign rule at that time. The Chinese Empire, since the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), was being dismembered and exploited by European Empires and Japan, which held possessions in Chinese territory. This process of dividing China assured the commercial interests of these powers and crushed the country, economically and politically (REIS FILHO, 1982). The situation in Japan differed from the rest of the region and would later have a huge influence in decolonization and regional integration dynamics. After the Meiji Restoration, in 1868, the Japanese were pursuing a policy of stimulating industrialization and modernization, while preserving the Japanese culture and identity at the same time. It was considered a process of combining “Western advances” with “Eastern values”. The result was that by the end of the XIX century Japan had a modern army and a powerful navy. This, combined with an aggressive foreign policy resulted in the attainment of an empire in East Asia. After the war against China, in 1894-1895, Japan conquered Formosa and secured the indirect rule over the Korean peninsula. In 1904, Japan started a war against Russia and won.
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The Japanese victory in 1905 made it the first non-Western nation to defeat an European one, launched it in the front rank of the modern world powers and ended an era of European assumption of racial superiority (DAVID, 2009). From this moment on, Japan played a decisive role in East Asian politics and regional dynamics. In 1910 it formally annexed Korea and in 1931 it launched an attack over Manchuria, a strategic region to Japanese plans of control of the whole region. In this project, conquering China became central, so as expanding to Southeast Asia and strongly opposing to European and North- American presence in Asia (KERSHAW, 2009).
1.2. Early attempts of regional integration: Before the Cold War By the end of the XIX century, the idea that Asian peoples should unite and make front to Western aggressions arose both in China and in Japan. These ideas were called Pan- Asianism. As consequence, many government-supported organizations were created in Japan, in order to promote Pan-Asian ideals. Such organizations imagined Japan and China leading East Asia, united in equal positions (HOTTA, 2007). It has guided Japanese foreign policy by the end of the XIX century, also contributing to the nationalist revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat- sen in 1911, in China, which counted with inestimable Japanese assistance (SATO, 2007). In this moment, a considerable fraction of Chinese and Korean elites saw favorably the Japanese strengthening. This Pan-Asian ideology prevailed in Japan until the Second Sino-Japanese War, in 1937. However, due to the rise of militarism, the Pan-Asian ideal was distorted and reduced to a pretext for colonial policies that Japan put in practice by the mid-1920s (HOTTA, 2007; MAGNO et al, 2011). With the rise of Japan, came the proposal of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co- prosperity Sphere. Publicly announced in 1940, the proposal for a bloc of Asian nations headed by Japan was designed to free Asia from Western domination and to promote Nipponese supremacy through East Asia. It was based on the thesis of the superiority of the Japanese race, and in Japan’s mission to lead Asia against Western powers (GORDON, 2010). Such discourse was used to legitimize the military and territorial expansion promoted by Japan, and there were obvious economic motivations, important to sustain the growth of the Japanese industry and its war efforts. In this scheme, the oil, the rubber, and the other raw materials of the European colonies in Southeast Asia were determinant to the invasion of this region by the Japanese (DAVID, 2009). The invasion of China started in 1937 and in 1941 Japan launched a synchronized attack against Southeast Asia and the North-American Pacific Fleet. Following the Japanese raid against the Hawaiian base of Pearl Harbor, the United States entered definitively in
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World War II. After the defeat of Germany, US efforts were directed to fighting Japan, which would surrender in 1945 after the launch of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Manchuria’s invasion by soviet troops. After the War, the Japanese take over demonstrated having a vital role in disrupting the colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, since it destroyed the patterns and the structure of the system imposed by the imperialist powers. Part of the Japanese strategy was supporting nationalist movements against Western rule, and indeed, in many colonies, the nationalist movements that fought for freedom saw in the Japanese occupation a way out of European domination and Japanese troops were hailed as liberators (DAVID, 2009). In spite of the colonial features of the Japanese occupation, in many cases it contributed to the establishment of the occupied state’s armies and bureaucracies, especially in Indonesia, paving the way for the future independence process (PITT, 2011). Indeed, the Japanese invasion resulted to be more of a political firebreak than a promoter of regional cohesion (TURNBULL, 1992). In the last stages of occupation in Southeast Asia, the Japanese made efforts to promote dialogue between nationalist movements of different countries and gave nominal independence to Burma, Philippines, Indochina and Indonesia. After the war, the ancient colonial powers tried to return, but it was not possible anymore. The rupture of the rule of such powers, and the costs of war made their return impossible (FRIEDRICH, 2011). Besides that, the creation of the United Nations and its Charter gave legitimacy to the independences, as well as the anti-colonial bias of the United States. The Dutch and the French tried to retake their territories, respectively Indonesia and Indochina, which caused violent reactions, and the attempt to reimpose themselves did not succeed. Great Britain returned in a more pacific way, and granted independence to its colonies without violence, generally. This way, it remained a great influence to its former colonies; such factor would latter cause conflicts among the countries in the region. The United States did something similar in Philippines, assuring political independence but keeping close economic and defense links, which would ensure a wider role for this country in the region. In the following years, the main challenges for the regions’ countries were to create a national identity, in order to keep their countries united within their boundaries (TURNBULL, 1992). The USA also occupied Japan after their victory, and under the rule of General Douglas MacArthur this occupation sought to establish American control and dismantle the apparatus of the Japanese society, considered by the Truman’s administration the originator of the will of military expansion (PIKE, 2010). China was still divided between the communist and the nationalist movements, a division present in a large number of countries in the region in that time. The consequences of
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. the victory of the communists would bring even more complexity to the situation of East Asia during the Cold War, which was just starting in the end of the 1940’s. The bipolarity and the division of the world between the capitalist and the communist blocks made many rivalries and political struggles arise in East Asia, turning the region into one of the most important zones in the world.
1.3. The Cold War The fact was that after the War, there was no obvious leader in the region (TURNBULL, 1992), since no country was strong enough to take this position. Basically, every country in East Asia was dealing with such internal troubles that searching to establish a regional order or unity was secondary. In many cases, the governments changed constantly, making the establishment of continuous external policy lines impossible. China was immersed in a Civil War, divided between the communist, led by Mao Zedong, and the nationalist Kuomintang party, led by Chiang Kai-shek. Japan was still occupied and with great part of it infrastructure destroyed. The Korean Peninsula was free from Japanese rule, but was now divided: the soviet troops occupied it north of the 38ºN parallel and American troops made the same in the south. There have been some attempts to promote regional cooperation by Great Britain and India. The first one tried to use the Commonwealth, focusing on its former colonies. For its plans to work, the participation of India was indispensable, but the Indian government adopted another approach. Jawarhal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, preferred to see India as the champion of the struggle against imperialism, and tried to adopt the role of natural leader and focal point of regional cooperation against the colonial features, but it did not work. Southeast Asian countries were afraid of coming under the rule of such a big neighbor, and avoided being placed under the umbrella of neither India nor China (TURNBULL, 1992). During that period, practically every country in Southeast Asia was facing rebellions, civil wars and unrest. In this region, the main transnational ideological or religious influences, namely nationalism, communism and pan-Islamism, have demonstrated to be more disruptive and divisive than a stimulus for unity (ibidem). Besides that, there were still strong influences of Great Britain and the United States, what gave rise to disputes and conflicts between countries in the region. In 1949 the Communist troops in China marched over Nanjing, the nationalist capital, and later in the same year Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China, putting an end to a civil war that started even before the Japanese invasion. Mao’s success would inspire communist movements throughout the region, mainly in Southeast Asia and Korea. In the
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UFRGSMUN 2012 following year, a war started in the Korean Peninsula, when the soviet-backed North Korean government invaded South Korea. United States, backed by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, engaged and pushed the North Koreans back, until the Chinese border. In that moment, China entered in the war and pushed the American and UN forces back to the 38ºN parallel, where the war continued until 1953, and ended in a stalemate. The fact is that the emergence of a communist giant such as China preoccupied the United States (and this was materialized with the Chinese intervention in the Korea War). At that moment, emerged the thesis that stated that if one country was to fall to communism, it would provoke destabilization in its neighbors. This way, the entire region would fall to communism. This would later be called the “domino theory” (TURNBULL, 1992). Like MacArthur said in 1951, “If we lose to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable” (DAVID, 2009). This kind of fear led the United States and Great Britain to pursue a more assertive policy in East Asia, by building bilateral treaties and creating organizations in order to deter the expansion of Communism. In 1951, as part of the deterrence policies, the United States signed bilateral defense treaties with Japan and Philippines, and a tripartite pact with New Zealand and Australia, the ANZUS. In 1954 the Geneva Conference was held in order to discuss the matter of The First Indochina War. This conflict started when the nationalist and communist movements in Vietnam opposed to the return of the French colonial regime. In this conference, the division of Vietnam in two zones was approved, with the North governed by the pro-soviet Viet Minh and the south by the State of Vietnam, backed by the United States. Subsequent to this conference in 1954 the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created. This Collective Defense Treaty was signed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and the United States. This last two were the pillars of such organization, but their different projects for it created a division that jeopardized the initiative. The USA had the idea of establishing a military alliance, and Great Britain saw it as an organization with a broad acceptance of members, that could embrace the concept of non-aggression. Besides that, controversy arose due to the fact that it was a foreign dominated institution, and that it could be more dangerous than the communist subversion it was supposed to fight (TURNBULL, 1992). These controversies and the critics it received from communist and non-communist countries made the organization not so durable and useful as it intended to be. At that moment, East Asia was divided between SEATO members and the Sino-Soviet backed countries. This way, there was a clear political economic and political division, the capitalist and the communist blocs. But in reality, the situation was not that simple. Some of
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. the Western-aligned countries had some reservations in their relations with the capitalist powers, and the same occurred in the other side, where the differences between China and the USSR became increasingly visible. The Bandung Conference, held by Indonesia in 1955, questioned this simplistic division, presenting non-alignment as a way for recent independent countries to act in the international system. Strongly supported by Jawarhal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier and Sukarno, the Indonesian President, the non-alignment policy was based not in neutrality, but in an active and independent actuation of developing countries, by aligning neither with the USA nor the USSR bloc. In one hand, the conference failed in creating a permanent Afro-Asian organization, due to the exclusion of China, decline of Indian relevance and inclusion of European members (TURNBULL, 1992). But in the other hand, it gave birth to the non-alignment movement, and its ideals of autonomy, sovereignty, non-intervention and equality among peoples and races were crystallized, becoming some sort of guidance for some nations. In 1961 the idea of “Great Malaysia” became public. This country became independent in 1957, peacefully, and received help of the British to fight communist rebel groups, thus maintaining strong relations with its former metropolis. The plans of “Great Malaysia” intended to unite Malaysia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei and the colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo in a federation (VELOSA-PORRAS, 2009). The “Great Malaysia” concept consisted in a loose union of several small Islamic sultanates and was proposed by the British with the purpose of maintaining its presence and avoiding the spreading of nationalist movements. In response to that, the Indonesian government started the policy known as Konfrontasi, supporting communist subversion inside Malaysia, since it saw the initiative as British imposed and neocolonialist. This strong opposition also put an end to Maphilindo, an attempt of creating a nonpolitical confederation made by Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Such forum was basically a strategy of Manila and Jakarta to delay the formation of the Great Malaysia Federation. Malaysia and Great Britain succeeded to contain the attacks, and the Indonesian government, led by Sukarno, demonstrated this way the economic weakness of its policies. This resulted in a coup led by the military in 1965, in which Suharto takes power and make profound changes in the Indonesian foreign policy (VELOSA-PORRAS, 2009). In 1961 Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), a cooperation organization focused mainly in the economic and cultural fields. Only in 1967 the first promising regional organization arose: ASEAN was created by the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, when they signed
