THE US It ROKERIED SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE, 1988
It Y
RAVEI,E I RAMAIMANA
A SHORT DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MAS'ER ®-4 AR S
IN HISTORY
IN THE Y AR S
AT THE RAND A -.4RIKAANS JNIVERSITY
SUPERVISOR o PROFESSOR H. J. VAN ASWEGEN
15 FEBRUARY 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION (i)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (ii)-(iii)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (iv)-(v)
SUMMARY 1 - 2
CHAPTER. 1 3
INTRODUCTION 3 - 8
1.1 NOTES 9
CHAPTER 2 10
BACKGROUND 10 - 14
2.1 NOTES 15 - 16
CHAPTER. 3 17
WHY THE US TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO MEDIATE THE ANGOLA - NAMIBIA CONFLICT IN 1988 17
3.1 INTRODUCTION 17
3.2 END OF REAGAN 'S PRESIDENCY 18
3.3 SOVIET UNION - UNITED STATES RELATIONS 18 - 20
3.4 SANCTIONS FRACAS 20 - 21
3.5 ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS 21 - 22
3.6 DESTABILIZATION 22 - 23
3.7 ANTI - APARTHEID ACTIVISM 23 - 25 Page
3.8 CONCLUSION 25
3.9 NOTES 26 - 28
CHAPTER. 4 29
WHY THE ACTORS IN THE ANGOLA - NAMIBIA CONFLICT ACCEDED TO US MEDIATION 29
4.1 INTRODUCTION 29 - 30
4.2 THE SOVIET UNION 30 - 33
4.3 CUBA 33 - 36
4.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 37 - 42
4.5 THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT 42 - 44
4.6 NOTES 45 - 49
CHAPTER. 5 50
THE EXCLUSION OF SWAPO FROM THE QUADRIPARTITE TALKS 50 - 54
5.1 CONCLUSION 54
5.2 NOTES 55 - 56
CHAPTER. 6 57
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF US MEDIATED TALKS 57 - 62
6.1 NOTES 63 - 64
CHAPTER 7 65
7.1 CONCLUSION 65 - 67
SOURCE MST 68 - 78 (1)
DEDICATION
Mailman!,
Shonisani,
Sedzesani,
Dakalo and Zwonaka,
this is yours. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Everyone uses history, and all of us use it in many ways. We use it, inner ans., to define who we are and to connect our personal experience with the history of a particular region, nation, and culture.
The production of a work of this kind poses many problems. Above all it requires a high degree of cooperation on the part of contributors. After deadlines have been met , changes frequently have to be made to eliminate overlaps with other chapters, to remedy omission, or to maintain a measure of stylistic uniformity.
I wish gratefully to acknowledge the cooperation of those who shared in the enthusiasm of this endeavour and made light of the difficulties entailed.
Helpful assistance was received from the librarians and staff of the State Library in Pretoria, the Africa Institute (Pretoria), the University of the Witwatersrand Library, the Rand Afrikaans University Library, and Library Gardens both in Pietersburg and Johannesburg.
As the reference and source list show, I am indebted to a large number of historians for the content of this work. In the process of summarising and selecting I hope that I have not offended them. In addition I am particularly grateful to them since they saved me from a number of factual and stylistic infelicities. None of them, needless to say, are responsible for the misjudgements which may remain. Professor H.J. van Aswegen, my supervisor, counts not just as my chastizing angel but as my torch-bearer, to him I owe the greatest of my debts. He knows more than I do, I have learnt much from him and have enjoyed doing so.
I would also like to record my indebtedness to my confidantes, Rendani and Joe, who made very useful comments on the sections of this work and assisted in ways too numerous to mention.
I am grateful, too, to my colleagues at Kolokoshani, they have, in the broadest sense, made the institution were I have the luck to work a tolerant and stimulating place, and I have benefited accordingly.
Thanks are also due to Aaron Manenzhe, who helped in typing whilst this work was taking shape. My personal thanks go to Livhu and Lufuno for their unqualified support and hospitality. Livhu and Lufuno, my deep appreciation, as always.
Makhado, Matodzi, Livhu, Phillip, Tshifhiwa and Tshilidzi you are and have been always my pillars of strength.
Finally, my thanks go most of all to Sedzesani, to whom I owe a debt quite above and beyond that acknowledged on the dedication page. She encouraged me from the outset to write, was endlessly patient with me, and allowed me to renege shamefully on my commitment to equal shares in domestic and parenthood duties. She also performed a difficult but occasionally necessary duty of preventing Dakalo and Zwonaka from being other than a comfort and help to me. Neither she, nor they, nor anyone else, should bear any of the blame for whatever errors of judgement this work may contain.
The facts, the inferences drawn from them, as well as any errors, are my own. (iv)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIDS - Aquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
DTA - Detente Turnhalle Alliance.
FAPLA - People 's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola .
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
GNP - Gross National Product.
JMC - Joint Monitoring Commission .
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola .
OAU - Organization of African Unity .
PLAN - People 's Liberation Army of Namibia .
RSA - Republic of South Africa .
RTZ - Rio Tinto Zinc.
SADC - Southern African Development Community .
SADCC - Southern African Development Coordinating Conference .
SADF - South African Defence Force .
SWAPO - South West Africa People 's Organization .
SWATF - South West African Territorial Force .
UN - United Nations .
UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission .
UNITA - Union for the Total Independence of Angola .
UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution . (v)
UNTAG - United Nations Transitional Assistance Group .
0 The term South African Defence Force (SADF) has been used in this study as this was the name by which it was known during the period under review . The name was however changed to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994. SUMMARY
In January 1981 , the Reagan administration entered office . Its dominant trend of thinking focussed on Angola - not Namibia - as the Southern African issue that demanded urgent attention .
It was against this background that the concept of 'linkage' was introduced . This elevated the question of Cuban forces in Angola to the centre stage of negotiations . This question , the removal of Cuban forces in Angola , became the pretext for preventing the implementation of UNSCR 435 , 1978 .The destiny of Namibia was caught up in a powerful legacy of East - West conflict .
However , as early as March 1986 , the Soviet Union , under Mikhail Gorbachev , pronounced its readiness in finding a political solution to the Angolan conflict as part of a broader policy decision to seek negotiated solutions to all regional conflicts .The Soviet Union came to regard its involvement in distant regional conflicts as an unnecessary expensive luxury , in that they fuelled the arms race and deprived it of access to Western investment and technology . A window of opportunity for the settlement of Southern Africa 's problems was opened up by Gorbachev 's perestirofika. The Reagan administration took full advantage of this glorious development , since it wanted to wrap up the Namibia - Angola question before its time ran out . This was coupled with a desire to prove that 'linkage' had been a success .
The Angolan war was unwinnable . No one was winning on the ground . Therefore , everyone wanted to win at the table . Each side had good reasons for wanting to see the war ended , but no one was prepared to admit it . Eight months of almost continuous negotiations between Angola Cuba and South Africa , with the United States acting as a mediator , on a regional peace settlement involving Namibian independence , culminated in the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on 22 December 1988. This finally established April 1, 1989 as the date of . starting the implementation of UN security council Resolution 435 of 1978 , involving a transitional phase leading to full independence of Namibia . CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The year 1988 marked a turning point in the history of Namibia . Nearly 28 years after the United Nations declared its occupation of Namibia illegal , South Africa finally ended its by-then-interminable delaying and accepted that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 , 1978 , be implemented . 1 )
At the same time , agreement for the simultaneous withdrawal of SADF and Cuban troops from Angola was entrenched . This ended a period of five years which was characterised by heavy SADF incursions into Angola and support for UNITA . US support for UNITA from 1986 onward , including the supply of strategically important weapons such as the stinger ground to air missiles and mercenaries , harassed SWAPO and confronted the Angolan army . 2)
Although many studies on the Namibian independence dispute have been made , there has been no concerted effort to single out and concentrate on the factors that influenced the US to embark on mediation , and the belligerent powers to concede to this initiative . This work addresses itself to that issue . However the details of the behind - the - scenes- diplomacy and the successive meetings at which the final agreement was hammered out is not a subject of this study .
According to Smith , S : Namibia : A violation of trust , Namibia is a small nation that was plucked from the shadows of history by calamitous fate . 3) If this is so , we would have to say that since 1990 , when it won its independence , the country was cast back into shadows again , while fate has moved on to pull other small nations , each is its turn , briefly into the limelight : Bosnia Burundi , Rwanda , Somalia , Democratic Republic of Congo and others . This formulation risks confusing history - what happened and what it means - with the constant attention of the media . It was not fate that brought Namibia out of the shadows of history , but the Namibians ' own obdurate refusal to remain there - their hundred year resistance to colonial rule . It was the Namibians themselves who took the bull by the horns and forced their case onto the agenda of world history .
It was partly in a bid to honour this , the Namibians' liberation struggle , that the research presented in this work was undertaken . There is a dearth for serious accounts of the Namibia 's liberation struggle . The history of Namibia's liberation struggle has been particularly prone to either demonisation or canonisation . There is, then, a need for a more illuminating history of the Namibian struggle to be written , one that takes seriously the grim nature of all the factors at play , while , nonetheless , surveying realistically the costs of the struggle , hence this work .
At independence many , perhaps most Namibians wanted to forget the war and its costs . Santyana ' s dictum that those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it is valid , however , forgetting the real history of the struggle also means forgetting the voices of those who lost out in the struggle's inner contradictions and conflicts . This , then , was one major reason for undertaking this study , not to write a definite history of the Namibian struggle , but to help place the history of the Namibian struggle , in its complexity , back on the historical agenda , to help it from slipping back into the shadows .
