Special flights:

Special flights: The GDR and liberation movements in Southern Africa Hans Georg Schleicher and Illona Schleicher

Special Flights to Southern Africa

Special Flights to Southern Africa Hans-Georg Schleicher & Ilona Schleicher // SAPES BOOKS

AFRICA z SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (SARIPS) SAPES TRUST SOUTHERN AFRICA SPECIALISED STUDIES SERIES Series Editor: Ibbo Mandaza Titles in the Series The Land Question in , 1995, Sam Moyo The Political Economy of in SADC, 1995, Balefi Tsie Women Teachers Under , 1997, Shirley Sebakwane (Mahlase) Labour and Migration in Southern Africa, 1998, Lloyd M. Sach ikonye (ed.) Special Flights to Southern Africa, 1998, Hans-Georg and Ilona Schleicher

First Published 1998 by SAPPHO P.O. Box MP 1005 Mount Pleasant Harare Zimbabwe ©SAPES Trust 1998 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, including electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Typesetting by Southern Africa Printing and Publishing House (SAPPHO) (Pvt.) Ltd., ISBN 1-77905-071-2 Cover design: J.P. Studio CONTENTS Acknowledgements Foreword List of abbreviations INT RO D UC T IO N ...... I PART O NE: ...... 7 Solidarity in difficult times: The GDR and the ANC in the 1960s The sanctions discussion in the GDR ...... 10 Conflict between foreign policy and foreign trade aims Trade unions, the and the boycott movement Criticism by ANC and SACP The international sanctions debate heats up The boycott decision 1963, problems of its implementation The GDR's trading interests in South Africa The boycott of South African sports Solidarity during the Rivonia trial and for Abram Fischer ...... 27 Centralistic structure versus grassroots movement Aims and progress of the solidarity campaign Exposing cooperation between Bonn and International cooperation during the Rivonia trial Solidarity tor Abram Fischer Propaganda, armed struggle, and the long way home for ANC and SACP ...... 50 Sechaba The African Communist Political and armed struggle: The GDR's position Military, intelligence and security training in the GDR N otes ...... 66

PART TWO: Zimbabwe. A special chapter in the CDR's Africa policy Prologue: Fifty flights from Luanda to Lusaka ...... 79 Initial contacts with ZAPU ZAPU as perceived by the GDR in the early 1960s GDR and ZANU: The "Chinese issue" Solidarity against UDI ...... 101 Political and material support for ZAPU GDR's attitude towards armed struggle Crisis and consolidation: cooperation with ZAPU 1969-1975 Cooperation in the heat of the struggle (1976-1980) ...... 118 A new quality in relations with ZAPU The ZAPU-ZANU dilemma of the GDR From Lancaster House to independence Epilogue: The new beginning ...... 139 N otes ...... 145 PART THREE: ...... 163 Traditions of solidarity The UN Namibia plan and GDR solidarity with SWAPO ...... 168 GDR and resolution 435: From reservations to support Top-level decision on cooperation with SWAPO Material support for SW APO ...... 182 The structure of "material solidarity" Capabilities and constraints of material solidarity Aid for SWAPO's camps and workshops Care for the wounded in Berlin-Buch: "Jacob Morenga" Ward 303 Cooperation in Education and training: Namibians in the GDR .... 198 Vocational training: Experiences in the Rostock sea port Berlin, Stassfurt, Cuanza Sul: Assistance in pullic education

Support for the armed struggle ...... 211 From paramilitary equipment to arms and ammunition Intensified cooperation in the "non-civilian" field Party relations between SED and SW APO ...... 215 SWAPO students in Rostock Discussions on Namibia's future The implementation of resolution 435 ...... "New thinking" in GDR's African policy Motives for the participation in the UN independence process GDR's involvement with the implementation of resolution 435 Notes ...... 2 . 234 Appendix ...... 247 Selected bibliography Archival Sources and unpublished Documents ...... 249 Interview s ...... 250 Books and Articles ...... 251 Yearbooks, Documents, Reference books ...... 257 Index ...... 261

Acknowledgements We entered into this venture mainly due to the encouragement we received from old and new friends in Southern Africa. We would like to express our sincere thanks to Zimbabwean Minister Nathan Shamuyarira in particular who initiated this book and lent his support to us right from the beginning. Without the financial assistance firom Solidaritaetsdienst- international e.V., Berlin, the completion of the manuscript in English would have been impossible. Its sincere interest in dealing with its own history and the adherence to the values of international solidarity was expressed by supporting the authors in various ways. SAPES Trust and The Southern Africa Printing and Publishing House showed great interest in the volume. We are grateful for the confidence placed in us by Dr Ibbo Mandaza and his colleagues. We would not have managed to present this piece of work in such a short space of time without the professional assistance and advise from the staff of the FederalArchives (Sti/lung Archiv der Pa'erien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (Berlin) and Adteilungen Potsdam). Knowledge from the files become much more lively in combination with the personal experiences of people actively involved in the relations between GDR and liberation movements in Southern Africa. Thanks to all our African and German friends and partners who readily agreed to be interviewed. Last but not least, we would like to extent our thanks to the translators. Brigitte and Karlheinz Ringleb, and their colleague Kathrine Vanovitch not only for the translation but also for the critical comments on the manuscript.

Foreword Marking South African Freedom Day, South Africa's embassy in Bonn invited friends of their country, for the most part representatives of nongovernmental organisations, for a seminar in late April 1996 to muster support for "the second phase of the struggle: attaining sustainable growth in South Africa". Dr Eid- Simon, a member of the Greens elected to the German parliament, was asked to address the gathering on behalf of the German guests. Recalling the long struggle waged by German opponents of apartheid. she noted that "white South Africans had man\, friends in who were more powerful than the fi'iends of black South Africans." This remark made me to comment, applauded by the seminar participants, that I had lived in a German state to which this did not apply. The GDR had supported the ANC's struggle politically and materially, rejecting apartheid on grounds of principle, and not least because of the bitter experience with German fascism. Any attempt to review and interpret history called for a differentiated approach, I appealed. This book sets out to achieve just that. The authors examine the GDR's relations with liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, which are today the governing political forces in their countries. They examine this in the light of their own intensive research, drawing on archival material, interviews with Germans and Africans who were involved, and their own experiences. With this exercise, they are rectifying the frequently superficial and one-sided pictures which the GDR, and also its adversaries in the West, used to paint in the Cold War period. Support for liberation organisations in the above-named countries was, from the outset, chiefly organised by the Solidarity Committee of the GDR which was founded in 1960. The Committee was subject, in its policy, to decisions by the Socialist Unity Party, the country's ruling party. Solidarity project operations were financed from funds donated by trade unions, political parties, mass organisations and individuals. These funds at times exceeded 100 million GDR marks a year. The objectives of the projects were closely linked to the government "anti- imperialist" foreign policy. This influence, combined with the fact that the Solidarity Committee virtually held a monopoly on raising resources and providing assistance to Third World recipients and that moral and political pressure was occasionally exerted on people to donate funds, tended to damper the commitment of some parts of the East German population. Nonetheless, increasing sections of the population embraced the ideals of international solidarity as advocated by the Solidarity Committee. The struggle against racism and apartheid, the libera- tion of the Portuguese colonies, the resistance of the people of to US aggression, and the fight of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua appeared clearly justified in view of the world situation in those days. Besides, support for liberation movements in Southern Africa was consistent with resolutions adopted by the (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). When the smouldering economic crisis surfaced in the GDR in the 1980s and the planned economy proved increasingly incapable of turning out sufficient quantities of goods required for solidarity projects, Gunter Mittag, the SED Politbureau member responsible for economic policy, initiated a decision compelling trade unions to reduce their solidarity donation intake. This decision met with angry criticism from trade unionists and others, and had to be officially withdrawn a year later. Donors were evidently convinced of the need for practical international solidarity and resisted restrictions on their willingness to help. Arguably, there could have been no clearer indication of a broadly cherished sentiment of solidarity among the GDR population. The idea was also taken up by protestant churches in the GDR, which joined the anti-racism programme of the World Council of Churches from its incipience in 1969. They assisted Southern Africa liberation movements, in cooperation with the Solidarity Committee. For example, they printed mathematics textbooks in the early 1970s for use in liberation areas of , and Guinea-Bissau. The main constraint encountered sheds light on another important aspect. Contrary to official claims, there was considerable friction in the GDR between political principles and convictions, on the one hand, and economic capacity and requirements, on the other. Officials in charge of economic administration tended to earmark products which were dispensable inl the GDR economy and were none too modern, for solidarity projects. If, in spite of this, liberation movements received supplies which really met their needs, this was not least due to the insistance of Solidarity Committee personnel. These tussles were well screened from the public at large. Seen from today's angle, the lack of transparency and the avoidance of public and open discussion was a grave deficiency of "real existing ". It prevented the formation of genuine consensus and conveyed the impression that decisions were passed down from the top of monolithic party and state apparatus and unquestioningly and unscrupulously implemented by apparatchiks. The analysis undertaken in this book also shows that solidarity for the liberation movements was not as selfless as GDR propaganda claimed. It was heavily conditioned by specific interests of the East German state in the

East-West confrontation, notably the inter-German antagonism during the Cold War. The GDR was struggling hard to gain general international recognition and expected its partners to support this struggle unwaveringly. If one studies the papers and decisions of those times in retrospect, one wonders whether a more relaxed approach might not have demonstrated greater sovereign composure, and probably to greater effect, than constant attempts to badger fi'iends into action. The authors suggest that the GDR's policies were not static but underwent evolutions in the forty years of its existence. Its foreign-policy makers tried in particular to react to international changes and to face facts, such as the immense developmental difficulties in Mozambique and Angola. In this way, the traditional paradigm of international class struggle as an interpretation of the situation in Southern Africa was progressively replaced by an emphasis on peaceful international cooperation to resolve the grave problems. In the end, the GDR even envisaged cooperation with the West German state in Namibia after independence. But things did not come to that. On 3 October 1990 the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany. After lengthy preparations, Solidaritaetsdienst-international e.V. was set up on 6 October 1990 as a non- governmental organisation. It has since been engaged in international solidarity, drawing on positive expertise and experience inherited from the GDR, but with rectifications or improvements where necessary. This has not been an easy venture, for although the GDR's solidarity was with the right side, the potential of this historical fact may have been diminished, for the policy of solidarity was part and parcel of a socialist experiment which has proved unsustainable and unfit to survive. By the same token, the links between apartheid and West German economic and political interests were a fact which must not be allowed to sink into oblivion. However, it would be counter-productive now, and possibly damaging to a new and better future, to cling to old patterns of confrontation. sets an example. Although, after his long imprisonment on Robben Island, he would have good reason to demand redress and punishment, he has been calling fbr reconciliation, seeking to bring rormer adversaries together. He acted accordingly during his visit to Germany, where he expressed gratitude for the GDR's solidarity and the efforts of other German activities in eliminating the "scourge of apartheid", and also extended a hand to German businesses which had maintained close ties with the apartheid state. He did this not only because he is aware that economic relations with German are important for his country and the entire region, but also because he realised that justice and peace cannot prevail unless former adversaries come to terms with each other and discover their common responsibility. South Africa is faced with a tremendous historic challenge. There is a rnomunting awareness that "building socialism" as Eastern Europe tried to do will be moving down a blind alley, but that capitalism in its present make-up cannot produce the kind of social justice which the Reconstruction and Development Programme of the new South African Government wants to establish. "The problems of reconstruction are harder than those of the struggle against apartheid," said Mandela in Berlin. There are no patented recipes for that reconstruction, but only ideas for the first steps. It is an evolution that will require patience and stamina. No individual can meet that challenge alone, not even Mandela. But his humanity and his vision of a society acting in concert hold out a chance that many people, not only in South Africa but the world over, will be inspired to think and act as he does. GDR solidarity, selected examples of which are described in this book, has bequeathed to us the commitment to aid that process. Carl Ordnung Chairman Soliduritusdienst international e. V. Berlin, end of May 1996.

List of Abbreviations AAPSO ANC ANC ANC ATUC CDU CSU COREMO COSATU CPSU DAFRIG DFD DGB DTA FDGB FDJ FRELIMO FROLIZI ICFTU IO. IDAF JMC KANU KBW KPD MK MPLA NDP NNF A fro-Asian People's Organisation African National Congress (South Africa) African National Council (Zimbabwe) African National Congress (Southern Rhodesia) African Trade Union Congress of South Rhodesia Christlich- Demokratische Union / Christian Democratic Union Christlich-Soziale Union / Christian Social Union Comit, Revolucionario de Mocambique/Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique Congress of South African Trade Unions Communist Party of the Soviet Union Deutsch-Afrikanische Gesellschaft/ German-African Society Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands/ Democratic Women's League of Germany Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund / German Trade Union Confederation Democratic Turnhalle Alliance Freier Deutscher GewerkschaftsbUnd/ Confederation of Free German Trade Unions Freie Deutsche Jugend/Free German Youth Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique/ Front for the Liberation of Mozambique Front for the Liberation of Zimbabve International Confederation of Free Trade Unions International Organisation of Journalists International Defence and Aid Fund Joint Military Command Kenya African National Union Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutsch lands/ Communist Federation of West Germany Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands/Comm tin ist Party of Germany Umkhonto we Sizwe Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola/People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola National Democratic Party National Front of Namibia

NUNW National Union of Namibian Workers OAU Organisation of African Unity PAIGC Partido Africano da Independencia da Guin, e Cabo Verde/ African Party for the Independence of Guinee and Cabo Verde PAC Pan Africanist Congress PF Patriotic Front PLAN People's Liberation Army of Namibia RENAMO Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique/ National Resistance Movement of Mozambique SACP South African Communist Party SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions SAIC South African Indian Congress SANROC South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/ Socialist Unity Party of Germany SEW Sozialistische Einheitspartei Westberlins /Socialist Unity Party of Berlin (West) SODI Sol idaritaetsd ienst-international e.V. SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands /Social Democratic Party of Germany SWANU South West African National Union SWAPO People's Organisation UDF United Democratic Front UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNIP United Independence Party UNITA Uniao para a Independencia Total de Angola/Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNTA Uniao Nacional doe Trabalhadores de Angola / National Union of the Angolan Workers UNTAG United Nation's Transitional Assistance Group VDJ Verband der Journal isten/Journal ists Union WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions ZACU Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union ZIPA Zimbabwe People's Army ZIPRA Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Introduction What sense does it make, today, to write about the GDR's involvement in Southern Africa, and specifically its relations with liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, given that the GDR no longer exists? Who will want to read about it now? On the other hand, has enough time passed bN already for approaching the issues involved objectively? The authors have several motives for embarking on this venture. Firstly, this book is intended to be a reflection by East Germans on the history of the former German Democratic Republic and, by implication, on the greater part of their own lives. They wish to present their conclusions from this scrutiny for discussion. To many people in eastern Germany, this exercise is a vital reaction to the radical social change they have experienced since the upheaval of autumn 1989. Coming to terms with all their past experiences, positive and negative, is indispensable, for it enables them to clear their minds and regain the energy and initiative they need to find their place in the united Gennany. In a way, the new conditions are fortuitous: the blinkers of a dogmatic ideology which history has proved to be unsustainable are falling away. Discipline and self-discipline, imposed or instilled in the name of loyalty to the old political system and government, cease to obstruct the view, and the rules of the Cold War no longer burden thinking. On the other hand, the ongoing discussion about the GDR's history has only too often been hijacked by the expediencies of day-to-day politics, making it harder to gain acceptance for a discriminating review of the last few decades. But neither prejudice nor nostalgia is helpful when analysing facts or circumstances in the GDR before its implosion. All this applies equally to the GDR's international relations, which have till now largely been excluded from the debate about 's past, and notably to its links with national liberation movements. These links were especially close in the case of Southern Africa, where they have left many traces, not least a multitude of human contacts. For an important span of their lives, the authors were actively involved in that association, such that they have professional and personal motives for their concern with the issues addressed in the present publication. Secondly, many of the GDR's one-time African partners are interested in a historical review, and this has repeatedly been indicated to the authors during recent visits to Southern Africa. There is an interest in learning more about their former allies, their motives, the internal evolutions, and hitroduction the causes of ultimate failure. In South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, we received a host of suggestions and much encouragement for the present project. A third point, probably of major importance to readers of the book in southern Africa, is that the history of relations is to a certain extent common history of those who were actively involved, or indeed co-operated with one another, in the past. Research should uncover facts and inter-relationships which may help us understand the history of both sides. As a matter of fact, the liberation movements had little time and few resources to archive documents while they were out fighting colonial and racial repression. Researchers enquiring into their own countries recent history might, therefore, appreciate the chance to study material on the international links of liberation movements as recorded by their former partners. Conditions for examining and assessing written sources are extremely favourable in Germany. After the GDR's collapse, the archives of its former political parties and mass organisations and, with a few exceptions, those of its governmental departments, were unrestrictedly opened for professional research. It has, therefore, been easy for us to examine the documentary evidence relating to the GDR's cooperation with liberation movements. Initial results were presented in two volumes which contained contributions on different aspects of the GDR's African policies. 'The present book focuses on the GDR's relations with national liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The authors have attempted to read and analyse the records on the GDR's association with southern African liberation movements within the context, on the one hand, of evolutions in East German society, and on the other, of internal developments within the liberation organisations, against the background of overall conditions in the southern African region and EastWest confrontation during the Cold War era. But more often than not, those contexts could only be dealt with in sketchy terms. This applies to the conflictridden evolution of the liberation movements, knowledge of which is crucial to understand the development of their links with the GDR. Similarly, the GDR's specific interests, its leeway within the Eastern bloc and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the interplay between the leading powers of both East and West in southern Africa will still have to be investigated in greater depth. By contrast, the impact of the inter-German confrontation - a highly specific manifestation of East-West conflict and a major factor in East German foreign policy - on the GDR's association with the liberation movements has been described in greater detail, based on ample documentary evidence. On the

Special Flights to Southern f.4rica whole, however, the findings and conclusions presented in this book are merely the result of initial stock-taking, which needs to be carried further by more research, analysis and discussion. Bearing in mind the current state of research, we have, therefore, devoted major attention to presenting an overview of facts on the scope, substance and forms of assistance for Southern African liberation movements, which were formerly published selectively and sporadically. Where sources were comprehensive, and dense enough, and previous explorations of singular issues have been intensive, our current study seeks to enhance the analysis and add more detail. Information provided by insiders in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia has been very helpful in finding answers to open questions, such as how efficient cooperation actually was in the various fields, including military and security matters. Interviews with former East German officials have also contributed to a better understanding of decisions and facts in that connection. The recollections, opinions and experiences of liberation organisation members and their former East German partners which we have incorporated, though still relatively few in number, indicate what a treasure waits to be unearthed by contemporary historical research. The book is divided into three parts. It begins by describing the GDR's solidarity with the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and then looks at GDR's assistance to Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its conflict-ridden relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and, last but not least, dwells on GDR's solidarity with the struggle waged by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). The chapters dealing with the South African liberation movement focus on the 1960s, whereas those on the Zimbabwean organisations cover both the 1960s and the 1970s. The third part, on cooperation with SWAPO, extends from the late 1970s up to Namibian independence in 1990. Thus, the book reflects three decades of GDR policy towards those liberation movements, though with a shifting focus. The historical background at national, regional and global levels outlined in the three parts points to evolutions in the environment of East German relationships with Southern African liberation movements. The portrayal of these relationships includes a closer look at individual features which were of general relevance for the GDR's policy. These were, for example, shared ideological and political values, its own policy objectives internationally and in Germany, and its status as a junior partner of the Soviet Union. Reference is also made to internal decision-making mecha-

Introduction nisms in the GDR and to ways and means of organising international solidarity and assistance under conditions of an administrative, centralistic fornm of government and limited economic capabilities. The first part, on cooperation with the South African liberation movement, reviews the GDR's stand on economic sanctions against the apartheid regime and its solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa, the GDR's conflicting foreign policy and economic interests, and the impact of the inter-German antagonism on cooperation with liberation movements. It also describes in greater detail how solidarity was organised and handled in the GDR's centralistic society, and elaborates on assistance with the production of periodicals and other printed material and the training of guerrilla fighters - lines of cooperation which were also important in the GDR's relations with ZAPU and SWAPO. The second part documents the extensive political and material assistance for ZAPU and traces the causes and development of the thorny relationship between the GDR and ZANU. Besides describing some of the political and ideological fundamentals underlying GDR's attitude towards liberation movements, this part sheds light on repercussions of the Soviet-Chinese conflict and rivalry for the GDR's policies. It also looks at the volatile issue of peaceful co-existence versus support for armed liberation struggle. While this issue is also considered in the other parts of the book, in different contexts, this section deals with the implications in terms of its role for the GDR as ajunior partner of the Soviet Union. The third part, devoted to ties with SWAPO, highlights the positions adopted by the GDR on the United Nations plan for Namibian independence and the diverse and copious assistance extended to this liberation organisation. It shows that the GDR, taking note of international trends, developed a new, constructive stand in support of a political settlement in the south-west of Africa. This shift, like ideas expressed at the level of party relations between SWAPO and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), pointed to a gradual departure from dogmatic views on development problems in the South. Material assistance for SWAPO by means of supplies, training of skilled personnel, and medical services for the sick and wounded, is analysed with the aid of statistics on quantities and funding, against the background of the changing economic situation in the GDR itself. The first signs of a break with unrealistic foreign-policy dogma contrast with an increasing ossification of the domestic situation in the GDR. Hence, the authors combine their description of the significant assistance which the

Special Flights to Southern Africa GDR dedicated to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa with critical comments on East German society, which ult imately failed chiefly because of its undemocratic character. At the same time, we have thought it important to emphasise in all three parts that the assistance provided cannot be ascribed anonymously to societal organisations or 0governmental departments which have ceased to exist together with the centralistic structure they were part of. The solidarity displayed was first and tbremost the fruit of many people's goodwill and commitment. It is these people who primarily deserve credit for assistance from the GDR, appreciated thankfully by partners in the southern African liberation movements. After all, "a friend in need is a friend indeed." Notes I U. Van der Heyden/H.-G. And i. Schleicher: Die DDR Lind Afrika Zwischen Klassenkampf und neum Denken, Hamburg/Muenster 1993, Engagiert fure Afrika. Die DDR und Af'ika vol. 11, Hamburg/Muenster 1994.

,PART ONE South Africa Solidarity in difficult times: The GDR and the ANC iw-the 1960s ... the German Democratic Republic, over the twenty years of its existence, has proved itself to be a constant and powerfil friend of the cause of the South African liberation movement. The spokespersons of the GDR have consistently spoken out against the barbarities of apartheid and racialism; they have protested vigorously against the savage repression and murders of those within our country who fight fbr freedom and human rights. The people of the GDR. like those of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. have rendered invaluable practical aid to our cause. including our brave guerrillas of the people's army. ULmkhonto we Size: aid which shall never be ftirgotten.' It was with these words that Dr Yusuf Dadoo in October 1969 acknowledged the GDR's relationship of solidarity with the South African liberation movement. Indeed these relations, which had roots in the more distant past, had seen a remarkable development since the beginning of the i 960s. Of all national liberation movements the political leadership of the GDR had always considered the South African one particularly important. From the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist ideology and revolution theory they perceived South Africa as the country in sub-Saharan Africa which, because of its level of development, offered the greatest potential for fundamental changes in the direction of socialism. The ongoing process of social differentiation, in particular the emergence of a comparatively strong industrial proletariat, was seen, in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory, to provide the conditions for a national- democratic revolution and for a subsequent revolutionary transition to socialism. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), the oldest African movement for national liberation, had been fighting for democratic rights for the majority of the people and against their racial repression by a white minority. The ANC had formed an alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP), the oldest Marxist party on the continent. Together with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and, later, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the ANC and SACP were the backbone in the decades of struggle against racialist dominance and apartheid in South Africa. The long traditions of this struggle, and its clear social commitment from the outset, explain why the GDR's relations with the South African liberation movement developed relatively early and with particular intensity, and why they remained relatively stable through all the ups and downs of the

Special Flights to Southern Africa battle with apartheid. The strongest link in these relations was the rapport between the SACP and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the GDR. They shared a common ideology and the vision of building a socialist society. German and South African communists had first met in the Communist International. After the Second World War, the SED was helped by the Communist Party of Great Britain in restoring and maintaining contacts with South Africa's communists. In 1948, one year before the GDR came into being, the Verwoerd government in South Africa institutionalised apartheid, confronting the South African liberation movement with increasing repression. The SACP was banned under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. Nonetheless the 1950s were to become a period of mass action against racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa. The ANC, the Congress of Democrats in which many white communists could lawfully engage in political activities, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Coloured People's Congress and SACTU jointly worked out a democratic alternative for South Africa: the Freedom Charter, which was then adopted by the People's Congress in Kliptown on 26 June !955. The alliance defied all political and legal proceedings against it (156 participants of the People's Congress being accused of high treason in a trial lasting from 1956 to 1962) with an impressive mobilisation of the democratic forces. It was in those days of the burgeoning fight against apartheid, in 1955, that Moses Kotane, the future SACP secretarygeneral, paid his first short stopover visit to the GDR.2 SACTU entered into regular correspondence with the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions (FDGB) in Berlin in the latter half of the 1950s. Contacts between the SED and SACP, between the FDGB and SACTU, and finally, after its inception in 1960, between the GDR's Solidarity Committee and the ANC rapidlN developed from the early 1960s onwards. Representatives of South African organisations were frequent guests in Berlin. As apartheid grew more and more entrenched, and its repressive machinery more and more rigid, international solidarity became crucial for the South African liberation movement. This was a good moment for it to seek and find responsive partners in the GDR, which was trying hard to establish ties with African and Asian countries in order to breach the international blockade erected by the West. This was a coincidence of concrete interests, and it lent additional weight to the underlying common ideology and world view. Another factor which cannot be underestimated in explaining the intensity of this developing relationship was that the officials of the SACP, SACTU and, from 1961 onwards of the ANC who visited the GDR found partners who had resisted and fought fascism and racial hatred, with personal experience

South Aftrica: GDR and the ANC in' the 1960s An ANC delegation led by Oliver l tmbo meets the president oj the Soldtrit Commlttee, Kurt Seibt, in Berlin on 17 May 1978, of illegality and exile. This was true of the first chairman of the Solidarity Committee, Horst Brasch, and also of his successor, Heinz H. Schm idt, as well as of Heinrich Eggebrecht, secretary of the Committee. As "'comrade Henry", the latter still has a reputation with the older generation in the ANC and other movements. It may be interesting to add here that all three of them were communists who had returned from what later came to be labelled as "Western emigration" and that their careers in the GDR were therefore not without difficulties, particularly in the course of Stalinist repressive policies in the 1950s.1 In the eyes of veteran activists on either side, German anti-fascist resistance and fight against apartheid had something in common; both in the antiapartheid movement and in the GDR, conditions in South Africa were often compared to those in Nazi Germany. While we concede that the usually simplistic equation in the propaganda was certainly questionable, it has to be noted that there were a number of protagonists of apartheid who drew considerably on the racist ideology of Nazism or had maintained close personal links with top Nazi figures and even sided with Hitler's Germany during the Second World War. Remembrance of those facts instilled another emotional

Special Flights to Southern .41ica component into the sense of affinity between the German anti-fascists who were now responsible for the GDR's external relations and foreign policy, and their South African partners. After the apartheid regime had crushed the structures of the ANC and SACP in South Africa by the mid-1960s, international solidarity became indispensable for the South African liberation movement. It became a lifeline which provided a chance to rethink and to rebuild their strength. In the following we will investigate what contributions the GDR made in that regard. Three priority areas will be brought into focus: the GDR's part in the boycott movement; solidarity with political prisoners; and cooperation on propaganda as well as in the non-civilian sector. The purpose is to elucidate conflicting interests in GDR regarding the trade boycott, to shed light on ways and means oforganising solidarity in the environment of an administratively and centralistically structured society, and to discuss propaganda aid and the training of MK cadres in terms of central issues of strategy and tactics - the correlation between political and armed struggle, between peaceful coexistence and support for liberation movements, The sanctions discussion in the GDR Many readers of the SED's central organ Neues Deutschlndof 23 July 1963 probably did not even notice the very brief reference on the last page to a press release by the Minister of Foreign and inter-German Trade, Julius Balkow, issued the day before, which said that the Trade Ministry had instructed all subordinate agencies not to trade in anyway with firms or other institutions from South Africa.4 It can be assumed that, except for a few insiders, scarcely anybody will have paid much attention to this announcement, because the explanation given, that the measure was taken to support the South African population's struggle against the apartheid regime, did not hint at anything unusual. For it was generally known that the GDR positively took sides with the peoples fighting against colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism. The ministerial decision came without any previous public discussion, and practically nobody was aware that it had been preceded by an internal argument, reflecting conflicting interests, over a number of years. Conflict between foreign policy and foreign trade aims In the second half of the 1950s the South African opponents of apartheid viewed external pressure on the apartheid regime and its international isolation as an effective action that would support their own struggle. At the first AllAfrican People's Conference in Accra in December 1958, the ANC called for

South Africa: GDR and the A NC in the / 960s an international boycott of South African goods, and consequently issued an appeal for a worldwide trading boycott against South Africa. The international boycott movement started at the non-governmental level through action taken by individual consumers in sorne A fi-ican countries, in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and in Scandinavia. The Eastern European countries were not involved. In a statement of 2 March 1959 the Foreign Ministry emphasised the GDR's position as one of a staunch supporter of the peoples of the African continent who are fighting for their freedom, but failed to respond to the call for economic sanctions against South Africa.' However, when newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany (Frankfihrter .4l/gelneine Zeitng of 17 September 1959, Sueddeutsche Zeitung of 15 September 1959) and the French news agency, AFP, reported that a GDR foreign trade delegation was visiting South Africa, the GDR Foreign Ministry did react to save the GDR's reputation. There was too much at stake, because the GDR was anxious to achieve greater international recognition and to break out of its diplomatic isolation, especially in Africa. "'Sending a GDR trading delegation to South Africa," an internal memo of the Ministry stated, "is inconsistent with our repeatedly declared foreign policy principles in support of the African peoples' struggle for national liberation and against colonialism and racial terror. Sending a GDR trading delegation to South Africa is likely to have a politically adverse effect on our relations with African states (Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, UAR) and on our existing contacts with the national liberation movements of the African peoples."8 The Foreign Ministry forced the recall of the trading delegation. Its memo shows that anti-colonialism, anti-racism and solidarity with national liberation movements were principles guiding the GDR's international policy. They determined, although to varying degrees, the thinking and action of people in the political arena. But these principles were not unaffected by concrete interests and requirements in the GDR: they might accord with national interests to form a conflict-free synthesis, when clearly stated anti-colonialism went hand in hand with efforts to enhance the country's international standing, or the principles and the interests might clash. The latter was the case whllen persistent and desperate efforts to improve the domestic economic situation through international trade proved incompatible with a boycott of South Africa. The tensions and conflicts between different political decision-makers which are essentially encountered in any society end normally in compromise which deviates to varying degrees from the initial lofty principles, and the GDR was no exception. But as the ruling dogma claimed that a socialist society was hannonious and free of conflict, and as conflicts could not be thrashed out democratically before the eyes of a critical public, there was usually only one

Special Flights to Southern Atrica way out to hush the conflicts up. At the same time it is true that this "genetic" deficiency inherent in a society of state socialism was constantly reinforced by the general Cold War postures and by the GDR's particular weakness in the highly sensitive area of foreign trade and international relations, where the West wielded superior power. Political players have often cited this circumstance to explain and excuse their own acquiescence in this specific situation. Trade unions, the Cold War and the boycott movement Just as it was Western press reports which triggered off the sensitive reaction of the GDR Foreign Ministry in the case of the trade delegation to South Africa, the stand of the FDGB on the boycott issue also demonstrated how much the policies of GDR institutions were influenced by the East-West conflict and by competition with the other German state.In March 1960 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and a number of affiliated national unions, for example those in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Nordic countries, Japan, Australia, Canada, Austria and the , called for a month-long consumers' boycott of South African goods.' Paradoxically enough, it was the Minister of Foreign and Inter-German Trade of that time, Heinrich Rau, also Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the SED Politbureau, who addressed a letter to the first secretary of the SED CC, Walter Ulbricht, to draw attention to that move. He urged a reaction to the "'devious game of rightist trade union leaders" who, he noted, were using the goods boycott for political canvassing among African and Asian populations "while their governments and capitalists carry on trading with South Africa in the hope that the socialist countries will follow the boycott, which would make room for themselves to step in and expand their business accordingly."'° He proposed that FDGB Chairman, Herbert Warnke, be instructed to take the initiative in the Secretariat of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) for a boycott of freight transport by air, land and sea, encouraging the unions of transport workers, seamen and commercial employees to take appropriate action. Ulbricht endorsed the proposal." Apart from his wholesale rejection of initiatives taken by "reformist" unions, the story shows vhat a great moral dilemma Rau was in: as Minister of Foreign Trade, he had mixed feelings, to say the least, about a commercial boycott of South Africa; as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and as an internationalist and Spanish Civil War veteran, he felt obliged to support the boycott movement. This ambivalence might explain why he was so much

South Afriica. GDR and the .4NC in the 1960s suspicious of a goods boycott on the one hand and in thvour of a transport boycott on the other, although it is evidently difficult to separate the trading of goods from their transportation. Four days later, Warnke wrote to WFTU Secretary-General Louis Saillant asking tbr his opinion. His letter echoed Rau's line of argument alright to the word." Following this initiative, the Secretariat of the WFTU-affiliated Trade Unions International of Transport Workers sent out a circular to national member unions suggesting that they protest to the United Nations about the policy of apartheid. It seems, however, that the Netherlands transport workers union was the only one among all WFTU members to join in the boycott of South African goods by refusing to handle them.'" To explain its nonparticipation, the Soviet trade union of seamen and dockers argued that there were no shipping lines between the USSR and South Africa, and any call for a boycott in these circumstances, rather than producing effective support, might be interpreted as demagogy on the part of Soviet trade unions.'4 This reasoning appears plausible. At the same time, however, it may not be misplaced to suspect that the Soviet hesitation at the boycott in general also reflected commercial interests, given that the Soviet Union and South Africa were involved in a trade of gold and diamonds which was of vital importance to both of them."5 A loss of face had to be avoided. The WFTU General Council therefore decided at its eleventh session in June 1960 to set up an "International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of South Africa", but remained silent about the boycott movement. The FDGB, particularly motivated by its sense of rivalry with the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) in the Federal Republic which took part in the boycott, became a founding member of that committee when it was constituted a year later. The committee called on workers in all countries to use all means at their disposal for the international isolation of the South African Government and for international pressure to eliminate apartheid. This appeal, too, failed to make explicit mention of a boycott of either trade or transport. '6 To evaluate the boycott debate in the international trade union movement of those days, we need more precise knowledge about both the motives and aims of ICFTU commitment to the boycott, and of the Soviet Union's strategy and interests which dominated the WFTU's policies on the other side of the fence. Several questions are raised: Did the communist dogma that retbrmism was corrupting the workers' movement thwart the chances of an effiective boycott movement across the borderline between the two systems in 1960/ 1961 ? Would the ICFTU have been ready for such a movement, or were the trenches of the Cold War simply too deep? Interestingly enough, the SACP

14 Special Flights to Southern ]Afi-ica appreciated the commitment of the ICFTU-affiliated unions to the trade boycott against South Africa.'7 The restraint displayed by the Eastern bloc countries and the WFTU visA-vis the boycott movement was noted by the anti-apartheid forces of South Africa, not without disappointment, though with some understanding that the boycott was confined to individual consumers. But when the call for sanctions against South Africa becarne more forceful at the international level of governments, for example, at the Conference of Independent African states in Addis Ababa in June 1960, the policy of the Eastern European countries came under increasing criticism. Criticism of the GDR by ANC and SA CP Starting in early 1960, the SACP raised the boycott issue as an important item in all talks with the SED. Dr Yusuf Dadoo, then a prominent member of the party's executive and later its chairman, met officials in the SED CC International Relations Department in August that year to underline once again the significance of economic sanctions for the struggle against apartheid. He informed his counterparts that the CC ofhis party had discussed the policy of the GDR and the other socialist countries and of the WFTU on the matter, expressing disappointment at the GDR's attitude. The Soviet Union, he said, had meanwhile promised him that trading with South African would be reviewed.'" The SED officials, too, assured Dadoo that the GDR's trade with South Africa would be reconsidered. They remarked, more casually though, that a boycott of South Africa might cause difficulties for the politics of peaceful coexistence. In those days there were hopes in the GDR that a German peace treaty would soon settle the German question, which would have ended the GDR's international diplomatic blockade and opened up new opportunities for its international relations. The records of the talks on 18 August say: "Our side stated that the CP of the South African Union would need to address the problem that certain contacts between the GDR and the South African Union may emerge i i the context of a peace treaty concluded with the two German states."' How unconvincing the arguments of the Eastern European communist parties and the SED were to South African communists is shown by a memorandum which the SACP CC sent in October 1960, as a circular it seems, to the governing communist parties in Eastern Europe, including the SED.20 The SACP CC was expressing concern that the socialist countries' governments, trade unions and other organisations had not yet identified, in public, with the boycott movement, and that non- South Afiica: GDR and the .4NC in the 1 960s participation in the boycott could estrange these countries fiom the forces of democracy and liberation in Africa. The memorandum stated that the apartheid regime was already exploiting their hesitation for its own propaganda purposes, and warned: "'The boycott of South Africa is taking the form of world-wide, government backed economic sanctions. Failure to participate in it can no longer be justified by the need to open up all possible East-West channels of trade. It is now, in our opinion, necessarv for all those who favour co-existence and peaceful competition between capitalist and socialist systems to bring to an end a situation where the socialist system is increasingly isolated from a world - and especially an Afro-Asian trend."2' The SACP was referring here to the question of how to reconcile a policy of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism with support for liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America - a problem that persisted, in different forms and with varying impact, through all the phases of the international process till the end of East-West confrontation. While the West perceived any support of liberation movements as evidence that the East's advocacy of peaceful coexistence was actually dishonest, various political forces and liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America feared their interests were going to be sacrificed on the altar of a rapprochement between the opposing systems in the wake of peaceful coexistence. The rationale for the Soviet Union to seek acceptance for politics of peaceful coexistence was due to an increasing awareness that war in the nuclear age spelt fatal dangers, and, in addition, to a pressing need for the coutry to catch up with the West in terms of economic performance and technology. At the same time, however, peaceful coexistence was viewed as an instrument of "international class struggle" in the rivalry between the hostile systems. These conflicting aspects combined to form a dialectical construct comprising peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism, class struggle inside the capitalist countries, and the struggle for national liberation, as communist parties defined it in the declaration adopted at their meeting in Moscow in 1960.22 This construct was drawn upon to postulate a concordance of the interests of the socialist countries, the working class movement in the capitalist countries, and the Third World countries and liberation movements, and to deduce from it the need for a joint struggle against imperialism. Having supported this line of thinking in earlier discussions following the Moscow meeting of communist parties in 1957, the SACP CC reaffirmed it in a statement on 13 September 1960, where it also called for international trade sanctions against South Africa.3 Regardless of all incoherencies of the peaceful coexistence concept and problems with its

Special Flights to Southern Africa practical handling, the SACP, like most communist parties, did believe that peaceful coexistence and the national liberation struggle were, in principle, reconcileable with one another. On this point, the SACP, and the ANC as well, held a different position fiom that of the Chinese CP and some of the liberation movements it supported. The latter were fundamentally opposed to the politics of peaceful coexistence which, they contended, were a betrayal of the very cause of national liberation. In the GDR, discussions about the sanctions were re-opened in early 1961. It was probably not so much a renewed query fi-om the SACP about the SED's attitude which the former's executive member, Michael Harmel, communicated during a visit in January, where he also drew attention to Soviet and Chinese decisions to stop trading with South Africa4, than Western press reports which fuelled the debate. Under the heading "East Germany and South Africa" the British Tribune published a reader's letter on 27 January quoting South African newspapers' reference to a South African importer who had said he saw good prospects for selling fish meal to East Germany. The reader concluded by asking whether British communists, themselves enthusiastic about the boycott, could not possibly bring their East German comrades round to boycotting South African commodities as well.'. By this point, those responsible in the GDR were sensitive enough to the issue for the SED Foreign Affairs Commission took it up on 6 February 1961 and instructed the Foreign Ministry to consult with other socialist countries.26 When Vella Pillay represented the SACP at the International Scientific Conference in Leipzig on "Issues of neo-colonialism and the policies of the two German states vis-a-vis the struggle of peoples for national liberation," he stated that he understood the economic problems and export interests of the GDR and was willing to accept that it might begin by simply reducing its South African imports.27 Hence the SED CC International Relations Department was able to note in 1961 that consultations with the SACP had helped "to rectify the GDR's trading policy vis-,-vis South Africa and to ensure greater efforts by its trading agencies towards joining the international boycott movement.'" However, protestations to the SACP that imports from South Africa had been reduced step by step were not true. The international sanctions debate heats up Only when the international debate took a more compelling turn within the UN and the OAU, after its inception in May 1963, while the SACP and ANC kept up their sharp criticism, did the GDR finally decide to join the trade boycott of South Africa. On 6 November 1962, at its seventeenth session, the UN General Assembly

South Africa: GDR and the A NC in the / 960s adopted a resolution initiated by African states, which invited the Security Council to impose sanctions against South Africa and, if appropriate, to consider excluding South Africa from the UN. The resolution requested member states to break off, or not to establish, diplomatic relations with South Africa, to close ports and airports to South African vessels and aircraft, to prohibit ships and aircraft from entering South African ports or airports, to boycott South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa.2' The founding conference of the OAU affirmed this list of demands." ANC President, Albert Luthuli, in a message to the British anti-apartheid movement that month, supported the UN resolution "On behalf of all the oppressed people and all freedom lovers in South Africa, I wish to make it clear that we welcome this resolution most joyfully; that we look forward to, and entreat, its most stringent implementation and that we would encourage the most vigorous forms of action in protest against apartheid policies which blight our country. ... I would ask you in particular to unite in protesting vociferously and unremittingly against the shipment of arms to South Africa. On this issue let your voice be clear and untiring: No arms for South Africa!"" In a situation like this, the South African anti-apartheid movement could reasonably be expected to react with even greater sensitivity to news that countries which they regarded as their closest allies were continuing to trade with South Africa. The SACP document headed "The Revolutionary Way out", mentioned, though not by name, socialist countries among those which were still not paying due regard to the UN resolution of 6 November 1962: "Even countries which supported these decisions, including some African, Asian and socialist countries, have themselves failed to carry them out consistently."3'2 Once again, it was Western reports about GDR trading operations with South Africa wh ich exacerbated controversy within the GDR about the issue of sanctions. The Johannesburg Szmndcv Times had carried an article entitled "Red arms dealers wooing in South Africa" reporting that Czechoslovakia and East Germany were known to be big suppliers of light arms ammunition and of rifles, and that these countries had a particular interest in increasing their trade with the South African Republic, unlike Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Canada where a ban on the export of light arms to South Africa had just been announced. But, obviously, no such prohibition had been enacted in Czechoslovakia. East Germany, the paper added, had contacted ammunition dealers in South Africa in an attempt to increase trade with South Africa. Clearly, the article concluded, the communist countries were ready to trade with South Africa, no matter whether there was a boycott or not."

Special Flights to Southern Africa In a letter to the SED CC of 29 May 1963, the SACP reacted to that article in a highly critical tone "... We would consider it absolutely necessary that your government issues a public statement repudiating the reports and declaring its correct position and policy on trade with the Republic of South Africa. In particular, your statement should categorically declare that your country has not and will not supply arms and ammunitions of any description to South Africa." Otherwise, the SACP warned, it would sharply and publicly criticise the GDR in the press.4 A few days later, on 4 June 1963, Mendy Msimang, ANC representative in London, addressed a letter to Ulbricht. He referred to an article in the London Sunday Telegraph of 2 June 1963, which asserted under the heading "Red arms for South Africa" that the GDR had offered South African arms companies hand guns on better terms than Western countries did. On behalf of the ANC, Msimang demanded a clarification of the facts and an unequivocal statement from the GDR Government on the UN General Assembly resolution of 6 November 1962.1' Moreover, he sent a letter to the German-African Society (DAFRIG) in the GDR on 12 June 1963 to inform them about his letter to Ulbricht and to ask them to bring pressure to bear on the GDR Government."' It was only now that internal debate began in the GDR with a view to taking an urgent decision. Senior foreign-policy officials at the government level and in the SED party apparatus approached their counterparts in the central economic authorities only to learn that those "'red arms" were hunting rifles from Suhl.'7 On 8 June 1963 Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp Schwab wrote to Julius Balkow, who was in charge of the Foreign Trade Ministry after Rau's death: "'The African peoples and all progressive-minded forces in the world are more and more insistent on boycott measures. The German Democratic Republic, too, has repeatedly issued statements for international notice, saying it is a staunch supporter of the national interests of the peoples on the African continent who are fighting for their freedom and against the policy of apartheid in South Africa. Trading with South Africa and calls of our new East Africa shipping line at Portuguese and South African ports are damaging to the GDR's reputation and provide imperialists with al opportunity to vilify the GDR and to discredit our policy in Africa"." He proposed that exports and all missions to, and imports from, South Africa should be stopped, and urged a swift decision be made. The SED CC International Relations Department underlined in a memo to the CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade on 14 June 'that in the interest of the GDR's reputation and not least in the interest of its trade with African countries, our trading with South Africa needs to be

South Africa: GDR und the ANC in the / 960s revised'."' Officials in the foreign ministry saw their line of argument backed by alarming news fiorn Ghana. The Soviet arnbassador to Ghana had informed the GDR Trade Representation in Accra that president Kwame Nkrumah, referring to British press reports about arms supplies from the GDR and Czechoslovakia to South Africa, had requested clarification on the socialist countries' position.4" At that time the GDR regarded good relations with Ghana as a key to breaking through the Hallstein doctrine which had been imposed by West Germany to prevent the GDR from being recognised diplomatically. GDR foreign affairs politicians were, of course, anxious that the Ghanaian President should not have the slightest doubt about the GDR's stance towards South Africa. As an upshot of the internal discussions, the press division of the Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade issued a press release on 22 June 1963 rejecting the 'mendacious dispatches of various agencies and newspapers of imperialist powers' as 'false reports' which aimed to divert attention from the 'close economic and military cooperation of EEC and NATO countries, including West Germany' with South Africa, and to discredit the GDR.4' At the UN, too, discussions about sanctions had become more heated. Following an initiative from 32 African states, the Security Council considered the South African issue in the middle of 1963. The African member countries having demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the UN and the declaration of mandatory sanctions, the debate in the Security Council was chiefly focussed on the question whether the policy of apartheid posed a threat to international peace and security and whether the imposition of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be justified. On 7 August 1963 the Security Council finally agreed on a resolution42 which stated that the situation in South Africa was seriously disturbing international peace and security. After successful diplomatic manoeuvres by the United States43, mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter were averted, but the Council, with consent from the United States and abstention from Britain and France, called upon all states to cease the sale and shipment of military goods to South Africa. These discussions at the UN indicated that the reproaches levelled at the GDR were really grave. The boycott decision 1963: Implementation problets GDR's final decision on the sanctions issue was taken at the SED Foreign Affairs Commission's meeting of 5 July 1963. Evidently for submission to the Commission, the foreign ministry had drawn up a paper defining its position

Special Flights to Southern Africa and coming up with the following conclusions from the international debate about sanctions: The eminent importance of the South African issue has also been recognised by the imperialists. To disguise their true intentions, they have been putting out statements declaring sympathy for the liberation struggle of Africans throughout Africa. Only thus can we explain the calls by the ICFTU to all UN member states to sever diplomatic and trading relations with the Republic of South Africa. ... In a letter of greeting to the ANC of South Africa the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany. author's note) Executive Committee notes that the SPD was in favour of freedom for all peoples and against any form of dictatorship and colonialism, and that it wholeheartedly supported the struggle for the freedom of the people in South Africa. In view of this development we think it is all the more important that the African peoples recognise those who are their true friends - the socialist countries. The slightest vulnerable spots the GDR shows in its position on the question of South Africa would no doubt be immediately exploited by the rulers in Bonn ... to discredit the GDR in the eyes of the African peoples. To observe the principles of proletarian internationalism and to guard the GDR's reputation among the African countries, a revision of the current state of affairs is therefore necessary.4 The foreign ministry recommended " the immediate cessation of imports from South Africa; " an expiry of exports to South Africa by the end of 1963 and a simultaneous shift to indirect exports via third countries, combined with the submission of lists of goods to the foreign ministry; an absolute termination of all exports as of 1964; " an immediate halt to all business trips of GDR citizens to South Africa and disallowance of South African participation in Leipzig trade fairs; * a ban on the delivery of export promotion material to South Africa; * prohibiting ships from the GDR calling at South African ports and at ports in the Portuguese colonies. In the minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission session of 5 July we find the decision which was finally adopted, as follows: I. The foreign ministry and the Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade will inform Comrades Walter Ulbricht, Willi Stoph and Bruno Leuschner in writing as to what measures are to be taken to cease direct (authors' emphasis) trading operations with South African firms... 2. With immediate effect, no foreign-trade personnel is to be sent to the South African Republic. 3. The Foreign Ministry will clarify with the transport ministry the problems linked with the calls of GDR vessels at South African ports.4"

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s This phrasing did not explicitly rule out, or set a time limit to, indirect trading, nor did it provide for stringent monitoring by the Foreign Ministry. On 8 July 1963 the minister for foreign trade ordered subordinate agencies to cease trading with South Africa, to let current export contracts expire, but forthwith to end the export of hunting rifles, together with the fitting ammunition." The aforementioned press release of 22 July 1963 failed to mention the details of the Foreign Affairs Commission's ruling or those of the minister's instructions. But the really strange thing was that the ministerial action was not supported by a decision of the CC Secretariat or the Politbureau, without which nothing usually happened at this level in the GDR, but founded merely on those general guidelines from the Foreign Affairs Commission. Although the Commission excerted substantial influence at the time - certainly more than in the years to come - normally its recommendations would have gone to the Secretariat or the Politbureau for a final decision. So, were those involved possibly too pressed for time? Or did they forego a formal decision at the party's top level in order to keep a channel free for some trading behind the scenes? It will be difficult to find unequivocal explanations for the uncustomary procedure. The GDR media did not exactly splash the minister's public statement across the front pages. But internationally the GDR was eager to arouse maximum attention for its boycott decision in order to enhance its own prestige and to satisfy the demands from the SACP and ANC concerning publicity. On 25 July foreign minister Dr Lothar Bolz informed chairman Diallo Telli of the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid about the foreign trade minister's instructions to end trade with South Africa. He described the decision as an expression of the GDR's will to support the South African people's struggle for liberation and the concurrent efforts of African states at the UN, and rejected western reports about arms deliveries from the GDR to South Africa as calculated propaganda.47 On 30 July prime minister Otto Grotewohl sent a telegram to the chairman of a foreign ministers' conference of African states in Dakar, which was to consider further international moves against apartheid, informing him of the GDR's position. He expressed his belief that 'freedom and self-determination for the people of South Africa will soon be achieved if all governments take similar steps.' The attitudes of governments on the matter would show 'who is a true friend of the African peoples.'48 While this was a diplomatically couched hint at the divergent attitudes of the two German governments towards the sanctions issue, a letter from the GDR Solidarity Committee to the OAU Liberation Committee was outspoken

Special Flights to Southern Africa enough to describe the diametrically opposed policies of the two German states vis-,A-vis South Africa. It placed the GDR's support of the South African liberation movement in tile context of the inter-German confrontation and, in this sense, stated that 'consistent struggle against West German imperialism and militarism and its chauvinistic policy ofrevanchism and neo-colonialism' was the decisive merit of this support.' Also in tile time to come the GDR would take advantage of the holes in the Federal Republic's attitude towards the apartheid regirne to underline what it identified as common interests with the liberation movement in South Africa in the face of a common enemy, and to call for mutual solidarity - all in order to win international assistance for its own policy on the German question and to puncture the Hallstein doctrine. Although the GDR had now decided in favour of a boycott, the ANC and SACP still had reason to be critical. On 29 September 1963 the Johannesburg SundaO, Times had reported shiploads from the GDR arriving for South Africa. The International Relations Department of the SED CC now took the shortest route to the top authority in the GDR. On 16 September and I October 1963 Peter Florin, then head of the department, sent memos directly to Walter Ulbricht to brief him about the problematic issue of sanctions. Should sanctions not be observed, he argued, 'the political loss, which w ill also have economic repercussions, is going to be greater than the present economic benefit.' Since Ulbricht's hand-written comment on the memo of I October was Einverstanden mit Einstellung Handel. W. U. 9. 10.63 (translation: Agree to termination of trade. W.U. 9/10/63)11, the foreign affairs politicians now had greater authority and sway to make those who were conducting the foreign trade comply with the boycott decision. Nevertheless, a formal decision by the party's bodies at the top was taken neither at that time nor, to our present knowledge, later on. The GDR's trading interests in South Africa Official GDR statistics on exports to Africa showed South Africa in second place after Egypt until 1959, and also second on the list of African importers until 1957. 2 Despite an ongoing decline since 1958, GDR exports to South Africa remained at a relatively high level, whereas imports dropped rapidly after 1961.1? 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 30April1963 Exports 9.6 8.4 7.3 6.5 6.7 6.7 Imports 1.4 1.1 1.6 !3.3 0.2 Figures in million clearing marks, or VM ,South Aftica: GDR and the ANC in the / 960s 23 By October 1963, G DR foreign trade organisations had contracted deals with South African trading partners worth over 1 million VM, including exports of machine tools at a value of 2.1 million VM." South Africa was an attractive market for them because the rate of foreign currency revenue was favourable. It was also a receptive market for GDR manufactures who had export capabilities and could obtain average world market prices. Major exports to South Africa were metal-cutting machine tools, sewing machines, musical instruments, office equipment, cameras, spare bicycle parts, textiles, machines for the printing industry, and chemicals. Imports from South Africa, chiefly fish meal and blue asbestos, were primarily channelled via firms based in Britain since the mid- 1950s. The prices of imports from South Africa were well below the world market average. In 1963, the GDR still imported around 30,000 tonnes of fish meal. It 1962 alone, doing without these important supplies of livestock feed would have meant an extra 2.5 million VM foreign currency countervalue expenditure. Since the state of the agriculture sector in GDR during the first years after the completion of collectivisation in 1960 was precarious, buying feed with a lower foreign currency input was all the more crucial."' The GDR's state-run shipping company, Deutsche Seereederei (DSR), also faced difficulties as a result of the decision to join the boycott. The* company operated a liner service to eastern and southern African ports from 1962. On this route, its vessels carried over 25 per cent of the total freight from the GDR and other European countries to ports in South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The cargo they carried back to destinations in Western Europe and the GDR was entirely taken on board in South Africa and Mozambique. In July 1963 the GDR transport ministry estimated that termination of calls at ports in South Africa would have a clear negative effect on the DSR's Eastern Africa Service, rendering it uneconomical and hardly worth maintaining. Yet its continued operation was considered necessary to avoid losing future business in the eastern African freight market.7 Foreign trade organisations in the GDR were expected to cope with the task of earning heigthened amounts of foreign currency on the one hand, and subordinating their activities to foreign-policy goals on the other. Complying with the latter would evidently make the former more difficult, at least in the shorter run. Small wonder that the organisations which serviced the machinebuilding, textile, high-precision and optical engineering, glass and ceramics, timber and paper industries were complaining to officials in the Foreign Trade Ministry.3 However, the guidelines established by the Foreign Affairs Commission,

Special Flights to Southern Africa orientated as they were towards cutting only direct flows of trade, had already set the stage for a compromise. A memo sent on 29 October 1963 from the competent CC department to Guenter Mittag, then a candidate member of the Politbureau and in charge of economic policy-making, affirmed that line of action. The memo noted "In view of our situation as we see it at present for 1963 and 1964, we would recommend conducting this trade with other methods. It need not be the GDR - foreign firms could do the job. We have arranged such things in the past, without exposing the GDR and its foreign trade bodies to any pressure."9 It would be helpful to inform Stoph and invite his opinion, it added. The GDR's statistical yearbooks contained no figures about trade with South Africa after 1960. The aforementioned note sent to minister Balkow on 20 December 1963 refers to an understanding with the statistics department that figures about trade with South Africa should in future only be given in papers for internal use60- not an unusual method in the GDR. The documents quoted show clearly that the GDR's trade with South Africa never ceased entirely, contrary to the impression conveyed by the official propaganda. Foreign Service officials repeatedly denied charges that the GDR was continuing its trade with South Africa.6' Hans Heese, a South African historian, remembers that Alpenkreuzer caravans, which were made in Olbernhau in the south-eastern region of the GDR and were very popular with his fellow South Africans, were still reaching South Africa by roundabout routes in the 1970s.6- After the political turnaround in the G DR in 1989, a wave of revelations swept through the media about the dealings of a foreign trade sector called Kornmerzielle Koordinierung (KoKo) (Commercial Coordination) under the supervision of Alexander Schalck- Golodkowsi. One of the stories concerned the purchase of the cruise ship, Arkona.63 It does not require much imagination to assume that KoKo was building on contacts established long before it came into being in 1966. In view of the above discussion the GDR's boycott decision of 1963 deserves critical comment. An unbiased judgement has to take into account that the GDR, economically weak and affected as it was by Western embargo policies, was subjected to additional economic hardships when official trade relations with South Africa were cut and important opportunities in that market lost. For the GDR, every single clearing mark it earned was worth its weight in gold. Therefore, despite some qualifications that have to be made, it is certainly fair to say that by term inating its official trade with South Africa the GDR was extending solidarity to the South African liberation movement. And yet, for the sake of honesty towards the ANC and its allies, we must attempt to discover the truth within an historical picture of contradictions, complexities

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s and shadings, and to digest the findings. Similar difficulties were soon to be posed by another boycott, although the complexities were not quite such a problem as in the field of trade. This time the issue was sport. The boycott of South African sports In an environment of international diplomatic blockade, sports acquired an important role in the GDR that it hardly enjoyed in any other country. Top performance in sports was seen as a way of winning international prestige for the GDR, and its athletes were celebrated in the country's media as 'ambassadors in track-suits'. But here again, the GDR had to fight against various odds - entry restrictions by NATO countries for its athletes, refusals to hoist the national flag or play the national anthem in their honour, and similar obstacles. Therefore, it was always a gain, both for the domestic sports community and foreign-policy aspirations, when the GDR was chosen as the venue of international championships. The world weightlifting championships, scheduled to be held in Berlin in October 1966, were no exception. Early that year, the SACP brought it to the attention of the GDR Solidarity Committee that the press in South Africa and in countries where South Africa had embassies was peddling news from official sources saying that national teams from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, though consisting of white sportsmen only, had been invited by the GDR to take part in these championships.64 The story of the preceding championships demonstrates what kind of quandary the GDR was in: In 1962 the world's best weightlifters had to do without their contest because the USA refused entry visas to certain countries, including the GDR, and the championships were finally held in Hungary. In 1964 Italy had to cede the functions of host to Japan because GDR athletes were not given entry permits. So now, in 1966, Berlin was to be the venue. Under the statutes of the International Weightlifting Federation, a national sport association hosting such an international event was obliged to invite all the Federation's national members without any discrimination, omitting only those which were in conflict with the Federation and therefore subject to preclusion. In this case, that applied to Romania, , and Pakistan, but to neither South Africa nor Southern Rhodesia. The British Anti-apartheid Movement requested the GDR Solidarity Committee to take action. The latter's chairman, Heinz H. Schmidt, was aware of the GDR's delicate position. In a letter to Hermann Axen, the SED CC secretary for foreign affairs, on 28 March, he proposed: From my point of view, we should seriously consider whctler we ought not rather back out of organising the world championships altogether,

26 Special Flights to Southern Africa and best of all, state the reasons openly. That would no doubt serve the GDR's prestige better than holding the championships under the circumstances described. An alternative would be to intervene officially with the International Federation's President (LISA) and Secretary-General (UK) and demand application of the international sports boycott against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In that context wve might recall that South Africa has been excluded from the International Olympic Committee. The correspondence should be published. It the two top officials insist on inviting these countries, the political responsibility would lie with them and our invitation would acquire the tone "Deplorably, the statutCs and the leaders of the International Federation compel us to invite you. ...' I am ully aware that we are in a grave dilemma. But I do not think we can solve it by turning a blind eye. Without overestimating the importance of these world championships, I would remark that given the popularity of weightlifting. especially in Arab and other AfroAsian countries, the damage would not be insignificant, all the more so as our various adversaries, simply to veil their friendship with Verwoerd and Smith, will have no scruples about exploiting the case against us. "And if this could be prevented," he went on, "without slackening efforts to overcome discrimination against our own athletes, it should be done. Besides that, a clear statement objecting to the GDR being placed on par with the racist South African regime could only be useful.1"65 A practicable solution was finally found. On the eve of the championships, the congress of the International Weightlifting Federation under the chairmanship of Federation President Clarence H. Johnson from the United States convened in Berlin. One of the items on the agenda, despite opposition from some participants, was racial discrimination in South Africa. The congress decided to appoint a commission to go on a fact-finding mission to South Africa and to formulate recommendations for the next congress in Tokyo, the following year.6 With this result the world championship in the GDR could go ahead. Around that time, delegations of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and the British Anti-apartheid Movement were staying in the GDR, at the invitation of the GDR's National Olympic Committee. SANROC President Dennis Brutus was given much publicity in the GDR media. At an international press conference on 16 October he took the opportunity to explain the consequences of apartheid in sport and to call for solidarity against racial oppression in South Africa.,7 So, on balance, any doubt about the GDR's unequivocal attitude towards apartheid was forestalled and a boycott of the racialist sports associations of South Africa in international sport activities was championed, without prejudicing the GDR's ongoing efforts at lifting the discrimination against its own athletes, experienced once again during the second international sports week in Mexico City in mid- October 1966.6s Nevertheless it cannot have been easy for the ANC to accept this or

South Africt: GDR and the INC in the 1960s similiar solutions to the problem of holding international sport events with South African athletes in socialist countries. In such cases left-wing radicals exerted pressure on the ANC, accusing it of 'collusion with revisionists', as representatives of liberation movements told officials in the GDR. These radical forces would have preferred tile sports associations of socialist countries to walk out of international organisations which were not yet willing to boycott South Africa. That was, of course, out of the question for the GDR, and for other Eastern European countries as well. Hence, the SED and SACP subsequently made an effort to work out a joint and forceful line of argument on the issue. The discussions about the South African boycott and chiefly about economic sanctions, in the early 1 960s not only shed light on the motives, the constellation of interests and the internal decision-making processes in the GDR. They show equally that there was some potential for conflict in the GDR's relations with the South African liberation movement. True, the frequently cited common ideological and political positions provided a firm base for these relations, but they did not signify an identity of interests in all matters, including important ones like the trading boycott. This fact tended to be passed over in silence, both in the GDR's propaganda and scientific literature, as if uncomfortable realities simply did not exist. Yet in late 1963, after the boycott was declared, the SED CC International Relations Department stated with some relief: "The severance of trade relations between the GDR and the Republic of South Africa has eradicated a decisive obstacle to activating the ties between our parties."7 It charted two chief directions for the future conduct of relations with the SACP. These were: assistance for the SACP in fighting the Verwoerd regime; - a more active kind of relationship with a view to strengthening the influence of the GDR in Africa by 'unmasking the imperialism and neo-colonialism of Bonn'.7 A combination of the two elements became an essential mark of the relations the GDR maintained with the South African liberation movement until winning international diplomatic recognition, and it was retained in a weakened and modified form even afterwards. Stepping up international solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle had become an urgent need in 1963, the month when the GDR announced its boycott decision, as dramatic developments were occurring in South Africa. Solidarity during the Rivonia trial and for Abram Fischer In August 1963 the SED CC received a letter from the SACP CC with an urgent call for solidarity. The SACP was informing the SED that on I I July 1963 the South African secret police had arrested Walter Sisulu, the undercover

Special Flights to Southern Africa Secretary-General of ANC, and another 17 prominent members of the ANC and SACP executives, and it described the danger the detainees were in.- On the Liliesleaf Farm at Rivonia, a suburb of Johannesburg, the police had also captured the plan for Operation Mayibuye, which contained ANC ideas about preparing for guerilla warfare in South Africa. By then, the liberation movement's military organ isation, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), set up in 196 1, had been staging sabotage attacks against installations of the apartheid regime.73 The first commander-in-chief of Umkhonto we sizwe, Nelson Mandela, had already been tracked down by the secret police in August 1962. Together with his comrades arrested at Rivonia, he was to be brought to trial on a charge of high treason. All of them were threatened with the death penalty in the proceedings known as the Rivonia trial.74 "Only the most massive solidarity campaign not only in Africa but throughout the world," the SACP was sounding the alarm, "can save the lives of Walter Sisulu and his brave companions. We are therefore appealing to you, dear comrades, to take initiatives to set in motion such a campaign, which - in accordance with the broad united character of our movement - should be joined by people of all democratic and anti-fascist trends, including trade unionists, churchmen and leaders of such non-communist political parties and movements, such as liberals, socialists and humanitarians of all schools of belief, as may exist in your country.75 In its reply, which also conveyed the position the GDR had taken on the sanctions issue in July 1963, the SED CC gave an assurance that the party would do all it could to launch a broad protest movement to help save the lives of the Secretary- General and the other ANC functionaries.76 On the international stage, a powerful solidarity movement to defend the detained leaders of the South African liberation movement emerged. On I I October 1963 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, with but one vote against - from South Africa - calling upon the South African Government to abstain from the prepared trial of the men arrested at Rivonia and to liberate all political prisoners unconditionally.77 The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa received further political and moral backing from the international community when on 20 November the General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.78 The GDR supported the declaration and pleaded for a corresponding convention, basing its arguments on the bitter lessons of German history, with the appalling effects of racial hatred practised during the fascist era.79 Centralistic structure versus grassroot movement Besides reinforcing the existing sentiments of solidarity with the anti-apartheid

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the i 960s struggle, response to the SACP's message also provided opportunities for the GDR to gain further international prestige. A letter from Peter Florin to Politbureau member Albert Norden, reponsibl for agitation and propaganda, which informed him of the SACP's appeal, foianulated this specific aim as follows: "Broad circles of the national liberation movement in Africa currently view support of the struggle in South Africa as a major criterion of anybody's stand vis-a-vis the anti-colonial movement. Speaking up to save Comrade Sisulu, in the context of a longer-term solidarity campaign in the GDR in support of the South African people's struggle for liberation, would add weight to the GDR's standing in Africa."80 In this connection it is interesting that preparations for the solidarity campaign coincided with the elaboration of a strategy and plan of action to break through the Federal Republic's Hallstein doctrine, in which the campaign itself did not play a part whereas the Federal Republic's attitude towards South Africa did." Looking at it from the angle of the domestic situation in the GDR and the latter's politics relating to the German question, the SACP's appeal fell upon fertile soil, two years after the Wall was built. The leaders in East Berlin were trying harder to instil into the minds of people in all walks of life that the GDR was a legitimate socialist German alternative. They organised broad public discussions of a document headed "The historic task of the German Democratic Republic and the future of Germany" after its adoption by the National Congress of the National Front in June 1962. Cautious steps towards a liberalisation of public life had given rise to new hopes throughout the GDR's population, and demonstrations of international solidarity were believed to play no minor role in legitimating the GDR as a historic alternative for Germany, which embraced peace, social progress and solidarity with people fighting the anti-colonialism for their freedom. Against this background it seemed that the National Council of the National Front, the umbrella institution comprising the various political parties and organisations in the GDR, would be most suitable to handle the Rivonia solidarity campaign. Florin suggested to Norden, who was also responsible for the work of the National Front, that he appoint a preparatory commission comprising representatives from the working group on information abroad2, from the CC International Relations Department, the foreign ministry and the German-African Society.83 The Solidarity Committee, which formed part of the National Council until 1965, was not mentioned. This apparent neglect was offset by an arrangement which placed the chief responsibility for the Rivonia solidarity campaign with National Council vice-president Horst Brasch, who was concurrently the chairman of the Solidarity Committee.14 We now wish to illustrate by way of this campaign how solidarity activities

30 Speciul Flights to Sutlheri-n 4icu were organised in the administrative-centralistic society of the GDR, how the functional and decision-making mechanisms worked with regard to solidarity. In the wake of the political changes in the GDR in 1989, these aspects became an issue of controversial discussion, in which the media in general delivered the wholesale verdict that solidarity wvas 'prescribed' to GDR citizens by the state. The precondition for launching the solidarity campaign during the Rivonia trial was a formal decision by the SED CC Secretariat. The preliminary paper was submitted by the National Council of the National Front on 8 November. It contained proposals for specific actions from the FDGB, the Free German Youth organisation (FDJ), DAFRIG and other organisations, once these had been cleared with the CC International Relations Department and the foreign ministry. At the invitation of the National Council, officials from the foreign ministry, SED, FDGB, FDJ and other organisations met again on 14 November to discuss the campaign details. Although time was running out - the campaign was planned to start in the middle of the month - they could not finalise arrangements for action because the decision of the CC Secretariat was still pending.5 As it turned out a little later, the submitted paper was not discussed by the Secretariat at all, but simply circulated to its members for their approval, which they finished doing on 19 November.", So, as far as the conception and organisation of the solidarity campaign for the Rivonia trial was concerned, we can say that the initiative in this case was taken by the SED CC's International Relations Department in response to a request from the SACP. The activities envisaged were founded on proposals made by the organisations involved, although by the officials responsible rather than by their memberships. A decision from the SED's top echelon was a formal requisite to put the campaign concept to work. Hence, the solidarity movement during the Rivonia trial was not a grass roots initiative by nature, but was organised from above, with officials of the participating organisations taking charge of the campaign activities. The mobilising effect of their endeavour reached remarkable results. The workings of other solidarity campaigns in later times followed a similar pattern, with different organisations or institutions taking the initiative. This does not mean, however, that solidarity activities were simply 'prescribed' and that GDR citizens could not identify with them. In fact, such a reproach implies that citizens of the former GDR were not mature enough and lacked an innate sense of solidarity. What is true is that the centralistic mechanisms of society tended to discourage rather than encourage people's own initiatives. In the given circumstances, solidarity work, especially campaigns from above, were largely harnessed to serve foreign-policy interests and the SED's

South Africa. GDR and the ANC in the 1960s ideological aims within the country and abroad. Only to a limited degree could solidarity be the expression of a self-organised movement by the people in their ovn right, although - and this appears to have been a curioLIs contradiction - there existed a widespread readiness to participate in solidarity campaigns. Wherever people do not shoulder their own responsibility for what they do and cannot bring their own creativity to bear, routine and formalism are bound to spread - and this also affected solidarity campaigns in the GDR. The opportunities and potential inherent in the conformity of the Government's foreign policy towards South Africa oil the one hand, and the readiness of many GDR citizens to express their solidarity with the struggle against apartheid on the other, certainly could not come into full effect under these conditions. But, as we shall see further on, there were further important reasons for that. A ins and progress of the solidariy campaign The decision taken by the SED CC Secretariat on 19 November set the following aims for the campaign: 1. to assist the democratic movements in South Africa in their struggle against the fascist Verwoerd regime, which has currently reached a high point; 2. to enhance the GDR's reputation, especially with the African and Asian states; 3. to expose and denounce West German imperialism and its policy of active support for the Verwoerd regime, which runs counter to the interests of the German people."7 This shows that solidarity with the accused in the Rivonia trial was conceptually linked to the GDR's aims vis-A-vis other countries and its policies on the German question. Evidently under the impact of ambivalent negotiating tactics by the United States88 and of Scandinavian initiatives at the UN, and as a reflection of the German-German confrontation, the introductory part of the decision noted that the imperialists were seeking to bar the socialist states from a solution to the South African problem, and that West Germany was playing a leading part in the attempt." The aspect of confrontation with the Federal Republic, whose role in Western policy towards South Africa was certainly overemphasised in the heat of the moment, will be looked at more closely further on. Activities to defend the leaders of the South African liberation movement started shortly before the trial was formally opened on 13 November 1963.

