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ZURCHER BEITRAGE Zur Sicherheitspolitik Und Konfliktforschung

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ZURCHER BEITRAGE Zur Sicherheitspolitik Und Konfliktforschung .. -- -ZURCHER BEITRAGE_ zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Heft Nr. 24 Sabina Ann Fischer Namibia Becomes Independent The U.S. contribution to regional peace Forschungsstelle fur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule 8092 Zurich © 1992 Forschungsstelle fur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, ETH Zentrum, 8092 Zurich Aile Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck und fotomechanische Wiedergabe, auch auszugsweise, nur mit schriftlicher Genehmigung der Forschungsstelle. Die in den "Zurcher Beitragen zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung" wiederge­ gebenen Auffassungen stellen ausschliesslich die Ansichten der betreffenden Autoren dar. ISBN 3-905641-24-0 ' . Table of Contents Preface· 1. Introduction l 2. The Ford·Administration 11 2.1. Policy Evaluation: National Security Study Meniorandurir 39 .(NSSM 39) . 14. 2:2. Policy Change: The Lusaka Speech 18 2.3. Achievements of the Ford Administration 21· 3. The Carter Administration 24 3.1. Different Players 27 3.2. Promise for a Settlement 33 ·. · 3.3. Achievements of the Carter Administration. 40 · 4. The Reagan Ad.ministration 42 4.1. Constructive Engagement I' 45 4.2. N~mibia: A new: Strategy . 50 -. 4.R Steps toward a Settlement: 1981-1988 56 4.4. Namibia's Independence and Tripartite Agreement. 65 . •' . 5. Implementing Resolution 435 and the Elections 80 t ' 6. Conclusion 84 7. Bibliography 91 $. Alibreviations . 100 9. Appendices: Map of Southern Africa . 101 . Appendix A: Heqtage . 102 Appendix B: Namibia: An Internatiori~l Issue 104 Appendix C: Strategic Minerals 107 Appendix D: The Cape Route 1.09 Appendix E: Option 2 in NSSM 39 111 Appendix F: U.N."Res 385 113 · Appendix G: Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian Situation 114 Appendix H: U.N.. Res 431· 117 · Appendix I: U.N. Res 435 118 Appendix J: The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 119 ·Appendix K: Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia · · 120 Appendix L: Protocol of Geneva' 121 Appendix M: Schedul~·ofthe Peace Process 122 Appendix N: Protocol of Brazzaville 123 Appendix 0: Tripartite Agreement signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa 124 Appendix P: Bila~ral Agreement signed by Angola and Cuba 125 Appendix Q: U.N. Res 628/629/632 126 Appendix R: Namibian Election Results 129 \ Preface Successes in conflict resolution are not very numerou·s. Namibia is one ofthe few cases .where quiet, steadfast and patie;n.t diplomacy produced such a sp.ccess. The author of the folloWing study tells the story of AJn,erican diplomacy to~ards the resolution ofthe Namibia conflict~ such as it becan),e visible from the documents and audible from many ·.. conversations with personalities involved. The story of the resolution of the Namibia conflict not onlyt'ells us something about. difficulties in Southern Africa, but. about the importance ·,of patient diplomats and .. diplomacy, the importance of personalities. in history-in general. · . 1.'. .· • . .. The author gives a short narrative .of the events as well as an analysis. of. the. American. policy, goals and. achievements .. In addition, the most important, documents of the development are giyen in appendices. It is very useful to have thi~ kind of summary description at hand,: long before extensive. history can qe written on the basis of . exhaustive archival studies. Zurich, March 16th, 1992 Kurt R. Spillmann -.1- 1. Introduction On March 21, 1990; the wish of many ge.nerations ofNamibians came true; Africa's. last colony decl.ared its indepell.dence after having been first a German and then a South African territory for one. hundred year~. 1 The end of South Africa,n rule in the t~rritory rewarded the N amibia:ris who f~ught arid sufferedfor the independence of their country. However, the last African colony's indepEmqence was also important · for the ~hoie so~ the~ African region.. Having found a solution for N: am.ibia m~de the chances for peaceful change in· Angola, South Africa:, arid the whole troubled . region ofsouthern Africa more likely. March 21 was·also a success for U;S.' diplomacy as the United States had played a leading role in the negotiations on Namibia's2 inde~endence. Washington's engagement in this African q11estion is remarkable,, because the U.S. traditionally devoted little attention to Afric~. In the first yea~s following Woi-ld War II, Europe and the Eaf;t-W-est cohflict were at Washington's center of attention, while Africa was treated as a ;,back..;burner i~m" _in the ·United States.3 Until the late 1950s, Washington considered:Afri~a to be in the European sphere ofinfluehce. Therefore, the u.s. policy toward .the African states needed to be in accordance with the policy toward the European colonial powers. A new situation in Africa was 'created in the late 1950s;' With Ghana's independEmce iD.1957 a wave of decolonization in Africa started, resultillg in the emergence ofnew and indepen:dents.tates;4 The newna,tion . states v.vere ·not aligned~ neither with the Eastern nor the Western bloc. Facing the threat ofthe possible expansion ofthe Cold. War toAfrica, the changes in the political landscape forced the U.S. to recons~der its policy toward Afri_ca.5 1 AppendixA: Information on Namibia's heritage. · . Appendix B: Information on Namibia as· an international issue. 