Analysts who are sympathetic to one side or the other have held up the agreements as evidence of the victory of one of the sides in the fierce and sustained battles that occured in the second part of 1987 and early 1988 in Angola , many of them around the strategic South East town of Cuito Cuanavale . However , some of the issues about the actual outcome of the 1986 - 1988 campaigns around Cuito Cuanavale were costly to both sides and no doubt prompted reassessments of whether those costs in human, military , and financial terms could be justified .4) In particular it was during this bout of intense fighting that Angola , Cuba , and the USSR first made concessions about linkage and indicated a willingness , in January 1988 , to consider total Cuban troop withdrawal from the whole of Angola rather than the phased withdrawal from Southern Angola that had been their earlier positions . 5) The point had been reached where the elimination of the threat posed to the MPLA government by UNITA was possible by military means , but not so long as the SADF was prepared to intervene . At the same time , South Africa ' s containment of the struggle in Namibia could be seriously threatened in the east along the Caprivi and Kavango borders , unless the RSA continued to step in to back UNITA , and in the west by the Cuban \ Angolan buildup to the north of Ovamboland. South Africa 's ability to contain the struggle in Namibia while at the same time localising the counterinsurgency was brought into question by mutinies within SWATF of several hundred black troops apparently not wishing to be cannon fodder in Angola . 6)
In conducting this research , a wide variety of sources were consulted , inter alia , journals , articles , newspapers , books , hansards , microfiches and microfilms . They provided useful insight and shed some light in the subject in question .
C . Crocker : Hi! h Noon in Southern Africa : Makin eace in a rou h neighborhood, argues that the linkage formula which was conceived by the Reagan administration in March 1981 became a linchpin that made progress in the Namibian dispute possible . This formula linked the Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola . It further holds that the formula gave the US a far better chance to nail Pretoria down to a categorical commitment to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 . The formula is alleged to have offered a major , visible , and strategic quid pro quo for agreeing to implement the Namibian decolonisation plan , and undermined already hollow rationale behind Moscow ' s heavily militarised African diplomacy , and sustained Soviet - Cuban relations . It also pronounces Chester Crocker , US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs , as the man who mattered most in the resolution of the dispute . 7) This analysis falls short of recognising important contributions made by other players in the conflict .
These sentiments are also shared by P . Stiff : Nine days of war ; W . Steenkamp : South Africa ' s border war 1966 - 1989 and A .W Signham : Namibian independence : A global responsibility .
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , argues that the new balance of power between the US and the fast - retreating Soviet Union , the military stalemate between the South Africans and the Cubans in Southern Angola , and the shifting equation of domestic politics inside South Africa itself , were crucial factors , indeed preponderant , in finally bringing the US into brokering a resolution of the conflict . For the belligerents , mounting a
challenge by force of arms proved to be a two - edged sword . 8) This work subscribes to this view .
This point of view is reiterated by the following works, D. Herbstein : The devils are among us ; N. Hunke : Namibia the strength of the powerless and R . Green : Namibia the last colony .
It sketches the internal dynamics of political and other forces at work inside Namibia and Angola as well as external developments and the manner in which they interacted with the global politics of the cold war and its eventual termination .
The structure of this work , then , is that Chapter 1 , presents a historical overview of Namibia ' s struggle for independence , with principal emphasis on the internalisation of the dispute . It also attempts to portray how the 1981 Reagan Administration ' s strategy to link Namibian and Angolan conflicts represented both continuity and change in US policy towards Southern Africa . Chapter 2 addresses itself to issues , both domestic and external , that compelled the Reagan Administration to pursue the mediation route with regard to the Namibian dispute .
Chapter 3 seeks to examine the manners in which the calculations of both international and regional actors imposed themselves on this basic conflict of paths and brought some kind of compromise whose immediate political form was articulated in the UN Plan that was ultimately implemented . It also documents how South Africa ' s conception altered from an " internal solution " of a form of an ' independence ' orchestrated by South Africa itself, to a calculatedly ambiguous position toward an independence which involved SWAPO . It also brings conditions in which the actors hammered their swords into ploughshares , and moved forward to Namibian independence to light .
SWAPO , a Namibian Liberation movement that played a distinctive role in driving the struggle forward , was excluded from the US mediated talks for the settlement of the Namibian dispute . 9) This anomally is explored in Chapter 4 .
To explain the outcomes of the US mediated talks , Chapter 5 traces what went on in the transition leading to the implementation of a UN Plan for the Namibian independence .
In the interest of clarity , the following concepts need a short explanation : South Africa , Pretoria , Republic of South Africa , and government refer to the South African government . Reagan , Reagan administration , administration , United States and Washington refer to the United States of America government . South West , South West Africa , and territory refer to Namibia . International actors refer to the United States , Soviet Union and Cuba . Regional actors refer to Angola ( MPLA ) , South Africa and SWAPO . Contact Group refers to the United States , France , the Federal Republic of Germany , Canada and the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland . Most certainly , it is not this work ' s intention to give comfort to those who wish Namibia ill , or who seek to detract from the achievements of its struggle . This , no doubt cannot be the primary result of attempting to tell the story as honestly and accurately as possible .
In any case , this work makes no claim to be distinctive , but should be regarded as an invitation to others , least Namibian scholars , and sustaining a debate about the country ' s past - whether in the process , they find themselves confirming anything written here , or contradicting it . One index of how liberated Namibia has actually become will be the extent to which such debate continues .
1.1 NOTES
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p . 58.
C . Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rotAgL_ieilaorhood I , p . 381.
S. Smith : Namibia : A violation of trust , p . 22.
A . Du Pisani : SWA / Namibia : The politics of continuity and
change , p . 13.
R . Dreyer Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics of
decolonization 1945 -90 , p .57.
Ibid .
C . Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p . 383.
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia ,p . 59.
R . Dreyer - : Namibia and Southern Africa: Re ional d amics of
decolonization 1945 -90 , p .57. 10
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The signing of the agreement for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian independence was. indeed a historic occasion . For it marked the beginning of the end of South Africa's 73 year administration of the territory . 1 )
This dated back to the First World War when , at the request of the British government ,General Louis Botha sent South African forces to occupy the harbours and capital of German South West Africa , taking Windhoek in May 1915 . First there was a military administration , followed by the 1920 League of Nations mandate. 2)
With the Second World War over and the scourge of Hitler and the gas chambers banished from Europe , the conquering powers lost little time in launching a new supranational organization , the United Nations . For the people of Namibia , however , it soon became apparent that the great betrayal at Versailles , far from being remedied , was to be compounded . General J . C. Smuts , the South African Prime Minister , encouraged by the British Labour government of Clement Attlee , set about incorporating South West Africa as a fifth province of the Union of South Africa . General Smuts argued that the United Nations had not inherited the League 's mandated territories and therefore South Africa should not be answerable to the new body 's Trusteeship Committee . 3)
On 4 December 1946 the General Assembly voted to reject incorporation , recommending instead that South West Africa be placed under the Trusteeship Committee , which had replaced the Permanent Mandate 's Committee of the League . 4)
This was followed by a long and acrimonious dispute with the United Nations which tried every manoevre it could to pry South West Africa out of South Africa 's hands and to give control of the territory to SWAPO . The South West Africans continuously and persistently took their plight to the United Nations , and built up a global consensus for their liberation struggle . 5) 11
In 1965 SWAPO had taken up the offer of money made by the OAU and its Liberation Committee . That offer carried with it the condition that SWAPO be involved in the armed struggle . The commitment to that struggle was made in 1966 . At the time the South West Africans were frustrated by their lack of success at the UN and the International Court of Justice . 6)
On May 19 , 1967 , the UN accepted a resolution which proclaimed that in accordance with the desires of the people , the territory henceforth would be known as Namibia . Since then the name has been used by the UN , the OAU and other international organizations . In early 1974 , the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution resulting from South Africa ' s continued refusal to withdraw from Namibia and to allow Namibians their right to self - determination and independence , recognising SWAPO as the sole arid authentic representative of the people of Namibia . 7) This resolution which was a shock for South Africa was easily adopted in the General Assembly , where the vast majority of its members , particularly the Afro - Asian and communist blocs , were supportive of SWAPO . This decision was based on the reality that SWAPO had at the time become the most effective and articulate Namibian movement , coupled with a need for a united stand to oppose South Africa ' s occupation of Namibia .
In 1975 , the South African government responded to both local and international pressures for her to relinquish Namibia , by unilaterally organising the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference based on the 1964 Odendaal Commission ' s recommendations for internal settlement of the. Namibian dispute . Contrary to South Africa ' s hope that the Turnhalle plan would satisfy demands for Namibian self - determination , the overwhelming international and internal response was hostile . 9) 12
After Angola attained independence from Portugal in 1975 , the number of clashes between SWAPO and the South Africans increased , and the way opened up for larger numbers of Namibians to escape into exile in Angola and thence to Zambia and beyond from which to infiltrate fighters back across the Angolan border . Like other national liberation movements , SWAPO sought to over - extend and wear down its enemy by sustaining a protracted struggle , using hit - and - run guerrilla tactics . 10) SWAPO shifted from being a party of protest , addressing the UN as well as its immediate overlords , to being people bringing about their own liberation .