Special Flights to Southern Africa Earlier, in mid-November, DAFRIG had issued a public appeal under the motto 'Freedom for the true South Africa!"90 The actual overture to the solidarity campaign, as envisaged in the CC Secretariat's decision, was a mass rally organised by the National Council of the National Front in the Berlin cinema Colosseum on 29 November. Delivering the keynote speech, Horst Brasch described the situation in South Africa, underlined the differing positions of the two German states vis-a -vis the apartheid regime, and called for massive protest against the persecution of apartheid opponents. Under the impact of United States President Kennedy's assassination the week before, he associated the solidarity movement for the South African patriots with the world-wide efforts for peace and disarmament, which he characterised, not exactly a matter of course for a GDR propagandist, as a movement embracing very different social and political interests, including realistically minded monopoly business circles in the United States, Britain and West Germany."' Those participating in the rally, representatives from political parties and mass organisations, enterprises and institutions, officials of the People's Chamber and the Council of Ministers, adopted a 'Freedom for the South African people!' appeal, which called for brief meetings in blocks of flats, enterprises and residential areas to adopt protest resolutions which would be passed on to the UN Committee on the Policies of Apartheid.-2 Another speaker at the rally was Harold Wolpe, a South African lawyer, who under dramatic circumstances had escaped from the Johannesburg police prison a few weeks before and was now visiting a number of countries to canvass support for the activities of the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners, established in London a little earlier.3 The trade union confederation, FDGB, played a major part in mobilising its members for the aims of the appeal. Back in November, its national executive had asked some of its regional executives and the central executive of the miners' union to use members' meetings in that month to encourage solidarity with the working people of South Africa, to adopt, and send to the South African Government, protest resolutions against the strangling of trade union rights and the persecution of apartheid opponents, and to demand freedom for political prisoners.' A circular of 24 February 1964 which FDGB chairman Herbert Warnke sent to the central executives of the industrial unions and to the FDGB's regional and district executives deserves to be quoted here, for it shows that the confederation was in some ways walking the tightrope. It wanted its members to launch their own initiatives to manifest internationalist solidarity, but did not want these to go too far. After praising some enterprises for their spontaneous reactions to international events, Warnke's letter continued:

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s Supporting the struggle of peoples for self-determination and national sovereignty, against any kind of foreign interference in internal affairs and against any form of racial discrimination, cannot be of concern only to individual enterprises or institutions or their trade union executives or the FDGB national executive, but ought to be a cause for the entire organisation to take up. This does not mean, however, that we should organise additional meetings after each and every international event; rather we should, in the scope of our normal trade union affairs, ... comment on specific, important international events and have our ,nembers' views expressed in resolutions and other forms." Although suggestions of this kind may have been due to a variety of motives, including understandable worries about the full use of working hours for production, such restrictions of refreshing spontaneity, fairly typical in the GDR, favoured formalism and routine in solidarity work. But it shows also that the readiness among the workers to display international solidarity must have been quite widespread. The FDGB regional executives in Karl-Marx-Stadt and Magdeburg organised one major rally each in Oelsnitz on 18 December 1963 with about 600 local people and trade unionists from Ghana, , Guinea, Morocco, Cambodia and Czechoslovakia present, and in Magdeburg-Buckau on 20 December with some 400 participants. These events had a particular appeal owing to the appearance of the South African trade unionists Arnold and Janette Selby. The Selbys were among the first South Africans to be granted political asylum in the GDR in the early 1960s. Moreover, union members came together to manifest their solidarity at workplace meetings in towns such as Arnstadt, Bernau, Burgstaedt, Weisswasser, Eisenhuettenstadt, Gera, Plauen, Schwerin and Berlin.' The youth organisation, FDJ, was also actively involved in the campaign. One of the bigger functions the organisation convened was a rally at the training school of the Fortschritt copper mine in Eisleben on 12 December 1963, with a turnout of some 800 young people. They were addressed by Tony Seedat, one of the ANC students enrolled in the GDR. Six hundred and sixty eight signatures were collected for a protest resolution at this rally alone. A month earlier, the FDJ organised student rallies at the Mining Academy in Freiberg and at Leipzig University. Together with the State Secretariat for Higher and Technical Education, DAFRIG organised a solidarity rally on 17 December at the Technical University of Dresden, where South Africans were studying. The GDR Peace Council met with students for a solidarity meeting in Leipzig, in which Wolpe took part. The Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD) called on all its regional executives to make use of branch meetings in neighbourhoods to adopt protest resolutions." So we can agree with the National Council's resume that the call for

Special Flights to Southern Afi'ica solidarity in December 1963 was well received by a very great number of people in different walks of life. A press release noted: Besides the protest statement of' the Writers Union. carrying the signatures of Anna Seghers, Erwin Strittmatter (both internationally renowned, authors* note) and Professor Hans Koch, the long lists of signatures from the School of Construction and Karl Marx University in Leipzig, from the students of the Mining Academy at Freiberg and the Ernst Thaehniann Mining Engineers School at Senftenberg. and the protests ot'2 000 students of the Dresden School of Economics, we have on record manifestations of solidarity by the apprentices and supervisors of the Elektromat Training Centre in Dresden, the students of the commercial school at Luckenwalde, from the trade unionists in the retail sector at Ludwigslust/Grabow. the personnel of the State Archike Administration under the Ministry of the Interior, and the stall of the Social Insurance Administration and Industrial Satety Inspectoratc of the FDGB Regional Executive in Erfurt." A highlight of the Month of Solidarity in December was the stay of an ANC delegation at the invitation of the Solidarity Committee - the first major ANC group to visit the GDR. It included Moses Kotane (ANC treasurer and SACP general secretary), Duma Nokwe (acting ANC secretary-general) and John B. Marks (member of the ANC national executive ), plus Dr Yusuf Dadoo (President of the South African Indian Congress). The three last-mentioned officials were also prominent members of the SACP executive. Kotane and Nokwe did not appear in public. After several postponements, they were visiting the GDR as part of a tour through several socialist countries with the aim to solicit material assistance fbr the ANC's fight for liberation. They held talks with Hermann Axen, then candidate member of the SED Politbureau and editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland, and met officials from the FDGB Central Executive, the National Council of the National Front, and the foreign ministry. What the South African guests encountered in the GDR was a great willingness to help. Because of the GDR's shortage of foreign currency, Solidarity Committee chairman Brasch proposed supplying goods instead of money, which the ANC could sell in Dares Salaam to finance its operations. The Solidarity Committee immediately provided goods worth 100,000 marks.9 This action was the prelude to a kind of assistance for the ANC that took account both of the liberation organisation's needs and the GDR's economic situation. The manufactures "Made in GDR" which thus reached the Tanzanian market included, among other items, watches and clocks, transistor radios, photographic cameras, 8-mm cine cameras, film projectors, textiles, motorbikes, scooters and bicycles.' The ANC received these goods in addition to ordinary aid supplies, such as those earmarked for refugees. In a letter he sent to the Solidarity Committee from Dar es Salaam, Moses Kotane stated how much the ANC appreciated this aid.

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s "We can assure you that the African people and the other oppressed peoples of South Africa will always remember what your people have done for them in their hour of need,"'' said Kotane in his letter. Marks and Dadoo supported the GDR solidarity campaign for the Rivonia detainees by addressing the annual meeting of DAFRIG and rallies in Dresden and Leipzig, and by interviews in the media. They commented afterwards that there had not been enough room for them to inform their audiences about their own struggle. Both of them regarded an interview with KarI-Eduard von Schnitzler, chief commentator on GDR television, 'as a unique opportunity to present their interests to the public.... Only, both of them wished they had been enabled to say something more about their own aims.""2 Instead, the interview focussed on the Federal Republic's relationship with South Africa, and this aspect also dominated the Neues Deutschland report about a meeting Marks and Dadoo had with the press.'3 Meanwhile, the SED view was that the South African comrades were .poorly informed about the strategy and tactics of our struggle against West German imperialism'. Considering that the ANC and SACP had extensive contacts and influence within the African movement for liberation, it was planned to brief them on 'our party's policy with regard to organising a worldwide campaign against the nuclear annament of West Germany and on our position towards the national liberation movement and the importance of strengthened relations between the GDR and the peoples of Africa.''04 Objectives of foreign policy in general vis-a- vis the Federal Republic in particular had become a heavy overtone in the solidarity campaign to support the men in the dock at the Rivonia trial. Exposing cooperation between Bonn and Pretoria A large-scale propaganda effortjuxtaposing the positions of either of the two German states on the South African issue would, in the eyes of the GDR's decision-makers, best serve their international and inter-German policy aims in the solidarity campaign. The fourth extra-European (African affairs) (AEA) division of the foreign ministry had worked out a line of argument to be used by newspaper editors in covering the campaign.' In these guidelines the authors underlined the social content of the race problem in South Africa and combined criticism of the West's ambivalent policy vis-d-vis the apartheid regime with factual evidence. But without differentiating, the gudelines took an exclusively negative view of Western blueprints for a solution to the conflict, including those proposed by Scandinavian countries. They were all judged by the standard formulas of the east-west-rivalry of the Cold War. The Scandinavian and American

Special Flights to Southern Africu proposals, the document said, 'aim to put the brake on the entire movement in the RSA (Republic of South Africa, authors' note) and to channel it into a groove acceptable to the imperialists. The racial problem is to be rid of its social content, and the socialist countries are to be excluded from all efforts to resolve the conflict. Resolving the conflict is being presented as a matter for the Africans and the imperialists to work out between themselves.' By contrast, they noted, the democratic movement in South Africa was supported by the socialist countries on the basis of proletarian internationalism. This showed that there was no racial barrier to a relationship between states where the working class held power, and the exploited social strata of other races. Consequently, 'the interests of the socialist states objectively accord with the interests of the movements in the African countries, especially the one in South Africa."6 In fact, however, the sanctions debate had just shown that interests could very well diverge in practice. The reference material for the press contained convincing arguments for critical commentaries on ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa, which were intensifying at the time, notably in the areas of trade and economic cooperation. Shortly before, in 1962, South Africa had fi-eed German property assets frozen during the Second World War. South Africa's Minister of Finance Nicholaas Diederichs still had excellent contacts in Germany dating from the Nazi era."07 At the same time, the authors of the press material thought that major demonstrations of solidarity taking place in the Federal Republic to defend Neville Alexander,' who was also being tried in South Africa for his antiapartheid activities, were actually aiding a manoeuvre by the South African Government designed to divert attention from the Rivonia trial. They supported this thesis by arguing that there was no comparable support in the West for Walter Sisulu and his companions. However, the GIDR had no contacts with organisations outside the Congress Alliance in South Africa. Moreover, the prevailing view in the GDR was that true solidarity was hardly possible outside its own type of society and without the same ideological premises. How much the GDR's political interests in the international and German context left their mark on the solidarity campaign was evident in the aforementioned Freedom for the South African people appeal. Over two thirds of the text criticised West German ties with South Africa and compared them with the GDR's position, which was interpreted as a kind of exclusive entitlement to all things progressive in Germany: We speak for Germany - we, the workers and peasants, the intelligentsia and indeed all citizens of the German Democratic Republic, the legitimate German state where the people have implemented their right to self-

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the / 960s determination! Our struggle against Hitler's heirs in the Federal Republic and your struggle against Verwoerd and Vorster - that, our African brothers, is one and the same struggle. Therefore we stand unswervingly at your side! "" During those months in late 1963 and early 1964 and afterwards, foreignpolicy documents"0 in the GDR on the colonial issue and on attitudes towards South Africa were similar in content and reasoning: * They invariably began by pointing out that the GDR's unequivocal condemnation of colonialism and racism was a reflection of bitter lessons from German history, with its fascism and racial hatred, imperialism and war. * The eradication of the socio-economic roots for imperialism, fascism, racism and war, and corresponding legislation against racialist ideologies and racial hatred in all segments of society in the GDR were then cited to account for these clear-cut positions. * These social changes in the GDR, in accordance with the 1945 Potsdam Agreement signed by the Allies who defeated Hitler, meant that the right to self- determination of its people was implemented,just like in countries which gained freedom from colonialism. * In polemics against the official West German view that only free allGerman elections would bring self-detennination to the German people, and citing post- war developments in West Germany, the Federal Republic was characterised as a state of revived German imperialism, where the old supporters of racialist ideology were back at the controls. Hans-Maria Globke, State Secretary in the Federal Chancellor's Office,' served at the tim.e as the central target of ample factual evidence. The documents contained a host of facts about the Federal Republic's ties with Portugal and South Africa. The convincing force of these arguments was dented by a major contradiction between the GDR's claim to champion the right to selfdetermination of colonially oppressed and dependent peoples, and the realities of a society in the GDR which painfully curtailed the democratic rights of its own people. Comparing the diametrically opposed positions of the two German states vis-A-vis colonialism and apartheid, and a sense of being on the right side of the international barrier, surely made many GDR citizens identify with their state. To those who were aware of the gap between the GDR's international claim and the realities of life at home, the official presentation of solidarity arguably had no great appeal. The solidarity campaign was accompanied by GDR press reports about conditions in the apartheid state of South Africa' 12and, more important, about

Special Flights to Southern Africa ties between Bonn, Pretoria and Lisbon. From August 1963, in the context of a tour of the Portuguese colonies by Bundestag Vice-President Richard Jaeger (Christian Social Union - CSU), the focus was on West German arms supplies to Portugal, " shifting to West German-South African relations in late October of the same year. "Is South Africa becoming a missile base for the revanchists in Bonn?" was the question Neues Deutschland asked on 29 October, giving the answer right away "West German top banker Hermann Abs finances 'research institute' for racial hate-mongers." Technology transfer, in particular with regard to nuclear research, was given a great deal of coverage in the following months.'4 That this kind of cooperation should have been made an issue for propaganda, styled of course on the Cold War cliches, can probably be explained by an excessive sense of alarm in the GDR in the face of ongoing efforts by influential groups in the Federal Republic to obtain control over nuclear weapons. On 19 November the SED Politbureau adopted a "Plan of action to intensify the struggle for disarmament and ddtente, against revanchism and nuclear armament in West Germany," vhich evidently also guided the propaganda effort against the Bonn- Pretoria ties although these were not specifically mentioned in the party's plan of action."5 Another target of GDR propaganda were South African operations of successor companies to IG Farben, the chemical corporation which was seen as the incarnation of German industrialists' involvement in the Nazi holocaust. Under the headline "IG Farben poison gas for South Africa?", Neues Deutschland examined the work of West German experts who were said to have won their spurs in the gas research institute of the armed forces in the German Reich." 16 Criticism of the Federal Republic's expanding trade with South Africa reached a climax when Willy Brandt, chairman of the SPD and governing mayor of(West) Berlin, said during an African journey that a trade boycott against South Africa was untimely and unwise - for which he expressed his regret years later.' 7 Finally, GDR top diplomats contributed their own share to the argument against West German foreign policy. Addressing the first session of the world committee of trade unions for unity of action against monopoly corporations, taking place in Leipzig, Otto Winzer, then State Secretary in the foreign ministry, reviewed Nazi Germany's colonial plans in the light of the documentary evidence. He underlined that the documents had been drawn up by officials who were meanwhile back in top posts in the Federal Republic, such as Hasso von Etzdorf, who was serving as ambassador to London.1" As an offshoot and follow-up to the propaganda effort during the Rivonia trial, the SED Politbureau decided on 19 May 1964 'Realization of an

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s international campaign to expose West Germany's support for the fascist Verwoerd regime and tile Portuguese policy towards Angola and Mozambique.' ', The 'exposure campaign' may be taken as a typical example of how Cold-War postures injected verbal overkill into legitimate and unavoidable controversy with political adversaries, of how incontestable facts were intermingled with circumstantial evidence and propaganda phraseology and enemy images permeated the language. So, the introductory passages of the campaign concept read as follows 'To further unfold our allround offensive against West German militarism and imperialism, which is to unmask West Germany's neo-colonialist policy, there is need for a global international campaign to unveil Bonn's role in defending the murderers of the African peoples, as a principal supporter of the fascist Verwoerd regime in South Africa and as a helpmate of the Portuguese Salazar regime in repressing the peoples of Angola and Mozambique."20 The campaign was aimed at a 'decisive discreditation of Bonn's neocolonialist policies...to help breach and finally defeat the Hallstein doctrine'... and also to "reinforce and expand the influence and links of the GDR in the African states, with cooperation and support from the international AfroAsian solidarity organisation (Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, authors' note), the trade unions and other organisations, political authorities and social bodies."'" In more concrete terms, the principal butts were defined as follows: firstly, the 'political, economic and military cooperation between West German imperialism and the Verwoerd regime'; secondly, cooperation with Portugal, and thirdly, the 'continuity of the colonial policies of German imperialism from Wilhelm II and the Weimar Republic to fascism and thence to the present neo-colonialist policy of West German militarism and imperialism.' The first result of this campaign was a memorandum on military and nuclear cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of South Africa22 which the Solidarity Committee published in September 1964. A working party was set up under the direction of the Committee's new chairman, Heinz H. Schmidt, which included one representative each from the foreign ministry, the working group on information abroad under the SED Politbureau's Commission for Agitation, and the CC International Relations Department. This body coordinated the necessary investigations of various scientific institutions, including those of the armed forces and the state security agency, and organised subsequent operations for the international distribution of the documentation.23 The SED had also requested support from the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Portugal and South Africa as well as from scientific institutions in Moscow, which all were, in principle, sympathetic to the

Special Flights to Southern Africa project. 24 Apparently, there was no significant cooperation forthcoming from them until publication of the afore-mentioned memorandum of the Solidarity Committee. Representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had pointed out to a GDR foreign ministry official during consultations in August 1964 that there were differing views on South Africa in the Federal Republic. "Even in the Foreign Office," say the notes taken by the GDR diplomat, 'views differed on this issue. There were forces who thought too radical a policy towards South Africa (meaning excessively overt support, authors' note) would jeopardise West Germany's present advantage of not being one of the old colonial powers. These forces were even prepared to accept certain boycott measures. There was a boycott movement in West Germany, which consisted predominantly of social democrats. It was necessary to consider whether cooperation with these circles might be advisable."" But that was definitely not the concern of the GDR's exposure campaign. The Cold War and the Hallstein doctrine did not encourage such differentiated or similarveined conclusions for the conduct of the GDR's policy. Besides, the uneasiness of critical minds which Moscow had detected in the Federal Republic was evidently pronounced in very muted tones for a long time. It was not until the mid-I 970s that a stronger push for changes in Bonn's South African policy surfaced, in the context of an upsurge in the anti-apartheid movement and of a mounting critical analysis of West German policies in Africa on the part of academics.'26 At any rate, the Federal Republic's policy towards South Africa still provided grounds in the mid-1980s for the opposition, for example, for Guenter Verheugen from the Social Democratic Party, to level sharp criticism at the Government. 27 As far as the South African liberation movement was concerned, it viewed anything that would help to isolate the apartheid regime internationally as welcome support for its struggle. It is noteworthy that until the mid- 1960s the Federal Republic ranked behind Britain, France and the United States on the ANC's scale of criticism for those who cooperated with South Africa, even though 'West German neo-colonialism" was a much debated issue.,2 ANC publications became increasingly critical of the Federal Government's attitude towards South Africa.'29 SED officials recorded Dadoo's evaluation of November 1961 as follows: The West German imperialists are very cautious towards South Africa and show extreme restraint over capital investment and other assistance, for they want to avoid being overtl) linked %Nith the South African regime which is hated worldwide and especially so on the African continent. In this context it is doubttl whether defence minister Fouch, was successful in buying arms during his recent stay in West Germany. In South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the / 960s France lie was very stccessfl, since French arms companies are now building an arms ltactorN in South Africa. It may w'!ll be that tihe West German imperialists have an undercover share in this project or in other French measures. The CP of South Africa is, like the GDR, very much interested in uncovering links between tile Verwsoerd regime and the West Genian imperialists, and it will eventually provide us with material.'" The Solidarity Committee's memorandum on the Federal Republic's military cooperation with South Africa was welcomed by the SACP, and the party helped to disseminate the material. In the GDR, however, there was some dissatisfaction with the commitment of the South African comrades, as they still saw US and British imperialism as the chief butts of their criticism.",' Only in the second half of the 1960s, after the Solidarity Committee published its second memorandum entitled 'The Alliance Bonn-Pretoria' in June 196732, did mutual cooperation in the propaganda battle over the Federal Republic's ties with South Africa achieve the quality desired by the SED. International cooperation during the Rivonia trial The motor of the international movement for solidarity with the defendants in the Rivonia trial was the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners, which had sent Harald Wolpe to Berlin. Since late 1963 the Campaign organised the dissemination of petition lists in some 30 countries where signatories, referring to the UN resolution of I 1 October 1963, demanded freedom for the victims of the judicial machinery of apartheid. In the GDR, DAFRIG was the first body to be prominently involved in the circulation of the lists and the collection of signatures. Wolpe, like Marks and Dadoo, had addressed the society's annual meeting and given very impressive accounts of the situation. Professor Dr Walter Markov, a renowned historian and the doyen of African and Asian studies in the GDR, who served as DAFRIG's first president, was one of the first to the list.3 Towards the end of 1963, the FDGB received a letter from the Anti-apartheid Movement in London, calling its attention to the collection of signatures and asking for circulation of the lists. The request was reiterated in a further letter in January 1964.34 The FDGB's response was a very committed one. It ordered 1,000 petition forms from London and organised protest rallies in enterprises and institutions."'3 During those weeks it also stepped up its material support for SACTU. At the second conference of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of South Africa, the FDGB delegation was able to inform SACTU representatives that their organisation could expect to receive aid supplies including medicines, tents, blankets and manual duplicators valued at more than 200.000 marks in 1964.11 In late January 1964, on behalf of the World Campaign, S.Abdul also

Special Flights to Southern Africa wrote to Walter Ulbricht as the GDR head of state, requesting him to lend his support to efforts for the release of South African prisoners by issuing a personal message. Ulbricht's private secretary Otto Gotsche consulted the foreign ministry and the SED CC International Relations Department on the matter. Both of them recommended sending a letter of reply to the World Campaign because, Peter Florin said, "the African peoples are very sensitive on these things and we have every reason to demonstrate our difference from West Germany."8 Consequently, Ulbricht in his reply of 10 April 1964 underlined the GDR's concurrence with UN resolutions and drew attention to the contrasting West German policy.39 This official support from the GDR for the World Campaign had a parallel in similar declarations from prominent statesmen such as Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, Ahmed Ben Bella, Kwame Nkrumah, S~kou Toure, and Jomo Kenyatta. In March and April 1964, the GDR again received urgent calls for help. In a letter, the SACP CC once more underlined the importance of international solidarity under the auspices of the World Campaign to save the lives of the Rivonia defendants, and of activities which were planned to come to a head in April. Part of the letter read, 'Above all, it is vital that when sentence is passed the flood of international demonstration and protest reaches such a peak that the world body (the UN, authors' note) will again be compelled to move - but this time with a threat of action if its call goes unheeded. Our aim is to ensure that at the vital time the campaign will reach such dimension that the ruling clique in South Africa will not dare to take the lives of those leaders.' 40 Also S. Abdul appealed by letter to the FDGB to step up its solidarity efforts throughout April '... we must demand international action before it is too late."4' Finally, the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid for the first time sent an official letter to the GDR Solidarity Committee - a major foreign policy success for the GDR in t' ise days. The UN Committee proposed making use of every opportunity to cause the Government of South Africa to: " refrain from carrying out the death sentence passed on political leaders of the anti-apartheid struggle and to save the lives of those political leaders threatened with the death sentence; * immediately stop the torture and humiliation to which opponents of apartheid in South Africa were subjected; " release the political prisoners, whose only crime was their opposition to apartheid; " abandon the policy of apartheid, which contravened the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1'42

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s There was mounting pressure from within the UN membership to oppose apartheid and support the democratic forces in South Africa. On 23 March 1964, the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid had presented its first report on apartheid in South Africa which highlighted the persecution and trials of apartheid opponents and demanded an end to these practices; an international group of experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General had recommended an amnesty for all imprisoned victims of apartheid; and 58 African- and Asian countries urged that the Security Council resume its consideration of the situation in South Africa.4' This was the international context for the renewed upsurge of the solidarity campaign in the GDR in favour of the defendants accused in the Rivonia trial. On the basis of the solidarity campaign decision adopted by the SED CC Secretariat on 19 November 1963, the Solidarity Committee drew up proposals for supporting the World Campaign in April 1964 and beyond, which, as recommended by the CC's International Relations Department, were approved by Politbureau mernber Erich Honecker."' The Solidarity Committee then issued an appeal". to the GDR public which contained the essential points suggested by the UN Special Committee. Neues Deutschland informed the public about the UN Committee's demands and carried a brief appeal for mass protest against the repressive policy of the Government in Pretoria."' At the same time, the Solidarity Committee sent information material to prominent figures in the political, scientific and cultural communities in the GDR about the Rivonia trial and the purpose of the international solidarity campaign, and solicited their support for the four propositions of the UN Special Committee.'47 FDGB chairman Warnke sent a letter of protest to the South African Government on behalf of six million trade unionists, saying: The German people that experienced the horrors of Hitlerite fascism and its bitter consequences to the utmost, knows best what the Nazi methods have done which you dare now practise again. Remember that people who committed these crimes of the Nazis have been punished by the people's tribunal of Nuremberg. I assure you that the people and the trade unions of the German Democratic Republic and our whole people abhor racism as a most barbarous, uncivilised and antihuman attitude. Our people stand unanimously at the side of those you have sentenced because they, as representatives of the South African people stand up courageously and selflessly not only for the national dignity of the overwhelming majority of the South African population but also because they are defending in South Africa the interests of all civilised mankind, of human decency and of democracy against the forces of disruption and of war preparations."K

Special Flights to Southern Africa Popular GDR artists such as singer Lin Jaldati and actor Manfred Krug, writer Rudolf Petershagen and many other intellectuals and professionals pleaded for the men around Nelson Mandela.'49 A protest meeting was held in Leipzig, where over 500 citizens and foreign students attended.,"0 Particularly remarkable is the correspondence which followed a protest letter from Professor Peter Alfons Steiniger, an expert on international law, resident in Berlin, to South Africa's Minister of Justice, Balthazar J. Vorster, on 24 April 1964, in which he called the administration of justice based on apartheid an offence against international law and demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners. The South African Government, calling attention to domestic legislation, used to reject international protests against apartheid as interference in South African internal affairs. Hence it was surprising that the South African Minister of Justice felt tempted to have a written reply sent to Professor Steiniger's letter (perhaps mistaking the GDR for the Federal Republic?), although his line of argument was not surprising at all. Vorster's private secretary, acting on orders from his superior, asked Professor Steiniger since when it had not been acceptable for independent courts to try people actually convicted of premeditated murder or indicted for sabotage or murder.' In his reply Professor Steiniger developed his counterargument in two directions. On the one hand he described in detail why the legislation of apartheid was incompatible with international law, which was also binding on South Africa, and in this context he recalled the Allied Powers' verdict in the Nuremberg proceedings against members of the Nazi judiciary. On the other hand, he challenged South Africa's judiciary as politically biassed and dependent on the government.'53 The snag in the Professor's thesis was that he was making demands on South Africa's legislation and administration ofjustice which were either not at all or else only partially satisfied in his own country, the GDR, such as the freedoms of thought, assembly and association, the independence of law courts, and free elections. This fact must have made his insistence on these precepts appear ambivalent and less convincing internationally. A few days before the courtjudgment was to be delivered, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, with a vote of abstention from its permanent Western members and Brazil, which called for an amnesty for all opponents of apartheid in South Africa, for the suspension of all the death sentences already passed, and the discontinuation of the proceedings still under way. 14 On 12 June 1964 came the sentences in the Rivonia trial, Nelson Mandela and seven of his co-defendants were condemned to life imprisonment, Lionel Bernstein was acquitted. This verdict deprived the South African liberation

South Africa.- GDR and the ANC in the / 960s movement of its leadership, while the principal aim of the international solidarity efforts, to save the lives of the accused, was achieved. The World Campaign, with some relief, wrote to DAFRIG: 'We are convinced that the efforts undertaken by you and by millions of others all over the world have helped to ensure that the accused in the Rivonia trial were not sentenced to death. For that, the people of South Africa will always be thankful to you.'" After the men around Nelson Mandela were convicted, the international solidarity movement protested against the court judgernent, and did not stop urging the release of political prisoners in South Africa. The next challenge for the movement was to help rescue political prisoners, including a number of SACTU members, who had taken part in sabotage by Umkhonto we Sizwe and whose lives were now also in danger. SACTU had informed the FDGB by letter on 12 February 1964 that Billy Nair and 19 codefendants were standing trial in Pitermaritzburg."'' In 1964 Vuyisile Mini, Zinakele Kaba, and Wilson Khayinga, trade unionists from Port Elizabeth, were in mortal danger. In a letter to DAFRIG the World Campaign urgently called for protests to the South African minister of justice against the death sentence handed down on these men.'" Yet international solidarity was not strong enough to save them. They were executed in early November, and the apartheid regime's repressive machinery continued working. Solidarity for Abram Fischer After the arrests at Rivonia, which had so grave an impact on continued leadership for the liberation struggle, the ANC and SACP were faced with the difficult task of reassembling their forces, reorganising their structures and reviewing their strategy. A joint communique issued by the Communist Party of Great Britain and the SACP on 17 October 1965 cited the fundamental issues the SACP was faced with. Their basic point was that international solidarity remained of the utmost importance for isolating the apartheid regime, and that the decisive field ofthe battle to be fought was in South Africa itself, with the key to liberation lying in the struggle of the oppressed mass of the people. The decision to prepare the national liberation movement for overthrowing the regime by the use of arms was defended as having been a correct one, despite the apartheid regime's success in repressing the sabotage movement, although the following rider was added: 'Such preparation had to be accompanied by intensified political work, whatever the difficulties are, to rally and organise the people. Fascist terror called for new methods of work, but the basic task was still the strengthening and cohesion of the united fi'ont of national liberation in the form which it had achieved in many years of struggle, the congress alliance.'"'

Special Flights to Southern Africa Up to the mid-1960s the repressive strategy of the South African Government denied the anti-apartheid forces any legal possibility to exercising political opposition. In this hard time Abram Fischer, who had acted as a defence counsel for Nelson Mandela and the other leaders of the liberation movement during the Rivonia trial, and previously for Albert Luthuli in proceedings on a high treason charge, assumed the leadership of the SACP, which was trying,jointly with the ANC, to organise illegal resistance in South Africa. Abram Fischer himself came from a respected Afrikaaner family with great tradition. Unlike most other people with a similar background, he rejected racialism and the doctrine of white superiority and became involved in the struggle against apartheid. Towards the end of 1964, shortly after his clients were deported to Robben Island, he was ordered to stand trial, together with 13 other men and women, for membership in the banned SACP. Released on bail, he travelled to London and took part in a debate in the House of Lords on the Rhodesian question where he pleaded for ajust settlement to be based on recognition for the right of the people of Rhodesia to self-determination. Ignoring the dangers that awaited him, he returned to South Africa and appeared in court, until he went underground in January 1965, not failing to inform the court of his intention to continue fighting apartheid illegally. Ten months later the acting chairman of the SACP was arrested, and again brought tip for trial in March 1966. Just like his clients in the Rivonia trial, two years earlier, he himself was now faced with the threat of capital punishment. Once more, a broad international solidarity movement emerged, decisively inspired and coordinated by the British Anti-apartheid Movement, the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners, and the Londonbased International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) led by Canon Collins.5 Abram Fischer's extraordinary personality, his integrity and humanity, the courage he displayed in challenging the judiciary of the apartheid system and in defending the struggle against racism and social injustice as a legitimate cause earned him, a communist, sympathy and respect from very many people of different origins and world outlooks. The trial triggered off a wave of solidarity in the GDR, too. In mid-April 1966 the Solidarity Committee asked the SED Politbureau's Commission for Agitation to encourage extensive media coverage of the trial and public statements from political, scientific and cultural personalities.0 Neues Deutschland published an exclusive contribution by ANC executive member Alfred Kgokong about Abram Fischer.16' While he was awaiting the verdict, the Solidarity Committee sent him the following message: 'We followed with great pride and admiration your magnificent stand at the trial for your political beliefs and ideals. On behalf of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the

South Afiica: GDR and the ANC in the / 960s German Democratic Republic we send you our warmest greetings and very best wishes for your health. We salute you as the great patriot and champion of brotherhood and equality of all races and nations. We pledge ourselves to fight alongside the world campaign for the release of all South African political prisoners. Your liberty has become a matter of honour for all peace and freedom loving people the world over."62 As a lawyer, he also received messages of solidarity from Peter Alfons Steiniger and Friedrich Karl Kaul, both prominent law professors, and from the GDR Association of Democratic Lawyers. The FDJ and other organisations as well as individuals sent him greetings, too. 1'6 When the court on 4 May announced its verdict of guilty and the danger of a death sentence was highly acute, protests to the South African Government were also mounting in the GDR. Christian institutions in the GDR displayed solidarity with the South African communist, much in line with a detailed public statement of Christian Action in Great Britain, from which the daily Neue Zeit of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the GDR had carried excerpts. On 5 May the Bureau of the Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians in European States, and pastors and theologians in Berlin and Leipzig sent cables to the South African minister of justice. On behalf of the Regional Committee of the Christian Peace Conference in the GDR, Carl Ordnung protested against the threat of death hanging over Abram Fischer "because he championed equality and brotherhood of all human beings."' Even bishops in the GDR intervened with the minister ofjustice, Vorster, to avert a death sentence. But they did not want any publicity at the time, presumably because of the tense relationship between the state and the churches in the GDR. The Solidarity Committee respected their wish."' The court did not dare to sentence Abram Fischer to death. Its judgment was imprisonment for life. The international solidarity movement, however, did not rest. Exemplifying the political range of support for Abram Fischer, protests came forward from ten members of the British House of Lords, from Italian senators, the Soviet Solidarity Committee and communist parties.66 A few hours after the court delivered its judgment, a televised protest meeting took place in Berlin on 9 May 1966, where Friedrich Wolff, chairman of the Berlin Association of Lawyers, took the floor and argued against the court's verdict as follows: Sabotage is one of the charges brought against Fischer... What does it mean to sabotage Verwoerd's regime? What does it niean to sabotage apartheid? it means to resist inhumanity, reaction and flscism! It means to struggle for humanity, for progress, for freedom and peace! The criminals are not those who resist racialism and fascism, but those who support racialism and fascism."'

Special Flights to Southern Africa He also recalled that while Fischer was awaiting the sentence, the leader of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, an advocate of closest relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa, was holding talks with Verwoerd and other South African politicians. Florence Maphoso, who was working as the ANC's representative in the Bureau of the Women's International Democratic Federation in Berlin, gave an account of the situation in South Africa. Participants at the meeting adopted a resolution protesting against the sentence and denouncing the cooperation between South Africa and the Federal Republic. The resolution was forwarded to the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid, to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization at its session in Dar es Salaam, and to other international bodies.' Protest rallies also took place in Leipzig and at the FDJ's youth college at Bogensee near Berlin. Notably universities and other academic institutions joined in the protest movement and, just as during the Rivonia trial, artists, scientists and politicians spoke up, too. Walter Felsenstein, the internationally renowned director of the Comic Opera House in Berlin, wrote this to Vorster: ... Mozart's Magic Flute is performed in South African Opera Houses. But how can Mozart's message be made to tally with the flagrant injustice practised in your country'? You are threatening the very existence of an upright champion of liberty and human dignity. The barrister Brain Fischer is to be buried alive in accordance with a 'justice' unworthy of the 20th century, which tramples underfoot ideals which a man like Mozart already helped to put into practice." ' When the SED CC on 6 June received a letter from the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain asking it to mobilise protest against Abram Fischer's condemnation and to declare sympathy and support for the South African communist, the SED leadership was able to reply that a broad solidarity movement was at work in the GDR.170 The SED also heeded a request from the SACP to demonstrate solidarity with the South African movement for liberation by observing the 45th anniversary of the party's founding on 30 July 1966.172 A few weeks earlier, on 11 June, Neues Deutschland had published a message of greetings from the SED to the SACP, assuring that the party and all the people would always side with the South African patriots. They also demanded freedom for 'the outstanding patriots of South Africa such as Mandela, Sisulu and Abram Fischer and the other imprisoned fighters for national independence and democracy."'72 The SED and the Solidarity Committee planned to continue the solidarity campaign for Fischer and the other South African political prisoners, bearing in mind that the UN had proclaimed 1968 International Year for Human Rights.

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s Solidarity Committee officials noted in a letter to the SED CC's International Relations Department on 15 August 1966 that although the solidarity campaign for Fischer had been kept within narrow limits in view of the war in Vietnam, the GDR nonetheless held a prominent place in international media coverage of protest action (mention was made of the London Anti-Apurtheid News) because of its swift and effective reaction to events in South Africa.'73 The implication was that this bonus of goodwill could be built on to advance the GDR's foreign- policy aims. The reference to restrictions of the solidarity movement for Abram Fischer because of simultaneous campaigning against the expansion of the US war in Vietnam, as well as the endeavour to employ the goodwill gained from the GDR's committed plea for the South African communist for foreign policy purposes indicate how solidarity was in certain circumstances regarded as an easily adaptable instrument. Organising simultaneous and all-out support both for Abram Fischer and the people in Vietnam was evidently overstretching the capacity of the apparatus which was handling this instrument. Maybe a grassroots solidarity movement motivated by a reponsibility of its own would have coped differently. Many people in the GDR had an abundant sense of solidarity, which could have been encouraged by fuller information on the anti-apartheid struggle. In this connection it is interesting that the Solidarity Committee communicated to the SED the following perception: In the past our press has, with few exceptions, given much more space to exposing West German support for the Verwoerd regime than to describing the colonial-fascist conditions in South Africa. Actually, our people know very little about that country. In future, exposing Bonn as a major protector of the racist regime should go hand in hand with reports on the oppression and persecution of the overwhelming majority of the population and the heroic and self-sacrificing struggle of the resistance movement."74 Whether and to what extent this criticism was accepted and changes made in propaganda cannot be deplored here; however, the obsession with German politics in the media reports continued until the G DR and the Federal Republic established a fairly normal relationship in the early 1970s. We can summarize as follows: Solidarity in the GDR with the leaders and activists of the ANC and SACP, from Nelson Mandela to Abram Fischer, was part of a worldwide movement, across the divide between the socio-political systems of East and West, and it involved people with different social, political and ideological backgrounds. It made a remarkable contribution to the movement's effectiveness. A specific trait of the solidarity campaigns in the GDR were strong repercussions from the Cold War and, in particular, from the inter-German

Special F/likhts to Southern A/iica confrontation. Hence, the campaigns tended to be employed by the GDR leadership in its own attempt to gain international recognition for the GDR and to discredit its Western rival at home and abroad - who, however, provided ample material. The campaigns were influenced by the divergent lines of development in the two German states in the post-war era, including their differing stances vis-a- vis national liberation movernents, and they mirrored the GDR's endeavour to gain a distinctive image in the eyes of Third World nations and its own citizens as a progressive alternative in Germany. Its support for the right of peoples to democratic self-determination was at odds with domestic conditions, where civil and political rights were disregarded. Setting objectives for these campaigns and organising them fiom the top reflected the mechanisms of political decision-making in the administrative, centralistic society of the GDR. At the same time. solidarity actions for the South African liberation movement were supported by very many people in different social and political environments, and without their commitment these actions could not have attained such a significant volume and weight. This commitment showed that a strong sense of human solidarity had taken root in the GDR, and, inversely, it strengthened that positive disposition in large sections ofthe public. It has to be added that the contradictions between domestic realities and international aspirations, and the instrumentalisation of solidarity in inter-German politics, potentially discouraged or excluded people who were critical of the G DR's system. The solidarity campaigns accompanied and reflected the hard and costly struggle for emancipation by the oppressed majority of the South African people as well as international developments and the Cold War coordinates in which both the South African liberation movement and the GDR, and other international players were moving. They are mirrors of their time. Propaganda, armed struggle and the long way home for ANC and SACP The trial of Abram Fischer revealed that the apartheid regime had managed by the mid- 1960s to destroy much of the ANC and SACP structures in South Afi-ica and to deprive them of their leaders inside the country. With an immense propaganda effort the regime was now trying to polish tip its international image and to secure support from the West as a bu lwark against communism. In the latter regard. it was quite successful. The number of South African political exiles had been rising since the early 1960s.The ANC and SACP had sent some of their leaders abroad, such as Oliver Tambo, Moses Kotane and John B. Marks, to solicit international

Soth Arica: GDR and the ANC in the 1 960s support for their struggle and to organise continued resistance from without. Many others had no other choice than to flee South Africa. like Harold Wolpe who reported his fate to GDR audiences during the Rivonia solidarity campaign. What was now becoming increasingly important was organising the cohesion of the South African diaspora from London to Moscow, from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka to Cairo, to keep the exiles and the international solidarity movement informed of developments, and to counter the apartheid regime's propaganda offensive. Sechaba was established to fulfil this task. Sechaba Sechaba, the ANC's first own journal, presented itself in January 1967 as a ,mouthpiece of the oppressed masses', and ANC president Tambo declared: *With this first issue of Sechaba, we are launching a new and powerful weapon to carry the truth about South Africa and the voice of the African National Congress into every corner of the world.'A7 The editor Mandla Kosi's - his true name was Marimuthu P. Naicker - domicile was London, where the manuscripts were compiled and prepared for printing. The journal carried no imprint, and this did not change until the second half of 1968. The cradle of Sechaba stood in tile GDR, at the Rotation print shop in Dessau in 1967, until the journal moved to Neustrelitz in December 1968 and finally to the Erich Weinert print shop in Neubrandenburg, where it stayed from May 1974 till October 1990. The GDR Solidarity Committee financed the printing and distribution, and initally one, later two editorial assistants from the ANC. Sechaba may have been the most widely known symbol of the GDR's solidarity with the ANC's fight for liberation. Eric Singh, who was involved in the making of Sechabu in the GDR for many years from 1969, remembers that the first talks between ANC and Solidarity Committee representatives about producing the journal in the GDR took place during the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference in Havana in January 1966.76 It can be assumed that the was an issue on the agenda when Naicker and Kgokong met with Schmidt and Paul Markowski, head of the SED CC Department of International Relations, on 22 October 1966, during their sojourn in Berlin for the Congress of the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ). 1 Barry Higgs, an anti-apartheid activist, was also part of the South African delegation. It was agreed that he would be stationed in GDR in order to take care of the layout, the packing and despatching of Sechaba which he did. Patrick Letalo who received vocational training as a printer in GDR was engaged in printing the first numbers of the journal.'x The cooperative arrangement for printing Se'chaba in the GDR met the needs of the ANC and did not overstretch the capacities of the GDR, in so far

Special Flights to Southern Africa as printing publications locally did not require expenses in convertible currency. The GDR's printing equipment industry and printing works were of a relatively high standard, compared with other countries in Eastern Europe. The SED also had a tight network of its own facilities which could print material for friendly foreign organisations and parties, with discretion where necessary. SED was also the owner of the printing shop Erich Wfeinert in Neubrandenburg where the party's regional newspaper Freie Erde was printed. Yet delays were constantly occurring before Sechaba could go to press and be dispatched. M.P. Naicker, the ANC's information officer, had to remind his German counterparts again and again that late delivery of the journal annoyed its readers and detracted from the topicality of articles. The reasons did not lie solely in slow production at the print shops. In fact, it was a very long way for Sechaba to go from London where the manuscripts were written under Naicker's direction, and ultimately to its readers. During the first time of Sechaba's existence, the manuscripts were transported from London to Berlin and onwards to Dessau, where cumbersome production planning and outdated equipment did not allow any fast processing and printing. The printed journal had then to take the same way back to London, where it was put in envelopes, stamped and posted. A memorandum of I May 1968 from Joe Matthews, executive member of the ANC, to the Solidarity Committee7 said Sechaba had established a prominent place among African journals, but further improvements were necessary. He complained about manuscripts having to reach the print shop at least six weeks before going to press, so that current and important material could not be included. He suggested that the number of copies should be increased to justify the use of more modem printing presses, and that the whereabouts of the print shop should be mentioned. Sechaba might then be mailed at the cheaper newspaper rate direct from the GDR, rather than being sent for final distribution to London first. Besides, the journal could then additionally be distributed in Western countries by newspaper agencies and bookshops. The ANC had also weighed up the political aspect of the problem: making public this support for the liberation movement from a socialist country, and the possible disapproval of ANC sympathisers in other countries. A carefully worded imprint need not necessarily name the country of production, although the imperialists knew anyhow where the journal was being printed, he said. His partners in the GDR were persuaded by his arguments, and a small imprint soon mentioned Sechaba's place of origin "Printed in Neustrelitz", and later "Printed in Neubrandenburg". Indeed, who on earth knew of Neustrelitz or Neubrandenburg? A large number of readers all over the world failed to realise that these towns had anything to do with the GDR. Only

South Africa: GDR und the ANC in the 1960s Engaged itiih Sechuba. From left: Eric Singh, Edinwid Ruehner (Soliduriiy Committee), unknown Indian stdent, M.P. Naicker, Heinz H. Schmidt (chairman Solidarity Committee) in Berlin. years later was the name of the Erich Weinert print shop in Neubrandenburg added and revealed, that this was a town in GDR. After the move from Dessau to Neustrelitz, the number of copies printed rose considerably, from an original 6 230 to 10 000 at first, to 15 000 in 1972 and then to 20 000 in 1973.10 But the production process in Neustrelitz was even slower, such that M.P. Naicker and Singh, near despair, frequently turned to the Solidarity Committee for help, where they received every assistance possible, in particular from Heinz H. Schmidt. When in 1970 the manuscripts got stuck at the airport in Berlin and could not be retrieved, the Solidarity Committee chairman received yet another request for help from London. M.P. Naicker wrote this in his letter to Schmidt on 23 October 1970: ...I really do not know what I should do to solve the problems that continue to arise every so often. As a desperate step, I want to ask you for some very personal assistance. I know you are extremely busy and can ill-afford the time, but please help me to overcome all these nagging problems. ... In December this year we shall have reached the fifth year of our long association in the field of publications. Yet we have not been able to solve the many problems that keep cropping up almost monthly.

