Foreign Aid and the Recurrence of Violence in Post-Conflict Countries

FOREIGN AID AND THE RECURRENCE OF VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Policy in Public Policy

Lesley Diane Hsu, B.A.

Washington, DC April 12, 2019

FOREIGN AID AND THE RECURRENCE OF VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Lesley Diane Hsu, B.A.

Thesis Advisor: Andreas T. Kern, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

There has been increasing attention and research focused on the sustainability of peace in post-conflict countries. Countries that emerge from civil war become highly dependent on foreign aid to provide basic services and help rebuild institutions and infrastructure. However, research has shown that in post-conflict countries, there is a fifty percent chance that a country will re-engage in conflict, or otherwise become highly aid dependent. This statistic is concerning as foreign assistance is often necessary to help reconstruction efforts, and counterproductive aid can have devastating consequences in a fragile country. As a result, the following paper will investigate what kind of role foreign aid may have in deterring renewed conflict. Using data on the aid share of GDP following dyadic peace agreements in the time span between 1975 and

2005, the analysis looks at the probability of the recurrence of violence within five years in countries just emerging from conflict. My main findings hint that an increased share of aid is associated with more lasting peace; however, this relationship is not significant. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that while foreign aid may provide a welcome economic boost to a country emerging from conflict, the effectiveness of the aid in helping maintain peace is more highly influenced by the environment in which it is disbursed. As a result, donors should be mindful of the context of the conflict when making decisions on how foreign aid is distributed.

iii

I would like to acknowledge my advisor, Dr. Andreas Kern, for his guidance and support throughout this process.

Many thanks, Lesley Diane Hsu

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 1

Background ...... 4

Literature Review ...... 7

Conceptual Framework ...... 9

Empirical Analysis ...... 13

Data Description ...... 13

Kaplan-Meier Survival Model ...... 18

Regression Results ...... 20

Conclusion ...... 24

Appendix ...... 26

References ...... 33

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Post-conflict Countries and Number of Failed Peace Agreements ...... 15

Figure 2. Duration of Peace Agreements by Year ...... 17

Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves ...... 19

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Logit Results ...... 22

Table 2. Post-Cold War Logit Results ...... 23

Table A1. Definition of Variables ...... 26

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics ...... 28

Table A3. Post-Cold War Descriptive Statistics ...... 28

Table A4. List of Peace Agreements ...... 29

vi Introduction

With the growing prevalence of civil war over any other type of conflict in the past few decades, much research has been dedicated to investigating the conditions and motivations that foster intrastate violence. One recurring theme that studies have found is that economic performance or the presence of an economic shock has been a significant factor in predicting the onset of conflict. For example, countries with lower levels of GDP per capita income, slower growth rates of per capita income, and more increased dependence on a primary commodity export have displayed higher risks of entering into conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Given that foreign aid becomes an important source of revenue for post- conflict countries, especially in the years following conflict when inflows are substantially enlarged from humanitarian and state aid appeals, the distribution and application of aid plays an important role in creating and sustaining an environment that discourages and prevents conflict.

Low economic development in the years following conflict can increase the risk of conflict relapse, as individuals are more likely to enlist with rebel groups in these conditions (Walter

2004). Therefore, this paper will be exploring the following question, what is the relationship between foreign aid and the likelihood of recurring civil violence in post-conflict countries?

The difficulty of ending civil conflict has been complicated over the years with changes in the dynamics and technology of organized violence, and varying levels of international intervention. For example, Howard and Stark (2018) argue that the international political environment has played a large a role in the sharp decrease in number of civil wars that have ended in a decisive victory after the Cold War, pushed along by the “absence of major threats and the quest for democratization” by the US and their allies (2018, 130). In Doyle and

Sambanis’ (2000) dataset covering civil wars from 1944 to 1997, 20% (13 of 61) of conflicts

1 during the Cold War ended in a “tie” (truce or settlement) while 70% (38 of 54) of conflicts after the Cold War ended in a “tie” (Fortna 2009). This has placed more pressure on the cooperation and voluntary demobilization of all participating groups to maintain peace.

Outside interventions have consistently played a role in initiating, negotiating, and ending conflict. While civil conflicts are limited within one country’s borders, neighboring countries often have an interest in the outcomes of conflict as they are impacted as well through the migration of refugees fleeing violence, disruptions in trade, and possible overflow of violence into their own borders. For example, because of shared ethnic backgrounds, states may intervene indirectly through covert support, allowing arms transactions, or allowing rebel operations on their territory (Gleditsch 2007). In the post-conflict period, outside intervention has often continued in forms such as support of peacekeeping forces, implementation of development programs, and involvement in institutional reforms, for which foreign aid has been a primary source of funding.

Once a conclusion to a civil war has been reached, the costs of long-running violence and destruction are even more difficult to overcome. Even in countries such as Sierra Leone and

Liberia that have deliberately included disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes in their peace agreements, the implementation of these mechanisms has not always been successful. Countries that have experienced war “have a two to four times higher risk of subsequent war,” which becomes substantially decreased after maintaining post-conflict peace for 10 years, but still remains higher than in pre-war conditions (Collier et al. 2003, 104). In fact, a 2011 World Development Report found that “90 percent of the civil wars since 2000 occurred in countries that had experienced a civil war in the previous 30 years.” (von Einsiedel et al.

2014, 3). Collier et al. (2003) have referred to this cycle of violence as a conflict trap.