In 1977 , the five Western members of the UN Security Council , Canada , France , Federal Republic of Germany , the United Kingdom and the United States , converted themselves into the so - called ' Contact Group ' for the specific purpose of negotiating Namibia ' s independence with Pretoria and the Front Line States . 11) The resulting Western settlement proposal of April 1978 , endorsed as UN Security Council Resolution 435 in September 1978 , was an impressive and ambitious piece of diplomatic work . It sought to convert the low - level bush war mounted by SWAPO in 1966 into a peaceful act of self - determination leading to statehood for Namibia . Its original motivation was to resolve the dilemma of having to support or veto the growing international pressure for UN sanctions against South Africa while at the same time continuing to put pressure on the RSA to go along with an internationally acceptable , rather than an internal , solution in Namibia . 12) The United States led the pack in promoting the group as a friend of the UN that would , overtime , make South Africa accept and implement the outstanding UN resolutions on Namibia . 13) 13
With Ronald Reagan ' s election and the United States policy of constructive engagement toward South Africa , any real threat of sanctions was removed from 1981 onward , giving the RSA more confidence that carrying out its strategy toward Namibia and the rest of Southern Africa according to its own internal political logic and demands would not bring punishments from the West . 14)
The growing insistence on imposing linkage between regional conflicts and global issues , making the Namibian settlement dependent on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola , marked the departure in United States policy in the 1980s. This was in line with mounting US right-wing clamour for an aggressive policy of standing up to, and even rolling back, perceived Soviet expansion in the Third World . However , the other four members of the Contact Group never subscribed to the notion of linkage , and disagreement over this issue led first to the French withdrawing and then to the virtual end in 1982 of the group as an effective coalition . 15)
From then on , the initiative passed to the United States acting on its own . The Reagan administration continued to carry on parallel negotiations on Namibia with Angola and the RSA about the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola . 16 )
The United States ' failure to get the Cubans out of Angola through negotiations was followed by a more aggressive policy of resuming direct military aid to UNITA in 1986 , for the first time in ten years after the repeal of the Clark amendment , by which Congress had prohibited any further clandstine or other involvement in Angola after the 1976 adventure . in the hope of forcing the Angolan government to negotiate with UNITA and accept linkage . Thus the scene was set for years of escalating conflict with South Africa sending armed forces into Angola to wipe out SWAPO bases and to assist UNITA against MPLA‘ - Cuban troops . At the same time the Soviet Union poured in additional military supplies to assist the Cuban and MPLA forces . 17) 14
For almost ten years continuing deadlock seemed to be the likeliest outcome , and UN Security Council 435 , 1978 , stood unimplemented , almost solely as a result of the recalcitrance of the RSA inspite of protracted negotiations . 18) 15
2.1 NOTES
The Citizen, 4 April 1989 , p .6.
Ibid .
Ibid .
D . Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p . 1.
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p . 20.
Ibid.
D . L . Sparks and D. Green : Namibia : The nation after
independence , p . 38.
B . Wood (ed.) : Namibia 1884 - 1984: Readings on Namibia's
history and society , p . 9.
P . Stiff : Nine days of war : Namibia-before during and
after , p . 28 .
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p . 20.
C . Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p . 39 .
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p . 51.
B . Wood (ed.) : Namibia 1884 - 1984 : Readings on Namibia's
history and society , p . 9.
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia p . 52. 16
C . Leys and Johnson S. Saul : Namibia ' s Liberation struggle :
The two-edged sword , p . 16.
L . Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p . 52 .
Ibid .
D . Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p . 177. 17
CHAPTER 3
WHY THE US TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO MEDIATE THE ANGOLA - NAMIBIA CONFLICT IN 1988
3.1 INTRODUCTION
On December 22 , 1988 the international protocol bringing about Namibia 's independence was signed at the UN headquarters in New York . A new initiative to open the way to the independence of Namibia was agreed upon . 1 )
A clear link was established between various steps envisaged in the Namibian settlement plan and an agreement for the redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops . This was a remarkable achievement , particularly in view of the prior rejection of linkage . A peace settlement that had evaded negotiators and the international community for almost four decades , was
achieved . 2)
This chapter seeks to examine the factors that made the Reagan administration to in 1988 , pursue the mediation route in respect of the Southern Africa conflict , thereby ending the Namibian dispute . Factors that militated against the continuation of the United State 's policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa are many and varied . However , this work neither claims to have covered all the contributory factors , nor that those that this work has reflected upon weigh heavier than the rest . It further holds that these are just but a few in the sea of factors . 18
3.2 . END OF REAGAN 'S PRESIDENCY
The Reagan Administration wanted to wrap up the Namibia - Angola conflict before its time ran out . 3)
In view of the complexity of the United States' political , bureucratic and government agencies all competing for influence , it was difficult to predict what course events would take after the 1988 presidential elections . 4)
However , it was assumed that the new administration would appoint someone else in Chester Crocker 's place , and this would have a considerable impact on the handling of the Southern Africa question . Particularly if constructive engagement and linkage were to be changed . 5) With this in mind , taking positive steps towards the resolution of Southern Africa crisis was seen as the most appropriate thing to do . Should such steps take off the ground , it was assumed that any administration that would take office in Washington would welcome diplomatic initiatives destined to secure the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola , legitimise official relations with a country whose foreign exchange earnings already depended largely on the operations of American oil companies , and end the embarrassing Namibian tragedy . 6)
The Reagan Administration was not only eager to ensure a diplomatic success before the end of its term of office , it also wanted to have something to show for its eight year policy of constructive engagement , in part to justify the continuation of its approach as the best way to bring about a negotiated end to the conflict in Southern Africa . 7)
3.3 . SOVIET UNION - UNITED STATES RELATIONS
The East - West armed stand off in Southern Africa took an unexpected turn when Mikhail Gorbachev , took over as leader of the Soviet Union and introduced his new policies of openness and reconstruction . 8) 19
The Soviet Union regarded its involvement in regional conflicts as an unnecessary and potentially dangerous irritant in its relations with the United States and its allies . The initiatives for improved relations between the United States and Soviet Union came largely from the latter , in response to domestic political circumstances . 9) Given increasing problems at home and within the Eastern Bloc , the Soviet Union was seeking to reduce its Third World commitments , in the knowledge that it could no longer afford to underwrite peripheral socialist economies indefinitely , nor support liberation movements across the globe . 10)
The extent to which the continuation of the Soviet Unio n co - operation depended upon Gorbachev 's political survival probably concerned those who hoped for a resolution of the Southern Africa conflict . Should he (Gorbachev ) fall victim to the reaction of party and state officials whose careers he appeared to threaten , then the world might face a return to the international adventurism favoured by his predecessors . The window of opportunity in Southern Africa , opened by Gorbachev 's pexestromAke. , threatened to close at a short notice . 11 )
This new Soviet foreign policy orientation which started to emerge at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1986 , undoubtedly contributed a lot in weakening the positions of those who argued that the independence of Namibia under a SWAPO led government would inevitably lead to further Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa . As the costs and risks of further escalating the war and the impossibility of either side finding any major breakthrough in military terms in the short run became more apparent , the new international climate was one that fostered genuine negotiations . 12) 20
Constructive cooperation between the superpowers , aimed at defusing global and regional centres of conflict , in the last part of the Reagan presidency , became , inter alia , a key which unlocked the Namibian independence process . The Reagan Administration took full advantage of Moscow 's increasing openness . 13)
3.4. SANCTIONS FRACAS.
Constructive engagement generated a growing backlash in the United States Congress , which came close to reversing the administration 's policies . 14)
The second term of the Reagan Administration faced mounting Congressional attacks over its policies towards Southern Africa . The most significant indication that the administration 's constructive engagement policy was in trouble , was the turn - around of Republican legislators who apparently got swept up in the wave of anti - South Africa activity . 15)
Economic sanctions proposal which had been rejected by a liberal , Democratic administration , 1979 - 1980 , quickly became the position of Republicans who seeked to score political points . President Reagan who was opposed to sanctions , tried to preempt calls for tough economic measures against Pretoria by issuing an executive order in September 1985 outlawing the action . This failed to subside the mounting pressure for sanctions within Congress which overruled the presidential veto to pass the comprehensive Anti - Apartheid Act in October 1986. 16)
The Reagan Administration was faced with a situation in which it had to stay with constructive engagement or acknowledge that its policy had failed and that it was time for sanctions . Washington did not want to be seen to have caved in to Congressional pressures . Should it give in to pressures , the Administration would 21
undercut the position of its most important allies in places like London , Bonn and Tokyo , where governments agreed completely with the Administration on the need to remain engaged . 17) By standing tall , President Ronald Reagan would be revered worldwide as a tough and principled leader who did not abandon his convictions to carry political favour at home . 18)
However , the Administration 's credibility in Congress with regard to its Southern Africa policy was eroded . It was not entirely clear, at the time , how Congressional frustration with regard to Reaga's policy in Southern Africa would be manifested . However , there was little doubt that it would be expressed in new initiatives . 19)
The decision to mediate , strongly backed by President Reagan , was probably taken to counterbalance the pressure exerted on Pretoria by Congress through new sanctions legislation . 20)
3.5. ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS.
The conflict in Southern Africa had the potential of disrupting raw material supplies to the West. Following the disruption of supplies , prices were likely to sky - rocket and physical shortages to occur with serious economic and political effects in the West . 21)
As it seemed likely that Southern Africa 's future held a period of prolonged and violent struggle , the economic repercussions for the United States could be quite damaging . In an environment of increasing violence , the economic costs to the United States would begin to mount . American owned property would certainly be vulnerable to attack . 22) 22
The Reagan Administration shared with South Africa the responsibility for the continued subjugation of Namibia . The continued American economic involvement in Southern Africa was seen to be prolonging the arrogance of the South African government . Against this backdrop , future governments of Southern Africa were likely to be prejudiced against Western business participating in the regional economy . 23) American investments and loans would be endangered , although even a radical government might be restrained by hopes of doing business with the West in the future . 24)
Washington came to realise that increased cooperation with the majority - ruled states in Southern Africa , and particularly the energy producers , would probably bring some economic advantage to the United States , hence mediation . 25)
The Reagan Administration held that a war ravaged Southern Africa economy would scarcely be expected to yield normal profit and regional trading patterns would be disrupted . Western business would, therefore , welcome the end of hostilities , since this would open Angola 's vast potential for commercial exploitation as the country rebuilds its war ravaged economy . 26)