Special Flights to Southern Akica .Should you need my presence inl Berlin to brief you further and to join you in meeting the people concerned with the handling of Sechaba and our other publications, kindly ask Eric to phone ine and I shall rush over immediately. During our long association I have often indicated, and I once again repeat most emphatically, my deep and sincere gratitude to you and all members of the Afro- Asian Solidarity Committee whom I have had the pleasure to work with, tbr the marvellous manner in which our organisation is being treated. I feel more than a little guilty to burden you with our problems once again but feel that you are the only person who could help me finally solve the innumerable problems which keep arising at regular intervals." In the period of the Weimar Republic, Schmidt himself worked as a journalist for newspapers of the communist party, and during his exile in Britain he was editor- in-chief of the anti-fascist paper Freie Tribuene in London. He was a man who could understand M.P. Naicker's worries from remembering his own experience, and so lie vigorously impressed on the managers of the print shop in Neustrelitz the need to ensure a more efficient approach to Sechaba. But the situation improved only when its production was shifted to the more modern printing works in Neubrandenburg. Even here, problems did arise and hence it required constant personal efforts by ANC and Solidarity Committee officers, and not least by the printing staff, to achieve a satisfactory result. In this connection Eric Singh praised Erich Bissmann, the graphic designer, who frequently worked all night so that Sechuba could go to press on tine .2 For its cornmittment a working team at Erich Weinert print shop was honoured with the name Nelson Aandela in May 1987 following an agreement between the ANC and the Solidarity Committee. In 1975 a way was found to transport the manuscript from London to East Berlin much more expeditiously via West Berlin. Following a request by M.P. Naicker, Detlev Reichel, ajournalist working with the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin's newspaper Die Wulhrheit and a member of the West Berlin Antiapartheid Movement, offered his address as a relay. Upon arrival of the thickly upholstered, A-3 sized envelopes from London he would hand them over to Eric Singh or Victor Moche from Sechaba, and later to members of the ANC Office in the GDR. The 'transfer', Reichel remembers, took place either at Bahnhof Zoo railway station in West Berlin or at the ill-famed Checkpoint Charly in Friedrichstrasse between West and East Berlin. 'We'll meet at Uncle Charly's' they used to joke when they arranged their rendezvous at the border. Later on, the West Berlin 'courier' himself took the Sechaba manuscripts directly to East Berlin.'8' Despite all the difficulties, the printing of material in the GDR was an im portant pillar of cooperation with ANC. Spotlight on South Africa, Weekly News Digest was also printed in the GDR for some time, and the series South

South Africa. GDR and the ANC in the 1 960s 4.-f'ican Studies and other pamphlets treating specific issues began their journey into the world from there."4 The frequently inferior paper qualit), of Sechabt and other printed materials was due to efforts to keep production costs low, on the one hand, and to the constant paper shortage in the GDR, on the other. There was a more attractive look to the letterheads, posters and Christmas cards the Solidarity Committee ordered to be printed for the ANC's wide international use. The African Comnunit After the GDR had acquired some routine with the printing of Sechabu for a year and a half, the SACP turned to the SED with a request. Its theoretical journal, The African Communist, which had been published in London as a quarterly since October 1959, was burdening the party's treasury with 2 500 pounds sterling annually, and further rises in cost were likely to occur. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the SACP to finance thejournal. ' Would the SED be able to help? Michael Harmel presumably raised the question with SED officials when he and Joe Matthews were staying in Berlin in May 1968 to attend a scientific conference under the auspices of the SED CC to commemorate the 150th birthday of Karl Marx.' Under the pen-name of Lerumo, Harmel was the editor of The Africcn Communist. Upon thorough consideration, the SED CC's International Relations Department recommended that the CC Secretariat should agree to having the journal printed in the GDR. An important factor was the journal's ideological alignment, as can be seen from the department's expose, substantiating the draft decision it submitted: 'In terms of its content, The African C'omnunist is aimed at encouraging the solidarity of the progressive forces on the African continent, and it represents a forum for exchanges ofMarxist-Leninist views. Decisions and documents of the South African Communist Party are also published in it. The journal can be assessed as one of the most significant publications propagating Marxism- Leninism in Africa.' There were no objections of a substantive nature to printing the journal of the SACP, with which the SED maintained 'very close, trusting and comradely' relations "in its stand towards our party and the CPSU, on issues of the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist struggle, the South African Communist Party is guided by distinctly Marxist-Leninist principles, which are reflected in The African Communist.' It was of particular importance to the SED in those days that '... the South African Communist Party unambiguously denounced the anti-Marxist policy of the Mao clique and the policy of West German imperialism."7 The SED CC's Secretariat decided on 3 1 July 1969 to print around 7,000

Special Flights to Southern AJfica copies of the journal in the GDR. It also granted a request from the SACP to print mini-sized copies of The African Communist for camouflaged transportation into South Africa from London. The Secretariat entrusted Zentrag with these tasks. The imprints in all issues, it told them, should not name the GDR.'8 From issue no. 37/1969 onwards the imprints mentioned Printing House Halle, three issues later Nationales Druckhauns Berlin, and then lnterdruck Leipzig, all of them owned by SED. The journal was despatched fi'om Zentralversandin Erfurt, a company in charge of despatching printed government papers within GDR. Unlike the arrangement for Sechaba, the costs for printing The AJrican Communist, includingthe mini-sized edition, initially 20 400 marks a year, plus those for distribution 189 were borne by the SED rather than the Solidarity Committee. The number of copies rose considerably over the years. The format of the mini-sized copies with a white cover leaf, which were destined for illegal distribution, had to be modified because readers in South Africa found it hard to decipher the small print. "', The production ofpublications for SACP's political work in exile and for clandestine distribution in South Africa - among them brochures with a camouflaged title page which did not betray its revolutionary content - became a major element of cooperation between the SED and SACP. Y" Similar to Sechaba, The African Communist too had a long way to go to reach its readers not only in South Africa but in most of the African countries. Harmel himself took the manuscripts of the first issues from London to GDR, later Sonja Bunting was in charge. Once in three months she had to come with the manuscript which in the first years also had to be type-setted in the GDR, in later years only the printing was done there. As Sonja Bunting's interpreter Ursula Hoffmann recalls they had also to travel once a year to Zentralversand in Erfurt in order to check the mailing list and to bring it up-to-date. The working team responsible for packing and mailing the journal consisted mainly of women who were very well aware of the importance of their work. They always welcomed Sonja Bunting with great warmth and gave her and her interpreter the impression that for them solidarity with the struggle against apartheid was a matter of heart. Zentralversand also stock-piled the books printed for SACP in GDR. From there they were dispatched upon request by the SACP depending on how the books were selling. '2 Political struggle atid armed struggle: The GDR 's position The first issue of Sechaba reflected the hopes of the South African liberation movement that it could make its way back into South Africa by means of the armed struggle. An article headed 'The creeping war. The new trend in

South Aftici: GDR und the AN( in the 1960s Southern Africa', analysing developments in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, came to the conclusion that southern Africa was entering a phase of military struggle.'03 Armed operations were already an important instrument of the liberation movements of the Movinento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola and Frente de Libertacao de Alocambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, and in 1965/66 armed attacks were launched by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia and by South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia. Finally, the ANC and ZAPU challenged both the minority regime of Ian Smith and the South African Government militarily through their combined large-scale Wankie operation from August 1967. Since the mid-1960s some of the liberation movements had been approaching the GDR with reiterated requests for support for their armed struggle. In order to better understand the difficulties the GDR decision makers had in meeting these requests we try to sketch how the debate within the southern African liberation movement on the strategy and tactics of armed fighting was perceived in the GDR and what position the GDR itself took on this issue. Embracing Marxist-Leninist views on war and military force and dividing armed conflicts into just and unjust wars, the GDR, like other socialist countries, regarded anti-colonial liberation wars as just wars, as a legitimate form of struggle for liberation, whose employment essentially depended on the behaviour of the respective colonial power. A majority of the UN member states also increasingly recognised the legitimacy of the liberation movements' armed struggle in southern Africa to enforce the right to self-determination for the peoples of the region. To the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, support for national liberation movements, including military aid, had since the 1920s been an element of pushing forward with the world revolutionary process. In the nuclear age, the USSR and its allies came to adjust their anti-imperialist alliance strategy by attempting to harmonise their support of liberation movements with a policy of peaceful co-existence between the diametrically opposed socio-political systems in the East and West. These changes in strategy and tactics were reflected in discussions. since the mid-I 950s, about the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism, and in debates about a role for the bourgeoisie in the movement for national liberation and about the relationship between political and military methods in fighting against colonial domination. These debates culminated in the 1960s in fierce controversies with the Cuban leadership which tended to favour exporting its own revolutionary experience, but primarily with the CP

Special Flights to Southern Afirica of which was adhering to a theory of revolution more or less equating it with a revolutionary people's war."4 Having embarked on a virtual tight rope walk between peaceful coexistence and an anti-imperialist alliance with the movement for national liberation, the Eastern bloc countries came to take a more or less ambivalent stand on the use of armed force in the liberation struggle and on the corresponding expectations these movements put forward to them. In fact, the policy of the Soviet Union and its allies till the end of the 1980s wavered between aiding armed liberation struggles and living up to a self-professed willingness to cooperate on peaceful settlements to the conflicts in southern Africa, between compromise and recourse to revolutionary means to overcome tile existing structures of domination in the region. Depending on the situation in tile Eastern bloc countries themselves, in the region and on the general international political climate, the emphasis would shift towards or away fiom support for the armed struggle. On 10 January 1967, a mere six months before the ANC and ZAPU staged their common military operation in the northwest of Zimbabwe, the Wankie operation, the SED Politbureau decided for the first time to supply arms to national liberation movements. In the list of recipients, which included FRELIMO, the MPLA and the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guin, e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) as well as ZAPU, the ANC was missing. That was the decision, although the SACP had communicated a request fbr arms to the SED time and again years before. This is borne out by confidential notes on a talk with Dadoo in early January 1963. " A memorandum of November 1964 from the Solidarity Committee indicates that the ANC was particularly seeking assistance with the military training of its cadres.'The fact that the ANC was nonetheless left out of the Politbureau decision is likely to have been due mainly to uncertainties in the GDR in view of reported contradictions arnong top SACP functionaries in London and Dar es Salaam regarding the question of armed struggle. While leaders in exile in Dar es Salaam were said to stake their hopes on rapidly carrying military action into South Africa from outside, those living in London were evidently giving priority to building up clandestine structures within the country.'' While Abram Fischer was still trying to organise the underground work of the SACP and ANC inside the country, Dadoo turned to the SED with a request for assistance: I have been asked )y my Central Committee to Write to you on a matter which is very vitally connected with oUr eftorts to strengthen our party and tu reinforce its underground machinery. The intensification of persecution and the serious casualties we have suffered calls for an equal

South Af'iuci." GDR und the ANC in the 1960s intensification by us of measures to impro c our techniqlCus of illegal functioning. Recalling earlier aid firom the SED he went on to specify' the kinds of assistance the SACP was soliciting: We are anxious to embark upon a programme of training for some of our selected cadres in techniques which have a bearing on general uderground activit and which include ilems such as illegal printing. illegal documentation. the art of personal disguise. tWchniques of evading both visual and electronic surveillance etc. etc. We would also like to aet ad% ice and. if possible, assistance on sorne of the latest techniques connected both with the printing of illegal propaganda, its camoullage for purposes of transportation into the country and special techniques of distribution. '" Mac Maharaj, Minister of Transport in the new South Africa, was one of the first South Afi'icans to undergo a sabotage train ing course in the GDR for several months in 1962 after completing training in a print shop in Bischofswerda. Both at that time and in the phase of the anti-apartheid struggle fiom the late 1970s onwards, he played an outstanding role in building up illegal structures of resistance within South Africa.'" The SED leadership was, in general, favourably disposed to the request but was reluctant to take a decision. A policy paper of 15 March 1966 by its International Relations Department explained this, saying that 'there are divergent views in the leadership of the CP of South Africa on whether or not cadres should be trained in this line. After we received word from the group in in December 1965 that there was no longer any interest, we were again approached with this request fiom London in February this year."About the same time, the faction in the South African liberation movement which was pressing for military fighting came to win the upper hand - surely also under pressure from a growing number of impatient MK recruits who were sick of the problems oftheir camp life in Tanzania and only too eager for action. The launching of the Wankie operation in August 1967 was the physical evidence. The foreign affairs specialists in the GDR had mixed feelings about that trial of military strength. In an information paper dated 14 September the foreign ministry's African affairs division expressed scepticism about the operation, provoking a harshly criticial reaction from the GDR's consul-general in Dares Salaam, Gottfried Lessing. In a letter to the CC International Relations Department of 17 November 1967 he quoted the following passage from that paper: 'As far as we know, there is currently no unanimity within the ANC leadership on the action. It is chiefly CP comrades in that leadership who

Special Flights to Southern Africa think the action at this time and under the present circumstances is not going to succeed.' Apparently unaware of the information from London, the consulgeneral rejected that appraisal and gave his comrades back home a lesson in revolutionary ideology, saying: The inlibrnation paper mentioned above, in my view betrays a defeatist attitude a. far as its appraising parts are concerned Approving of the arguments contained in it would mcan that revolutionary struggles should not be launched unless success is certain from the outset, and that revolutionary forces should not lake the initiative hccause the class enemies could st p tip their counter-revolutionary measures.The dividing line between proponents and opponents of the Wankie operation could certainly not be drawn between the ANC and the SACP, as the foreign ministry analysis appeared to imply. Divergences on the priorities of the liberation struggle will rather have cut across both of them. But Lessing was evidently right when rejecting a point in the foreign ministry's paper which queried whether the decision to go ahead with the Wankie operation might not have been due to radical leftist forces under the influence of the People's Republic of China and/or to the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) operating with provocative intents behind the scene.-- The radical ideology of Maoism, in particular the Chinese theory of people's wars, was naturally attractive to many young ANC fighters. One can assume that their "revolutionary impatience' needed to be taken seriously by the leadership around Kotane and Marks in Dar es Salaam. But to interpret this as Maoist plotting - as it was only too easily done in the countries of the Eastern bloc in the period of a widening Moscow-Peking rift - would surely have meant ignoring the inner dynamics of the South African liberation movement. Lessing, the diplomat with experience of class struggle,03 noted reproachfully in his letter 'that the comrades who wrote this paper seem to lack clarity about the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on the issue of armed struggle.' All in all, the paper rather indicated that his colleagues at headquarters in Berlin had the greater sense of reality. About the same time as Lessing was penning his cricticism of comrades atthe foreign ministry, SED CC officials in Berlin received first-hand information about the course of events in southern Africa. A visiting SACP delegation with Marks and Kotane from Dares Salaam, joined by Brian Bunting and Joe Slovo from London, had talks with SED functionaries led by politbureau member Friedrich Ebert between 15 and 23 November 1967 to exchange views and information on international developments and the strategy and tactics of each party. In their expos6, the SACP representatives gave due priority to the military actions started in August.204 For the first time, the SACP and SED issued a communique about the meeting, which contained no direct reference

South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s to this issue, but merely stated: The comrades of the South African Communist Party gave details about the difficult struggle demanding great sacrilices, which is being waged by the democratic tbrces in South Africa against imperialism and racism, for democracy, national independence and freedom. The apartheid regime is sharpening its terror campaign against all progressive forceN. both amongst the white and non-white populations... The masses of the people are fighting back even more impressively against the terrorist measures of the government, against ' hite domination and for the democratic revolution. The SED's response was described as follows: 'The Socialist Unity Party estimates the role and struggle of the South African Communist Party, as the leading force in the national liberation movement in South Africa, extremely highly and expresses its admiration and its unlimited solidarity for the heroic struggle of the democratic forces of South Afica.'-2°s The restraint of both parties in their communique might partly have been due to doubts on the GDR side about the sense of the Wankie operation, and partly to the SACP's probable concern at the tirne to make no particular mention of military activities in a joint communique with a governing communist party of the Eastern bloc. As a report on their stay in November 1967 indicates, J.B. Marks and Moses Kotane were highly pleased with the outcome of their talks with the SED; Marks even noted that he had fallen in love with the GDR this time.206 By the time the SACP delegation was paying that visit, military action in Rhodesia had produced results which must have had a fairly sobering effect on the liberation movement's thinking, although further batches of guerilla fighters marched south in 1968, too. The course of the armed struggle will have strengthened the persuasive power of those who preferred building illegal structures and organising political work within South Africa and, correspondingly, wished some of their cadres to be given appropriate training in the GDR. Military, intelligence and security training in the GDR The attendant circumstances of the SACP delegation's visit in November 1967, preceding developments, and the make-up of the SACP delegation permit us to assume that the visit was decisive in setting the stage for the intensive support the SED was going to provide for the illegal work of the South African liberation movement. After the experience of the Wankie operation and the discussions of the ANC's consultative conference in Morogoro (April 1969), it was above all Joe Slovo who took charge of organising underground activities within South Africa and ensuring the training of the required cadres. As Ronnie Kasrils recalls, training for solo

Special Flights to Southern Africa fighters and small groups was subsequently arranged to take place in the GDR, which had specialised on this kind of assistance for the South African and other friendly liberation movements.rr In line with the political hierarchy, the SED leadership commissioned tile Ministry for State Security (MtS) to train personnel from the South African liberation movement. Technical, responsibility for their training in military and security matters, which included both intelligence work and counter-intelligence, lay with the ministry's departments for intelligence and anti-terrorist defence, in conjunction with other ministerial units. As of 1971, necessary coordination was done by the International Relations Institute at the MfS Law School. The ANC members received their security training well screened from outside observation, in what were called safe houses. Military drill and the handling of various types of hand- held arms and explosives was, as a rule, performed in camps outside built-up areas. Essentially, the training programme comprised three sets of subjects: basics of security work of illegal parties, specific (secret) security work, and Marxism- Leninisrn.2u8 The first set had four priorities fixed: " description of the strategy of imperialism and of the main lines of attack and the instruments of its secret services; * the link between security work and all other activities of the illegal party, and, derived therefrom, basic security requirements for personal behaviour, for the party's structure and for building a reliable system of communications for the party both within and between its structural components and across borders; * basic requirements for the development of cadres to assume leading functions, and for winning members: * security concerns in the organisation and execution of direct and indirect political work among the masses. This involved know-how about 'installation of and security precautions for illegal print shops, the camouflage of printed material and its secure distribution among the people, means and methods of effective and secure visual campaigning under conditions of illegality, the secure use of sound recordings, video cassettes, etc. '209 The second set, training in 'specific security work', included the following subjects: * firstly, 'protection of the party from enemy attacks', i.e. "prevention of enemy attacks and reconnaissance of enemy strikes which have occurred or are just occurring' briefly, counter- intelligence:

South Afkica: GDR and the ANC b7 the 1960s * secondly, the procurement of information 'which permits the party to make a concrete analysis of the class struggle situation and to adjust its strategy and tactics.' These included creating *sources and points of support in enemy ranks' 0 briefl', the organisation of intelligence operations. Both Sechaba and The A/ican C'ouninunist reported an example of 'indirect work among the masses' in their first issue of 1970. On 14 November 1969, underground fighters of the liberation movement had caused some sensation by actions undertaken in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, East London and Durban, which could not possibly be ignored by the South African press. Pedestrians saw leaflets from the exiled ANC floating down towards them, and workers going home from their shift heard from hidden loudspeakers linked to tape recordings: 'This is the African National Congress, this is the voice of freedom.'""0 In the mid- 1970s, this type of action was very much expanded, involving a number of underground fighters who had been trained in the GDR.' In the GDR, it was noted with much relief that the ANC had abandoned its military actions with ZAPU, which were bound to fail under the circumstances, and was changing course to reinvigorate the resistance in South Afiica itself, not least by means of political propaganda. Addressing a Solidarity Committee session in early 1970, Committee chairman Schmidt expressed satisfaction that the South African liberation movement was increasingly giving attention to political and ideological work and was, for this purpose, relying on assistance from the GDR. He said, with obvious reference to the ANC's propaganda activities of November 1969: If we have managed in the GDR to produce for the third consecutive year now the South Atrican liberation movements central organ ,Sechaba. which comes into the country in large lumbers and organies exiles fiom outside, then this aid is ten times more important than anything else which may look more venturesome. It. a short while ago, maJor speeches were transmitted via simple loudspeaker systems at the railway stations of all the tour big cities in South Africa and a leallctling action took place. then this shows how effectively solidarity can %%ork, and a maior part ol the solidarity is triom us in the GDR.21-' He did not explain this share. It is interesting, however, that the request Dadoo communicated to the Solidarity Committee and the CC International Relations Department - possibly during his stay in Berlin for the 20th anniversary celebrations of the GDR - did include six loudspeakers which needed to be adaptable to tape recorders and suitable for transmitting speeches. The Solidarity Committee had promised to consider whether supply could be arranged.2' GDR veterans who were involved in cooperation with the ANC A

Special Flights to Southern Africa remember that GDR equipment was actually employed for the undercover work of the liberation movement. Another item covered by the cooperative arrangements between the SED and SACP were leaflets and texts for illegal distribution in South Africa. To complete the picture of how and to what extent the GDR cooperated with the ANC on security and military matters during the early stage in the 1960s, we have to add that this cooperation became much intensified in the 1970s. When thousands of young South Africans left their country after the Soweto uprising in 1976 and joined the ANC and its army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, providing shelter and training for them became a critical problem for the liberation movement. In this emergency the ANC turned to the GDR, amongst others, for help and did receive assistance. Special flights were arranged from 1976/77 onwards to fly young MK recruits in groups of about forty from their camps in Angola to the GDR. Later ol MK soldiers who had already done basic training in Angola and proven their mettle were also selected. Many of those young people hoped to be chosen for a training course in the GDR.24 The training base was a secret camp in a hilly stretch of landscape near Teterow, in the vicinity of a wellknown motorcross track. Military drill, general security concerns, intelligence and counter-intelligence, information and propaganda activities were the centrepiece of the courses, which lasted six months. The ANC trainees lived in the camp, together with their GDR instructors and on friendly terms with them. These instructors were responsible for the practical military and security training, whereas ANC officials like Ronnie Kasrils, Pallo Jordan and Aziz Pahad gave lectures on the ANC's history. Firing practice was at a shooting range farther off. The trainees' instructiop and exercises were intensive and extensive, confronting them with exacting standards. They covered a wide range of combat missions, such as strikes from ambush, surprise attacks, or the construction of underground bunkers and tunnels. Kasrils, the longstanding MK chief of military intelligence, rated the training in East German camps as more creative and practical than the one he himself had received in Odessa, Soviet Union. Looking back, he credited the East German instructors with high professionalism and political self-confidence.215 Every year from 1976 to the end of the 1980s, the training camp near Teterow accommodated two groups of about 40 MK fighters each, and around I 000 in this period altogether. In addition, the special training of solo fighters and of small groups of up to three persons, begun in the later 1960s, was carried on. Nominees for this kind of training would depart from South Africa legally for short or longer absence, making their friends and relatives believe their new residence was in Great Britain or some other country and giving

South Africa. GDR and the ANC in the 1960s them cover addresses for contact..2 " The efficiency of this training was highly appreciated by those responsible for intelligence work in MK like Ronnie Kasrils. Few participants of training courses have voiced their criticism about the usefulness of the practical value of this training in regard with the South African environment.21' In mutual cooperation on military and security matters, the South African liberation movement preferred their partners in the GDR to specialise on cadre training. In the view of the ANC and SACP officials responsible, the GDR's contribution was of a high standard and well adapted to the conditions and requirements of the liberation struggle in South Africa. Assistance of this kind was an extremely important part of the GDR's overall support for the South African liberation movement. To sum up the analysis one can say the 1960s, when it was questioned whether the South African liberation movement would survive, and the GDR was under pressure to prove its legitimacy and to surmount the international blockade, was a crucial period for closer relations between the ANC and SACP on the one hand and their partners in the GDR on the other. Essential groundwork was laid by the policy decision of the GDR leadership to join the trade boycott against South Africa. Material aid for the South African liberation movement, solidarity with its imprisoned leaders, and assistance for the reorganisation of the ANC and SACP after severe setbacks until the mid1960s strengthened and deepened these relations. The chosen forms of material assistance met the needs of the liberation movement without overstraining the limited economic capabilities of the GDR. The printing of various types of material for the ANC and the SACP was a novel line of cooperation and a speciality of GDR solidarity, which somewhat later came to benefit other movements such as ZAPU in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia. After the clampdown on all democratic and legal opportunities for participation in the political decision-making process in South Africa and the ensuing decision of the ANC and its national allies to launch an armed struggle and to organise illegal resistance, assistance by the GDR in the non-civilian sector became a specific feature of its solidarity. This form of cooperation followed an initiative of the SACP, to which the GDR responded. It reflected the intensity and progress which had been achieved in their overall relationship. All things considered, the 1960s were years in which stable foundations were laid for close ties between the GDR and the South African liberation movement on which all the partners were able to build in the following two decades.

Notes SAPM() I3Arch )Y 3( iIV A2/20/1 40. Congratulatory message from the SACP CC. signed b. Dadoo. 3 Oct. 1969. 2 Kotane. together with Maulvi Cachalia. travelled to Britain. Egypt. . and Indonesia for the Blandung Conl'crence. and to Warsaw for the 5th World Youth Festival. More about this trip see B. Bunting Moses Kotane. South African Re\ olutionarv. London 1983, p. 199ff. fhe visit in (DR is recalled in documents about Kotane's \isit to the GDR in December 1963 (Cl. SAI'M() BArch I)Y 30/IV A2 20.)985_ report on the visit of the General Secretary otlthe SACP and other leading comrades, undated). I lorst Brasch served as chairman until early 1964. The Committee's work until the earl\ 1970s was chiefly managed by Eggebrecht and Schmidt. leinrich E.c brecht was born in Berlin on 5 ,luly 191 (. ilc \ orked as the Red Trade Union International's secretar\ for youth affairs in the Communist Youth League of Germany in tipper Silesia, In 1933 lie was briefly imprisoned in Esterwegen concentration carnp. Till 1935 he \was leader ol' the undercover organisation of the Communist Party of Germany !KPD) at Zabrze. Upper Silesia. From 1935 to 1947 he \vas in exile first in Prague, from 1939 in London, frorn 1942 in Australia until he went back to London in 1945. In 1947, he returned to East Germany. lie worked as a propaganda officer in the SED apparatus. the Association for Mutual Farmers' Aid and the Ministry of Transport. From 1960 to 1972 he was the secretary of the GDR Solidarity Committee, and from 1964 to 1968 in charge of the Committee's liaison oflice to AAPSO in Cairo. Ile died in 1989. (Intervie\ vith Eggcbrcclht's wile Lucic on 15 Nov. 1995). IHinL1. It &'Iniidi was born in I lalle on 26 November 1906. lie worked in the .journalistic tield for the KIPD till 1933. From 1933 to 1936 he \as in prison and in a concentration camp. In 1937 lie vent into exile first to Czechoslo\akia. in 1938 to Britain. He was a member of the illegal KID apparatus. He worked as ajournalist and became editor-in-chief of'the ,migr.s* paper F,'eie Tribtene. In 1946, lie returned to East Germany where he held executive posts at radio stations. In 1949. during the Stalinist trials against communists with western contacts he also was accused of beeing an agent and saboteur. He %\as not tried but the SED leadership relegated him to doing cultural work in rural areas. 1954 he became editor-in-chief of the A'Iaga:in, 1956 of the satirical magazin Eulen.s)iegel before again he got into trouble with the SED leadership. Schmidt was relegated to the Bureau of the National Council of the National Front and \worked as the Council's spokesman. From 1964 to 1971 he served as full-time chairman of' the Solidarity Committee, and until 1975 lie was its honorary chairman. Fie died in September 1989. (Cf B.R. Barth and others (ed.) Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein biographisches Handbuch. Frankfurt/Main 1995, p. 646f.- Neues DeutschlandB edition, (East) Berlin (ND). 24/ 25 Febr. 1996). ' Cf. ND, 23 Jul. 1963. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/410. Memorandum The Boycott of South African Trade, attached to a letter fr'omn the SACP CC to the SED CC. dated 12 Oct. 1960. The Memorandum outlined the evolution of the boycott movement.

South Afri-c: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s During the conference (5-13 Dec. 1958) an observer delegation of the National Council of the National Front of the GDR was present in Accra. (Cf. ND, 19 Dec. 1958). See Erklaerung dies Ministeriums fuer Auswaertige AngeleCenheiten der DDR vorn 2. Maerz 1959 zum Kolonialterror in Afrika, inDokumente der Auirenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DAP), vol. VII, (East) Berlin 1960, p. 56ff 7 United Arab Republic. comprising Egypt and Syria. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/411, Foreign Ministry notes. 18 Sept. 1959, containing comments on items in tranljiitrier Allgc'neine Zeiuing of 17. Sept. 1959"Delegation der Zone in Suedafrika", and in Sieddeutsche Zeitung of 15 Sept. 1959 "'Pankow verhantlelt mit Suedafiika "This %vas mentioned in the SACP memorandum of 12 Oct. 1960 (Cl.footnote 5.). II SAPMO BArch DY 34/200.403, Rau's letter of 24 Mar. 1960. In early 1962 the functions of the Foreign Afafirs Commission of the SED Politbureau, constituted in 1957, were explained as follows "It is the Commission's task to prepare fundamental decisions for adoption b\ the Politbureau and, primarily, to monitor their implementation. Within the scope of decisions made by the Central Committee and the Politbureau, the Commission has a right to issue binding recommendations and instructions to state and party organs and mass organisations for their work in the entire field of foreign policy. The Commission shall advise the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee's foreign policy department and the Ministry of Foreign Trade (wherever basic foreign-policy issues bear on its operation) ... The Commission is no substitute for the work of the foreign policy department or the Foreign Ministry, but is authorized to solicit reports and information from any organ on foreign policy matters." (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/2.115/3. Information, 19.lan. 1962). The CC's foreign policy department and subsequently its foreign policy and international relations department was later simply named international relations department, and it appears with this designation throughout the present text. " Cf.ibid. This is borne out by Ulbricht's handwritten notes on the letter. 2 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/200.403, Warnke's letter dated 28 Mar. 1960. 13 A note by the Trade Unions International of Transport Workers to the WFTU Secretariat, summing up the response to its appeal, listed reactions by trade unions in Australia, Mexico, Colombia, France. China, GDR. Netherlands. Italy and the USSR. The Netherlands transport workers union, member of the WFTU. had urged local dockers to heed the ICFTU's call and buy no South African goods for a two-month period beginning I May 1960. (Cf SAPMO BArch DY 34/200.403). 1 4Cf.ibid. 15 Cf. P. ValeThe Soviet Union. Southern Africa and Sanctions, in: Suctilons against Apartheid, edited by Mark Orkin for the Community Agcncy for Social Enquiry, Claremont 1989, p. 162f. The WFTU itself was preparing for an international trade union conference on the development of international trade, which the FDGB thought should also discuss a lifting of all discrimination and trade restrictions in the form of embargo measures by Special Flights io Southern Africa which the GDR was hard-hit at the time. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/200.403, note of the FDGB National Executive on the information of the WFTU on a internationale trade union conference lor the development of international trade, undated). " Cf. Die Apartheid am Pranger. (East) Berlin 1965, p. 18 (Schrfienreihe neher den WU*GB, no. 47). '" This was stated in the SACP's memorandum of 12 Oct. 1960. (Cf. footnote 5). 1K Cf' SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V 2/20/410, file notes about a conversation with Dadoo, 15 Aug. 1960. "' Ibid. 20 Cf. footnote 5. 21 Ibid. 22 Cf. Erklaerung der Beratung von V'ertretern der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien November 1960, (East) Berliny196I, p. 38. 23 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, SACP CC statement. Johannes-burg. 13 Sept. 1960. (German translation). 24 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/410, information on talks with Harmel. 8 Feb. 1961. Flannel visited theGDR from 17 to 20 Jan. 1961. 21 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/410, Gruene Information 11, 2 Feb. 1961. 2, Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/8, minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission session on, 6 Feb. 1961. 11 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V 2/20/410, file notes, 17Apr. 1961. 21 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/410, report on relations with communist parties south of the Sahara, no date (1961). 29 Cf Resolution 1761 (XVI1), 6 Nov. 1962, in: Yearbook of the UN (YBUN) 1962, New York 1964, p. 99. 3" Cf Resolution ueber die Dekolonialisierung, in: G. Kramer: Portugal am Pranger, (East) Berlin 1964. p. 131ff. 11 A. Luthuli: No ,4rms jbr South Africa, in: Lutuli speaks. Portrait oIjChief Lutuli, published by the Solidarity Committee of the Genman Democratic Republic in Cooperation with the UN Centre Against Apartheid, sin~loc., 1982. p. 88. 2 Cf. The Revolutionary Way out, in: The African Communist, London, no. 13, AprilJune 1963, p. 5. This sentence is missing in the 1984 German edition of SACP documents by Dietz Verlag, although it cites The African Communist as the source. (Cf Der revolutionaere A usweg, in: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Suedafrikanischen Kommunistischen Partei 1915-1980, (East) Berlin 1984, p. 444.). " Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V A2/20/987. german translation of the article in Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 19 May 1963. 1 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V A2/20/987, letter from the SACP CC to the SED CC, dated 29 May 1963. " Cf. MfAA/A 16048, Msimang's letter to Ulbricht, 4 Jun. 1963. 3" Cf. MfAA/A 16048. Msimang's letter to DAFRIG, 12 Jun. 1963. " This follows lrom a internal memo by the CC international relations department to its department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, dated 14 Jun. 1963. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V A2/610/332.). Suhl, a town in Thuringia. had a tradition of South Africa: GDR and the ANC in the / 960s 69 manufacturing hunting arms. 3K MfAA. A/16048, Schwab's letter to Balkowv, 8 Jun. 1963. 3" Internal memo. 14 Jun. 1963. Cf. footnote 37. ", Cf. SAPM) BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987, file notes about talks with the USSR ambassador on 20 Llune 1963. In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, president Nkrumah had expressed a view on this issue. He himself doubted that Western press reports about arms deliveries to South Africa from socialist countries were true, and spoke out in this sense \ is-... -vis other African politicians. 11 Cf. ND. 23 June 1963. 42Cf. Securitv Council resolution S/5386, 7 August 1963, inYBIJN 1963,New York 1965, p. 20. A binding arms embargo was declared as late as 4 Nov. 1977. 1. Cf W. Leimgruber: Kalter Krieg urn Afrika. Die amerikanische 4frika-Politik 1961-1963, Stuttgart 1990, p. 143ff " SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987, Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry's 4th extra-European division (AEA) on the trade with South Africa, dated 3 .uly 1963. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/2. minutes, Foreign Affairs Commission session, 5. Jul. 1963. decision no. 8. Stoph was then First Deputy Prime Minister and Leuschner Deputy Prime Minister. 4" SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/610/332. letter by the Ministry for Foreign and Inter-German Trade, overseas directorate 1I, to the SED CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, 14 Oct. 1963. Cf. MfAA/A 16048, Bolz's telegram to Telli. 25 Jul. 1963. MfAA/A 16048, Grotewohl's telegram. 30 .lul. 1963. 19 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/A2/20/987, Brasch's letter to Telli, copy without date. Cf. also ND, 4 Sept. 1963 Brasch's message to African heads of state taking part in the founding conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa. 10 CC SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/610/332, Florin's memo to Ulbricht, 16 Sept. 1963. " SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V A2/20/987, Florin's memo to Ulbricht, 1 Oct. 1963. The text is identical with the memo of 16 Sept. 1963. 12 Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1959, (East) Berlin 1960, p. 574. 11 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A/610/332, report: Stand des Handels mit der Suedafrikanischen Republik. annexed to a letter by the Ministry for Foreign and Inter-German Trade to the SED CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, 17 Jun. 1963. .4 VM (=Valutamnark) was an accounting unit used to convert foreign currency world market prices for export and imports of goods and services into the GDR's nonconvertible currency. 11 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A/610/332, letter by the department for trade policy with capitalist countries, Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade, to minister Balkow, 20 Dec. 1963. ", This is noted in the report on the state of trade with South Africa, dated 17 Jun. 1963. (Cf. footnote 53). 17 Relevant data are contained in a draft of a Ministry of Transport paper for the

Special Flights to Souilhern Af'ic' Politbureau, dated JuIN 1963. The authors have so far been unable to trace the draft's subsequent late. (Cf. MfAA/A 16048). " Cf. footnote 55. 5, SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/610/332. memo by the CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, to Mittag. 29 Oct. 1963. "" Cf. footnote 55. 6" e.g. Statement of a Foreign Ministry spokesman, dated 2 June 1964. in DAP 1964, vol. XII, (East ) Berlin 1968, p. 886. oratelegrarn from deputy foreign minister Georg Stibi to the chairman of the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid, dated 13 March 1965, inDAP 1965. vol. XIII, (East) Berlin 1969. p. 4461 2 Cf. H. Heese: Trotz Sanktionen - DDR-Fahrceuge rollen in Suedalrika. in: U. van der Heyden/I l.-G. and I. Schleicher (eds.): Engagiert /uer .4Jrika. Die DDR und Ainfrika. vol. II. Hamburg 1994. p. 73 fl (.3 Cf. Berliner Zeming. 20/21 Mar. 1993. 64 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. Schmidt recalled this in a letter to Axen, dated 28 Mar. 1966. " Ibid. Cf'. ND. 15 Oct. 1966. , Cf. ND. 17 Oct. 1966. "CIff ibid. "DDR" was being disallowed as the official designation of the East German athletes' country of origin. Cf, SAPMO BArch DY 30,/IV A2/20/986. speaking notes for talks b) Marko\ski with M.P. Naicker and Alfred Kgokong on 22 Oct. 1966. They both attended a congress of the International Organisation of'lournalists held in Berlin. " SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. concept for the development ofrealations with the SACP 1964, no date. "' Cf. ibid. 72 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, letter of the SACP CC to the SED CC. 1 Aug. 1963. " For this early history of MK see N. Mandela: Der lange IV(,g cur Freiheit. Autobiographie, Frankfurt/Main 1994, p. 364ff": J. SlovoSlovo. The Unfinished Autobiography, Randburg 1995, p. 148ff " File GDR Solidarity Committee issued a protest statement against the conviction of Mandela and other ANC activitists on 3 Dec. 1962 (Cf. BArch P DZ 8 7415- 660). For the Rivonia trial and prior events, see H. Bernstein: Die llaenner von Rivonia. Suedafrika im Spiegel eines Processes, (East) Berlin 1970. 75 ILctter dated I A\iiu 1963. see footnote 72. At that time it was not Net cleu that N-andela would be included in the trial. In the trial of 1962 hc could onlN be convicted of having left the country illegally and of having organiscd strikes in Ma 1961 (Cf N. Mandcla: Der lunge lWeg zur Freiheit, section 6.). "' SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. The letter exists in the records only as a draft. dated 6 Sep. 1963. " Cf. Resolution IS, (XVIII). II Oct. 1963. inYBUN 1963. p. 21. In subsequent years. I I October was observed as Day of Solidarity with South African political South Africa: GDR and the .-INC in the I 960s prisoners. " Cf. Resolution 1904 (XVII )I L ' Declarution ol he lintinatiot a! all VOrws o/ Raact/, Discrinination. in: Y BUN 1963. p. 3441ff. , Erl, leriln.o der leoiertig der D1 :ur Beseitigung aller IVormen (er Rcissejtliskri'iiiii tiig. 30 Oct. 1963. in I)AP 1963, vol. \1, (I-ast) Berlin 1965. p. 269f: and telegram liom deputy foreign minister Georg Stibi to the president of the 20th session of the 1,N Commission on Human Rights. dated 26 I'eb. 1964, in )AIP 1964. \ol. Nit. (East) Berlin 1966, p. 5441fi' As long as the (iDR. like the (RG, was not a member ofthe [!N. it was not allowed to sign the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assemblk on 21 Dec. 1965 (cf. YBtUN 1965. Ne~k York 1967, p. 4401'), whereas the FRG %% a Slo\Cd to sign. Only after the international blockade w as 1i fled could the GDRjoin the Convention by accession in March 1973. S.\PMO BArch DY 30/IV A2!20/985, Florin's memo to Norden, 16 -ept. 1963. Cf. SAPIO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/3, draft paper of the Foreign Ministry for the Foreign Affairs Commission on measures against the I lallstein-I)oktrin. 19 Sept. 1963. The l-lallstein doctrine. formulated by state secretar) Walter Hallstein in the FRG's Foreign Office, rested on the Federal Republic's claim to represent all of Germany and threatened to impose sanctions on states recognising the (iDR diplomatically. Another paper from the Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Affairs Commission. also dated 19 Sept. 1963 and giving an evaluation of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany contained a suggestion that the campaign against the Hallstein doctrine should be accompanied by "systematic action at the diplomatic level and the use of outward-bound information in order to unmask Bonn's neocolonialist policy." In this context, advantage should be taken of the FRG's position towards South Africa and Portugal. and of its military cooperation when information was intended for Arab countries. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/3). , The working group on information abroad was part of the [Politbureau's Commission for Agitation, set tIp in early 1963. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DV 30 IV 2/ 902/106. Norden's draft paper, 4 Febr. 1963 on the formation of the commission and ist tasks: and SAPMO BArch DY 30/I IV 2/2/872. Politbureau decision. 27 Mar. 1963.). "1 Cf. footnote 80. 11 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987. The persons reponsiblc for the paper (dated 8 Nov. 1963) to be submitted to the CC Secretariat, in terms of the campaign's content, objectives and organisation, were Peter Florin, Rudi Singer from tile Commission for Agitation, and Horst Brasch. 11 Cf SAPMO BArcb DY 30/IV A2/20/985, minutes of the meeting on 14 No\,, 1963. 6 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/0 IV 2/3/928, CC Secretariat decision, 19 Nov. 1963. In a letter to the office of the SED Politbureau, a member of the Bureau of the National Council Presidium had called attention to the urgency of a decision. (Cf. BArch P IZ 8 7328 662-028). V7 CC Secretariat decision. 19 Nov. 1963. see footnote 86. "" Cf. Leimgruber, W:Kalter Krieg urn Afrika, loc. cit. Special Flights to Southern Africa "' Cf. footnote 84. " Cf ND, 13 Nov. 1963. "' Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7304-662. speach manuscript. ,2 Cf ND, I Dec. 1963. " ND had reported on Wolpe's visit and the objective of the World Campaign earlier, on 26 Nov. 1963. 94 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 201.4176, proposal by the FDGB international relations dept. on measures to save Walter Sisulus's life. 5 Nov. 1963. Tile trade union daily Tribuene reported extensively on the persecution of apartheid opponents in South African. Cf e.g. Tribuene. 5. 9. 23. and 30 Nov. 1963. " SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 201.2502, circular no. 1, 24 Feb. 1963. "' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986, information by the FDGB National executive, 17 Jan. 1964. 97 Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. 986, BArch: P DZ 8/7305-662, draft reports on the solidarity campaign, without dates. "" SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. press release from the National Council, 8 Jan. 1964. "' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. report on the visit of the general secretary of the SACP and other leading comrades, without date. Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7304-662, list of solidarity supplies to the ANC 1961-1967. 2 Nov. 1967. "" BArch. P DZ 8/7304-662, Kotane's letter (German translation), 14 Jan. 1964. 1032 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, report on the visit of Marks and Dadoo in the GDR (3.-7.12.1963), without date. 1113 Cf ND, 7 Dec. 1963. 1" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. See footnote 99. "' SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986, guidelines for the press concerning the solidarity campaign in November/December, 18 Nov. 1963. ',)' Ibid. The Foreign Ministry's paper relied for details on an unpublished manuscript by Eberhard Czara. which came out as a book in 1964. under the title .-chse zum Kap. For the relationship of Apartheid politicians with Nazi Germany see also B. Bunting: The rise oj the South ,.IJficon Reich, London 1986 (first published in 1964), in particular chapter 6, p. 56ff. "" The prominent South African vriter and philosopher Nevil le Alexander. holding a doctorate of German literature from Tuebingen University in the Federal Republic of Germany, was a member of the Unit), Movement and an organiser of militant groups outside the ANC. and embraced the ideas of the Algerian liberation war and the Chinese revolution. ND. I Dec. 1963. Cf. footnote 79. Further documents: Erklaerung des 11inisterinns fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten cder DDR vom 20. Dezember 1963 :ni Beschluc des t!INO-Sicherheitsrates gegen die .4partheid-Politik der Republik Suedafrikla voin 4. De:ember 1963 turd -u 1- 'ersuchen der westdeutschen Regierung. ihre

South Aftica: GDR and the AN( in the 1960s neokoonialistische Politik und ihre Unterstuet:ung des 'erwoerd-Regimes iu leugnen, in DAP 1963. \ ol. XI. p. 287ff,: Statement ofa Foreign Ministry spokesman on the GDR Government's telegram to the president of the 20th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. MfAA/A 9643 (German text). I Globke wrote the legal commentaries to the Nuremburg race laws in nazi Germany. 112 Cf. ND. 5 Dec. 1963. "' Cf. ND. August-October. notably 31 Aug.. 30 Oct. 1963. 114 Cf. e.g. ND. 4 and 9 Nov. 1963. "s Cf SAPNIO BArch DY 30/IV 2/2906. Politbureau decision, 19 Nov. 1963. ND. 9 and 10 Nov. 1963. ,'Cf ND. 13 and 17 Nov. 1963. "" ND, 30 Nov. 1963: Tribuene, 3 Dec. 1963. " SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/931, Politbureau decision. 19 May 1964 Durchfutehrung einer internationalen Kampagne zur Entlarvung der tUnterstuetzung Westdeutschlands fiier das jaschistische 'erwoerdregime und die portugiesische Politik gegenueber Angola und Mocambique. 12,, Ibid. 121 The campaign was also intended to influence the forthcoming 2nd Non- Aligned Summit in Cairo in October 1964, The same consideration determined the calendar for installing an office of the Solidarity Committee in Cairo to serve liaison with the Permanent Secretariat of AAPSO. The office began to function in September 1964 under the direction of Eggebrecht. Cf. ibid. -' Memorandum on cooperation of the West German Federal Republic and the Republic of South Airica in the military and atomic lields, Dresden 1964. 2I Cf. footnote 119. 124 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. letter from Honecker to the SACP CC. 4 Jun. 1963: cf. also SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987, letter of reply from the SACP CC. 29 Jun. 1963. I SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987. notes about talks at the CPSU CC, African affairs division, on 14 Aug. 1964. '26 Examples were: H. Blev/R. Tetzlqfjf (eds.)Ajrika utrd Bonn. Iersaeumnisse und Zwaenge deutscher Afrikapolitik, Hamburg 19 78: R. RodeDie Sueda/rikpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1968-1972) SIudien tun Konflikt im Sueden .-Ifrikas (Wissenschaftliche Reihe Entwicklung und Frieden). Mu n ich 1975. 27 G. Verheugen: Apartheid, Suedajrikat und die detschen Interesseo am Kap. Cologne 1986. ,2X See. e.g., the contribution in the wake of a conference on this topic. by B. Pela: Two German States and the New Africa. inThe African Communist, no. 6/1961. p. 19ff.: P. Florin: The German Peace Treaty and Africa, in: The Ajiican Communist, no. 8. 1962/p. 47ff. 12) e.g. in the editorial of South Africa Freedom News, no. 20. 14 Jan. 1964, Cairo. under the heading: "The Bonn Government stands with the 1'erwoerd Regime in Defiance ofAfrica 's Opinion. " ,", SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/410. notes on consultations with Dadoo, Vithout Special Flights to Soithern Africa date Dadoo visited the GDl in late No\ember 1961 lor talks \ ith the SI-l) about a conlerencc o Alfrican communist parties, planned to be held in February. 1962. '" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. appraisal of the SACP. \ithout date (1965). 2 The Alliance Bonn-Pretoria. , Ieifloramfidutii othe 1Jio-.staii'oliSidarttv Committee oYlhe GDR. (East) Berlin 1967. 131 Cf. .,Ipurtheid: Who isJor it - JJho is against it?. published by DAFRIG. sin.lot.. sin.an. This commitment of DAFRIG is noted in the World Campaign's circular of9 Jan. 1964. along \N ith funds of 28.00(0 DM raised by West German students and through effbrts of Nora Schimming-Chase. later to become the frec Namibias first diplomatic envoy to Germany (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34.'A 20 1.25)5 ). ,14 1'. SAIPMO BArch DY 34/A 201.2502. The letters dated 28 No\. 1963 and 17 lan. 1964 bear the signature ofS. .\bdul, secretar) of the .\nti- aparthcld %lo\ cment. \\ho is apparently identical with \bdul Mint. "')Cf. SAl'Ml) BArch DY 34,,\ 201.2505. memo from the FDGB's international relations department to secretary for international relations \\olfgang Beyreuther. I I Feb. 1964. 1" Cf. SAIPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-1036. SED CC Secretariat decision. 2 March 1964. This decision 'as drafted by the FDGB on 14 Feb. 1964. 3 Cf'. SAPMO BArch DY 30,IV A2/20/985. In a letter to Florin dated 31 Mar. 1964. Gotsche referred to the letter from S. Abdul (A. Minty) dated 22 Jan. 19o4 -" SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. Florin's letter to Gotsche. I Apr. 1964. \\ith an enclosed draft for a letter by Ulbricht to the World Camnpaign. which was basically adopted by the State Chancery. Gottfried Lessing. head ot'the (jDR Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA. also recommended a positi\e response b.\ Ulbricht to the World Campaign's request. (CI' MfAA/A 16047). 13, Cf. MIAA/A 16047, copy of lIbrichtfs letter dated 10 Apr. 1964. Essential parts of the letter were published in ND. 21 Apr. 1964. "" SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. letter from the SACP CC to the SED CC. 8 Mar. 1964. ," SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 201.2502, letter from S. Abdul (A. Mint)') to Beyrcuther, 10 Mar. 1964. 2 Cf. ND, 22 Apr. 1964. SCf. YBUN 1964, Nev York 1966, p. 106f. '"Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. Schmidt's letter. 14 Apr. 1964. memo from Florin to I-Ionecker. 15 Apr. 1964. 145 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. draft version. 146 Cf ND. 22 and 24 Apr. 1964. 147 Cf. e.g. S.\'MO BArch DY 341A 201.2502. notes for private information. 22 Apr. 1964. Enclosure to a letter addressed to Warnkc. Ibid.. cop) of the letter without date. ND, 29 Apr.. I May 1964. i, ND. 25 Apr. 1964. ,u Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7304-662. Steiniger's letter. 24 Apr. 1964, letter from South Africa." GDR and the ANC in the 1960s Vorster's pri\ ate secretary. 19 May 1964, cover letter from an assistant of'Steiniger's to Vorster's private secretar. 29 Jul. 1964, with Steiniger's legal argumentation enclosed. '' Ibid., letter dated 19 May 1964 (German translation). 'cif. ibid., letter dated 29 Jul. 1964. C Security Council Resolution 190 (1964), 9 Jun. 1964, inYBUN 1964, p. 118. 's Cf. ND, 4 Aug. 1964. '" Cf SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 201.2502, Mark Shope's letter to the FDGB. 12 Feb. 1964. '" ND, I Oct. 1964. '" SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, Communiqu. of joint meeting of Communist ParO' of Great Britain and South African Communist Party, 7 October 1965. 15' Cf Anti-Apartheid News, London. February-June 1966. "' SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/1 13, minutes. Solidarity Committee Secretariat session, 19 Apr. 1966. ""1 ND, 26 Apr. 1966. M., German Democratic Republic demands Freedomnfir Brain Fischer and all South Africa's Liberation fighters, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in the German Democratic Republic, (East) Berlin, June 1966. p. I. ", Cf. ibid., p. 2. ' Ibid, p. 9. "'i SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, information on the solidarity campaign from the Solidarity Committee to the SED CC international relations department, 15 Aug. 1966. "'Cf. ND. 10., I1., 12.5.1966. German Democratic Republic demands Freedomjbr Brain Fischer, loc.cit. p. 10.ND, 10 May 1966. '' Cf. ibid., p. 1 f. Ibid., p. 22. , Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. To an undated letter fiom .lohn Ciollan. general secretary of the Commnist Party of Great Britain, was attached a copy ola letter friom the party's Executive Committee to Fischer, dated 2 1 May 1966, expressing the party's solidarity and sympathy. The tiles contain only the draft of Ulbricht's reply to Gollan. "I' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, letter from the SACP, 25 Jun. 1966. Reference to the SED's congratulations on the SACP's 45th anniversary (without the text) is contained in: Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, vol. XI, (East) Berlin 1969, p. 350. 7I Cf. ND, II June 1966. '71 See footnote 165. '14 Ibid. Earlier, in September 1964, during his visit to Berlin to attend an international scientific session on the centenary of the First International, Michael -larrnel had drawn the attention of his SED partners to an information deficit about South Africa

Special Flights lo Southern Africa in the GDR media. Axen, then editor-in-chief offettes Deutschland, tried to rectit') that impression in talks with Ilarmel.(Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, report on Harmel's visit, 30 Sept. 1964). "7' Sechaba 1967/1, p. 16. t, ('CI* E. Singh: Sechaba - A .VC-Zeitschrift printed in GDR. in: U. van der Heyden/H.G. and]. Schleicher: Engagiertfiier Africa. p. 133. Heinz H. Schmidt informed the Solidarity Committee Secretariat on 19 April 1966 about plans to print a journal for the ANC in the GDR (Cf footnote 160). ' CT. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1V A2/20/986, Markowski's speaking notes, 21 Oct. 1966. A formal decision by the SED Politbureau or the CC Secretariat about printing Sechaba in the GDR has so far not been traced. 'v" Interview with Arnold Selby on 31 May 1996. '7. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986. memorandum regarding Sechaba. I May 1968 (German translation). '"' This follows from annual plans submitted by M.P. Naicker to the Solidarity Committee (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986: BArch. P DZ 8/7304-662; BArch, P DZ 8/7305-662). From 1967 till December 1975, Sechaba came out monthly. Because of constant newsprint shortage it appeared as a quarterly from January 1976 to December 1978, until it re-appeared as a monthly from January 1979 onwards. (Cf. E. Singh, loc.prim.cit., p. 135.). "'t Barch, P DZ 8/7304-662, M.P. Naicker's letter to Schmidt, 23 Oct. 1970. 18x2 Cf. E. Singhloc.prim.cit., p. 139. ', Interview with Reichel on 7 Feb. 1996. ', Issues from the series South African StudiesGuerilla Warfare, The South African Trade Union Movement; The Road to Freedom is via the Cross (Speeches of Albert Luthuli); Nelson Mandela speaks. Speeches, statements and articles by Nelson Mandela. Other titles: Forward to Freedom, The Strategy. Tactics and Programme of the African National Congress; African National Congress. A Short history. I" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A- 1618. SED CC Secretariat decision, 31 Jul. 1968. The international relations department explained this situation in its draft of the decision of the Secretariat. '"' One year before, Dadoo and Matthews. in Berlin for the 7th SED party congress (17-22 Apr. 1967), had inquired about the GDR's capacity to print a special issue of The A.fican Communist in mini format and on ultra-thin paper for illegal distribution in South Africa. liarmel and and Markowski took up the matter in June 1967. The SED promised to help. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. notes of a conversation on 24 Apr. 1967; tile notes of talks between Markowski and Harmel on l0.lun. 1967). ', See tootnote 185. "x Cf. ibid. Zentrag was a company which adminstered print shops and publishing houses owned by SED. It was accountable to the CC department Finanzverwaltung und Parteibetriebe. SED owned about 35 printing shopsand 30 publishing houses and thus was in control of more than the half of the printing industry in GDR. "" Cf. ibid.

Sow/h Afi'ica: GDR and the ANC in the 1960s "", Interriew\, with Sonja and Brian Bunting on 19 Dec. 1995. As examples can be mentioned: A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting 'ears, The ('umnunisl Partv ofSouth Aftcw 1921-971, London 1971; B. Bunting: Moses Kotane, London 1975: The South African Communists speak. London 198 1. 1 2 Interview with Ursula Hoffniann 23 Apr. 1996. 193 Sechaba, 1/1967, p. 2f. " For this question. see also the following chapter about the GDR's relations with the Zirnbabwve liberation movement. I" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, information, 29 Jan. 1963. Dadoo had attended the 6th SED congress (15-21 Jan. 1963) and announced a delegation with Kotane would arrive in February/March 1963 to discuss eventual arms deliveries to the ANC. This visit by Kotane did not actually take place until December, during the solidarity campaign at the time of the Rivonia trial. 191 Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, confidential information by the Solidarity Committee, no date (November 1964). 19' Veteran SACP activist and trade unionist Ray Simons was among those who favoured building up structures for illegal work in South Africa itself. She confirmed in an interview on 28 Dec. 1995 that there existed divergences in the SACP and ANC leaderships on this question. (Interview with Simons on 28 Dec 1995). Besides, it was a fact that the ANC received the weapons it needed in full from the Soviet Union. The former chief of military intelligence of MK who is now South Africa's Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils. who also confirmed differences in the leadership on the Wankic operation, underlined in an interview on 4 Dec. 1995 that the ANC needed no arms assistance from the GDR in subsequent years either. (Interview with Kasrils on 4 Dec. 1995). ' SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, Dadoo's letter to the SED CC, 7 Aug. 1965. .,Cf. Interview with Mac Maharaj. Hilda Bernstein Collection. Mayibuye Centre Oral History, University of the Western Cape, Belville. Cf. also SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/57, letter from Industriedruck Bischofswerda to Zentrag dated 21 Febr. 1962. 2IN SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/985, speaking notes for talks with the SACP delegation, 15 Mar. 1966. This paper was drawn up for Axen who met Dadoo and Marks in Moscow during the 23rd CPSU party congress (29 Mar.8 Apr. 1966). On that occasion Axen was given a letter from the SACP CC requesting one or two study places for senior cadres "outside all relations and solidarity actions". (Cf. ibid., memo from Axen to Markowski, 15 Apr. 1966). 2,0 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986, letter from Lessing to the SED CC international relations department, dated 17 Nov. 1967. Lessing referred to hijormation no. I I 7/IX by the Foreign Ministry's African affairs division, dated 14 Sept. 1967. 202 Cf ibid. 3 Dr. Gottjried Lessing lived in southern African exile during nazi rule in Germany and was married to , the famous novelist. ie held a number of important functions in the GDR Foreign Service. He was the director of the Foreign Ministry's African affairs division (4th AEA) until the mid- 1960s, and posted as consul-general to Tanzania as from 1965. Serving as ambassador to , he lost his life in

Special Flights to Southern AJrica in 1979. during the military clashes around the overthrow of . 2114 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985. draft report on the SACP delegation's visit (Marks und Kotane), 15-2) Nov. 1967 : report oMn the SACP delegation'visit oftthe SACP der SACP, 15-23 Nov. 1967, dated 8 Dec. 1967. The final version of the report was extended to include the stays of Bunting (17-21 Nov.) and Slovo ( 19-23 Nov.). 205 The African Communist, London, no. 32/1968, p. 74f. '04) Cf. footnote 204, report dated 8 Dec. 1967. 2_ 7 Interview vith Kasrils on 4 Dec. 1995. 2111 Cf'. BStU JHS 22001. Die Sicherung der Arbeit der koinrnunistischen und Arbeiterparteien unter den Bedingungen der Illegalitaet - Erfahrungen und Anjorderungen bezueglich der Ausbildung von Kadern kommunistischer und Alrbeiterpartien durch das Institut Internationale BeZiehungn der Hochschitle des M IS. 24P) Ibid. p. 203f. "Direct work among the masses" was understood to mean work in legal organisations and institutions, permitting personal contact with other people. "Indirect work among the masses" included the printed word and the party's press, visual campaigning, the spoken word, and armed propaganda. While the party's authorship is easily discernible in these "'indirect" operations, there is but limited scope Ior personal contact with the people. On basic securit) requirements for armed propaganda actions, which the South African liberation movement also engaged in. the international relations institute cooperated with other service units of the MIS. 2"1 For detailed reports about these actions, see The African Communist, no. 40/1970. p. 93f.: Sechaba, 1/1970, p. 3. ANC underground propaganda inside South Africa was also reported later: Voice of Freedom, in Sechaba 4/1976, p. 38ff.: How to outwit the enemy, in: Sechaba 1/1977, p. 6ff 211 Tim Jenkin was one of those chiefly involved, he has described the leafletting action in an interview. (Cf. Oral History of Exile ProJect, Mayibuye Centre, University of Cape Town, Belville). As Kasrils remembers (interview on 4 Dec. 1995), another MK fighter vas James April, one of the first to go to the GDR for training in 1969, after the Morogoro conference. The late Chris Hlani, too. received special training in the GDR before he infiltrated into South Africa in 1973, 74. 212 Kuratorium Internationale Solidaritaet. Atfro-Asiatisehes Sol idari tact-skom itee (editor): Solidaritaet in Aktion, 1970/I. Schmidt's statement p. 30. 2I3 Cf'. BArch. P DZ 8/7304-662. file notes about the agreement reached with Dadoo. without date. In their talk, Dadoo and Schmidt discussed possibilities for further assistance, which, besides loudspeakers, should comprise the supply of "talking Christmas cards" with a message and of "protein-rich soup" to the ANC in Dar es Salaam. The quotation marks in the text of the notes are probably codes for illegal propaganda items for the ANC. 2 4 lInterviewv w ith Kasrils on 4 Dec. 1995. _,. R. Kasrils: -Irmned and Dangerous.4 YI, 'ndercover Struggle Against 1partheid, Oxford 1993. p. 125ff'. 2'" Interviews with Kasrils and Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, High Commissioner of South Ali'ica in Zimbabwe. on 4 Dec. and 30 Oct. 1995 respectively. 2"7 Interview with Jenny Cargill on 5 Dec. 1995. PART TWO Zimbabwe A Special Chapter in the GDR's Africa Policy Prologue: Fifty flights from Luanda to Lusaka 'Mission accomplished. 512 tonnes of special freight was transported in 50 airborne consignments in the period from 14 March to 23 May 1979.' These concise and matter-of-fact preliminaries began a report by the GDR Minister of Transport, Rudi Arndt, under the heading 'The organisation of special freight flights from Luanda to Lusaka'.' The next few sentences made it clearer that those flights were not just ordinary air transport operations, but an extremely important venture by the GDR, undertaken to assist ZAPU in a crucial phase of the struggle for independence for Zimbabwe, as ZAPU was stepping up its activities from hinterland bases in . Meanwhile, ZANU was operating effectively from Mozambique and from strong points established in Zimbabwe itself. The two liberation organ isations co- operating within the framework of the Patriotic Front (PF) rivalled for the political and military power in the future independent Zimbabwe. Only a few insiders in the GDR, in ZAPU, in Angola and Zambia knew the circumstances of those 50 flights, which were rather dramatic on more than one occasion. The Minister of Transport's report reveals that the airlift was maintained under complicated political conditions and with extraordinary safety precautions both in Angola and Zambia. The report went on: Given the presence of Rhodesian killer troops in Lusaka, special safety measures were taken to provide protection tor the Interflug aircraft and its crew in the air and on the ground, since attacks on the plane had to be reckoned with during the flight or the turnaround at Lusaka airport. The timing of the flights was such that departure from Luanda was around noon and arrival in Lusaka after dusk. This ensured that the plane could be unloaded in the dark, in the military section of Lusaka airport. In addition, Zambian air force fighters were patrolling along the borders with Rhodesia from the moment the Interflug plane entered Zambia's airspace until it landed at Lusaka. Several times the freight plane had to dive down very low during approach to Lusaka to evade the Rhodesian radar and interceptor guidance systems and planned attacks. The Ilyushin 18's fuel reserve was so calculated that in the event of Rhodesian attacks on Lusaka aiport the loaded plane could make its way back to Luanda airport without landing. Intertlug experts at the Lusaka air traffic control centre maintained contact with the airborne llyushin so that the crew was constantly informed about flights of Rhodesian air force fighter planes and conditions for discharging its freight at the port of destination.