2 As a result, my research attempts to build on this growing area of research and focuses on how the international community has attempted to maintain peace and security, specifically through the distribution of foreign aid to post-conflict countries. My key hypothesis is that countries with higher aid shares of GDP are less likely to revert back to conflict, which is tested using a replication dataset that contains a compilation on dyadic peace agreements from 1975 and whether or not they have “failed.” Through the application of a duration model and regression analysis, my initial results do not show a significant direct relationship between the aid share of GDP and the recurrence of conflict.

3 Background

Civil war and conflict embody a type of political violence within a sovereign state that consists of armed combat between an incumbent government and a non-state challenger with claims of full or partial sovereignty of territory (Cedermann and Vogt 2017). This is distinct from an interstate conflict, in which one state is actively engaging in violence with another state.

While external actors may also play a role in the conflict through funding, material support, and involvement of foreign fighters, the primary actors are contained within state boundaries.

Therefore, civil wars must have the following components: violence, territorial competition, and a willingness to govern a population. Although other varieties of political violence such as military coups, state terror, riots, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism may occur during civil conflict, they do not officially fall under the definition of a war taking place.

The threshold of distinguishing the official beginning of civil war and from random outbursts of violence and other forms of internal armed conflict has been debated over the years.

Nevertheless, researchers and policy makers have most commonly deferred to the Uppsala

Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/PRIO dataset criteria of conflict, developed by Gleditsch, et al.

(2002): civil wars are conflicts that involve at least 1,000 battle deaths of combatants in a single year, and a minor armed conflict consists of at least 25 battle deaths per year and fewer than

1,000 battle deaths over the duration of the conflict.

After the Cold War, the number of ongoing civil wars around the world sharply dropped.

This has been partly attributed to the decrease in Cold War “proxy wars” in developing countries. Yet that trend has recently seen a reversal; while still lower than a peak in 1990, there has been a gradual rise in the number of civil wars and battle-related deaths in the past decade

(von Einsiedel et al. 2014). Intrastate conflicts have now become more common than interstate

4 conflicts. Whereas international wars tend to last for less than six months, the duration of civil wars has been increasing from a previous average of seven years. In 2017, the average duration of ongoing civil wars has been more than twenty years, which has been driven by intractable conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Somalia (Fearon

2017).

Post-conflict situations have been generous recipients of aid since the end of the Cold

War. Almost 10% of total official development assistance (ODA) worldwide is distributed to post-conflict countries under formal peace (a period of up to 10 years without conflict after the signing of a peace accord), and over 15% for countries under negative peace (a period of up to

10 years after the number of battle deaths fall under 1,000/year regardless of a peace accord)

(Boyce and Forman 2010). However, Boyce and Forman also note that the amount of aid disbursed varies greatly between countries depending on the political importance of countries and difference in humanitarian and peace building needs. For example, in the first five years of post-conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina received approximately $350/person/year (constant 2007 dollars) while Guatemala received nearly $30/person/year (ibid., 2010).

International funders often attach conditionalities on foreign aid to ensure compliance as well, either on the incumbent government or for rebel groups. Matanock (2017) finds that this occurred with democracy and governance aid, which “could most easily be tied to compliance with electoral rules” (106). The threat of sanctions for noncompliance can be a powerful incentive to prevent the resumption of violence, especially for groups that have extremely limited resources for which any amount of sanctions would be costly. Therefore, aid dedicated to democracy-promotion programs has been seen as a credible alternative to armed international interventions to enforce peace (ibid., 2017).

5 Yet, in some cases, conditionalities may also set initiatives up for failure as target goals may prove to be impossible to meet because of the devastating costs of conflict (including lack of infrastructure, widespread malnutrition, shortage of personnel, and outmigration). The withdrawal of funding for not meeting targets, or the damaging efforts to attempt to meet these targets, may thus have unintended consequences of only exacerbating the conditions that would encourage the reemergence of conflict. As a result, foreign aid has the potential of either creating conditions to maintain peace or breaking them down completely.

6 Literature Review

There have been few studies that have looked at the relationship between of foreign aid and conflict. One study examined changes in country aid and found that foreign aid shocks, or severe decreases in aid revenue, significantly increased the probability of conflict (Nielsen et al.

2011). However, post-conflict countries can be distinguished from developing countries in that they are more prone to revert back to conflict. Therefore, there may be a differentiation between the impact of post-conflict foreign aid and traditional development aid. Ideally, traditional aid can be delivered through a stable government mechanism with appropriate monitoring mechanisms that oversee the progress of a program. However, aid in post-conflict situations is usually distributed in the absence of a strong rule of law and with institutions that often lack the political will or capacity to implement projects (Boyce and Forman 2010). A decisive military victory is more likely to yield stable peace. Yet many civil conflicts have also been increasingly ending in draws, such as in the form of peace agreements, rather than having an outright victor.

One study has attributed this trend to the availability of peacekeepers, which has it made it easier for countries to maintain peace and stability during a stalemate and thus making draws a viable end to conflict (Fortna 2009). In any case, the lack of clear leadership or continuing existence of rebel groups within a country adds another layer of complexity in the reconstruction process.

Reconstruction is both an immediate response and long-term process and requires significant amounts of aid. Kang and Meernik (2004) find that the motivations and levels of foreign aid from OECD states are primarily determined by humanitarian need, economic openness and characteristics of the conflict. Levels are higher in post-conflict years, especially when there has been military intervention, but later taper off. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that aid has an ambiguous effect on the risk of civil conflict, but find that it is more effective in

7 promoting growth in post-conflict situations than in others. However, while levels of aid increase post-conflict, they usually taper off after two years when they should be increasing instead.