3.6. DESTABILIZATION.
The adoption of a far - reaching policy of regional destabilisation by the South African government had impact on the United States' Southern Africa policy . 27)
Destabilisation , which at first seemed to have the tacit support of the Reagan Administration , eventually created a rift between the United States and South Africa . The State Department 's Africa team , headed by Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker , recognised that escalating regional conflict , the principal precipitant of which was South African support for 23
anti - government insurgents in Angola , Mozambique , and to a lesser extent , Zimbabwe , was a threat to Western interests . 28) A process that increasingly placed the United States on the side of South Africa 's neighbours was began . Washington 's officials gradually abandoned their earlier belief that the principal causes of regional instability were Moscow , Havana , and their radical allies in the region . 29)
By 1987 , as a result , it was no longer possible to speak credibly of a alliance between the United States and South Africa . The United States did not want to share with South Africa the responsibility for continued destibilisation of Southern Africa . 30)
3.7. ANTI - APARTHEID ACTIVISM.
As from 1984 the South African policy of apartheid burst upon the American public as a topic of mainstream media interest and public debates . The American air became charged with the electric currents of RSA 's racial politics . 31)
American politicians , officials , pundits , businessmen , journalists , church leaders , and trade unionists found themselves dealing with something white hot . The South African government 's reform moves previously considered beyond reach were being dismissed as cosmetic . The Reagan Administration found itself in the midst of a debate over whether constructive engagement or an alternative policy of sanctions was the right way to end apartheid . 32)
As South Africa 's black townships descended into a swamp of mass protest , police repression , and violence , the Reagan Administration soon found that there was muck on its shoes . Put there by the media and Washington 's political opponents , the muck was even harder to remove because the Administration had a policy toward Southern Africa , and had blessed it with a name ,
"constructive engagement ." 33) Powerful voices within South Africa were opposed to constructive engagement and the Namibia - Angola settlement process from the outset . 34) Washington was identified as a threat towards the peaceful resolution of the South Africa and Southern Africa questions . To them , the United States represented domination , and names like Chester Crocker symbolised continuity with the Kissinger era which first came up with the linkage question . 35)
Apartheid 's opponents tried every trick in the book to undercut the Administration , feeding information to hostile United States Senators who sought to block Chester Crocker 's diplomatic efforts , sending secret emissaries to Washington to try the back door way to the president and other senior players . Seeking to discredit and exclude Chester Crocker from top level meetings with Pretoria 's senior officials . They hired lobbyists of their own to promote their policy preferences with favoured American interlocutors and passed self - serving information to Washington through intelligence liaison channels . 36)
In practice , these people had their own diplomatic service with their own message , code language , channels , delivery system , and a network of friends scattered amongst Conservative circles in and around Washington and other Western capitals . 37)
In the United States , the Administration had the task of responding to a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Africa while fighting of a challenge from domestic opponents . Battles over United States - South Africa policy that began in 1984 continued in one form or another for some 34 months . 38) The Reagan Administration 's ardent defense of its Southern Africa policy , was interpreted as defending apartheid . Consequently , Washington 's prime goal became an uphill battle to get out of the corner into which it had been painted . 39) 25
The most honourable thing for the United States to do became disengagement from Southern Africa . It was against this backdrop that Washington took a conscious decision to work towards ending the South African impasse . 40)
3.8 CONCLUSION.
The decision by Washington to mediate was not an easy one . In fact , it was the culmination of a variety of factors at play .
The gradual transformation of superpower relations , including an agreement to explore the resolution of regional conflicts , in no small measure was of great significance . 41) The relevance of the United States presidential elections to an overall settlement of
Angola - Namibia conflict cannot be over - emphasized . 42)
In a nutshell , both international and internal pressures weighed heavily on the Reagan Administration , to such an extent that the resolution of the Southern Africa impasse became the best possible thing to do under the circumstances . 26
3.9 NOTES
Department of Foreign Affairs : Namibia independence and
Cuban troop withdrawal , p. 1.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 410.
Ibid.
Africa Institute Bulletin vol.28 , no.6 , 1988: Angola / Namibia
maneuvering for advantage , p. 1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
K. 0 ' Neill and B. Munslow : Endin the cold war in Southern
Africa , p. 90.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 37.
Africa Institute Bulletin vol.28 , no.6 , 1988: Angola / Namibia
maneuvering for advant e , p. 2.
K. 0 ' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in
Southern Africa , p. 2.
Africa Institute Bulletin vol.28 , no.6 , 1988: Angola / Namibia
maneuvering for advantage , p. 2.
27
D. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics of
decolonization 1945-90 , p . 57.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Maki eace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 184.
L. Cliffe : The transition to inde endence in Namibia , p. 63.
C. Leys and Johnson S. Saul : Namibia 's Liberation struggle :
The two-edged sword , p. 80.
Ibid , p. 81.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 256.
K. Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in
Southern Africa , p. 91.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 272.
Ibid.
K. 0 ' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in
Southern Africa , p. 91.
Ibid.
J. S. Whitaker : Africa and the United States , p. 56.
Ibid.
Ibid.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 272. 28
J. S. Whitaker : Africa and the United States , p. 56.
Africa Institute Bulletin vol.28 , no.6 , 1988: Angola / Namibia
maneuvering for advantage , p. 2.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia , p. 174.
Ibid.
Ibid.
C. Leys and Johnson S. Saul : Namibia 's Liberation struggle :
The two-edged sword , p. 18.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 265.
Ibid , p. 257.
Ibid.
Ibid , p. 260.
Ibid . p. 265.
Ibid , p. 280.
Ibid.
Ibid , p. 272.
D. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics of
decolonization 1945-90 p. 184.
K. 0 ' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in
Southern Africa , p. 93. 29
CHAPTER 4
WHY THE ACTORS IN THE ANGOLA - NAMIBIA CONFLICT ACCEDED TO US MEDIATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to shed some light on the main factors that made the major players in the Namibia - Angolan conflict concede to the United States mediation initiative in 1988 . The major players referred to here were the Soviet Union , Cuba , Angola and South Africa .
However , this work does not claim to have covered all the factors at play that had a bearing in this regard , since , no doubt , they are many and varied .
No single factor can explain why the different role players acceded to the United States endgame diplomacy in Southern Africa . Each side had good reasons for wanting to see the war ended , but no one was prepared to admit it . Tacitly , the parties had long calculated their negotiating moves in terms of trends in the Angolan war. 1 )
Angolan , Cuban and Soviet illusions of a military victory over UNITA were destroyed . This , in a way , hastened the regional settlement , since outright victory was beyond anyone 's reach . The existence of a rough and relatively stable balance of military power in the region became a linchpin . 2)
Each side came to realize that its position or that of its Angolan ally was strong enough to run the risk of settlement , but could not become strong enough to impose terms on the other side . 3) 30
The Namibia - Angola conflicts imposed a heavy financial burden on all of the parties involved . Had the parties persisted on pursuing coercive options , their burdens would have mounted considerably. 4)
In 1987 - 88 , the season for peace - making arrived during the apogee of escalatory folly . The moment of maximum risk became converted into a magic moment of opportunity . The American leverage reached its peak when soldiers and politicians alike grasped this powerful logic of strategy . 5)
At last , the planets came into alignment .
4.2 THE SOVIET UNION
The emergence of a Soviet government interested in regaining international respectability and lessening the burdens on its own resources by seeking negotiated solutions to regional conflicts around the globe , turned out to be a key , inter alia , which unlocked the Namibian independence process . 6)
By late 1987 and early 1988 , Soviet diplomatic , academic , and media elites were increasingly frank in distancing themselves from policy commitments driven by the Communist Party and the armed forces . Soviet realists came to realize that Angola was an unmitigated military disaster , and that no amount of hardware and advisers could bring victory to the MPLA 7)
On Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze 's scale of priorities , improved United States - Soviet relations came first . This depended in part on removing the major tensions provoked by ideological confrontation and military rivalry in the Third World . The trick , from the Soviet standpoint , was to convert one strategy into another without any loss of superpower status . A strategy based on unilateral ideological goals and military means needed to be replaced by one stressing universal goals , and political - diplomatic means 8) . 31
The role of a responsible UN Security Council permanent member and world wide peace - maker alongside Washington presented a more modern and acceptable form of superpowerdom . Moscow therefore , wanted to exchange its weak hand as an imperial military monster , for one which was more compatible with its real resources and its domestic imperatives . 9)
The Soviets ' dilemma , however , was how to reduce their commitment in the region in accordance with the new dictates of national economic policy and global strategy without losing face in a solution where their clients would inevitably have to make substantial concessions . 10)
There is considerable evidence to the effect that Soviet analysts and policy makers came to realize that a continuation of past policy in Southern Africa was a recipe for a prolonged and increasingly costly entanglement . Soviet Union entanglement in the region was damaging to Moscow ' s relations with the West , and to Moscow ' s international prestige . That is , gains made through Moscow 's military support of revolutionary movements and governments carried substantial costs in the central relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States . 11 )
Soviets Africanists became increasingly aware of the reality that Southern Africa not only had a low revolutionary potential , but that newly independent Third World countries would increasingly turn to the West , with all ensuing political consequences .