2 .· In this paper only "Namibia", the name of the new!_y independent state will be used. The· . Germans and South Africans called Namibia "South West Africa". In 1968 the U.N. General Assembly adopted ''Namibia'~ as the name for the territory. Pretoria; however, called the territoey"South West Africa" up to independence in 1990. · . · . · . National Democratic Institute for International Affairs CNDI)~Nation Building: The U~N. and Namibia, Washington D.C. 1990, p.viii. ·· ··· . · 3 · In a letter, Lucius l3attle; the speCial assis~nt of Secr~tary of State Dean Acheson,· WrOte, "Little room was left for an emphasis on areas that have since attracted major attention. Not much c;tttention w_as paid ~o the MiddleEast, almost none to Africa and only symbolic"lip service was gwen to Latzn Amenca... ~· · · . · ·. · , .· Personal letter to Helen Kitchen, January 19~ 1988; cit.; Brown, CarlL., Ceriterstage: American Diplomacy since World War II, New York ~990, p.177. · · . · . · 4 Carter, Gwendolen M., O'Meara, Patrick; Southern Africa: The· Conti~uing Crisis, Lond~n I 1979, p.320. .' . •·. 5 Note, Executive Secretary to theNational Security Council (NSG), Subject: U.S Policy .toward Africa, South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5719/1, August 23, 1957, p.2,3, National ~chives and Record Service, Washington D.C., USA (NARS). · · · - 2 - . In the ·1960s, the U.R began to pay special attention to ·Southern Mrica. Th~· engagement still remained minimal, but washington paid lip service to the inde~ . pendence struggle of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and gave some aid to theFrente Nacional de Libertacao deAngola(FNLA).6 It was expected that the white governments would continue to dictate the regional politics in the '1960s and 1970s, despite the insurgency efforts of different movements} South 8 Africa was particularly interesting because ofits strategic minerals ; the geographic location between the south Athintic and the. Indian Ocean, and the control of air and sea communication9 in the area.~0 Th~ spread,of communism in the region was . ' . seen as a potential threat to Washington's strategic and economic interests in South Africa a~d resulted in the increase of the U.S~ engagement in southern Africa. :, . In 1974 a military coup in Lisl:>on against Marcello Caetano;s governmenttook place.· . The Portuguese iriilitary overthrew Caetano b~cause ~t was disconteJJ.ted with the colonial policy and weary of fighting stal~mated wars in Africa for fifteen. years.U Therefore the new military leadership in ·Lisbon gave the colonies their indepen~ dence. In Angola and Mozambique Marxist governments came to power. These events caused a drastic change in the tr.S. policytoward the region. Henry Kissinger, · who was Secretary of State at the time, began a shuttle diplomacy, aimed at · Namibia,. Zimbabwe12 .·and ·south Africa.13 The· goal of the new U.S. policy was to prevent any f~her African states from being taken over by Marxistre~mes. When the Carter administration came into office in 1977 the U.S. intensified its ·engagement in the region.l)uring the first two years ofC~tier's term, the southeril. Africa agenda had a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy than ever before. The goals to be achieved were still ~e same as in the last year of the Ford achllinjstration: . ·Namibia and Zimbal:>wehad to be given independence and Pretoria had to give up . 6,. U.S. Congress, Senate, Ango}Ei,, Hearings before the Subcommittee ~n African Affairs ofthe Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, February 3,4,6, 1976, .94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p.l6,17. 7 Revised Draft, Problems of Southern Africa: Background, October 4, 1962, p.16,25,26, (no additional information on origin given), NARS. · .. 8 Appendix C: Information on strategic mineral debate. 9 Appendix D: Information on the sea lane debate 10 Note; Executive Secretary to the NSC, NSC 5719/1, August 23, l957, p:3,4, NARS. 11- . Ottaway, David B.; The Washington Post, April26, 1974, "RevQlt Triggered by Book: War. Hero Attack use of Forces in Coloni~s". ·. · · ·... · · . 12 "Zimbabwe" was called '~Rhodesia" (Southern Rhodesia) lintil independence in i980·. Here the · name "Zimbabwe" will be used for the country also when referred to in the time before 1980. 13 Brown, CarlL., Centerstage, p.180,181.. • 3 - . its policy of apartheid.· A ch~nge occurred, however, in the new administration's appr()ach and: motivated an increase in Washington's engagement in ·the region. The new administration desired better relations with black African states, and it _championed· a foreign policy·on the basis of moral principles and human rights.
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