Given the relationship between economic development and a decrease in conflict risk, some studies have looked at the effectiveness of post-conflict aid as it relates to economic growth. Girod (2011) has found robust evidence that foreign aid given to governments with low resources and low strategic importance to the donor are more likely to result in positive development outcomes. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also take a look at the effect of economic policy and foreign aid on the risk of civil war by predicting the risk of conflict occurring in five- year periods. While they did not find a direct effect of aid on the risk of conflict, there was evidence of that indirect effects of increased aid and policy improvement on growth and income could significantly reduce the risk of conflict. Another study looking at foreign aid and the risk of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa attempted to control for various endogeneity issues and found foreign aid to lead to a decrease in likelihood for an ongoing conflict to continue (de Ree and

Nillesen 2009).

8 Conceptual Framework

There are many different types of aid and different ways in which aid can be used by recipient countries. Therefore, reference to foreign aid in the hypotheses describes aid with the objective of supporting economic growth, for example, development, governance, and humanitarian aid. This is in contrast to aid used for military or security purposes, which do not necessarily provide an economic benefit to civilians nor work towards preventing violence.

The theory behind the hypothesis that incoming foreign aid will be allocated to projects and initiatives that will help catalyze the development of the population, which would include addressing the immediate medical and nutritional needs of civilians and ex-combatants, constructing infrastructure, and providing education and training to members of affected communities. Overall, this will go towards supporting individuals and communities that are working to rebuild their livelihoods. With an improvement in economic situation, the willingness to reengage in conflict decreases as the opportunity cost to pursue violent activities becomes higher (Miguel, et al. 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). As a result, the overall risk of resurgent conflict decreases.

Assuming that foreign aid is an effective tool for supporting development and growth, I will be testing the hypothesis that,

H. post-conflict countries that receive larger amounts of foreign aid have a decreased risk in reverting back into conflict.

However, as seen in previous studies, there are also multiple other factors they may impact the risk of conflict recurrence, which I attempt to control for in my analysis. These include:

Type of conflict: The costs of conflict can influence motivations to reengage in violence after the end of war. Studies have found that high costs can either create desires for retribution

9 post-conflict or leave combatants fatigued with resources too limited to engage in further conflict

(Walter 2004). The duration of conflict also plays a factor in the willingness to reengage in violence. Parties that have undergone longer wars are less prone to fight again, echoing the “war weariness” argument of the combatants that have suffered high losses (Fortna 2004).

Type of governance: The inclusiveness of a regime may also impact the outcome of a peace agreement. Commitment problems, which refers to situations in which rebel groups may back out of an agreement because they sense bad faith on the part of the state or feel that the costs of fighting are not high enough to completely disengage, can derail negotiated settlements.

As a result, power sharing provisions are often included in agreements as a mechanism to

“provide mutual benefits and reduce the marginal gains for each side form reneging on a peace deal” (Matanock 2017, 99). Matanock finds that these provisions that allow former combatants turn into political actors can help stabilize peace. Therefore, more inclusive and participatory governments may decrease the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Alternative interventions: In addition to aid, the international community has increasingly deployed UN peacekeeping missions to support peacebuilding strategies, particularly after the

Cold War. The traditional peacekeeping mission, which includes military units and civilian officials, is requested with the consent of parties to the conflict and assists with demobilization and disarmament efforts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Generally, these operations are not authorized to deploy the use of force unless in self-defense. However, peacekeeping missions mandated by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, otherwise known as peace enforcement, are primarily military interventions that are authorized to enforce peace with or without party consent (ibid., 2000). Fortna (2004) argues that the presence of all forms of peacekeeping has reduced the risk of the recurrence of violence and tended to make peace more lasting.

10 Socio-economic status: The socio-economic status of country has been found to have a significant role in estimating the likelihood of the onset of violence as poorer societies are more likely to be susceptible to fall into conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that on average,

“$1,000 less is in per capita income is associated with 41% greater annual odds of civil war onset” (2003, 83). Additionally, GDP per capita has often been used a proxy to represent the state administrative, military, and police capabilities (ibid., 2003).

The disbursement of aid can also be affected by the levels of corruption, and in order for aid to be effectively implemented, there must be low levels of corruption wherein recipients and donors must have the same long-term objectives and priorities. For example, aid allocated for poverty reduction in communities must actually reach these communities instead of being pocketed by the government (Berrebi and Thelen 2011). Furthermore, with aid that is allocated for specific projects and initiatives, there must an effort commitment to successfully carry out these projects and initiatives. In their analysis of a community-driven development program in the Philippines (KALAHI-CIDSS), Crost et al. (2014) find that the program’s objectives to

“enhance local infrastructure, governance, participation, and social cohesion” may have been affected by incidents of sabotage by insurgents (1836). As a result, there was a significant increase in violence, mostly suffered by government forces in this case.

Provisions of the peace agreement: The contents of peace agreements include various military provisions with the goals of sustaining lasting peace, and therefore should work to decrease the risk of recurring violence. The variables that I have included in my analysis are provisions that specifically outline the implementation of a military ceasefire and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program.

11 Since the mid-1990s, there has been increase in the deployment of DDR programs, as they are considered as integral components of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies. A 2004 UN report addressing global threats, challenges, and change stated that that the demobilization of combatants was the “single most important factor determining the success of peace operations” (Waldorf 2013, 703). The success of DDR programs has been mixed, although there does seem to be evidence that the inclusion of DDR programs in peace agreements do lead to a greater likelihood of sustained peace.