This trend could be reversed if only the Soviet Union would give large scale aid equalling subsidizing the entire economies of such countries . The Soviets came to terms with the hard reality that their policies had not produced what the Third World wanted , namely , economic development . 12) 32
Having been heavily involved in the region , the Soviet Union learnt that inflicting a total military defeat on the South African and UNITA forces was not possible . More so it witnessed a continuing economic and political deterioration back home. Despite the dim prospects , Moscow was not willing to walk away from the Angolan conflict since doing so would not only have severely damaged Soviet prestige , but eliminated Moscow from its principal
position affording it a role in the politics of Southern Africa . 13)
Moscow anticipated a more favourable compromise settlement in Southern Africa , in which a great deal would be salvaged , and a basis laid for opening up new possibilities for the Soviet Union in Southern Africa , South Africa , and Africa as a whole . In the light of this , Moscow became determined to pursue a political settlement , and in mid - 1987 urged the Angolans to accept linkage between the independence of Namibia and the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola , which had been a stumbling block to
meaningful negotiations since 1981. 14)
Moscow ' s realization that no progress would be made unless the Reagan administration ' s demand that Namibian independence be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops , which both Angola and Cuba had been obstinately resisting , triggered Russia ' s active participation in the settlement initiative . 15) Gorbachev wanted to ensure a settlement that did not project the image of defeat for Moscow or its Cuban ally . Supporting the American mediated negotiations thus presented a means of extricating itself from the
Angolan war without having to abandon its allies . 16)
Economic difficulties at home and the growing cost of defending weak and embattled allies forced the Soviet Union to abandon its expansive design in Southern Africa , and instead sought ways to reduce its commitments . Soviet support to Cuba and Angola was not a free gift , but was paid back in hard currency . When 33
Angola 's supply of hard currency to the Soviet Union , in an exchange for support diminished following the drop in world oil prices , Soviet involvement in Angola began to appear less an asset than a liability . The Angolan war then put a drain on Soviet resources . 17)
Moscow 's determination to use the country 's resources to resurrect its own economy , moved the Soviet towards foreign policy moderation in Southern Africa . 18) Its new - found belief that Soviet security might in fact be reduced by measures that make its competitors insecure , its conviction that the war in Angola could not be won at acceptable economic, military and diplomatic costs , its realization that change in South Africa would be slow and difficult , and that violent revolution in South Africa might be of limited utility . Its perception of America 's determination under Reagan to link the resolution of the regional conflicts to economic and other concessions to the Soviets , and its admission that Moscow 's existing politics had not produced what the Third World most wanted , made Russia to oblige to US mediation . 19)
The confrontation policy was thrown out of the window since it perpetuated an indefinite , escalating conflict , that wo uld increasingly drain Soviet resources , continue to damage its international prestige , exacerbate sour relations with the United States , hinder Soviet overtures to important moderate states in Africa , and feed back to affect its domestic social , economic and political situation . 20)
4.3. CUBA
Of all the actors upon the Southern Africa regional stage , the Cubans seemed to have had the least gain from a peaceful settlement . Precisely because this would involve having to reabsorb tens of thousands of young men into an economy in which unemployment was rampant . 21) 34
Havana had not yet fulfilled its self - proclaimed missions , to ensure the security , if not legitimacy , of the MPLA government , and to end apartheid in South Africa . Inspite of this , Cuba joined the peace train , and subsequently agreed to stop fighting in
Angola and return home . 22)
Cuba had to respond to , if not welcome , increased superpower cooperation , particularly over settling the Southern Africa conflict . Havana was willing to consider peace initiatives because the superpowers had structured its options that peace , rather than war , added to its international status and opened diplomatic and economic opportunities . Since any settlement in Angola which would appear as a defeat for Cuba , would diminish Cuba 's international' standing , and President Fidel Castro 's political position at home and in Latin America . 23)
Castro and his military were utterly disdainful to Soviet planning . For 12 years the civil war had ebbed and flowed across the vastness of the Angolan landscape . As Dos Santos had stated publicly in a highly conservative estimate in mid - August that , 60 000 lives had been lost and one tenth of the population had become homeless in the war . 24) Yet the MPLA government and its superpower ally , in the Cuban view , had no strategy . Every hill and each village of forty huts was treated by Angolan military planners as a significant target . Soviet planners favoured tactically complex and ponderous ground advances that took FAPLA units hundreds of kilometers away from their rear support bases . Soviet - led FAPLA offensives bore little relations to Angolan conditions . 25)
The Cuban military personnel did not share Soviet assumption about likely enemy counter - moves . The Cubans argued against the 1987 Soviet -Angola battle plan , and played only a minimal role in it . Castro felt that he was a hostage to a poorly led strategic alliance and an inept local regime by joining the diplomacy , he 35
might gain options and greater influence on decisions that affected Cuba . 26)
The whole edifice of Cuban policy was based on the fierce pride of a small state whose leader had a grandiose sense of destiny .
Castro helped to shape the events of 1975 - 76 in Southern Africa . As time passed , he hungered to shape the next phase of regional development . He made a serious bid for a place at the African peace table back in 1984. 27) For Castro , the new global fluidity represented both an opportunity and a potential threat . He never forgot how the superpowers settled the 1967 Cuban missile crisis over his head without reference to his interests . He , therefore , did not want to allow this to happen in Angola , the flagship of Castro 's internationalist policy . Cuba needed a major and visible role to play . 28)
Although the Cubans had achieved little from an ideological point of view , in that they had not resolved the Angolan question , they had limited material reasons for staying on . No vital Cuban interests were at stake in Angola. So , when prodded by the Soviet Union to leave , and asked by the MPLA to go , they had no consuming reason of their own to stay . 29)
For Cuba the halcyon days of generous Russian handouts were gone . In 1975 , it was estimated that the Soviet Union subsidized the Cuban economy to the tune of £ 1.5 million per day . By 1977 , the figure rose to £ 3 million per day . In 1984 , it rose to £ 4 billion a year , with the Soviet Union buying Cuban sugar at inflated prices , and supplying oil at below world marked cost 30) . In December 1987 , the Soviet subsidy was £ 1 billion per year . When the Angolan war put a drain on Soviet resources , as Luanda stopped paying for the Soviet weapons by early 1988 , the Russians , subsequently , reduced their financial support to Cuba . 31) 36
Since then , the cost of the Cuban presence in Angola weighed increasingly heavily on Cuba ' s economy , the development of which was hampered by a loss of export earnings , an over - centralised bureaucracy , the end of five years period of high economic growth , growing economic dependency on the Soviet
Union , and that the country ' s economy depended entirely on sugar , which for health reasons had become as unfavourable as nicotine . Some measure of rapprochement with the United States became economically desirable . 32)
President Fidel Castro who was personally responsible for the Cuban involvement in Angola , and directed the operation in Angola , realized that the Angolan war was unwinable . Rising casualties , in lives and health to Cuban soldiers , incurred in someone else 's far - off unwinable conflict was , in a way, asking for domestic discontent and made the Angolan war an unpopular exercise . However , there was a serious concern in Cuba that the returning troops would bring an AIDS menace back home . 33)
For Cuba , the long stalemate in Angola had become embarrassing following the build - up in early 1988 , a commitment more onerous in percentage terms than the United States engagement in Vietnam at its peak , since the Cuban troops deployed in Angola constituted more than half of Castro ' s overseas military commitments . Having invested their prestige and blood in the inconclusive war , the Cubans came to see it as a quagmire . 34)
Although Cuba was not exhausted , in the sense of having no more energy or resolve to fight , continued war seemed pointless when all that could be seen was over - looming costs in pursuit of a receding goal . Rather than waiting for the end of apartheid as Castro had hoped , Cuba needed to find a way to declare its mission fulfilled with honour . 35) 37
4.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
South Africa was caught between the carrot of renewed contact with , and thereby international legitimacy from, Moscow , and the stick of further disapproval , and perhaps more sanctions from
Washington . 36)
Contrary to the negotiations between the Contact Group and South Africa in 1977 and 1978 , during which Pretoria knew that the West did not intend to impose sanctions ,this time around the question of sanctions against South Africa had already been imposed by Congress in October 1986 , after it had overruled a veto by President Reagan 37) . Though limited , the Congressional sanctions have had the effect of reducing the Republic ' s exports from US $ 2 .5 billion in 1986 to US $ 1 .4 billion a year . The American congress had considered tougher new sanctions bills in March 1988 , and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives adopted the so - called Dellums Sanctions Bill in May 1988 . The bill had crippling effects because it prohibited all imports from South Africa except some strategic minerals , and all
exports to South Africa , save humanitarian assistance . 38)
The capacity of sanctions to force changes in Pretoria ' s policies had become a matter of acrimonious debate . The real argument should turn on the role of sanctions as one pressure point among several . The effects of sanctions , and the threat of more of them , were increasingly felt inside South Africa despite official denials . According to an estimate by the South African Trust Bank in 1989 , sanctions and disinvestment since 1985 had led to a cumulative foreign exchange loss of R40 000 million , or
approximately US $ 15 210 million . 39)
Sanctions have also worked to stop Rossing s customs , among others British and Japanese utility companies , renewing their contracts . Anti - Apartheid lobbyists have engineered embarrassing 38
scenes at RTZ and other annual general meetings in London , as well as in Japan , Holland and the USA . 40) As a result the mine has been reduced to 80 percent capacity . The imposition of sanctions aggravated a severe economic crisis in South Africa . By agreeing to the US mediated settlement , South Africa seized a great opportunity , since the Reagan administration could not fend off further sanctions which were becoming a serious issue in the debates leading to the US Presidential elections . 41)
The arms embargo on South Africa had far reaching economic and military implications . Despite efforts to get around the embargo , South Africa 's relative military capability declined dramatically in terms of air superiority . No better example could be found than the failure to replace the obsolete French fighter planes . 42) The arms boycott left the air force and its expert pilots stranded in a time capsule . The provision of spares for highly sophisticated equipment in the SADF became a serious problem . South Africa 's most reliable armaments were obsolescent . More modern armaments available to South Africa 's enemies contributed towards this process of obsolescence . By the mid - 1980 's South Africa had lost its ability to overfly Angola with impunity . 43)
Moreover , South Africa was economically beleaguered , beset by a plunging rand and a raging inflation . Even without sanctions , the war and the occupation of Namibia were a heavy burden for Pretoria . In late 1988 , South Africa was servicing a total foreign debt of US $ 22 billion , with more than US $ 3 billion due for repayment in 1990 / 91 . 44) Military spending became more of a burden , as the overall South African economy suffered due to changes in the world economy . The 1987/88 national defence budget of R 7.4 billion , was three and a half times the level of the first year of the decade . South Africa 's military costs of the operation in Namibia and Angola , in addition to the normal costs of running Namibia and aiding UNITA , in 1988 , stood at US $ billion a day . 45) 39