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy Needless to say, absolute safety could not have been ensured in an emergency. The situation in southern Africa was very tense throughout the months of the airlift. The South African Army was intensifying its acts of aggression against Angola, and special units also intruded into Zambia. There were increasing ground and air attacks by Rhodesian forces on ZAPU camps in Zambia in March and April, costing the lives of hundreds of people. Four heavy raids on ZAPU camps occurred between 10 and 12 April alone, and the residence of its leader, Joshua Nkomo, was also the target of an attack. While staying in Lusaka for a solidarity conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) held from 10 to 13 April to discuss greater assistance for the liberation movements and the Front-Line states in southern Africa, the participants were witnessing for themselves how urgent international solidarity actually was. This experience was shared by a delegation from the GDR Solidarity Committee, led by its president Kurt Seibt. The regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia was preparing for elections on 20 April to install a puppet government led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and thus acquire a semblance of legality. But ZANU and ZAPU rejected the elections as a fraudulent manoeuvre, and in so doing were backed by the UN, the OAU, and of course by the international solidarity movement. Even after the elections, Rhodesia continued to send commandos across the Zambezi - with a two-fold purpose, as ZAPU representatives told diplomats at the GDR embassy in Lusaka: to stage another show of power and military strength to impress the outer world, and to liquidate members of ZAPU's leadership before the puppet government began a campaign for international recognition. It was on account of these acute dangers in the post-election situation that the Interflug llyushin 18 stayed grounded for a number of days till 25 April.2 After the airlift mission was accomplished, the GDR leadership awarded all the 53 men engaged in the operation - plane commanders, crews, technicians and safety personnel - high national distinctions for their personal commitment. "In carrying out their mission", the proposal for the awards was substantiated, "the commanders had to react to a diversity of changing conditions at short notice. Terrorist strikes from Rhodesia into the Republic of Zanbia's territory required them to possess tactical alternatives and great skills to fly the aircraft to Lusaka and land and take-off safely. Thunderstorms with downpours that were frequent over Angola this year often made landing at Luanda difficult and repeatedly necessitated several approaches, demanding maximum concentration. Despite the physical and psychological

Special Flights to Southern Africa stress the commanders acted with calm and resolve. The high punctuality, their sense of duty and courage earned them great credit and respect from the African personnel." The over 512 tonnes of 'special' freight which they flew safely to its destination were only a fraction of the total of some 8,000 tonnes of solidarity supplies for ZAPU which had been stockpiled in Luanda, under adverse physical conditions, since 1977, awaiting onward shipment to Lusaka. These included perishable foodstuffs as well as arms and ammunition for ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Several countries, including Nigeria and Yugoslavia, had cooperated in transporting this freight to Luanda but felt unable to engage in its onward transportation to Lusaka. In May 1978, ZAPU had therefore requested the GDR via the embassy in Lusaka to help resolve the transport problem.' The SED CC Secretariat responded fairly quickly on 27 June 1978 by declaring agreement in principle provided the costs in hard currency would be repaid and instructed Interflug to make the necessary preparations. However, alarmed by the mounting attacks on Zambia by Rhodesian commandos, the policy-makers in Berlin hesitated to give the green light for the airlift to take off. On 6 February 1979, a few days before his first journey to various African countries (due to last from 1 5 to 24 February), the SED CC general secretary and chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker, gave his approval for an imminent start to the airlift., After an Interflug expert and ZAPU representatives jointly checked out the local conditions for the airlift in Lusaka and Luanda, Klaus Heikes, Interflug Director-General and deputy Minister of Transport, informed his minister on 2 March 1979 that following a decision by the SED General Secretary, the airline would be undertaking charter flights from 15 March to 9 May 1979. The instructions had been relayed to him verbally by the CC Department of Transport and Telecommunications, and the Solidarity Committee had been named as Interflug's partner. An IL 18 with two crews and five technicians would leave for Luanda on 12 March, he specified.7 Four crew members of this Ilyushin 1 8 did not return alive from the mission. A disaster occurred in the early afternoon of 26 March, within minutes after the aircraft had rolled to start position for its thirteenth flight to Lusaka. While the plane was racing over the runway at a speed of more than 250 km/h, one of the engines failed. The pilots were unable to bring the heavily loaded plane to a halt. It lifted into the air, only to plunge down with its cargo of 16 tonnes of foodstuffs and crash. The GDR crew and six ZAPU members on board were killed. The report on the disaster by a fact-finding commission from the GDR gives the names of the German victims as Commander Dieter Hartmann, 2nd pilot Jochen Wilsdort; navigator Horst

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's AJrica policy Umlauft, and board engineer Frank-Rolf John.8Joshua Nkomo expressed his deep distress about this tragedy in a letter of condolence to Erich Honecker "The sacrifice of the comrades is invaluable and priceless. ... We had grown to regard them as part of our liberation force because of their manifest warmth in tile duty of serving the Zimbabwe struggle. We are deeply grieved at this loss and we hereby express our deep condolence to you, comrade, to the Socialist Unity Party, to the workers and masses of the German Democratic Republic. Their contribution to our liberation struggle heralds the day of lasting mutual friendship now and in future."' The GDR public learnt about the accident from a brief news item in Neues Deutschland the next day and from a joint announcement which the DirectorGeneral and the party and trade union executives of Interflug placed in the newspaper obituary columns for their four staff members, but they were not informed about how the disaster had happened nor about tile background of the mission as a whole. '0 The dead were flown back to the GDR on 29 March and buried in the presence of their families, relatives and close colleagues. Interflug very quickly replaced the lost aircraft with another Illyushin 18. With a new crew, technicians and a safety team it left for Luanda on 2 April. Assistance for ZAPU could now continue. Before the airlift commenced, ZAPU cadres and the GDR crew had worked out all the details. The tasks that fell to ZAPU consisted in making all the necessary formal arrangements with the authorities in Angola and Zambia. Together with their partners from Angola and Cuban military personnel they set up whatever safety precautions were feasible under the complex circumstances. ZAPU members had to move the freight from the storehouses to the airport and to load and unload the aircraft. The 50 flights by Interflug between March and May 1979 were no doubt one of the most stirring chapters in the annals of cooperation between the GDR and ZAPU. Dumiso Dabengwa, at the time ZAPU's chief of intelligence and simultaneously responsible for logistics, holds the view that this airlift was crucial for ZAPU to implement its Turning Point Strategy at the end of the 1970s when the organisation was making preparations for a massive attack using regular armed forces. Dabengwa also recalls an aspect which placed the GDR airlift in the wider context of subsequent international developments over the Rhodesian issue. To his knowledge the Rhodesians and Western intelligence services obtained information about ZAPU's plans and the new dimension of armed struggle. He thinks that the magnitude of the GDR's assistance through the Luanda-Lusaka airlift, which naturally remained no secret to Western services, must have made them realize that ZAPU's strategy

Special Flights to Southern A/ica was serious, and therefore genuine negotiations were necessary. Considering this, he even sees a direct connection between the airlift operation and the move to go ahead with the Lancaster House negotiations."' Jeremy Brickh ill, a former ZAPU intelligence worker, also assumes that the GDR's airlift raised fears in the West that this evidently new quality of assistance for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe might have unpredictable effects on developments in the entire southern African region. He supports the thesis that the operation directly influenced the convening of the Lancaster House Conference. 12 Almost exactly a year later Zimbabwe achieved independence. Yet the celebrations on 18 April 1980 saw no GDR representatives present, and diplomatic relations between the two countries were established only more than six months later. In the GDR, all this was experienced as a painful wound - not only by the policy-makers but also by many people who had been commmitted friends of Zimbabwe throughout the struggle for its freedom. How could that have happened? Support for the Zimbabwe liberation movement was at the time one of the priorities for the GDR's foreign policy in Africa. But as we intend to show below, the GDR's extensive assistance till 1980 went almost entirely to ZAPU, whereas relations with ZANU, for a variety of reasons, only marginally exceeded sporadic contacts. Attemps by ZANU politicians to have this situation changed had failed to draw a positive response from the GDR, leaving ZANU with a sense of deep frustration when it came out victorious from the February 1980 elections. What was probably the most bitter disappointment for the GDR in all its involvement in Africa grew out of its highly contrasting relationships with the two liberation movements in Zimbabwe, notably the unrealistic expectations it placed in ZAPU and its gross underestimation of ZANU. A great many factors led to this dichotomy. Besides its own policy principles and interests, and any shortcomings in its own analysis and the subjective skills and behaviour of its foreign policy experts, the GDR could not possibly ignore conflicts within and between the liberation movements and, more important, the impact of broader international developments, notably the East-West confrontation and Soviet-Chinese rivalry. The limited scope and discretion GDRenjoyed as ajunior partner of the Soviet Union are illustrated here in an exemplary way, All those factors, we believe, accounted fbr the failures and successes in the GDR's abiding solidarity with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, which make up a highly specific chapter of its foreign policy in Africa. Below, we shall take a closer look at the basis for the siccessful association

*1- 84 Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy' between the GDR and ZAPU and at the support and assistance this organisation received from the GDR over the years. At the same time we shall trace the difficulties in the GDR-ZANU relationship at its different stages, and shall try to answer the question why these were not ironed out before Zimbabwe achieved independence. Initial contacts with ZAP' Initial contacts between the GDR and the Zimbabwe liberation movement came about in 1960, when 17 African countries achieved their national independence. It is on record that in 1960, the President of the African National Congress (ANC) of Southern Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo, enquired in a letter whether he could send a representative of his organisation to the GDR. The foreign ministry in Berlin reacted by instructing the GDR Trade Representation in Accra to invite the liberation movement's leader.'3 But the visit failed to materialise. Closer relations with representatives of ANC's successor organisation, the National Democratic Party (NDP) were then established a little later in Cairo. In those days the GDR maintained an "Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the GDR in the United Arab Republic" in the Egyptian capital. This Office existed in parallel to consular missions with quasi-diplomatic functions in the host country and became an important pivot in the initiation of contacts to and from African and Arabian countries as well as with liberation movements. The Office was headed by experienced diplomats like Richard Gyptner, Wolfgang Kiesewetter and Ernst Scholz, the last two of whom were subsequently appointed deputy ministers in the foreign ministry. A number of younger diplomats posted to the Office were involved in the early contacts with liberation movements. They benefitted very much from these contacts later when serving as ambassadors in various African countries. This applies, for example, to Gerhard Stein and Horst Koehler, ambassadors to Zambia and Somalia respectively in the 1970s and 1980s. The Office also acted as a gobetween when the NDP was seeking to enter into relations with the Solidarity Committee in Berlin, which had been founded as the "Committee of the GDR for Solidarity with the African Peoples" in July 1960.4 The NDP, too, set up an office in Cairo in 1960, with a view to developing its own international ties. George T. Silundika was put in charge of that Southern Rhodesia Office, and he instructed his staff in December 1960 to contact diplomats at the GDR Plenipotentiary's Office. He himself could not take part in the first meeting at the GDR Office on 13 December 1960 as he had to go to London to join representatives from the liberation movements of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for negotiations with the British

Special Flights to Southern Africa Government and representatives of the Southern Rhodesian administration about the future of the Central African Federation.5 Upon his return from London he met GDR diplomats, including Gerhard Stein, for talks on 30 December 1960, leaving them much impressed indeed. Stein underlined in his notes6 that Silundika was adamant that settler rule in Southern Rhodesia needed to be ended, but that his stand was not one of 'blacks against whites' but rather in favour of a parliamentary representation of all segments of the population based on equal rights, as well as a corresponding participation in national government. What especially impressed his German partners was that he wanted to go back to Southern Rhodesia even though detention awaited him as the NDP secretary- general. Finally, a GDR representative had the opportunity of a having meeting with the NDP's president, Joshua Nkomo. Horst Brasch, Chairman of the Solidarity Committee, met him in Cairo in March 1961, during the third AllAfrican Peoples' Conference.7 The first NDP officer to visit the GDR, in April 1961, was Moton Malianga, the organisation's vice-president. He attended the International Scientific Conference on "Issues ofneo-colonialism and the policies of the two German states", which was held in Leipzig.'" In the same year, the Solidarity Committee printed 5 000 copies of a pamphlet for the NDP, at its own expense." A Ziimbabwean took part in the first training course held at the school of the GDR Journalists Association in 1961/62.2u On account of these promising lhiks the Solidarity Committee thought the NDP would be one of the suitable addressees for an important foreign policy move which the GDR was planning to undertake later in 196 1. Before going into the details of this story, it might be useful to recall that the GDR had made repeated efforts since 1958, in concert with the Soviet Union, to achieve a peace treaty between the Allied Powers of the Second World War and the two German states. Proposals to that effect had been tabled by the USSR at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in May and July 1959, but turned down by the Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. Nonetheless, achieving a German peace treaty remained a priority goal of the GDR's foreign policy. The Solidarity Committee, too, was called upon to publicise the concept of the peace treaty in African countries and to win international support for it. The Committee's Secretariat discussed appropriate action in July 1961.2, It was agreed that the president of the National Council of the National Front of the GDR, Professor Erich Correns,12 should write personal letters to leaders of liberation movements to explain the GDR's position on the Gen-nan question. The letters were to pay heed to each recipient's partner's specific concerns in their own fight for liberation. Besides, the Solidarity Committee itself would

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy turn to individual liberation movement representatives who had been the Committee's guests in Berlin. All letters were to be sent out in the middle of August. While these plans were being made, the situation in the GDR was deteriorating dramatically, and the Berlin Wall went up on 13 August 1961. The letters now had to incorporate an additional controversial theme which was likely to compromise their original purpose, for the widely questioned and rejected errection of the wall by the GDR leadership, needed explaining to those who were to be won over as friends. In a letter to Joshua Nkorno, dated 16 September 1961, Professor Correns tried to win the NDP president's understanding for the GDR's policy.3 Solidarity Committee Chairman Brasch had written to Nkomo earlier, on I I September, associating his expos, with recollections of their previous meeting in Cairo in March. Emphasising a common confrontation with Western imperialism and arguing for the right of self-determination for the Germans along distinctly anti- imperialist lines, this letter betrays an attempt to appeal to the African leader's sentiments and convince him of the need tor reciprocal support: The potential for war and provocation from West Berlin has been brought under control and the extremely endangered peace has thus been saved. - To pre-empt the conclusion of a peace treaty, the powers-that-be in West Germany take recourse to every means of slander and hatemongering, lies and distortion. In a demagogic fashion they talk about the German people's right of self-determination as crucial for a solution to the German question. But what they actually mean is a right of selfdetermination dispensed by German imperialism which is out to decide which country will fall to it as its next prey. ... We are of the opinion that in iew of the danger of war, the German people's right of self- dvtermination is first and foremost a right to secure peace. The interests we share in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for peace. independence and growing prosperity for all peoples oblige us to help one another. In this serious situation we look to the leading statesmen and policy- makers in all countries and think they should not stand aloof' The issues raised are not those of a German internal quarrel, rather they are issues of vital importance for all peoples of the world.24 The latter campaign is an example of how the GDR, still much isolated in the international community, was trying hard to find opportunities for entering into dialogue and winn ing friends. It saw the liberation movements as suitable partners because of"mutual anti-imperialist solidarity". In view of this interest, the GDR politicians were adding a special element to the Marxist-Leninist conception that the socialist countries were in alliance with the movernent for national liberation while the "worldwide revolutionary process of transition from capitalism to socialism" was forging ahead "on the basis of common anti- imperialist interests" and as a "constituent part of proletarian

Special Flights to Southern Africa internationalism." The GDR's contribution to this standard formula was its claim to be specially exposed "at the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle", and this specific situation, it was argued, called for a particular commitment to solidarity with the national liberation movement. This justified expecting solidarity in return - in other words, postulating a need for mutual support. The fact that the G DR's own interests in this reciprocal relationship fiequently tipped tile scales in its own favour, on account of the inter-German confrontation, has already been described above.2' Tile following example shows that the degree of political support that liberation movements extended to the GDR - measured primarily in terms of public statements - was an essential criterion in judging these movements, including tile one in Zimbabwe. In his letter Brasch had invited Nkomo to the GDR on the occasion of its 12th anniversary, but Nkomo could not honourthis invitation. Foreign-policy analysts in the GDR saw the reason primarily in the NDP's line of policy where they found fault with signs of opportunism in the anti-imperialist struggle. Likewise, it appeared dubious to them that while the views of the NDP representatives on the German question were positive, they were expressed in fairly general terms and only in individual talks. Nonetheless, the conclusions they drew in a report at the end of 1961 were as follows: It was right for us in 1961 to have expanded and deepened the contacts we established with the leading liberation movements in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, UNIP and NDP, in 1960. It was also right and usetil that we invited representatives of these parties to visit the GDR, which has enabled us to develop person-to-person contacts. We can be proud to have had really leading and influential functionaries (though not the presidents) visiting our republic. In this direction we should continue to work in order to expand the range of personalities whom we have links with.-'However efforts to intensify these links were barely successful in the first months of 1962. GDR diplomats in Cairo felt that Washington Malianga, who had succeeded Silundika in the NDP Office in Cairo in January 1961, was dragging his feet on mutual co-operation. They suspected reservations about relations with the GDR and other socialist countries.27 Unlike the case of the South African liberation movement, where political and ideological commonalities between SED and SACP were very propitious conditions for their close association from the very beginning, the GDR and the Zimbabwe liberation movement only drew closer after the conflict with the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia intensified and assistance was forthcoming from the GDR Solidarity Committee. The GDR side first had to become better acquainted with the NDP and, after it was banned, with ZAPU which succeeded it in December 196 l,just as foreign affairs specialists

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDRs A/rica policy in the GDR had to make thorough studies into all the wider issues around the Central African Federation and the Southern Rhodesian problem. There was little preliminary material they could build on, and they had to rely on observations fiom afar and on information from their contacts in the Zimbabwe liberation movement. ZAPU as perceived by the GDR in the early 1960s The GDR's relations with ZAPU came into being at a time when the latter,just like the United National Independence Party (UN IP) in Zambia and the Malawi Congress Party in Malawi, was fighting for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and against attempts to reject tile "one man, one vote" principle in electoral law and thus create a state of affairs which would ensure the survival of settler minority rule. The first major analysis of the problems surrounding the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with conclusions for the future development of the GDR's relations with democratic organisations in the Federation, was finished on 19 May 1962.28 It was drawn up by staff members of the Office of the Plenipotentiary in Cairo who maintained contacts with Northern and Southern Rhodesian liberation movements' officers posted in Cairo. In the following passages, we intend to deal with that study in somewhat greater detail, for it reveals fundamental political and ideological approaches and terms of reference in analysing national liberation movements in general and the one in Zimbabwe in particular. The positions reflected in the document represent a mix of correct perceptions, gained by using instruments of Marxist social analysis, and blinkered adherence to political and ideological dogmas. Reviewing the economic, political and social development of the three parts of the Federation, the authors of the analysis described the specific features of settler colonialism in Southern Rhodesia, the constitutional development and the discriminatory implications of settlers' rule for the African majority. They carefully traced lines of conflict within the white minority and investigated contradictions between the most conservative of the settlers and the more flexible British policy which preferred making concessions to the African population. The Africans' fight for equal rights had broadened, their level of organisation had improved and their goals had become more realistic, but all this was not yet enough to oppose the white settlers' and British Government's policies more effectively, the analysis noted. The British Government, the authors believed, would manage to preserve a compromise to the Africans' disadvantage for some time to come, while the African liberation movements were not sufficiently informed about contradictions between the settlers and

Special Flights to Southern Africa the British Government, exploited them too little, and were too fragmented in their struggle. Because of an excessive nationalism, founded on panAfricanism, they do not seek to win over forces in the region which could be their allies.29 Pan-Africanism was looked upon with a certain reservation in the GDR, because, according to Marxist thinking, it encouraged a type of African nationalism which did not pay sufficient attention to the socioeconomic roots of colonialism and racism, and because some of its figureheads consequently tended - as it was seen by GDR analysts - to place greater store by the antagonisms between blacks and whites than by the contradictions and contrasts among the social classes and strata. In view of the complex nature of the conflict, the GDR diplomats did not foresee a solution to tile Federation's problems in the short run. Hence they thought it was necessary for the Africans to focus their struggle on acquiring the freedoms of what was called in Marxist Theory "bourgeois democracy", eliminating discriminatory laws, and improving the social situation of the working people in town and country in order to achieve equal rights, restrict the white settlers' power and gradually prepare for a takeover by the African majority and the establishment of a national-democratic state with - in comparison with other African countries - special features. The liberation movements were to work towards this objective by demanding economic, political and social equality for the African population and by bringing influence to bear on government policy, chiefly by way of mass mobil isation over the demand for a comprehensive bill of rights, notably an electoral law based on "one man, one vote". Nonetheless, the GDR diplomats did not rule out armed conflict. 'As the white settlers are hardly amenable to concessions and the antagonisms are likely to sharpen, it will prove useful to prepare for an armed struggle. Armed struggle should first be seen as a consequence that would result from the settlers' stance, but should better be avoided. The currently available forces are not capable of waging a successful armed struggle,' they concluded.3 These realistic views of the situation in the region, of the prospects for the independence cause in Rhodesia and possible compromises were partly overlaid by a crude class struggle pattern of thinking. Interestingly enough, this was less apparent in the authors' assessment of the "class enemy" than of the role of the African parties and organisations. Their policy was seen as not adequately meeting requirements, and a consistent solution to the problems, the authors felt, could anyhow come only "from the working class led by a militant Marxist party."'" This phrasing clearly reflects not only the Marxist-Leninist dogma of the leading role of a Marxist vanguard party but

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy also illusions about the actual state of social differentiation and misconceptions about the interrelationships among the classes and strata in Third World countries. A simplistic categorisation and the European yardstick detenTnined this analysis of African classes and strata and their role in society. This showed, on the one hand, an overestimation of the role and level of the urban "working class", whose strikes and political actions in Salisbury (Harare), Bulawayo and Que Que (Kwekwe) in 1960 and later no doubt deserve to be remembered as a highly important element in the emancipatory movement of the African majority in Rhodesia. On the other hand, the analysis displayed a considerable measure of distrust vis-a-vis the "petty bourgeois" forces and, more important, a nearly total neglect of African rural populations as an important constituent of society. When attempting to find the reasons for these analytical shortcomings, we certainly will have to add to the GDR diplomats' dogmatic blinkers the simple fact that they had practically no opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge about the situation prevailing in the Central African Federation. Given their ideological premises, the authors of the paper were consistent in according great attention to the trade unions in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, where industry was more developed than in Africa generally. Since communist parties did not yet exist, they said it was for the trade unions to lead the workers' movement and to push forward with the fight for national liberation, without letting themselves be taken in by the "petty bourgeois" parties; UNIP and ZAPU. The analysts remarked critically that the trade unions in the Federation had but vague notions about socialism and voiced public criticism of imperialism and British colonialism only in a general way, without challenging the neo-colonialist designs of the USA and West Germany. Moreover, the Rhodesian trade union leaders avoided supporting the positions of the socialist camp in public, and tended to look for a Third Way.3This now was something that was totally ilTeconcileable with tile orthodox Marxist-Leninist views of laws governing the course of global developments in the era of transition from capitalism to socialism. Looking for an indigenous Third Way in a world which was bipolar in terms of the confrontation between two sociopolitical systems appeared highly suspicious. The desire to draw Third World emancipatory movements over to their own side to tip the balance in the EastWest conflict was obvious. The paper differentiated between the "petty bourgeois" parties of the Federation. While UNIP was assessed as a mass party which was already well-organised and influential, ZAPU was seen as still having considerable organisational weaknesses and lacking clarity about the situation and the

Special Flights to Southern Africa tasks and methods of struggle. It was conceded, however, that the largely illegal conditions for ZAPU entailed much greater difficulties. The relations of these parties with the GDR and the other socialist countries were assessed with caution: The leading African organisations in the Federation have formally recognised the role of the socialist countries, including the GDR, in the anticolonial struggle and are to a certain degree interested in cooperation. In view of the fact that most of their leaders come fiom petty bourgeois or feudal strata and were educated in imperialist schools and had, or sought, few opportunities to gain information for themselves, they have certain reservations which make them inclined to believe what imperialist propaganda keeps saying about the socialist states. They have not yet surmounted the influences of anti-communism. This is why, despite some promising beginnings, a deeply trustful relationship has not yet developed. There is still distrust vis-a-vis the socialist countries' policy. This is more distinct in ZAPU than in UNIP.33 The authors of the analysis underlined that due to its political and economic importance, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would have top priority in the GDR's foreign policy towards Africa in the long run. Clinging to their theory about the role of social classes and strata, they stated that intensified contacts with the trade unions would be a particularly important element in relations with Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Cooperation with UNIP and ZAPU should also be pursued, but kept in narrower bounds than relations with the trade unions." As to political cooperation with UNIP and ZAPU, the German problem should be the central theme, as was customary in the GDR's foreign relations at the time. The task they placed second to analytical work in developing mutual relations was "informing the organisations of the Federation about the role of the GDR and the contrasting policies of the two German states in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the situation in Germany and the GDR's policy and to build the necessary trust as the basis for further cooperation."35 For some time to come, they argued, it was necessary for the GDR to make a special effort to develop relations with ZAPU and to support its struggle. Relations with UNIP had achieved a higher level already. Organisations of the Federation should be given only such help, ideological, political and material, as they really needed. The criteria for "real need" was not further specified. For ZAPU and UNIP, the diplomats recommended printing or furnishing material that would be helpful in building their party structures. Something they considered highly important were

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy invitations for delegations to visit the GDR, where they could hold political consultations. From September 1962, 12 youths from Southern Rhodesia would be invited for vocational training in the GDR, and ZAPU was offered scholarships for students?6 Thus, the GDR had set tile stage for cooperation with the Zimbabwe liberation movement. A significant step towards invigorating relations was the visit which the new head of ZAPU's office in Cairo, Edward Ndlovu, paid to the GDR from I to 9 November 1962. GDR diplomats in Cairo had established a closer personal relationship with him, and his visit to the GDR was requested by ZAPU - clear evidence for the Solidarity Committee that reservations vis-a-vis the socialist countries were abandoned. A major reason for the shift was seen in the repressive policies of the white minority regime, which had banned the NDP in December 1961, after protest actions against the constitution introduced that year, and persecuted its leaders and members. In September 1962, ZAPU was also banned. Nkomo and other executive members were arrested. The GDR Solidarity Committee viewed it as the chief purpose of the talks with Ndlovu "to generally improve current relations between ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia and the GDR (Solidarity Committee) and to show by means of allround practical help that the GDR is a reliable friend in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism." The detailed exchange of information and views on developments in Southern Rhodesia, on the one hand, and in Germany, on the other, proceeded to the two sides' satisfaction. The Solidarity Committee promised its guest to supply ZAPU with goods, in particular textiles, but it turned down ZAPU's request for explosives and arms. The internal report on the visit noted on this point: "In line with our political conception and because of our situation we explained to him clearly that the GDR and its institutions cannot grant such a request. In the end we had the impression that he understood the situation and the reasons for our refusal.'38 Shortly afterwards, Ndlovu wrote to the Solidarity Committee how ZAPU's external leadership viewed the results of his visit to the GDR: ,When I returned from Berlin I submitted my report to my colleagues at our headquarters in Dar es Salaam and the)' greatly appreciated your spirit of goodwill which demonstrated a very high degree of your solidarity with the peoples of Africa."" Relations with the trade union movement in Zimbabwe also gathered momentum. As far as the GDR was concerned, they developed as a relatively autonomous line of connection to the Zimbabwe liberation movement, quite in the sense of the recommendations in the aforementioned analysis of May 1962 by the Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo. Aaron Ndlovu, Bulawayo District Secretary of the African Trade Union Congress of Southern Rhodesia (ATUC),

Special Flights to Southern Africa visited the GDR from 14 to 24 January 1963, at the invitation of the GDR's Confederation of Trade Unions (FDGB). ATUC, which somewhat later became the Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions (ZACU), was close to ZAPU. Among other things, the FDGB and Ndlovu agreed to stay in regular contact and to exchange information. The FDGB also offered material assistance and study places at its college in Bernau. 4" Cooperation between the federations was intensified after ZACU's president, F. M. Nehwati, visited the GDR in January 1965. The FDGB once again offered study places at the college in Bernau, and provided a supply of clothing, office material and equipment for trade union work." Brasch and Nkomo met again in December 1963 in Nairobi, during Kenya's independence celebrations. Nkomo told Brasch that he had been unable to visit the GDR in the course of the year since he was confronted with several court proceedings in Southern Rhodesia. He announced a visit by a member of ZAPU's leadership at the beginning of 1964. He also discussed with Brasch further cooperation with the Solidarity Committee, including material solidarity and cadre training for ZAPU.42 The first consignment for ZAPU from the Solidarity Committee in 1963 included blankets and medicines, but these were still in customs bondage within the port of Dar es Salaarn, not cleared by Tanganyikan authorities,43when the two officials met in Nairobi. ZAPU, as well as other liberation movements, encountered similar difficulties with the release of solidarity supplies time and again in the years to follow. By the end of 1963 the Solidarity Committee counted ZAPU among the parties and liberation movements of sub-Saharan Africa which were its close partners." The Committee's work programme for Africa for 1964 mentions several commitments to ZAPU: an invitation to vice-president James Chikerema and continued material assistance and industrial training. Southern Rhodesia was now ranked fourth on the Committee's list of priority countries, behind South Africa, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.45 Cooperation with ZAPU was assuming distinct contours. GDR and ZANU: The "Chinese issue" This promising upturn in bilateral relations coincided with divergencies inside ZAPU about the strategy of the liberation struggle, in particular in connection with the constitutional talks. In August 1963, when ZAPU already counted among the more important partners of the GDR Solidarity Committee, a group around Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira and Robert Mugabe left ZAPU to found ZANU. In the GDR, this split in the liberation movement which was blamed on ZANU, was perceived as a crucial setback in the struggle for liberation. Although GDR foreign affairs experts were critical of ZAPU

Zimbabwe. A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy because of an assumed lack in clarity about the aims and methods of the independence struggle, and of Nkomo because of too much pliability over Britain's compromise proposals, they saw no reason to change their more favourable attitude towards ZAPU. A major reason for this decision was the fact that contacts they had developed, particularly good relationship, with such people as Silundika, Jason Z. Moyo, E. Ndlovu and A. Ndlovu, remained in ZAPU and were playing an important part in the organisation, while those where cooperation had not been that much satisfactory, were now in ZANU. They were downright suspicious of Ndabaningi Sithole, ZANU's president, whom they saw as gripped by a stubborn nationalism and anti-communism. They believed he was maintaining close links with the United States and colluding with the white settlers. ZANU was more or less identified with Sithole. Other ZANU leaders, such as Takawira and Mugabe, were unknown in the GDR. But all in all, the analysis which the Office of the Plenipotentiary in Cairo communicated to the foreign ministry back home was differentiating, and did not suggest closing the door to ZANU: The split in the liberation movement in Zimbabwe and the inception of ZANU benefits the imperialist forces, and it appears safe to suspect that the division was inspired by imperialist forces. The damage to the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe is evident... The division has had the effect of bringing to light shortcomings in ZAPU's previous fight and of stirring renewed efforts by ZAPU, and it is likely to produce fresh debates for more clarity in ZAPU's struggle." Their recommendation was to continue studying the problem and for this purpose to contact both sides. Without siding with either of these in public, efforts towards cooperation with ZAPU were encouraged. This did not exclude the possibility of supporting ZANU in certain situations if this helped the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The -progressive forces" within ZAPU which were not further described were encouraged politically, morally and materially: restraint was advisable concerning material aid for ZANU and only when ZANU officially requested it, should such aid begin.7 The continuity of the GDR's cooperation \ ith ZAPU and its restraint towards ZANU were subsequently determined by a number of international factors. UNIP, a major partner of the GIDR Solidarity Committee, supported Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU after a short period of wait-and-see, and other friendly liberation movements like the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) were also more in support of ZAPU than of ZANU. ZAPU was already cooperating in important international bodies like the AAPSO, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), where the Soviet Union wielded considerable influence. But more and more decisive for

Special Flights to Southern Africa the GDR's stand towards ZANU became tile current constellation in the "world revolutionary movement", notably the conflict of the USSR and the Eastern bloc with the People's Republic of China. In appraisals of ZANU at the time of the split in the Zimbabwe liberation movement, the Chinese factor played a very marginal role. References to a close association with American interests, especially on the part of Sithole, were clearly dominant. There was just one vague hint at the Chinese government supporting ZANU.47 The situation remained like this until 1964/ 65, to change only towards the end of 1965, when ZANU was being more and more dismissed as a pro- Chinese party responsible for the split. In particular, ZANU's overemphasis on armed struggle was heavily contested. ZANU's leanings to China now came to dominate the GDR's perceptions. It has to be added at this point that the GDR's position was always decisively determined by Soviet appraisals which, right into the second half of the 1970s, saw ZANU primarily as a pro-Chinese separatist group."' The vehement dispute between Moscow and Peking was about important questions of strategy and tactics in the struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems and about conceptions for the evolution of socialism, but equally about hegemony in the "world revolutionary movement", plain and simple. The GDR never challenged Moscow's claim to leadership because a close relationship with the Soviet Union was only too vital for the very existence of the East German state. Therefore, the GDR's leaders were arguably unrivalled in constantly emphasising "the leading role of the Soviet Union" as "pioneer of progress for humanity", right until and during Gorbachev's rule. This also explains its unambiguous stand in the Soviet-Chinese controversy about leadership of the "world revolutionary movement" and its resultant subordination to Moscow's policy vis-a-vis the Zimbabwe liberation movement. ZANU also saw the Soviet Union's dominant influence on the GDR's attitude towards their organisation as a decisive factor for the G DR's options and choices in developing relations with the Zimbabwe liberation movements. In their view, the GDR was the Eastern bloc country which had the closest relations with the Soviet Union and was the most willing to follow Moscow's politics." But in the dispute with China, the GDR did not simply toe "the Soviet line" but had reached conclusions from its own analysis of'traits of Chinese policy, which it perceived as alarming enough. To elucidate the lastmentioned aspect, we shall dwell here a little on matters which were of special concern to the GDR in the context of the Soviet-Chinese dispute over the "general line" of the international communist movement, which ater simmering over a long period, burst into the open in 1963, around the time when ZAPU

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy was split. Clues are contained in an internal report prepared by the SED Central Committee's Department of International Relations, in April 1963.' The main thing which caused concern to the SED was the Chinese leadership's policy, labelled as "leftist-sectarian and dogmatic" and "adventurist," their attitude towards the overriding question of preventing a new world war, peaceful coexistence and the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism. Referring to the settlement of the Cuba-crisis in October 1962, the SED observed that China was not willing to concede necessary compromises in international politics: The Chinese comrades counter reasonable compromise with a concept of armed struggle which is allegedly the only decisive means to gain victory... Peaceful coexistence and the inherent policy of peaceful economic competition are not regarded as an important form of the international class struole against imperialism. CoUnterposing peacelul coexistence to class struggle, the Chinese comrades implicitly censure the CPSU and the other fraternal parties tbr their politics of peaceful coexistence and economic competition which, they say, is not the road to socialism worldwide and does not serve revolutionary change and the liberation otpeoples. but means abandoning class struggle and revolution.'2 In fact, the paper went on to say, the Chinese leadership insinuated that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were abandoning the socialist revolution for the sake of peaceful coexistence and did not support, but rather tried to slow down the national liberation struggle which the Chinese leadership in essence conceived of as recourse to armed force. In the Chinese view, efforts towards disarmament would disarm the national liberation movement and bring it to a standstill. The SED attributed this rationale of the Chinese communist party to their failure to understand the qualitative implications of new missile and nuclear weapon technology for modern warfare. This judgement of the Chinese policy strictly adhered to the MarxistLeninist pattern of interpreting international developments. At the same time, the SED's critique was a reflection of its genuine concern about the maintenance of peace, which it was threatened by the Chinese policy of those days. After all, the GDR was situated directly at the potentially explosive divide between the two hostile political systems, where any clash of the blocs would hit the Germans first. It is interesting that the Soviet Union, which occasionally, as a super power, was cautious in discussions with Third World and liberation movement partners, encouraged the GDR to bring its specific interests into the debate over the Chinese stance. One consideration was no doubt that the GDR, situated as it was "'at the tbrefront of the international class struggle," could hardly be accused of any "retreat in the face of imperialism", even though it

Spec'iul Flights to Southern Afiiu subscribed to peaceful coexistence. Moreover, its effective solidarity with liberation movements had earned the GDR prestige, not least in AAPSO, where China still enjoyed substantial influence.' In AAPSO, too, Chinese representatives nourished doubts about peaceful coexistence politics, basing their arguments against their Soviet rivals even on an alleged difference between coloured and white peoples. The disapproval of peaceful coexistence which the Chinese in AAPSO often articulated, for example, by advocating warlike clashes in Europe as a contribution to the world revolution and as relief for the national liberation movement on other continents, had a direct bearing on the GDR's security interests. At this point in the debate, representatives of the little GDR, whose support for peaceful coexistence could in no way be construed as Big Power interests, were better placed than the superpower USSR to argue convincingly with liberation movements. This happened when Heinrich Eggebrecht, as a GDR Solidarity Committee observer, addressed the AAPSO Executive Committee's session in N icosia in September 1963, shortly after The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow. The Chinese representative had maintained during the session that by signing the treaty the Soviet Union had become a collaborator of imperialism. Eggebrecht noted in his report about the meeting that out of a total of 24, ten delegates, including from ZAPU, supported the Soviet polic\, and the treaty. The All- Chinese Trade Union Federation submitted a statement to FDGB on 14 August 1963 denouncing the treaty4 The GDR Solidarity Committee had some success with its arguments about the dialetics between peace, social progress and national liberation. Heinz H. Schmidt, Chairman of the Committee emphasised: "I he method of referring to the national interests of the GD and its anti- imperialist struggle for peace has also proved eflective in etforts to strengthen anti-imperialist unity of action in the peoples' ,Nolidarity movement... This is true, in particular, of our endeavours to refute the Chinese leaders' line N hich. in the solidarity movement, ,nanifested itself in an overt call to the GRL) that the best w ay of huwving solidarity with Vietnam N as to occupy West Berlin and to )ursue a policy that shOuld be aggressive and work up tension so as to tie as 11an1 US troops as possible at our western state frontier. Countei ing this advcnturism %%ith a well-reasoned presentation of our anti-imperialist polic, of peace..., we have made a contribution to clariting these issues..." The dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China degenerated into a total row, entailing heavy consequences for the relationships of the GDR and other Eastern European countries with liberation organisations like ZANU which maintained close links with China. The factor which blocked these relationships was not only disagreement on the substance of policy, however crucial this may have been in the circumstances, especially

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy regarding the issue of preserving world peace. What seems to have weighed even more heavily was the kind of political culture which had come down to the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc and the international communist movement from Stalin's times: a definite incapacity to enter into and sustain on the basis of equal rights a democratic debate over differences of opinion which could have taken up and advanced the theoretical approaches and practical policies of all those concerned. What prevailed instead was to excommunicate anybody who took a position deviant from one Moscow had officially endorsed, which does not mean, however, that the Chinese leadership was more tolerant. This incapacity to handle conflicting interests and contradictions in a constructive way was only too evident and had disastrous results. All these developments in the 1960s and beyond were one factor restraining the GDR Solidarity Committee from building up relations with ZANU with its pro- Chinese label. Other factors, less weighty though, which affected the formation of opinion and policy in the GDR were internal problems in ZANU and the attitude of ZANU itself, and the influence which its rival, ZAPU, brought to bear. It must be stated in fairness that GDR experts on foreign relations never absolutely refused to cooperate with ZANU. The 1964 work programme drawn up by the Solidarity Committee in late 1963 expressly mentioned ZAPU as the main partner, but stipulated at the same time that contacts should be established with ZANU.56 But what came out of it were merely sporadic exchanges of information. The records show that such contacts continued via the GDR Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo, where Tranos Makombe and Moton Malianga in January 1964 inquired about possibilities for scholarships and military training, 1 and in London, where Didymus Mutasa, ZANU's local representative, approached GDR officials.,8 Right after ZANU's breakaway from ZAPU, another channel was opened via ZANU's representative in Dar es Salaam, John Mataure, who requested that the GDR Solidarity Committee divert the mopeds kept in customs bondage at Dares Salaam from ZAPU to his own organisation.9 Foreign Ministry officials in Berlin saw his letter as a move to test whether the GDR was willing to cooperate. The head of the fourth extra-European division (AEA) recommended that the GDR was ready to cooperate with all the forces engaged in the struggle for national liberation, but that the Solidarity Committee could not withdraw from previous accords reached with ZAPU.60 A much more distanced stand on Mataure's request was taken by diplomats at the Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo, who remembered having had less good experiences with certain officials who were assigned to the local ZAPU Office before they went over to ZANU.6' Towards the end of 1965, ZANU again approached the Solidarity

Special Flights to Southern A/iica Committee. Simpson V. Mtambanengwe, Secretary for International Affairs, sent a letter requesting assistance, including aid suited for armed operations.2 In late February 1966 Mtambanengwe travelled to Berlin to meet officials of the Solidarity Committee and the FDGB, who gained a good impression from the discussions.13 Herbert Chitepo, national chairman of ZANU, sent a letter to the Solidarity Committee thanking "the wonderful reception and hospitality" extended to Mtarnbanengwe. He wrote: Through Mr. Mtainbanengwe's visit we arc very glad to have made and established direct contact vith you which xke .ould like veal effectively to maintain. Regarding the request for material assistance Mr. Mtambanengwe made, I would like to assure you that I personally have taken steps to ensure their quick and sall delivery through the channels you suggested. We are urgently looking forward to hearing from you. We need fraternal help now and e are confident that we ourselves will do the rest \ith courage and unswerving determination till our goal of ridding Zimbabwe of colonialist fascism is finally achieved.'" He was prepared to send another representative of ZANU to Berlin immediately if the Solidarity Committee deemed it necessary. Henry Eggebrecht, the officer in the Solidarity Committee executive who knew the liberation movements best, advised his colleagues to stay in contact with Mtambanengwe and Chitepo, whom he himself had not met by then. While not rejecting Chitepo's suggestion of sending another representative for further discussions, he thought the Committee should wait before extending another invitation.(" A review of the Solidarity Committee's activities in 1965/66 ultimately spoke of mere information contacts with ZANU."' Attempts at establishing direct contacts from Berlin to both the South African Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and ZANU - the two movements developed a close relationship - had immediately caused angry reactions by the ANC insofar as the PAC was concerned. Despite that, the Solidarity Committee kept trying to keep doors open. Schmidt, for example, noted: "The whole question of relations with these extremely nationalistic movements, which are mostly sustained by intellectuals and under both Chinese and American influences and which, like the PAC and ZANU, are not without influence in their countries, is at present under review."6'7 Evidently under the impact of the further deteriorating Soviet-Chinese rift, that view turned out unfavourably for ZANU, in spite of the promising beginnings of relations in early 1966. China increasingly lost influence in AAPSO, and the fifth AAPSO Conference, scheduled to convene in Peking and, according to Soviet views, most likely to split AAPSO, was prevented by Soviet representatives and

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in ihe GDR's Airica policy pro-Soviet solidarity committees of African and Asian countries and liberation movements."' In 1967, Ch ina broke with AAPSO, with negative repercussions on relations with liberation organisations believed to be -pro-Chinese". When AAPSO shifted its focus of attention to southern Africa in the second half of the 1960s, not only ZANU but also the PAC, the South West African National Union (SWANU) in Namibia and the Cornit, Revolucionario in Mozambique (COREMO) found themselves barred from cooperation, as was seen in the preparations for, and the proceedings of, the international conference in support of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, South West Africa and Zimbabwe, held in Khartoum early 1969. In May 1968, Berlin was the venue of a scientific conference under the motto, "Against racism and neo-colonialism, for the liberation of southern Africa", which was organised by the Central Council of Africa, Asia and Latin America Sciences (ZENTRAAL) in the GDR, in conjunction with the national Solidarity Committee and with assistance from AAPSO.6' SWAPO, the ANC and ZAPU sent delegations to attend, the latter was represented by George Nyandoro. The documents of the conferenceu were to go for final consideration to a follow-up conference of AAPSO on southern Africa which would convene in Conakry in 1968. But as early as May 1968, the secretary of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, A.S. Dzasochov, informed his colleagues in the GDR that the scheduled conference could not take place in Conakry since president Sekou Tour, insisted that in addition to liberation movements supported by the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, the PAC, SWANU, ZANU and COREMO should be invited as well - which, in the opinion of AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat, would make the conference meaningless.' After some to and fro, the international conference in support of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, South West Africa and Zimbabwe finally took place in Khartoum from 18 to 20 January 1969, under the auspices of AAPSO and the World Peace Council - without the "proChinese" organisations. What is more, the conference issued an appeal that the six participating liberation organisations - the ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC - be regarded as the sole and authentic representatives of their peoples.72 This decision meant a permament exclusion of the other liberation organisations and proved disastrous enough, not least for relations between the GDR and ZANU. It was always a convenient excuse for the GDR later on to keep its distance from this organisation. Irrespective of how one might judge the Chinese policy of those years, it 100

Special Flights to Southern Africa is evident that this selective or exclusive approach to the liberation organisations ruled out whatever cooperation would have been possible with those which showed leanings towards China. It betrayed a lack of political wisdom in the Soviet Union and its allies, including the GDR, since their perception failed to take account of the heterogenous nature and internal dynamics of organisations like ZANU - things which were also innate in ZAPU and the other organisations recognised by AAPSO. Tile way the excluded organisations were treated was bound to cause misgivings about the Soviet Union and its allies even in those of their members who were no blind followers of China and had an interest in cooperating with the USSR and the Eastern European socialist countries. Anyhow, a mutual rapprochement was now hopelessly blocked for a long time to come. The only addressee in the Zimbabwe liberation movement for practical solidarity from the GDR was ZAPU, with which the Solidarity Committee intensified its relations throughout the 1960s. Solidarity against UDI Political and material .upport for ZAPU After the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved towards the end of 1963, the international community witnessed the intluence wielded by the most conservative and rigid politicians of the white minority around [an Smith, who became Prime Minister in April 1964. They wanted to secure their rule against the African majority at all costs and were little inclined to accept even the soft offers of compromise from the British "mother country". Campaigns by black Africans for the country's independence and free elections on the basis of "one man, one vote", with street fighting in Harare in January 1964 and in Bulawayo in April, were violently put down. ZANU was banned in August 1964. In March 1964, ZA PU contacted the GDR ambassador to Zanzibar, Guenter Fritsch, with a renewed request for assistance with the equipment and training of military cadres. Chikerema expressed ZAPU's fears that a unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia N as imminent. Therefore, he suggested, up to 5 000 ZAPU fighters should receive crash training to foil that plan. This approach of ZAPU was met with reservations in the SED CC apparatus. The notes about the talks in Zanzibar bear a handwritten remark, the translation of which is "Caution - the best thing would be our Zanzibar people talked them out of it".71 In Zanzibar, ZAPU had also submitted requests for the supply of arms and military equipment from the G DR. Upon consultation with the Solidarity

102 Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's A/rica policy Committee, the head of the fourth AEA at the Foreign Ministry, Gottfried Lessing, communicated to ambassador Fritsch on 2 April the reply that the Committee was ready to dispatch to ZAPU equipment like tents and boats. As a matter of principle, the delivery of arms and ammunition had to be refused, however. The reason was the GDR's special situation and the existence of two German states. The GDR had already been criticised for this stand, and therefore it had to be made clear that the GDR was not opposed to armed struggle, but could not supply arms on account of its specific situation. This problem would surely be an important point in talks with Jason Z. Moyo and Nyandoro during their expected visit to Berlin, he stated.74 The GDR authorities were much more open to an earlier request which Joshua Nkomo had lodged with the GDR Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo in Ma) 1963 and which Chikerema reiterated in September 11963 that the GDR train radio communication operators and provide equipment of this kind.7 Furthermore GDR officials had noted in talks with ZAPU executives that the organisation had little experience in underground work, which it needed under conditions in Southern Rhodesia. Chikerema's request to receive two or three men in the GDR for several weeks to consult with veterans of the anti-fascist underground resistance was answered with a commitment that the plea was going to be considered. The Plenipotentiary's Office recommended to the foreign ministry that careful attention be given to the request because this would be an effective wa) to help ZAPU with building LIp its underground network. In our view, it should be possible to find one or tmo comrades, perhaps party veterans. who would be able to explain to these representatives (if ZA Pt the techniques of organising the party. protecting its network. organising its ork among the masses and its propaganda - (these items have the mark "'moeglich-i "possible '/ on the margin of the paper, author's note) and possibly of preparing for an armed struggle (here the mark is ",nein" / "'no",', author's note) under conditions of illegality One thing \\e constantly note is that ZAPU has no slightest idea how to organise this struggle. E\cessive trustfulness and a lack of \ igilance vis-a- is white settlers again and again causes the party great damage.'" On 22 April 1964, ZAPU's treasurer Jason Moyo began a longer visit to the GDR. Till 5 May he was a guest of the Solidarity Committee, and afterwards continued his stay in the GDR up to 9 June. On 6 June Nyandorojoined him. Moyo's talks at the Solidarity Committee centred on further assistance for ZAPU. He also had an opportunity to study some aspects of life in the GDR, including agricultural development. He met German anti-fascists and was very moved by his visit to a former concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, north of Berlin. He was also highly impressed by the May Day demonstration

Special Flights to Southern Africa in Berlin.' There is some reason to believe that Moyo's visit marked the beginning of paramilitary supplies for ZAPU and also of broader mutual cooperation on military and security matters. The training of cadres for ZAPU's intelligence service %Nas to assume particular importance and efficiency. This was stressed by former ZAPU activists who were engaged in the field of security during the liberation struggle."M Against the background of the exacerbating conflict in Southern Rhodesia, ZAPU seemed to be a preferred partner of the GDR in this field, compared with other liberation organisations. Indications to this effect can be discovered in confidential notes taken on November 1964 by Eggebrecht. Heading the Solidarity Committee's liaison office to AAPSO in Cairo from its inauguration in September 1964, he was now the person to take charge of further developing the ties with liberation movements. He informed Berlin about inquiries from liberation movements as to whether the GDR could provide military equipment and train military cadres.' As before, Eggebrecht reported, GDR representatives told FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC, ZAPU and other movements that anns deliveries by the GDR were ruled out but paramilitary items like uniform textiles, blankets and water bottles would continue to be supplied. "It was only with ZAPU that we talked in greater detail and not so evasively, promising to give a final answer later," said Eggebrecht Eggebrecht added that the ZAPU people had specified very concrete demands for military training by instructors, for a small vessel and military conveyances to take fighters to other countries for training. At that moment, however, the GDR did not reach a decision. After the turmoil over the split in the Zimbabwe liberation movement and insecurities in the GDR about the path and aims of ZAPU, policy-makers in the GDR came to place much greater confidence in ZAPU in the course of 1964. So it was planned to invite a ZAPU delegation to attend a scientific conference of the SED that year in Berlin. A preparatory paper noted that ZAPU was an anti- imperialist party whose leadership comprised both petty bourgeois nationalists and trade unionists with a working-class background, some of whom had a certain acquaintance with Marxism-Leninism. There was "every reason to assume that the proletarian forces in the party will gain the upper hand in the future." Persons to whom these high expectations would apply were not named. Very likely, J.Z. Moyo will have been one of them. Another interesting detail is that in the summer of 1964 the SED was already considering direct inter-party relations with ZAPUY' Consultations which Henry Eggebrecht held in October that year in Lusaka with the ZAPU leaders in exile testified to a further intensification of relations

104 Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Afr'ica policy between ZAPU and the Solidarity Committee. In his notes on the conversation with James Chikererna, George Nyandoro, Edward Ndlovu and George Silundika on 27 October he listed ZAPU's detailed wishes in terms of further assistance."' These were based on the movement's expectation that the struggle for a new constitution would grow in the near future and that general elections in Southern Rhodesia would be enforced. Hence ZAPU asked the Solidarity Committee to provide motorbikes, bicycles, radiotelephones and similar equipment to enhance its operational mobility. To bolster up its propaganda effort, ZAPU hoped to obtain from the GDR a mobile radio transmitter2 and diverse canvassing material, ranging from badges and flags to shirt tissue and ties. The ZAPU officials also requested the services of legal experts in drawing up constitutional proposals for the forthcoming negotiations in London, and further assistance with training by providing university study and vocational training as well as courses for trade union officials, youth affairs officers and journalists. They specified that training for six radio communication and telecommunication operators and six printers, type-setters and mechanics, would be very much appreciated. It is evident that these lines of training could also be used for cadres to engage in clandestine operations. Few perhaps realise that the GDR did in fact meet ZAPU's request for expertise on the constitutional issue. On 21 January 1965 Eggebrecht was able to inform David Mpongo, in charge of ZAPU's office at AAPSO in Cairo at the time, that a group of experts led by Dr. Peter Adolf Steiniger, Professor of International Law at Berlin Humboldt University, was ready to assist ZAPU with elaborating a constitutional proposal of its own. Mpongo \\ as asked to inform ZAPU leaders in Lusaka immediately and advise them to send Edward Ndlovu to Berlin as soon as possible to delier ZAPU's draft and a copy of the current British proposal for the constitution.83 Ndlovu's visit to the GDR was organised fairly quickl\, and lasted from 19 February to 4 March 1965. In addition to talks he conducted at the Solidarity Committee and at FDGB headquarters, he was also received by Deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi, which underlined the importance ZAPU was enjoying in the GDR's strategy in Africa.s4 In those days, a meeting of a liberation movement officer with a senior GDR government official was still something extraordinary. Ndlovu gave interviews for the GDR news agenc\ ADN and Radio Berlin International, in which he referred to arms deliveries from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Smith regime and the service of West German pilots in the Southern Rhodesian armed forces. He also paid calls on Zimbabweans who were studying or training in the GDR.a- Sources in the archives we have been able to study so far did not provide ally further

Special Flights to Southern .-li'icl clues about the interesting aspect of GDR-ZAPU cooperation on constitutional proposals for a free Zimbabwe. The hopes for a negotiated settlement and for free general elections based on the "one man, one \ ote" formula did not materialise. In the course of 1965 it became increasingly clear that the Rhodesian minority regime of Ian Smith was determined to prevent any democratic majority rule. On I I November, he unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence from Britain (UDI). These developments were closely watched in the GDR. With its own scope for more meaningful action being rather modest because of the country's far-reaching isolation from international affairs, the GDR issued statements to protest against UDI and to support ZAPU's goals. The first statement came out on 14 October"L when a Foreign Ministry spokesman denounced the Smith regime's intention to declare unilateral independence, which was evident enough after the talks between Britain and Southern Rhodesia had ended in failure on 8 October. At the same time these comments, in tile then habitual Cold War style, aimed to "unmask" the ambivalent attitude which the West in general and tile Federal Republic of Germany in particular were taking towards the white minority regime. Another statement on the Rhodesian question, by the Solidarity Committee, was communicated to delegations and liberation movement representatives by a GDR observer delegation, comprising Karl-Heinz Kern, head of the Economic and Trade Mission in Ghana, and a Solidarity Committee official, at the OAU summit held in Accra in October. This statement announced that the Solidarity Committee would step up its active solidarity for the Zimbabwe liberation movement and, again, assailed the Federal Republic of Germany for its collaboration with the Smith Government.7 Previously, on 19 October 1965, GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer had sent a telegram to OAU secretary-general Diallo Telli to condemn the Smith regime's drive at unilateral independence."8 And finally the GDR Government reacted to UDI with an official statement on 13 November", in which it castigated the move as defying international law, rejected any recognition of the white minority regime, and assured its "'fulI sympathy and solidarity with the African population of Rhodesia struggling tbr a democratic solution to the Rhodesian problem based on the right to self-determ ination.""9 The statement deplored the inconsistent attitude of the British Government towards the Southern Rhodesian racists, and it did not fail to mention West German support for the Sm ith regime. The GDR officially cut off its entire trade with Southern Rhodesia, ill conformity with resolutions adopted by the UN and OAU. The GDR news agency ADN reported on 21 December 1965"' that following instructions by the Minister for Foreign and Inter-German trade, all trade relations with

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy Rliodesia had been severed several months before. Directors-general of foreign trade organisations had been given order to conclude no trade contracts with firms in Rhodesia and to ensure that contracts with firms in other countries would prohibit GDR goods being re-exported to Rhodesia, said the ADN dispatch. It made no reference, however, to imports, direct or indirect, from Rhodesia. Subsequently, and especially after joining the UN in 1973, the GDR reaffirmed its support for ZAPU, specifically by urging strict sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Nonetheless, it appears that, as in the case of South Africa, indirect trade relations with Southern Rhodesia persisted, for both tobacco and copper from there did reach the GDR. Further research is neecessary to shed light on the obscure paths of that trade. After UDI, there was a substantial increase in practical solidarity from the GDR for ZAPU. In the period from 1964 to 1965, the planned 87 000rnark'2target for aid supplies to ZAPU climbed to 175 000 marks.3 After the vessel Usedom had steamed from Rostock harbour to Dar es Salaam in October 1964 with a cargo of motorbikes, film cameras and projectors, collapsible dinghies and boat engines, tape recorders plus tapes and microphones, it repeated the same journey in February 1965 with a consignment comprising loudspeakers, badges, collapsible catamarans and dinghies, outboard engines, shoes, motorbikes and typewriters. A consignment of flags was to follow later.14 The Solidarity Comittee's plans of 1966 envisaged 175 000 marks' worth of supplies for ZAPU and, interestingly, 25 000 marks' worth of material aid for ZANU.11 Having expressed its own protest against UDI in a telegram to ZAPU' on 19 November 1965, the FDGB, too, increased material assistance for its sister organisation ZACU. Shortly after UDI, in December, it informed ZACU that it intended to provide goods worth 15 000 marks, which ZACU effectively received in the course of 1 66. With this consignment FDGB reacted to an urgent request from ZACU for financial help after the oppression of a strike in Bulawayo. Due to permanent shortage of convertible currency FDGB sent goods for sale instead referring to a similar successful practice in the cooperation with ANC and SACTU.97 GDR's attitude towards armed struggle UDI exacerbated the Zimbabwe liberation movement's confrontation with the white minority regime. In 1966, ZAPU started armed action in Southern Rhodesia with small groups of fighters infiltrating into the country.8The

Special Flights to Southern Afiica month of April saw ZANU guerrillas and Rhodesian police detachments engaged in armed clashes at Sinoia (Chinhoyi)." In June 1966, T.G. Silundika, in his capacity as secretary of ZAPU's National Executive Committee, informed the GDR Solidarity Committee in Berlin about the most recent developments in and around Southern Rhodesia and about ZAPU's strategy. The organisation intended to mobilise forces which would disrupt public life in Southern Rhodesia and thus explode the myth of domestic stability which the Smith regime was professing to the international public. To create such a situation, military action was deemed inevitable. ZAPU had military cadres, predominantly trained in Algeria and now based tbr the most part in a camp in Tanzania which they were forbidden to leave. 'The socialist countries,' Silundika pleaded, 'have always helped us. But the problem is that this help has to reach us across the bridge of independent African states.' Tanzania would only agree to deliver the arms destined for ZAPU if Zambia also consented. Now that president Kenneth Kaunda felt he had been deceived by Great Britain over the Rhodesian issue, the consent would probably be forthcoming, he added."'0 At a time when everything seemed to indicate that an armed struggle for independence was imminent in Zimbabwe - this form of struggle had already been spreading in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Guinea-Bissau - a decision of principle by the GDR leadership about whether to supply arms to liberation movements appeared increasingly inevitable. At this juncture, the balancing act of the Soviet Union and its allies between peaceful coexistence along the East-West divide and support for national liberation movements tilted towards greater assistance for these by military means. Surely, this was not just due to regional developments in southern Africa and to requests by liberation movements to the socialist countries on account of their greater emphasis on armed struggle. The Soviet Union and its allies also provided growing military aid since the focus of the EastWest conflict was shifting to Third World countries, as the escalating war in Vietnam demonstrated, and in order to react to the West's global strategy. Not least, their commitment was to thwart the ambitions of the Chinese rival and to take the wind out of Cuba's sails on a revolutionary course which looked adventurist from the Eastern European viewpoint."" On 10 January 1967 the SED Politbureau adopted its watershed decision about the "supply of non-civilian goods to national liberation movements

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy in Africa"'')2- the first time that the GDR had taken tile principal decision at highest level to supply arms to liberation movements. It stands to reason that the decision could not have been taken without clearance from the leading power of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union, and probably the visit of a Cuban military delegation to the GDR at the end of 1966 was also instrumental in the matter.103 The paper which the foreign ministry had prepared for the politbureau's decision mentioned that it was a policy principle of the GDR to assist national liberation movements, and that non-civilian assistance had occasionally been provided before. Such requests to the GDR, which were not specified in the paper, had lately been increasing, and the lists in the annex had been drawn up according to foreign- policy priorities, the situation in each liberation movement and the needs of the partners concerned.",' In terms of the volume of envisaged supplies, these lists ranked FRELIMO first, followed by ZAPU and the MPLA and PA IGC, with equal amounts of arms and ammunition, coming third. The composition of supplies was the same in each case. Essentially they consisted of infantry weapons like carbines, machine guns, sharpshooters' rifles, sub-machine guns of different makes, and ammunition, along with anti-personnel mines, binoculars and blankets. For ZAPU, that meant over 3 600 infantry weapons, around 870 000 rounds of ammunition, 1 000 anti- personnel mines, 220 steel helmets, 30 pairs of binoculars and 200 blankets. When and how much of these items were actually supplied to ZAPU is not recorded. The foreign ministry recommended that prior to their dispatch the consul-general of the GDR in Tanzania should check the situation with the national authorities since the Tanzanian Government had so far been more inclined to assist ZANtLJ.'5 The assumption in the foreign ministry was that ZAPU would still need some time to prepare for armed struggle. 'For two years,' its paper for the politbureau explained, "ZAPU has been orientating its members and the African population towards armed conflict with the regime. The leaders of the party are aware, however, that preparations for an armed uprising will take a few years more.'"" The commencement of military confrontation in Wankie where ZAPU launched an armed operation together with the ANC in August 1967, outpaced this time scale. Doubts which were held in the GDR about the sense of that operation in regard to the ANC have already been explained in the preceding chapter. '1t is not clear whether these doubts also applied

S 1h'cial Flights to Southern Africo to military operations undertaken by ZAPU at a time which the GDR considered as early. GDR press reports about the joint operations by ZAPU and the ANC emphasised their thrust against the Smith regime. "' Authorities and organisations in the GDR voiced unequivocal solidarity with guerrillas taken prisoner in Southern Rhodesia. The GDR Committee for the Protection of Human Rights "was one of the voices which protested against the execution of liberation fighters in April 1968, and the foreign ministry was prompted by this event to urge that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia be upheld."' The GDR also responded positively to the appeal for solidarity with captured guerrillas, which was ajoint initiative by the International Defence and Aid Fund and the London-based World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners. In a circular letter, signed by Canon Collins and sent to all UN member states, which also reached the GDR, these organisations hoped for international solidarity to support their call that the Southern Rhodesian authorities grant ZAPU and ANC fighters tile status of prisoners of war or political prisoners."' The GDR Solidarity Committee responded by requesting Professor Peter Alfons Steiniger, the expert on international law mentioned in an earlier context, to formulate a legal opinion. Professor Steiniger sent his paper with a letter to president Davies of the Supreme Court of Southern Rhodesia.'2 He argued that the colonial regime defied established international law as laid down in the UN Charter, in particular in Article 1, paragraph 2, and Article 51. He had in mind the right of peoples to self-determination and self-defence, and his conclusion was as follows: The patriots of Zimbabwe who make use of this right are engaged in an international armed conflict with the occupation lbrces, tial is to ,,a), the) must be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Prisoners of War Conwention of September 12. 1949. "lhey may not be punished for exercising the right of resistance which tor them is a patriotic duty, irrespective of the standards and procedures b) the occupationists. In other words, the activitics ot" your court, and the authorities subject to it, with regard to these prisoners of' war constitute murder or illegal detention, and every person involved in the proceedings is personally responsible." The Solidarity Committee sent copies of the letter to, amongst others, AAPSO, solidarity committees in other countries, and African ministers of justice and heads of state."' The Wankie operation was followed by a similar joint operation of ANC

1I0 Zimbabwe.- A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy and ZAPU fighters around Sipolilo (today's Guruve) in the north east of the country in 1968. In the same year, ZAPU's military activities were increasingly resented by politicians in Zambia, the country from which they were launched. In November, a number of ZAPU and ZANU officials were deported from Zambia to Tanzania, accused of forcibly recruiting people in Zambia for their guerilla armies. As the GDR Consulate-General in Tanzania infonned the foreign ministry in Berlin on 19 November, after talks with Dr Tichafa Samuel Parirenyatwa, the ZAPU leadership attributed Zambia's attitude primarily to British pressure.'" Southern Rhodesia's colonial motherland was undertaking a fresh attempt at a negotiated settlement with the Smith regime, and the disturbing factor of anned conflict was to be eliminated wherever possible. On top of that, internal shifts in the liberation movements as well as political developments in southern Africa since the end of the 1960s, themselves interrelated, were generating new contradictions. They called for a new response, and ZAPU was not alone in finding the challenge difficult. Cooperation with ZAPU 1969-1975 The course of the joint military operations with the ANC launched in August 1967, plus political developments in the region, was causing ZAPU, just like the ANC, to reconsider not only its military but also its overall political strategy. This was the impression officials in Berlin gained firom Silundika's visit to the GDR in October 1969. From the interpretation given to his account at the Solidarity Committee, the main problem was for "all liberation movements to review the current political situation in Africa and draw conclusions for their own activity. In their work, liberation movements primarily need to take account of the more flexible tactics of the imperialist and neo-colonialist powers." Acknowledging Silundika as a strategic thinker, his hosts recorded his views in the following terms: 'Now that their armed struggle has not produced significant successes, the movements ought to enter into fundamental discussions and ask themselves whether they are politically and theoretical ly capable of enforcing a m ilitary decision.' They quoted him as saying that help by the socialist countries, especially, material assistance through food and dress for the provision of the liberation movement, continued to be of vital importance."' The Solidarity Committee plans for 1969 envisaged aid supplies for ZAPU worth 150 000 marks.16 In the main, ZAPU received dress and equipment for its soldiers."7 It is interesting that the FDGB, too, contributed

Special Flights to Southern Africa to the supplies for ZAPU fighters through its channels to ZACU. Previously, in October 1967, Aaron Ndlovu had requested radio communication equipment from the FDGB, "I and in November he added a list which included paramilitary equipment for 800 men."9 The FDGB answered Ndlovu that they could not fulfil all his requests, but announced that, since one shipload of supplies had been dispatched, further aid would be forthcoming in 1968. 2u In Dares Salaam, ZAPU received nine cases with FDGB solidarity goods, including coats, blankets, clocks and watches, in the first three months of 1969.121 In September of that critical year for ZAPU, another consignment from the FDGB followed. Mentioning radios, binoculars, clocks and watches, blankets and dress, Ndlovu thanked the FDG B for the supplies in a very cordial letter: 'We are very much short of words to express our inner and deep feelings in appreciation of your help. There is a saying in one of our languages which says 'Uingane weqiniso ngungane ngezenzo' which means 'a friend indeed is a friend in need'. Otherwise without your help we would hardly maintain hundreds of men we have in our army."22 In 1970, the FDG B again supplied ZACU with dress, light footwear and airbeds for 200 men. In his evaluation of the situation Silundika problably not only considered that Great Britain had once more ventured into constitutional negotiations with the Smith regime which, it is true, were thwarted when the Smith Government held a referendum on a constitution in June 1969.2 4 President Kaunda, who left no doubt about his support for the liberation movements, despite economic losses for his country and the threat to Zambia's security by the racist regime, had spoken out for acceptance of the Lusaka Manifesto at the conference of East and Central African heads of state in Lusaka in April 1969 in an attempt to unblock the conflict situation. The Manifesto dealt with possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the colonially and racially oppressed countries of the region and, at the same time, emphasised that the peoples concerned were entitled to fight for their right to self-determination with every means at their disposal.I'2 The Manifesto was also designed to counter South Africa's attempts to gain economic and political influence through its "outward looking" African policy, thereby seeking to isolate the ANC and its allies as well as the other liberation movements in the region. A modification of the military strategy had previously been indicated by executive members of ZAPU to GDR diplomats in Dar es Salaam.126 Future operations, they said, should be decentralised and carried out by

Zimbabwe. A special chapter in the GDR's Africu pulicy smaller units. But above all they wanted to make a greater effort to build or rebuild ZAPU's political organisation in Zimbabwe, and to set up resistance groups which would support the military struggle launched from outside the country. In this context, ZAPU executives asked if they could send a number of security cadres to the GDR to train in techniques for infiltrating into Rhodesia and for countering infiltration of ZAPU by the regime's security. Whether or not such training took place at the time or whether it was delayed because of subsequent developments within ZAPU is not recorded in the archive material so far studied. ZAPU fell into the grips of an internal crisis, in which basic uncertainties and differing views on the movement's future strategy and tactics were overlaid by dissent over the style of leadership and charges of personal power ambitions levelled at James Chikerema, who presided over the fiveman strong external leadership of ZAPU.'' In the wake of that crisis, ZAPU's international relations, including those maintained with the GDR, suffered a serious setback. The GDR had excellent relations with the top officials in both rival factions in the external leadership i.e. Chikerema and Nyandoro on the one side and Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu on the other. As a result, Chikerema informed his GDR partners about the conflict in September 1970,28 and so did Ndlovu, from the opposite side, in October.'12 The GDR remained extremely cautious about making any public comments on the strife within ZAPU. But, like the USSR, the GDR Solidarity Committee drastically reduced its support for ZAPU during the crisis in 1970, and provided a mere 17 800 marks 'o worth of assistance in 1971. Unlike the Soviet Union which had chosen to support Chikerema, "I' the GDR hesitated for a long time to take sides in ZAPU's internal conflict and maintained contact wvith both factions, but ultimately decided to place greater confidence in the majority wing of the organisation's external leadership led by Moyo and Silundika. When the Soviet embassy in Lusaka had lost contact with this group, a GDR Solidarity Committee delegation visiting Lusaka in May 1971 helped to restore the link. It is interesting that Heinz H. Schmidt, who led the delegation on this visit, in his report recommended establishing or re-establishing relations between the GDR and organisations like ZANU, the PAC and UNITA, essentially for information purposes.132 Cooperation in the printing scene also came to a standstill, having just commenced in 1969. After a request by ZAPU which Edward Ndlovu had first conveyed during his talks in the GDR in September/October 1968,"-3