While the ceasefire and DDR provisions indicators in my data are limited in that it does not show whether or not these measures have been implemented and to what extent, the intent behind the inclusion of these provisions may indicate a greater willingness of all parties to demobilize and maintain peace.

12 Empirical Analysis

The following section provides an analysis of my hypothesis. After a description of my controls and key independent and dependent variables, I test my hypothesis using two methods.

First, I estimate the duration of peace agreements using Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates and compare the probabilities of lasting peace across different ranges of aid shares. I then test my hypothesis using logistic regressions.

The conflict data that will be used for this analysis comes from a replication dataset used in Aila Matanock’s “Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict.” This dataset contains information collected for 110 peace agreements between 1975 – 2005 that addressed any type of internal conflict resulting in 25 or more battle deaths per year. By examining conflicts that have ended in peace agreements, the dataset provides an official end date to the conflict, thus avoiding any issues with determining conflict termination (i.e. right censoring). Peace settlements that involve more than one rebel group are also separated as dyadic settlements in the data because “conflict recurs on a dyadic level.” As a result, there are 122 observations because 12 agreements had multiple signatories. Overall, the dataset covers 49 civil conflicts in 43 states.

Data Description

Most of the countries in this dataset can be classified as low income or lower-middle income countries, with the United Kingdom and Israel being the outliers. The average civil conflict lasted just over a year: the longest conflicts occurred in Israel/Palestine (50 months) and

Guatemala (47 months). The majority of conflicts, 71%, had turned into major wars by the time a peace agreement had been signed. Additionally, a little over half of the peace agreements

13 included DDR provisions. Around 23% of the situations had traditional UN peacekeepers in the country at the time the peace agreement was signed.

The key dependent variable is denoted as failure, which indicates whether or not there has been sustained peace after a period of 5 years; therefore, the dataset also covers the period until 2010 in measuring the recurrence of conflict. Figure 1 illustrates the countries that are included in the dataset, and the number of cases in which peace agreements have failed in each location. The failure of peace is defined as a return to minor conflict (noted earlier as more than

25 battle deaths per year). It is also important to note that the failure of a peace agreement refers specifically to the failure of dyadic peace between the parties that have signed the agreement. For example, if an agreement has successfully led to the demobilization of a participating rebel group, the situation is marked as having not experienced failure. However, that does not signify that the country has avoided conflict. It is possible that another conflict can arise in the country between a separate rebel group and the incumbent government, or another participant to the agreement has not complied with peace.

Figure 1. Post-conflict Countries and Number of Failed Peace Agreements

A preliminary overview of the data shows that the recurrence of violence after peace agreements confirms trends that have been found in previous literature. Figure 2 depicts the various peace agreements by the year they were signed and the number of months before they failed. Out of 122 peace agreements, there are 65 instances in which there has been a recurrence of civil conflict within five years. There is a distinct change in the failure rate before and after the end of the Cold War. Prior to 1991, about 75% of peace agreements failed; however, the majority of peace processes took place after the War and while improved, about 50% of those agreements still eventually failed. In countries where peace has failed, nearly half of those failed

15 (53) within the first year,1 20 of which failed within the first month. While in some cases, the reason for the recurrence in violence is unknown, other agreements failed because either a few members of the rebel group refused to accept the agreement (ex. Chad, Reconciliation

Agreement 1999) or there were continued disputes about the provisions and the peace agreement was never implemented (ex. Comoros, Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2000). After one year, the number of peace agreements that fail considerably drops: 4 agreements fail after that period, and 6 fail after two years. This reinforces conclusions of previous studies that the period immediately following the signing of a peace agreement is a crucial stage for maintaining peace in the peace process (Collier et al. 2003; Call 2012).

There is only one instance in which peace failed within 10 years after having sustained peace after 5 years, the Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional signed in Colombia in 1991.2

Therefore, I assume that my results would generally be comparable even when accounting for a longer period of time. As a result, I focus on the failure of peace by the 5-year mark.

1 One agreement, the Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II in Israel (Palestine) was left out of the scatterplot because of lack of clarity in the amount of time before conflict restarted. 2 This agreement was signed between Colombia and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and could however technically be considered as a success. While the Colombian government officially considers the EPL to be disbanded since the 1991 agreement, dissident members united and continued to fight under another faction, and later allied or joined with the FARC.

Figure 2. Duration of Peace Agreements by Year

The rest of my analysis focuses on the role of foreign aid, which is represented by the key independent variable, share_aid, and describes ODA as a share of a country’s GDP in US 2005 constant prices. The amount is a lagged two-year average. The average amount of aid a post- conflict country received was 5% of its GDP: the lowest receivers of aid were the UK/Northern

Ireland (1998), followed by Zimbabwe (1975), Georgia (1994), and South Africa (1993), all receiving aid consisting of less than 1 percent of their GDP. Yet none of those countries experienced a relapse back into conflict. The highest receivers of aid were Liberia at 21.7%

(1995), Mozambique at 23.4% (1992), and the Democratic Republic of Congo at 26.4% (2003).

17 While Liberia experienced a failure of peace, Mozambique3 and the DRC4 did not see subsequent recurrences in conflict.

Kaplan-Meier Survival Model

In order to further look into what role the amount of aid may have on the peace process, I estimated the durability of the peace agreements using the Kaplan-Meier Survival model, using the share of aid as the treatment. Because the original dataset did not include the amount of time that had elapsed before there was a recurrence in violence, data on the duration of each peace agreement was inputted from the UCDP Database, specifically the UCDP Peace Agreement

Dataset, which includes annotations on the duration of each peace agreement from 1975-2011.5

Situations that did not have a recurrence of violence after 10 years (120 months) were considered censored.