South Africa built up its manpower and weaponry to a level that soon made Namibia the most militarized country on earth , 100 000 Security Force personnel to fewer than 1 500 000 people . In 1973 , when the army took over border security from the police , there were but four security force bases in Ovamboland . A decade later there were 80 . The permanent force underwent a sizable expansion , in numbers and quality of training , but most were conscripts . Full conscription had been introduced in 1967 , with nine months national service for every white male school - leaver , including Namibians . 46) It was extended to twelve months in 1972 , and to two years in 1977 , by which time Namibia began to weigh heavily on the emotions of white parents. After National Service , recruits automatically became members of the Citizen Force , to be called up annually for camps ranging from one to three months . These military call ups were a bone of contention , interfering with studies and work . 47)
Pressing domestic political factors impelled South Africa 's decision - makers to adjust to global and regional changes . The question of South Africa 's role in the Angolan war was cause for concern in certain quarters of white opinion . Doubts expressed by influential Afrikaners about the importance of the war were shared by a growing band of conscientious objectors . Mostly their reasons were religious , though others , who were not against soldiering as such , refused to fight what they regarded as an unjust war . Thousands of White young men left the country to avoid annual camps .What had been disconcerting to the government was the number of Afrikaners refusing to fight . One of them , Ettiene Marais , had been an army 'captain in Angola . The loss of some sixty white troops since September 1987 was hardly a crisis , but neither was it a negligible matter for a conscript and reservist - based defence force , especially when the stakes were not clear . It was one thing for the SADF to defend against SWAPO attacks in Namibia , but it was much harder to explain why White boys should die to defend UNITA ' s Jonas Savimbi . 49) In May 1988 , the South Africans were tempted into an ill - fated effort to score a knock - out blow against the MPLA at Cuito Cuanavale . The Angolans stood firm . When the SADF ordered in fresh Namibian troops from 101 and 102 atallions , hundreds mutinied , claiming that they were being used as the White man 's cannon fodder . 50) Once White national service mechanized units were sent in , casualty figures could no longer be hidden . Before the battle of Cuito Cuanavale , South Africa had no serious intention of leaving Namibia . But once the SADF had invested its prestige in capturing the airfield of a remote Angolan town and failed , the chemistry of the sub - continent changed . President P.W Botha and his Generals needed little persuasion , facing the electorally - ruinous prospect of hundreds of young White soldiers dying in Angola , they were desperate for talks . 51)
When Cuban - Angolan - SWAPO forces moved through the Western provinces of Cunene and Namibia to within range of the Namibian border , South Africa was put under tremendous pressure more that at any time in its history . Dislodging this impressive new Cuban presence in the Angolan South would have required a politically unpopular mass mobilisation of South African forces and a bloody counter - escalation . 52 ) Alternatively , a negotiated Cuban withdrawal from Southern Africa conflict , became an even objective for South Africa than before . An excellent opportunity presented itself to South Africa when Angola accepted the principle of a Cuban troop withdrawal without insisting on an end to United States support for UNITA . Such a decision reassured South Africa that the UNITA card would remain to keep pressure on the Angolan government after the loss of Namibia as a launch pad for further military support to UNITA . There was no better option than to agree to the price for getting the Cubans out . 53)
Given the large portion of GNP being consumed by the military and police , the slow - down in the economy , the negative flows of foreign investment , the decline of metal prices in the export markets , the looming repayments on the country ' s foreign debts , 41
the decline of the purchasing power of the Rand , South Africa could not afford to continue paying the bills for Namibia , and the increasingly costly war in Angola . Ending South Africa ' s occupation of Namibia , the cost of which was estimated at US $ 1 million in 1987, thus presented prospects for substantial savings. 54)
In Afrikaans medium churches , theatres and night clubs one could detect popular misgivings about the Angolan war . Such mainstream White sentiments did not constitute a full - blown anti - war movement , but it unquestionably weighed on decision - makers who had no desire to see one develop . 55) The unrest and militant resistance in black urban townships , and the West 's failure to support Pretoria in these trying moments , fueled by White reaction , made South Africa to reconsider its position in the Namibia - Angolan conflict . There were insufficient resources for side shows like Angola and Namibia at a time of increasing black military and organisational sophistication , serious economic slow - down , and unprecedented foreign pressure . The independence of Namibia was , therefore , a small price to pay for a major opportunity to augment national security . 56)
In the first and last resort , however what persuaded the South Africans to agree to leave Namibia were the Namibian people themselves . They did not all support SWAPO , but they despised South Africa and held the empty shell of the interim government in contempt . No amount of UN Resolution , peace marches down Kaizer Street , sermons from the pulpit , or request from Western capitals would have moved South Africa one millimetre Southwards. Something more was needed . Namibia could not rely on the West . 57) So it was forced into armed struggle . While deriding the efforts of PLAN , it is clear that South Africa 's initial military problem was its inability to counteract the guerrillas . As a result the war was pushed into Angola , which led to confrontations with FAPLA , in turn , inviting increased 42
Cuban and Soviet assistance , and ineluctably to Cuito Cuatnavale , there to commit the elementary mistake of turning counter - revolutionary warfare into conventional confrontation far from home . 58)
4.5. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT.
The prospect of a settlement that would give rise to a genuine independent Namibia was in the interest of the Angolans . Basically because it had the potential of removing the SADF threat 800 kilometers to the South of Angola 's border . Thereby ,
giving Angola a sympathetic Southern neighbour . 59)
The devastating effects of the war in Angola which resulted in damages estimated at £ 12 billion from 1975 to 1987 , and cost over 60 000 lives , and economic mismanagement led to a reassessment of Angola 's diplomatic and economic options . 60)
The Soviet Union policy towards Angola since the decisive entry of Cuban troops in 1975 had been to provide the MPLA with large scale military and to some extent , political support , but not the economic assistance operating in Angola paid for Soviet and Cuban military equipment and personnel . In a bid to expand its military might been 1985 and .1988 , Luanda consumed 80 % of the US $ 1.3 to $ 1.8 billion it earned each year from oil . Following the shortfalls in oil revenue , Angola failed to pay the Soviet Union its dues . 61) By the end of 1986 , the effects of massive bureaucratic controls , official corruption and ineptitude , and heavy deficit financing had finally caught up with the MPLA . It was beginning to pile up arreas in its foreign debt to the Soviets and Cubans , who were not amused at the loss of hard - currency payments . Four hundred state enterprises and a bloated overhang of security and regulatory officials had destroyed both agriculture and industry . The pressure for major economic reform which had 43
swept the rest of sub - Saharan Africa had washed up on Angolan shores as well . Advocates of economic reform began to find their voice . Dos Santos began placing higher priority on cultivating ties with Western governments and bankers , especially European ones , and on meeting the criteria for admission to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund . 62 ) It was in the bid to alleviate its economic problems that Angola Joined the United States' initiative .
As Angola 's largest creditor , the Soviet Union bowed to the inevitable and rescheduled the huge debts piling up from arms sales , that averaged over US $ 1 billion a year . Moscow supported Angola 's turn to the West for improved economic ties since it was its only hope of getting paid . Arrears had also began to build up on Angolan US $ 300 - 400 million annually for support to Cuban troops , advisers , and civilian technicians . 63) The economic crisis had finally begun to spill over into the sacrosant military sphere , causing periodic strains on the Soviet - Cuban - Angolan triangle . President Dos Santos came to realize that for Angola to survive , let alone prosper , the MPLA government to achieve international recognition , and to have cordial relations with the West , war had to be brought to an end . 64)
A failed South Africa - UNITA attack which aimed at driving FAPLA - PLAN - Cuban forces back over the river into C u it o Cuanavale , led to a stalemate , with both sides holding their water positions . This incident was a serious setback to those in the Angolan government who maintained that a military solution to the civil war was possible . The Angolans accepted , after their costly and painful blood letting , that any form of military victory over South Africa was , but a pipe dream . 65)
The war in Angola had serious social and economic repercussions . Following the closure of the Benguela railroad since 1975 , diamond production in the Northern Province grounded to a halt . Work stoppages and strikes by African workers in industries , the ports , and farming paralysed the economy . Food became scarce , services broke down , famine spread in rural areas , medical resources were hopelessly inadequate , and larger and more significant was the displacement of Africans from towns and rural areas in northern Angola as the fighting escalated . This coupled with wholesale devastation made continuation with the war by Angolans pointless . 66) 45
4.6 NOTES.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 453.
S. Uys : SA polices UN cease-fire , p. 1.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 463.
S. N. MacFarlane : The Soviet Union and Southern Africa
Security , p. 72.
Ibid .
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 157.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 410.
Ibid .
Ibid, p. 411.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 149.
Ibid.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 185.
K. 0' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in Southern
Africa , p. 88.
46
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia , p. 31.
K. 0' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in Southern
Africa , p. 88.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disen ement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 36.
Ibid , p. 32.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 186.
Ibid .
0. E. Kahn(ed.) : Disen!a!ement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 184.
Ibid , p. 31.
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 157.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 192.
Ibid , p. 32.
Ibid , p. 194.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough neighborhood , p. 356. 47
Ibid , p. 357.
Ibid.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
ros • ects for•eace in Angola and Namibia, p. 195.
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 157.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 167.
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 157.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 167.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
ros s ects for eace in An ola and Namibia, p. 194.
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 157.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough neighborhood , p. 356.
0. E. Kahn (ed.) : Disen!a!ement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 188. R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 174.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. , p. 181.
0. E. Kahn(ed.) Disen a ement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 191.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Re.ional d amics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 176.
L, Cliffe The transition to independence in Namibia , p: 63.
G. M. Khadiagala : Allies in Adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 p. 156.
Ibid.
0. E. Kahn(ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 190.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 176.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa Making peace in a
rough neighborhood , p. 380. 49
Ibid.
Ibid.
0. E. Kaim(ed.) : Disengagement from South West Africa : The
prospects for peace in Angola and Namibia, p. 190.
Ibid.
C. Crocker : High noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough neighborhood , p. 356.
L. Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p. 55.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 176.
K. 0' Neill and B. Munslow : Ending the cold war in Southern
Africa , p. 88.
Ibid.