Special Flights to Southern Ahfica the GDR had been printing and dispatching ZAPU's journal Zimbahwe Review, on terms similar to those granted to tile ANC foi- Sechuba. since early 1969. The output reached 10 000 copies in 1970, and the costs incurred by printing the journal, first in Zeitz and later in Erfurt, by dispatching it and by paying editor Albert Ndindah were borne by the Solidarity Committee. The September/October issue of 1970 was tile last to come out. Only after three years, in the first quarter of 1974, did the journal return to its readers. While the crisis within ZAPU lasted, the GDR continued to canvass support for the movement in political and diplomatic international fora, in particular by advocating stricter sanctions and observance of the arms embargo against the Government of lan Smith and pre-emptive action against any concession to his regime which would curtail the right of the country's African majority to self- determination. 14 Statements to this effect, of course, also served the GDR's self- portrayal shortly before the international diplomatic blockade against it was to fall. The visit of a ZAPU delegation with Edward Ndlovu as national secretary. Ethan Dube in charge of cadre and security matters, and Philemon Makonese, ZAPU's representative in Zambia, to the GDR from 2 1 to 26 July 1972 marked the resumption of co-operation between the GDR and ZAPU. In talks on this occasion, the GDR Solidarity Committee judged the consolidation process within ZAPU to be positive, although its assessment of the results achieved up to that point was more sceptical than that of the guests from Zimbabwe. The GDR officials had great difficulties with ZAPU's concept that its political work among the population inside the country should primarily be subordinated to the needs of organising and sustaining the military struggle, because they felt this concept would restrict the organisation's scope for action. Moreover, they had the impression that ZAPU overrated its own military capacities and based its own strategy insufficiently on the situation inside Zimbabwe, while underrating the strength of the West and the racist regimes in southern Africa. And they had some doubts about the information that ZAPU had set up a joint military supreme command with ZANU.' As a result of the talks, material assistance by the Solidarity Committee for ZAPU was resumed, though at a low level in the initial stage. Only in 1973 did the Solidarity Committee resume deliveries to ZAPU on full scale. In 1974 the value of the goods delivered rose from approximately 170 000 marks from that of the previous year to 373 000 marks more than double. 3" The range of solidarity supplies for ZAPU now broadened con'iderably,

Zimhahie: A special Lhapler in the GDR's Africu policv covering mainly uniforms and other types of clothes, blankets, tents, shoes, food (instant dishes and soups were very popular), medicines, tools, propaganda material, boat engines, rubber dinghies and collapsible boats. The latter became a specialty in the GDR's assistance. In 1974, ZAPU was again granted two university scholarships and five vocational traineeships, and in 1975 two Zimbabweans were admitted for professional studies and two for industrial training, various orders and lists of deliveries of the Solidarity Comm ittee.' Besides the aforementioned paramilitary supplies. ZAPU asked for mines and explosives and radio communication equipment for arned combat."8 For an instructor course in military intelligence for ten men, which was to begin in July 1973, ZAPU proposed the following lines of training: physical training and combatives: small arms handling: elementary military training; elementary radio communication; demolition and sabotage; cr yptography, codes, photography, radio and telephone interception, and intelligence tactics signed by Ndlovu and submitted probably in July 1972.'3 So far, no records have been found to indicate whether the course was held and whether the scheduled date really marked the beginning of an intensive cooperation between ZAPU and the GDR in this field; neither do the archives provide any clues about arms deliveries in the first half of the 1970s. When a ZAPU delegation with Moyo, acting chairman of the Revolutionary Council established in October 1971, Dube (security) and Amos Ngwenya (administrative affairs), held talks at the Solidarity Committee in Berlin in March 1974, they were able to state that ZAPU's international relations with the socialist countries, but also \ ith the OAU and other international organisations, were once again intact. 40 By contrast, ZANU failed in a renewed attempt in 1972,'1973 to establish contact with the GDR via its embassy in Dar es Salaam. GDR diplomats responded evasively, rejecting ZANU's contention that the GDR's onesided support for ZAPU constituted interference in the liberation organisation's internal strife and arguing that it was ZAPU rather than ZANU which AAPSO recognised as an authentic liberation organisation. Internally, they were in favour of further contacts with ZANU.'4' Consequently, the embassy recommended in Jul\ 1973, after talks with John Mataure, ZANU's chief representative in East Africa: In a longer perspective and taking account of the growing role of / .\NU in the liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, and of tle resulting possibilities for our own future positions, it miigit be

Special Flights to Soittthern Ajici good to consider whether establishing a miinullml ffrelations, despite the Chinese influcnce in Z.,\NU. would be c\pedicnLt. lhe Soviet ( Inioun is repor ed to be giving direct assistance to tie joint ZANtI-.\IPtJ military colinand."At that time, ZANU was arranging for Chitepo to travel to socialist countries, and expressed an interest in his visiting the GDR. GDR diplomats were again evasive. When the Solidarity Committee refused in 1974 to invite a ZANU delegation and suggested that contacts might be made during a planned conference on Rhodesia in Mogadishu, the ZANU representative in Dar es Salaam reacted very angrily and called that conference "a scheme by the Soviet-imperialistic AAPSO". 4 In the GDR, the conference project was seen as an opportunity to encourage cooperation and joint action between ZAPU and ZANU. This was also the keynote of the Solidarity Committee's reasoning conveyed to the visiting delegation with Moyo in March 1974. ZAPU, however, wanted to use the conference primarily to strengthen its own position. The sharp rejection of the conference, which was scheduled for November 1974 but in the end did not take place because of rapid developments, nourished the G DR's restraint towards ZANU. Nonetheless, ZANU did receive aid from the GDR, though on a small scale and indirectly via the OAU Liberation Committee. The records contain clues to such deliveries, which included uniform textiles, as early as 1973.1' But some of ZANU's weaponry is also said to have been of East German origin."4 It probably reached ZANU via FRELINM1O, which cooperated militarily with ZANU. By that time, the GDR had succeeded in gaining full diplomatic recognition by the international community and admission to the UN on 18 September 1973, as a result of detente in Europe which was accompanied by lessening tension between the two German states. It inaugurated an embassy in Lusaka on 18 March 1974, which facilitated relations with ZAPU and direct liaison with its leadership in exile.4" The GDR's foreign policy made use of the new and greater possibilities to support the southern African liberation movements politically and diplomatically, primarily in UN bodies, with a view to promoting international acceptance of their role and aims. GDR officials spoke out for them to have a right to employ such means of struggle against the colonialist and racist regimes as they deemed inevitable in any given situation, including recourse to armed fighting. This happened although the trend towards dttente in

Zinibab we: A special chapter in the GDR's Afkica policy Europe and between the superpowers, USA and USSR, since the late 1960s and early 1970s was reviving the issue about whether politics of peaceful coexistence was compatible with support for the armed struggle of liberation movements. There was suspicion in the Third World and in liberation movements that the rapprochement between the blocs m ight lead to a sellout of their interests. The West regarded assistance for liberation movements, which it called "terrorists", as irreconcilable with d6tente and disarmament. The East, including the GDR, held the view that d6tente in Europe did not mean maintaining the social and political status quo throughout the world and, more important, that colonial and racial oppression as a source of conflict and war needed to be eliminated.47 While the European process of detente was reaching a climax, the situation in southern Africa changed dramatically as the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1974 and 1975, and Angola and Mozambique gained independence. This also had an impact on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The leaders of ZAPU and ZANU who had been in detention since the middle of the 1960s were released from detention in November 1974, and following mediation by Zambia and South Africa, the two movements engaged in talks with the minority regimes government. True, this attempt at opening negotiations was abortive,just as the unification of ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and the African National Council (ANC/ Zimbabwe)'48 under pressure from the Front Line states proved a failure, but on the whole the liberation struggle received much fresh impetus. On a visit to Berlin from 10 to 13 February 1975, T.G. Silundika informed the Solidarity Committee about the latest developments. Once more his partners were convinced by his balanced and matter-of-fact analysis of events and of the motives of those who had initiated the negotiations, and by his own reflections on ZAPU's strategy. ZAPU, he said, was determined to seize the chance for negotiations, although it had good reason to be cautious about this initiative by African governments, which had been taken without any consultation with the liberation organisations. Military struggle continued to be an important lever which would help to wring concessions from the racist regime at the negotiating table."' Silundika emphasised that political unity between the different forces in the liberation movement was necessary if this opportunity for a political settlement was to be explored. I' Developments in southern Africa prompted the Soviet Union and its allies to expand their support for states and liberation organisations in the

Speciul Flights to Southern Africa region where, decision-makers in Moscow and Berlin hoped, a new alignment of forces could have positive repercussions beyond the regional scope, in favour of the Eastern bloc. So the liberation movements in southern Africa became a priority target of the GDR's African policy. As regards the Zimbabwe liberation movement, the GDR continued to focus its assistance on ZAPU. Besides the historical causes, the state of affairs within ZANU was also a factor. ZANU's political programme in 1974 appeared confused to the experts in the GDR, who specifically disapproved of explaining the conflict between "blacks" and "whites" in Rhodesia as part of a worldwide confrontation between races.'' ZAPU's programme itself, founded on an analysis of the social causes underlying the conflict in Rhodesia. was closer to their own Marxist way of thinking. 12 Discussions with ZAPU officials reinforced this impression. Silundika, fbr example. pointed out the danger arising from reducing the Rhodesia problem to a conflict between "black" mojority and "white" minority as Smith, Vorster and their supporters in the West as well as some elements in the national liberation movement did. He described this attitude as "extreme narrow minded nationalism and tribalism."'" Another point militating against ZANU was the fact that this organisation presented an image of utter disunity to the GDR - which observed from the sidelines, having few direct contacts with the organisation itself- during a watershed situation in its African politics which included a stronger commitment in southern Africa. The crisis in ZANU's leadership came into the open when the leaders imprisoned in Southern Rhodesia were released to negotiate with Smith at the end of 1974. The ousting of Sithole as president of ZANU and the clashes about the organisation's unity, the Nhari revolt and the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, the rejection of the ZANU leadership by Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) commanders in 1976 - all these events left a major blemish on ZANU's image in the eyes of East German analysts."4 Hence, policy-makers in the GDR saw little reason to review their attitude towards ZANU, particularly as it was unclear to outsiders for a long while which of the factions would finally gain the support of ZANU's grassroots membership and, very important, of the guerrillas in the camps. Information coming in from the Front Line states was also most contradictory in this regard.

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR 's Africa policy Cooperation iii the heat of* the struggle (1976-1980) .4 new quality in relations with ZA PU After the failure of the 1974/75 negotiating initiative and the abortive constitutional talks between Nkomo and Smith in early 1976 (7 January to 19 March), the option of a non-violent settlement of the Rhodesian problem did not initially look very promising. The summit of the Front Line states of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, held in Quelimane on 8 February 1976, declared the decision had now to be sought oil the battlefield. The conference held in Geneva from 28 October to December 1976 to consider the "Kissinger Plan" for the transition of power to the African majority in Zimbabwe also ended without agreement.'" Previously, in October, ZAPU and ZANU had set tIp the Patriotic Front (PF) to ensure a joint stand during these talks. The Smith regime sought a way out in cooperation with submissive black politicians, with the ultimate aim of maintaining white minority rule. This situation was described to GDR officials by a ZAPU delegation visiting the G DR from 8 to 12 December 1976.'5' The delegation was led by Clement Muchachi and included five members of the ANC/ZAPU team at the negotiations in Geneva. This visit was the first occasion where ZAPU executives held talks with SED officials, and the signing of an agreement on SED-ZAPU cooperation marked the beginning of direct relations at party level. The establishment of this relations resulted from the positive The kitchen oi a ZimahweL,, relu'ee camp i as supported 1it1 household goods and.ioodstu/Js .rom GDR.

Speciul Flights to Southern AHfica 119 development of ZAPU's cooperation with the Solidarity Committee and other organisations in the GDR and reflected the general trend towards direct and close contacts between SED and national liberation movements since the ear'I 1970s. On 22 January 1977, the staff of the GDR embassy in Lusaka were alarmed by news from an utterly shocked ZAPU member: 'Jason Moyo has been killed by a bomb.' The shock was compounded by the fact that lHansGeorg Schleicher, the number two at the embassy, had talked to the vicepresident of ZAPU over the phone a short while before. Their conversation had been about all those bureaucratic formalities required in order to receive a special aircraft of the G DR airline Interflug which was bringing solidarity supplies for ZAPU to Lusaka. A car ride into the city's centre, past the police cordons around ZAPU's office, provided grievous certainty about the bomb attack and its victim..For many years, Jason Moyo had been one of the most important ZAPU partners for the GDR. Together with Silundika and other members of the exiled leadership, he had decisively contributed to the image of ZAPU in the GDR. He was held in high esteem for his sense of political responsibility and his closeness to Marxist thought, but also for his human qualities. He was regarded as an architect of the Patriotic Front, as an advocate of viable ulnity in the Zimbabwe liberation movement. Only a few days after his assassination, the special Interflug plane landed at Lusaka airport."57 When its solidarity freight was publicly handed over to ZAPU officials, diplomatic circles in the Zambian capital believed the GDR was making an effective gesture of solidarity in immediate response to Moyo's death. In fact, this solidarity delivery by the first special Interflug flight to Lusaka had been agreed during Muchachi's talks in the GDR, and Moyo was to accept the goods for ZAPU upon arrival. In those dramatic days, GDR journalists for the first time visited a training camp of ZIPRA and sent home detailed reports about the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.' Their pictures from ZAPU camps and their reports about meetings with members of the liberation movement are said to have added to public concern in the GDR about developments in southern Africa and to have inspired greater solidarity donations for the liberation struggle in that region. In March 1977, ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo paid his first visit to the GDR and was received by Erich Honecker, head of state and leader of the SED. Nkomo had further talks with foreign minister Oskar Fischer and at the Solidarity Committee. He also met all of the 25 Zimbabweans who were staying in the GDR for study or vocational training. The SED attached 119

120 Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy great importance to Nkomo's visit and the strengthening of links with ZAPU. This was evident in the protocol honours for the ZAPU president. A paper to brief the SED Politbureau on the outcome of the visit describes the atmosphere as follows: The warm reception by Comrade Erich Honecker and the frank, trustful talks and meetings, as well as the information given about the GDR's solidarity assistance, deeply impressed the guests and prompted Joshua Nkomo to sum up that this had been for them the most impressive visit abroad so far." Honecker and Nkomo developed a close personal rapport. As a follow-up to the visit, the SED Politbureau decided to increase support for ZAPU by taking appropriate political action at the diplomatic level and providing concrete aid in various forms. One of these was the printing of propaganda and information material and the expansion of the editorial office of Zimbabwe Review, where editor Albert Ndindah became ZAPU's official representative vis- a-vis the SED Central Committee apparatus and the Solidarity Committee. More special flights by Intertlug were to supply ZAPU continuously with solidarity goods from the GDR. An entirely new item on the mutual agenda, due to requests by ZAPU, was inviting delegations of ZAPU experts to study GDR expertise and practice in agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, trade and commerce, and government. Finally the two sides agreed on military aid, the supply of "non- civilian goods" and the training of "special cadres" in keeping with the GDR's capacities. 60 Cooperation was now rapidly expanding. In May 1977, when Nkomo visited the GDR again, he discussed opening an official ZAPU office in Berlin. training opportunities for party cadres and economic experts, and more university scholarships and industrial traineeships. "' In September 1977, a first batch of 30 ZAPU members enrolled at the SED's regional party school in Dresden - something which the SED interpreted as heralding a ne%% quality in its relations with ZAPU. W2 ZAPU was the first liberation movement for which SED regional party school courses were ever organised. Courses for ANC and SWAPO students followed in 1979/80. In October 1977, during his third consecutive visit to the GDR in a year, Nkomo paid calls to these students and to military cadres receiving "special training".'6' These were ZIPRA members training in military intelligence. From 1976 to 1979 onwards, this kind of training developed to become a particularly

Special Flights to Southern Africa important area of GDR-ZAPU cooperation on military and security matters. ZIPRA commanders at the time felt that the training of such cadres, destined to infiltrate into Rhodesia, was a priority for the GDR's assistance to ZAPU. In addition, previously trained ZIPRA commanders were sent to the GDR for specialised instruction in leading larger regular units like companies and battalions. Another important area was training in communications. From 1977 to 1979, groups of ZIPRA cadres were regularly in the G DR for military and security instruction in courses which normally took six to twelve months, rarely less than four months. While military training for ZAPU in the GDR started relatively late compared with similar instruction in the USSR and Cuba, the number of trainees, their specialisation and the quality of the courses reached levels which greatly contributed to the combat capabilities of ZIPRA in this phase of the liberation struggle. "' Even senior political executives of ZAPU were given special training in the GDR. For example, Simon K. Moyo, Director of ZAPU in President Nkomo's office. received intelligence and security instruction over several months in 1977 and 1979.65 The new quality reached in GDR-ZAPU relations was also evident in a formidable rise in the value of material assistance, to over 8 million marks in 1977. This was more than what the ANC and SWAPO (goods worth 2.4 and 2.3 million marks respectively) received together in that year."" Solidarity supplies were mainly used to maintain ZAPU's refugee camps in Zambia. In April, the GDR ambassadorto Zambia, Gerhard Stein, visited ZAPU camps near Lusaka and on the 25th of that month informed the Solidarity Committee about the critical supply situation there. 'It is my impression,' he wrote, 'that the reason behind inviting me and the Cuban charged'affaires to visit ZAPU camps was not only concern on the part of Nkomo and his people, but also an urgent call by Zambia, and possibly by President Kaunda himself, that foreign friends should help since Zambia is no longer capable of shouldering the extra burden alone, in addition to its own supply problems and commitments towards the refugees. There were clear hints at Zambia's interests as Nkomo kept saying that Zambia was doing its utmost but was overtaxed. And President Kaunda, we were told, agreed that both of us, as heads of foreign missions, should visit the camps together with Nkoino to see the real situation with our own eyes."" As previously agreed with the president of ZAPU, special Interflug planes made additional flights to Lusaka, seven in all in 1977.1 The fireight

Zimbabwe: A speCiUl chtpter in he GDR's Africa policy ZIPC opens on ofi,' r in Berlin on 4 ,unuuar, 1978. -I//red Adindah presenis his credentiuls to Kurt Seibl. they carried comprised, for example, food, detergents and sanitary articles, clothing and textiles, medicines, household utensils, radios, camrp beds, blankets and airbeds. When SED Politbureau member Werner Lamberz met top executives of ZAPU in Lusaka in June 1977, Dumiso Dabengwa, head of logistics and intelligence, told him that the solidarity supplies that had come in by then were of great help to ZAPU. The organisation had to cater for 14 000 refugees, including 2 000 children. The food supplies from the GDR, he said, helped to save many people from dying of starvation. 169 Looking back, former ZAPU officials consider that the GDR's capacity for quick help in emergency situations was a very positive factor in the mutual relationship. When there was an acute danger of catastrophic famine in the refugee camps in Zarnbia and President Kenneth Kaunda even had maize provided from the national reserve stocks, special planes fiorn the GDR with food and medicine oil board landed in Luanda. As Jeremy Brickhill said, it was the proverbial help in need.'70 In 1978, the GDR continued its aid for ZAPU. Six Interflug flights with

Special Flights to Southeri Afticu solidarity goods arrived at Lusaka airport.'' But that year's climax in the relationship was the inauguaration ofZA PU's office in Berlin on 4 January, in the presence of Nkomo. The office was given a semi-diplomatic status, and its first head was Albert Ndindah, succeeded by Isaac Nyathi in June 1979. During his stay in Berlin from 2 to 4 January, Nkorno met Hermann Axen, the responsible man in the SED Politbureau for international affairs. Meetings between leading G DR representatives and ZA PU's president also took place during the frequent travels of SED Politbureau members to southern African countries. Honecker met him for lengthy talks in Lusaka on 21 February 1979, on the last-but-one leg of his African tour from 15 to 24 February, which took him to Libya, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. Nkomo said on this occasion that the assistance granted by the GDR was the biggest compared with other international aid, and Honecker handed him a symbolical solidarity cheque worth 5 million marks.72 That journey of Honecker's, with an entourage of top-level party and government executives, was the climax of the GDR's Africa policy. It also sparked off fresh initiatives in the relationship with ZAPU. On 19 February, while Honecker was in Africa, the SED Central Committee's Secretariat passed a decision on long-planned assistance for ZAPU in the medical field, including the assignment of two doctors and two medical assistants to a ZAPU hospital in Zambia and the provision of equipment for a doctor's workplace and further medical appliances.' The big airlift for ZAPU from Luanda to Lusaka from March to May 1979 has already been desribed in detail in the beginning of this chapter. In the military field, too, cooperation continued. By the time Nkomo returned to the GDR in June 1979, combat uniforms "made in GDR" had long become part of the scene in the military camps of ZIPRA in Zambia. During this visit, Nkorno was again received by Honecker, and he had talks with defence minister Heinz Hoffmann on 18 June, where he put forward ZAPU's ideas about further GDR assistance. Having explained the situation in Zimbabwe after the sham elections in April and the efforts ZAPU was making to reorganise its army, he asked the minister for a quick supply of weapons, vehicles, uniforms and anti-aircraft equipment. He also suggested that the GDR should send military advisers to ZIPRA in Zambia. Minister Hoffmann transmitted to Nkomo a prepared consignment of 1,000 submachine guns and 250 000 rounds of ammunition, and promised to examine whether more arms could be supplied. On the question of sending military advisors, he made it - as lie reported to Honecker - unmistakebly

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy clear that the GDR could not do this for political reasons, and instead offered to train more Zimbabwean military cadres in the GDR.74 Honecker emphasized in his talk with Nkorno that the political and armed struggle had to be intensified significantly in order to prevent the international recognition of the Smith- Muzorewa government and to prevent the Western intention to torm a spearhead against independent African states to the north of Zimbabwe. The Patriotic Front could rely on the GDR's and his personal support at any time.'74d But, as Msika recalls, Hoffmann was not as rigorously opposed to sending GDR advisers as his memo on the talks with ZAPU's delegation suggests. The requests made by ZAPU were no doubt associated with the implementation of its Turning Point Strategy. All in all, relations between the GDR and ZAPU had by then reached a level the political significance of which could only be compared to relations with countries like Angola or Mozambique, which were high on the GDR's list of African priorities. In the perception of GDR politicians, ZAPU had become a very important partner indeed. The ZAPU leadership on the other hand rated the ties with GDR exceedingly high. This applies not only to the extensive assistance on military and humanitarian concerns, in education and other sectors, but also, and not least, to the level of political cooperation. Msika, S,:cretarygeneral of ZAPU in those days, paid tribute to the preferential treatment of ZAPU by the GDR, which the liberation movement did not experience in any other country. Talks with Honecker personally could be arranged at short notice, and the discussions were very open and frank. Amongst other talks, Msika recalls discussions with members of the GDR leadership on strategies for development in a future, independent Zimbabwe, for example the development of rural areas. 7: ZAPU's rapport with the GDR, he remembers, was so close that the good offices of East Berlin were used more than once to bring influence to bear on Moscow in favour of the liberation organisation's requests. These were for the training of Zimbabwean military specialists (pilots and others) in the Soviet Union but also for the delivery of modern Soviet military hardware (planes and antiaircraft defence) which were needed for the implementation of ZAPU's Turning Point Strategy with massive attacks in the style of regular warfare against the Rhodesian forces. Whereas the Soviets, according to Msika and Dabengwa, were initially reluctant to support this strategy, GDR partners were far more sympathetic and supportive and helped to bring Moscow round.7' But in the end it was mainly due to massive Soviet support that

Special Flights to Southern Aftica 125 ZIPRA was able to build up its capacity substantially. ZAPU was given priority treatment by the GDR in the decisive phase of the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation. One important factor for their supporting the Turning Point Strategy was undoubtedly that GDR decisionmakers placed high confidence in the reliability of ZAPU's leadership. Furthermore the strong engagement in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle needs to be looked at against the background of the significant role Africa played in the GDR's foreign policy in those years, the late 1970s. The GDR's policy in and towards Africa had reached its zenith; Honecker's two African journeys in one year are clear evidence. There were various reasons for this great interest in Africa, especially in its southern region. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union and its allies thought a strategic defeat could be inflicted on the West in southern Africa. This thinking was nourished by illusions about the attempts in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia to enforce a path of development modelled on the Eastern European pattern. One important motive for the GDR was certainly its hope of building useful economic relations with countries in a region well endowed with resources. The GDR's policy, determined by the international struggle between the Eastern and the Western systems, by foreign-policy principles of anti-colonialism, anti-neocolon ialism and antiracism and by its own political and economic interests, coincided with intensified efforts by the Zimbabwean and other liberation movements and indepependent states in southern Africa to bring down the rninority regimes in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. The ZAPU-ZANU dilemma of the GDR The intricacies of the conflict over Rhodeisa, with many negotiating initiatives being made by the West as well as the competition situation between ZAPU and ZANU, time and again confronted the GDR leadership with the question how to judge ZAPU, its traditional ally, in a political sense. At the end of the 1970s ZAPU was held to be the most politically stable of the Zimbabwe liberation organisations with an effective, singleminded leadership. At the same time, analyses made by the embassy in Lusaka pointed to a differentiation process going on within the movement. The bulk of the leadership in exile and a few of its internal leaders were reckoned to belong to the "progressive wing" with socialist leanings. The confidence placed in ZAPU mainly emerged from close cooperation with exiled leaders whose personality and ideological proximity to Marxism-

Zinihuhw": A sec'ial chapter in the GDR x 4fi'ica polic' Leninisn were convincing enough. To this cate-ory belonged, for example, Mo\ o and Silundika. Other representatives of repute were Edward Ndlovu, who had eminently contributed to the developing relationship between ZAPU and the GDR for many years, as well as Dumiso Dabengwa, Alfred "Nikita" Mangena, Ethan Dube, Akim Ndlovu and Lookout Masuku, who handled military and security- related cooperation with the GDR in the later phase of the struggle for liberation. ZAPU president Nkomo was held in esteem as an integrative leader, whose influence was essential in maintaining the movement's unity, despite its heterogenity. Next to him, secretarygeneral Joseph Msika was involved in a great number of top-level contacts as was John Nkomo. Analysts believed the "pro- capitalist" forces in ZAPU to be within its internal wing, plus a few of those in exile. These forces wielded influence in the leadership through persons like Josiah Chinainano, vice-president of ZAPU at the time.77 Nkomo's extensive diplomatic activities vis-a-vis Western countries were closely observed, not without scepticism, but primarily judged as reflecting the international acceptance of ZAPU as the dominant political force in the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation. And the GDR had no objection on principle to a political solution to the conflict, although it mistrusted the Western negotiating initiatives as neo-colonialist manoeuvres aimed at weakening the positions of the Soviet bloc in the region. Essential for the judgement of ZAPU was the fact that the organisation was trusted by the leading Eastern power. the Soviet Union and did not maintain relations with the People's Republic of China. At that .juncture, the GDR was having difficulty forming an opinion about ZANU, of which Robert Mugabe became president in October 1977, for it was still bearing the stigma of unpredictability and pro-Chinese orientation from earlier times. Experts in Berlin were not sufficiently aware that under Mugabe's leadership ZANU had been reorganised, which clearly enhanced its political stability and military clout in a short time. Contacts by GDR diplomats with ZANU officials in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam had but a small impact back home, and the same goes for reports about those interesting developments within ZANU which came in fiom the GDR's embassy in Maputo. The signals from Maputo were given little heed in Berlin and induced no reaction in the sense of a modified view of ZANU. Instead, the GDR in essence toed the Soviet line and kept its distance towards ZANU. Cooperation with the liberation movement in Rhodesia remained

Special Flights to Southern Afiica confined to ZAPU, which.jealously kept a watchful eye on its own virtual monopoly on relations with the GDR. Any direct links between the GDR and ZANU - a matter broached by GDR Solidarity Cornnittee officials, who pointed out that the two organisations were working together in the Patriotic Front - met with rejection firom ZAPU. Its spokesperson c\,idently knew how\ to put their mnessage across to their GDR partners. A lecture paper delivered in ZANU's Chitepo College in Chinoio, which atccording to ZAIPU officials wvas used in class, highlighted their rival's pro-Chinese orientation and negative vie\\ of peaceful coexistence.7' Nevertheless, it is not the case that the GDR pursued an active antiZANU policy, as some Western observers have wrongly contended.7 ' On the contrary, in view of the further differentiation expected within and between the political streams inside ZAPU, its alliance with ZANU in the Patriotic Front was believed important for strengthening the "progressive forces" in the Zimbabwe liberation movement as a whole. Besides, certain politicians in the GDR's leadership who were evidently attentive to the constant hints by the friendly FRELIMO party and the GDR embassy in Maputo, had meanwhile spotted personalities in ZANU whose political credo, specifically their preference for a socialist orientation for a free Zimbabwe, was acceptable to the GDR. In Maputo in February 1977 Larnberz had talks with Mugabe and Nkomo in their capacity as co-presidents of the Patriotic Front. He was visibly impressed by the personality of the ZANU leader and invited him to visit the GDR.80 On that occasion, Lamberz commented to GDR diplomats that one could not demand that Mugabe and ZANU restrict their relations with China, especially in the military field, as a condition of cooperation between the SED and ZANU, as it had been called upon to do over and over again.' Lamberz, who died in a mysterious helicopter crash in Libya in March 1978, failed, however, to gain acceptance for his ideas in Berlin - a visit by Mugabe did not come about until after Zimbabwe achieved independence. Yet, the latter half of the 1970s had provided sufficient grounds for the GDR to move towards ZANU. The organisation's socio-political concepts for a free Rhodesia were assuming contours, its socialist orientation was becoming more distinct, and objections to peaceful coexistence plus negotiations were diminished, even though armed struggle continued to be accorded top priority.2 The Soviet leadership watched the approach between the US and China atthe end of the 1970s with great distrust. It was feared that the West would play the "Chinese card". Beijing's influence in

Zimbabwe. A special chapter in the GDR's Afi'ica policy Africa - the continent was according to Eastern strategic thinking a focal point of the struggle between socialism and capitalism - would then enhance the positions of the West. Thus the relations with China remained the key question in the attitude of the Soviet Union and her allies towards ZANU. Moscow saw no alternative to the one-sided backing of ZAPU and rejected demands of the Tanzanian and Mozambican leadership to support ZANU. It was feared that by supporting ZANU which had an ethnic base of 80 percent of tile Zimbabwean population this liberation movement would seize power in independent Zimbabwe alone thus providing ground for a pro-Chinese "solution of the problems of the country. The Soviets regarded the political unification of both liberation movements based on principles" - meaning the approach of ZANU towards ZAPU's positions - as the solution to the ZAPU-ZANU problem.2 Moreover, ZANU was highly suspicious of the various Western negotiating proposals - as the GDR was - and indicated this more clearly than ZAPU. Both the GDR and ZANU viewed the activities of British and US diplomacy as attempts to devise a neocolonial settlement for Zimbabwe. But the USSR, and hence the GDR as a junior partner, perceived an equal danger in Chinese activities, whose antiSoviet thrust was seen as leaving more elbowroom in Africa for the West. For the Soviet Union and its allies, the attitude towards China continued to be the crunch question for their stance vis-A-vis ZANU. Mugabe's visits to China in 1977 and 1978 were observed with distrust. In addition, the Soviet Union and most of its allies found it difficult to deal with the differing stands of the Front Line states towards ZANU and ZAPU. This problem and the rivalry between the two organisations' leaderships for influence in the Patriotic Front is reflected in frustrated reports which Soviet deputy foreign minister Leonid llyichov conveyed to the GDR leadership upon his journey to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola in late January/early February 1979.IKJ Ilyichov's mission was to transmit a message from Leonid Brezhnev to the heads of state of these countries, setting forth the Soviet Union's position on Western attempts to produce an "internal settlement" for Zimbabwe and Namibia by installing neo-colonial puppet regimes. To avert this danger, the USSR called for unity in the liberation movement and efforts by the Front Line states to resolve their differences over ZANU and ZAPU. Political leaders in Zambia as well as Tanzania and Mozambique argued in their talks with llyichov "I that the struggle against the racist regime in Rhodesia was entering its decisive phase and that the course of events

Special Flights to Southern Africa imposed al armed struggle as the only means for the national-dernocratic forces to seize power. " In this context, Zambia fully favoured ZAPU whereas Mozambique and Tanzania, as presidents Machel and Nyerere stated, supported ZANU, which they felt was the only organisation actually waging an armed struggle. They saw Nkomo as too willing to compromise with the British, and tried to persuade llyichov to renounce one-sided support for ZAPU and to aid ZANU as well. The disagreement on this issue proved insurnountable. Honecker neets Joshua uko, George Sdundika and Joseph Asika in Lusaka during his Atica tour in Lusaka on 21 Fehruarv 1979. In his meetings with Nyerere and Machel plus foreign minister Joaquim Chissano, llyichov rejected the idea of supporting ZANU to the same extent as ZAPU.86 Soviet reservations about the ZANU leadership were still strong; nonetheless, llyichov met Mugabe for talks in Maputo. Concerning ZANU's relations with ZAPU, Mugabe told the visitor from Moscow that ZANU, which had been bearing the brunt of the war against the Smith regime, saw unification of the two organisations' armed forces as a step towards their unity, and that political unification could be considered after

Zimnah we: A special chapter hi the GDR's Africa policv victory. He insisted on ZAN U's independence in its international relations, remarking that Chinese aid, which his organisation would continue to accept despite reservations about Peking's foreign policy, did not make ZANU an agent of China."' Ilyichov recognised that ZANU had become an influential factor in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and, differing fi'om Mugabe, favoured "genuine unity in the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe based on political and military unification of ZAPU and ZANU", stressing political unity."' ZAPU president Nkomo, whom Ilyichov met before seeing Mugabe, also spoke out for "unification based on an amalgamation of the party organisations with a single political leadership"."' Interestingly, llyichov also informed Honecker that "destructive elements" continued to exist in Nkomo's and president Kaunda's position on the question of the Zimbabwe liberation movement's unity. In his view, they underrated ZANU's strength, and neither of them had failed to point out to him that there was Chinese influence behind Tanzania's and Mozambique's stance.'I llyichov's vague conclusions merely confirmed the Soviet helplessness: It has proved useful to maintain dialogue with the African Front Line states, and possible to exert influence on them in the required direction to make a full efort towards preserving and consolidating the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and, in doing so, to reinforce the position of the progressive forces while isolating the pro-Chinese and other reactionary elements. It is safe to assume that Ilyichov's information largely influenced the views of the GDR party and state delegation which travelled to these countries, except Tanzania, shortly after his own mission. When Erich Honecker arrived in Lusaka for his visit to Zambia (20-22 February 1979), it was not yet clear whether anyone on his delegation would meet ZANU leaders in Maputo, the next station of their journey, or what kind of meeting it might be. In formal talks on 20 and 21 February, president Kaunda gave his guests from the GDR a dramatic description of what he feared was a life- threatening economic situation for his own country, which had caused his Government to re-open the transport routes to Rhodesia that had remained closed since 1973. He noted he had not sold out to his adversaries, and nor had Nkomo, although certain African politicians were insinuating as much. And he strongly emphasised that, -contrary to campaigns which contended otherwise, the armed struggle was being waged by both ZANU and ZAPU.

Special Flights to Southern Afica "Don't believe the slander," he appealed to Honecker and his associates.'" This statement and Kaunda's personality left a deep impression on the GDR delegation. The next day, Honecker reassured Nkomo that the GDR delegation wou ld not lend an ear to those who were spreading slander and suspicion about the ZAPU leadership, and that he fully accepted ZAPU's policy, including its ideas about the Patriotic Front's development. ZAPU guaranteed a socialist-oriented Zimbabwe, it had the GDR's full support, and every effort had to be made to ensure it acceded to power, he stated. Referring to the forthcoming talks in Mozambique, he told Nkomo that his delegation was not bent on meeting Mugabe; he would, however, not rule out the possibility of talks with the ZANU leader."' In Maputo, it was then decided that the SED CC secretary for international affairs, Axen, should hold talks with Mugabe. The talks between the two politicians in Maputo in February 1979 were to become a seminal event on the negative course the GDR steered in its relations with ZANU until Zimbabwe's independence. The meeting took place in Maputo on 24 February, under the shadow of international developments which were directly related to the crunch issue for the Eastern bloc countries in relation to ZANU, the attitude towards China. A few days before, on 17 Feburary, China had launched its military operation against Vietnam. Opening the talks, Mugabe gave his view of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and of ZANU's international links. He mentioned that ZANU had been receiving extensive assistance from China, but at the same time criticised the Chinese attack against Vietnam. As far as the relations with the GDR were concerned, ZANU could not help reproaching the GDR, too, for a lack of objectivity in judging the liberation struggle waged by the people of Zimbabwe. There had been a series of misunderstandings for many years. But currently the picture was, according to Mugabe's opinion, unambiguous and clear. After all the GDR and ZANU were struggling against a common enemy. Mugabe asked that the GDR review its attitude towards ZANU, and requested military and non- military aid like ZAPU was receiving."4 Axen, for his part, noted that the positions of the GDR and ZANU on many international issues were identical or close. He pleaded for unity among Zimbabwe's patriotic forces so as to avert a neo-colonial settlement for Zimbabwe, and then explained the GDR's stand towards ZANU. The

132 Zili bwtc':. .special chupter" in ihe OGDR's .Afica po/i v GDR had rightly been cautious towards ZANU, which had split the liberation movement, and it was supporting ZAPU as a solid liberation movement. He maintained that ZANU had not merely accepted Chinese assistance, but actually encouraged the divisive Chinese policy. Despite the fact that Mugabe's comments on Chinese foreign policy and its armed attack against Vietnam had indicated a distance on his part, Axen criticised ZANU for keeping officially silent about the Chinese aggression in Vietnam. Fie proposed a joint press release condemning the Chinese aggression in public. The ZANU leader replied that a session of his organisation's Central Committee on this matter was still outstanding, and argued, for the sake of unity in that body, against condernning China in public and by name. This was brusquely rejected by the GDR politician as a technical excuse designed to distract from ZANU's incorrect position. Under these circumstances he saw no possibility of issuing ajoint press release, Axen said, and abruptly broke off the talks.'' If one takes into account that, for example, in contrast, the GDR had acceded to Zarnbia's request to refrain from an explicit denunciation of China it becomes obvious that the "Chinese question" became more and more a hollow excuse for the resentment of the GDR leadership against ZANU. '16 The only conclusion about ZANU drawn by the GDR leadership after the.journey was as follows: For the time being, contacts with ZANU are to be maintained in the previous forms (information contacts via the embassy in Maputo). Depending on a clear statement by ZANU on China's aggression against the SRV (North Vietnam, authors' note), a decision will have to be taken on limited aid within the scope of solidarity supplies."7 However, the requests made by ZAPU for greater solidarity were to be examined immediately and granted quickly, in accordance with the available capacities. 8 The diplomatic faux pas by the SED's top tbreign-policy official, and his presumptious behaviour, which was rather untypical ofthe country's foreign affairs community, had extremely grave consequences, not only for the GDR's relationship with ZAN U during the period until Zimbabwe achieved independence. The negative effects of those talks lasted much longer, such that bilateral relations between tile two governments were delayed and remained blighted. Not only had Axen hurt Mugabe's feelings, but his manner was near to being political blackmail. The wound proved deepseated. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister for many years,

Special Flighls to Southc/ri.A1.i/ w spoke of the Stigma of Maputo, which as not eradicated until 1983, when Mugabe \ isited the G DR.""' It was surely no accident that Axen was out of Berlin, "taking a cure", at the time of Mugabe's visit. The embarassing filure of Axen's meeting with Mugabe produced widespread disappointment among the GDR's foreign-policy experts. Even those who did not Net realise how successful Mugabe had been since 1976 1977 in tbrging a strong military and political organisation firom a ZANU torn by ethnic strife and personal tussles for power, had to admit that it was a force that could not be by passed. But still, the way out of the dilemma was seen in unity between ZAPU and ZANU in the Patriotic Front (PF), which in practice meant not developing a constructive approach to ZANU and consequently a better relationship. Inaction in this sense went along with wishful thinking about preconditions for unity in the liberation movement and the quality of the PF. While the front was realistically viewed as a fighting alliance, it was still thought to represent a major intermediate step towards unification of the two liberation organisations. After official recognition of the PF by the OAU (1977) and the Non-Aligned Movement(NAM) (1979), some experts in GDR were seeing unification ithin reach. If unity between ZAPU and ZANU was to come about, the GDR's policy dilemma would cease automatically. The close links with ZAPU could be taken over to the PF, without any need for the GDR to make a major shift in its stand towards ZANU before. Honecker's views about the correlation of forces in an independent Zimbabwe, which he expressed in his talks with Nkomo, seem to indicate that, to him, 'real" unity meant that the old friends in ZAPU would dominate a united liberation movement and finally gain power in Zimbabwe. The concerning passage in the notes about the talk reads: "We fully agree that a public dispute among the forces of the Patriotic Front does not help anybody. Cooperation and joint struggle is necessary. One should do everything that ZAPU, Nkomo, will gain power." 200 This of course reminds very much of the old tactics of leading East German communists vis-a-vis social democrats during the unification of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party and the founding of SED in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany in 1946 and afterwards. Some officials in the GDR foreign ministry, however, were contemplating a modified stand towards ZANU. This required, first, paying due regard to ZAPU's interests. But the next important point was that Mozambique, the country with which the GDR had the closest relations in southern Africa,

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Afirica polici had been urging the GDR time and again to support ZANU. When Chissano, then foreign minister, visited the GDR in 1978, he chiefly used his private meetings to air his views on the situation in Rhodesia and devoted most of his tirne in the official talks making passionate pleas in favour o'ZANU.-" A decisive obstacle for the GDR's diplomacy in developing a more flexible approach towards ZANU was tile Soviet Union's rigid stand. This showed in a consultation which Dr Klaus Willerding, deputy foreign minister of the GDR, held with the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow in June 1979. When he raised the question of developing relations with ZANU while continuing to treat ZAPU on a preferential basis, the reply of his colleague llyichov was an unusually harsh rebuke: "Relations with a ZANU in Chinese bondage were out of the question". This sharp reaction by the Soviet politician, who had just been to southern Africa, demonstrated Moscow's hard line, and came as quite a shock to the East German side.Regardless of the cold shower in Moscow, officials in the GDR foreign ministry continued developing concepts for relations with ZANU. A paper entitled "Analysis of the policy of imperialism in Africa", which was drawn Lip in the ministry for the Politbureau, proposed, inter alia "Cooperation with ZANU, inclusive of its military wings, shall be intensified with a view to promoting the unity of the Patriotic Front on anti-imperialist foundations and opposing attempts by imperialism to divide the movement or bring it round to a pro-imperialist line."2°0 This was the first instance where it was not expected that a union of ZAPU and ZANU would automatically resolve the GDR's dilemma in relation to the Zimbabwe liberation movement - conversely, cooperation with ZANU was seen as a possibility to further unity between the two organisations. This conclusion in mid-1979 came very late and was never put to the test. What prevailed henceforth was the delusion that the GDR could help towards the unity of the movement without making essential shifts in its relations with ZANU. Accordingly, a telegram Honecker sent on 12 June 1979 to the two co-presidents of the PF, Nkomo and Mugabe, expressly appreciated the steps ZAPU and ZANU had taken after tile April election farce staged by the minority regime, adding that unity in the Patriotic Front was one of the essential conditions for the success of the struggle for genuine national independence.2 A positive signal from the GDR to ZANU pointing to a constructive mutual relationship was not forthcoming.

5Speciul Flights to Southern Afi'ica From Lancaster House to independence The GDR was in agreement with the Front Line states and the Zimbabwe liberation movement in consistently rejecting all "internal settlement" variants for Zimbabwe. During his visits in February 1979, Honecker expressly confirmed this to his partners in Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. In that telegram of 12 June he assured Nkomo and Mugabe that the GDR "in accordance with the attitude of the community of socialist states, will persist in its principled policy of unswerving Support for the liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front", and strongly condemned 'manoeuvres designed to instal a neocolonialist regime in Zimnbabwe.''2 ?5 The GDR also shared the view that it was necessary to intensify the armed struggle, and agreed to provide physical assistance, as was borne out by Nkomo's talks with the GDR defence minister on 18 June 1979. In his talks with Nkomo on 19 June, Honecker agreed that a stabilisation of the Muzorewa puppet regime had to be prevented. Stabilisation of that regime, he said, would result in a ieocolonialist settlement in Zimbabwe and, together with it, facilitate the imperialist plans in Namibia. The GDR leadership feared that the West would then be in a position to create a spearhead against the independent countries north of Zimbabwe. Therefore it was considered necessary to significantly intensify the political and military struggle in Zimbabwe and also to escalate the international boycott against the Muzorewa- Smith regime.2"' Notwithstanding its support for the armed liberation struggle and its evidently great solidarity with the Turning Point Strategv, there was clarity in the GDR that an exclusively military solution to the conflict was hardly likely and that a solution would only be found in a political settlement, with armed struggle being an important means of exerting pressure on the political front. The decisive prerequisite, the Soviet Union and its allies thought, was to enhance the stature of the Patriotic Front as the authentic representative of the African majority in Zimbabwe. The socialist countries' consistent support for the liberation movement was aimed at this objective, but they had no wider concept of their own for diplomatic initiatives and political negotiations. Because their policy was so strictly dove tailed with the liberation movement, they had no counterparts in the white minority government in Rhodesia or in South Africa, the latter's ally, whom they could have talked to. Consequently, it was impossible for them to mediate. Their option was to support the liberation movement's position to the extent that the PF would come out of the negotiations strengthened, or

Zimnbabwe: .4 special chapter in the GDR ,Ariica puli even victorious. At any rate, they wanted the expected compromise of the forthcoming negotiations chaired by the colonial power Britain and attended by delegations from the PF and the Muzorewa government in London (I 0 September to 21 December 1979) to turn out as favourable as possible for the P F. During the negotations in Lancaster House, Karl-Heinz Kern, the G DR's ambassador to London at the time, remembers receiving telegraphic instruction from the SED Central Committee in Berlin almost daily about how to assist the PF delegation, concretely the ZAPU delegates. He relayed to Nkomo hints and information coming in from Berlin regarding the actual proceedings of the conference. Ambassador Kern had cordial contacts also with Mugabe. who accepted his invitation to attend the embassy reception on the GDR's 30th anniversary.-r The ZAPU delegation in London also received support from GDR intelligence. An overhearing -proof room at the GDR Embassy was placed at the disposal of the delegation. Besides, ZAPU was counselled during the Lancaster House conference, for example on tactical issues of the negotiations, the delegation was also provided with secret reports on British and other Western countries as well as on African positions.-. The Zimbabwe liberation movement viewed it as vital, former ZAPU politicians recall, that the GDR vowed to continue its full support no matter how the Lancaster House negotiations turned out. This was especially important as Africa, and notably some of the Front Line states, were bringing pressure to bear on the Zimababwe liberation organisations to agree to a compromise at Lancaster House. Otherwise, the\ were warning the PF, it "ould lose its support fiom these states."-" The GDR took a critical vie\N of the Lancaster House Agreement, signed on 2 1 December 1979. An information paper fiom the SED CC International Relations Department to the PolitbureaLl stated that the PF had been recognised as a legitimate political and military factor and that it was involved in the ongoing process for the resolution of the Rhodesian problem, but that Great Britain had come nearer to its aim to enforce imperialist interests on essential matters. Recalling the highly problematic provisions for the transition period pending independence, the risk of election rigging and the bias in favour of Muzorewa, a political stooge, the paper spoke of the danger of' a "neo-colonialist solution" to Rhodesian problem vith similarly negative effects in the region. Against this background, unity Of the PF was crucial, the authors concluded. They noted with great

Special Flights to Southern A/ficat disappointment that ZAPU and ZANU had registered separately for the election campaign."' Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union \\ hich had urged Nkomio and Mugabe in late December 197) to establish unity,' the GDR made another effort to persuade ZANU and ZAPU to join forces in the elections. In a political move which appeared as relatively massive for the GDR and which underlined its commitment to Zimbabwe's cause, ambassadors conveyed oral messages from Honecker to the presidents of Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and to the PF co-presidents. The tenor of these messages was emphasis on the need to maintain and strengthen the unit, of the PF to enable the progressive forces in Zimbabwe to succeed."' GDR diplomacy also went into action in an attempt to minimise the disad'vantaged position of ZAPU and ZANU in the electoral preparations in Zimbabwe and to offset the advantageous situation for the Muzorewa party. In late JanIu.MrN carl) February 1980. shortly after being elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council lbr a two-) ear period, the GDR became involved in preparations for a session of the Council which African countries had demanded to consider the situation in Rhodesia and to create the necessary prerequisites for truly free and fair elections in that country. When the session was held, Great Britain came under heavy attack since the prevailing situation in Rhodesia, with a continued deployment of South African troops, violence committed by Rhodesian security forces and obstructions for the PF was seen as jeopardising the planned elections. The permanent representative of the GDR to the UN, Peter Florin addressed the Council session on 3 1 January 1980. 1Ii line with the position of African states, he demanded "'unsvwerving compliance with agreements entered into; the neutralisation of the army and auxiliary forces of the former regime in Rhodesia, the immediate and unconditional \N ithdrawal of South African troops and all other foreign mercenaries; the elimination of the influence of the former machiner of power; the ending of the emergency and martial law situations; the liberation of all political detainees and the return of refugees."'3 A few weeks later, Florin was elected to the Council presidency for the month of February. In informal consultations of Council members, he threw his weight behind the demand by African states that a monitoring group of the UN secretary assembly be sent to Rhodesia.'' There can be no doubt that sustained international pressure at the time ensured that the elections

Zinihbbwe: A specicl chapter in the GDR's .1fica policy were finally held under acceptable, though not easy conditions. ZANU was the clear winner of the elections gaining 57 out of the 80 contested seats of the House of Assembly - an outcome that had not been expected in the GDR. The "patriotic forces", in GDR parlance, had achieved an overwhelming victory, but it was ZANU rather than the GDR-backed ZAPU gaining disappointing 20 seats which was returned with a majority of seats. On its front page, the daily Neues Deutschland published the text of congratulatory telegrams frorn Honecker to Mugabe and Nkomo. The paper's headline "Erich Honecker congratulates Patriotic Front leaders" showed the old wishful thinking about unity of the PF, out of touch with reality. In the telegram to its leader, ZANU, the election winner, was not even mentioned, and the ADN news agency spoke of a forthcoming Patriotic Front Government.2t5 The decision about sending these state telegrams and about the political shadings of their wording were taken at the highest level, not in the foreign ministry. Political tact and sensitivity were totally lacking in phrasing the text. Zimbabwe's independence after a long and fierce struggle was, of course, sincerely welcomed in the GDR. Over many years, people had displayed solidarity in a diversity of forms to achieve this end, and hence it was so much more hurtful to see that officials of their own country were not present at the independence celebrations in Salisbury. That was a harsh defeat for the GDR's foreign policy, especially as the Federal Republic of Germany, whose policy towards the white minority regime in Rhodesia was frequently criticised by African states,-l had a delegation with foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher present at the official ceremonies. Attempts by the GDR to enter into diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe were initially unsuccessful. Mozambique, which had long pleaded with Eastern bloc countries to assist ZANU, now advised Zimbabwe to establish fully fledged governmental relations with the GDR. During his visit to the GDR in September 1980, the Mozambican president offered a mediation initiative,17 and in October foreign minister Chissano's personal intervention ensured its success. After Chissano had talked with Simon Muzenda, Zimbabwe's foreign minister during the UN general assembly session in New York, Edison Shihiruru, a member of the Zimbabwe delegation at the UN session contacted H.G. Schleicher, at the time of the GDR delegation to the UN Security Council. The Zimbabwean representative suggested that direct negotiations on diplomatic relations should immediately be undertaken in Salisbury or Berlin. With obvious relief, this proposal was

Special Fli his to Southern .-Iiica 139 expeditiously brought to the attention ofGDR foreign minister Oskar Fischer shortly before his departure from New York. Not much later, H-Ionecker had deputy foreign minister Bernhard Neugebauer sent to Salisbury as his special envoy. Neugebauer held talks with Zimbabwean officials from 28 October to I November. Neugebauer met Mugabe on 30 October 1980 and handed over Honecker's personal message on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Following a detailed exchange of views Mugabe expressed his opinion that diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and GDR are to the advantage of both sides and should be established immediately. It was agreed that an agreement should be concluded accordingly.'2 After the talks Neugebauer had with Mugabe officials of the foreign ministry suggested that in addition to this a protocol not to be publicised should be signed containing some basic principles. Chiefly it was to state that neither the GDR Government nor SED continued any relations with ZAPU. Neugebauer insisted that such a protocol was not in correspondence with his talks with Mugabe nor with the normal practice in relations between states nor with the mandate of his delegation. But the G DR diplomat had to swallow this bitter pill. Agreed Minutes were signed on 31 October 1980 where the GDR accepted and recognised the Mugabe Government without any qualifications or reservations, confirmed the closure of the ZAPU office in Berlin as from 17 April 1980, and declared that it would not enter into agreements or arrangements with any party, in Zimbabwe without the consent of its Government..2 " Finally on I November 1980 the agreement on establishing diplomatic relations was signed.20 Epilogue: The new beginning The GDR was honestly interested in good relations with the independent Zimbabwe and with the Mugabe Government. Factors which had a bearing on this interest were Zimbabwe's political prestige in the Third World, the active and constructive part it would expectedly play on the international scene, its comparatively developed economy and, finally, the tradition of the GDR's solidarity with the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The GDR leadership viewed Zimbabwe as an important political partner that would support its own politics of peace and dialogue, but also in the persisting global competition between the two sociopolitical systems. They trusted that commercial dealings with a country which was fairly potent compared with others in Africa would help to improve the GDR's import

Zimn/hcbwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Aifrica polic, Robert Mugahbe with GDR Finance Minister Ernst llOfner and Ambassador H1unsGeorg Schleicher at the Bulawaio Trade Fuir. and export situation and thus to keep its ailing economy afloat. The independent Zimbabwe, the GDR's foreign policy experts thought, could reasonably be expected to have an interest in relations with the G DR, once bad feelings about the neglect of ZANU during the liberation struggle were forgotten. Ideological principles which guided its foreign policy, such as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-racism and socialism 22, were very close to the ones the GDR subscribed to. Besides, the GDR was heavily engaged in the region, chiefly in Mozambique, a close friend of Zimbabwe's, whose viability was of great concern to Zimbabwe. In the context of diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe, the GDR Council of Ministers laid down a package of measures, including the rapid installation of an embassy and accreditation of an ambassador, to underline its interest in a swift development of the new relationship. A delegation of experts was to explore the practical possibilities and opportunities, and an all-embracing concept needed to be worked out.'22 The embassy started working in December 1980, initially with diplomatic personnel who had not been

Special Flights to Southern A/rica 141 involved in anv of the dealings with the liberation movement and, consequently, had not worked with ZAPU. Official contact with ZAPU was largely avoided, all the more so as relations between ZANLJ and ZAPU in Zimbabwe were soon deteriorating. In the tbllowing two years, a number ol'governmental agreements were concluded to provide the groundwork for more developed relationships. They concerned mutual trade, cooperation in sciences and technology, the arts and cultural exchanges, air service links and the media. Of particular importance from the GDR's perspective was an inter-party agreement signed between the SED and ZANU in 1981. This agreement provided, amongst other things, for the continued enrolment of Zimbabwean cadres at the SED's regional party school in Dresden. Foreign minister Oskar Fischer visited Zimbabwe in May 1982. The breakthrough and high point in bilateral ties between the two countries occurred in 1983, when Robert Mugabe paid a state visit to the GDR (24-27 May). It was much appreciated that the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe called the GDR a reliable friend and ally and found words to break the spell which had long influenced relations. 'The material assistance,' he said to his hosts, 'which you extended during the anti- colonialist struggle, no matter through which channels, was your sincere contribution to the struggle which the people of Zimbabwe fought for their liberation.'-223 This acknowledgement integrated the GDR's extensive aid for ZAPU during the liberation struggle with the newly established country-to-country relations. Serious difficulties from the past, it was believed in the GDR, were now over. But in fact, ZANU's negative experiences with the GDR's nonresponsive attitude in the past proved to be a long-lasting burden. Offlicials in Zimbabwe continued to have reservations, and there was no sweeping movement towards closer relations across the board. Yet Mugabe's visit sparked off some major positive developments. A joint GDR- Zimbabwe economic commission started working in the same year. Zimbabwe opened an embassy in Berlin in 1984, and cooperation extended to cover additional areas. Political contacts and consultations at relatively high levels were important events. In the 1980s with the escalation of the arms race, the GDR viewed dialogue on the fundamental issues of ensuring peace worldwide as imperative. In this perspective, Zimbabwe was a particularly important partner, as a Front Line state in southern Africa, as host of the NAM summit in 1986 and entrusted with the chairmanship of

Zimhbbwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Aftica polic'y t oundation o/ the Zi,,hbbithe-G)R Jrien7dshIJ assocluton in Harare on 2- September 1984. From le/f: Dun Ahivuti. S 'dnev Sekeruanayi, lbbo Alundaua, Hans-Georg Schleicher, Nelson MWujo. the NA M. A draft treaty of friendship between the two states was submitted by the GDR ambassador, but was not earnestly followed up by either side. A journey by Honecker to southern Africa, tentatively envisaged for 1984, also included a visit to Zimbabwe. The journey was postponed, and finally dropped because foreign policy priorities centred mainly in Europe. On the GDR's African agenda, Zimbabwe ranked right after Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique at the top. However, the GDR exercised restraint over a rapid socialist-oriented transition in Zimbabwe. not least because of the aforementioned countries' negative experience. Its policy-makers were aware of the limited scope for the Mugabe Government to combine socialist visions with the reality of an economy functioning on a capitalist pattern, the stability of which was thought essential for a successful development of the country. Whenever asked for advice, GDR officials cautioned against hasty steps along the above-mentioned lines. Schleicher remembers having received respective instructions before his depart,,re to Harare in 1983 to

Special Flights to Souther'n Afi'icu take up his assignment as the GDR ambassador to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's importance and value for the G DR was reflected in efforts to develop a wide range of bilateral ties. In addition to relations at party level, many institutions like trade unions, women's and youth associations, farmers' unions, and journalists' and writers' organisations established or expanded mutual contact. A Zimbabwe-GDR friendship society was founded in Harare in 1984. In most cases relations at this non-governmental level included the exchange of delegations and informations, scholarships and limited material assistance offered by the GDR institutions to their respective Zimbabwean partners. These ties had to compensate for the lack of projects of economic cooperation. In the economic field the crisis in the GDR economy set narrow limits to the development of cooperation. Trade, mostly in the form of barter, climbed from Z$0.77 million in 1982 (equivalent to 0. 1 per cent of Zimbabwe's exports and 0.0 per cent of its imports) to Z$63.3 million (2.8 per cent of Zimbabwe's exports and 0.9 per cent of its imports) in 1986, but then dropped markedly and subsequently became stagnated.224 The GDR conducted no major development projects in Zimbabwe, apart from its involvement in erecting a vocational training centre at Mashayamombe, where a friendship brigade of the GDR's youth organisation, Free German Youth (FDJ), worked successfully. This was explicitly confirmed by the former senior Minister of Political Affairs Didymus Mutasa.22 As other economic development aid projects were extremely difficult to implement on account of low capacity in the GDR, cooperation on culture and the academic disciplines became a mainstay of bilateral relations. Military relations developed, encompassing the training of Zimbabweans in the GDR as well as the delivery of arms and equipment and the accreditation of a GDR military attach, to Zimbabwe, but without gaining major importance. When ZANU and ZAPU united on 22 December 1987, people in the GDR reacted with joy and relief. Decision makers, foreign policy experts and a large public were seeing the fulfilment of their long-cherished hope for unity between the "patriotic forces" as a guarantee for the successful development of an independent Zimbabwe. They thought that now both sides had really every reason to cite "traditional relations of long standing". From the GDR's point of view, relations betweeen the two countries developed to increasing overall satisfaction in the 1980s. Although there was a lack of economic cooperation, efforts in many other fields were diverse.

Zimbabwe: A special chapter i the GDR " Africa policy I n the context of its ardent campaigning for peace, disarmament and detente during the 1980s, the GDR came to regard Zimbabwe as an important partner, credited with an active policy and prestigious position in Africa and within the NAM. Zimbabwe's former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nathan Sharnuyarira has confirmed that close cooperation existed between Zimbabwe and the GDR in international activities for disarmament and ddtente. He also recalled that the two countries shared common ideological and political principles on decolonisation and anti-imperialism, and highly commended the GDR's active stance. But he also noted that the development of bilateral relations in the economic, and to some extent even in the political field, had not been satisfactory. He mentioned two factors hampering a more prosperous relationship between the two countries: the GDR's attitude towards ZANU prior to independence, which led to a continued personal distrust of I lonecker in the Zimbabwean government, and the GDR's subordination to the Soviet Union and its policies."', Obviously, views on the quality of relations between the GDR and Zimbabwe were not the same in East Berlin as in Harare. True, the GDR's foreign policy experts would not forget the embarrassing situation they faced when Zimbabwe achieved independence, nonetheless, they believed that the development of bilateral relations with Zimbabwe was a success story, at least from 1982/83 onwards. The picture is somewhat different, however, if looked at in a longer perspective, from the early 1960s, when the GDR started out on its commitmlent to the Zirnbabwean liberation struggle, through the peak of support in the late 1970s, the heyday of the GDR's involvement in Africa. In fact, that evolution seemed to hold out promises for an East German commitment in a future independent Zimbabwe similar to its political and economic input in countries like Mozambique and Angola. But a few years later, when Harare and East Berlin had established official diplomatic ties and Mugabe's visit to the GDR lent a fresh impulse to the new relationship, the GDR's involvement in Africa as a whole was already receding. The GDR no longer had the economic potential to offer the same assistance to Zimbabwe's national effort as it previously had to neighbouring Mozambique. Nevertheless, cooperation in the fields of politics, culture, education and training de,,eloped throughout the 1980s, but limited due to the GDR's strained economy. Seen from this angle. the GDR's perception that ties betveen the two countries were rather successful appeared plausible. Working at the 6 DR's embassy in Zimbabwe for a span of five \ ears. from I983 to I988, the authors themselves shared that sense of

Special Flights to Southern Africa satisfaction about a relationship which they were anxious to advance and witnessed as progressing. Notes I SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, Transport minister's report to SED Politburcau member Guenter Mittag, 6 Jun. 1979. 2 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, telegram from the embassy in Lusaka, 23 Apr. 1979. 1 SAPMO BArch DY 30/.J IV 2/3 A-3344, decision by the SED CC Secretariat, 25 Jul. 1979. Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, internal memo from the SED CC's international relations department to the transport and communications department. 25 May 1978. Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3163, decision by the SED CC Secretariat, 27 Jun. 1978. -3 Cf. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/.11V2/2 A-2124, decision olthe Poliiiburcau. 12 Dec 1977: Information Lamberz" visit to Libya. "SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, memo, dated 5 Feb. 1979, from Egon Winkelmann. head of the CC International Relations Department, to Honecker, informing him that verifications had confirmed the flights would be sale. Winkelmann proposed to start the airlift although a written accord about its financing by Libya was still outstanding. while oral commitments by Libyan authorities had been given. lie informed that interflung calculated costs of 142 million mark including 677 000 in hard currency. When the airlift ended. Libya had still not paid. and whether they ever did could not be verified. SCl'. SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627. Henke's letter to Arndt. 2 Mar. 1979. 'SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, report about the accident, annexed to Henke's letter to the head of the CC transport and communications department, 6 Apr. 1979 Berichi zur Katcistropie mit den Lu/i/ithr-eug dier Inter/lug vom 7Yp IL 18, Reg., Nr. DM-STL am 26.3.1979. " SAPMO BArch. DY 30/J IV I/5, letter Nkomo's to Honecker dated 28 March 1979. ND, 27 Mar., 6 Apr. 1979. "Interview with Dabengwa on 8 Nov. 1995. For the Turning Point Strategy, see i. Brickhill: Daring to Storm the leavensThe Military Strategy of ZA PU 1976 to 1979, inN. BhebelT Ranger (eds.) Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, vol. one, Harare 1995, p. 48ff. 12 Interview w ith Brickhill on 17 Nov. 1995. Cf. Also It. ElIert: The Rhodesian

146 Zilmbab we: A special chapter in the GDR's A/rica policy Front War. Counter-isirgencs v and guerilla ivar in Rhodesia 1962-1980, Gweru 1993. P.80. Ellerk wvrites that Western intelligence reports about military preparations of the liberation movements for a final battle caused worries in Salisbury. Intelligence advisers and military commanders recommended that Smith goes along with the British proposals for ending war. " MIAA/A 14353, State of relations report for Jul.-Sept.. dated 14 Oct. 1960. by the Foreign Ministry's 4th extra-European division (AEA). dealing with African affairs. 'he report contains no clue about to whonm Nkomo's letter was addressed. The newI established SolidaritN Committee budgeted for the planned visit in September (SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV/2/55. project paper for the Solidarity Fund board of trustees, 15 Jun. 1900J). " Later on. after external intervention against this name which might have been seen as diplomatic recognition for the GDR. the designation "Plenipotentiary ..., for the head of the mission was changed to become "Representative...'. For consistency in this publication, we have seen fit to use the original designation "Plenipotentiary'. From 1963 the -'Committee of the GDR for Solidarity %kith the African Peoples" was called "'Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee", and then from 1973 "Solidarity Committee of the GDR". Cf. MfAA/A 14190. file notes, 15 Dec. 1960. "Cf. ibid.. file notes. 5 Jan. 1961. " Cf SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.401. draft report, dated 29 Mar. 1961. on the proceedings of the conference. Cf'. Probleme des .Veokolonialismnus utinddie Politik der beiden de utschen .S'tuten gegenueber dem nationalen Befreiwzgs1wnp/ der I "oelke,. (East) lBerl in. 1961 (Minutes of the conference, held 5-8 April 1961). 1' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/2/20/55, estimate/out-turn account b\ 31 Dec. 1961. 1.056 marks au'e specified as costs for the 5.0t00 pamphlets. 2" Cf MfAA/A 14190. state of relations report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA. dated 21 May 1962. 'he trainee was Mutizwa Tazian-a, the propaganda officer at the NDP office in Cairo. (2)Cf. BArch. P DZ/8 0767-660, minutes, dated 29 .ul. 1961. of the SolidaritN Committee Secretariat session on 26 Jul. 1961. (2)rhe National Council of the National Front was a body \where all political parties and mass organisations were represented. The Solidarity Committee %NiLs initially a branch of the National Council. but became an organisation in its own right in 1965. 2 , Cf. BArch. P1 D/ 8/7420-660. Prof Correns" letter to Nkomo, dated 16 Sept. 1961 (in German). lHe sent similar letters to MPLA president Mario de Andrade (17 Sept.), UNIP president Kenneth Kaunda (18 Sept.). Uganda People's Party president Milton Obote and Sheikh Ali Muhsin Barwani, leader of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.