Conflict situations were divided into three groups: Group 1 contained countries that received less than 1% of foreign aid as a share of their GDP (29 countries), Group 2 countries

(48) received between 1% and 5% of aid, and Group 3 countries received more than 5% of aid

(45).

3 Second attempt at implementing a peace agreement between the Mozambican government and RENAMO 4 Also a second attempt at implementing a peace agreement that ended the Second Congo War. While the government has maintained control over the country, proxy violence in the eastern region of the country between Rwanda and the DRC has contributed to continued instability. 5 Some peace agreements were coded as having failed in the UCDP dataset, and not having failed in the Matanock Dataset. Where there was disagreement, I amended the Matanock dataset to reflect the UCDP categorization.

Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves

The results generally follow the initial hypothesis. After 20 months, the survival of a peace agreement remains relatively high for Group 1 countries at just over 75%. This could be explained by the inclusion of situations that may not have needed to rely on foreign aid to maintain peace, possibly indicating that they had alternative resources and capabilities to implement and manage and sustain peace. However, there is a noticeable difference in the probabilities of survival within the first 12 months between Groups 2 and 3. For Group 2, the probability of a peace agreement surviving within the first 3 months is at 75%, whereas for

19 Group 3, the probability of survival is at 85%. Group 3’s probability of survival reaches 75% at the end of 8 months, where by that time, Group 2’s probability of survival drops to around 62%.

While this graph does not account for confounding factors such as the differences in the provisions of peace agreements or nature of conflict, it exposes a possible relationship between the amount of aid and durability of peace.

Regression Results

As a result, for my regression analysis, I choose a number of control factors to try to account for these differences and attempt to see if my hypothesis still holds. The equation that I use for my regression analysis is as follows:

�� = � + � ∗ �ℎ�� + � ∗ � + �

whereas Failure is a dummy variable that captures failure of peace within 5 years. Share of Aid represents the aid share of GDP, with C representing the vector of controls. As previously mentioned, the chosen control variables seek to account for various elements that may affect or contribute to the maintenance of peace in a post-conflict situation. These cover the nature of the conflict (duration of conflict and status as a major war) which could impact the willingness to demobilize, the type of governance (regime type) which could impact the reception and distribution of aid, the presence of alternative external interventions (UN peacekeeping and

Chapter VII missions), socio-economic status (real GDP per capita and level of corruption), and contents of the peace agreement (inclusion of ceasefire and DDR provisions).6

The results are presented in Table 1 below. Because my results will reflect whether or not peace is more or less likely to fail based on the amount of aid, I use a logistic regression for all

6 Table A1 in the Appendix provides definitions for these variables. All the variables were compiled by Aila Matanock using various sources. Some data for failure were amended with the author’s research using UCDP data. Table A2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for these variables.

20 my models using robust standard errors. In Model 1, I regress failure on the share of aid, and while there is a negative relationship, it is not significant (p=0.3), meaning that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between the proportion of aid and the recurrence of conflict. Model 2 includes controls without peace agreement provisions to consider that more than a few situations were not able to implement these provisions and these provisions are often implemented to varying degrees. However, these controls are included in Model 4. Because of the limited number of observations, these models were additionally run without the inclusion of the corruption variable for comparison (Models 3 and 5).

The results of Model 2 show a significant negative relationship between aid and failure

(p=0.04). Using average marginal effects, an increase in one percent in the share of aid of GDP is associated with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of a peace agreement failing, keeping all other controls constant. However, when the peace agreement provisions are added in

Model 4, this relationship is no longer significant (p=0.17).

Table 1. Logit Results Failure of Peace (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Share of Aid -3.286 -8.202** -4.488 -6.157 -3.610 (3.207) (3.975) (3.444) (4.521) (3.653) Conflict Duration - -0.0497 -0.0175 -0.0791* -0.0140 (0.0322) (0.0217) (0.0454) (0.0229) Major war - -1.637* -0.153 -1.511 -0.274 (0.862) (0.551) (1.083) (0.593) Regime (lagged) - 0.508* 0.197 0.459 0.150 (0.298) (0.185) (0.323) (0.185) UN Peacekeeping - 0.735 0.0879 1.534 0.330 (0.917) (0.599) (1.053) (0.657) Chapter VII Missions - -2.297** -0.953 -3.062* -0.979 (1.084) (0.655) (1.581) (0.729) GDP per capita (lagged) - 0.164* -0.000167 0.106 -0.0142 (0.0845) (0.0613) (0.0787) (0.0639) Ceasefire provision - - - -1.182 0.241 (1.035) (0.593) DDR provision - - - -2.294*** -0.992** (0.753) (0.410) Corruption - 1.038*** - -0.923** - (0.391) (0.420) Constant 0.293 3.660** 0.287 6.272*** 0.744 (0.247) (1.428) (0.652) (2.161) (0.821)

Observations 120 77 120 77 120 Log Pseudo Likelihood -82.4 -40.4 -79.7 -34.2 -76.6 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses

Because of the differences in peace agreement failure rates before and after the end of the

Cold War, I also rerun by regressions using data from conflicts that ended in and after 1991, which removes 16 observations. The descriptive statistics of my control variables are similar to those that included all conflicts (Table A3 in the Appendix), and the rate of failure is exactly

50% (53 peace agreements). By removing conflicts pre-1991, I am controlling for behaviors and political environment pre- and during the Cold War that may have affected the likelihood of the recurrence of conflict, including the type of support and aid that came from the international community.