Ibid.
W. Breytenbach : Cuito Cuanavale revisited , p. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 184.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. CHAPTER 5
THE EXCLUSION OF SWAPO FROM THE QUADRIPARTITE
TALKS.
Contrary to other colonial territories where the political parties were directly involved in the agreements leading to independence , neither SWAPO nor any other Namibian political party participated in the 1988 quadripartite negotiations .However , this chapter seeks to shed some light with regard to SWAPO 's exclusion .
Initially , Angola and Cuba wanted to include SWAPO in the negotiations , but dropped their demand as the South African government categorically refused to include SWAPO in t h e discussions. 1 ) Clearly , Pretoria was not at ease with SWAPO 's advancement diplomatically , as well as in further isolating South Africa on the Namibian question and in establishing its own
credentials as the Namibian answer . 2)
Inside Namibia , SWAPO exercised a strong pull on the loyalties of the majority of those who continued to resist South African occupation and white domination , whether in the churches , the schools or the work places . Pledging itself to armed struggle and arranging the military training to some of its cadres abroad , SWAPO was then able , by mid - 1965 , to win exclusive backing from the Organization for African Unity as the Namibian liberation
movement of standing . 3) It was as a result of this kind of acceptance that SWAPO was ultimately to parlay , at the United Nations General Assembly into its previledged international status
as a sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people . 4) More and more non - political entities such as worker unions , student and community organizations openly pledged their support to SWAPO 's struggle for genuine independence for Namibia , to Pretoria 's utter dismay . 51
The Namibian government , for its part , lacked the men , the money , the means , and above all the capacity and the will to rival the ernomous international publicity available to SWAPO through the United Nations , the Organization for African Unity , the Eastern Bloc , and progressive forces - governmental , academic , and clerical - in the West . The Turnhalle candidates thus could not put their case before the world . 5)
Although all efforts were made by the South African forces to diminish the influence of SWAPO in Namibia , its popularity as a vanguard party grew from strength to strength , and its involvement in the struggle deepened. 6)
The South African government argued that SWAPO had no authority to speak on behalf of the majority , not to mention all the population groups of Namibia , and should , therefore , not feature in the negotiations . 7) Pretoria further held that SWAPO was an exclusively Owambo party , disputing its claim to be a national party , and marginalizing its aims and achievements . According to the South African government , the 1978 elections which enjoyed 80 % turnout of registered voters , despite SWAPO and other non - collaborationist parties boycott , made SWAPO 's international title - sole and authentic representative of Namibian people questionable . (8) Pretoria further argued that the voters who took part in the elections and who mostly voted for the DTA , voted against SWAPO . However , the fact of the matter was , the 80 % turnout came about partly because many young SWAPO activists had left the country for Angola and Zambia after Angolan independence made the crossing of the border more possible . Many were forced to register and to vote against their will for a restricted set of collaborationist parties . Considerable pressure was exerted upon the people in Owamboland , for example collaborationist chiefs threatened their subjects with loss of rights , jobs , or services . 52
The registration document that every Black Namibian had to carry and produce on demand also contained the voting record , such that it was an effective instrument available to exert pressure on people to register and vote . The old , blind and disabled , as well as mentally retarded people , who received pension from the government , were threatened with loss of pension . Teachers and nurses were threatened with dismissal . Many refugees and temporary residents were registered , and no one from the boycotting parties could challenge the list . 9) In all fairness , the internal elections were in more ways than one , Pretoria manipulated .
Pretoria subsequently demanded that the United Nations should cease to recognise SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people , and acknowledge Namibia 's internal parties on an equal basis with SWAPO . 10) It (Pretoria) further held , inter alia , that all financial assistance to SWAPO through the office of the Commissioner for Namibia be stopped immediately ; the Security Council should desist from consulting only SWAPO on matters affecting Namibia ; the Namibia Institute in Lusaka be restored to its original purpose of serving all Namibians ; all aid channelled through UN specialised agencies to SWAPO be terminated immediately ; and that the SWAPO representative in New York be removed from direct participation in matters of the Office of the Commissioner of Namibia . All this , South Africa insisted , should be done before any decision concerning the implementation of Resolution 435 could be made . This was contrary to the United Nations position , also accepted by SWAPO , that the exclusive recognition of SWAPO would fall away once agreement was reached . 11)
The South African government , then , made it clear that , if Angola and Cuba insisted on drawing SWAPO into the negotiations , Pretoria would request UNITA 's participation in the talks .Since the Luanda government wanted the withdrawal of the South African and Cuban troops from Namibia and Angola respectively as the gist of the negotiations , they did not want UNITA to join the talks 12) 53
One of Pretoria 's main plans , for insisting on SWAPO 's exclusion , was to denigrate the liberation movement . Pretoria sought to portray SWAPO as warmongers , thereby playing on fears that people in the South and the centre had for SWAPO as a northern Owambo and a potentialy ruthless party . 13)
South Africa wanted to maintain its propaganda that SWAPO was nothing , but an organization bent on destruction and murder , not interested in solving the question of Namibia peacefully and in a democratic manner . However , the South African government justified its military action against SWAPO in neighbouring countries by stating that it was carrying out a protective function necessitated by SWAPO attacks from across the border . 14)
In the final analysis , the exclusion of SWAPO from t h e quadripartite negotiations was justified on the grounds that the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 , which directly concerned the Namibians , had already been agreed upon in 1978 . 15)
SWAPO , the Contact Group , and the Frontline State spent nearly two years , the whole of 1977 and part of 1978 , negotiating steps and procedures for the implementation of Resolution 435 . Resolution 435 provided days , weeks and months as to how the whole process would be carried out . Owing to the fact that Resolution 435 was already agreed upon , and was not open for negotiations , South Africa and SWAPO needed to furher agree on the dates for its implementation , and the Namibian independence process would start rolling . 16)
Therefore , SWAPO did not have any role to play in the negotiations , since the issues under discussion were the time frame for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola . This issue concerned only Angola , Cuba and those who demanded it .
In all fairness this matter could be resolved mainly , if not solely , by Angola and Cuba . 17)
So, SWAPO was not locked out , because it .1 d not have on y role to play .
Despite initial protest , SWAPO accepted its position , as the negotiations - between Angola . Cuba and South Africa did not directly concern the implementation of Resolution 435. 18)
5.1 CONCLUSION.
It is no accident that .when the negotiations occurred that paved the way for independence elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision , SWAPO was not at the bargaining table . SWAPO and its supporters among the African and nonaligned countries were deliberately marginalized from some of the most crucial agreements.
Even if many of the developments that produced the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 were outside SWAPO 's control , it is also true that SWAPO 's role as the unremitting antagonist of South Africa - politically inside the country , diplomatically on the world stage , and militarily - was crucial . 55
NOTES
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics of
decolonization 1945-90 , p. 187.
C. Leys and Johnson S. Saul : Namibia 's Liberation struggle :
The two-edged sword , p. 16.
Ibid , p. 41.
G. Totemeyer and W. Werner (eds.) : Africa 's Last colony , p. 39.
P. Duignan : South West Africa, p. 26.
G. Totemeyer and W. Werner (eds.) : Africa 's Last colony , p. 39.
Ibid.
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 37.
Ibid , p. 25.
G. Ichadiagala : Allies in adversary : The front line states in
Southern African Security 1975-1993 , p. 127.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 160.
Ibid , p. 186.
L. Cliffe : The transition to inde endence in Namibia , p. 162.
Ibid.
E. Landis : Namibia , the United Nations and the West ,
p. 88. R. Leonard : South Africa at War : White power and the crisis
in Southern Africa , p. 64.