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UFRGSMUN 2012 the Bangkok Declaration. This organization differed from all the previous attempts due to the fact that it arose from a local initiative, and suited the interests of the countries involved (TURNBULL, 1992). Since ASEAN was created right after the Konfrontasi , it was a means of reconciliation among neighbors. And due to the fact that Indonesia, by its size and population, was a key state in the establishment of the organization, it formed a kind of political defense that constrained new confrontation policies and hegemonic pretentions. This organization also provided some basis for its members to fight secessionist and communist movements inside its territory, supporting nation-building. This way, ASEAN focused in the common problems and in the idea that the solution should be free of external interference (BEUKEL, 2008). Indeed, for many years the organization concentrated in this non-interventionist and equitable basis. Such context paved the way for the success of the Japanese outsourcing process, as defined by Giovanni Arrighi (1997). Henceforth, the technologies of little aggregate value and intensive in manpower were transferred to the Asian Tigers 1, while the Japanese dynamic pole specialized in development of cutting edge technologies. In the next decade, it would be the Tigers turn to transfer such technologies to other countries, mainly ASEAN and China. The aim was to focus in more advanced producing techniques, as well as in the services sector. The Fukuda Doctrine represented the consolidation of the economic diplomacy towards Asia, demonstrating publicly, by the first time since World War II, the importance of Southeast Asia to Japan. This Doctrine, launched in 1977, advocated Japan’s process of maintaining closer relations to East Asia once again, and especially with ASEAN countries, to be made through “heart-to-heart understanding” (HOOK et al, 2005).This meant convergence of visions regarding economics and political issues. Such policy promoted interdependence between region’s countries, consolidating the economic integration between East and Southeast Asian states. It has granted privileged Japanese access to Southeast Asian markets and trading routes, essential to the supplying of energy and raw materials to the Japanese industries. The “Japanese outsourcing process” was also responsible for the spreading of the Japanese Economic Miracle, which resulted in the Asian Tigers and the Chinese Economic Miracle itself. (MAGNO et al, 2011). ASEAN members had most of the time authoritarian regimes, but open market policies; foreign investment was a way of achieving growth and development (TURNBULL, 1992). The assurance of such kind of system was important in a region full of what was seen
1Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. as Communist menaces. Despite all that, the organization had a slow development, with not too much being done until 1971, when was signed the declaration of the Zone of Freedom, Peace and Neutrality (ZOFPAN), stating the desire of the members states to maintain the area free from external influence (ASEAN, 1971). In the middle of the 1970 decade, Asia was facing new challenges and transformations. The United States had just withdrawn from Vietnam, where the Communist Viet Minh was victorious. Not only there, but also in Laos and Cambodia Communist parties and regimes had just triumphed. Besides that, the Nixon Doctrine was in effect, with USA using a new strategy for the region, gradually approaching of China. This new context demanded a renewal in the organization, which led to the Bali Summit of ASEAN, in 1976. In this conference, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was signed.It stated some of the main features of ASEAN, such as non-interference, non-intervention, pacific settlement of disputes and renunciation of the use of force. It was also designed the High Council, a dispute settlement mechanism. The adoption of such treaty reiterated ASEAN’s normative framework (BEUKEL, 2008). It also invoked the Bandung Conference principles, the United Nations Charter and the Bangkok Declaration, of 1967 (TURNBULL, 1992). More than that, such characteristics formed what would be called the ASEAN Way, an ethic basis adopted by the organization, based in quiet diplomacy, consensus, dialogue-focused and minimum institutionalization. Such concept guides the ASEAN process of integration and its relations to its bigger and powerful neighbors until today. Brunei joined the organization in 1984, and after the end of Cold War, with the dismantle of Soviet Union and the end of the Communism related tensions, ASEAN passed by a phase of expansion, incorporating the other nations in the region. Vietnam entered in 1995, and was followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997. In 1999, Cambodia also became a member. The history of the Asia-Pacific rim shows the Strong interdependence between East and Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War shows us that it’s not possible to analyze these regions in a separated manner. The end of the bipolar system and the ascension of new powers in Asia raise new questions about the old problem concerning the influence of external powers in the region. Nowadays, Asia must face a dilemma: to seek sovereignty through the development of integration processes or to leave competition increase confrontation and subsequent interference from other great powers.
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2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2.1. The Asian Affirmation The rapid economic development witnessed in Asia since the 1970’s has moved the center of the global economy and the core of the international politics to the Asia-Pacific region. This process symbolized the return of Asia as a main player of the world politics after more than a century of occidental domination and also can represent the beginning of process of hegemonic transition between the West and the East. At least that is how this phenomenon was interpreted by most Asian countries (HUNTINGTON, 1997). As ambassador Tommy Koh registered in 1993 “a cultural renaissance is sweeping all Asia” (HUNTINGTON, 1997). This new Asian momentum represented not only the resurgence of a new Asian nationalist movement, but also a new moment for relations between Asian countries. This is what Samuel Huntington (1997) called the “Asian Affirmation”. This “affirmation” is result of the economic growth experienced by these countries, especially China and Japan, and is composed by the following characteristics: (1) the Asians believe that the rapid economic development will allow their countries to deal with the West, especially the USA, in an equal manner, and even surpass them as the main pole in the International System; (2) this economic success can be attributed to the Asian cultural values; (3) although the differences between Asian civilizations are recognized there are also important aspects in common, so it is necessary to promote new forms of dialogue and cooperation between these countries, in order to protect their common interests; and (4) Asians sustain that their model of development should be followed by other non-western countries, in an effort to universalize their concept (HUNTINGTON, 1997). Aside the merit of Huntigton’s analysis the truth is that we are currently witnessing a new phase of cooperation and dialogue in the Asian continent. Mainly it is the effort to institutionalize the economic integration process, described on the last session, which was dictated mostly by private enterprises. Such institutionalization is necessary to maintain the economic growth easing the competition and avoiding the escalation of tensions between these countries. The enhancing of cooperation between Asian countries is also needed to maintain a common dialogue with the extra regional powers to maintain the good governance of the region without interference. This process will be translated in the expansion of the ASEAN, the creation of new dialogue forums, such as ARF, the creation of new cooperation blocs and the development of a new ethical content to the integration process, the ASEAN Way. The success of this new Asiatic cooperation drive can possibly determine the future of the current hegemonic transition to a multipolar International System in the same way that its
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. failure can lead to the escalation of competition and conflict with effects not only East Asia but possibly in all world. Hence, three paths unfolds on the Asia horizon: to choose the path of competition and further escalation to a possible War, as Aaron Friedberg (1994) put it; or to seek cooperation through the dialogue and interdependence as Amitav Acharya (2003) describes it; or to accept the moral leadership of a new hegemon, as Yan Xuetong (2011) proposes on his model of “Human Authority” based in pre-Qin theorists.
2.2 TheAsean Way and the 2015 Vision We can say that the main contribution of ASEAN to the current process of integration and cooperation in Asia was the Asean Way. This concept is known as a series of six principles adopted by the ASEAN countries on the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976, the cornerstone of ASEAN. The six principles are as follows: 1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; 3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 6. Effective cooperation among themselves (TAC, 1976).
Thereby, the promotion of dialogue and non-interference, embodied in the Asean Way, conformed the ethical content of international regimes adopted by the ASEAN, and later by other countries in Asia (REIS, 2012). This ethical content will try to establish a new kind of governance in Asia in the post American hegemony period, or as Huntington puts it the Asiatic Affirmation period. And it will be with these principles in mind that the ASEAN will reach a new level of cooperation internally and externally. Internally the ASEAN countries will seek the construction of the ASEAN Community, in other words, an integrated bloc with legal personality and common security, economic and socio-cultural policies. This path was confirmed in 2007 with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter that entered in force in 2008. The Charter finally granted legal personality to the bloc and serves as a Constitution to the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN Countries decided to create the Community in 2003 at 9 th ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Community will be constructed under three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and they are all comprised in the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015, that is expected to be fully implemented
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UFRGSMUN 2012 until 2015. But there are still some challenges ahead. The Asian Development Bank estimates that an amount of US$ 600 billion would be necessary to materialize the Master Plan of Asean Connectivity (MPAC), the infrastructure building plan, approved by ASEAN members in 2010. It means something like US$ 60 billion annually, a very high and faraway of being achieved sum (CHONGKITTAVORN, 2012). Externally, ASEAN exports its model of governance based on the Asean Way through a series of dialogue forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three Meeting (ASEAN+3). They were all designed to solve political and security issues through multilateral dialogue and cooperation and to the construction of new international regimes. This institutional architecture aims, through the ASEAN way, to establish some basis of regional and extra-regional consensus about Asian political, security, and economic issues. This way, the Asean Regional Forum is the broader dialogue forum, aiming to achieve a regional security regime, by promoting dialogue and confidence building between every single influent player in the Asia-Pacific, encompassing members of several other regional organizations. By accommodating external players, such as China, United States and the European Union to discuss internal regional issues, the ARF is achieving to reassure the ASEAN members sovereignty in the region, inserting such powers in a series of common norms and principles (BEUKEL, 2008).
2.3. The Export of ASEAN model This model serve as an example to the integration processes in East Asia, namely to China, Korea and Japan. As it was explained in the Historical Background, the integration in region was mainly economical, explained by the “flying geese” model, without the protection of legal frameworks nor international regimes or organizations. Taking the initial drive of the ASEAN+3 as an example, China, Japan and Korea started to institutionalize its integration process that began to overflow the economic sphere and started to cover political and legal issues as well. The ASEAN+3 Meeting was designed initially to deal with the issues of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and resulted in a series of new agreements and the establishment of novel international regimes. The first one was the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which establishes a network of multilateral currency swap between the central banks of ASEAN and the Central Banks of China, Japan and Korea (VISENTINI, 2012). The next step was the creation of three free trade areas (FTAs) between these countries and ASEAN. Subsequently in 2008 China, Japan and Korea created their own summit, the Trilateral Summit, to solve
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. their own political, economic and security issues and to consult about their foreign policies as well. In 2009 the three countries announced the intention to form their own community, the East Asian Community (VISENTINI 2012). Since then, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was created in 2011, in order to form a common bureaucracy to deal with cooperation issues among the three countries. The Trilateral Summit was expanded to the ministerial level with the objective to coordinate policies between the three countries, in the area of foreign affairs, transport, health, environment and other issues. And, in 2012, the three countries agreed on a framework to incentive mutual investment and to protect intellectual rights and also agreed to start the negotiations to create a FTA among China, Japan and Korea (MAGNO, 2012).