Special Flights to Southern Africa 2- BArch, P DZ 8/7420-660, Brasch's letter to Nkomo. dated II Sept. 1961 (in German). Brasch also wrote to, amongst others, M. de Andrade (MPLA), AAPSO secretary-general Yussuf Sebai, Mzwai Piliso (ANC), and George T. Silundika (N DP). ->See chapter on the GDR's relations with the South African liberation movement. 2, SAPN4O BArch DY 30/IV/2/20/415, annual report 1961. dated 10 Dec. 1961. The aailable copy gives no definite clue about its authorship. In all probability, it has been Nritten in the Foreign Ministry. 27 Cf. MfAA/A 14190. letter from the Office of the GDR Government's Plenipotentiary in Cairo to the Foreign Ministry's 4th ALA on developments in 1961/62. dated 23 Aug. 1982. This perception was based on repeated postponements, and the final cancellation, of a visit by Malianga or other senior NDIP officials to the GDR. Karl-Heinz Kern, head ofsection in 4th ALA. had noted earlier 'Regrettably. we have received wvord of such cancellations from Southern Rhodesian politicians more than once, and it seems necessary ... to explore the reasons. Our Iirst tentative conclusion is that this reflects a certain reservation, if not lack of willingness, about developing closer relations with us." (Cf. MfAA/A 14190, Kern's letter to the Office of the Plenipotentiary, dated 28 Feb. 1962). 29 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV/2/20/415. The analysis Is the 67-page paper "Foederation von Rhodesien und Ajassalanf' and the document containing conclusions out of this analysis "'Schhusjolgeruwlgen JUer cdic Entwicklung der Be-_iehuningen zu den demokraiischen Organisationen der Foederation Rhodesien und Njassaland ". -" Ibid.. Foederation von Rhodesien und Njassaland, p. 65, A" ibid, Sch/tss/olgerungen .p. 6. Ibid., p. 2. .2 Cf. Foederation von Rhodesien und Njassaland p. 631". Ibid.. p.66. 14 Cf. Schludfolgerungen .... S. 10. Emphasis on trade union relations at that time included posting social attach,s to a number of GDR missions in Africa in early 1961, such as Horst Koehler's assignment to the GDR Plenipotentiary's Oflice in Cairo. These social attach.s, nominated by the FDGB, were guided by the FDGB National Executive and the Foreign Ministry. but placed under the latter's administrative authority. Their function consisted in establishing and maintaining relations with trade unions and other societal organisations in their area of influence (Cf. MfAA/A 17214, paper for submission to the SED CC Scretariat, 8 .an. 1961). 13 Ibid., p. 10. -" Cf. ibid., p. I1. Solidarity Committee assistance with vocational training did however not attain noteworthy dimensions until 1964. ' BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, directive for Edward Ndlovu's visit, without date. - BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, concluding report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th

Zimbabwe: A special chapter i7 the GDR 's Africa policy AEA, dated 5 Dec. 1962. The value of this first major supply wvas planned to be 70.000 marks (Cf. MfAA/A 15038. Report, dated 17 Nov. 1962, on the review session at the National Council on 8 Nov. 1962). " BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662. Ndlovu's letter to the Solidarity Committee. 28 Dec. 1962. "' Cf' SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989, report, dated 5 Feb. 1963. by the FDGB National Executive's international relations department on the delegation's visit. Most probably Albert Ndinah was the lirst Zimbabwean to attend a course at the trade union college in Bernau (1963-64) before he underwent vocational training in a print shop. Ndindah became (1978) the first official representative of ZAPU in the (iDR. He described his first impression of GDR in DDR...DDR... rufen die Trommeln. edited by Hochschule der Gewerkschaften Bernau. Fakultaet fier das Auslaenderstudium. 1964. p.9f. " Cf SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, file notes by the FDGB National Executive's international relations department, 26 Jan. 1965. "' SAPMO BArch NY 4182/1326, report by the delegation, annex 4notes about a conversation with Nkomo. 4Cf. ibid. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/1 12. appraisal of the Solidarity Committee's work and relations, 2 Dec. 1963. " Barch, P DZ/8 0767-660, plan of the Solidarity Committee lbr the work in 1964. undated. 4, MfAA/A 15038, paperAppraisal of the split in the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, 19 Oct. 1963. 41 Cf ibid. 4X Cf. ibid. " Cf. K. Somerville: The Soviet Union and Zimbabwe: The Liberation Struggle and after. in: C.R. Nation/M. V. Kauppi (Eds.): The Soviet Impact in .-ljrica, Lexington/ Mass.. Toronto 1984, p. 2 16. "' Interview with Shamuyarira on 8 Nov. 1995. On the other hand Guenter Sieber. the last head of the SED CC International Relations Department. stresses the complexity of the problem. To his knowledge SED experts on Chinese affairs had conducted intensive and discriminative studies of China's development and its international relations throughout the years, enabling the GDR in the early 1980s to normalize relations with the People's Republic very quickly and successfully. (interview with Sieber on 8 Oct. 1995). In its official policy. however, unequivocal support for the leading power, the Soviet Union, and disapproval of China's policy remained dominant until the early 1980s. " Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/1, Vertraulicher Bericht ueber den Stand der Diskussionen zu den Fragen der Einheit und Geschlossenheit der kommunistischen Bewegung in den einelnen Bruderparteien, dated 22 Apr. 1963.

Special Flights to Southern Ajrica (Confidential report on the state of discussions within individual fraternal parties on questions bearing on the unity and coherence of the communist movement). - Ibid. . AAPSO had invited the GDR Solidarity Committee and other European socialist countries' Committees to attend. as observers, its 3rd Conterence in FebruarN 1963, held in Moshi. I'anganyika. In September 1964. the GDR Committee was the first Eastern European country (except the USSR) to open a liaison office at AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat in Cairo. In 1965. the 4th AAPSO Conference in Winneba, Ghana. finally decided to grant observer status to Solidarity Committees of the Eastern European countries, including the GDR, overriding fierce opposition from the Chinese delegation. " BArch, P DZ 8/0767-660, Eggebrecht's report about the 6th session of AAPSO's Executive Committee in Nicosia, 10-12 Sept. 1963. The All-Chinese Trade Union Federation submitted to FDGB a statement (14 Aug. 1963) on the nuclear test ban denouncing the treaty. FDGB sent a copy of its answer to the Chinese statement (25 Sept. 1963) also to ATUC. (Cf. SAPMO-BArch. DY 34/ 7304, letter to ATUC dated 28 Oct. 1963) 13 SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/1 13, paperReview of work from autumn 1965 to autumn 1966, and projections for 1967. 1" Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/0449-662, work plan of the Solidarity Committee for the year 1964. .1 Cf. MfAA/A 15038, Wolfgang Schuessler's letter from the Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo to the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 26 Jan. 1964. " Cf. MfAAIA 15038, paper, dated 25 Nov. 1964, by 4th AEA on issues concerning the liberation movement, which mentions that following Mutasa's requests, smaller supplies were being planned, and that ZANU had solicited assistance in terms of training. arms and finance for travel, which had not been provided by then. 59 Cr. MfAA/A 15038. Mataure's letter to Eggebrecht. 28 Sept. The mopeds probably belonged to the Solidarity Committee's consignment referred to in the talks between Brasch and Nkomo in December 1963, where customs clearance by Dar es Salaam authorities posed so much difliculty. "" Cf. MfAA/A 15038. Lessing's letter to the Plenipotentiarys Office, 28 Oct. 1963. (.1 Cf MfAA/A 15038, Schuessler's letter to 4th AEA, 31 Oct. 1963. 62 Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, Mtambanengwe's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 18 Nov. 1965. 63. Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, file notes by the FDGB's international relations department. 24 Mar. 1966. It is not known who invited Mtambanengwe. 1-1 BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, Chitepo's letter, 4 Apr. 1966. 6 - Cf. ibid. Eggebrecht, who was stationed at the Solidarity Committee's liaison

Zibin hh we: A special chapter in the GDR's Ajica policy office in Cairo and visited Berlin during April 1966. noted his suggestion on Chitepo's letter. " (T. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/1 13. Cf. footnote 55. 0, Ibid. "' The 5th AAPSO conrlirence..scheduled to be held in 1967, convened in Cairo as late as 1972. "' This conference was originally planned to bejointly convened by ZENTRAAL and the Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Ha\,ing launched the idea for the conference, the Soviet partner withdrew its co-sponsorship for tactical reasons, much to the surprise of the GDR side (Cf' SAPMO BArch DY 30,JIV A2/ 20/798, information about the 2nd session of the preparatory committee on 2 Feb. 1968). 7'Sumnniay oJ Proceedings o. the Scientific Conference "'Against Racism and NeoColonialism. Jbr the Liberation of Southern Ajrica" in Berlin, 22-25 .'iar 1968. (East) Berlin 1968. " SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/! 14, notes on a conversation with Dzasochov. 16 May 1968. 72 Cf Commentai ,. The Khartoum Conterence, in: Sechaba 3/1969, p.3. The representatives of the six organisations at the conterence vere Robert Resha (ANC). Eduardo Mondlane (FRELIMO). Agostinho Neto (MPLA). Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC), (SWAPO). and Stephen Nkomo (ZAPI). " Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989, notes on a con'ersation between Chikerema and Fritsch. 22 Mar. 1964. In Zanzibar. the GDR maintained its tirst and only embassy in Africa at that time. A number of GDR advisers, including some from the Ministry of State Security, served the local authorities. I'he head of' the GDR intelligence service. Markus Wolf. himselftravelled to the island in 1964. Cf. M. Wolf. Geheinmisse der- russischen Kueche. Hamburg 1995. pp. 44ff14 Cf. MfAA/A 15038. Lessing's letter to Fritsch, 2 April 1964. " MfAA/A 15038, file notes, 13 May and 23 Sept. 1963: letter friom the 4th AEA to the Plenipotentiary's Office. 3 Oct. 1963. ', M IAA/A, unprocessed classilied documents in VVS- Archiv I L 214. letter from the Plenipotentiar% 's Office to the 4th AEA, 31 Oct. 1963. 77 BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662. report on Moxo's visit. 7K Interviews with Dabengwa (8 Nov. 1995). Brickhill (17 Nov. 1995). and Simon K. Moyo (13 Nov. 1995). 7, Cf' BArch. 1- DZ 8/7412-660, Eggebrecht's notes, Nov. 1964. Ni Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/796, Notes b, Schuessler. SED CC international relations department, 20 Jul. 1964. X1 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989. report about Eggebrecht's talks \\ ith ZAPU executives in Lusaka on 27 Oct. 1964. Eggebrecht represented the GDR Solidarity Committee at the Zambian independence celebrations.

Special Flights to Southern Africa Supplying a radio transmitter was a seriously debated question at the Solidarity Committee in 1965. w ith prelference for a possible joint project involving several socialist countries. Evidentl\. the idea did not materialise (Cf. SAINl() BArch DY 30/IV A2,'20/989. tile notes by Willi Zahibaum, GDR Solidarity Committee. 1965. concerning the procurement and commissioning of mobile radio transmitters for ZAPU). 9- SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/112, Eggebrecht's notes. 2 Feb. 1965. 14 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304. internal memo from the FDGB National Executi\ c's international relations department to secretary Beyreuther. 23 Feb. 1965. 85 Ctf. NIfAAi15038. report about Ndlo\u's visit. 15 Mar. 1965. At the time. ZAPU had five students in the GDR. plus six trainees wvho were to acquire skills in telecommuncation mechanics and the locksmith's and printer's trades. Statement of a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on [he negotiations between the British Go\ einenl and the prime minister of the sell-governing British colony of Rhodesia on Rhodesian independence, 14. Oct. 1965. inDokumente zur Au'enpolitk der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DAP) 1965. vol. XIII. (East) Berlin 1969. p. 751 r " Cf. ND. 24 Oct. 1965. " Cf. Telegram of GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer to OA I secretary-general Diallo Telli, inDAP 1965. vol. XIII, p. 514. " Cf. Statement of the GDR Government. 13 Nov. 1965, inibid.. p. 7521ff. Ibid.. p. 753. Statement of the GDR news agency. Ailgenteiner Deutscher NachrichtendiensI (ADN). on the severance of trade relations between the ()DR and Rhodesia, dated 21 Dec. 1965. inibid.. p. 754. 92 This sum indicates the value of the goods. Transport costs were estimated at 13.000 marks (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/0449-662. explanatory notes for the 1964 budget). ,. Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7412-660. proposal for the appropriation of funds, without date. '4 Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660. list of shipments from end of 1964 to end of 1965. The value of these shipments was 56.000 and 150,000 marks respectively. ' Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7412-660, discussions on 9 Dec. 1966 about further solidarity supplies. 96 SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304. telegramn 19 Nov. 1965. , Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304. FDGB's telegram to the (JDR General Consulate in Dar es Salaam. dated 23 Dez 1965. With this consignencnt FDGB reacted to aii urgent request from ZACLI for flnancial help after the oppression ol a strike in Bulavvayo. (Cf. SAPMO-BArch. DY 34/7304, ZACU's iclcgramme to FDGB dated 20 Nov. 1996). Due to the permanent shortage ol" convertible

Zinbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy currency FDG1B sent goods for sale instead reterring to a similar successfil practice in the cooperation with ANC and SACTU. " Cf' D. Dabengwa: ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation, in: N. Bhebe/'. Ranger (eds.)Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War (Volume One). University of Ilarare Publications, Harare 1995, p. 27. "' D. Martin/P. Johnson, The Struggle lot Zimbabwe. The Chimurenga War. Harare 1981. p. 9"1 I,,m, BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662. tile notes, dated 23 Jun. 1966. on Silundika's talks with Eggebrecht and a GDR Foreign Ministry official on 20 Jun. 1966. ill In coordination with the Soviet Union, the Solidarity Committee delegation to the solidarity conference of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples (Tricontinenta) in Havana was to oppose what was seen as leftist-radical influences manifest in an overemphasis of armed struggle. According to the delegation's appraisal, efforts to this end were not successful enough. its preformulated passages on peaceful co-existence fora final declaration were sacriticed in order to accommodate the Chinese and ensure the unanimity of the conference (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/I 13. report of the Solidarity Committee's observer delegation to the Ist Solidarity Conference of the African. Asian and Latin American peoples in Havana from 3 to 12 Jan. 1 966. dated 14 Jan. 1966. "'I SAPMO BArch DY 30/.J IV 2/2/1093, decision by the SED Polithureau. 10 Jan. 1967: Lieferung nicht-iviler Gueter an nationale BeJreiuibgsbewegitgen in. lIika. "' In the run-up to their visit, the Cubans had enquired whether the GDR was training guerillas or supplying arms to liberation movements, which the SED leadership still denied before the delegation \vas received. See. H.-G./I. Schleicher Waffen fuer den Sueden Afrikas. Die DDR und der bewat'ffete Belreiungskampf. inU. van der Heyden/ .-G. and I. Schleicher (ed.)Engagiert fuer Afi'ika. Die DDR und Afrika, vol. 11. Muenster/Hamburg 1994. p. 12f* 104 SAPMO BArch DY 30/I IV 2/2 A-1200. decision by the SED Politbureau. 10 Jan. 1967Foreign Ministry's draft. " Cf* ibid. "' Ibid. '7 Cf. chapter I: Solidaritv in di/ficult limes: The GDR and the South African liberation movement in the 1960s. I,,, Cf ND. 22 and 29 Aug. 1967. " Cf' ND. 8 Mar. 1968. "" Cf. telegram, dated 14 Mar. 1968, by GDR deputy foreign minister Dr. Wolfgang Kiesewetter to UN secretary-general U Thant to protest against the murder of African patriots in Southern Rhodesia (German text), in DAP 1968. vol. XVI/I. (East) Berlin 1971. p. 418f. "l Cf* SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, circular to all UN member states, dated 16 Aug. 1968.

Specicd Flights to Southern Ajica 153 1-2 The letter was printed in Sechaba 4/1969. p. 1I. ,' Cf.BArch, 11 DZ 8/7326- 662. letter from Eggebrecht to Erich Stange. his successor at the Solidarity Committee's liaison office in Cairo, 22 Oct. 1968. '" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989. letter fi'om the GDR ConsulateGeneral in Dar es Salaam to the Foreign Ministry's African all'airs division, 19 Nov. 1968. " BArch. 1P DZ 8/7307-662. file notes on a conversation with Silundika at the Solidarity Committee on 21 Oct. 1969. 1 ". Cf. SAP)MO BARrch DY 30/IV A2/20/115. plan of solidarity supplies 1969. W'J Included were combat suits. shawls, 420 shirts, 500 pairs of gym shoes, 1.500 blankets, and loudspeakers, worth 107,000 marks altogether (CT 3Arch. P DZ 8/ 7307-662. list. dated 17 Oct. 1969, of supplies to ZAPU made in 1969). ' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A200.7304, Ndlovu's letter dated 29 Oct. 1967. " Cf SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, Ndlovu's dated 21 Nov. 1967. The attached list contains, amongst other things. coats, combat suits, sleeping bags. and army rations for 800 men. Further items requested were inflatible dinghies, bicycles, motorbikes, cars and agricultural implements. I2N, SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, letter from FDGI3 to Ndlovu. undated copy. In a letter, dated 21 Aug. 1968. Ndlovu informed the FDGB that ZACU received the 1967 delivery as late as around the middle o" 1968. and the announced 1968 delivery in August the same year. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304). 121 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304. Ethan Dube's letter dated I Apr. 1969. 22 SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, Ndlovu's letter to the FDGB, dated 15 Sept. 1969. 123 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, letters from the FDGB to ZACU, dated 7 Jul. and 2 Dec. 1970. 121 In a statement the Solidarity Committee protested against the 20 June 1969 referendum (Cf. ND. 21 Jun. 1969). After the constitution was adopted in November 1969, the Republic of Rhodesia was proclaimed in March 1970. The GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on the proclamation of the Republic of Rhodesia by the Smith minority regime, 4 Mar. 1970, in DAP 1970 vol. XVIII/I. (East) Berlin 1972, p.459). ". Lusaka W1/antfesto on Southern Africa. Joint .Statement bY Thi'e'fl Governments. Apr. 1969. inC. Legum/i. Drysdale (eds.). Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents 1969-1970 (vol. 2). London 1969, p. C 4111 12" BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes, dated 26 Apr. 1969, by vice-consul Mueller on talks on 17 Apr. 1969 with Chikerema, accompanied by Parirenyatwa and Dube. 127Ctf S. Nd o vu: Zim bawe: Somejacts about its liberation struggle. sin. loc., 1973, p. 49ff. 129 Cf. Barch. P DZ 8/7307-662, file noteson a conversation with Chikeremaon 14

Zimbabwe:. A special chapter in the GDR's Af'ica policy Sept. 1970. 12,, Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes on a conversation with Ndlovu on 23 Oct. 1970. 1311 This figure is taken fi'om material by Solidaritaetsdienst-international e.V. (SODI), Berlin. In a letter dated 25 Sept. 1970 Jason Moyo had requested the Solidarity Committee to provide fbod, dress, topographic aids, and medicines lor 450 men, plus inflatible dinghies and other items (Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662). Apparently, the GI)R did not respond to the request. ' Interview with former ZAPU official George Kahari on 8 Nov. 1995. 132 Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7310-662. report. dated 4 Jun. 1971. on Schmidt'sjourneN to Tanzania and to Zambia ( 1-23 May 1971 ). 1-, BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, notes, dated 4 Oct. 1968. on a conversation between Ndlovu and Eggebrecht on 30 Sept. 1968. ' Cl., e.g., telegram, dated 17 Nov. 1970, from GDR foreign ministerOtto Winzer to UN Security Council president George Tomeh. concerning the Council's debate of the question of Southern Rhodesia, in DAP 1970. vol. XVIII/2, (Last) Berlin 1972, p. 984f: telegram, dated 29 Nov. 197 1. from foreign minister Winzer to OAU secretary-general Diallo Telli. inDAP 1971, vol. XIX/I, (East) Berlin 1974, p. 6271: and, after publication of the Pearce Commissions report in .une 1972telegram. dated 21 Jun. 1972. from foreign minister Winzer to UN Security Council president Lazar Moisow. inDAl' 1972. vol. XX/2, (East) Berlin 1975. p. 0 I t '" Cf' BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662. appraisal. dated 31 Aug. 1972. ol' the results of, talks with ZAPI's delegation; report, dated 27 .lul. 1972. on the second conversation with ZAIU's delegation. "" According to figures in SODI records. Cf'. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, speaking notes for talks with ZAPU's delegation on II Feb. 1975. Cf. Also Barch. DZ 8/7024-661, various orders and lists of deliveries of the Solidarity Committee. "' BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662. Material Request submitted to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR (no date, probably 1973). '., Ibid. Signed by F. Ndlovu and submitted probably in July 1972. '" Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes dated 13 Mar. 1974 '4' Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662. file notes dated 24 Nov. 1972, 15 Feb. 1973. 42 BArch. 1) DZ 8/7307-662, notes on tile conversation. 13 lulv 1973. The Ioint Military Command (.IMC) was a lose ZAPUI-ZANU unit), arrangement which came into being as a result 01 a meeting with the OAU Liberation Committee in Mbeya (Tanzania) in 1967. Under the influence of a number of Alrican states it was agreed that ZAPU and ZANU would field their soldiers under the JMC and a joint military leadership \ ould implement the agreement. ZAPU, however was opposed to unity at this stage and was very reluctant to implement the JMC. (Cf.

Special Flights to Southern Africa 1). DabengwaZlPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National libcr tllion. p. 29f.). i' Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, notes on the discussion. 19 Sept. 1974. 14 Since 1973, oil the occasion of Africa Freedom Day in May. tile (DR Solidarity Committee had been supplying solidaritN goods to the ()AL Liberation Committee annually for distribution to liberation movements. From the 1973 consignment. the 0AU Committee provided ZANU with two cases of uniform textiles and three cases of food. This is indicated in a letter from Ma jor Mbita, the Liberation Committee's executive secretary, to the GDR ambassador in Dar es Salaam, dated 17 .lu. 1973 (Cf BArch, P DZ/8 7327-662). '' Cf. U. Engel The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Zimbabwe (1980-92), Flamburg 1994, p. 57. 14,The authors were involved from early 1974 in making the local arrangements for the opening of the embassy and stayed on till early 1977. ' Such \as the argument which Peter Florin, permanent representative of the GDR to the UN, used in his lirst speech in the SCcurity Council debate on South Africa. (See Florin's statement inDAP 1974. vol. XXII/2. (East) Berlin 1978. p. 642ff ) In the discussions about defining the term 'aggression, GDR diplomats emphasised the right of peoples to fight against colonial domination and apartheid as part of self-defence, and stated that support for this ight was consistent with provisions of the UN Charter. (See statement of GDR representative Gunter Goerner in the Sixth Committee during the 29th session of the UN General Assembly, 4 Dec. 1974. inibid., p. 970.). Taking the floor in the debate in the First Committee during the 30th session of the General Assembly, on agenda item - Implementation of the Declaration on the strengthening of international security", Florin said "'Eliminating sources of conflict by means of political settlements on the basis of the UN Charter and with due regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN remains a top-priority task to strengthen international security. ... On this occasion I wish to reaffirm the GDR's position that eftbrts to eliminate colonialist and racist terror in southern Africa have a dual objective to give effect to human rights and to strengthen international security. Peaceful coexistence is in fact impossible with a regime which constantly and grossly violates the UN Charter and demonstratively disregards resolutions adopted by the organisation. Easing the situation in South Africa means supporting the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia so that they can free themselves from colonialist repression and build their own peaceful nations." (Quoted in German inDAP 1975, vol. XXIII, (East) Berlin 1979, p. 1026.). "I The ANC led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa had been founded in 1971 and worked legally in Zimbabwe. From late 1974 it united the different liberation organisations under its umbrella. By founding the Zimbabwe Liberation Council in September

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy 1975, Ndabaningi Sithole split the ANC. In late September Joshua Nkomo took over as the president of the ANC, while Muzorewa formed the United African National Council. The ANC as the liberation organisations' united firont fell apart: ZAPU retained the name for some time. '", Cf. BArch. P )DZ 8/7307-662. Peters Sebald's report oil the visit, 18 Feb. 1975. '3o Cf. BArch, P )DZ 8/7307-662. Eggebrecht's notes on the talks with the ZAPU delegation, dated 20 Feb. 1975. ' ' Mwenje No 2: ZANU P'olitical Programme. Ist August 1972, p. 6. 1.-G. Schleicher remembers discussions upon the issue among the Africa-experts in the Foreign Ministry. "S2 Cf. Zimbabwe African People 's Union (ZAP(,). Ideological Concept. Lusaka ( 1971 ). This concept has been further discussed and replaced by The Ideological Programme of the Zimbabwe African People s Union (ZAPU), Lusaka, Nov 1978. This programme was probably printed in the GDR (Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7336-662. The Programme of the Zimbabwe Airican People (" Union, manuscript) as \%ell as the ideological concept before. This assumption is supported by the layout of' the printed documents which is identical with the one used for other brochures printed in the GDR for liberation movements. ' ' Cf. fbotnote 150. ' 4 While in prison at Que Que in Southern Rhodesia. Sithole was suspended from his functions as ZANU president by a majority of other imprisoned ZANU Central Committee members on I November 1974. In December 1974. a group in ZANU led by Thomas Nhari revolted in Zambia against the ZANLA supreme command. The incident claimed over 60 lives, and the revolt was savagely quelled. On 18 March 1975. a car bomb in Lusaka killed Herbert Chitepo. national chairman and leader of ZANU's organisation in exile. An international commission appointed by Zambia to investigate blamed forces inside ZANU for the killing. and a number of ZANLA commanders were arrested. The issue has remained highly controversial, and there are many indications that the Rhodesian secret service was responsible. The Zimbabwe People's Arm)' (ZIPA) had emerged in 1975. from ZANLA and ZIPRA forces, but was soon reduced to ZANLA lighters and. not without support from some of the Front Line states, temporarily acted as a third fbrce in the clashes inside the Zimbabwe liberation movement, unwilling to yield to the authorit of the established political leaderships. This led to a crisis in ZANU. which was surmounted in January 1977. A number of ZIPA leaders were detained in Mozambique. For problems of ZAN(J's internal development, see D. Martin/P.Johnson The .trugglefbr Zimbabwe chaps. 9-12. The devolopment of ZIPA is described by D. Moore: The Zimbabwe People's Arm 'r: Strategic Innovation or more of the Same?. in: N. Bhebe/T. Ranger Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation war, p. 7311'.. see also D.

Special Flights to Southern Africa l)abeng%%a: ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War ol'National Liberation. ibid.. p. 331, 55' This plan drafted by US-Secretary ol' State Henry Kissinger and discussed with the British. Vorster and Smith but not with the liberation movements aimed at the installation of an interim government and majority rule within two years, Great Britain was to enact legislation enabling the transition to majority rule. Kissinger's initiative was doomed to fail since the tint-line states were not sufficiently informed but was then soon taken up by the British Foreign Secretary. Anthony Crosland. Iie persuaded the British Cabinet to convene the Geneva Conference. (For details see S. NzombeNegotiations %kith the British. inC. S. Banana (ed.): Turmoil and Tenacity. Zimbabwe 1890-1990, Harare 1989. p. 17011. "" Cf. BArch, 1' DZ 8/7336-662. report on the delegation's visit, dated 21 Dec. 1976. " ND. 26 Jan. 1977. Iit Cf. ,eue Berliner Ilustrierte 16/1977, 18/1977 and 21 / 1977. 1"5 SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2053, decision of the SED Politbureau dated 15 Mar. 1977 Report on the ZAPU delegation's visit from 7 to I I March 1977. ""' Cf. ibid.Conclusions. ", Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7336-662. information paper. dated 30 May 1977, about Nkomo's unofficial visit from I I to 28 May 1977. 1,2 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 22620. The course lasted until June 1978. Nkomo and Joseph Msika visited these students, too. Similar courses were held in 1978/79 and 1979/80 for identical numbers of students.(Cf. SAPMO BArch DY/ 30 vorl. SED 22621. Internal memo from the CC's international relations department to the propaganda department. 5 Oct. 1979). After Zimbabwe had gained independence, from 1982/83 up to 1989/90, these scholarships were taken over by ZANU. 163 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV B/2/20/68, information paper from the CC's International Relations Department to the Politbureau. 18 Oct. 1977. 114 Interview with Dabengwa on 8 Nov. 1995. Cf Also BstU. MfS-Abt. X 93.p. 000054 " Interview with Moyo on 13 Nov. 1995. "" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3103, decision of the SED CC Secretariat. 22 Feb. 1978. See also chapter 3, p.... table 2. 1,.7 Cf BArch. P DZ 8/7307-662, Stein's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 25 Apr. 1977. "', Besides the one on 20 Ian.. one flight each on 3 Apr., 25 May. I I and 12 Oct.. and two in November (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662. letters from Solidarity Committee secretary-general Kurt Krueger to Nkomo. dated 4 Apr.. 24 May, 10 Oct., Nov 1977.). I't' SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2087, decision of the SED Politbureau on 21 June 1977 Report on the talks of the delegation with with John L. N komo and other

Zimbabwe." A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy ZAPU officials in Lusaka on 24 Junc. Larnberz suggested also to send a ship with solidarity goods. Whether the vessel was sent or not could not be verified yet. 170 Interview with Brickhill on 17 Nov. 1995. "I' Aftera first dell\ er) of aid in early February. more followed on 16 Mar., 6 Aug., 30 Oct.. 21 Nov., and 12 Dec. 1978 (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7336-662. letters from Solidarity Committee secretary-general Kurt Krueger to Nkomo, dated 5 Feb.. 15 Mar.. 5 Aug.. 29 Oct., 21 Nov., 11 Dec. 1978). "I Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/i IV 2/2 A-2216. decision of the SED Politbureau. 27 Feb, 1979. An aid supply for Zimbabwean refugees was transmitted to ZAP!J in Lusaka on 18 .an. More consignments follow later in tile year on1 9 Mar.. 15 Aug., 4 Sept.. 28 Dec. (Cf' BArch. P DZ 8/73336-662, letters from Krueger to Nkomo in 1979.) ' Cf'. SAI'MO BArch DY 30.1 IV 2/3 A-3266. decision of the SED 'olitbureau, 19 Feb. 1979. ' This follows from Hoffmann's memo to Honecker. dated 18. Jun. 1979 (Cf. BArch MA AZN Strb. 32638). "" Cf: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J/JIV2/20/166, report of the CC's international department to the Politibureau dated 2 July 1979. '17 Interview with Msika on 3 Nov. 1995. , Interviews with Msika on 3 Nov. 1995 and Dabengwa on 8 Nov. 1995. 1 7.b Cf' SAPMO-BArch. DY 30/J/.IIV/20/166, notes on talks between Flonecker and Nkomo on 19 June 1979. The speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrej Grornyko at a meeting with his Warsaw Pact colleagues in MaN 1979 clearly indicates how much the Soviet Union felt being pressurized in this question. Gromyko stated that also in future the liberation movements are to be supported by all means. lie felt that this was a matter o' principle \ hich could not be compromised and he did not see an. alternative to this policy. (Cf SAPMOBarch, DY 30/IV B2/20/1 56, shorthand notes of Gromyko's speech). According to CPSU official Boris Ponomarev the re-organisation of ZIPRA and also of SWAPO's military training programmes. (Cf SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/./I V2/201/ 1353, protocol of the meeting of the secretaries for international relations and for the communist parties of COMECON in Budapest Feb./March 1978) ' Cf BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, assessment of the embassy in Lusaka dated 27 Jan 1977. ' Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7336-662. notes. dated 12 Oct. 1978, by Guenter Mauersberger. GDR ambassador to Ethiopia. on a conversation with Atwell Bokwe on II Oct. 1978. Judging by its text, the undated paper from ZANLA headquarters seems not to have been written before late 1976. most likely in 1977. In a chapter on "Global (East-West) Detente" meaning detente "between bet\\een lirces of imperialism and socialism" this exercise isjudged as " - An un-Marxist attempt, to make progress and reaction co-exist pcacefull,, under

Special Flights to Southern AfHica the pretext that revolutionary wars destroy the achievemennts olfmankind in science and technolog) (nagniticient cities, large dais and bridges). Typical of revisionist tendencies \vho are atiaid of war and turn liberal, overlooking the catastrophic effects of imperialism. - Advocating an impossible peaceful passage from capitalism to socialism". (p. 1 The paper also challenges a "Soviet formulated 'USSR Operation I Zero Hour.' \\ hich was aimed "to crush ZANLA and seize political power". (p. 5). (Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7336-662, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), ZANLA Headquarters Chimoio. Chitepo College Detente and United Front). '7, Cf. G.M. Winrow: TheJoreignpolc/ o'the GDR in A/i'ica. Cambridge etc. 1990, p. 192f. "'" Inter% iex " ith .ohannes Vogel, ex-GDR ambassador to Mozambique, on 15 Dec. 1993. "I' Lamberz' remark was recalled by Dr. Llisabeth Quart, ex-GI)R charg. d'al'faircs in the Congo (Brazzaville) in an interview on 8 Oct. 1995. ' Mugabc indicated this in an interview with ,leunc Afriquc. 1977 (858). 17 Jun. 1977. This interview was noticed in the Foreign Ministry with great interest and translated into German. (I.-G. Schleicher, personal working papers). I)2, Cf. SAPMO- BArch. DY 30/1V 1320/159. information paper of the GDR Embassy in Moscow on the Soviet policy in Africa dated 20 Nov. 1978. W"- Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 301/J IV 2/202-584, information papers, dated 6, 12 and 15 Feb. 1979; supplementary information, dated 12 Feb. 1979. ' rhe Soviet delegation was received by Nyerere on 30 .an., b\ Kaunda on 2 Feb. and by Machel on 5 Feb. 1979. " Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/.1 IV 2/202-584. footnotc 183. 'x, Cf. ibid., information papers dated 6 and 15 Feb. 1979. 'x' Cf ibid., information paper dated 15 Feb. 1979. IKN Ibid. file notes dated 12 Feb. 1979. Ibid.. supplementary information paper dated 12 Feb. 1979. Cf ibid. f' ibid.,file notes. 12 Feb. 1979. - Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2214, decision of the Politbureau dated 27 Feb. 1979 (Short-hand minutes of the official talks between Ilonecker and Kaunda). ZAPU's and ZANU's contribution towards the armed struggle is still a controversially debated issue. Whereas D. Martin/P..Johnson in Zimbabwe in the Struggle gave all the credit to ZANLA and none to ZIPRA, Walter Kamba. ViceChancellor of the Harare University. insisted at an international conference on Zimbabwe's War of'Liberation (held at the university on .luly 8-12. 1991 ) that time has corme to look at both. First results to approach historical truth through .joint effort have been achieved at this conference as the contributions" show. They are included in N. Bhebe/T. Ranger (eds.)Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation Wtar. Vol. One, larare 1995 and Sociely in Zimbabwe's Liberatlion f ar, Vol. If, I lararc 1995,

Zimbabwe: A special chapter in the GDR's Africa policy "I The notes about the conversation on 21 Feb. record Honecker as follows "In Mozambique we are going to see Samora Machel and Oliver Tambo. We are not bent on talks with Mugabe. but an opportunity for that could nonetheless arise. In any talks we will not forget the views of Comrade Nkomo and will express our opinion frankly." (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2216. decision of the Politbureau dated 27 Feb. 1979). 1,,4 (' ' SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2'2 A-2216. decision of the Politbureau dated 27 Feb. 1979. ile notes on Axen's talks with Mugabe on 24 Feb. 1979. , Cf. ibid. 'u" The relevant passage in the Joint Declaration was worded in very general terms. Cf. ND. 22 Feb. 1979. ",,7 SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2214, decision of the Politbureau dated 27 Feb. 1979. annex 4. 1"1 Cf. ibid 'r' Interview %% ith Shamuyarira on 8 Nov. 1995. -11 See footnote 193. 2,,1 H.G. Schleicher, then head of section in the Foreign Ministry's East and Central Africa division, was present at the talks. 2,,2 H.-G. Schleicher took part in these consultations in Moscow. 2 Cf. SAPM() BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/30. Analyse der Politik des hnperialismus in.Lfrica. 27 Jul. 1979. 104 Cf. DAP 1979. vol. XXVII/l. (East) Berlin 1984. p. 456. 201. Ibid. p. 456f. (German original). 2 "' Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/166, information paper for the Politbureau No. 99/1979. 2,07 Interview with Kern on I I Apr. 1995. 17, Interview with a former GDR intelligence officer on 20 Oct. 1996. 209 Interview with Moyo on 13 Nov. 1995. The PF negotiaters had some fundamental differences with the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in the final phase of negotiatiations on the ceasefire. Only after the frontline presidents analysed the situation on 1 7 Dec. PF accepted the latest British ceasefire proposals 'Well aware of the shortfalls of the settlement". (quoted inS. Nzombe: Negotiations iwith the British. p. 189). 24", On 15 Dec. 1979 agreements on a ne%% constitution. arrangements for the transitional period preceding independence and a ceaselire agreement were concluded and signed on 2 1 Dec. For more details about the negotiation process and the stand of the parties concerned see S. Nzonbe Negotiations with the British. p. 181 IfT. 21,1 Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/I IV 2,.20/125. information paper for the Politbureau. dated 28 .lan. 1980: Zur Einschaetzung der Ergebnisse der Londoner Konferenz zu Simbab we und zu den Konsequenzen fier dos 1Iirken der Patriotischen Front (Appraisal of the results of the London conference on Zimbabwe. and of the consequences for the operation of the Patriotic Front).

Special Flights to Southern .4fica 21" CC SAPMO BArch DY 30/.1 IV 2/202-584. deliberations of the Soviet leadership on the Rhodesian problem as transmitted to the PF leaders, Nkomo and Mugabe. were brought to Honecker's notice on 29 Dec. 1979. See footnote 2 10. -1 Quoted from Against Racism. Aliirtheic and Colonialism, /)ocuments published bv the GDR 19"-4 982, (East) Berlin 1982, p. 351 f. 214 H.-G. Schleicher was involved in these activities as a member of" the (iDR delegation in the Security Council. 2" Cf. ND. 6 Mar. 1980. 21" Cf. R. Weiss: Der Rhodesien-KonJliki. die Polintk der Irontstaaten und die Haltang der Bundesrepublik in: I1. Bley/R. Tetzlaff (eds.), Ari/ka and BonnL'trsaeutnisse und Zwaenge deutscher Afrika-Poitik, I lamburg 1978. p. 122. West German support for ZANU came only from Konmunisiischer Bund 11'estdeutschland (KBW) which assisted the liberation organisation materially to a considerable extent. KWB's ties with ZANU were met with suspicion from the side of the West German authorities, its support for ZANU's armed struggle was rejected by the Foreign Affice. (Cf. ibid., p. 143.). ZANU highly appreciated the KBW's solidarity as IVIutasa and Shainuy'arira conhirm (Interviews on 10 and 4 Nov 1995). In the final phase of the liberation struggle. Otto-Brennecke-Stiftung. a foundation. financed a greater number of traineeships for ZANU and ZAPIJ. 217Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2-1859, decision of the Politbureau on 30 Sept. 1980, report on Machel's visit 17-20 Sept. 1980. -1%, Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/i IV 2/2 A-2364. decision of the SED Politbureau dated 25 Nov. 1980. report about special envoy Neugebauer's negotiations. -'1" Cf. ibid.. annex 41'ereinburte Niederschrili der Republik Simbabwe und der DDR, dated 31 Oct. 1980. It can be assumed that due to the previously intensive relations between GDR and ZAPU the formal closure of the office did not mean that all relations had ceased to exist overnight from 17th to the 18th April, Zimbabwe's Independence Day. A large number of ZAPU cadres receiving training were still in GDR and it was necessary to find new ways to cater for them as citizens of Zimbabwe. ., Cf. 218. annex IAbkommen :ivischen der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Regierung der Republik Sintbabwe ueber die Hrstellung diplomatischer Beziehungen und den A ustausch von Botscha/liern. 121 Cf. U. EngelThe Foreign Policy, loc.prim. cit.. p. 62ff. 222 Cf footnote 218, .Schlucijolerwigeniuer das weitere fl'orgehengegenaeber der Republik Simbabwe. 221 Cf. ND, 25 May 1983. The quotation is re-translated from the German as published. 224 Cf. Statistical Yearbook ofZimbabive 1989. Central Statistical Oflice Harare. p. 2091". 221 Interview with Mutasa on 10 Nov. 1995. 22'-" Interviews with Shamuyarira on 4 and 6 Nov. 1995.

PART THREE Namibia Traditions of solidarity Schwarz und Weiss am Waterberg, written by Maximilian Scheer and published in 1952, was the first book which confronted readers in the GDR with an inglorious chapter of German history: the colonial conquest of African territory which was subsequently called German South-West Africa.' The writer shed light on the economic and political interests of the German Empire in the vast expanses between the Oranje and Cunene rivers. He described the fierce resistance which the indigenous peoples mounted against their colonial subjugation, and recalled how German colonial troops quenched their uprisings. In the years that followed, researchers in the GDR dealing with this part of German history compiled documentations which supported the cause of the Namibian independence movement. Horst Drechsler wrote his Suedwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, which became a standard work on the uprising of the Herero and Nama.2 In Imperial Germany, the genocidal campaign against the Herero people was an issue of heated political controversy. Politicians in the bourgeois Zentrum party called for a more moderate colonial policy, but the only serious opponents of colonialism were social democrats around August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht and Ernst Ledebour. They spoke out against the colonial conquests, in keeping with the motto of the labour movement that a people which suppresses others cannot be free itself. But they could not hold out against the overwhelming chauvinistic propaganda of the powers-that-be and the nationalistic frenzy which had seized most Germans. The anti-colonial posture of Bebel's Social Democracy was duly mirrored in the GDR's perception of history and, indeed, an acknowledged tradition in its foreign policy. In 1960, the internationally hailed year of African emancipation, Walter Ulbricht as head of state declared before an audience of foreign diplomats that the GDR's awareness of this historical tradition meant a rupture with the policy of the German Reich and that the GDR's foreign policy was also fundamentally different from that of the Federal Republic of Germany. 'The German Democratic Republic,' he said, 'follows a different tradition of the German people vis-a-vis countries and peoples which are languishing under colonial repression and waging a struggle for their national liberation

Namihia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO - the tradition of the German working class and of German humanists, who always despised and fought against colonial oppression and exploitation; who always defended the sacred right for oppressed peoples to live in freedom and human dignity, the right for all peoples to live happly in independent nation- states.'" A critical comment needs to be made here, however, It was obvious that GDR leadership claimed all anti-colonial, anti-racialist and humanistic aspirations in German history as a progressive heritage for the republic in East Germany exclusively and exploited them as one of the pillars supporting its legitimacy. The fact of the matter is that the GDR came into existence as a result of the Second World War and the subsequent division of Germany; it was not legitimated by a people exercising democratic self-determination, which would have been a true criterion for the claim of its leaders. The continued denial of civic rights to the East Germans was ultimately one of the causes for the GDR's decline and fall. At the same time, however, anybody who lived there and subscribed to its philosophy remembers that many of its citizens who worked in societal organisations or governmental institutions, enterprises or local bodies made personal contributions to the country's solidarity with the struggle of colonially oppressed peoples, in the spirit of August Bebel and the internationalist traditions of the German working-class movement. Independent of this tradition, but probably not entirely free of its influences, the churches in the GDR in the 1 960s also recognised the needs of peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin-America in their anti-colonial and antiracial emancipation movement. They provided valuable assistance in many places, including Namibia. What inspired them was the legacy of the Confessing Church of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a theologian who had actively resisted Nazism and made the supreme sacrifice. The GDR's attitude towards the German minority in Namibia was rather reserved - not only because many of them held passports of the Federal Republic of Germany. For the most part, the Germans in Namibia were opposed to the efforts of the African majority to shake off colonialist and racist oppression; even fascist leanings were (and still are) discernible.' An obvious disinclination of the German-speaking minority to accept the "wind of change" which was blowing with increasing strength throughout Africa, on the one hand, and prejudices in the GDR which were ideological and political on account of its rivalry with the Federal Republic, on the other, combined to produce a totally undifferentiating judgement in the

Special Flights to Southern Africa GDR about the Germans in Namibia, which persisted for a long time. Another factor in that perception were the very limited opportunities for contact. In the early 1960s, as part of a general effort to communicate with Germans living abroad, the GDR tried to make contact in Namibia - with very little success, however.5 At an early stage of development, the GDR supported "the legitimate insistence of the national liberation movement in Namibia on full independence and national self-determination for the people of the territory", as foreign policy statements used to say in those days, and regarded all "attempts of the apartheid regime in South Africa at annexation of the territory as aggressive acts which must be foiled with every means available"." The GDR supported the UN in its desire to discharge its special responsibility for decolonisation in Namibia and an end to illegal South African rule over the territory. By the same token, the GDR protested when the International Court of Justice at The Hague in July 1966 failed to pass judgement on the substance of the case submitted by Liberia and Ethiopia on behalf of the African states, notably their charge that South Africa, with its policies of apartheid, had been violating its Mandate obligations for the territory.7 Four years later, after the International Court's advisory opinion of 21 June 1971, GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer hailed that the responsibility of the UN for Namibia had been reaffirmed.' When we try to review the GDR's motives in this regard, it appears that the solidarity it effectively extended to the Namibian liberation movement and its persistent declarations about the differing positions of the two German states also served to canvas international recognition for itself and to break through the Western diplomatic blockade, especially in Africa. Another compelling reason for the GDR to act in this way, which seems even more important for our appraisal, was that liberation movements: and a growing number of independent African states expected the GDR to support them. And although nobody in the GDR ever avowed a special responsibility for Namibia because of Germany's colonial role in old times, it seems justifiable to assume a latent influence of this historical factor on policy makers in the GDR. The liberation movement, for its part, always attached particular importance to relations with the GDR because of German involvement in imperial days and the considerable influence which the German- speaking minority was still wielding in Namibia.9 As early as 1960, the newly founded Solidarity Committee of the GDR succeeded in making contact with Namibian liberation movements the South

!66 Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU). Relations were initially more intensive with SWANU and its Chairman, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, who visited the GDR several times. The President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, paid his first visit to the GDR in January 1962 to conduct talks with Solidarity Committee officials. Both liberation organisations sent a limited number of members to the GDR for basic or advanced journalistic training at the school of the Association of Journalists (VDJ) and at newspaper editorial offices. The Free German Youth (FDJ) College at Bogensee near Berlin also included Namibians among its first African students.0 A typewriter and copies of SWAPO's programme printed in the GDR marked the modest beginning of material assistance for SWAPO." While the Solidarity Committee and other societal organisations were scaling down relations with SWANU as of 1963, with nothing but exchanges of information from the mid-1960s, links with SWAPO developed continuously, though not dramatically. In 1966 Nujoma visited the GDR for the second time. Other SWAPO officials also paid visits, for example, VicePresident Louis Nelengani, Secretary-General Jacob Kuhangua and Information Secretary Emil Appolus, in 1965. Peter Nanyemba. at the time SWAPO's representative in East Africa, and Solomon Mifima, responsible for trade union work, travelled to Berlin a year later. Similar visits took place in the years to follow. When the conflict with the apartheid regime exacerbated in the second half of the 1960s and SWAPO was in urgent need of greater international solidarity, assistance was forthcoming from the GDR Solidarity Committee. One event which caused a stir across the globe, including in the GDR, were court proceedings against Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, a co-founder of SWAPO, and other 34 Namibian patriots in Pretoria. The GDR Solidarity Committee protested to the Vorster Government against the trial and demanded the immediate release of the defendants, who had been sentenced to long-term imprisonment.2 While the trial was in progress, Foreign Minister Otto Winzer sent a telegram to the UN Secretaiy-General to demand cessation of the proceedings and to reaffirm the GDR's readiness to support any measures designed to put an end to South African control over Nambia. " A noticeable increase in the GDR's cooperation with SWAPO began in 1974/75, after changes in southern Africa in the wake of Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique. The GDR stepped up its involvement in the region as a whole, and SWAPO, forging ahead with its

Special Flights to Southern Africa 167 struggle for liberation in a much more propitious environment, was interested in a more intensive collaboration with foreign partners, including the GDR. The Namibian liberation movement and the legitimacy of its struggle gained increasing acknowledgement in the international fora. To counter South Africa's attempt at enforcing an "internal settlement" by encouraging and installing political forces which were to the apartheid regime's liking, a great majority of states in the UN General Assembly on 13 December 1974 adopted a resolution recognising SWAPO as "the authentic representative of the Namibian people",)4 After the international diplomatic blockade against the GDR was lifted and the two German states joined the UN in September 1973, the GDR had more room for political and diplomatic action to support the Namibian liberation movement. The GDR co-sponsored the aforementioned resolution of 13 December 1974." Intensified relations between the GDR and SWAPO since the mid-1970s are mirrored in the volume of material assistance provided to the liberation organisation by the Solidarity Committee. From 74 000 marks worth of supplies in 1973, it climbed to 487 00 marks in 1974 and over a million in 1975.16 Following consultations in October 1974 with a delegation led by Andreas Shipanga,6a SWAPO's Secretary for Information at the time, cooperation was initiated in a field where the Solidarity Committee had sufficient experience. The GDR undertook to print SWAPO's journal Namibia Toaqy, just like the ANC's Sechaba and ZAPU's Zimbabwe Review. In May 1975, SWAPO president Nujoma paid his third visit to the GDR. At the time SWAPO was confronted with increased South African attempts to isolate the organisation by means of political dialogue with independent African states. Part of this scheme were the Turnhalle Talks, which were to prepare the ground for an "internal settlement" of the Namibian question, without SWAPO's participation and with the obvious aim of perpetuating white minority rule in a modified form. To demonstrate its solidarity in this situation and in response to an urgent request from SWAPO, the GDR Solidarity Committee rushed a supply of blankets and medicines to Dar es Salaam."'7 SWAPO's cooperation with the GDR developed steadily, without major ups and downs, up to 1975. The decisive leap forward occurred in the context of international developments and initiatives after the UN Security Council had adopted its resolution 385 on 30 January 1976. Western countries were trying to work out a compromise solution for Namibia and to forestall any further expansion of the Eastern bloc's influence in southern

168 ONamibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO Africa. The substance, volume and forms of the GDR's relations with SWAPO were now greatly determined by this constellation. The GDR maintained its support for SWAPO unwaveringly through all the developmients over the Namibian issue and by that found itself in conformity with the majority of the UN member states. Its assistance included political and diplomatic support, notably in UN fora, solidarity supplies and the provision of experts for SWAPO camps; university scholarships and vocational training; education plus day-today care for Namibian boys and girls in the GDR; medical treatment of wounded and sick SWAPO members, and military and security support by training cadres and supplying equipment. The present chapter outlines the GDR's positions in relation to developments over the Namibian problem and deals with specific aspects of priority importance for its association with SWAPO. These concern primarily the structure, quantity and quality of material assistance and the life ofNamibians during their education, training or medical treatment in the GDR. To review party-to-party relations between the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and SWAPO, we shall take a closer look at their cooperation on political education and ideology and at the aim and content of the SED's counselling of SWAPO. The GDR's role in the run-up to Namibia's independence will conclude our analysis. In examining these priority aspects, we will be dealing with the methods, limits and results of the GDR's support for SWAPO. The exercise will also confront us with problems and contradictions within the GDR's society which had an impact on cooperation with SWAPO. Finally, the ultimate goal of our scrutiny shall be to consider the personal commitment of East Germans to solidarity with SWAPO, the fruits of which strike the visitor everywhere in Namibia today. The UN Namibia plan and GDR solidarity with SWAPO GDR and resolution 435: From reservations to support In resolution 385 adopted on 30 January 1976, the UN Security Council had unanimously condemned the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and called on the Government in Pretoria to create conditions for free and fair elections under UN supervision and control in Namibia.18 When South Africa devised the Turnhalle Talks to arrange for Namibia's independence with the help of congenial political forces, and the West Special Flights to Southern Afica proved reluctant to agree to decisive measures against South Africa, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on 20 December 1976 which recognised SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia" and reaffirmed the legitimacy of its struggle, including armed struggle. It called on UN member states to support SWAPO.", Like a majority of UN member states, the GDR had supported resolution 385 - but remained rather sceptical about whether or how the resolution could be implemented, and was clearly distrustful of subsequent attempts by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to steer South Africa round to a negotiation course. The GDR used the world organisation 20 to set forth its position on the Namibian issue and to attack Western efforts towards negotiations. Speaking in the Security Council on 16 October 1976, Peter Florin, GDR Deputy Foreign Minister and permanent representative to the UN, explained why the GDR was less inclined to support compromises on the implementation of resolution 385. He stated: If the Security Council decided on an immediate withdrawal of South Africa's colonial troops from Namibia and an immediate transfer of power to SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, with the proviso that otherwise all members ot the Security would forthwith sever all relations with Pretoria, political, economic and military, - in which I believe they would be followed by an overwhelming majority of UN member states - those ruling in South Africa would understand that the crucial moment has come. So far, all proposals to this effect have foundered on the attitude of certain states, which is indicative enough.2' If, he added, the regime in Pretoria and Western circles close to it now felt compelled to begin a political and diplomatic game, then this is due to the changed global relationship of forces and the successful struggle of the peoples of Africa, in particular the people of Namibia. Such a game could, however, not resolve the problem, he warned.2The GDR described Western diplomatic activities vis-a-vis South Africa and SWAPO as neo-colonialist manoeuvres, designed to give effect to resolution 385 while at the sarne time preventing the complete isolation of South Africa, securing Western influence on developments in the south of Africa and containing the gains of the Eastern bloc in the region.21 The Soviet Union and its allies were not alone in taking this view; many Third World countries shared it. Distrust in the Eastern bloc was heightened when the contact group of five Western members of the Security Council,

170 Namibia: The GDR 's solilarity wtith SW'APO France, Great Britain, United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada, initiated talks in April 1977 with the South African Government, emissaries of the Turnhalle Talks and representatives of SWAPO to sound out the chances for a negotiated settlement for Nam ibia based on resolution 385. Addressing the UN General Assembly in October 1977, Florin stated that contacts between the five Western members of the Security Council and the "quislings and puppets" of the Turnhalle conference in Namibia contravened resolutions adopted by the UN and the OAU. He supported SWAPO's insistence on an immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all South African forces from Namibia and spoke up against South Africa's annexation of Walvis Bay. He reproached the contact group for a policy of appeasement towards South Africa because the group had not taken a clear stance on Walvis Bay.24 In the light of developments in 1976/77, Florin defined the basic points of the GDR's position on the Namibian problem, which were maintained throughout subsequent years. He urged that all states which wanted to see Namibia's illegal occupation by South Africa ended and the right of the Nambian people to self- determination granted ought to: * recognise SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and break off all relations with forces opposing the people of Namibia and SWAPO; * reaffirm the right of the people of Namibia to wage their struggle for self- determination in any form and with every means until attaining complete independence, and afford SWAPO the support necessary for this struggle; * to take stringent coercive measures against the apartheid regime which is holding Narnibia under occupation in defiance of international law, tosupport imposition of a mandatory an-ns embargo and economic sanctions by the Security Council, and to contribute actively to a further isolation of South Africa; 0 reject any preconditions for achieving independence or its restriction, in particular any presumptions concerning the stationing of South African troops, the maintenance of military bases and the conducting of nuclear tests in the territory of Namibia; * ensure the attainment of genuine independence and true self determination for the people of Namibia by eliminating the influence of opposed forces, in particular South Africa's state apparatus and repressive machinery in Namibia, the propaganda instruments of the apartheid regime,

Special Flights to Southern Africa and neo-colonialist vested interests, economic and other, which are operating in Namibia, in conjunction with the apartheid regime, to defend Namibia's accession to independence as a single whole and with its territorial integrity strictly observed, by countering any attacks against these principles.-5 GDR diplomacy favoured giving the UN greater responsibility for resolving the Namibian issue since it saw a solution endangered by Western negotiating initiatives. Accordingly, Florin pleaded at the special session of the UN General Assembly on Namibia in April 1978 that the Council for Namibia, as the competent UN body, join with SWAPO in forming a transitional government which should immediately begin to organise free elections. In the meantime, Justice M. Steyn, South Africa's general administrator, had initiated a few reforms in Namibia, which, however, in no way modified the repression of the black majority. The contact group had continued separate talks with SWAPO, with which the South African Government refused to negotiate, with the Front Line states and South Africa. A key issue in negotiations was the withdrawal of South African troops pursuant to resolution 385. It became increasingly obvious that South Africa was trying to gain time to create an environment in Namibia in which an electoral victory of SWAPO would definitely be prevented.2" The West was exerting no discernible pressure on South Africa to oppose that intention. In this situation Florin asked how free elections in Namibia "at the racists' gunpoints" could really be, and once again criticised Western states for not wanting to put pressure on South Africa.27 How seriously Pretoria's willingness to negotiate could be taken was demonstrated by the attack by a South African force on SWAPO's refugee camp at Cassinga on 4 May 1978, which claimed many lives, including a great number of women and children. It was evidence of its sense of political responsibility when SWAPO remained ready to negotiate despite that savage provocation, and accepted the Western plan for independence in July 1978, whereas South Africa was pushing ahead with preparations for elections of its own, meant to impose its "internal settlement" in Namibia. The plan which the contact group submitted to the Security Council in late July 1978 provided the basis for resolution 435, which was adopted by the Council on 23 September that year. The plan envisaged UN-supervised elections in Namibia before the end of 1978, prior to independence, which were to be preceded by a reduction of South African troops in the territory.