P. Katjavivi : Namibia behind the diplomatic charade , p. 25.
R. Dreyer : Namibia and Southern Africa : Regional dynamics
of decolonization 1945-90 , p. 187. 57
CHAPTER 6
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF US MEDIATED TALKS
The US mediated negotiations led to the peace agreement which resulted in a one-year transition to independence for Namibia, signed at the UN headquarters in New York on 22 December 1988. 1 )
The tripartite agreement , signed by the South African foreign minister , Pik Botha , the Angolan foreign minister , Alfonso van Dunem , and the Cuban foreign minister , Isidoro Malmierca , formalised their commitment to independence for Namibia under the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 , which was to start on 1 April 1989 , leading to elections for a Constituent Assembly seven months later , and formal statehood early in 1990 , though no date was specified . 2) It also pledged the cooperation of both Angola and South Africa with the UN Secretary General in ensuring the territory 's independence through free and fair elections and respect for Namibia 's territorial integrity . 3)
In addition to this trilateral accord , was a bilateral Cuban - Angolan agreement regulating the troop withdrawal , starting with 3000 by 1 April 1989 , and ending with the last of the 50 000 by
1 July 1991 , meeting a condition set by South Africa . 4)
In the peace accords , Pretoria was awarded a single face - saver , that is , the closure of the seven African National Congress camps in Angola . None of Pretoria 's major aims , namely , pre - conditional or even parallel Cuban troop withdrawal , a role for UNITA in the government of Luanda or better still , the MPLA 's overthrow was realized . 5)
Following the signing of the accords , some analysts warned that much could go wrong before April 1 . It was projected that any of the parties , for whatever reasons , could upset the whole peace and independence process . (6) It was against this background that a Joint Monitoring Commission was set up immediately after the signing of the accords , on 22 December 1988 consisting of South Africa , Angola and Cuba , with the US and the Soviet Union invited to join as observers , with an invitation to be extended to any independent Namibian governmnent to join as a full member . 7)
Under the annexture of the agreement , the Joint Commission was designed to facilitate the resolution of any dispute over either the interpretation or implementation of the tripartite agreement by any
of the parties establishing the Joint Commission . 8)
The exclusion of the major voice of the Namibian people , SWAPO , from the talks contributed to the tragic gueri llla incursion in April 1 , 1989 . Had SWAPO been a party to the negotiations , the tragedy might well have been avoided . There were grounds for different interpretations of the August 1988 , Geneva protocol , which sought to deploy PLAN above the 16th parallel until the South African withdrawal from Namibia was completed. 9) Following the incursion , the UN settlement plan was suspended and the arrangements for elections were indefinitely postponed . The Angolan , Cuban , and South African members of the Joint Monitoring Commission met on 8 - 9 April in Namibia and finally hammered out the Mount Edjo Declaration by which SWAPO fighters would be guaranteed safe passage to UNTAG - monitored assembly points and then escorted north of the 16th parallel in Angola , the process to be completed by 16 April . This withdrawal was proclaimed complete by 15 May , and the elaborate process once again moved uneasily forward . The war was now officially over . 10) 59
The creation of the Joint Monitoring Commission was one of the major achievements of the settlement . Not only did it help to rescue the UN plan from collapsing , but an institution was created that had significant potential beyond Angola and Namibia , and for the region in general . 11 ) In fact , a political structure was put in place which provided a forum as well as a certain amount of political platform for meeting and talking about matters of common interest , which would otherwise be hard to arrange . 12)
The UN Transition Assistance Group ( UNTAG) , a much larger United Nations team , was created to monitor the ceasefire in Namibia between South Africa and SWAPO . It would police the phased withdrawal of South African troops and the restriction to base of both sides . A civilian section of UNTAG would supervise elections leading to Namibia 's independence , due to be held on November 1 , 1989. 13)
The UN Angola Verification Mission ( UNAVEM ) , on the other hand , a team of 70 military observers and support staff was set up at the request of Cuba and Angola to monitor the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola . Conservative United States critics argued that UNAVEM would be too small and too dependent on Luanda for logistical support to be an effective safeguard against cheating , but UN officials rejected the criticism out of hand , rightfully so . 14)
The withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola and Namibia respectively , marked the absence of foreign forces in Southren Africa for the first time since the Napoleonic wars . The withdrawal of SADF from Namibia back to the South African borders , also marked the end of a generation of cross border wars . 15)
The Namibian negotiated settlement benefited South Africa in economic , political and military terms . Pretoria was finally relieved of its enormous financial burden from assistance to the territory , totaling about R1 billion a year just to keep it going . Budgetary assistance alone was officially estimated at R 5 billion during the financial years 1980 to 1990. 16) This figure excluded what was spent in fighting the bush war against SWAPO in northern Namibia and on the battles in Angola . Public money wich was poured into Namibia from year to year over decades was diverted for use inside South Africa . The money was urgently needed for housing , welfare and health services , education and other fields hit by drastic cuts in state expenditure . 17)
Even before the Namibian independence , early economic benefits were reaped in the Western Cape when the independence process begun , a minor boom was experienced among businesses that helped in meeting the requirements of nearly 10 000 troops and officials of the UNTAG . They needed fast deliveries of large quantities of commodities and services from the Western Cape , including food , fuel , building materials , tents vehicles , electrical and communications equipment . 18)
Four months after the New York accords , Citicorp rolled over loans totaling US $ 670 million due for repayment in 1990 . A small pat on the back for Pretoria , though Dr. Gerhard de Kock , governor of the Reserve Bank , admitted that it remained impossible to raise long term loans abroad . 19) There was at the time an opportunity for major peace dividends in a country that was spending billions on defence , nuclear development and political ties in Africa and beyond . 20)
Politically the Namibian settlement brought to an end on paper , at least 73 years of South African rule in the territory which culminated in a 22 year civil war and a strong era of international disputes , condemnation sanctions and threats over continued illegal occupation by South Africa . It released South Africa from the responsibilities and hazards of continuing , in effect , its role as the last of Africa 's colonial powers in the face of mounting world criticism and hostility . 21) 61
For an average White Namibian , the signing of the New York accords was a signal to flee to South Africa . The lack of effective border policing , the rand monetary system and the absence of exchange controls in Namibia meant that Whites could move to South Africa easily , should they wish to , and take their assets with them . Many had already moved their savings to South Africa . 22)
The Angola - Namibia settlement transformed a major irritant in East - West relations into a remarkable example of United States - Soviet cooperation in the settlement of regional disputes . The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was a pointer to a reduction in involvement further afield . 23)
With the approach of independence , Namibia began to take its first steps as a separate actor on the international scene . For a start the country immediately entered into formal relationships that strengthened its links with neighbouring African states . It automatically became the 10th member of the Southern African Development Community ( SADC , formally SADCC ) , which sought to promote regional links and mutual development , especially in transport and trade , but also had among its aims lessening dependence on South Africa . 24) The latter had certainly been one of SWAPO 's stated aims since its inception , although given the extreme degree of economic reliance , this was not so easily accomplished . Namibia also applied for membership to the overlapping Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern
African countries . 25)
The United Nations , which had been passing resolutions challenging South African rule , and had been acting to assert its own trusteeship , finally established a presence in the country to oversee a transition to peace and eventually , in 1990 , to full independence . 26) 62
The culmination of the settlement process was the first fully open elections in Namibia , in November 1989 , to choose an assembly that wrote the constitution for the country . 27)
Africa 's last colony was free . Representatives of seventy countries attended the event , perhaps the most celebrated independence ceremony witnessed in Africa . 28) The presence among delegates of US Secretary of State , James Baker , and Soviet Foreign minister , Eduard Shevardnadze , symbolised a new era . So too did the presence in Windhoek of Nelson Mandela , whom President F.W de Klerk had just freed from 27 years of imprisonment back on February 11 . 29)
The undoubted Western media hero of the agreement was not Angola certainly not SWAPO , which did not even feature as a signatory but Chester Crocker . How much of diplomatic triumph it was for Chester Crocker and the United States is open to question . 30) 63
6.1 NOTES
The Citizen, 4 April 1989 , p. 1.
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 178.
Ibid , p. 164.
Ibid , p. 174.
Ibid , p. 175.
City Press ,29 November 1988 , p. 1.
Weekend Argus ,24 December 1988 , p. 17.
The Star .23 February 1989 , p. 3.
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia . p. 178.
Ibid , p. 183.
Ibid , p. 184.
Ibid .
The Citizen ,23 September 1988 , p. 1.
Ibid .
C. Crocker : High Noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough neighborhood , p. 490.
Weekend Argus ,24 December 1988 , p. 17.
Ibid .
Ibid . D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 176.
C. Crocker : High Noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough p. 491.
Weekend Argus , 29 November 1988 , p. 17.
The Sunday Star , 14 May 1989p. 14.
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 177.
L. Cliffe : The transition to independence in Namibia , p. 281.
Ibid .
C. Crocker : High Noon in Southern Africa : Making peace in
a rough neighborhood , p. 1.
27, Ibid .
Ibid , p. 489.
Ibid .
D. Herbstein and J. Evenson : The devils are among us : The
war for Namibia , p. 175. 65
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The 1988 settlement for the Namibian dispute was a historical watershed that many Southern Africans who have been yearning for ever since the die was cast for war and racial confrontation decades earlier .
Apart from the traditional American desire to help the spread of self - government and democracy , there were profound political reasons for engaging in the effort to bring independence to Namibia . Clearly , US desire to strengthen its economy and commercial links with Namibia were not served by local conflicts or arms races , or by efforts of outside powers to exploit them from unilateral advantage . On the contrary , US national interests were best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth , which alone could nurture modern American economic and political institutions . This was the fundamental principle behind US policy of mediation in search for a more stable , secure , prosperous and democratic Southern Africa . This situation was brought about to a large measure by the Soviet Union's decision to scale down its support for liberation movements in Southern Africa as part of its policy of detente with the US .
The Namibian and Angolan conflicts imposed real financial burdens on all the regional parties involved . By the late 1980s , all the players were war weary and were willing to reduce the costs of the war .
Angola was in economic shambles , unable to repay its $ 4.5 billion debt to the Soviet Union , and no longer able to pay Cuba its $ 1000 a day per soldier fee . To crown the indignity , they had watched impotently when the Southern part of their territory was occupied by South African Forces , and their infrastructure in the way of towns and villages , bridges and roads being devastated . The Cubans and Soviets began to pay when Angola 's oil revenues declined in the mid - 1980s . The South African economy was in trouble , with a declining standard of living among Whites . Sanctions for so long dismissed as ineffective , actually proved influential.
The season of peace - making arrived during the apogee of escalatory folly . The Cubans and South Africans each had escalatory options , but those options , if pursued to their logical conclusion , posed mounting dangers and would suck the sides deeper into the Angolan bog . Violence as a credible tool of political action became suspect . The moment of maximum risk was converted into a magic moment of opportunity . The diminished Soviet role as the enemy of one side and the ally of the other was a factor in the new equation of early 1988 . But it was not the most important factor . After all , it was not the Soviets who served as the impetus in the peace process during the crucial points of 1987 - 1988 . It was the regional powers , starting with the Cubans , who finally recognized the stalemate into which their own past actions had led them , and who began exploring the path toward peace . Soldiers and politicians alike finally grasped this powerful logic of strategy . The ultimate success of the American mediation owes much to the leverage it derived from this coming together and reversal of opposites .
Having acted independently of the UN ,the US handed over to the international body the responsibility for working out the implementation arrangements of the agreements . In essence , the decolonisation plan brokered by the US downplayed the role of the UN in the transition to that of a linesman , with South Africa itself a protagonist , as stage manager . In addition , agreements were made among the governments of Angola , Cuba and South 67
Africa with regard to security arrangements , specifically , the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola , and were not signed or agreed to by SWAPO or the UN . As a result , there was room for considerable ambiguity about the legality and relative primacy of different agreements .
In a nutshell , the Namibian settlement was determined not by technical calculations or legal rights or wrongs , but by the balance of political , economic and military forces on the ground or in the international arena .
This study advances an argument to the effect that it was not linkage that unlocked the Namibian dispute , but a wide range of factors that have been alluded to in the text . SOURCE LIST
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