2.4. The New Silk Road Challenge But what is at stake in this process of Asian Affirmation? Why do we need a model such as Asean Way to reach consensus on regional issues? Why the old bilateral relations are not enough to maintain peace, prosperity and stability in the region? The answer can be found on the challenge imposed by the conventionally called the “New Silk Road”. The New Silk Road is a term used to describe the connection between railroads, highways, maritime routes, communication lines and pipelines throughout the Eurasian continent. It is the ideal of connect Europe and the Western hemisphere to the Asia-Pacific Rim through a corridor of goods and services. The objective is to supply with energy and raw materials the new center of world economy, the Pacific, at same time that good can be exported throughout the continent and the world. Today the flow of good in the region depends mainly of maritime routes with critical bottlenecks, such as the Mallaca and Ormuz Straits. There are a lot of explicit and implicit plans to construct a New Silk Road. The United States Congress have issued and updated The Silk Road Strategic Act, which is basically a plan to revive the ancient silk road by building highways, railroads and pipelines in Central Asia to prepare Afghanistan for the post-war (HORMATS, 2011; LIN, 2011). A stabilized Afghanistan would be the center of access to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia (STARR et al, 2010). China’s concept of the New Silk Road, made public in 2004, of a Eurasian Land Bridge connecting Asia to Europe through the Eurasian continent (LIN, 2011). There are also declared Russian intentions to transform the country into a transports and energy artery, to link the Asia-Pacific Rim to Europe. This way, the main corridor of the New Silk Road would be into Russian territory (RT, 2012).
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Even the United Nations has its own projects, embodied in the UNESCAP’s Asian Highways and Railroads project (UNESCAP, 2003). Alongside with UN and ASEAN we have other regional organizations with their own view about the New Silk Road. The South Asian Association For Regional Cooperation (SAARC), with an Indian hegemony seeks to increase their influence over the ASEAN region, the Eurasian Community, with a Russian Hegemony, wishes that the Transiberian Railroad and Highway became the core of the Silk Road. There are other relevant organizations with opposite points of view about the Asian future. Among them we can cite the new proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the agreement between United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam that seeks to improve the American competiveness and to grant the American Pacific Century (CLINTON, 2012).The TPP seeks to maintain the security and economic partnership with old allies in order to secure the Asian maritime routes and maintain them dependent of the security framework of the US Navy. Other organization that cannot be put aside is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The APEC is mainly an economic forum aimed to promote Free Trade and economic liberalization. Besides being one of the greatest forums of the Asia-Pacific region, the APEC is frequently criticized by some of its members for its economy-oriented profile, neglecting the promotion of development of its country members, which could represent a vantage for the bigger economies in the economic competition in Asia. Thus, the main obstacle that lays ahead the construction of a New Silk Road it is not the infrastructure, as it may seem at first glance, but to create international regimes that may permit the efficient flow of goods, to solve security issues and historical conflicts and to reach a consensus on how to implement such international regimes without harming national policies and interests (STARR et al, 2010). In other words it is necessary to reach a consensus between the three major powers in the International System, EUA, China and Russia and all the other countries in the region. Therefore, the Asean Way model emerges as a solution to promote dialogue, confidence-building and consensus among these divergent projects. In such scenario, the ARF arise as the main forum to debate about these challenges since its interregional nature brings together countries of almost all Eurasia to debate about Asian political and security issues.
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2.5. Conclusion With the end of the Cold War, the Asian continent saw unprecedented economic growth, at the same time witnessing a power vacuum in the region, caused by the gradual process of American military withdrawal and the dismantle of the Soviet Union. In such scenario, a fast growing China and Japan, raised Asia-Pacific instability. Asian countries, especially ASEAN members, have responded to such changes with the creation of its own institutional architecture, mainly by the export of the ASEAN Way. During the last years, such system remained stable and did not face any great challenge. But the raising economic and military Chinese power –seen as a menace by many countries- and the United States assertive declaration of return to the region (CLINTON, 2012), have made the ASEAN countries to enhance their governance capabilities with the promotion of the ASEAN Vision 2015 and with the enlargement of the ASEAN way Architecture represented by new dialogue forums, such as the EAC, the ASEM, the ASEAN+3 and mainly the ARF. The overlap of interests of the many countries and organizations in the region can be represented by the different broad projects of the New Silk Road that has placed the Asian countries in a dilemma: choosing the path of competition and further escalation to a possible War, seeking cooperation through the dialogue and interdependence, or even accepting the moral leadership of a new hegemon. Neither way, in an optimistic view, is expected that the ARF based in the Asean Way can deal with all these challenges and spur the shadow of the war out of Asia. The ARF represents the most relevant instrument to converge such different interests in a base of consensus.
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION The creation of ARF in 1994 itself was a great step towards the further integration of the ASEAN bloc. This forum was celebrated as the first meeting between high representatives of the participant countries and as a first step to promote peace, cooperation, and the establishment of a consensual basis between the many countries and organizations with interests in Southeast and East Asia regions (ASEAN 2006). Another great mark for integration and cooperation in Southeast Asia was the adoption of the ASEAN Vision 2020 in 2003 at the 9 th ASEAN Summit. The Vision called for the establishment of The ASEAN Community based on a three pillar system: a Political-Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio-Cultural Community (ASEAN, 2006). The first step taken toward this goal was the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 at the
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12 th ASEAN Summit which serves as a Constitution for the future ASEAN Community. Along with the Charter, the countries present decided to accelerate the implementation of the Community, therefore announcing at the same meeting ASEAN Vision 2015 (ASEAN, 2010) and promoting the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. Concomitantly, the bonds between East Asian countries also have tightened. The beginning of the Trilateral Summits and the proposition of the East Asian Community between China, Japan, and Korea in 2008-2009 marked such moment (VISENTINI, 2012). This cooperation has continued with the establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the signing of the protocol for the incentive and protection of investment between China, Japan, and Korea and the decision to form a Free Trade Area among these three countries (MAGNO, 2012). There was also a deepening of the cooperation between these two regions, East and Southeast Asia. Among these initiatives, it is possible to quote the formation of Free Trade Areas between ASEAN and China, ASEAN and Japan, and ASEAN and Korea – agreed in 2007, 2008 and 2005, respectively –, the ASEAN+3, forum and the Chiang Mai Initiative. At the same time, ASEAN is expanding its economic agreements, negotiating FTA’s with Australia, New Zeeland, India, and the European Union. It is also expanding its dialogue forums through the creation of other interregional forums, such as ASEM, and the expansion of others, such as EAS, which includes the USA and Russia since 2011. Beyond that, there is a large number of agreements, protocols, and declarations which were signed with other Asian and non-Asian countries and organizations. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether these initiatives are sufficient to mitigate competition and promote cooperation or whether they are only expedients for the creation of new zones of influence in the region.
4. BLOC POSITIONS The United States of America sees the Asia-Pacific as the “key driver of global politics” in this century (CLINTON, 2011). This way, it is directing huge diplomatic, military and economic efforts to such region. For President Obama, participating more actively in its crescent economic growth and dynamism is a top priority in the country’s Foreign Policy. Promoting free market, free navigation in the South China Sea and seeking military transparency of the region countries are some of the core strategic objectives seen as vital for the United States. Such interests must be pursued mainly through the establishment of a wide military presence, the deepening of bilateral relationships with emerging countries and the engagement in regional multilateral institutions, which are seen as supplementary to the
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. bilateral ties. The main objective is to “build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific” (CLINTON, 2011). In this context, playing an active role in ASEAN and APEC is fundamental. United States is a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN since 1977, and in 2009 has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The country has also a mission to ASEAN in Jakarta (US, 2012). In its turn, APEC is considered by Washington the “premier regional economic institution”, fundamental to the process of guaranteeing open and free markets, facilitating economic growth and cooperation (CLINTON 2011, US 2012). Also of much importance are the efforts of the US to create more small forums, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative and the Pacific Islands Forum. There is a growing progress in developing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a organization that may serve as a platform to more profound regional agreements and even a Free-Trade Area (CLINTON, 2011). A deep engagement with the Asia-Pacific and its old and new institutions is the right way to promote democracy, free market, respect to human rights and other values seen as universal by the United States. Canada was a founding member of APEC and has a strong commitment with such organization. It has strong links with ASEAN and has an active role in the region’s issues (CANADA, 2012), an importance reflected by its own participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum. In many aspects, Australia and New Zealand share many propositions regarding regional cooperation with the United States, due to its friendship and security alliance with the country. Due to their geographic positions, these countries have an important role in the regional institutions and multilateral forums of the Asia-Pacific Rim. They are both ASEAN dialogue partners, TAC signatories, and founding members of ARF, having an active participation since its beginning. They are also APEC founding members, believing in its potential to promote free trade and investment, and participants of East Asia Summits as well. Australia is now negotiating its entry in the Trans Pacific Partnership (AUSTRALIA, 2012), and New Zealand was one of its founding countries (NEW ZEALAND, 2012). One of the most important ASEAN-related organizations in East Asia is ASEAN+3, which comprises all ASEAN members, China, Republic of Korea and Japan. These three countries are considered the major economies in the region, and the relations among them and other players in the region is fundamental for determining the future of any East or Southeast Asian integration process. Japan had a key role in promoting integration in East and Southeast Asia, mainly through the Fukuda Doctrine, exporting capitals to promote integration, and by proposing the
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UFRGSMUN 2012 creation of the East Asia Community. The country is also a major player of APEC, supporting its development and deploying efforts in order to deepen its ties with the other members (JAPAN, 2012). Japan has a strong relation with the United States, being one of its most important allies in the region. In 2011, Japan has expressed its aspirations to become a member of the Trans Pacific Partnership (OKADA and NAKAYAMA, 2011), and negotiations are already in course (JAPAN, 2012). At the same time, Tokyo has a strategic partnership with China, having proposed the East Asia Community along with Beijing, besides the prospects for the creation of a free trade agreement. In 2011, it has created the Secretariat for Trilateral Cooperation, along with South Korea and China. The Republic of Korea is part of a wide number of regional organizations around the Asia-Pacific Rim. It also has strong economic and military ties with the United States, due to its shared values and strategic importance for South Korea. Such alliance serves as a pillar for deterring North Korea and laying the basis for the unification. It has also expressed interest in being part of Trans-Pacific Partnership (REUTERS, 2010) and was invited by the Unites States to do so (DONGA, 2010). Seoul also realizes that there are significant changes in the international security and economic environment. This way, the Republic of Korea aims to develop the ROK-US Alliance into a multi-dimensional strategic alliance, but at the same time developing its cooperation with China (SUNG-HWAN, 2012). Seoul has also an important role in the Trilateral Cooperation. Being the second economy in the world, and one of the top players in the Asia-Pacific, People’s Republic of China has a very important role in determining if the future of Asia is going to be one of integration or conflict. China pursues what it calls an “independent foreign policy of peace”, preserving China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, in order to pave the way for China’s reform and modernization (PRC, 2012). Beijing supports regional cooperation and multilateralism, as it is attested by its participation in a wide number of regional institutions, such as ASEAN+3, SCO and APEC. But it is of extreme importance for this country that such engagement does not affect its internal affairs. One example of such approach is the question of the territories in South China Sea, seen as integral part of China. Timor-Leste has already declared its intentions to become a full member of ASEAN (ARF, 2009). For this small and young country, becoming part of a broader regional institution is a way of gaining relevance. It also has strong ties with Australia, which approximates the views of these two countries. As well as Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea seeks full membership of ASEAN (GMANEWS, 2009), although it is already an observer member. The country already belongs