172 Namibia.- The GDR 's solidaril, with SWAPO South African forces and SWAPO troops were to be concentrated in their bases, and South African police were to remain in Namibia for the transition period. Armed groups of a tribal make-up were to be demobilised. All Namibian political prisoners were to be released and Namibian refugees and exiles enabled to return. All discriminatory laws were to be abolished. The plan proposed special UN responsibility during the transition period, its presence being secured by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). A special representative for Namibia, appointed by the UN Secretary-General, was to ensure free and fair elections to a Namibian Constituent Assembly under the supervision and control of the UN. He was to work together with the Administrator-General appointed by South Africa to ensure the orderly transition to independence.8 Resolution 435 reaffirmed the aim to remove the illegal South African administration from Namibia and, with UN assistance, to transfer power to the people of Namibia, in conformity with resolution 385. It provided for free and fair elections under UN supervision and the establishment of UNTAG to support the Secretary-General's special representative. Preparations made by South Africa for an "internal" settlement of the Namibian question were declared null and void."' It was due to urgent pleas by African states that the Soviet Union, as the leading Eastern power, had refrained from vetoing resolution 435 in the Security Council, worked out through diplomatic channels by its Western rivals. The USSR and Czechoslovakia abstained in the vote. The GDR's reservations about the independence plan were aired by Florin in the General Assembly debate: Adopting resolution 435, the Security Council has decided on measures to supervise preparations for and the conduct of elections in Namibia. We share the justified doubts which several members of the Security Council have expressed about the effectiveness of those measures. It is hard to understand that, on the one hand, the continued presence of South African administration and South African armed forces is creating new, artificial obstacles on the path to Namibia's independence, while, on the other hand, a large contingent of UN forces and civil personnel is to be put in place to manage the concomitant dangers. Would not an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all troops, the police and the administrative machinery of the racists from Namibia offer the best guarantee for the elections to proceed smoothly? That would correspond with the content of the many resolutions adopted by the UN on this question. If, after decades of fruitless consideration of the Namibian question in

V_ N Special Flights to Southern Africa 173 the UN, there was now fresh momentum, then this was a result of the changed international alignment of forces and the rise of the African peoples and national liberation movements, the GDR diplomat said, before adding: In this new phase of eflfrts for Namibia's liberation, utmost vigilance is required. The more united the action by anti-imperialist, anti-racist forces, the less impressed they are by the n1anoeuvres of' NATO countries and South Africa. the more firmly they insist that the [IN employ all tie means at its disposal, the more swiftly a true settlcment of the Namibia problem will be achieved." This stand by the GDR on the conflict in Africa's south-west took little account of the delicate constellation of forces and interests in and around Namibia, and it negated the need for compromise among all the parties concerned, which was inevitable to move towards a political settlement. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial dominions and the emergence of people's republics with socialist leanings in Angola and Mozambique, and the upsurge in liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself had given rise to hopes in the Eastern bloc that the balance of forces in that African region could be upset, with strategic reverberations beyond. Their appraisal of developments in southern Africa was euphoric, with maximalist visions of the "world revolutionary process". So it was believed that the triumph of the Mozambiquan and Angolan liberation movements, FRELIMO and MPLA respectively achieved with assistance from the USSR, Cuba, the GDR and other socialist countries - in a fierce military conflict in the case of Angola - could be repeated in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Given this perception, compromise settlements in the south-west of Africa did not fit in with the strategic interests of the Eastern bloc, and Western negotiating initiatives on Namibia, and on Zimbabwe as well, therefore encountered little goodwill on the part of the USSR and its allies. Needless to dwell here on the fact that Western diplomatic activities naturally served their own countries' economic, political and military interests in a strategic sense. Often enough, these had been the subject of intense debate and sharp criticism in UN bodies. But the Soviet Union and its allies had, of course, additional, and in fact highly justified, reasons to be doubtful about the proposed compromise solutions. And so did many other UN member states. These doubts were due to the obvious intransigence of the apartheid regime. The South African Government was successfully playing the "bulwark against communism" card vis-A-vis the West. The West, anxious to safeguard its interests in the

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO region, resisted, but half-heartedly, South African schemes to torpedo the independence plan for Namibia. Defying resolution 435 South Africa held elections in Namibia in December 1978, only three month after it was adopted. During the negotiating process since 1977, the West's ambivalence towards the apartheid regime was coming under continued criticism from UN members, including the GDR. As its representative at the UN, Florin, put it, the negotiations had only given the racists time to undercut the relevant UN decisions, to instal neo-colonialist puppets and to step up their rule of terror against the Namibian people. One could not help thinking sometimes, he observed at the 33rd resumed session of the General Assembly on Namibia in May 1979, that many had apparently forgotten that South Africa was the occupier and SWAPO the representative of a repressed people. The concern of the NATO countries participating in the negotiations, he feared, was meant to try to mediate as neutrals and non-parties to the conflict than to rescue the profits of their monopolist corporations, preserving a sphere of imperialist influence and protecting the prerogatives of the white colonial ists. For Namibia to become free and independent, he urged that South Africa's withdrawal needed to be enforced by making use of the powers stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter." Supporting the call for comprehensive and binding sanctions and for strict observance of the arms embargo decided by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 was another central theme of the GDR's diplomatic activities. The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO and insistence on international sanctions to put pressure on South Africa were based on its policy principles of anti- colonialism, anti-racism and anti-imperialism. At the same time, its policies were a reaction to Western diplomatic efforts at implementing resolution 435, in point of fact a reflection of the heightened East-West rivalry in the south of Africa. Eastern bloc diplomacy had no negotiating concept of its own to be set against the West's initiatives, although the Soviet Union and its allies, on principle, endorsed a peaceful settlement of the conflict. They accepted resolution 435, yet with certain reservations. They thought any further-reaching compromise in South Africa's favour was an attempt at denying SWAPO the desired fruits of victory and, consequently, at blocking any chance for themselves to wield influence in a strategically vital region. Theo-Ben Gurirab, at the time SWAPO's secretary for international

Special Flights to Soithern Africa 175 relations and today Namibia's foreign minister, emphasised that SWAPO consulted with the GDR and other socialist countries on all important strategic and tactical questions connected with the negotiations with the West. SWAPO saw the role of the GDR and the other Eastern bloc countries not so much in direct participation in negotiations about a settlement of the conflict as in strenghtening SWAPO's negotiating position. In his conviction, the stand taken by the Eastern European states at tile UN helped SWAPO's legitimation. The liberation organisation could confidently join the negotiating game because it knew it had firm friends behind, who, like "watchdogs", were most critically following the Western diplomatic efforts and who, if need be, would support it in a renewed struggle.2 Before long, in January 1981, when the Geneva conference foundered because of South Africa's rejection of a cease-fire and a breakthrough towards implementing resolution 435 was blocked, the attitude of the Soviet Union and its allies towards that resolution changed. While the West dissociated itself from its own child, primarily on account of president Reagan's new African policy, the East withdrew its reservations about the UN-sponsored independence plan. For example, a joint communique, of the GDR Government and a UN Council for Namibia delegation, issued on 19 June 1991, recorded the GDR's agreement that resolution 435 was the only acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian issue." A pronouncement like this would have hardly been imaginable at the time when the resolution was adopted. The GDR Government officials also reaffirmed to the aforementioned delegation "its principled position of total support for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people, including armed struggle, for self- determination, freedom and independence, under the leadership of SWAPO which is the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people."" Through all the stages of the international debate about Namibia up to its independence, the GDR remained committed to its unreserved support for SWAPO, translating this policy into concrete action to the extent of its political and economic capabilities. Top-level decisions for the GDR's cooperation with SWAPO Against the background of international developments over the question of Namibia since the mid-1970s, the GDR as well as SWAPO had been seeking to intensify their collaboration. Contacts and discussions which SWAPO representatives had with East German diplomats in various African

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO countries, chiefly in Angola and Zambia, and at the GDR Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, as well as practical cooperation with the Solidarity Committee and other organisations gave rise to new ideas and preliminary arrangements for subsequent approval at the top level. The decisive upswing in the mutual relationship came as a result of the visit which SWA PO president Sam Nujoma paid to the GDR from 16 to 20 December 1977. The visit had actually been expected to take place in March, after Nujoma had inquired at the end of 1976 whether he could come together with a delegation and after the SED Central Committee had extended an invitation to SWAPO?.3 It seems that the delay was due to the initial activities of the . The GDR made careful preparations for the forthcoming talks with SWAPO. In their preliminary stage, plans already foresaw a meeting between Sam Nujoma and SED General Secretary and State Council Chairman Erich Honecker. " But prior to that, in June 1977, Nujoma met SED Politbureau member Werner Lamberz in Luanda, one of the stations in the latter's journey to several African countries. He informed him about the efforts of the Western contact group and the reservations which SWAPO was having, in particular about the contact group's ideas on the withdrawal of South African troops. It was feared the Western proposal would hollow out resolution 385. Nujoma asked for increased assistance for SWAPO by the GDR7 On 8 November 1977 Nujoma met President Kurt Seibt of the Solidarity Committee during a short stop over at Berlin-Schoenefeld airport to inform him about the state of the talks with the Western contact group. Besides, he took the opportunity to communicate requests for further assistance, in particular in terms of cadre training, health services, and supplies of badly needed foodstuffs, medicines and medical equipment. He said he was happy that the Narnibians who had been trained in the GDR were doing very well, politically and technically.8 The long-planned visit of a SWAPO delegation finally took place shortly afterwards, from 16 to 20 December 1977. In Nujoma's company were Ndjoze Uanivi, executive member, Kapuka Nauvala, Secretary for the President's Office, Dr. lyambo Indongo, Secretary for Health and Social Affairs; and Linekela Kalenga, Secretary for Education and Culture. The delegation met Erich Honecker as head of state and general secretary of the SED, Solidarity Committee president Kurt Seibt and foreign minister Oskar Fischer. The GDR team for the official negotiations was led by Politbureau member

Special Flights to Southern Africa Hermann Axen. The talks were focussed on developments over the Namibian question and on the strategy and tactics of SWAPO. Nujoma explained SWAPO's stand in the negotiations with the Western contact group, especially on the controversial issue of South African troop withdrawal and the status of Walvis Bay. In his view, SWAPO had gone to the limits of what it was able to concede when accepting the Western proposal to have UN forces stationed in Namibia for the period of transition to independence. He observed that these proposals also satisfied the interests of the white settlers in Namibia. Up to that time the negotiations had come to nought, but SWAPO, of course, remained willing to negotiate realistic and fair proposals, In view of the situation as it had emerged, Nujoma told his GDR counterparts that SWAPO considered the armed struggle, which might have to be waged over a longer period of time, as the principal means of challenging South Africa. SWAPO was increasingly combining this form of struggle with political work within Namibia, he added." In his reply Honecker replied he thought SWAPO was pursuing a wise policy under the given circumstances. Honecker further said sometime it was important to emphasise the political and diplomatic struggle, and, equally, to add the element of armed struggle if necessary." This remark showed that the GDR leadership recognised negotiations on a political settlement of the Namibian question as a reality which had to be accepted, even though it had definite reservations about "neo-colonialist manoeuvres" and was downright critical of the West's ambivalent posture. The GDR leaders respected SWAPO's participation in the negotiations and did not attempt to influence it to the contrary. The common view which both sides shared about the purposes the West was pursuing in its diplomatic activities was recorded in ajoint SED-SWAPO communiqu6: Both sides condemn the intrigues and manoeuvres engineered by international imperialism and its 'new strategy', all of which is designed to find neo-colonialist solutions to the problems of southern Africa, deceive the peoples of Zimbabwe, .Outh Africa and Natmibia and to preserve the existing relationship of forces in the region, %%ith power in the hands of a minority of white settlers.,' The SED supported SWAPO's demand that all South African troops and the illegal administration should be withdrawn from Namibia and all political prisoners be released, as prerequisites for a negotiated settlement. SED and SWAPO insisted on immediate and full implementation of all UN resolutions and decisions on Namibia by South Africa and all UN member

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO states.2 A rapid response was forthcoming to SWAPO's requests for assistance, which Nujoma had communicated in his talks with Axen and Seibt. State and party chief Honecker gave Nujoma definitive promises in the course of their conversation. These were subsequently endorsed by the Politbureau.3 The Politbureau's decision contained the following details: 9 It agreed to the installation of a SWAPO office with a staff of three, whose head should be accredited with the president of the Solidarity Committee. The cost of installing the office and for the Namibians' appartments, plus running expenses, should be borne by the Solidarity Committee; Concerning cooperation in the field of training and education, it was decided to admit a total of 200 SWAPO members, from whom 130 were to take up industrial training and 70 be enrolled for university studies.4 The ministry of education was instructed to organ ise German-language courses, and responsibility for subject- matter training or study was conferred upon the ministry of higher and technical education, the ministry of health and the State Secretariat for Vocational Training. Besides, the SED was ready to send three natural science teachers and two social science teachers to SWAPO-camps in Angola. The Solidarity Committee was to continue organising medical treatment for wounded SWAPO personnel in the GDR. And it was envisaged that a physician and an X-ray assistant be assigned to SWAPO health facilties in Angola - a new form of assistance by the GDR. Moreover, Honecker had promised equipment for two planned hospitals in southern Angola and medicines, medical appliances, first-aid kits and surgical cases:4 * Material support for SWAPO should be continued, in particular by supplying foodstuffs, clothing, textiles for women and children, and shoes;41 * Costs in GDR currency, incurred by training or education, accommodation and clothing for SWAPO cadres, should be borne by the Solidarity Committee, whereas the foreign currency for return tickets both for Namibian trainees and students and GDR specialists assigned to SWAPO was to be provided by the SED CC's department for financial administration and party-owned enterprises. The Politbureau's decision contained no answer to a request which Nujoma had conveyed to Honecker during their talks: the supply of arms and ammunition, which SWAPO needed for an anticipated intensification

Special Flights to Southern Africa of the armed struggle. Honecker had accepted the list and assured that it would be examined by the ministers for defence and state security, Heinz Hoffmann and Erich Mielke. He had instantly promised supplies of light arms.47 The SED and SWAPO also signed their first agreement ol inter-party cooperation in 1978 and 1979. Thus the SED established direct party relations with SWAPO, as it had before with the MPLA (1971), FRELIMO (1972), the ANC (1972) and ZAPU (1976). Scarcely a year later, Sam Nujona returned to the GDR from 13 October to 5 November 1978. He attended the inauguration of the SWAPO Office in Berlin and was present when SWAPO's first representative to the GDR, Obed Emvula, was accredited to the president of the GDR Solidarity Committee on 1-3 October. On 19 October, he once again had talks with Erich Honecker. In the meantime, the UN Security Council had adopted resolution 435, but the Western contact group was still unsuccessful in gaining South Africa's agreement to the envisaged negotiations on a settlement. Honecker told his visitor that he expected the five imperialist states to do everything in their power to prevent genuine independence both in Namibia and Zambia and enforce a neo-colonialist solution instead. In political dealings with imperialist states, he noted, it was important to be both flexible and firm on principles. Nujoma replied that SWAPO's aim in negotiations with members of the contact group had been to isolate South Africa at the UN and to have pressure exerted by the "five" on the regime. But it was now obvious, he added, that the West was not willing to put decisive pressure on South Africa. SWAPO was ready to compromise but not to commit national suicide. It rejected attempts by the contact group and South Africa at achieving an "internal" settlement with the installation of internationally presentable puppets in Narnibia. Faced with this situation, SWAPO would continue its armed struggle, despite outside pressure, he said. Nujoma requested that material assistance, including arms deliveries, be doubled, further places for industrial training and university study be provided, and GDR specialists and technicians be primed to go to Namibia after independence." In spite of South African resistance it still appeared probable at that moment that Namibia's independence would be achieved shortly, on the basis of resolution 435. The GDR leaders viewed developments from this perspective, notwithstanding their reservations about the Western contact group and its Namibia plan. Hence, they gave some thought to developing

180 Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO ties with an upcoming independent Namibia, hoping that their close rapport with SWAPO as an important political force in Namibia would lead to promising collaboration with a national government in Namibia. The GDR's interest in bilateral relations was due to Narnibia's political importance for future developments in the entire region, including South Africa itselt; and to the Namibian economic potential. Initial concepts for the GDR's political and economic cooperation with a free Namibia were developed in the first half of 1978. The foreign ministry and the ministry of foreign trade prepared a paper which the "Politbureau Commission for coordination of the GDR's economic, cultural and technoscientific relations with countries in Asia, Africa and the Arab region", called the "Mittag Commission" by insiders, discussed on I 1 October 1978.1' The fact that this Namibia paper came to the GDR's top economic executive for preliminiary decision - not to the Politbureau's Foreign Affairs Commission 11 which used to be the competent body till the early 1970s revealed the new predominance of economic interests in the GDR's overall African policy and its relations with Namibia, after these relations had been of exclusively political significance in the sense of solidarity a short while before. Anyhow, the paper was given final approval by the SED CC Secretariat on 3 January 1 979.11 The paper was drawn up at a time when the GDR's policy of intensive collaboration with Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, with their socialist leanings, and of massive assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa was expected to reach a new dimension. Closer economic ties with these friendly African states were to invigorate the GDR's ailing economy, too. Primarily it was considered essential to gain access to mineral raw materials and agricultural commodities with minimum foreign-currency inputs and to find markets for industrial plants, vehicles, machines and other East German goods, all on a basis of mutual advantage, which the GDR always affirmed in commercial dealings with its partners. The GDR leadership was aware that in Namibia the glittering prizes might even be harder to reach than in Angola or Mozambique. Hence the SED Secretariat's decision of 3 January 1979, which provided the framework for political and economic relations with an independent Namibia, was based on the assumption that SWAPO as the strongest political force would play an important role once independence was achieved, but was realistic enough to note that "since their proposals for a settlement of the Namibian question were accepted by the UN Security Council, the major imperialist powers

Special Flights to Southern Africa I 5 I have gained a partial success in safeguarding their positions in Namibia." In an independent Namibia one would have to reckon with other political groups under pro-imperialist leaderships like the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and others. The important mining industry was exclusively controlled by foreign monopolist corporations, and agriculture was in the hands of the white minority." Moreover, the GDR leaders expected interGerman quarrels in Namibia. On this point, the aforementioned decision cautioned: "Once the GDR has relations with an independent Namibia, these relations are likely to be affected by a particular confrontation with the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany - author's note), one factor of which, among others, will be the presence of a relatively influential minority of about 30 000 Germans (FRG citizens for the most part) in Namibia." To be able to develop political relations without delay once Namibia had acceded to independence, and to lay the groundwork for mutually advantageous economic exchange by taking advantage of the rapport with SWAPO, the SED CC's decision called for some preparatory work on opening a resident GDR mission and concluding agreements or conventions on trade, techno-scientific cooperation, exchanges in the field of culture and related academic disciplines, on shipping services and consular affairs. In accordance with a request from SWAPO, GDR experts and consultants were to advise it on constitutional law, economic planning and econonic management, and to train political cadres. A delegation of experts to Namibia to explore further opportunities for cooperation was also going to be sent after Namibia's independence. Beyond mere framework accords in the areas mentioned, fisheries was the only area where a rapid and detailed agreement on commercial cooperation with tangible results was deemed desirable.4 The SED's decision on erecting the skeleton structure for a broad range of inter-governmental relations was evidence of the GDR's great interest in Namibia. When Erich Honecker once again met Sam Nujoma, on 18 February 1979, during his visit to Luanda on a leg of his great African journey, tile negotiating process on Namibia had entered a critical phase. Despite the Namibian elections staged by South Africa in December 1978, which the UN refused to recognise, SWAPO maintained its consent to the UN plan for independence. At any rate, Nujoma did not rule out, in his talks with the GDR head of state, that SWAPO would soon assemble its forces in bases, as envisaged in the plan, and cooperate with the UN force. For the SWAPO soldiers to convey the best possible impression, they needed to be well-

Ncinibia: The GDR's solidariy with S'Ii'IPO equipped and well-dressed, NUjoma said, and asked for GDR assistance. lonecker promised help and gave SWAPO's president a symbolical 5 million mark cheque." At its meeting in Camabatela in August 1979 SWAPO's Committee rated the increasing material, political, diplomatic and moral support of the G DR very high. Nujoma expressed the organisation's sincere thanks in a letter to Honecker and appealed for more help.5" Once top-level contacts between 1977 and 1979 had produced key decisions on greater GDR assistance for SWAPO, political cooperation, material supplies, training and education, medical treatment for the sick and wounded, and provision of weapons for armed struggle became the pillars of this mutual relationship. The following section will shed light on how the agreements turned to account. Material support for SWAPO The structure of "material solidaritl," As in the case of other liberation movements, material assistance for SWAPO was primarily organised, coordinated and financed by the GDR Solidarity Committee. In the broader sense, it involved funding for the following operations or services: * the procurement and transport of goods; " training and education (vocational training, technical and university studies) and, in the case of SWAPO, day-to-day care for Namibian youths: * the medical treatment and rehabilitation of sick and wounded people: * the production and dispatch of journals (Namnibiu Today in the case of SWAPO), the printing of books, pamphlets, posters and material for exhibition, and the production of badges, flags, etc.; * air travel expenses for liberation movement officials; " rents and running costs for the offices of liberation movements in Berlin. In the narrower sense, material assistance meant supplies of goods which liberation movements could sell to finance their activities." Supplies financed by the Solidarity Committee also included paramilitary equipment for the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the armies of other liberation movements. Arms supplies came, as a rule, from the stocks of the National People's Army, with the Solidarity Committee often paying for their transportation.

Special Flights to Southern Africa (DR Ambassador Hurst Schoen hands over solidarity supplies.for the .INC' and SWAPO to Oliver Tainbo and Sam Nujoma, Egon Winkelmann, Kapuka Nauvala. As soon as the SED and SWAPO established direct party-to-party relations, material assistance also became an item in their mutual agreements. Technical responsibility in terms of procurement, transport and, of course, funding of solidarity supplies continued to lie with the Solidarity Committee. Working together with the competent governmental agencies, the Committee made the necessary arrangements for training and education for liberation movement members and medical treatment for the sick and wounded. The bulk of the funds flowing to the Solidarity Committee was contributed by members of the trade union confederation, FDGB. Back in 1960, when the Solidarity Committee was established, the SED leadership had decreed that the FDGB should annually assist the Committee with an agreed amount of money. From the mid-1970s onwards, this contribution totalled around 100 million marks a year." Most FDGB members bought a monthly donation stamp, in addition to paying their membership fee. After the political change in the GDR in autumn 1989, this was interpreted as state-prescribed solidarity - an indiscriminate verdict that did not do justice

Ncinihia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWA PO to reality. In a great many cases, individual union members or work teams in enterprises and institutions undertook to donate a fixed amount every month, and additionally contributed money in extra fund raising campaigns. But there was moral pressure exerted as well, and even cases of coercion are on record. What may have caused rather more indignation among the population in the formerGDR was an administrative, centralistic management of solidarity as well as insufficient public information and a lack of codetermination about the use of the funds raised. There was a virtual public outcry in 1989 when it became known that the SED leadership had ordered the diversion of money from the FDGB's solidarity fund for other purposes; for example, 50 million marks for a national youth festival, which was staged to take young people's minds off the serious problems in the country's society. All this disappointed very many East Germans and discredited the G DR's international solidarity in their eyes. Beside the funds it transferred to the Solidarity Committee, the FDGB made its own contributions to the general assistance for SWAPO and other liberation organisations by financing courses for trade unionists at its Fritz Heckert College in Bernau near Berlin and by providing material supplies as well. The Journalists Union, VDJ financed advanced training for Namibian journalists at its School of Solidarity from its own budget. The youth organisation FDJ, trained youth affair officers of liberation movements at the Youth College on Lake Bogensee, near Berlin, at its own expense. The Red Cross society in the GDR and other organisations, too, contributed resources of their own to the nation-wide solidarity effort. As part of its relations with other parties, the SED financed political education courses for SWAPO members at its regional party school in Rostock. Unlike the Solidarity Committee and the organ isations mentioned above, it had foreign currency at its disposal, and could fall back on this in exceptional cases to assist international partners. Within the anti-racism programme of the World Council of Churches, the churches in the GDR provided assistance for SWAPO and other liberation movements in humanitarian fields, cooperating occasionally with the Solidarity Committee in the required practical arrangements. The Committee was the only societal institution in tile GDR which could pay for air or sea transport in GDR currency, and therefore it sometimes handled the shipment of solidarity supplies provided by the churches. The current state of research into material assistance for SWAPO by the Solidarity Committee gives tile following picture for the period from the

Special Flights to Southern Ajica late 1960s, during which assistance rose to substantial proportions: Table 1: Value of material assistance for SWAPO from thousand marks- TM) 1968 to 1989 (in Year Supplies Training/ Medical Misc. 18b (incl. shipment) education treatment n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 50,0 50,0 50,0 228,5 250,0 350,0 350,0 350,0 856,0 853,0 1 052,6 974,9 943,1 474,1 450,0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 1 105,3 1 887,0 4 438,0 4 436,9 5 295,7 5 267,1 4581,2 4213,5 6263,9 n.d. n.d. ll.d. n.d. n.d. n .d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. *312,0 *400,0 *565,0 674,2 n.d. 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1,8 70,4 31,6 4,2 n.d. 74,1 487,3 1 001,9 1 522,7 2 262,4 3 552,1 6 133,4 5 123,6 5954,5 10570,2 6009,6 6376,2 4 160,6 3 107,5 3 409,7 5162,3 9 323,2 [Total 74350,3 37488,6 1 951,2 7282,2 Sources: Records of SODI Material supplies/services and training/education: SAPMO Barch, DY 30/VORL. SED Material supplies/services 1979-88, training/education 1983-88, medical treatment and misc. * planned resources Figures in italics - estimates n.d. - no data available misc. - miscellaneous

Nanibict: The GDRs s olidaritv iti'h SWA PO Table I shows that the aggregate value of supplies from the Solidarity Committee to SWAPO in 1975 was double the 1974 figure, and again increased about two fold from 1978 to 1979, the year when resolution 435 was expected to be implemented. The absolute peak in all the years up to 1989 was reached in 1982, with supplies worth some 10,5 million marks altogether. This increase was due to additional solidarity supplies by the Solidarity Committee in an acute emergency situation, which we shall describe further down. During the 1980s, there was a considerable up and down movement, but ata high level and never falling below the 1977 level. In 1989, when resolution 435 began to be implemented, assistance again climbed steeply to over 9,3 million marks. The expenses on training and education are noteworthy, especially on vocational training and the schooling and day-to-day care for Namibian children and teenagers in the GDR. The 37,5 million mark allocation for these purposes from 1981 -1989 compares with 54,1 million marks of supplies to SWAPO in the same period. According to the figures in the previous, incomplete table, the value of supplies and services provided by the Solidarity Committee for SWAPO from 1968 to 1989 is well over 120 million marks. The actual sum must have been greater, for the available data on expenses on the medical treatment of sick and wounded Namibians, which was increasingly required from 1977 onwards, relate only to the last few years. The Solidarity Committee's total expenditure on medical treatment for Namibians is assumed to have been 5 million marks. To gain a complete picture comprising the full range of supplies and services which SWAPO received from GDR, not only those from its Solidarity Committee, data would have to be added on military supplies and training, but these are either not presently available or full of gaps. The same applies to data on SED assistance for SWAPO, in particular in the field of political education, and data on assistance from the churches and on independent solidarity contributions made by the FDGB, FDJ, VDJ and other organisations59 The following data on supplies (Table 2) and training/education (Table 3) provided by the Solidarity Committee for all southern African liberation movements associated with the GDR, for Angola and Mozambique as African top-priority countries may be helpful in making comparisons and appraising the aid SWAPO received.

- N Special Flights to Southern Africa Table 2: Supplies by the Solidarity Committee to southern African liberation movements, Angola and Mozambique, 1975-1989 (in thousand marks) Year S\\APO ANC ZAPU'" Angola Nllozanmbique Total 1975 1.001.9 929,1 1.216.2 9.206,1 13.215.4 25.568,7 1976 1.522.7 1.972,3 471.3 107.557.4 11.835.3 123.359.0 1)-- 2262. 4 21.421.3 8.330.7 8.889,8 11.677,9 33.582,1 1978 3.552,1 2.729,7 4.413,2 14.000.0 11,157.6 35.852.6 1979 6.133.4 3.289,1 8.027,2 14.700,0 14.968,3 47.118,0 1980 5.123.o 2.309,4 2.797,4 n.d. 11.628.3 21.858,7 1981 5.954,5 2.968,8 13.315,0 44.871,8 67.110,1 I 82 10.570,2 1.936,8 9.561,4 27.068,8 49.137,2 1983 6.009,6 2.207,9 1.940,7 10.778,3 20.938,0 1984 6.376,2 2.180.1 2.432,0 5.290,4 16.286,8 1985 4.160,6 2.003,9 n.d. 7.405.7 13.574,9 1986 3.107.5 1.886,4 2.675.6 3.244.8 11.131,1 1987 3.409,7 2.630,9 3.430,0 10.698.9 20.343,7 1988 5.162,3 3.868,1 2.710,0 3.698,6 15.668.7 1989 9.323.2 3.972,6 2.885,0 3.154.3 19.546,7 Total 73.669,9 37.306.4 25.256.0 193.303,0 190.694,4 521.229,7 n.d. - no data available Table 3: Training/education services provided by the Solidarity Committee for southern African liberation movements, Mozam bique and Angola 1981-89 (in thousand marks) YEAR SWAPO ANC Mozambique Angola Zimbabwe 1981 1 105,3 240,2 43,2 n.d. n.d. 1982 1887,0 623,3 83,1 n.d. n.d. 1983 4438,0 867,2 10763,4 2197,2 317,5 1984 4436,9 853,6 11386,1 2254,4 229,6 1985 5295,7 813,5 13778,6 3529,6 225,5 1986 5267,1 970,7 16456,4 3696,6 345,6 1987 4581,2 1071,2 21279,8 4016,2 1091,6 1988 4213,5 982,0 19713,0 3876,3 896.2 1989 6263,9 825,8 10561,8 3122,7 847,8 Total 37488,6 7247,5 104065,4 22693,0 3 953,8 n.d. - no data available Source Records of SODI

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO Sources: Data for ANC, SWAPO, Mozambique, ZimbabweWorking sheets of SODI; data for Angola 1983-88 SAPMO BArch vorl. SED 40567 vol. 1.2. Data for 1989 cf. DDR-Eniwicklungspolitik zwischen Ab- und Aiujbruch, in epd- Entwicklungspolitik Frankfurt/Main, V/1990, p. 53. In terms of the value of aid supplies, SWAPO benefitted nearly twice as much as the ANC. In the case of training/education, SWAPO ranked even before Angola as a top-priority country, and compared with the ANC the resources spent in favour of SWAPO were five times as high. These expenditures highlight SWAPO's importance to the GDR. The figures are, of course, not the only criterion to judge the GDR's relations with the liberation movements. They are no indicators of the quality of aid nor do they reflect the problems which had to be resolved before aid reached its destinations. We shall take a closer look at these problems below. Capabilities and constraints in the GDR's material solidarity Commencing in 1978, solidarity supplies arrived almost regularly at SWAPO camps in Angola, often in the new year or around 26 August, international Nam ibia Day. In the middle of 1981, when the influx of refugees from Namibia was increasing and South African forces were stepping up their aggressive operations in southern Angola, Sam Nujorna contacted the GDR leadership, urgently requesting assistance to feed the refugees and SWAPO's fighters. He told them that 30 000 tonnes of flour and other food were needed.6 The GDR Solidarity Committee had provided solidarity supplies for refugee camps in Cuanza Sul in June and August that year. However, supplying a bigger quantity of flour now posed a major problem. After the necessary checks, chairman Gerhard Schuerer of the State Planning Commission informed Erich Honecker that the GDR had the capacity to supply the following quantities of food to SWAPO: 5 000 tonnes of flour, 50 tonnes of instant soups, 30 tonnes of semolina dishes, 20 tonnes of blancmange, and 25 tonnes of broth paste. Seven thousand tonnes of grain which were needed to produce the 5 000 tonnes of flour had to be taken from the national reserve stocks, to be replenished in 1982. In addition, reported Schuerer, foreign currency was required to import jute bags to pack the flour and finance transport by sea. The other foodstuffs could be provided by increasing production without affecting availability to the G DR population."'

Special Flights to Southern Afica 189 As a result of the talks with Nujoma in July/August 1981, the SED CC Secretariat decided not only to supply food but also to send an Africa Line freighter of Deutsche Seereederei to Mozambique to move 2 000 tonnes of foodstuff over to Angola. The cost, 460 000 GDR marks, was to be borne by the SED CC main cashier's office. Besides, SWAPO was to receive, in the course of 1981, spare parts worth 100 000 marks for its GDR-made IFA W 50 lorries. The Solidarity Committee was to finance this delivery. '2 The G DR's big supply of food reached SWAPO in the first six months of 1982. It exemplified a specific strength of GDR solidarity swift aid in acute emergency situations. With seven million marks spent merely on the flour,"- this iesponse raised the total of the Solidarity Committee's material assistance for SWAPO frorn the five mnl iion marks originally projected for 1982 1 to more than double that figure (see Table 1). This is all the more noteworthy as it happened just when the "Mittag Commission" was reorienting the Solidarity Committee to reduce the overall solidarity intake and to expend resources predominantly on commercial projects initiated by the GDR in top-priority countries. In view of the general shortage of manufactured goods, the required reduction in material solidarity supplies was to be offset by an increase in solidarity services - the training, education, and medical treatment of wounded personnel - for "national economic reasons"." Unlike manufactured goods, services of this kind offered a potential for increased solidarity. It was growing more apparent that the GDR economy was undergoing a crisis. Fewer goods were available for solidarity purposes. Therefore SED Secretary for Economy Mittag insisted that solidarity donations raised by the trade unions should decrease. On 26 May 1982 the CC Secretariat adopted a "decision on the management of solidarity donations". According to the records, international solidarity was said to make "high demands on material cover".6 However, even this casual reference to the economic causes of the new modesty in the field of solidarity is not reflected in the official guidelines for argumentation 67 expediently adopted together with the decision on "restructuring solidarity donations and their use" - which essentially meant applying the throttle. Following the decision by the SED CC Secretariat, the FDGB National Executive set out to reduce solidarity donations friom trade union members. While the highest denomination of a solidarity stamp had previously been fifty marks, the maximum was now suddenly a mere ten marks. But many members found all this hard to understand and continued to donate high

Namibia." The GDR's solidaritY with SWA PO amounts for solidarity so that their membership booklets, crarmned with low- value stamps, ran out of space. Any fund-raising campaigns, occasionally undertaken by work teams at their own initiative, were no longer welcome. One year later, in June 1983, the FDGB recommended that the SED CC Secretariat withdraw its strange decision, which it did. The Secretariat put out a new decision saying "because of many enquiries by trade union branches at enterprises, the series of FDGB solidarity stamps is to be restored to its previous scale (including stamps worth over ten, and up to fifty marks)."G" Meanwhile it had been discovered that the flow of donations from the population could very well be tapped to replace state budget funds earmarked for techno-scientific cooperation with developing countries, such as for training assistance for Mozambique and Angola.9 Clearly, the GDR leadership was arbitrarily able to use solidarity as an instrument for its political or economic goals vis-a-vis other countries, without any need to offer the slightest explanation to the public. Under the prevailing circumstances, it was not easy for the Solidarity Committee staff to frequently procure supplies for SWAPO and other liberation movements that would meet their needs. Fired by initiative and imagination, and with the help of partners in governmental agencies, like the all-important "solidarity commissioner" in the Ministry of Material Supplies, they tried to surmount the hurdles of dirigistic economic centralisation and commodity shortages to fulfil the pledges made towards liberation movements. Often enough, domestic economic deficiencies and the resultant scanty stocks in shops were seen as a reason for withholding details about the contents of solidarity shipments. To give an example, GDR media were not allowed to report that milk powder was being supplied to liberation movements to feed refugee children, because milk powder was in short supply in local shops for some time. Economic constraints had an impact on the GDR's readiness to abide by one of its foreign policy principles: solidarity with the movement for national liberation, which was understood to include countries freed from the colonial yoke. Hence, the volume of material aid in the 1980s was reduced even for top-priority countries like Angola and Mozambique, whereas there were no cuts in solidarity supplies for SWAPO and the ANC (see Table I1). Liberation movements did, however, receive all the assistance they had been promised. 190

Special Flights to Southern Africa Aid for S APO's camps and workshops A delegation of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), examining the situation in camps for refugees from South Africa and Namibia in neighbouring countries in the late 1980s, gained comparatively positive impressions from their visit to SWAPO camps in tie Angolan province of Cuanza Sul. East German supplies of equipment had been important in erecting these camps, besides Scandinavian humanitarian aid, which, however, exceeded the GDR's assistance in the strictly humanitarian field.7' GDR solidarity supplies were elements of the Namibian refugees' daily environment and experience in the camps 72: tents made in Pouch, a place not far from Leipzig; canned and other food helping over very critical situations and saving many lives, some of their clothing also "made in GDR", often taken from unsold stocks in East German textile factories. The combat suits of the PLAN fighters had been delivered from GDR army stocks or made on site from GDR material, while IFA W 50 lorries, made in Ludwigsfelde near Berlin, transported supplies to the refugee camps, and also soldiers to the front. A good part of the equipment for nursery schools in SWAPO's camps in Cuanza Sul province, and of the schoolbooks, other teaching aids and pupils' utensils were also of GDR origin. And last but not least GDR teachers, doctors and nurses wvorked in the camps. Their skills, dedication and human qualities earned them respect and affection from many Namibians. Summarising the impact of all this practical solidarity on the people in the camps, Obed Ernvula, the first representative of SWAPO in the GDR said: "'In the camps, GDR became a teaching name, refugees sang the praises of it."173 Efforts to help the Namibian refugees also involved growing cooperation at a broader international level. In this regard, Festus Naholo, SWAPO's chief of logistics, recalls the construction of a big nursery school in a refugee camp in Cuanza Sul province in 1985 where 500 children were looked after. The idea for the project was conceived in discussions SWAPO held with the Finnish Friendship Society. The latter, however, felt the size of the project would overstrain their capacities and therefore contacted the GDR Solidarity Committee, proposing to join forces. A little later, a delegation of the Committee went to Angola to study the feasibility of a nursery school project site. The result was a Finnish-East German "joint solidarity venture". The GDR Committee provided 150 tons of cement and steel for the project and paid for the transportation of seven Finnish pre-fabricated houses of machinery and equipment from Helsinki via Rostock to Luanda with ships

192 Namibia: The GDR's solidarity wiih SWAPO of the GDR shipping line. Members of a Free German Youth Brigade working in Angola did the necessary work to errect the foundation. The childcare centre was ceremonially opened by SWAPO Secretary-General Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, with GDR Solidarity Committee officers present, on 14 March 1985." Naholo remembered another, even more important form of material support by the GDR assistance for production facilities run by SWAPO in Angola and Zambia. For farms where cattle and chickens were kept and vegetables grown, the Solidarity Committee supplied tractors, agricultural implements, and seeds. SWAPO had built big tailor workshops in Lubango, Cuanza Sul, Luanda, and Zambia, which were almost like small factories, with about 30 workers each. Apart fiorn producing badly needed clothing for Narnibian refugees, they gave many of these people jobs and an opportunity to acquire technical skills. Equipment for the workshops in Luanda and Lubango had almost exclusively been financed and supplied by the Solidarity Committee. It included 'eritas sewing machines made in Wittenberge. In Cuanza Sul, Swedish machines were combined with GDR equipment, whereas workshops in Zambia processed GDR- made fabric on Norwegian machines. These SWAPO workshops also tailored uniforms for the PLAN soldiers.75 Assistance to relieve the situation of Namibian refugees met with wholehearted approval and support from the GDR public, including children. When the children's magazine Bunnii called upon children below school age to collect gifts for Angolan and Namibian children, the response was enthusiastic. Over 950 000 gifts, not seldom children's favourite toys, were packed, transported, and finally handed over in Angola in July 1983, with the Solidarity Committee's help. This is a minor example proving that solidarity work was more than a half-hearted reaction to administrative, centralistic directions. The spirit of solidarity was spread among the GDR population to an extent that should not be underestimated. Cure Jor the Iountded in Berlin-Bach: "Jacob Morenga"' Ward 303 Medical treatment for wounded soldiers and civilians played an increasingly important part in the GDR's solidarity effort for SWAPO fiom the mid- 1970s onwards. In the summer of 1977, ten soldiers whose legs had been amputated were flown to the GDR for further treatment.-" Another batch comprising 40 PLAN fighters arrived by air in early 1978, followed in July by 40 victims of the South African attack on Cassinga.7 In the 1980s, SWAPO was in need

Specilcd Flights to Southern Afiicu I V-) of medical care for increasing numbers of refugees injured in South African raids on camps in Angola and for PLAN fighters wounded in battle."8 Altogether, several hundred Namibians received medical treatment and follow-up care in the GDR.' SWAPO considered the GDR's assistance in this field to be eminently important, (also emotionally) - not only for the wounded and injured themselves but for the liberation organisation as a whole. Lucas Pohamba, SWAPO's long-standing Secretary for Finance and minister with various portfolios after independence, underlined the great moral and psychological effect this medical aid had among the Namibian refugees, who had been exposed to the horrors of South African raids and had seen friends and relatives dying or suffering from the most serious injuries. It was highly encouraging for them to know that there was hope for recovery and rehabilitation even in very critical cases. Pohamba remembers that wounded victims of attacks on the camps were usually flown to the GDR within a week.80 Often, they were transported on special Interfli.g planes. The GDR chiefly admitted patients with complicated injuries which could not be treated in Angola. Unlike Scandinavian assistance in the medical field, which was confined to civilian refugees, the GDR also catered for PLAN fighters. Upon arrival in the GDR, the wounded were taken to clinics in various places, for instance in Bad Dueben near Leipzig. As a rule, troop officers were treated in Bad Saarow, south of Berlin. The majority of the Namibians were admitted in ward 303 of the second Geriatrics Clinic in Buch, a suburb of Berlin. Most of them were refugees, the rest PLAN soldiers. Several times, like during his stay in the GDR in September 1983, SWAPO president Nujoma paid calls on his compatriots at the clinic in Berlin-Buch, finding them well looked after." This clinic also treated wounded personnel of the ANC, ZAPU and the PLO as well as nationals from 33 other countries. Admission of such patients was organised in most cases by the Solidarity Committee, and sometimes by the SED Central Committee, the FDGB or the ministry of health. Thus, Berlin-Buch acquired an international reputation as a place of humanitarian help and solidarity. The "solidarity ward" was set up in summer 1978, after the South African raid on Cassinga, when SWAPO urgently needed aid for the seriously wounded among the refugees. Doctors and nurses on the ward took care of twenty from those who arrived in GDR on 6 July 1978. "I remember it as if it were yesterday," said senior physician Dr Christian

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO Zippel, vice-director of the clinic, "how those seriously wounded people, with horrible mutilations, were brought to our clinic directly from the airport. Among them were ten young men and ten women, one of them pregnant. A bullet had nearly hit the unborn baby, who was then born on our ward."'2 Dr Erich Kwiatkowski, who was in charge of the ward from its inception, recalls, with emotion, the ten years of service.83 Treating and nursing the wounded Namibians posed new professional and human challenges to both the doctors and the medical staff, and it was an entirely new experience. When the first twenty Namibians arrived on the ward, the first thing to do was find a way of communicating, as they spoke neither German nor English. One of them had been trained in Czechoslovakia, and by chance Dr Kwiatkowski had studied medicine there. So Czech became the medium of communication. Another handicap was that hardly any among them had enjoyed even a minimum of schooling or vocational training back home. So, after some time, it was almost natural for the lucky few who were literate to teach their comrades on the "SWAPO ward" to read and write. One of them was Reverend Hellao Jambeulu Hellao, formerly a pastor of the Wounded Namibiahs who after the Cassmga Massaker received medical treatment in Berlin-Buch learn to walk with artificial limbs (20 December 1978).

Special Flights to Southern A/ica Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia, who had lost his wife and daughter in Cassinga and was seriously wounded himself. He was the first Namibian -in-house" teacher at Berlin-Buch. Medical problems were not tile only ones in station 303; dealing with each other, different cultural backgrounds and traditions, agreeing how to organise the patients' daily routine constantly raised new questions. Maybe this is why the doctors, medical assistants and Namibian patients became "a great community", as Dr Kwiatskowski put it. Dr Zippel underlined, too, that the medical personnel and the patients were on very friendly terms, so that private invitations to visit German families were nothing unusual.4 Following a request by nurses in the second Geriatrics Clinic, who had delved into Namibian history, the ward was given the name "Jacob Morenga" in 1988. The closeness of the ward's medical team to their patients had a lasting positive effect on the confidence which SWAPO placed in its cooperation with the G DR. After surgery, the wounded learned to lead an independent life again, with supervision by the doctors and help from physio and work therapists. They received artificial limbs, which, like many other things, were in short supply in the GDR. Those responsible for procuring them had to develop much personal initiative in contacting suppliers and finding ways to negotiate the obstacles of an economy ridden with shortages. The same was true of various types of crutches, which needed to be permanently available and, time and again, were difficult to obtain. The Namibian patients will have hardly noticed these worries of their East German doctors. Now that so much water has flown under the bridge, Dr Kwiatkowski is still pleased to have procured artificial limbs and other aids which were vitally necessary for his Namibian patients. "All of us here had the feeling we were really needed," is how he described the motivation of the doctors and nurses on ward 303. Patiently aided by the medical staff, the Namibians learnt to cope with their physical handicaps. In work therapy exercises, such as weaving or other handicrafts, they learnt to use their arms and legs again. This posed certain difficulties due to the different cultural values of Namibians. The men disliked weaving, stitching or leatherwork which they felt was "women's work", even if they were supposed to do it as a therapeutic exercise. Without dispensing with work therapy, which was a proven method in German medical practice, thought had to be given to how the patients' rehabilitation could be organised so that after return to the SWAPO camps iamihia: The GDR 's solidaritv with SWA PO and, one day, to their own country, they would be able to do without the help of others and cope with local conditions. For a fair number of them. vocational training subsequent to medical treatment proved to be a useful approach to social reintegration. 1laying finished their medical treatment, eight of the ten Namibians admitted in 1977 started vocational training in 1979, an example which becarne widely accepted and emulated. Several women later trained as receptionists at a hotel in Oberhof, and a number of men trained in stockkeeping and other occupations at a potassium mine in Merkers in Thuringia. This training also gave them an opportunity to make use of their newly acquired literacy. Many of the Namibian patients returned to Africa with their morale strengthened and a feeling that they were equal human beings, despite their physical handicaps. Dr Zippel mentioned further examples of careers which patients began after treatment. Monica Shikwam be went to the SWAPO children's home at Bellin as a nursery school teacher, and worked later at the School of Solidarity in Stassfurt. Her brother, the Reverend Hellao, went to Leipzig to study international law. And Nyati Angula learnt a medical trade, as a laboratory assistant." The public had a positive view of medical treatment for Namibians in the GDR. Special campaigns, such as the one by the weekly Wochenpost under the motto "Solidarity action 303" in 1988, were organised to raise funds for maintaining the ward in Berlin-Buch and catering for the wounded. Readers of the weekly contributed 140,000 marks in that campaign alone.", The Association of the Blind and Visually Handicapped as well as other organisations helped with social events or outings, and schools invited patients for get-togethers with pupils. Dedicated Christians offered help for believers among the patients, taking them to services in church. A Protestant priest regularly visited them on the ward. Solidarity assistance for SWAPO in the medical field included the treatment of officials in hospitals, especially in the Government Hospital in Berlin, and in convalescent homes elsewhere in the GDR. This assistance was very much appreciated. SWAPO greatly acknowledged the work of GDR doctors and medical staff in its hospitals in Angola. The doctors came from different hospitals in the GDR; they were all highly qualified and had for the most part longstanding supervisory and executive experience. SWAPO's hospitals were to a significant extent furnished with GDR equipment and received much of their medicines and dressings from the GDR. Even during the period of

,Special Flights to Southern AJfiica transition to independence, in mid-1989, a GDR-inade mobile X-ray unit was commissioned to SWAPO in Angola. 7 In cases showing particular Namtbiun patients at the solidarity ward' in Berln-Buch (2 Oct. 1981). Nyatt Angula entertains his comrades with his guitar. Erasmus Jacob (2nd from right) is already two years in GDR and able to help the medical staff as interpreter complications, East German doctors in the camps usually recommended further treatment in the GDR, where the required specialised inputs were available. The GDR gave SWAPO hard currency to buy urgently needed medicines in Western markets ", although the GDR was chronically short of such currency and normally provided its solidarity for liberation movements in the form of material supplies and services rather than cash. The GDR's medical assistance was a substantial part of its overall humanitarian help. It is well remembered among Namibians as a hallmark of East German solidarity, and especially by many former patients, who hold personal memories of the dedicated care they received from physicians like Dr Kwiatkowski and his colleagues on the "Jacob Morenga" ward.

Namibia: The GD!? v solidarity with S WA PO Cooperation in education and training Namibians in the GDR Vocational training: Experiences in the Rostock seaport The accord on increased GDR assistance for SWAPO in the field of training, which had been reached during Sam Nujoma's visit in December 1977, was soon acted upon. SWAPO's partner for all contacts on vocational training was the Solidarity Committee, which closely worked together with the State Secretariat for Vocational Training. The State Secretariat was responsible for making the domestic arrangements in the GDR and supervising the actual training. Narnibians had been in the GDR for skilled industrial training before 1977.9 As a rule, their living and training had been financed by the Solidarity Committee from public donations. But now the dimension was much bigger: 130 traineesh ips were planned and actually provided in 1978. In September that year, 106 young Namibians arrived from Angola, to bejoined by eight of the ten wounded SWAPO fighters who had been in the GDR since 1977.10 In February and March 1979, SWAPO sent another batch of around 100 would-be trainees. More followed in subsequent years until 1989, bringing the total number of Namibian trainees in the GDR to around I 400."' The first group of 105 people, returned to Angola in August 1981 with a skilled worker's certificate, followed by another 87 who left the GDR in February 1982.92 Their traineeships, consisting of theoretical courses and practical instruction, qualified them for skilled work in a diversity of occupations, for instance, as foundry workers, welders, shop mechanics, telecommunciation and electrical fitters, engine and farm mechanics, dockers, agricultural technicians, shoe- makers, printers, and photo laboratory technicians. Later, between 1986 and 1989, Namibians also obtained certificates as machine and plant fitters, communications technology specialists, transport clerks, repair mechanics, master craftsmen in electrical engineering, sailors, well diggers, irrigation and drainage technicians, and crop and livestock farmers. Some of them even became vocational instructors, well-qualified to pass on their knowledge to prospective skilled workers."' Nahas Angula, formerly SWAPO's Secretary for Education and Training, considers that the GDR was SWAPO's principal partner in vocational training.4 Regrettably, only very few of those trained in the GDR could make use of their newly acquired skills and knowledge in the years before Namibian independence. Consequently, part of their proficiency was lost as time

Special Flights to Southern Atrica went by. Most of them rejoined SWAPO's armed forces, and tile mechanics among these maintained and repaired the W 50 military trucks supplied by the GDR. Some of the agricultural specialists organised some small-scale food crop projects which were to contribute to the self-sufficiency of More tha 100O Numibians who received three years o/ vocational training return back to Angola by special plane on 28 August 1981. SWAPO camps."5 In the GDR in February 1985, Angula informed the Solidarity Committee that some of the cadres trained in the G DR were working in Zambia, Tanzania and other countries, partly without pay. At that time, SWAPO was hoping that UN programmes might be used to find meaningful employment for additional numbers of newly trained Namibians in African countries.96 As the authors have been confronted with varying assessments, it appears preferable to leave it to experts to judge the content and quality of the Namibians' industrial training in the GDR. While the judgement given by SWAPO officials is, in essence, a positive one, some Namibian employers, for example, noticed onsiderable qualification shortcomings. However, all of them agree that the Namibians trained in the GDR constitute a valuable

Numihia: The GDR s solidaritV with SWA PO resource which has to date been insufficiently drawn upon in the pursuit of national development. To remedy this situation remains a challenge, with much scope for Germ an-Narnibian cooperation. What we seek to do is not to review the vocational training of Narnibians in the technical sense, but rather to discover how they lived during their years in the GDR, how they coped with an entirely different environment and culture, and what problems they and their German partners faced and solved in joint efforts. The material which has been consulted gives interesting insights into the experiences of a group of Namibians who lived and worked in Rostock, a port on the Baltic coast. The authors are aware that the situation of the Namibians in this group is painted from archive records and from an East German perspective. This description is just one piece in the mosaic of Namibians' lives in the GDR, with its many different colours and shadings. The Otto Bennecke Foundation organised a followup programme ( 1989 - 1993) for 2 000 Namibians who had been trained in East and West Germany, in Eastern European and African countries. Two hundred and twenty seven out of 404 returness from the GDR who participated in the programme found ajob (56,2 percent). This number is favourable compared with those coming from other former East bloc countries, it is rather low however in comparison to the employment rate of those Namibians who have been trained in the Federal Republic of Germany, (76,7 percent) and in African countries (66,2 percent). The first thing to observe is that the enterprises or businesses where Namibians trained were scattered all over the GDR. All Namibians attended a German- language course for six months, before they started two and half years of practical and theoretical instruction in an occupation. For most of them, these educational opportunities were a totally nev challenge, and their aptitudes and preliminary basic knowledge or skills varied. On average, they had received six years of schooling, and some as little as three years. The German teachers and instructors soon realised that they could not apply the standards of the GDR's education system to their Namibian trainees. Primarily they noticed an insufficient knowledge of the natural sciences and, more important, mathematics. But an equally serious handicap was a lack of elementarv general knowledge on which any specific vocational training needed to rely and which had now to be taught first. Because of the varying educational level of the Namibians, East German experts were not so sure whether all of them would be succsessful in obtaining a certificate in accordance with G DR standards.7 200

Special Flights to Southern A/rica So both in vocational training and German-langague courses, the German instructors and teachers continually had to look for new methods to put their messages across. The Ministry of Education was responsible for the organisation and content of the German-language courses, and the Herder Institute in Leipzig developed specific crash course material called "Deutschlntensiv". But in addition to their own efforts, the success of the Narnibians in class Nery much depended on the personal dedication and understanding of the German teachers. Flow could the Namibians, whose experience of life was based entirely on their own country and the SWAPO camps in the Angolan bush, be expected to follow German lessons about everyday life in the GDR, which was entirely unfamiliar? In addition to formal schoolbook teaching, teachers in Greifswald therefore suggested, for instance, taking their classes on trips to a supermarket or the clothes department in a big store, going to the cinema and drinking coffee in a restaurant together, or spending some time in a bookshop or railway station. The Namibians needed to speak and listen to German speakers in context to overcome unaccustomed situations." Without the dedication of the teachers and vocational instructors and the cooperation of the officials in the State Secretariat for Vocational Training and the Solidarity Committee, without the assistance of the German staff in factories and other enterprises, the Namibians would not have acquired a sound vocational training. Much personal affection, not without a paternalistic note, marks the report which Kurt-Andreas Lentzner, who led the group of tutors, wrote about training the first 15 Nanibians at the seaport of Rostock from 1981 to 1984." His report, from which we intend to quote in greater detail, offers much insight into the working and living conditions at the Baltic Sea of those young Namibians aged 20 to 36. This group of Namibians took up their lodgings in a workers' hostel belonging to the Neptun Shipyard, in five three-bedded rooms on the seventh floor of a high- rise building. "Each room." wrote teacher Lentzner, "is fully furnished in modern style, a good place to live, learn and sleep. Each room has an adjacent storage closet with three built-in wardrobes. Every resident has a tall wardrobe to himself. There are niches for cooking and washing. In each room the manager of the hostel has put a small fridge to hold provisions for a weekend. The hostel for German apprentices provided a radio set for each of the five rooms until the end of the training period." Lentzner also noted with satisfaction that, with the help of the seaport

Narnihia." The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO management, a common room was equipped with a TV set. Midday meals were provided in canteens. During theoretical sessions the Namibians ate in a staff restaurant called the "Baltic" in Luetten-Klein, where the price was only one mark. On other days, when they were at the harbour for practical instruction, they took their meals there instead. 'All our Namibian friends,' commented their attentive tutor, 'prefer cooked meals. Therefore they collectively withdrew from the full-board arrangement and cooked tasty national dishes in their rooms for dinner, either in the evenings or, after a night-shift, at midday.' A nearby supermarket in the new borough of Luetten-Klein catered for their shopping needs.' Unlike their fellows at Rostock seaport, 15 Namibians who were training in geology at a crude oil and natural gas enterprise at Grimmen, not far from Rostock, had to cope with less favourable housing conditions. Inspectors fi- om Rostock County Council criticised the state of sanitary facilities and furnishings in the apprentices' hostel where they were accommodated.'0' The arrangements made by the management of the oil and gas enterprise were evidently not as good as the optimum conditions which the Rostock seaport company had set up for their Namibian trainees. Nonetheless, it was not easy for most of the trainees in Rostock to acclimatise to their new environment. Although they had all successfully finished a six-month language course in Dresden, some of them had difficulty using their German and enriching their vocabulary. After six years at most in elementary schooling or, in one case, none at all, systematic learning was unaccustomed. Lentzner described the situation of his pupils as follows: In a number of cases, their families had spent more time on the run than settling down to work and mak,- a living to meet their barest needs. Their school was often in a rejugee camp or under trees in a sanctuary, a schoolbook in one hand and in the other a weapon to defend their lives against the South African racists. It was not only this lack of previous education which posed difficulties for the Namibians in their new German environment. GDR tutors noticed they were homesick and missed their relatives, but suffered also from most distressing memories of racial discrimination and persecution in their own country. Lentzner observed: 'Some of our Namibian friends had gone through horrible childhood experiences due to the man-hunting, persecution, tortures and killings by the South African racists, and these memories persisted, 202

Special Flights to Southern Africa which may account for their scepticism towards all white-skinned people.' 102 The mental and physical health of the young Africans, and consequently the success of their training, greatly depended on the degree to which their German teachers, instructors and fellow workers were attentive to their needs and won their trust. The methods used in intermediate German teaching and theoretic classes were tailored specifically to the Namibians' needs, with great scope for individual coaching and praise for the slightest progress, to encourage the trainees to master the difficulties and cope with their curriculum. Social events organised by the local residents, invitations to visit their teachers' families and other human contacts helped them to surmount psychological barriers. Before long they responded with increasing confidence in their neighbourhood and at their workplaces. Their teachers must have been highly pleased and proud when, towards the end of the theoretical classes, 80 per cent of the Namibians said mathematics was their favourite subject, on a par with sports. Their instructors at Rostock seaport also did their very best to help apprentices cope with the challenges of practical training. In all subjects (except driving lessons) their marks were 'ood" or better. Two final certificates showed the overall mark "excellent", eleven "good" and two "satisfactory".U3 The Namibians' extra-curricular record was also convincing. They took part in cultural and sporting events, and notjust as onlookers. They formed a folklore group and made their first public appearance in their vocational school. The response was so encouraging that they expanded their repertoire to include more songs, even German ones, and, naturally, national dances. The folklore group became the "Vivat Namibia Song and Dance Group", attracting increasing public attention. *Our group scored its absolutely finest and biggest success,' noted Lentzner, 'when it came off so well in a choir contest during Rostock's 1983 summer festival. For the first time we were presenting four-part songs and won a first prize and much applause, in company with well-reputed choirs from Leipzig and Berlin, Rostock university and Czechoslovakian radio...'"I The Namibian trainees also joined in "community works" ("Subbotniks"), which were commonplace in the GDR, in neighbourhoods or during harvest time in agriculture. 'Over free weekends our Namibian friends voluntarily helped two nearby farm cooperatives with fruit-harvesting ... or with sorting, loading and storing vegetables...,' reported Lentzner. 203) Nanmibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWA PO Visits to cultural and sports events and many outings to places of interest made them more intimately familiar with life in their host country, scenic landscapes and local history. Sunming up his association with the Namibian trainees through all tile ups and downs of their stay in the GDR, Lentzer noted: 'For me, these three years have been among the most challenging, but also the most fascinating in nearly forty years of professional practice.'" In August 1992, that dedicated teacher must have been stunned to hear in the news that foreigners" homes had been set on fire in RostockLichtenhagen - the very place where ten years back the Vivat Narnibia Dance and Song Group had performed to great applause at the local educational college during a students' festival. Pictures of the excesses travelled around the world and may have reached Lentzner's former trainees, who surely had quite different recollections of Rostock. And perhaps they heard that in Wittenberge, a town southwest of Rostock, Germans threw two Namibians down from a balcony of a multi-store building in a burst of hatred. Having experienced humane solidarity in the GDR during their stay in Rostock - if unaware of the growing problems and conflicts in societx at large, which culminated in the political changes in 1989 and the GDR's ultimate demise - they will have been utterly bewildered by those incidents. Care and friendship will have concealed many latent conflicts from their view, and besides, they judged their environment and their lives in the GDR by the standards to which the majority of the African population were exposed back home. The xenophobia which burst into the open in eastern Germany after 1989 had to a certain extent been simmering below the surface, although it was also largely due to the dramatic political and moral changes and the attendant social anxieties which affected people's lives. Nevertheless, some of the causes were rooted in the East German society itself. A broad public debate about this phenomenon began after the upheaval of 1989.106 Political conditions in the GDR, which left no room for democratic discourse about the problems weighing on society, militated against sincere endeavours by many people to encourage international solidarity and public tolerance and amity towards people of different ethnic origins. True, the dominant ideology preached internationalism, but at the same time spread intellectual and cultural intolerance. In the aftermath of 1989, a specific brand of GDR nationalism and a kind of provincialism among the East German population turned into a xenophobic attitude towards people from 204

Special Flights to Souilc'rn .frica20 other countries, who were now seen as competitors for fewer jobs and affordable housing. Xenophobia is by no means confined to the eastern part of Germany, and b\ discussing the causes of this phenomenon in the GDR context we certainly do not wish to belittle the solidarity which many GDR citizens showed towards SWAPO and a free Namibia. On the contrary, their sincere commitment and practical support deserves to be understood and accepted as a valuable inheritance for the united Germany. Beltin, Stassfurt, Cuianza Sul: Assistance in public education In May 1978, gruesome pictures outraged the international public. On 4 May South African paratroopers had attacked a SWAPO camp at Cassinga in Angola, massacring men, women and children, 867 altogether. Similar attacks on SWAPO camps in Angola followed in rapid succession. Faced with this situation, SWAPO president Nujoma requested the SED leadership in 1979 to grant asylum for a prolonged period to around 200 children aged between four and six and 20 Namibian women. The children, orphaned by the attacks on Cassinga or left to themselves while their parents, including top-ranking SWAPO officials, were fighting in the field, had to be saved from constant bombardments by the South African air force. The wornen accompanying them were to help the children in exile and simultaneously to train as nursery school teachers. They would, SWAPO hoped, be available in time as cadres for a nursery school programme of its own. As to the children, SWAPO was confident that GDR was optimally placed to educate them in the desired political sense. Festus Naholo expressed SWAPO's great trust in the GDR as follows: 'Somebody to whom you entrust your future, your children, that somebody is really a friend of yours."' In September 1979 the SED CC Secretariat granted SWAPO's request. It noted that receiving the children and the women could provide effective help for SWAPO's struggle and its policy with regard to a prospective education and training system of its own. As the G DR had no experience of working with African children in this specific situation, plans were initially drawn up for a small home to house 80 children and 15 Namibian women in attendance.08 The building chosen was a mansion in Bellin, a village south of Guestrow in the Mecklenburg region, which had for a long time housed a specialised school for the Schwerin County SED Executive. It was surrounded by a 205

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO large park with beautiful old trees, and expectations were that the children would be happy in this serene milieu. In this context it may be of interest that around the turn of the century second- or third-born sons of the landed gentry east of the Elbe river who saw no future for themselves at home left to try their luck in German colonies, preferably German South-West Africa, today's Namibia. Eight decades later, the reverse was happen ing Nam ibian children took possession of the former hereditary residence of one of Mecklenburg's aristocratic families. The interior of the mansion had, of course, to be greatly modified to suit the purposes of children's education. The funds were provided for by the GDR finance ministry.0 Within a very short time the building was ready for its new purpose, thanks to combined efforts by the competent authorities in Berlin and Schwerin County, assisted by East German women who had seen SWAPO refugee camps in Angola and had witnessed the problems of the people there. Everything was waiting - toys, clothes and everyday necessities - for the children and their escorts. The German women had seen to it that the children's provisional domicile in Bellin was welcoming and that at least a few details recalled their familiar African environment. They recommended, for example, that instead of buying dolls' prams, standard toys in GDR kindergartens, it would make more sense to procure cloth for slings to carry the dolls in. Before the children arrived in Berlin, a team from the GDR Ministry of Public Education travelled to Angola in October 1979 to prepare the necessary contracts with SWAPO on cooperation in this field, which also included the assignment of GDR teachers to SWAPO-run educational facilities in Angola. ' Additional arrangements were agreed with a SWAPO delegation which visited the GDR to study its experience in public education. Finally, the moment had come: after a long flight from Luanda via Lagos on an Interflug plane, the first group of 80 children arrived in Berlin on 18 December 1979. They immediately boarded coaches which took them to Bellin. They must have been very tired and fairly intimidated when they saw their new home. Their anxiety during these early days in Bellin was eased by the presence of 15 Namibian women who, together with GDR colleagues, catered for their needs. At the same time these women took a nursery teacher training course at the educational college in Schwerin - a very great challenge for them, too. The cost of the project was financed from three different sources. Travel 206