22 The results of these models are in Table 2 and reflect similar outcomes to the models in

Table 1. In Model 7 without the inclusion of peace agreement provisions, there remains a negative relationship between aid and the failure of peace, although the significance of this coefficient has slightly decreased (p=0.06). The average marginal effect of the share of aid is still comparable, with an increase in one percent in the share of aid of GDP being associated with a

1.3 percentage point decrease in the probability of failure, keeping all other controls constant.

Including the peace agreement provisions in Model 9 decreases the significance of the share of aid on failure even more (p=0.22).

Table 2. Post-Cold War Logit Results Failure of Peace (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

Share of Aid -3.664 -7.600* -5.241 -5.261 -4.557 (3.305) (3.999) (3.725) (4.260) (3.915) Conflict Duration - -0.0317 -0.00227 -0.0631 -0.00124 (0.0315) (0.0225) (0.0468) (0.0233) Major war - -2.222** -0.750 -1.701 -0.789 (0.965) (0.615) (1.205) (0.647) Regime (lagged) - 0.629* 0.250 0.491 0.213 (0.361) (0.202) (0.398) (0.207) UN Peacekeeping - 0.652 0.265 1.370 0.393 (0.932) (0.632) (1.027) (0.673) Chapter VII Missions - -2.126** -0.877 -2.904* -0.895 (1.075) (0.667) (1.491) (0.726) GDP per capita (lagged) - 0.162* -0.00147 0.0857 -0.00676 (0.0845) (0.0608) (0.0786) (0.0643) Ceasefire provision - - - -1.000 0.278 (0.992) (0.631) DDR provision - - - -2.230** -0.646 (0.869) (0.440) Corruption - -0.969** - -0.813** - (0.390) (0.412) Constant 0.195 3.242** 0.230 5.730*** 0.459 (0.257) (1.440) (0.710) (2.083) (0.890)

Observations 105 71 105 71 105 Log Pseudo Likelihood -72.2 -36.6 -69.4 -32.04 -68.2 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses

23 Conclusion

The results of my analysis indicate that increasing amounts of foreign aid do not have a significant impact on decreasing the likelihood of conflict recurrence in post-conflict countries.

Additionally, any potential relationship may involve only incremental changes in decreasing the probability of a peace agreement failing. Whether or not these conflicts ended pre-1991, when civil conflicts were more inclined to conclude with decisive victories, also did not adjust my findings.

There are limitations to this analysis. As with many other studies that have researched post-conflict situations, my dataset has the issue of containing a small number of observations. It also only covers only certain subset of violence, namely civil conflict, and out of those, only includes those that have attempted to implement peace agreements. Thus, my results are constrained to a particular type of post-conflict environment and prevent me from generalizing any conclusions.

It is additionally difficult to capture the entire complexity of warfare through the control variables that I have chosen. For example, while civil conflict primarily involves intrastate actors and violence, neighboring countries and regional organizations often have a vested interest in the outcomes of these conflicts and have intervened in various situations in order to help mediate the peace process or provide support to certain parties. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of

Congo has in part been perpetuated by states and rebel groups based in surrounding Great Lakes

Region, for example in Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda, for reasons including common ethnic ties and sympathies (Ahere 2012). As a result, the effectiveness of aid flowing into the country may have been decreased by counteracting forces. Because these nuances are probably not sufficiently controlled for in my regression, there are likely to be issues of omitted variable bias.

24 Finally, it is possible that the disbursement of foreign aid is endogenous to the expectations of peace and the implementation of peace provisions. Countries may be more likely to offer aid to states that they believe have the capacity to maintain peaceful environments.

Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that in the allocation of aid, donors are more likely to direct aid to low-income, low-population countries where they have strategic interests.

Although post-conflict countries on average receive more foreign aid than other situations, of which amounts are more likely allocated to efforts going towards creating environments that mitigate conflict, my results suggest that simply funneling large amounts of aid into a fragile country will not ensure a peaceful society. These findings are in line with

Collier and Hoeffler’s (2002) general conclusions that the direct effect of aid on the risk of conflict varies depending on the models that they have chosen. I would not go as far as concluding that aid plays no role in the peace process. Previous studies have found that foreign aid has helped contribute to temporary growth spurts in the immediate years of following post- conflict peace (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

However, given the diversity of post-conflict environments, including the motivations and interests of former combatants, I would recommend that policymakers and donors place equal importance on the way foreign aid is being implemented and distributed in post-conflict situations. By making sure that aid is holistically addressing and meeting the needs of the communities and states that are being assisted, donors may likely find that their contributions become more effective in promoting and maintaining peace.

25 Appendix

Table A1. Definitions of Variables7 Variable Definition Dependent Variable Dichotomous variable indicating whether there has been a Failure of Peace recurrence of conflict (at least 25 battle deaths/year) within five years (source: Matanock, UCDP) Key Independent Variable Development assistance that has been averaged over the two Share of Aid prior years as a share of the country’s GDP in US 2005 constant prices (source: Penn World Table Version 7.1) Control Variables Number of years of dyadic conflict between the government Conflict Duration and rebel group leading up to the peace agreement (source: Kreutz 2010)

Dichotomous variable indicating whether the conflict has Major War reached 1000+ battle deaths up to the point the peace agreement has been signed (source: UCDP)

A lagged categorical variable that ranks the type of government from the most to least inclusive: 0=Parliamentary Regime democracy, 1=Mixed (semi‐presidential) democracy, 2=Presidential democracy, 3=Civilian dictatorship, 4=Military dictatorship, 5=Royal dictatorship (source: Cheibub et al. 2009)

Dichotomous variable indicating whether there was a U.N.