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. to a series of regional institutions, such as APEC, the Pacific Islands Forum, the South Pacific Commission, the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the ARF itself. Together with India, Sri Lanka has been giving great importance to regional integration and to developing ties with its neighbors. It has fostered the development of regional cooperation, through SAARC and its bonding with other regional institutions, like ASEAN. The European Union sees the Asia-Pacific as a region with many emerging economic powers, therefore recognizing its great importance. It supports regional integration processes in Asia, as can be seen by the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It has also improved ties with ASEAN and the SAARC, and participates actively of the ARF, due to the shared commitment with regional integration. Such processes are seen as means to achieve regional stability, economic prosperity and as a way to deal with global challenges (EU, 2012). It has major relations with ASEAN, and these two regional institutions have developed a Plan of Action in order to promote a closer cooperation in political, economic and cultural issues (EU, 2012). The Russian Federation is pursuing a strategy of looking east and enhancing its position in the Asia-Pacific. The country sees APEC as an example of the benefits of regional economic cooperation, and it’s willing to deep its relations with it, by, for example, hosting the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012. Moscow aims to become, through the involvement in regional organizations as APEC and the Eurasian Economic Union, a bridge between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific. It would consolidate Russia’s role of transportation artery between these regions and develop infrastructure of transports and communications (RT, 2012). In this sense, Russia is playing an active role in regional multilateral arrangements in Central and East Asia. One example of this is the central place Russia occupies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Deeply committed with the ideals of independence, friendship and peace in Asia and the rest of the world, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea strives for the development of South-South relations, assuring the principle of collective self-reliance. This way, friendship and cooperation are seen as fundamental to the establishment of a new and peaceful order in Asia and the rest of the world, free from external domination (DPRK, 2012). Bangladesh was a leading country in establishing the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and in maintaining an active policy of fostering its development (BANGLADESH, 2012). Such support to regional institutions made it a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Consistent with its “Look East Policy”, India has been engaging with the Asia-Pacific region through a crescent involvement in regional organizations. New Delhi’s participation in
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UFRGSMUN 2012 the ASEAN Regional Forum is a clear feature of such determination to direct its foreign policy to other Asian countries and regional institutions (INDIA, 2012). Of course it is not only to Asia that India aims. It has a significant partnership with the United States, exemplified by its nuclear agreement signed in 2006. It is unnecessary to talk about India’s importance, since it is an emerging power not only in Asia, but in the entire world. As well as the other South Asian countries, Pakistan is a member of SAARC and has a strategic role in the process of stabilization of Afghanistan and this way, the entire Central Asia (ARF, 2011). According to such role, and by strongly supporting regional initiatives such as ASEAN and the ARF itself, it is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (PAKISTAN, 2012). It is also a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), having ties with other Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. Mongolia follows pacific and cordial guidelines of foreign policy in general. It has the status of a nuclear-weapon-free country and its engaged in the promotion of a Nucler- Weapon-Free-Zone (ARF, 2011). It engages with regional organizations, in order to develop bonds with the region countries. It is an observer member of SCO and a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Vietnam is a very strong supporter of the enhancement of the ASEAN Community, and especially of the politics-security pillar. This way, the establishment of a security community, by a closer defense cooperation, is seen as essential. An approach and cooperation deepening with the United States are also seen as a contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region (VIET NAM, 2012). Philippines shares many of these views, affirming that maritime security in South China Sea is an imperative, and must be achieved through a multilateral approach (PHILIPPINES, 2012). These two countries share the view that ASEAN should enhance its role in defending the member’s interests, acting as one and providing a multilateral space to resolve such disputes. Singapore is strongly committed with the implementation of the ASEAN Community, and has been the largest contributor to the Working Plans that aim to develop such initiative. Is of extreme importance Singapore’s robust economic cooperation with China; they have signed a Free-Trade-Agreement in 2009, and also share strong cultural ties (SINGAPORE, 2012). The Lao People’s Democratic Republic , Myanmar and Cambodia share the fact of being very recent members of ASEAN, and of having very important economic partnerships with China. All of the three are developing economies, and thus believe in the importance of ASEAN to promote mutual development, specially Myanmar, that faces the problem of
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Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. economic sanctions by western countries. This way, all of them are supporters of ASEAN Community (LAOS, 2012; MYANMAR, 2012). Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia are strong promoters of ASEAN Community. For both of them, ASEAN is the cornerstone of its foreign policies, so enhancing ASEAN cooperation and internal trade will bring enormous benefits. These three countries are also active members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, developing greater dialogue and partnership with other Islamic countries (THAILAND, 2012; MALASYA, 2012; BRUNEI, 2012). Indonesia , by its population and size, had always a leading role in ASEAN. Due to its economic and population growth, it is being seen by the US as an important partner (CLINTON, 2011). Jakarta maintains important economic ties with the European Union and the United States, but it has also a strong leadership role in ASEAN, and sees the ARF as the main forum for such influence to be exerted (INDONESIA, 2012).
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER 1) The Asean Way and its regional architecture is capable to surpass the national interests of the countries involved and lay a basis for a consensus? 2) How to promote regional sovereignty by bringing to the table extra regional parties? 3) It is possible to make the Asean Way an universal value in order to promote dialogue and confidence-building? 4) How do ASEAN principles of sovereignty and non-intervention apply in the process of deepening regional integration among its members? 5) How to converge such different projects about the New Silk Road and bring peace and stability to the region? 6) How to overcome the challenges imposed to the ASEAN countries and build an ASEAN Community until 2015?
REFERENCES
A Keynote Speech by Mr. Kim Sung-Hwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at the 5th ROK-US Alliance Int'l Conference. March 19, 2012. Available at:
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ACHARYA, Amitav. Will Asia ‟s Past be its Future? International Security, Volume 28, Número 3, 2003, p. 149-164. Disponível em: ~ 23 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. ministres/Baird_Southeast_Asia-Asie_du_Sud-Est_2012.aspx?lang=eng&view=d> Last retrieved on: September 17, 2012. FRIEDBERG, Aaron. Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia . Disponível em: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162- 2889%28199324%2F199424%2918%3A3%3C5%3ARFRPFP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X. Last retrieved on: May 14, 2012. FRIEDRICH, Jörg. Yalu : À Beira da Terceira Guerra Mundial. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Record, 2011 HOOK, Glenn D. et al. Japan’s International Relations . Londres, Routledge, 2005. HORMATS, Robert D. The United States “New Silk Road” Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed? U.S. Department of State. September 29, 2011. Available at: ~ 24 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN. What is ApecFo Japan? Available at: ~ 25 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. REIS FILHO, Daniel Aarão. A Revolução Chinesa . São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1982. REIS, João Arthur da Silva. Asean Way: O Conteúdo ético da Integração Asiática. Porto Alegre: Anais do I Seminário Brasileiro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais (SEBREEI), 2012. REPUBLIC OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Available at: ~ 26 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Viet Nam joins efforts to build ASEAN community. March 07, 2012. Available at: ~ 27 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. VELOSA-PORRAS, Eduardo. Lasideasenla política exterior :el caso de Malasya y ASEAN (Asociación de Nacionesdel Sudeste Asiatico). Pap. Polít. Bogotá (Colombia), Vol. 14, No. 1, 201-221, 2009. VISENTINI, Paulo Fagundes. As Relações Diplomáticas da Ásia. Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço, 2012. XUETONG, Yan. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power . New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. ~ 28 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 Topic B: Maritime Sovereignty in East Asia Marcelo de Mello Kanter, Erik Herejk Ribeiro and Gustavo Henrique Feddersen 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. From ancient times to modern history Since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.- 220 A.D.), China alternated moments of great unity and development with decades of collapse or invasions, for instance the Mongol’s establishment of the Yuan Dynasty in 1279. After the defeat of the Mongols, the Ming Dynasty was founded in 1368, starting another golden age with great discoveries and improvements in naval power, agriculture, arts and economy. Over the centuries, China established a hierarchical order over East Asia, being the great center of a tributary system, reaching from East Asia to Central and Southeast Asia (KANG, 2010). China was the first empire to arrive at the Spratly Islands back in the East Han Dynasty (23-220 A.D.), also being the first to develop economic activities and jurisdiction over the Islands during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.) according to its official documents (FMPRC, 2000). The Paracel Islands were also part of the Yuan domain, as recorded in “The History of Yuan”, including China’s navy regular patrols in the region (SHEN, 1998). Vietnam also claims the exercise of sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracels Islands starting from the 15 th century. The maritime sovereignty in East Asia from the 16 th until the 19 th century began to be disputed between China and the European imperialist countries based in the south Pacific (France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Due to Japanese and European Expansionism as well as internal collapse, China’s maritime domains were affected and started to be occupied by the French Indochina, the German Empire and the English colonial domains in the South China Sea. On the other hand, China ceded, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan and the Pinnacle Islands 2 (also known as Senkaku, or Diaoyu) in the East China Sea to Japan after the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895 (SUGANUMA, 2000). 1.2. Clashes of Empires: from Russo-Japanese War to World War II The contemporary history of Asia-Pacific is marked by a series of clashes between empires. Regarding the major regional powers in the beginning of the 20 th century, one can 2 It did not specified by name in the Treaty, but said island belonged to Taiwan, although this is still disputed by Chinese and Japanese nationalistic scholars (SUGANUMA, 2000). ~ 29 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. notice the Imperial Russia struggling to maintain a permanent maritime access in the Pacific Northwest, while Japan promoted its expansionism and the Western powers were still a colonialist force ruling, formally or informally, several countries in the region. The territorial disputes until 1945 remained a permanent source of tension in Asia-Pacific relations, leading to at least three more imperial wars: The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the World War I (1914-18) and the World War II (1938-45). The Russo-Japanese War resulted from Imperial Russia’s intention to restore its sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which were given in exchange of the Sakhalin Island in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875). Japan was also troubled by the Chinese concessions to Russia in inner Manchuria, especially Port Arthur. The Japanese victory established a new framework for East Asian relations and gave it a new great power status, halting Russian expansionism. With World War I causing the German retreat from East Asia, the first decades of 20 th century reassured the French and English dominance in Southeast Asia and the Japanese Imperialist Expansion in Manchuria and Korea (annexed in 1910). Meanwhile, in the first half of the century, China started to concede contracts that allowed merchants to exploit extractive activities such as mining guano, phosphorus and other minerals. Also, the government began to restructure the administrative regions, placing the Paracels Islands under Hainan Prefecture’s jurisdiction in 1911 (SHEN, 1998), while the Spratly Islands remained under central government control. At that time, China was already mapping and renaming all its islands, dividing the South China Sea Islands into four groups: Xisha (Paracel), Nansha (now Zhongsha, or Macclefield Bank), Dongsha (Pratas), Tuansha (now Nansha, or Spratly). Despite its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, France tried to invade them in December 1931, based on alleged constructed monuments and temples in the region dating from 1835, from the emperor of An’nan (Vietnam). Thus, China sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Embassy in Paris, affirming that there was no record of the An’nan vassal State invading China’s territories, and the sovereignty had been exercised by China for centuries. In 1933, France declared the occupation and sovereignty over nine islands in the South China Sea, and later it was discovered that these islands where in the Spratly region. Since the Republic of China was in civil war against Chinese communists, it was unable to take actions. France occupied these islands and also the Paracel (starting from 1938) until the Japanese invasion in 1939 (SHEN, 1998). The Japanese played a crucial role not only in Northeast Asia, but also in the southeast during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which after 1941 became a part of the ~ 30 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 broader Pacific Theatre in World War II. Japan refused foreign presence in the South China Sea and took control of the Paracel and Spratly islands until the war ended (SHEN, 1998). World War II led to deeper restructuration in Pacific Asian relations. Japanese troops deployed over Southeast Asia aided many nationalist independence movements against colonial rule (notably in Indonesia, Burma, French Indochina and Malaysia), while, on the other hand, the United States helped the Philippines in its independence struggle against Japan. As results of these combined movements, many Southeast Asian countries negotiated their independence, beginning in 1945: Indonesia in 1945 (recognized in 1949 by the Netherlands), the Philippines in 1946, Burma and Ceylon in 1948, Laos in 1949, Cambodia in 1953, Vietnam in 1954, Malaysia in 1957, Singapore in 1965 and Brunei in 1984. 1.3. The end of World War II and disputes in Northeast Asia With the surrender of Japan in 1945, the end of the Pacific War was signed through the Potsdam Declaration in August. The declaration established that Japan would never have expansionist intentions again, disarming the country and occupying some points in its territory. Besides the military retaliation, Japan was punished by losing all its territories with the exception of its four main islands (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku) and other territories determined by the Allies following the Cairo Declaration (1943) signed by the Great Britain, the United States of America and the Republic of China. Those three countries agreed that Japan should give back Manchuria, Taiwan and Penghu to China, also leaving Korea free and independent. The Soviet-Japanese theatre of the Second World War was apart from these agreements between Japan and the Allies. In the Yalta agreement, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin stated that former rights of Russia violated in 1904 should be restored together with its North Pacific possessions (Sakhalin and Kurils). The Soviet Union was not a signatory of the San Francisco Treaty (1951), the treaty that formally established peace between Japan and the Allies. The Soviet Union claimed as its reasons for not signing the San Francisco Treaty that its terms were in violation of the Yalta Agreements, that the People’s Republic of China had not been invited to the negotiations, and that the United States occupation of Japanese territories constituted an anti-Soviet measure. Still, China’s government was concerned about the Treaty, which did not state provisions about the Spratly or Paracel islands (GROMYKO, 1951; TEXTS, 1951). Finally, the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 was signed, resuming diplomatic relations between the countries, although leaving the territorial dispute for future negotiations. Although, Article 9 stated that: ~ 31 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. “[h]ereby, the U.S.S.R., in response to the desires of Japan and taking into consideration the interest of the Japanese [S]tate, agrees to hand over to Japan the Habomai and the Shikotan Islands, provided that the actual changing over to Japan of these islands will be carried out after the conclusion of a peace treaty” (TEXTS, 1956, p.2). After Korea was liberated from Japanese occupation, the two parts of the country, North and South, fell into a civil war in 1950. During the conflict, known as the Korean War, South Korea (or the Republic of Korea - henceforth ROK) was negotiating its boundaries with Japan, after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 8, 1951. In January 1952, the then ROK president Syngman Rhee declared a Peace Line (also known as Syngman Rhee Line) which included the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo for ROK or Takeshima for Japan) in its boundaries (COULSON, 1998). The United States had already shown support for South Korea’s claims, as stated in SCAPIN No. 677 (Supreme Command for Allied Powers Instruction), handling Liancourt Rocks to Korea. Since the final version of San Francisco Treaty left the sovereignty over these islands undefined, both countries started to claim rights over the Liancourts. Notwithstanding the Japan-Korea dispute is not limited to the Liancourt Rocks; it also includes the Tsushima Islands (also known as Daemado), and later claims about the name of the Sea shared by both countries 3. The arguments of each party rely on historical exercise of sovereignty over Tsushima and Liancourt Rocks in different periods of ancient and modern history. Over the centuries Tsushima was a key point for merchants heading to Korea and Japan. It has institutional and cultural influences from both countries and, in modern history, it has been ruled by Japan. Historically, Tokyo used the islands as a base to launch attacks against Russia, Korea and China. Since 1872, Tsushima is part of Nagasaki Prefecture. Nevertheless, recent developments in Japan-Korea relations have raised the dispute over Tsushima once again. On the other hand, Liancourt Rocks remain under ROK’s jurisdiction since 1954, despites attempts of Japan to solve the issue in the International Court of Justice in 1954, 1962, and more recently, 2012. Nevertheless, the ROK avoided international mediation, stating their undeniable sovereignty (COULSON, 1998). It is essential to assert that Japan-Korea relations are much more complex than an issue of sovereignty; it originates from centuries of Imperial clashes. The Japanese colonial rule in the 20 th century played a especial part in the development of the complex relation between the countries, since it involved several repressive policies (such as prohibition of Korean language, forced 3 Historically the sea was named Sea of Japan. However the denomination started to be contested in 1992 by the Republic of Korea, which defends the East Sea denomination. ~ 32 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 assimilation of Japanese culture, social and political repression), despite its modernization measures during the period (SETH, 2011). Since the Korean War and the consequential separation of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea), the two countries engaged in border disputes, including maritime sovereignty. The main focuses on dispute are Yeonpyeong, Baengnyeong and Daecheong Islands in the Yellow Sea, currently under ROK jurisdiction. These islands came under ROK’s sovereignty since 1953 as a result of Korea Armistice Agreement. After the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan also had undefined maritime boundaries with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The region in dispute was the Diaoyu-Senkaku (Pinnacle Islands), which had been ceded to Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War. However until 1969 none of the countries had shown interest in establishing their rule over the islands. In November 1968, countries such as the ROK and the Philippines conducted a research, under the sponsorship of ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East), on the East China Sea and Yellow Sea. According to the results of the survey the area between Japan and Taiwan “might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly comparing favorably with the Persian Gulf area” (SUGANUMA, 2000, p.129). In the subsequent months of the discovery, thousands of applications for drilling rights were submitted to Okinawa prefecture in Japan, which conducted two more researches in the area, confirming the initial ECAFE’s expectative. In 1970, the Executive Yuan in Taiwan responded by giving exploration rights in China’s territorial waters, including the Diaoyu Islands region. Furthermore, the state-owned China Petroleum Corporation signed agreements with United States’ companies to develop the extraction of oil and gas. An incident occurred in September after some civilians led a group of reporters from the China Times to plant a Taiwanese flag, provoking the action of Japanese officers (SUGANUMA, 2000). After the creation of a “Liaison Committee” for conjunct exploration of resources without the participation of People’s Republic of China, a Remin Ribao’s (PRC newspaper) commentator stated that those areas were China’s sacred territories, and they would not permit any foreign presence. The PRC sent strict warnings regarding the activities of Japan and the United States, which led the countries to suspend their drilling activities in March 1970, especially because of the Washington’s interest in a détente with the PRC (SUGANUMA, 2000). However, in the Reversion Treaty (1972), President Nixon granted full sovereignty to Japan over Okinawa, including Diaoyu-Senkaku. Once again the PRC made a complaint and the United States assumed a neutral position, which has been kept since ~ 33 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. then. Japan has continually refused Chinese proposals for joint development (SUGANUMA, 2000). 1.4. Decolonization and new China-Southeast Asia relations Since the 19 th century, relations between China and the former vassal States or members of its hierarchical order in Southeast Asia were restricted by European influence. In the aftermath of World War II and the beginning of decolonization, a new framework of relations was arranged. With the end of the War, China restored its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, despite the uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction over the island. During the drafts for the San Francisco Treaty’s final text, Vietnam, supported by France, made a statement reassuring its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly: “[a]s we must frankly profit from all the opportunities offered to us to stifle the germs of discord, we affirm our rights to the Spratly and Paracel islands, which have always belonged to Vietnam.” (VIETNAM, 1981, p. 16). China did not attend the meetings and the Philippines did not state any claim, believing that Japanese renunciation of the islands would make it res nullius4 and consequently available for acquisition (DZUREK, 1996). Later in 1956 Thomas Cloma, a Filipino citizen, asserted ownership over 33 Spratly islands and gained support from the government, naming the territories as Kalayaand (Freedom Land). At this time, Taiwan had frequent patrols in the region and apprehended Cloma’s brother’s ship, leading him to recognize Chinese ownership of the islands. South Vietnam also sent a patrol to the islands in 1956 (DZUREK, 16, 1996). The dispute remained cold until the 1970s, when Southeast Asia saw a major regional shift. In 1971, the People’s Republic of China was recognized by the United Nations; followed by the visit of the United States president Richard Nixon to Mao Zedong; and the end of the Vietnam War. Washington approached the People’s Republic of China, leaving communist Vietnam relying solely on the Soviet Union and antagonizing the PRC. After a great turmoil in the 1960s (Cultural Revolution, War against India, clash with the Soviet Union), the PRC started to build defenses in the Paracel, which remained calm until 1974. In 1974, South Vietnam conducted an inspection over the Paracel Islands, finding People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) troops from the PRC stationed. Thus, South Vietnam decided to fight against China for the Paracel, but lost the air and sea battles, and, consequentially, the control over these territories. Later PRC started the oil exploitation in the region. Only in the 1980s the PRC started to conduct scientific researches regarding the region in order to effectively occupy the Spratly Islands. In March 1988, occurred the “Johnson South Reef Skirmish” episode: a naval battle originated from the China’s ambition 4 “No person’s property.” ~ 34 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 to build a marine observation station in the Spratly which lead to confrontation with Vietnam. The result of this battle was the capturing of 6 islets by the PLA’s Navy. Both countries decided to enforce their military presence in each side’s occupied islands (DZUREK, 22, 1996). Starting in 1974, the Philippines occupied islands in the Spratly region, searching for oil. In 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos signed the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) decree and proclaimed sovereignty over Kalayaand , arguing that it was not part of the Spratly Islands and were conquered by effective occupation and control and geographic proximity. Malaysia also claims part of Spratly Islands, starting military visits in 1978, arguing it is part of its surrounding continental shelf (ignoring that sovereignty over the islands invalidates these claims). Malaysia maintains a base in Swallow Reef since 1983 and proclaimed its EEZ in 1980, although without specifying which areas are covered. Brunei is the last claimer of the Spratly, beginning in 1983-1984 with its independence and demarcation of continental shelf covering an area a little farther than Malaysia’s. However, Brunei does not contest the islands’ sovereignty, just the rights to explore economic activities in the South China Sea (DZUREK, 19-21, 1996). There was also attrition between Australia and Indonesia over Timor Island (considering the natural resources present in the territory) starting with the Indonesian annexation of Timor Leste in 1975 until 1999, when the country gained its independence. 2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2.1. Contemporary Background The 1990s were relatively stable regarding the maritime disputes in East Asia. The apparent global dominance of the United States, after the end of the Cold War, served as a strong deterrent to countries that had disputes with its allies. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea were going through a period of cooperation, due to the paradigm of the New Industrial Countries (NICs). The main focus of the government of the People’s Republic of China, at the time, was reclaiming Macau and Hong Kong, and effectively incorporating these areas under its sovereignty. On the other hand, the incorporation of these territories had a significant symbolic value to China, showing that the country had managed to overcome its past at the hands of Western powers. Thus, the People’s Republic of China, propelled by its economic growth, could begin to assert its dominance in the region, especially as, over the course of the first decade of the 21 st century, the United States concentrated the vast majority of its military and diplomatic resources on the Middle East, and Central Asia. ~ 35 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. This period saw the occurrence of the first summit of the Asean Regional Forum (hereinafter, ARF), in 1994, in which Beijing affirmed that it would not use force in the resolution of the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. However, in the following year, 1995, a notable incident took place: the discovery by the Philippine government that a Chinese military structure was under construction in the Mischief Reef, in the Spratly Islands. The Philippine government claimed this to be part of a Chinese strategy of occupying territory that was not frequently patrolled: the Chinese military would build progressively larger “temporary” structures, and if these were not demolished by other countries’ patrols, they would be expanded into permanent military forts. This incident raised tensions significantly, leading several countries to increase their patrols of the disputed area. However, in order to avoid escalation, the Philippine government refrained from dismantling the Chinese structure, merely lodging diplomatic complaints (MEYER, 1996). In the aftermath of the Mischief Reef Incident, the Philippines sought greater multilateral support, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began taking action as a bloc, further restricting Chinese action on the South China Sea. Beijing, preferring bilateral negotiations, reacted by moderating its stance, and refraining from further occupation of disputed areas, even making concessions before the second ARF summit to internationalize the subject, accepting some forms of multilateral negotiation (EMMERS, 2005). However, disputes continued to happen in the South China Sea, even with less Chinese participation. The apparent paradox of the ASEAN members joining to avoid Chinese expansion in the region, but continuing to have skirmishes with each other, led to the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2002), ratified by all members of ASEAN and Beijing. The Declaration, however, was only a political statement, rather than a binding document creating mechanisms to avoid confrontations – perhaps underlining the degree to which China managed to maintain its freedom of action, avoiding multilateral negotiations. At the same time, Beijing proposed the course of joint economic development, through which sovereignty disputes could be temporarily shelved, and the economic resources of the islands could be jointly explored. The Philippines were the first to accept the proposition, with the Philippine and Chinese State- owned oil companies developing pre-exploratory oil surveys in the South China Sea in 2005, with Vietnam following suit in the same year. On the other hand, the argument could be made that this exploratory model would be overwhelmingly favorable to China, being a form of bilateral negotiation (EMMERS, 2005; WAIN, 2008). The rising tendency of shelving sovereignty disputes in favor of economic development was not always successful, leading to cases of heightened tensions. In 2004, for ~ 36 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 instance, Japan felt its interests in the Senkaku islands threatened by Chinese development of an oil platform nearby, and announced plans to begin surveying for oil in the area of the islands, eliciting strong responses from Beijing, and increasing tensions regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyou islands (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2012). Japan also turned to surveying for oil in the areas around the Liancourt Rocks. This led to a heightening of tensions with the ROK, whose President, Mr. Roh Moo-hyun, claimed that the recovery of the Dokdo Islands – Liancourt Rocks – was a symbol for the Korean recovery against Japanese colonialism. On the same year, the ROK sent a naval current research vessel to the surroundings of the islands, accompanied by military vessels, claiming to be merely exercising its sovereignty to conduct research in the area (NAKAJIMA, 2007). The increased effort by Japan to assert itself in disputed areas also led to heightening tensions with Russia over the Kuril islands. As late as 2006, certain concessions by Russia allowed Japanese citizens to travel without a visa to the Kurils, and for Japanese fishing vessels to fish in the waters of the islands, until rising tensions led to Japanese fishing vessels being fired upon by Russian patrol boats. At that time Putin’s government was offering Japan the Shikotan and Habomais islands (approximately 6% of the disputed area) in exchange for the cessation of Japanese claims over the rest of the archipelago. It used as its basis the Joint Declaration of 1956, according to which Japan would receive these islands once a peace treaty was signed. Japan, however continued to refuse this proposition, preferring to offer economic incentives to stimulate the population of the Kurils to favor being integrated into Japanese sovereignty. However, starting in 2007, a growing fishing industry and economic developments in the islands seemed to make these offers less effective at attracting the islanders (ISLANDS, 2007). In 2008, tensions raised significantly in the Spratly islands, with the visit of the Taiwanese leader, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, sparking criticism from the other claimant parts. In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming jurisdiction over an extended area, eliciting criticism from the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines (CLCS, 2011). The situation over the islands truly flared in 2011, with an attack by Chinese patrol boats on Vietnamese oil exploration ships, indicating that the rationale for economic exploration of resources is being abandoned amid more intense efforts for reaffirming sovereignty. These were underlined by Chinese military drills in the area. The situation has become tense as, after Filipino forces apprehended Chinese fishermen around the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, China has used economic retaliations such as banning fishing in certain areas of the South China Seas, limiting the imports of certain goods from the Philippines, and limiting the number of Chinese citizens ~ 37 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. allowed to go to the Philippines. The Chinese Naval forces have also maintained a presence in the Shoal, erecting barriers to block access by Filipino vessels in the area (AP, 2012). At the same time, maneuvers of a more political nature were being employed regarding the South China Sea, with both Vietnam and the PRC creating administrative divisions that covered the Paracel and Spratly islands, which, in turn, elicited the lodging of diplomatic protests from the other parties (SINA, 2012). Regarding the Kurils, by 2010, tensions had become sufficiently high that negotiated alternatives were being essentially abandoned in favor of political maneuvers to demonstrate sovereignty. That year was marked by the visit of the then Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to the South Kurils, possibly in an implicit demonstration of support to China in relation to the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu (RUSSIA, 2010). In 2011, Mr. Medvedev announced plans to increase the defense of the Kuril islands, by increasing the deployment of military personnel and equipment (RUSSIA, 2011). In 2012, Prime Minister Medvedev also signed a resolution focusing on the social and economic development of the Kurils, apparently seeking to cement their link to the Russian Federation (CCTV, 2012). The Senkaku/Diaoyu have been the stage of a shifting of alignments. Whereas Japan and Taiwan were firmly aligned in the 1990s, by the late 2000s, significant friction has occurred concerning these disputed islands, and this, in turn, has brought Taiwan and the PRC closer together. One incident marking this transformation took place in 2008, when a Taiwanese fishing vessel sunk after a collision with a Japanese patrol boat. Japan released most of the crew of the ship, however, detaining the captain for a few more days, and seeking reparations. After anti-Japanese activists circumnavigated the Senkaku in a demonstration, accompanied by Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels, Japan instead apologized for the incident and offered reparations (VLADIMIROVA, 2012). A similar incident took place in 2010, however, with a fishing trawler originating from the PRC colliding with two Japanese patrol boats. The subsequent arrest of the Chinese captain caused widespread indignation in China, with the country temporarily restricting the exports of rare earth materials to Japan. After Japan released the Chinese captain, China demanded an apology and compensations, which Japan refused to do. The Beijing demands caused strong reactions from the Japanese population, with large anti-Chinese demonstrations taking place (WSJ, 2010). The matter of the Senkakus became critical when, in 2012, the Japanese government nationalized a few of the disputed islands, which previously belonged to private individuals. The PRC and the ROK have expressed intense opposition to this action, and several large anti-Japanese protests have broken out in Chinese urban areas, with Japanese businesses being vandalized amid cries for war against Japan (NPR, 2012). In September 2012, several Taiwanese patrol boats entered ~ 38 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 the Senkakus’ territorial waters, and engaged in a skirmish with water cannons against Japanese patrol vessels. Reportedly, PRC patrol vessels were also present, although at a distance, and refrained from taking part in the episode. With respect to the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo/Takeshima, after 2008, when Mr. Lee Myung-bak became South Korean President, his government began showing signs of attempting to enforce its claim over the islands in a more forceful manner, including plans for the building of infrastructure and their development as a resort area. Japan, in response, offered the opportunity for a bilateral meeting, parallel to a assembly of security ministers, which was refused by the ROK (SOUTH, 2008). Interestingly, the DPRK, despite its frictions with Mr. Lee Myung-bak’s government, has shown support for the ROK in the dispute for the Liancourt Rocks against Japan (CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 2012). In 2012, Mr. Lee Myung- bak continued this policy by being the first head of State to visit the Liancourt Rocks, in a demonstration of the ROK’s claim to the islands. Japan reacted forcefully, withdrawing its ambassador from South Korea, summoning the Korean ambassador to Tokyo to file a complaint, and threatening to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice. This was later officially proposed to the ROK, which refused (SOUTH, 2012). 2.2. Relevance of the Issue The maritime disputes for sovereignty over certain islands and archipelagos in East Asia may seem counterintuitive, due to the relatively small areas being sought by various parties. However, the territorial waters that surround these islands add certain layers that make their possession far more important than it would seem at first. The most obvious advantages brought by sovereignty over these islands are economic. Control over the South China Sea archipelagoes, in particular, allows a nation to control one of the most transited sea lanes in the world, with over half the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passing through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, the majority of which goes on to pass through the South China Sea. A large part of the transit through the area is composed of raw materials, especially oil and liquefied gas, meaning that, geopolitically, controlling the area allows for control of energy supplies for all East Asia. Furthermore, several of the islands themselves have proven natural resources, such as significant reserves of oil (for instance, in the South China Sea alone, estimated to reach 28 billion barrels) and gas. Furthermore, the islands also possess large biodiversity, and economically exploitable fish populations, with many incidents of clashes often involving fishing trawlers, due to the high profitability of fishing in the waters surrounding the islands (CORBETT, 2012; WESLEY, 2012). ~ 39 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. Therefore, the country that controls the islands has the capacity not only to exploit its economic resources, but will also have the ability to severely hamper the supply of raw materials, especially energy, to States in the region. Thus the islands acquire great strategic importance, amid rising tensions. Other important dimension that the islands have is in furthering the capacity to project naval power to greater distances. China, for instance, has great reluctance in installing military bases in foreign soil. So, it is only reasonable to believe that it seeks to establish its sovereignty over nearby islands, in order to be able to install naval bases, solidifying its status as a regional power. The Kuril islands also fit in a dynamic of power projection, since having them – and their territorial waters – gives Russia access to seas further to the South that rarely freeze. In other words, for the Russian naval forces in East Asia to have undeterred year-long access to the seas, they depend on the possession of the Kurils. Should Japan instead possess this archipelago, defensive installations could effectively halt Russian access to the Pacific Ocean. These strategic and economic factors that lend importance turn them into important objectives in foreign policy, with much political capital being put to ensure a claim over them. Therefore, sovereignty over the islands becomes a matter of national pride, with great symbolic value being attached to them. Therefore, the public opinion in several countries becomes intensely focused on these islands, with massive popular protests breaking out whenever a threat to a nation’s claim to an archipelago is perceived. Hence the even greater efforts to project aggressive stances in this topic, since showing signs of weakness on the subject can threaten the perception of legitimacy that a government holds. 2.3. Specific Aspects of the Archipelagoes Solving the maritime disputes on the Western Pacific is one of the top goals of the East Asian countries’ diplomacy. The arguments on which the countries support their claims are diversified, going from historical evidences to present days treaties. On the following paragraphs the main issues and interests regarding sovereignty are presented. 