Peacekeeping mission on the ground when the peace U.N. Peacekeeping agreement was signed. These do not include “political missions.” (source: Nygard et al. 2011)

Dichotomous variable indicating whether there is a presence Chapter VII missions of a Chapter VII military intervention in the country (source: Doyle and Sambanis 2000)

A lagged variable of real GDP per capita measured in the GDP per capita 1000s, converted at 2005 prices (source: Penn World Table Version 7.1)

7 Sources referenced by Matanock in her dataset

Table A1. (cont.) Definitions of Variables Variable Definition

A lagged continuous variable describing the degree of

corruption from most to least on a scale of 0 to 5. Sourced Corruption from the International Country Risk Guide from 1984 to present. (source: ICRG)

Dichotomous variable indicating whether there has been a Ceasefire provision for a ceasefire in the peace agreement (source: UCDP)

Dichotomous variable indicating whether there has been a DDR provision for a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in the peace agreement (source: UCDP)

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable # of Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max

Failure of Peace 122 0.533 0.5 0 1 Share of Aid of GDP 120 0.049 0.054 2.49e-07 0.264 Conflict Duration 122 13.9 12.15 0 50 Major war 122 0.713 0.454 0 1 Regime (lagged) 122 2.79 1.21 0 4 UN Peacekeeping 122 0.23 0.422 0 1 Chapter VII missions 122 0.156 0.364 0 1 GDP per capita (1000s, lagged) 122 2.34 4.21 0.161 27.02 Corruption 78 2.27 1.1 0 5 Ceasefire 122 0.787 0.411 0 1 DDR 122 0.525 0.501 0 1

Table A3. Post-Cold War Descriptive Statistics

Variable # of Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max

Failure of Peace 106 0.5 0.502 0 1 Share of Aid of GDP 105 0.049 0.056 2.49e-07 0.264 Conflict Duration 106 14.34 12.88 0 50 Major war 106 0.708 0.457 0 1 Regime (lagged) 106 2.78 1.21 0 4 UN Peacekeeping 106 0.255 0.438 0 1 Chapter VII missions 106 0.156 0.364 0 1 GDP per capita (1000s, lagged) 106 2.49 4.47 0.161 27.02 Corruption 72 2.27 1.13 0 5 Ceasefire 106 0.783 0.414 0 1 DDR 106 0.585 0.495 0 1

28 Table A4. List of Peace Agreements State Year Peace Agreement Party Fail Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1975 Declaration of intent ANC 1 government Philippines: Mindanao 1976 Tripoli Agreement MNLF 1 Chad: government 1978 Basic Charter (Fundamental Charter) FAN 1 Chad: government 1978 Khartoum Agreement FAN 1 South Africa: Namibia 1978 Western Contact Group (WCG) Settlement Proposal SWAPO 1 Chad: government 1979 Kano Accord FAN 1 Chad: government 1979 Kano Accord FAP 1 Mauritania: Western 1979 Algiers Agreement POLISARIO 0 Sahara Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1979 Lancaster House Agreement PF 0 government Mozambique: Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity 1984 RENAMO 1 government and Conflict Uganda: government 1985 Nairobi Peace Agreement NRA 1 Philippines: Mindanao 1987 Jeddah Accord MNLF 1 India: Tripura 1988 Memorandum of Understanding with TNV TNV 0 Sudan: government 1988 DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement SPLM/A 1 Uganda: government 1988 Gulu Peace Accord (Pece Peace Agreement) UPDA 0 Angola 1989 The Gbadolite declaration on Angola UNITA 1 Angola 1991 The Bicesse Agreement UNITA 1 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement Cambodia 1991 FUNCINPEC 0 of the Cambodia Conflict Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement Cambodia 1991 KPNLF 0 of the Cambodia Conflict Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement Cambodia 1991 KR 1 of the Cambodia Conflict Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejército Popular De Colombia 1991 EPL 0 Liberación Guatemala 1991 The Querétaro Agreement URNG 1 Liberia 1991 Lomé Agreement INPFL 1 Liberia 1991 Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement NPFL 1 Mali (Azawad) 1991 Tamanrasset Accord MPA 1 Papua New Guinea 1991 The Honiara Declaration BRA 1 (Bougainville) Yugoslavia (Slovenia) 1991 Brioni Agreement Slovenia 0 Chad 1992 El Geneina agreement FNT 1 El Salvador 1992 The Chapultepec Peace Agreement FMLN 0 Mali (Azawad) 1992 Pacte National MPA 1 Mozambique 1992 The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP) RENAMO 0 Afghanistan 1993 Islamabad accord HII 1 Afghanistan 1993 Islamabad accord HIII 1