2.3.1. The Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyutai Islands These islands are located between mainland China and Japan, northwest of Taiwan. Its sovereignty is claimed by all these parties, and it is one of the most controversial maritime disputes in the area. The disputes started mainly in the 1970s, when a group of Japanese, together with two goats, were sent to these inhabited rocks to claim its ownership (JINGOIST, 2012). Since then, it was considered, at least by the Japanese government, as private property of a Japanese ~ 40 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 family, called Kurihara. Nowadays, the Prime-Minister of Japan, Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, signals a more assertive stance of its government regarding this issue, as it prepares to nationalize the islets chain. Shortly after the Prime Minister’s announcement, Chinese vessels were spotted near the islands, which led to harsh diplomatic exchanges. On the Chinese side, the main argument is that the islands were part of China until the end of the 19 th century, and were taken by Japan as spoils of the Sino-Japanese war. After the post-World War II occupation of Japan by the United States, Washington would have given the ownership of the Islands to Japan, after withdrawing the bulk of its forces from Okinawa, in 1972. The last time tensions escalated because of this issue, prior to Mr. Noda’s announcement, in 2010, when thousands rallied in China to condemn the establishment by Japan of the “Senkaku Islands Colonization Day” (MCCORMACK, 2011). At the time, Taiwan allied with China in its stance against Japan, which led to more synergic efforts between both parties regarding maritime sovereignty, even on the South China Sea. (FEDDERSEN, 2012). 2.3.2. Liancourt Rocks (The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands) The Liancourt Rocks are a group of islets in the Sea of Japan, which are disputed by Japan, North Korea (DPRK) and South Korea (ROK). Both Japan and the former Korea have historically ruled the region alternately, but in the 20 th Century, Korea was brought into Japan’s sphere of influence and progressively colonized by Japanese, including the Dokdo Islands. This scenario changed dramatically after the World War II, when Korea regained independence and entered in a civil war between North and South. Meanwhile, Japan lost all of its territories, except for its four main groups of islands and surrounding area. In spite of this, there are different views on this issue because the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not make a clear statement about the “surrounding area”, although the Allies had made clear, in 1946, for Japan to keep its ships 12 miles away from these islands, later reverting the control over the islands to South Korea’s government (SCAPIN Nº 677 and Nº 1033). Since then, South Korea has exercised sovereignty over the islands, despite Japanese claims, and has made regular tourist visits to them, together with a small group of administrative personnel (CYBER DOKDO, 2012). These regular visits started right after a local Japanese prefecture created the “Takeshima Day” in 2005 to make people aware of the issue in Japan (BOSTON, 2009). In 2006, Japan announced an economic survey around the islands and South Korea responded aggressively by sending gunboats to prevent Japanese coast-guard vessels from mapping the region (WHY, 2012). More recently, in August 10, 2012, ROK’s president Mr. ~ 41 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. Lee Myung-Bak visited the Dokdo Islands, becoming the first president to do so and provoking a temporary withdrawal of Japan’s Embassy. Japan reacted threatening of lodging the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), proposing such solution in August 21, which South Korea rejected ten days later (SOUTH, 2012). In spite of some rumors about natural resources in the Liancourt Rocks, the real interests are beyond the islands. Both countries still resent Japanese imperialism, and for Korea the sovereignty over these islands could mean that their country and the Korean people are sovereign and free from foreign influence. Resonating this issue, DPRK supported its southern neighbor, in spite of still being “technically” at war against ROK, declaring its support for South Korea on the Dokdo issue (CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 2012). The Korea- Japan dispute is not only about territories, but also about war reparations and Korean claims for Japanese crime apologies (e. g. including the “comfort women” issue 5). Like Diaoyu- Senkaku Islands, this dispute may impede ways for deeper economic and political integration in East Asia, including plans for uniting currencies (the Chiang Mai initiative) and multilateral cooperation in a broader frame (ASEAN+3). 2.3.3. The Kuril/Chishima Islands The Kurils, part of the Russian Sakhalin Oblast, form a chain of islands ranging from near the Russian Kamchatka Territory, on the far northeast, to Hokkaido, a main high populated Japanese island. It has an area of about 15 km and there are 19.000 inhabitants living in the region (mostly Russian) (RUSSIA IC, 2007). The Kurils were divided in 1855 by Imperial Russia and Japan, but 20 years later Russia exchanged them for the control of Sakhalin (which lies in the Russian southeastern coast). In the Russo-Japanese War (1904- 1905), the first clash between a growing Eurasian empire and the newly imperialist Japan led the czar to lose Sakhalin. The whole region was returned back to Russia after the Allied victory in 1945 and since then Japan claims former sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which they call Chishima. In fact, Japan wants a restoration of former agreements that were made in 1855 (Treaty of Shimoda), dividing North and South Kurils, and because of that issue both countries have not signed yet a formal peace agreement after the World War II (JAPAN, 5 The issue of the so called “comfort women” refers to the “forcible recruitment of women who were held in so- called "comfort stations" and subjected to rape and other forms of sexual abuse at the hands of the Japanese military”, during Japanese occupation of territories during World War II, similarly to the “Joy Divisions” of Jewish women described in certain Nazi concentration camps. It must be noted that the Japanese “comfort stations” existed even in Japan, with Japanese women. The issue remains taboo in Japanese society, and the Japanese government has failed to provide official apologies and significant compensation for this issue (MORRIS-SUZUKI, 2007) ~ 42 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 2010). The European Parliament in 2005 brought back the dispute by issuing a declaration supporting Japan’s claim for its “northern territories”. A year later, Mr. Vladimir Putin admitted for the first time a negotiation and maybe an agreement to settle the dispute, seceding some of Russia’s territory (in Russia’s officials view, Japan should firstly recognize their sovereignty over Kurils to later negotiate for some islands) (GORENBURG, 2012). Mr. Putin declared that Russia could give Japan two of its four claimed islands to end the dispute, but Japan was not willing to negotiate and responded with its Parliament in 2009, adopting a law that stated Japanese sovereignty over Kuril Islands and Russia’s illegality in occupying them (GORENBURG, 2012). After rising to power, President Medvedev took a more aggressive position and visited the region in 2010, provoking a temporary recall from the Japanese ambassador in Moscow. After a personal call of Mr. Medvedev to improve the Kuril’s defenses, Russia started to build capabilities in its Pacific Fleet, deploying amphibious assault ships recently bought from France in the region (MYSTRAL-CLASS, 2011). The main interest in dispute is Russia’s free access to the Pacific Ocean in all seasons; since the region and Russia’s naval bases are far north, therefore suffering the threat of being stuck in the Sea of Okhotsk or in the frozen waters during winter. The dispute also has an economic side which is about to be explored by Russia and maybe Japan, that admitted the joint exploration has no role in sovereignty disputes (GORENBURG, 2012). The region is rich in mineral resources (such as hydrocarbon deposits, gold, silver, iron, titanium and rhenium), geothermal energy and fish, while tourism could be also explored. Japan, instead, needs Russia’s energy resources especially from Siberia and fears that freezing relations with Russia and South Korea could lead them to supply China, which also has growing needs for natural resources (GORENBURG, 2012). 2.3.4. The South China Sea Archipelagoes (Spratly and Paracel Islands) The South China Sea is a part of Pacific Ocean, ranging from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan. This area comprises more than one third of world’s shipping transit and is believed to have huge natural resources as oil and natural gas (PHNOM PENH POST, 2012). There are two main groups of disputed islands in the region, the Paracel Islands in the north, equidistant from Vietnam and China coastlines and Spratly Islands, in the south, laying off the Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines coasts, and a half of the distance to Vietnam coast. The Paracel Islands are claimed by People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China retook their control in 1946, after Japan’s surrender and occupied Woody Island and Macclesfield Bank, while the other islands were still occupied by South Vietnam. After the ~ 43 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. battle of Paracels in 1974, China gained control over the whole archipelago. In 1982, Vietnam officially established the Hoang Sa District, covering the Paracel Islands (SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1988). Since then, China and Vietnam have been most active in occupying and protecting the region. For their part, Spratly Islands are disputed and occupied (with the exception of Brunei) by six countries: Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Differently from Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan does not support China’s point of view in the South China Sea (TAIWAN CNA, 2012). While China and Vietnam both claim the whole archipelago based on historical documents; Brunei, Malaysia and Philippines claim only part of the region as their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), regarding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which became active in 1994. For that purpose, the least countries state the islands were res nullius , i. e. the territories were not effectively occupied until their claim for enjoyment of the islands. Philippines has a special and contradictory claim different from the others, based on the Thomas Cloma occupation in 1956 and later annexed de jure by Philippines in 1978, calling the new land Kalayaan (this is specially contradictory, because according to their claims the islands were res nullius , but they were actually under Filipino rule). The current situation in both regions is far from solution. Notably there is one (re)rising great power (China), struggling to show the world its weight in the 21 st Century and avid to prove it can fill the vacuum of power after the end of the Cold War. Formerly, China was the most powerful country in East Asia and dominated the South China Sea, so it is not hard to perceive an attempt to regain this respect and sovereignty over this sea which could be solidified by achieving international recognition of China’s rule in Spratly and Paracel Islands. Besides the economic advantage in annexing the islands (some estimates reach one trillion dollars), the strategic importance of the region is vital to China’s maritime defense and projection, since the Armed Forces doctrine is opposite to stationing troops abroad (STOREY, 2010). However, there are still three important challenges to achieve these objectives: the United States, ASEAN and Taiwan. The United States was the great “winner” of the Cold War, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and has been the great power of the Pacific Ocean since the end of the World War II. The Western superpower became a close ally of defeated Japan, reconstructing the country and leading it to an economic miracle in the 1960s and 1970s. The United States also was responsible for maintaining Republic of China (Taiwan) engaged against mainland China, which population, over the times, became increasingly pro-unification (especially after the end of Cold War and People’s Republic of China’s policy of “one country, two systems”). ~ 44 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 In Southeast Asia, the United States was the most important ally of anti-communist regimes that challenged not only Soviet’s power, but China’s dominance too, like Suharto in Indonesia, also Philippines and Thailand. More recently, Washington has a policy of bilateral security engagement specifically with the key actors in the region. It has developed strategic ties with Vietnam and Philippines, promoting military exercises in the South China Sea (CS MONITOR, 2010). The ASEAN countries have varied positions and behaviors regarding the South China Sea issue. Cambodia was the host of the ASEAN summit in 2012 and made continuous efforts to divert the spotlight from the South China Sea recent developments, stating that the forum could not make any final document expressing its opinion about the issue. Cambodia is not the only country in ASEAN which implicitly supports China; Myanmar, Laos and Thailand are also interested in closer cooperation, since these countries have growing investments from China and Hong Kong, while Singapore nowadays is more a Chinese trading hub than ever (KHANNA, 2008). In spite of that, Philippines and Vietnam are calling on their neighbors to take more aggressive and supportive attitudes, converging for a multilateral and common view of the issue. Indonesia and Malaysia (which share this view with Brunei), as founding members of ASEAN, always call for a multilateral and unbiased negotiation, strengthening ASEAN ties not only between the 10 members, but also among East Asia. It is important to make it clear that the South China Sea issue is a structural one, belonging to national interests within the long term and not in momentary situations. That means that military alliances are transient, but the national interest is difficult to change, so even ASEAN countries allied with China, United States or even India might not want to get too involved in balancing against great powers, instead making a complex game of “Balance of Influence” (a mix between balancing and bandwagoning) (CIORCIARI, 2009). By playing with the great powers in an institutional frame, it becomes easier for smaller countries to have a more prominent role in regional affairs. So it is not clear what role ASEAN countries will have in the long term, especially those not interested in maritime claims, because they can stand for both sides depending on the situation and on the advantages they can take, but also regarding the structural consequences. 3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION The disputes concerning sovereignty over the archipelagoes in East Asia have been comparably lacking in the development of international efforts to solve them. The majority of disputes involve only two parties, and there have been very few incidents of arguable spillover, and escalation has mostly been avoided. Therefore, the bilateral disputes have not ~ 45 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. produced concerted international action. The disputes on the South China Sea, on the other hand, perhaps due to the large number of parties involved, have been more successfully internationalized, and have generated some international resolutions. However, these have been limited, and not very successful at solving controversies. The first document worthy of note was the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. This document, however, defined itself as a declaration of principles, providing guidelines on behavior on the South China Sea, such as exhorting restraint, and stimulating all parts to cooperate in certain areas such as environmental protection, search and rescue operations, safety of navigation, and so on (ASEAN, 1992). Besides, this document was only signed by the members of ASEAN at the time (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei), not having sufficient scope. Ten years later, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed by the current ASEAN members and China. This document reinforced the need for restraint in the disputed areas, repudiating the use of force, and established which activities could be carried out by the signatories in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2002). This document was not effectively binding, although it was originally intended as a preliminary step towards the solution of disputes in the area. However, no document expanding and building upon the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties has been successfully elaborated, and all documents since have generally repudiated the use of force in disputes in the South China Sea, promoting initiatives of joint economic development of the area (ARF, 2012). 4. BLOC POSITIONS The People’s Republic of China has strategic interests in both the Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyutai and South China Sea issues. Because of its model of government fostered industrialization, the country demands higher and higher volumes of oil to maintain its growth pattern. Both areas, besides containing oil reserves, are strategic positioned on the verge of the Sea Lines of Communication that supplies the country with fossil energy. Many North-American military analysts have suggested the idea of strangling, in a given contingency, those lines of communication and denying to the Chinese those supplies. That is why China is very assertive regarding sovereignty in those areas, as they are a matter of national security. They support their maritime claims on the basis that, historically, the islands chains located in those areas always belonged to China. In the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that would give China the majority of the South China Sea as their Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as a vast portion of the East China Sea. China also ~ 46 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 prefers to avoid multilateral negotiations regarding the status of the islands, preferring a bilateral, case by case approach. Due to their close relations with China and the fear of an arising powerful Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are not inclined to support ASEAN countries claims, rather insisting that South China Sea issues should not be discussed in multilateral forums and supporting China’s view in the other disputes (INTER AKSYON, 2012). Mongolia , for its part, is becoming increasingly influenced by China, especially because of its economic dependence on China and granted access to Pacific Ocean (WEI-FANG, 2005), thus also supporting their view on maritime issues. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea generally aligns automatically with Beijing in foreign relations, but it is essential to state that they have a special interest in Dokdo/Takeshima islands and should support Republic of Korea’s claims in this specific maritime dispute. Myanmar is an internationally isolated country which is opening gradually its political and economical systems, but in the last 20 years has been backed and covered from criticism by China; since it is not a vital issue for Myanmar or its immediate neighbors, it should stick together with China, but trying to avoid a confrontational profile. As well as Myanmar, Thailand enjoys special strategic relations with Beijing and is willing to provide military assistance to their partners whenever they want; however, this is the Thai Armed Forces view and does not reflect its diplomacy of non-confrontation within ASEAN, so the national interest comprises both points-of-view (THE NATION, 2012). Australia , in spite of allowing the United States to base troops in Darwin in 2011, does not want to see a major conflict that would move Asia’s economies backwards. Nowadays, China is Australia’s biggest partner in foreign trade, however the most part of direct investments come from Western countries (AUSTRALIA, 2012). For Australia, stability in the South China Sea is essential to the country’s development, but they also have a moral compromise of being linked to the Commonwealth and to Western Powers; the country also has serious ambitions of being a mediator of the sovereignty disputes. New Zealand , which also has strategic ties with United States (O’BRIEN, 2012), Sri Lanka and Singapore share this view of neutrality and need for stability, preferring to avoid confrontation and to maintain the economic trade flowing through East Asia (AUSTRALIA, 2012). Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste have applied to join ASEAN and thus will support multilateral negotiations and should enforce the role of the organization in conducting peaceful talks. Indonesia is the most active player for stability in Southeast Asia, circulating among ASEAN nations a draft code of conduct for the South China Sea (INDONESIA, 2012). The country is pursuing unity of views within ASEAN to enforce the organization that it helped to ~ 47 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. create and to institutionalize. Therefore, Indonesia is seeking an influential place in Southeast Asia, which would be capable, in the framework of institutionalization, to attract its members to closer cooperation in security, economy and culture. To achieve this objective, Indonesia must keep an open multilateral dialogue between ASEAN and Great Powers, including territorial issues. Malaysia and Brunei , despite their claims for res nullius territory and EEZ, are looking, as well as Indonesia, for a multilateral and peaceful solution for disputes that could unite ASEAN countries and promote stability in the region (MALAYSIA, 2012). The most threatening and assertive positions in Southeast Asia, besides China, are from Vietnam and Philippines . Both countries show publically their intentions to take every measure possible to guarantee their sovereignty rights in South China Sea. While Vietnam states that it has been historically exercising sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands, its demands include the totality of both archipelagos; the Philippines claim just a part of Spratly Islands, called Kalayaan, but are not less bold in their actions. In 2012, for example, several incidents marked the relations between them and China, joining together against their common enemy and calling the support of all ASEAN members. Their economic relations with China have been strained and suffering from sanctions and boycotts from both sides, at the same time they build up military capabilities. The most important incident was in the Scarborough Shoal, where surveillance ships from Philippines and China clashed over illegal activities from Chinese fishermen. Since then, China kept its ships stationed there to avoid foreign presence and tensions are still high. As stated in other paragraphs, Vietnam maintains strategic relations with both Russia and United States, which are developing quickly Vietnamese armed forces in equipment and military exercises respectively. Vietnam is also pushing for a Sino-Indian dispute over influence in Southeast Asia complex, as it calls for India a more active role beyond the Malacca Strait and extends contracts in hydrocarbon conjunct exploration (VIETNAM, 2012). The United States of America constitutes a great power in the Pacific and, as such, seeks to maintain its position of dominance in East Asia. The main United States’ goals in maritime disputes are contain China and to regular intervene in the region as a major provider of security, still to keep the SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) under control. To do so, it must keep its allies engaged with these goals and to show China it is still the greatest power of Pacific. There is a lot of discussion whether United States would be willing to intervene directly and it is not clear what would be their position in an escalating conflict. At the same time they urge Philippines to avoid a confrontational position; The United States blame China for hostilities in South China Sea (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012). The role of Washington in diplomacy is to enforce the multilateral role of ASEAN and its members and ~ 48 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 to support Japan’s claims over China. The country also has promoted other frameworks of integration in the region and has strengthened the role of international organizations, the rule of law and former political little-active Pacific countries as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Washington also values its long standing alliance with Japan and Republic of Korea, although it does not express preferences on disputes (CAMPBELL, 2012). The main objective of Japan is to contain China’s rising in East Asia (also in the South China Sea) and to regain some of the prestige lost after World War II, when the country lost a lot of its possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Japan claims the ownership of Diaoyu- Senkaku Islands against China, but until now the perspectives are bringing them, especially in 2012, to a “Trade War”. After Japan “purchased” the islands in September, Chinese people started a series of clashes in many regions of the country to destroy Japanese branded products (e.g. cars, electronics) and the trade is about to drop due to unofficial intentions from China to put an embargo on some vital Chinese exports to Japan (THE DANGERS, 2012). Also it has contentions with Republic of Korea about Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) and it seems the Islands are responsible to keep some of the pre-World War II spirit into these two countries. The ownership of these islands and also Kurils to Japan mean that they still have a dominant position in East Asia. For the same purposes, Republic of Korea has claimed the sovereignty over Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), ruling this territory since the end of Korean War. For ROK and also for DPRK, which supports South Korea’s claim, exercising sovereignty over Dokdo Islands mean the country is finally free from Japanese colonialism and it has a key role in defining East Asia’s relations among Great Powers. The last claimant in maritime disputes is Russia , which currently rules Kuril Islands and also has been involved in polemics over these territories. Russia needs Kurils to have a clear way in the Pacific Ocean and still wants the natural resources present in this region. Defending Kurils means for Russia that it is a great power of the Pacific and not only an influential country in Europe, compounded by the fact that Japan before the World War II had subjugated Russia in the far east during the Russo- Japanese War. In the South China Sea, Russia has developed over the years close ties with Vietnam and is currently supplying Vietnamese armed forces to balance China (RUSSIA LAUNCHES, 2012). Russia, for its part, is developing economic ties with South Korea and has interest in joining efforts to socialize North Korea for further cooperation; regarding Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands, Russia is in favor of China’s claims, with highly public support (RUSSIA: DIAOYU, 2012). The European Union relies on the South China Sea trade, which comprises almost 20% of its exports and 30% of its imports. The Union also has an alliance with Japan and ~ 49 ~ Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past. South Korea, besides economic ties, and seeks for regional stability and peaceful negotiations in all maritime disputes that would involve its partners (MYKAL, 2011). Like stated in another section, European Union supports Japanese claims for Kuril Islands. Canada is shifting its foreign policy to a more active role in East Asia relations and there are three main questions in its new form of engagement: regional tensions challenge Canada’s economic approach (thus developing pragmatic relations instead of moral ones); Canada’s allies are increasingly involved in South China Sea tensions and its partners may consider that Canada is more worried about restricting the North West Passage (NWP), a Sea Lane in North Canada, which could be against the argument of its allies claims (MANICOM, 2012). India is investing in South China Sea natural resources, as its needs grow quickly. Also, after its Look East policy started in 1993, India became increasingly aware of Southeast Asia relations, however it did not have much effect in the first decade (PANDYA; MALONE, 2010). The country is still trying to find partnerships in the region and to participate in East Asia’s issues, but strategically, India does not have yet neither the strength, nor the immediate intention to take a more assertive position in South China Sea dispute, for example (INDIA TODAY, 2012). Regarding these arguments, it is more likely India will try to explore the region’s natural resources (with China’s complaints about the illegality of these activities in disputed areas) and make itself more relevant strategically by enforcing its alliances with Japan, South Korea (NDIA-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN, 2012) and United States, but preferring to have a softer approach of cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes. For their part, Bangladesh and Pakistan would be more likely to keep a low profile because of their fundamental relations with China and United States, trying to avoid controversial positions that would upset Great Powers, without having a practical interest in East Asia’s maritime disputes. 5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER 1) How to safeguard national interests while avoiding conflict with other nations? 2) How can extraregional actors participate in reaching a solution, while keeping their interests in mind? 3) To what extent should convergent positions regarding maritime disputes shape the foreign policy of traditional rivals? 4) To what degree should issues be internationalized, and discussed multilaterally, in bloc, or kept between the parties directly involved? ~ 50 ~ UFRGSMUN 2012 5) Is joint economic development of disputed territories feasible? 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