29 Table A4. (cont.) List of Peace Agreements State Year Peace Agreement Party Fail Afghanistan 1993 Jalalabad agreement HII 0 Chad 1993 Tripoli 1 Agreement CNR 1 Haiti 1993 The Governor's Island agreement military 1 India (Bodoland) 1993 Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993 ABSU 0 India (Tripura) 1993 Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993 ATTF 1 Liberia 1993 Cotonou Peace Agreement NPFL 1 Niger 1993 Paris Accord FLAA 1 Rwanda 1993 Arusha Accords FPR 1 Somalia 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement USC or SPM 1 South Africa: 1993 Interim Constitution ANC 0 government Angola 1994 The Lusaka Protocol UNITA 1 Bosnia and 1994 The Washington Agreement Croat 0 Herzegovina (Croat) Chad 1994 Abeche agreement FNT 0 Chad 1994 Bangui-2 Agreement CSNPD 0 Djibouti 1994 Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale FRUD 0 Declaration on measures for a political settlement of Georgia (Abkhazia) 1994 Abkhazia 0 the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict Liberia 1994 Akosombo Peace Agreement NPFL 1 Papua New Guinea 1994 Honiara Commitments to Peace BRA 1 (Bougainville) Somalia 1994 Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation USC/SNA 1 Bosnia and The General Framework Agreement for Peace in 1995 Serb 0 Herzegovina (Serb) Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) Chad 1995 The Dougia Accord MDD 1 Croatia (Serb) 1995 The Erdut Agreement Krajina 0 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Israel (Palestine) 1995 PLO/Fatah 0 Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B Liberia 1995 Abuja Peace Agreement [Liberia] NPFL 0 Accord e’tablissant une paix définitive entre le Niger (Air and 1995 gouvernement de la republique du Niger et CRA 0 Azawad) lórganisation de la résistance armée military Philippines 1995 GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace 0 faction Afghanistan 1996 Mahipar agreement HII 1 The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance Guatemala 1996 URNG 0 and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements Liberia 1996 Abuja II Peace Agreement NPFL 0 Mexico 1996 The San Andrés Accords EZLN 1 Philippines 1996 Mindanao Final Agreement MNLF 0 (Mindanao) Sierra Leone 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement RUF 1

30 Table A4. (cont.) List of Peace Agreements State Year Peace Agreement Party Fail Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord JSS/SB 0 Tracts) Chad 1997 National reconciliation agreement CDR or FNT 0 Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Moldova (Dniestr) 1997 Relations between the Republic of Moldova and PMR 0 Transdniestria Somalia 1997 The Cairo Declaration on Somalia USC/SNA 1 The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Tajikistan 1997 Establishment of Peace and National Accord in UTO 0 Tajikistan Chad 1998 Donya agreement FARF 0 Guinea Bissau 1998 Abuja Peace Agreement junta 1 UK (Northern Ireland) 1998 The Good Friday Agreement PIRA 0 Chad 1999 Reconciliation agreement MDD 0 Colombia 1999 Common Agenda for the Path to a New Colombia FARC 1 Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Congo 1999 Cocoyes 0 Hostilités Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Congo 1999 Ninjas 0 Hostilités Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Congo 1999 Ntsiloulous 1 Hostilités Democratic Republic 1999 Lusaka Accord MLC 1 of Congo Democratic Republic 1999 Lusaka Accord RCD 1 of Congo Democratic Republic 1999 Lusaka Accord RCD-ML 1 of Congo Israel (Palestine) 1999 The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II PLO/Fatah 1 Israel (Palestine) 1999 The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II PNA 1 Sierra Leone 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement RUF 1 Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1999 Kosovo peace agreement 1 Kosovo 0 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 2000 CNDD 0 Burundi Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 2000 FROLINA 0 Burundi Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 2000 PALIPEHUTU 0 Burundi Comoros (Anjouan) 2000 The Famboni Declaration MPA 1 Sierra Leone 2000 Abuja Ceasefire Agreement RUF 0 Comoros (Anjouan) 2001 The Famboni II Agreement MPA 0 Djibouti 2001 Accord de reforme et concorde civile FRUD-AD 0 Macedonia 2001 The Ohrid Agreement UCK 0 Papua New Guinea 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement BRA 0 (Bougainville)

31 Table A4. (cont.) List of Peace Agreements State Year Peace Agreement Party Fail Agreement on Peace between the government of the Philippines 2001 Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic MILF 1 (Mindanao) Liberation Front Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Angola 2002 UNITA 0 Intent Chad 2002 Tripoli 2 agreement MDJT 1 Colombia 2002 Los Pozos Accord FARC 1 Indonesia (Aceh) 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement GAM 1 Uganda 2002 Yumbe Peace Agreement UNRF II 0 The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Burundi 2003 Government and the Forces pour la defence de la CNDD-FDD 0 democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nk˙runziza Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros (Anjouan) 2003 MPA 0 Comoros Democratic Republic 2003 Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act MLC 0 of Congo Democratic Republic 2003 Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act RCD 0 of Congo Democratic Republic 2003 Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act RCD-ML 0 of Congo Ivory Coast 2003 Accra II MJP 1 Ivory Coast 2003 Accra II MPCI 1 Ivory Coast 2003 Accra II MPIGO 1 Ivory Coast 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords MJP 1 Ivory Coast 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords MPCI 1 Ivory Coast 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords MPIGO 1 Liberia 2003 Accra Peace Agreement LURD 0 Liberia 2003 Accra Peace Agreement MODEL 0 Ivory Coast 2004 Accra III MJP 1 Ivory Coast 2004 Accra III MPCI 1 Ivory Coast 2004 Accra III MPIGO 1 Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la Senegal (Casamance) 2004 republique du Senegal el le Mouvement des forces MFDC 0 democratique de la Casamace (MFDC) Chad 2005 Yebibou agreement 2005 MDJT 0 Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesia (Aceh) 2005 Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the GAM 0 Free Aceh Movement Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte Ivory Coast 2005 FN 0 d'Ivoire Sudan (Southern 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement SPLM/A 0 Sudan) Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Sudan: government 2005 NDA 0 Agreement)

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