Special Flights to Southern Arica2 expenses from Angola were borne by the SED CC main cashier's office; the salaries for teachers and assistants were paid by the Ministry of Public Education, which in its 1980 budget included all running costs for the children and their home.'" But soon the Solidarity Committee replaced the Ministry as the sponsor, which meant that all the costs of food, clothing, maintenance of the home in Bellin and other expenses were financed exclusively from solidarity contributions by the East German public. The expenditure per child was over I 200 marks a month."3 The residents of the mansion in Bellin virtually became the children of solidarity. Among them was a boy, today in his twenties, who remembers how the Namibian children felt in Bellin in those days First, in Bellin, we lived in a huge old farmyard, almost like a palace. The old building, the wooden floors which vibrated when we were dancing, the beautiful old windows, everything there ... was simply beautiful.'''4 After two years, the first 28 of the Namibian children reached school age. Like German children, they started their first day at school with a traditional present, a conical bag of sweets. They were grouped in two special classes at a ten-year old polytechnical school in Zehna, a neighbouring village. They had prepared for school by doing special exercises, notably in the German language. Two Namibian teachers were employed to teach them a proper command of their mother tongue and tell them about the cultural traditions of their native country. A few African round-huts were even built in the park. The fifteen Namibian women also passed an important milestone after two years. In 1981 they sat for examinations and received diplomas as qualified nursery teachers. Most of them returned to Angola; four stayed on to take a six-month course on pre-school education management and planning. In September 1981 the next group of Namibian women arrived in Bellin. By 1989, 64 had taken their nursery teacher's diploma at the educational college in Schwerin."' At SWAPO's request, the home in Bellin took in another 25 Namibian children below school age in 1982. This meant that it had to be enlarged and structurally modified."6 Additional numbers of children arrived in the following years."' Even in July 1989, when SWAPO was clearing its camps in Angola during transition to Namibian independence, 200 children below school age and also older ones were flown to the GDR. The total number of young Nam ibians admitted to the GDR was 425.' ' After 26 Namibian children reached school age in 1982 and again in 207

Nam ibia: The GDR's solidurity with SWA PO .aunibiun chttdro' in the ciddreui s tue in Belin in Ahtrch 1) 1983, their educational future became an urgent issue. During his visit to the GDR in September 1983 Sam Nujoma requested that they be allowed to stay in the GDR for higher-grade schooling. Tile fact that this question was submitted to top- level decision-makers shows how much importance was attached to schooling. The SED Politbureau agreed that the children should be looked after and educated in the GDR for several years more, tentatively up to completion of grade 10, where compulsory education ended for East Germans."9 Consequently, the children in this age group were transferred from Bellin to Stassfurt, to a boarding school called the "School of Friendship", for education in grade 5 and upwards. Since 1982, the boarding school had been the home for 900 Mozambican pupils, who took up industrial training in 1985 in and around Stassfurt and elsewhere, so that the school now had some free space. This was used to accommodate the Narnibian pupils.'20 Until 1988 they took their lessons in special classes at a polytechnical secondary school in Loederburg, with German teachers for all subjects except the Oshiwambo language and history of their native country, which 208

Special Flights to Southern Afica2 were taught by Namibians.1' Namibian children in the GDR were in tie news in 1989 as the electoral campaign in Namibia was starting and certain forces thought they could instrumentalise them for their own political aims. Actively aided by the International Society for Human Rights in Frankfurt/Main, they spread stories about an "enforced exile" of these children and their"Germanisation" in the GDR. '22 The stories were soon discredited, and the campaign finally misfired. Its authors had been insinuating that the children were the kidnapped sons and daughters of prisoners in SWAPO custody. Compounding the turbulence in the German unification process, the campaign had the effect of producing a hasty return of the children to Namibia, where no conditions had been met for their proper integration. Their return marked the beginning of a new stage in their personal histories as "SWAPO children" or "GDR children", now adolescents or grown-up. Their fate has been described in detail and has been the subject of much comment both in Namibia and Germany.23 Upon repatriation, most of them felt they were arriving in a foreign country. Some of them have meanwhile digested the cultural shock and gained a foothold in Namibia. In early 1996, ten of those who had extended their stay in the GDR were studying at a university or other educational establishment in South Africa, 13 were in Germany (tell for training, two for an au pair year), 26 had found a full- time or part-time job or an opportunity for training in Namibia, and six were studying there, reported Hannelore Hopf, psychological consultant for these young people on behalf of Service Overseas, at the University Centre for Studies in Namibia (TUCSIN). In her 'view, the years the Namibians had spent in the GDR had been very useful. That part of their childhood was a happy one and they were given good education, which they could build on if and when they had an opportunity, essentially in the form of ajob or further train ing or education. She criticised the strong political and ideological bias of their education in the GDR.'24 Interestingly, young people who were questioned about their stay in the GDR, while expressing differing views on certain aspects of their life there, unanimously praised the care and sense of belonging they enjoyed ill the GDR, and their relationship of trust with their East German teachers. At school and at home, they had all been "like a big family". 'When I think back, I primarily associate a fine time, a very line time with the GDR,' said a young woman who was part of the group.'2' Notwithstanding financial aid from tile foreign office in Bonn and socio- 209

Namibiu: The GDR's solidaity with SWAPO pedagogical counselling by the church run development aid organisation Dienste in Uebersee (Service Overseas), some of the "GDR children" are encountering extreme difficulties in finding their place in life, as they feel torn between two different cultures.'-M Four from the group of those who stayed longer in the GDR initially "dropped out" upon their return.)27 SWAPO officials have also reported that the boys and girls sent to the GDR turned out to be like Germans rather than the prospective leaders of a free Namibia, which it was hoped they would become.21 It will take more joint German-Namibian efforts to bring this chapter of GDR- SWAPO cooperation to a fortuitous end for all the young Namibians concerned. The "black Germans", as they are frequently characterised in Namibia, are potential bridge-builders between the cultures in Namibia, and can play a role in German-Namibian relations as well. There was another dimension to GDR-SWAPO educational cooperation Cuanza Sul province in southern Angola. From 1980 onwards,29 GDR teachers went there to teach Namibian refugee children and help SWAPO educational officers to develop strategies for an education system in a free Namibia. They also contributed to international seminars on this subject.13U With supplies and personnel, the GDR also assisted SWAPO with building its own Pioneer Organisation for children. Useful cooperation developed in Cuanza Sul between East German teachers and Namibian nursery school teachers educated in the GDR. Together with their colleagues from other countries, these East German teachers were often the stable factor in education at the SWAPO camps, when Narn ibian teachers had to put blackboard and chalk aside and take up a rifle or whatever the situation required. The international community of teachers in Cuanza Sul contributed very much to the continuity of work on the "education front."'' The teachers' work did not finish when classes were over; they would often spend their afternoon running leisure activities for young people in the camp. They helped set up the Pioneer Organ isation, rehearsed songs or poems with the girls and boys. 'These afternoon activities,' stresses the SWAPO Youth League official Lempy Kalungu, 'were actually no part of the teachers' regular work, they did them in their free time."2 The assignment of GDR teachers was very much appreciated by their Namibian partners. Their dedication, like that of other GDR experts in the camps who were working side by side with their colleagues from abroad, largely determined the GDR's image in SWAPO's eyes, demonstrating that 210

Special Flights to Southern Africu vh ites and blacks could very well I ive and work together as equals. Teacher Sabine Zinke is specially remembered by members of SWAPO. She compiled a collection of songs which were sung in the SWAPO camps and, like some of her East German colleagues, did not break off her contacts after the GDR ceased to exist.'3 Pashukeni Shoombe, today SWAPO's Secretary for Finance, has described the lasting impression left by the GDR experts' work in the camps: I sas admiring those people, the teachers and doctors, because they were hard working people and serious with their work. They were sometimes harder working than our own people. They were really our friends. What impressed was their behaviour. They were not selfish, the), shared with us, they helped When going to the GDR I thought I could upgrade myself to them. 4 Support for the armed struggle From paramilitary equipment to arms and ammunition Cooperation on military and security matters played a particularly important part in relations between the GDR and SWAPO. As described above, the GDR supported the liberation organisation's armed struggle as a legitimate means to win independence for Namibia. The assistance which the GDR provided in this specific field, at SWAPO's request, fiorn the second half of the 1970s conformed with UN recommendations and OAU decisions. Assistance for SWAPO in the "non-civilian" field, as it was called in the GDR's official terminology, dated back to requests which SWAPO made after its armed action began in August 1966."5 In May 1967 it asked the GDR Solidarity Committee to provide paramilitary equipment for its fighters, in particular khaki shirts and trousers, food bags and water bottles, hats, raincoats, boots, blankets and binoculars for 150 fighters. Further items on that list were six wireless transmitters, 50 light tents, 12 bicycles, six motorbikes and, not to be forgotten, 50 crates of cigarettes. Even musical instruments, three trumpets and six guitars, were included."'h In 1969 SWAPO requested camouflage battledress, water bottles, compasses, shirts and shoes for men as well as dresses and shoes for women.'7 It is not recorded whether and how much of these items were supplied. What is clear is that the Solidarity Committee furnished SWAPO, just like other liberation movements in southern Africa, with paramilitary equipment as of the mid-I 960s. However, SWAPO was not among the recipients when the SED Politbureau decided in January 1967 for the first time to supply arms to

Namibia.: The GDR's solidarity with SWA PO southern A frican liberation movements."' The Solidarity Committee continued to provide supplies for PLAN fighters throughout the first half of the 1970s. As Sam Nujorna assured the Committee in a letter of thanks in September 1972, medicines and medical equipment from the GDR were very helpful.'39 In 1974, for instance, supplies for PLAN camps included water bottles, airbeds, camp beds, blankets and food."4 The importance of supplies for the camps obtained a vital dimension in tile second half of the 1970s as thousands of young Nanibians left their country for Angola and Zambia to join SWAPO. They needed shelter and food, and later the question was how and where to educate and train them, first and foremost for military combat, but also for an occupation or trade. Depending on their level of education, man), of them were told to go for vocational training or university studies elsewhere. Assistance for SWAPO's armed struggle began to increase after Nujoma's visit to the GDR in December 1977. As noted above, the GDR's highest authority committed itself to assisting the PLAN " ith military hardware. Acting upon instruction by Erich Honecker, who was also the chief of the GDR's National Defence Council, Defence Minister Heinz Hoffmann ordered an urgent check of the GDR's supply capacity and communicated his conclusions in early January 1978: in January and February it would be possible to supply sub-machine guns (150 pieces of type KmS and 700 of type K), 60 heavy machine guns type PKM, plus ammunition, from the Defence Ministry's stocks, and 150 type M pistols and i5 type M light machine guns fiom the State Security Ministry's stocks. The cost of the 135, tonne consignment was estimated at 1,15 million marks.4' Evidently, however, it was delivered with a few months' delay, in May. A high-level military delegation from the GDR visited Angola from I to 17 May 1978, when hundreds of Namibians were killed in the South African attack against Cassinga. The officers were given first-hand information on the situation in Angola by senior SWAPO officials and also on the successful forging of the armed struggle in Namibia. They were also asked to take home "warmest thanks for the comprehensive solidarity" from the GDR, evidently a reference to the mentioned arms supply aboard the Deutsche Seereederei vessel Fichte, which had just steamed into the South Angolan port of Mocamedes.'42 Towards the end of that year, another consignment worth 1,4 million marks was being assembled for SWAPO's army, to be complete and ready for shipment in February 1979. It included 2 000 AKM sub-machine guns, each with two combat sets of ammunition, 212

Special Flights to Southern Africa 5 000 grenades, 2 000 infantry mines, 200 portable radio communication sets and 2 000 steel helmets.'43 Intensified cooperation in the "ion-civiliani "field Aid in the "non-civilian field" was also a topic in Honecker's discussions with Nujoma in Luanda in February 1979. The two leaders agreed that tile GDR would assist SWAPO by providing uniforms for 10 000 fighters and urgently needed vehicles. Honecker added that it would not be easy to supply the uniforms since the GDR had already undertaken to make 150 000 uniforms as solidarity aid for other recipients in this period. He promised Nujoma 50 trucks of the W 50 type.44 The trucks and also heavy weapons were essential if SWAPO's military leadership was to carry out its new strategy, which a delegation led by Peter Nanyemba, Secretary for Defence, expounded during a trip to the GDR from 26 to 30 April 1979, after visits to Moscow and Prague where the delegation had secured support for the liberation movement's plan.4s In Berlin, they met officials from the SED CC's Security Affairs Department and were received by the GDR Defence Minister. They outlined to their German partners SWAPO's decision to gradually set up regular units in support of the guerrillas - a strategy that somehow resembled ZAPU's plans at the time. The SWAPO leadership was sure of growing support for the organisation from the Namibian people, and that was one of the reasons for the decision, they said. The new mechanised units, which were to be equipped with modern material, would not be placed under UN control. By that time, Defence minister Hoffmann was able to make Nanyemba a definitive promise that the uniforms for the PLAN would be made in the GDR as soon as SWAPO provided a list of the required quantities and sizes. He also mentioned the decision already taken to supply trucks, whereas all the other requests were going to be examined.'47 These included, among other items, ten T- 34 tanks, 67 armoured personnel carriers and 20 pieces of artillery. In addition, the SWAPO military requested one-year training courses for 20 commanders from batallion up to brigade level, similar to those which the USSR and Czechoslovakia would be organising, as well as training for counter-intelligence officers and assistance with organising counter-intelligence, reconnaissance and bodyguards.'48 After Honecker gave consent, the SED CC's security affairs department communicated these requests to the ministries of defence and state security.49 Defence minister Hoffmann reported to Honecker in October 213

Namibiu: The GDR's solidarij with SWAPO 1979 that, upon consultation and coordination with the Soviet General Staff, his ministry thought additional military aid could be provided for SWAPO. The GDR, he proposed, should supply arms and ammunition worth 3,5 million marks, including anti-tank missiles, sub-machine guns, sharpshooter rifles and machine guns, with the required ammunition, as well as grenades, protective masks and demolition agents. Furthermore, he offered training for a total of 20 military cadres on two courses, one from 1980 to 1982 and another from 1981 to 1983.'5 More "non-cilivan" supplies from the GDR reached SWAPO in the years to follow. In 1981 1,6 million marks were earmarked for this purpose, and 2,8 million in 1983/84.' In addition came W 50 trucks to serve as PLAN personnel carriers, and spare parts for these vehicles. Plans for 1983/84 listed 44 of such all- wheel-drive vehicles worth 3 million marks, among them 40 personnel carriers, three bowsers and a truck-mounted workshop. Instead of ready-made unifomis, the GDR supplied textiles with a camouflage pattern from wh ich uniforms were tailored locally in Angola ,52-probably a better solution for both sides. Ex-PLAN commanders, who now serve in the Namibian Defence Ministry, said they counted the GDR among the principal suppliers of weapons, equipment and provisions for SWAPO's army in those days. They especially appreciated GDR- made communication technology. Establishing radio communication networks was generally an East German speciality, which was also provided in independent African countries, including Angola. Namibian military executives have confirmed that GDR supplies of weapons and equipment greatly helped SWAPO to build up a significant military potential and a developed logistics network.'53 Commencing in 1978, the GDR chiefly trained PLAN fighters in military intelligence, which the GDR had chosen as a priority area in assisting fi'iendly liberation movements in southern Africa. It also assisted in the technological field and other areas, for instance, service as bodyguards. Looking back, former PLAN officers praised the high standard of training in the GDR. Their fonner adversaries had closely observed the GDR's aid to SWAPO.' 4 Their current view is that military training in the GDR was by comparison effective, with high technological and tactical standards, especially in military intelligence - a line of activity they had been directly confronted with. South African military commentators also believe that the increased combat power of the PLAN, associated with its shift towards mobile guerilla tactics in the early 1980s, and its capacity to conduct combat operations 214

Special Flights to Southern 4frica with larger units, to which the PLAN had been resorting to since the mid1980s, vere the result of GDR training for SWAPO's military cadres.' East German assistance has been instrumental for the strengthening of the fighting of PLAN. PLAN was actively fighting alongside Cuban and Angolan forces against the South African/Unio para a Independenia Total de Angola (UNITA) attacks at Cuito Cuanavale."L'l The GDR's cooperation with SWAPO in military. intelligence and security matters was regarded as necessary and important by both sides, in view of the situation and the historic implications of the liberation struggle. The GDR granted material and training assistance at the request of SWAPO, which appreciated it as a significant contribution towards achieving independence for Namibia. Party relations benveen SED and SWAPO As mentioned above, SED and SWAPO concluded their first agreement on cooperation during Nujoma's visit to the GDR in December 1977, which was the basis for developing party relations in subsequent years. SED did not however overestimate the role of the an-ned struggle. The party saw the latter in relation with SWAPO's political work as the CC international department stated in the middle of 1987. In our opinion the political struggle inside Namibia is of prime importance. It will strengthen SWAPO's close attachment with the people and its position in the long run. To this end the strengthening of the unity of SWAPO and the broadening of its alliance with the different groupings inside the country are significant. The settlement of the Namibian problem cannot be achieved primarily by means of armed struggle.' 5b As a rule, such agreements concluded by the SED with friendly liberation organisations were for a period of one or two years. In a short preamble they summarised the political and ideological premises - common opposition to imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism - and staked out the principal directions of future cooperation. These included, among other things, invitations for study delegations and encouragement of relations between mass organisations like trade unions and youth and women's organisations. A particularly important point were consultations about international developments of common interest and each other's policies, and a regular exchange of information, documentation and publications. Education of liberation movement cadres at institutions run by the SED was another major purpose of such agreements. As previously explained,

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO material assistance to be contributed by the Solidarity Committee was included in the scope of party relations. The same applied to visits by senior officials for medical treatment or vacations in the GDR. The SED viewed a formal agreement on party relations as an indicator of the political status of its relations with the liberation movement concerned. SWAPO students in Rostock One-year courses for SWAPO cadres at the SED's regional party schools were a major feature of inter-party relations. The first course for SWAPO members began in September 1979 and lasted only for six months. Together with ten ANC members, 21 Namibians attended a basic course on MarxismLeninism at the regional party school in Mittweida (then in Karl-Marx-Stadt County, today Saxony). In 1980/81, when SWAPO sent 19 cadres for political education, the regional "John Scheer" party school in Rostock took over as the location for the courses, which were extended to last ten months, from September to June, plus vacations. From then until 1989/90, about 30 SWAPO members were annually enrolled for such political education courses in the GDR, some 310 women and men altogether. In terms of party school students in the GDR, SWAPO held second place among the friendly parties and liberation movements in southern Africa, behind ZANU/ZAPU and followed by the ANC, the MPLA and FRELIMO. "I Responsibility for the content of politico-ideological education lay with the SED Central Committee's department of propaganda, which coordinated with the CC's International Relations Department. In a report to the top echelon of the party in 1988, the propaganda department underlined that participants in the courses "had their first-ever opportunity to acquaint themselves coherently with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory, the dialectics of the world revolutionary process and the anti-imperialist struggle as well as with the generally valid laws of socialist revolution and socialist construction." The greater part of the participants had never before read a "classic of Marxism-Leninism." "To help them form a scientific perception of the world and, in particular, to understand the developmental processes in nature and society, arrangements were made to introduce them to Marxist-Leninist classics. Film shows and lectures showing the evolution of life on earth and the development of man and society, with visible success, were organised," says the report.'57 The propaganda department reported that the teachers combined lectures on the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution - a priority teaching subject "most closely with a description of the SED's concrete experience in initiating the antifascist- democratic transformation and establishing and constantly 216

Special Flights to Southern Africa strengthening the new political power structure in the years from 1945 to 1960, specifically in implementing the land reform, school reform, judicial reform, transferring enterprises into people's property and gradually launching cooperative forms of production, enforcing national economic planning, creating military safeguards for the revolutionary achievements and developing politico- ideological persuasion." This approach was also to push back "the occasionally fairly simplified ideas about the pace of progress and the conditions and premises for moving ahead."'58 The periods of"antifascist-democratic transformation" in East Germany between 1945 and 1949 and of "creating the founding of socialism" up to 1961, as they used to be characterised in GDR historiography, had always been central to whatever the GDR told its partners in African and Asian countries about its experiences. With approval, in fact encouragement by the Soviet Union, GDR representatives in the mid- ! 960s started to place increasing emphasis on specific East German experience from the period right after World War I. This experience differed in certain ways from that of the Soviet Union after the October revolution of 1917 and of the other Eastern European countries, and was judged a useful example for a peaceful transition to socialism, with scope for coexisting forms of property of means of production, including private capitalist ones, over a lengthy period of time and an involvement of different social classes and strata in "the revolutionary transformation of society." Originally, the GDR's example was also intended to counter Chinese propaganda about a "people's war" as the only form of socialist revolution, and the "big leap" policy for social and economic development."' But despite some modifications the GDR society had to follow the basic principles of the Soviet brand of "socialism" which was doomed to fail mainly due to its undemocratic character and the inefficiency of its centrally planned economy. The central point of all discussions about the East German experience with foreign students at party schools was how to tackle economic and social development under the extremely difficult initial conditions. This aspect was believed to be of great importance for the friendly liberation organ isations. It remains debatable whether the experience of the GDR as a highly industrialised country could have been of any use to SWAPO and other Third World partners, particularly as they were presented as a result of "generally valid laws" of"the Marxist-Leninist doctrine", which was in fact in a state of dogmatic ossification and included as indispensable features the "leading role of the party" and policies to safeguard its unbridled power. Adherence to these dogmas in the GDR was one of the reasons for the non-development of democracy; and without democracy, social progress was ultimately 217

218 Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO unsustainable. The collapse of "socialism" in the GDR and in Eastern Europe has left this as an historical experience to remember. Cooperation with the GDR in general and in the area of political education in particular was no doubt one channel for the input of socialist ideas in SWAPO's programme. However, according to insiders, it would be simplifying to describe the study at the party school in Rostock as pure "indoctrination". The courses included many excursions and other contacts with everyday life in the GDR, which gave participants food for thought in various directions. There were those who primarily concluded that women need to participate on equal terms in shaping society, whereas others gained insights into the difficulty of sustaining a country's economy. Others again realised from their own day-to-day experience that cooperation with whites was quite feasible if it was based on mutual respect. Last but not least, their study of historical and dialectical materialism will have given all of them a greater knowledge of nature and society. 160 This has been confirmed, in retrospect, by both SWAPO officials and outside observers, "I SWAPO representatives have underlined that students, among them many top and middle level officials, viewed their courses at the party school in Rostock not primarily as ideological instruction, but as an opportunity to examine and discuss a variety of theoretical and practical questions. For the greater part of them, their studies in Rostock did not just expand their knowledge; they encouraged personality development in a general sense. Frequently for the first time in their life, they were involved in discussions on different subjects where they were supposed to state their views. They learnt to be articulate, to enunciate critically on problems and to develop a line of reasoning. When they returned to the camps, they were fit to act in a new role to draw up different kinds of political material, to give lectures, and to mobilise others by means of their own activity. A great number of SWAPO members who, after independence, came to serve in the government and civil service or in SWAPO itself were students at the regional party school in Rostock. The policy of reconciliation pursued by the Namibian Government, with active support from the former Rostock students, contains elements, especially where relations with the German-speaking minority are concerned, which are due to experiences in the GDR and keeping company with East Germans.162 It has to be noted, however, that these experiences were mostly not tarnished by the grave deficits in the GDR's society which were felt by its citizens. Where these deficits were noted, they will probably have appeared much less significant to the Namibians in view of their own negative experience of racial oppression and social plight, to which the African majority was

Special Flights to Southern Africa 219 exposed in Namibia Linder South African occupation. Discussions on Nanibia's future Another important field of party relations was SED "counselling" for SWAPO. The SED regarded this role as a major indicator of the mutual trust that had evolved in the overall relationship. In 1986, the International Relations Department of the SED Central Committee chose Professor Johannes Pilz from the party's Institute for Socialist Economic Management to serve at the GDR's embassy in Luanda, with the diplomatic rank of counsellor. His specific duties consisted in coordinating all matters which regarded SWAPO in Angola, except those concerning security and military aspects of cooperation, and in maintaining permanent liaison with SWAPO's leadership. 6 "My task was to prepare the GDR's relations with Nam ibia for the times after accession to independence, so that the GDR would be politically present, on an equal footing with the Federal Republic of Germany, which had much influence in the country on account of the German minority," said Professor Pi lz. 6 Emphasis was on the word "equal". By the mid 1980s, relations between the two German states had eased to a degree that concepts for relations with Namibia were no longer determined by inter-German rivalry, or at least less than they had been a few years before, in the late 1970s. As that period drew to a close, policy- makers in East Berlin even started to think about the possibility of sensible East- West German cooperation in Namibia, and Professor Pilz remembered how he enjoyed suggesting this to his West German diplomatic colleagues.' Relations between the two Germanies had reached a level which made it possible to surmount the front lines of the Cold War, persistent and yet on the ebb and which encouraged "new thinking" in the GDR's African policy. Professor Pilz had been instructed by the CC's International Relations Department not to spoon-feed SWAPO, and by no means to insinuate that the GDR should be the sole German representation to be recognised. He was supposed to follow this same line with regard to Namibia's domestic development. "My task was to lead an open discussion with SWAPO, to give food for thought rather than present ready-made concepts," he said. His former partners have confirmed that he explicitly told them that SWAPO ought to develop its own ideas and should not blindly copy the GDR, since a socialist development for Namibia after independence was out of the question under the prevailing circumstances. What was visual ised instead was a stable, democratic evolution in Namibia following independence. SWAPO members who had dealings with Professor Pilz remember fraternal cooperation

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO and his cordial association with their organisation 6' Professor Pilz had studied problems in Namibia and matters relating to SWAPO well before his posting to the GDR's embassy in Luanda. He had been a member of the working group on developing countries at the Institute for Socialist Economic Management, and SWAPO officials knew him from courses on economics and finance which were organised in the GDR at SWAPO's request; for example, a general course on economic policy from May to July 1983, consultations about financial policy in 1984, and a further education course on financial administration a year later.67 Lucas Pohamba, SWAPO's Secretary for Finance at the time, remembers that a small group of senior SWAPO officials took part in the above-mentioned two-month course in 1983. They attended lectures at scientific institutes in Berlin and held discussions in seminars. Visits to administrative authorities and financial institutions gave them an insight into the organisation and management of government agencies. The GDR partners involved saw to it that the course was tailored to accord with prospective conditions in an independent Namibia.68 Professor Pilz had also represented the Institute for Socialist Economic Management at seminars convened by the UN Institute for Namibia to discuss economic development in Namibia after independence. His working group, which was dissolved by Politbureau member Mittag - for unknown reasons in 1986, had been exploring pertinent issues for some time and compiled a paper in 1983, which contained reflections on initial economic policies in an independent Namibia. Erich Honecker handed this paper over to Sam Nujoma during his visit to the GDR in September 1983. '6" The paper was a good basis for discussions on future Namibian economic policies which Professor Pilz held with his SWAPO partners in Angola. These discussions took account of the negative experiences observed by the GDR since the mid 1970s during its involvement in a forced policy of socialist development in Angola and Mozambique, which was evidently at odds with real conditions in these countries. Therefore, Professor Pilz recalled, the paper drawn up by the East German scholars did not recommend a socialist-oriented path of development for Namibia, but a cautious disengagement from its total economic dependence on South Africa. The paper paid due regard to agricultural development, including a reallocation of resources in favour of rural regions. A balanced development of all regions and structural prerequsites to achieve it were anothCr priority it suggested. As far as the country's overall development was concerned, the scientists noted that all national forces of good will should be invited to join in the reconstruction effort, without any marginalisation on political grounds. Class struggle was not a recipe propounded in the paper, 220

Special Flights to Southern Africa which, remarkably enough, came from one of the SED-run institutes. This comparatively realistic perspective for socio-econornic development in a free Namibia fitted in with a critical review of traditional development strategies for Third World countries generally which had been undertaken in the GDR since the early 1980s. This review resulted in an expos, with new reflections which the SED CC's International Relations Department submitted to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Politbureau in October 1984. Starting out from an analysis of the economic and social situation in developing countries, the authors emphasised that the search for "quick solutions" to the problems of developing countries did not help anyone. In their view, the policy of accelerated industrialisation and technological modernisation in these countries had reached its limits, as it entailed increased technological dependence and a neglect of agriculture and food production, with catastrophic consequences for the people.'70 Not least under the pressure of the Reagan Administration's confrontation strategy, the GDR took a more realistic view in the 1980s of its own potential and that of the entire Eastern bloc. Seen from this angle, any further advance of socialism in Africa, which would have required massive support from the socialist countries, appeared to be out of the question. The CC's International Relations Department noted: Given the current power balance, the socialist countries will not be able for the foreseeable future to provide crucial material support of any major proportion to sustain the economic consolidation of revolutionary developments. It is therefore more important than ever to help revolutionary forces develop realistic strategies about how to achieve the aims of their struggle and ensure economic progress, paying due regard to the existing level of productive forces and social conciousness and primarily relying on their own potential, and visualising compromises where these are inevitable."' Suggesting "reliance on their own potential" rather than "internationalist help" by the Soviet Union and its allies would have been condemned as a Maoist theory a few years before. All in all, that paper from the CC's International Relations Department betrayed an evolving awareness of problems, which was also reflected in the party relations between the SED and SWAPO. The implementation of resolution 435 "New thinking" in the GDR's Africa Policy As noted in a preceding chapter, a curious situation emerged in the early 1980s. The Eastern bloc countries, which initially did not want to see Security Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO Council resolution 435 adopted, came to defend the substance of the UN plan for Namibia presented by the Western contact group and demanded its implementation more insistently than some of its authors, notably the United States. This happened after Ronald Reagan had moved into the White House and launched his policy of "" towards South Africa. 2 That policy departed from the previous Western diplomacy of compromise, which had been fairly successful in countering the Eastern bloc's offensive in southern Africa, as shown by the results of initial negotiations on the Nam ibian question and the Lancaster House agreement on Zirbabwe. The new situation in the East- West conflict with its southern ramifications was glaringly manifest in southern Africa, where the West, with a crude friend-or-foe view, was siding with South Africa and the rebel movements of UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, which were supported by the apartheid regime, whereas the East was supporting the governments in Angola and Mozambique and the liberation organisations of ANC and SWAPO, which were recognised by the UN and the OAU. Encouraged by the deterioration in the overall political climate, South Africa became so intransigent on resolution 435 that implementation appeared more distant than ever. Pretoria opted for an aggressive policy ofdestabilising its neighbours, which caused immeasurable damage and destruction to human, social and economic resources, especially in Angola and Mozambique, the East's allies, but also in the region as a whole. It used the territory of Narnibia as a springboard for permanent aggression against Angola. The South African destabilisation strategy confronted the Eastern bloc with a choice: should priority go to stabilising Angola and Mozambique or supporting the armed struggle waged by SWAPO and the ANC? This question was a subject of internal discussion in the GDR, which decided in favour of Angola and Mozambique, without cutting back assistance for the liberation movements. This strong engagement in the region placed an increasingly heavy burden on the Soviet Union and its allies. Internationally, at the UN and at conferences on southern Africa, GDR representatives spoke up against the policy of confrontation in southern Africa and pleaded for a solution to the Namibian problem without further delay, on the basis of resolution 435. Like deputy Foreign Minister Gerd Koenig at the international conference on Namibia in Paris in April 1983, they particularly opposed the US-devised linkage between a Namibian settlement and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Koenig insisted on comprehensive and effective sanctions against South Africa to force it to abandon its policy which defied international law. 'it is therefore high time that the Security Council again exercised its full

Special Flights to Southern Africa responsibility. Immediate measures are required fbr a speedy implementation of resolutions 385 and 435, in addition to further resolute steps to harness the apartheid racists. The stand taken by each Security Council member on such decisions will demonstrate their true position,' he stated.' The GDR expressed the view that the call for Cuba to withdraw its troops from Angola, as a precondition to Namibia's accession to independence, constituted 'gross interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states' and was "'part of the racists' destabilisation policies," an "alternate form of the attacks which have been mounted for many years against social progress in the region", aimed at "the unbridled enforcement of imperialist interests and the liquidation of the national liberation movements."'174 During his visit to the GDR in September 1983, SWAPO president Sam NuJoma described the difficult situation for SWAPO and Angola in the wake of South Africa's aggression and the operations launched by UNITA with Pretoria's support. . Faced with extreme challenges, SWAPO hoped that the socialist countries would provide increased assistance, not only for the organisation itself- which it effectively received - but also for Angola, which urgently needed help in all fields. In view of the exacerbated conflict in southern Africa, the GDR Foreign Ministry reviewed the situation in the region. After the CC's International Relations Department had submitted the aforementioned expos, on the developing countries to the Politbureau's Foreign Affairs Commission in October 1984, the Ministry followed suit one month later, with its own strategy paper on the GDR's future policy in southern Africa. 76 Unlike the International Relations Department, which conceded that serious problems in developing countries, including the people's republics of Angola and Mozambique, were due in some ways to the socialist strategy for development applied there, the Ministry practically confined itself to describing the consequences of the Western confrontation strategy in southern Africa and also clung more visibly to the clichds of "international class struggle." What both papers had in common was an explicit emphasis on the need for peace in the region. The Foreign Ministry paper observed that southern Africa continued to hold "an important place in the class struggle between socialism and imperialism." It interpreted the region's degeneration into an acute source of conflict as a result of imperialist global confrontation politics, designed "to halt the advance of socialism in Africa." As against this, the socialist countries were firmly aligned with the independent states in southern Africa and the national liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. Together with the independent states and the national liberation movements they urge that the politics of military force and destabilisation 22 3

Namibia. The GDR's solidarity with SW,4PO against the states and peoples of southern Afirica be discontinued and tile conflict in the region be resolved by peaceful means. This attitude is part and parcel of (he peace policy of the socialist states, and it contributes to preserving the independent African states as an important force in the struggle to ensure peace and thwart the imperialist confrontation course. Delending the progressive course in Mozambique and Angola remains a priority task for revolutionary struggle in the region.' The foreign affairs experts perceived a single-minded strategy by the United States and South Africa in which each had a different role to play, as the overt use of predominantly military force was gradually supplemented by political and diplomatic means (such as the Nkomati agreement signed by Mozambique and South Africa in April 1984, and similar agreements signed by South Africa and other neighbouring countries in the region, author's note), underpinned by selective economic blackmail and military pressure against the Front Line states. In its conclusion, the paper attached great importance to the Namibian question and, among others, proposed the following tasks: In coordination with the USSR and other allies, the GDR should make "an effective contribution to ensuring and strengthening peace and security in southern Africa and oppose the continued involvement of the region in the imperialist course of confrontation and sharpened conflict." Its foreign policy should seek to "mobilise all progressive and patriotic forces for a common struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, against a pro- imperialist settlement of the Namibian question, and for preventing renewed aggression." Support should be given to steps by the African states "aimed at ensuring a peaceful evolution in the region, independence, territorial integrity and sovereign statehood, and a further reinforcement of collaboration with the national liberation movements";'7 * In political and diplomatic contacts, the GDR should encourage coordinated action by the OAU member states, in particular the Front Line states, and the liberation movements, both among themselves and with the socialist states and other allies; * Political, diplomatic and material support for the ANC and SWAPO should be continued on the basis of inter-party accords, focussed on "political exchanges of views, cadre training, provision of experts and consultants, medical and other solidarity services". Assistance for SWAPO with the development of strategies to resolve the political, economic, social, cultural and other basic problems in a free Namibia should be maintained; * The G DR continued to regard "unconditional implementation of the UN resolutions on Namibia, including resolution 435/78", as the "sole realistic basis for Namibian independence" and called for the full exercise of UN re- 224

Special Flighis to Southern Africa sponsibility in this process. Within the UN system and other international organisations, GDR diplomacy should exert influence so that "the status of SWAPO \\ ill be safeguarded, in conformity with the relevant UN decisions." Attempts at "pro-imperialist phoneN solutions and undercutting Security Council resolution 435/78 should be rejected."'17", While the premises were still those of "international class struggle", the paper differed from the thinking of the mid- 1970s in that it no longer envisaged any further change in the international relationship of forces in favour of socialism, but a need to defend positions already gained in southern Africa. The dominant concern was preventing an escalation of the conflict and restoring peace and security to the region as conditions for its future development. That approach to the problems in southern Africa, consistent with the GDR's adamant policy of peace and dialogue in Europe, accorded with the interests and aims of the Front Line states, which ajoint delegation explained to the leadership in East Berlin in April 1987. Beyond that, it was becoming increasingl, clear that the GDR's economic weakness (which left no scope for undertaking additional commitments in favour of Mozambique at that meeting ,80) did not permit to pursue a further-reaching strategy in southern Africa in the context of"a continued world revolutionary process." In the mid-1980s, the defence of Security Council resolution 435 by the socialist countries was still associated with rejecting any further compromises on a Namibian settlement, such as the one which emerged towards the end of that decade, given the new global and regional constellations. Only the rapprochement between the superpowers during Soviet perestroika under Michail Gorbachev, and their willingness to cooperate on resolving regional conflicts, finally freed perspectives on South West Africa from Cold War fetters. Under the pressure of socio-economic disaster at home, the Soviet Union sought to jettison "foreign- policy ballast". In addition, South Africa's destabilisation strategy, supported by the United States, had reached its limits and backfired. The increasing erosion of the apartheid system, a resistance movement in South Africa which could be contained only by a state of emergency, the effects of international sanctions on the South African economy and, not least, the military stalemate in Angola after the clashes of Angolan-Cuban units with UNITA and South African troops at Cuito Cuanavale, made Pretoria more amenable to a Namibian settlement based on resolution 435. Angola needed to free its hands in order to tackle its catastrophic economic and security problems, and Cuba was keen to end its military engagement in Angola for political, economic, and psychological reasons. As the interests of all parties began to coincide, it became possible 225

Namibiu: The GDR's solidariO, with SWAPO to end the confrontation in South West Africa and work towards a settlement, in which the linkage to the Cuban troop presence, originally conceived to delay and hollow out resolution 435, allowed everyone concerned to save face. ' The GDR being one of the main supporters of SWAPO watched the renewed and earnest negotiations on South West Africa very attentively. Obviously the remarkable engagement of the GDR in the region was acknowledged by the United States. When US Assistant Secretary of State John C Whitehead was received by Honeckerduringa visit in GDR (I I June 1988) he mentioned American worries about the East German military engagement particularily in Angola and in Nicaragua. Whitehead told Honecker that it seemed desirable that the GDR would be included in the talks with the Soviet Union on regional conflicts. The East German leader did not respond directly. He however expressed his support for the ongoing talks on Angola. The GDR, he underlined looked forward to achieving concrete results and would do what is in it's power to contribute to this.'a The GDR watched the renewed and earnest negotiations on South West Africa very attentively. On 21 August 1988, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer communicated to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in a message on Namibia Day that the GDR regarded the negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with a mediating role for the United States, and the agreements on bringing about Namibia's independence as an important step on the way towards a political solution to the conflict in southern Africa. The GDR welcomed the agreement to propose the first of November 1988 as the starting date for the implementation of resolution 435, and recorded its own readiness to assist in implementing the UN decisions on Namibia. It left no doubt that it would continue with its solidarity with SWAPO.82 It hailed the agreed principles for restoring peace to the region and the provisions laid down for their observance as the fruits of good will and flexibility on all sides, which included South Africa. In view of past experiences, however, the GDR saw cause for vigilance: international public pressure on South Africa should not let up. Early implementation of resolution 435 was a great challenge for the UN and, at the same time, offered a chance to enhance the organisation's prestige. Motives for tile GDR's participation in the UN independence process Despite its reservations about resolution 435, the GDR had been thinking about participation in the Namibian independence process since the moment the resolution was adopted. It considered that involvement in the process would provide opportunities to exert influence through all its stages up to 226

Special Flights to Southern Africa and beyond the actual achievement of independence. Consequently, in 1978/ 79 the Foreign Ministry compiled a list of GDR election monitors for the elections envisaged in the UN plan for Narnibia, as H.G. Schleicher, one of the potential candidates, remembers. The verbal statement about the GDR's readiness to cooperate in implementing the independence plan for Namibia, which Foreign Minister Fischer had conveyed to the UN Secretary-General in August 1988, was soon translated into practical preparations. On 8 September 1988 the SED CC Secretariat decided on measures to prepare for the GDR's participation in the civil component of UNTAG.'84 A contribution here, the attached expos, of the Foreign Ministry noted, would reaffirm the GDR's advocacy of peaceful settlements to regional conflicts: The GDR has a fundamental interest in the restoration and preservation of peace in southern Africa and consistently supports a political settlement of the Nanibian question in accordance with the interests of the Namibian people, on the basis of Security Council resolution 435. Cooperation in UNTAG, it was believed, would also be support for Angola, Cuba and SWAPO, and was expected to enable the GDR to exert "concrete influence on the correct organisation and conduct of the elections in Namibia pursuant to the UN mandate... and to counter attempts by imperialist quarters to gain influence through broad involvement of their nations in the military and civil components."'185 Other gains which the GDR hoped to make were opportunities to move towards fully fledged relations with an independent Namibia and to enhance its own positions within the UN, not to mention economic considerations. By participating in UNTAG's civil component the GDR could defray part of its mandatory financial contribution for UNTAG. Calculations were even drawn up indicating foreign currency which would boost national revenue if GDR citizens served in the UN contingent.'86 On 20 December 1988 the SED Politbureau addressed the Narnibian question. Following the CC Secretariat's decision of 3 January 1979 on developing political and economic cooperation with an independent Namibia, the SED Politbureau decided to update and detail the measures envisaged. On the one hand, the decision showed continuity in the GDR's policy on Namibia; on the other hand, it reflected the fundamental changes in global and African politics which had meanwhile occurred. In the expos, of reasons for its paper submitted to the Politbureau,'87 the Foreign Ministry no longer foresaw inter-German confrontation in Namibia. It underlined that the GDR had gained political positions in southern Africa from its long-standing, all- 227

228 Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO round cooperation with the independent states and national liberation movements in the region. It was emphasised that the GDR had a "fundamental interest in continued and deepened cooperation and in a sustainable peace for southern Africa, specifically in a favourable external environment for all independent states in the region to develop peacefully," and that it therefore supported the political settlement of the Namibian question. The elimination of tensions in southern Africa by peaceful means would produce "objectively improved opportunities for the states in the region to join the struggle for peace, disarmament and development and to build economic relations with the GDR." Diplomatic relations, and a GDR embassy in Windhoek, should be established immediately after independence, and ties with SWAPO should be preserved. Preparatory steps were envisaged for relations in the economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields. Of immediate relevance to the period of transition was the decision to send two Foreign Ministry officials to Namibia to represent the GDR during the independence process. '" The GDR was clearly committing itself to the implementation phase of resolution 435. The GDR maintained close contact with SWAPO to coordinate its attitude towards the independence process, and it increased its assistance for SWAPO as that process went on. For example, a large group of PLAN personnel was given specific security training, notably as bodyguards, in the GDR in 1987/ 88, as part of concrete preparations for SWAPO's return to Namibia. Many of those trained security officers were aboard the DC 10 of Zambia Airways which carried the first major group of SWAPO officials, headed by Hage Geingob, who became Namibia's Prime Minister, back to Windhoek in June 1989. In a situation where the South Afiican administration was still exercising control in Namibia, the task assigned to those officers consisted in verifying whether the bulk of SWAPO's executive, and President Sam Nujoma himself, could safely return, and in taking precautions to ensure their permanent safety in their own country. The phased return of SWAPO's leaders and senior officials from exile is now known to have been discussed, carefully planned and coordinated with GDR partners, with due attention given to the political implications and the publicity and vital security aspects."89 SWAPO also consulted the GDR when preparing for the electoral campaign and formulating its election manifesto, and the GDR sent an expert to Lusaka to assist SWAPO with the production of videos. Before his return to Namibia, Sam NuIJoma paid a longer visit to the GDR from August to early September 1989. He met officials for detailed talks, which resulted in arrangements for continued cooperation between SWAPO and the GDR. Unlike other states which reduced their support for SWAPO, on the

Special Flights to Southern Afica grounds of neutrality when the UN process towards independence commenced, the GDR continued and actually increased its assistance. The posting of a Diplomatic Observer Mission to Namibia for the period of the independence process was regarded as political and moral support for SWAPO. In accordance with its mandate to observe the electoral preparations and tile ballot itself, the Mission was not involved in direct assistance for SWAPO. Its presence, however, like that of other friendly countries, was an important confidence-building factor for the liberation organisation. The GDR's commitment to a settlement in southern Africa which would reflect the interests of all the parties involved, including those of Pretoria and the West, was not at odds with continued, unrestricted solidarity for SWAPO. A few days after the GDR diplomats arrived in Windhoek, SWAPO and the SED signed an agreement on education and care for Namibian refugee children.9' Neither SWAPO nor the ANC ever doubted the GDR's stand towards them, whereas they were at times confused about the Soviet policy of new thinking as far as its consequences for the liberation organisations in southern Africa were concerned. GDR's involvement with the implementation oj resolution 435 The GDR's Diplomatic Observer Mission to Namibia was not uncontested. South Africa continued to exercise authority in Nar ibia during implementation process of the UN plan for Namibia, so that opening a Mission in Namibia could be interpreted as de facto recognition of the illegal occupation of the Namibian territory by South Africa. This was, in fact, the argument advanced by a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official when his GDR colleagues informed him about the plans for the Mission. The Soviets insistently advised against such action. A few years back, that would have meant an end to all such plans on the part of the GDR, but times had changed. With Gorbachev's reform politics, about which the GDR leadership was otherwise greatly reserved, Moscow now allowed its allies much more leeway. In Berlin, Soviet advice was no longer automatically seen as an order. And besides, the OAU and SWAPO were in favour of a GDR Mission being installed in Namibia. More serious difficulties arose with the South Africans, who were most reluctant to permit entry for an East German Mission. The UN SecretaryGeneral had to intervene to change Pretoria's mind. Due to the delay, the GDR diplomats did not arrive in Windhoek until the second half of April 1989. As head of mission, H.G. Schleicher assured , special representative of the UN Secretary-General, of the GDR's support for implementation of the UN's independence plan, which had run into serious danger because of armed fighting in northern Namibia earlier that 229

Namibiu: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO month. In that critical phase, the GDR expressed strong committment for a political settlement, respecting South Africa's role as a player in the independence process. Certain South African representatives had difficulty accepting the East German siupport for the independence plan as long as the GDR continued to display solidarity with SWAPO. The GDR Mission had strict instructions to behave neutrally and to fully support the implernentation process of resolution 435. The Mission's head had an opportunity to emphasise this attitude in talks with South African officials, including general administrator Louis Pienaar. Since accurate knowledge of the situation and problems in the country was indispensable for the Mission to work effectively, its diplomats fairly quickly established contact with all relevant political forces and familiarised themselves with the situation in the regions. They also developed close cooperation with UN representatives and other foreign observers, including those from Western countries. Working together, the international observers exerted influence to ensure correct and swift progress on the UN plan for Namibia and opposed attempts at disrupting the process. The East and the West collaborated with a sense of unanimity that had rarely been seen before. The East German diplomats repeatedly commented on developments in the country in meetings with the Namibian and international media. They believed it was important to strengthen the confidence of the Namibian people in the independence process and the forthcoming elections and to reassure them on international support.'9' In several interviews w ith GDR media, they sought to sketch a differentiated picture of developments in Namibia and southern Africa and thus rectify the black-and-white portrayal which was still typical of the GDR's information policy. The G DR also contributed to the implementation of the UN plan for Nam ibia in practical terms. In conjunction with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) its Solidarity Committee organised the repatriation of Namibians from the GDR. On 18 and 27 July 1989, two special planes of the GDR airline Interflug carried a total of 250 Namibian refugees back to their native country. The passengers were young people who had been in the G DR for studies at universities or technical schools or SED party schools or for vocational training. The bulk of then were initially accommodated in the transit camp at Doebra near Windhoek, which had been equipped with tents and other facilities from the GDR. The GDR spent a total of 1.2 million marks on the repatriation of Nam ibian exiles.92 Those Namibians who interrupted their studies to help SWAPO with its electoral preparations had been promised they could return to the GDR after the elections to finish their education.193 For the flight back home, the Interflug planes took on board Namibian children 230

Special Flights to Southern Africu and youths who, as agreed between the SED and SWAPO in April 1989, were to be educated and looked after in the GDR. When the repatriation operation was over, 49 vocational trainees, ten patients, six members of the SWAPO Office, 37 teachers and students of education as well as 424 children of school or pre-school age were still in the G DR."14 At the request of the UN Secretary-General, the GDR assigned 30 police monitors to the civil police force, CIVPOL, a component of the UNTAG."9 During the implementation of resolution 435 the UN police monitors turned out to be extremely important ensuring peaceful progress towards independence. The original strength of the international police contingent was, therefore, first doubled, and soon trebled. The assignment of East German police for several months was the first instance of GDR participation in a UN operation of this kind. Strict criteria were applied in choosing candidates for the contingent, such as professional competence, foreign- language skills, and knowledge about Namibia. Some of the monitors were recruited from the National People's Army and temporarily incorporated into the People's Police. Most of the norninees were given a lower police rank for the term of their assignment, since their army or police ranks in most cases proved to be higher than those of their prospective CIVPOL colleagues. After the East Gennan police officers had first encountered some reservations on the part of the white minority and local opponents of SWAPO, they were finally accepted. " The greater part of them, 21 men, were deployed in Ovamboland in northern Namibia, in areas around Oshakati, Ongandjera and Ombalantu, which were politically volatile and potential sources of turmoil. Together with colleagues from Fiji, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Austria, Ireland, India, the Netherlands, Sweden and Nigeria, they helped ensure a smooth electoral process. Both in Namibia and in the GDR, people watched with interest how East and West German police monitors would get along with one another at Ombalantu. Before long, joint patrols in the Namibian bush near the Angolan border had become normal routine for them, just like get-togethers in their free time. Neues Deutschland, the central organ of the SED, reported on this particularity at the Ombalantu CIVPOL station in a way that would have been unthinkable for a GDR newspaper a short time before: "A People's Policeman from Leipzig and a Federal Frontier Guard from Ratzeburg go out on patrol shoulder to shoulder. For the first time since the brutal campaign of extennination and repression conducted by the Kaiser's troops 80 years ago, Germans, now citizens of two sovereign German states, are Out on a peacemaking mission, acting in concert rather than opposition, under the UN flag which has made this possible."'97

Namibia. The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO East and West Germans UN police observers serving with UNTAG 1989/90 The rest of the GDR contingent, nine men, were stationed at Mariental, Gibeon and Bethanie. They, too, performed their duty conscientiously, although more often than not their thoughts were with their home country, which was changing so radically while they were there. Shortly before election day, another group of 25 East German civil monitors arrived in Namibia, at UN request, to proceed to the Kavango area to assist with the supervision of elections in rural districts. In addition, the Evangelical Churches of the GDR sent election observers to Namibia to act on behalf of the World Council of Churches in Geneva. The team included Dr Zippel from the hospital in Berlin-Buch, where Namibians were cured, and Dr Karin Behl, also a physician. They courageously countered intimidation and violence around the elections, occasionally finding themselves in quite dangerous situations. "' Besides supporting the independence process, the GDR's Diplomatic Observer Mission had the task of helping to prepare relations at governmental level. As described above, ideas had long been in the pipeline and initial decisions had already been taken. In the commercial field, fisheries were especially attractive for the GDR. Experts had drafted a fisheries agreement, 232

Specichl Flights to Southern ,Afi'ic which vas to regulate fishing operations in conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to the mutual advantage of both countries. The agreement also envisaged collaboration in developing the Namibian fisheries industry, including the training of specialists.'"' Training was a field in w hich the two partners could rely on a common stock of experience. In October 1989, a delegation of experts from the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade travelled to Namibia for discussions with commercial partners on economic cooperation. Interflug was also interested in collaboration. Another field with potential was mining,. It stands to reason that there were plans to continue cooperation with SWAPO in the field of education and training. In the last few months of its existence the GDR granted 15 new scholarships for 1990. A supply of 200 literacy kits. each for40 children, was handed over in Namibia at the beginning of 1990, and a collection of books went to Windhoek University in early April. About the same time, Nahas Angula, Namibian Minister for Education, Culture and Sport, inaugurated an exhibition of art reproductions from the GDR.11° Continued cooperation between the GDR and SWAPO and ties at governlnental level were consistent with the long tradition of GDR solidarity with the Namibian liberation struggle. Sam Nujoma paid tribute to this long association when he received the GDR delegation attending the Namibian independence celebrations on the day of his accession to the Namibian presidency. On the same day, 21 March 1990, the two governments established diplomatic relations, and the GDR opened its embassy in Windhoek - the last one opened by the GDR. Three days before Namibian independence, the GDR had had its first free and democratic elections, and in less than seven months' time the GDR ceased to exist as an independent state. With remarkable consistency over three decades the GDR supported SWAPO, which is today the governing party, vested with responsibility for the development of independent Namibia. That long-lasting cooperation with SWAPO has left traces of various kinds in various fields, which are easy to find in Namibia. Human relations developed between many Namibians and East Germans, which have survived the sands of time. The experience ol these people is probably the most valuable inheritance from the past, and it deserves to be taken up and accepted for a prospering Gernmn-Namibian relationship today and in the future.

Notes 'M. Scheer: Schwarz und Weiss am Waterberg. Suedwestqfrika heute und geslern, Schwverin 1952, p. 109ff. I H. Drechsler: Siedwestyi'ika unter Deutscher Kolonia/herrschai, (East) Berlin, 1966. A revised edition also appeared in English, under the title "Let us Die Fighting". The Struggle of the fterero and Nama against German Imperialism (1984-1915), London 1980, with a foreword by Sam NLIoma, I Address to the Diplomatic Corps by Walter Ulbricht, chairman of the GDR State Council, on the GDR's foreign policy, in Dokumente zur Audenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Deno/ratischen Republik (DAP) 1960, vol. VIII, (East) Berlin 1961, p. 201. I Representatives of the Namibian liberation movement mentioned these political views of the Germans in initial contacts with the GDR. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/ IV 2/20/412, notes about information from Jariretundu Kozonguizi, without date (1961). 'Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/30/690, decision by the SED CC Secretariat, dated 20 June 1960. A report of January 1961 on implementation of this decision on measures to activate efforts among citizens of German origin relates two contacts in South West Africa and five in South Africa, and marginally mentions discussions between "progressive emigrants" and so-called "refugees from the East" in South Africa and South West Africa. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/61). 'Telegram from GDR deputy foreign minister Georg Stibi to the chairman of the UN Special Committee on the implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation, Gershon B.O. Collier, 3 .lun. 1966, inDAP 1966, vol. XIV/1, (East) Berlin 1970, p. 679. 'Telegram, dated 27 Jul. 1966, from GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer to African foreign ministers, inDAP 1966, vol. XIV/2, p. 10661. On the question olfNarnibia at the UN, see A.T. Moleah Nainibia-The StruggleJbr Liberation, Wilmington 1983, p. 127ff" ' Telegram, dated 12 Nov. 1971. from GDR freign minister Otto Winzer to the president of the UN Security Council. Eugeniusz Kulaga, on the issue of Namibia, inDAP 1971, vol. XIX/2, (East) Berlin 1974, p. 1008f. " Festus Naholo, SWAPO's former chief of logistics, recalled this in an interview on 20 Feb. 1996. ... After Nujoma's visit, SWAPO sent the first student, Solomon Mifima, to the FDJ Youth College. Emil Appolus finished ajournalism course in 1962. (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nujoma's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 20 Feb. 1962). " Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/ 7306-662, notes, dated 17 Jan. 1962. on a conversation with Nujoma with the Solidarity Committee on 10 Jan. 1962. 12 Cf. Netes Deutschland B edition, (East) Berlin (ND), 12 Feb. 1968. i3 Telegram from GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer to UN secretary-general U Thant, dated 9 Feb. 1968. inDAP 1968, vol. XVI/l, (EAst) Berlin 1971, p. 417f " Resolution 3295 (XXIA) of the UN General Assembly, dated 13 Dec. 1974, in Yearbook of the UN (YBUN) 1974, New York 1977, p. 164.

Special Flights to Southern Africa 235 Cf YBUN 1974. loc. cit., p. 155. "' These figures have been taken from material compiled by Solidaritaetsdienlstinternationale. I (SODI). '" CF. Bach. DZ 8/7 306-662. Report on talks with the Swapo delegation (25 to 30 Oct. 1974) dated 27 Nov 1974. 11 Cf. SAPNIO B,\rch DY/30 .1 IV 2/3 A-2766, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 2 Dec. 1975. Substantiating its proposal for this supply, the Solidarity Committee had indicated to the SED leadership that SWAPO was in a difficult phase of its struggle against the racist regime in South Africa. 1' Cf. Resolution 385 (1976) of the Security Council, dated 30 .an. 1976, inYBUN 1976. Ne% York 1979. p. 782f. "Cf. Resolution 3 1/146 of the General Assembly. dated 20 December 1976, inYBLIN, p. 785. 2() The description of the GDR's positions on the Namibian question is essentially confined to official statements at the UN. GDR Foreign Ministry records cowering that period are currently not accessible. With a few exceptions, the present quotations are based on German texts as published in the volumes Dukunntee zur A udenpolitik der I)eutsehen Demolkautischen Republik (D/ P). 21 Florin's statement in the UN Security Council on 13 Oct. 1976, inDAl" 1976 vol. XXIV/2, (East) Berlin 1980, p. 935. 22 Cf ibid. 21 A message by Honecker to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, dated 2 I March 1977, emphasised"lntensified attempts have been made recently to counter the struggle of national liberation movements with neo-colonialist methods. But the peoples in southern Africa have not only an uncontestable right to national independence and freedom but also a legitimate claim to choose the socio-economic system under which they want to li\e, without outside interference." in DAP 1977 Vol. XXV/2, (East) Berlin 1982, p. 1014. 24 Cf. Florin's statement during the 32nd session of the General Assembly. on agenda item "Namibia", 19 Oct. 1977, inDAP 1977, vol. XXV/I, p. 994f. 2. Ibid., p. 995'. 2, Cf. A.T. Moleah Namibia. [he Struggle for Liberation, p. 200ff 27 Cf. Florin statement during the UN General Asscmbly's spccial session on Namibia, 26 Apr. 1978, inDAP 1978, vol. XXVI/2, (East) Berlin 1983, p. 1008. 21 The Western Proposal for a Settlement of the \aniiban sintatton (in: L. Cli ffe e.a.: The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Boulder/London 1994, pp.239ff.) was later on - after the accomplishment of Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari's mission to Namibia (6 to 22 Aug. 1978) - included into the UN secretary-general's report on the implementation of the settlement proposal in Namibia, presented to the Security Council on 29 Aug. 1978. (Cf. YBUN 1978, Nuw York 1981. p. 894ff.). 29 Cf. Resolution 453 (1978) of the Security Council. dated 29 Sept. 1978. inYBLUN 1978, New York 1981. p. 915f. The resolution endorsed the secretary-general's report of 29 Aug. and his explanatory statement of 29 Sept. to the Security Co,:ncil. 30 Florin's speech at the 33rd session of the UN General Assembly on agenda item

Namibia: The GDR's solidwrif; with SWAPO "Namibia", on 8 Dec. 1978, inDAP 1978 \ol. XXVi2, p. 1050, 1052. " Florin's speech during the 33rd session of the UN General Assembly oil Namibia, 25 May 1979, inDAP 1979, vol. XXVII/2, (East) Berlin 1984. p. 929f. Interview with Gurirab on 8 Feb. 1996. T he relevant passage in the communiqu, reads "The Government of the German Democratic Republic expressed its support for the peaceful resolution ofthe problem of Namibia on the basis o fSecurity Council resolutions 385 (1976). 43 1(1978j. 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). ... It denounced efforts by South Africa and ofcertain Western Powers to elevate the so-called internal parties to equal status with SWAPO and any moves to revise or modify Security Council resolution 435 (1978) which provides the only acceptable basis for a settlement." In DAP 1981, vol. XXIX. (East) Berlin 1985. p. 497. 14 Ibid. ' Nujoma had expressed his request to the GDR delegation attending the celebrations in Luanda on the first anniversary of Angolan independence. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY/30/J IV 2/3 A-2930, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, dated 21 Jan. 1977). I"' Cf. ibid. 37 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/i IV 2/2 A-2087, decision of the SED Politbureau. dated 21 .lun. 1977Notes on the GDR delegation's conversation with NuJoma on 17 June 1977. '" Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV B 2/20/88, information paper 156/1977 for the Politbureau about Seibt's and Nujoma's talk dated 28 Nov 1977. ' CIf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1 IV 2/2 A-2129. decision of the SED Politbureau. dated 24 .lan. 1978Report on the SWAPO delegation's \ isit to the GDR from 16 to 20 Dec. 1977. 41) Cf ibid.Notes on the talks between Nujoma and Honecker on 19 Dec. 1977. "' Joint communiqu, on the visit to the GDR of a delegation of SWAPO. in Against Racism, Apartheid and Colonialism. Documents published by the GDR 19- - 1982, Dresden 1983, p. 121. 42 Cf ibid., p. 120. 4' See footnote 39. In particular, SWAPO requested skilled training for 200 persons for the railways, agriculture, and the food processing and hotel industries. (See footnote 40). 4S Cf ibid. CIf ibid. Besides. Ionecker promised Nujoma three copies of Sabine Katins' documentary film "Wer fuerchtet sich vorm schwarzen Mann" (Who is afraid of the black man) and the printing of 5,000 mini-size copies of a SWAPO pamphlet. 47 See footnote 39. 41 SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/3 A-3237, decision of the SED CC Secretariat. dated 4 Dec. 1978Report on Sam Nujoma's visit to the GDR. 4" This Commission was set up in December 1977 with the mandate to deliberate on and coordinate all questions related to activities by the SED or the GDR Government in these regions, and to prepare recommendations for adoption by the SED Politbureau. The Commission included executives with competence for external economic relations, national economic planning, foreign policy and 236

Speciul Flights to Southern Africa2 national security. 50 The shift of authority between decision-making bodies in regard to the GDR's international policies will be evident from a comparison with the role played by the Foreign Affairs Commission in the context of the trade boycott against South Africa in the early 1 960s. See the chapter "Solidarity in difficult timesThe GDR and the South African liberation movement in the 1980s" in the present volume. 51 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2'3 A-3250, decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 3 Jan. 1979 l'or'chlaege zurpolitischen und ockonoinischen Zuscunwe, marheit mit Nwnibi (Proposals on political and econoinic coopcration wvith Namibia). It \a uncustomiir fur a paper like the one 1i rnj the Nlittag Commission to be put on ice b, the CC Secretariat for t\o months. The Secretariat might have shcl ed it \'aiting Ior the outcome of discussions with the SW.\PO delegation ( 13 Oct.-5 Nov. 1978). 52 Cf. ibid. 53 Ibid. 51 The GDR had been fishing offthe Namibian coast since 1976, under the Southeast Atlantic fisheries convcntion. The rich fisheries were of great interest to the East German ocean fishing fleet, and an agreement was to secure its fishing rights in the area. " Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2214, Politbureau decision dated 27 Feb. 1979Notes on the meeting Honecker's with Nuioma on 18 Fcbr. 1979 in Luanda. 5" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/1 IV .1/5, Nujoma's letter dated 23 Aug. 1979. 57 Goods supplied tbr sale Nere an important part of material assistance lbr the ANC and ZAPU (Cf. chapter on solidarity with the South African liberation movement in the 1960s). This was not practised in the cooperation with SWAPO. . By 1960, the FDGB's annual transfer was some 2 million marks. By 1975. annual transfers had climbed to 75 million marks, and steadied at 100 millions from 1976 to 1987. That amount decreased to 80 and 75 millions in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The share of solidarity contributions from other organisations, governmental agencies, churches, schools and other sources rose continually from 1980, exceeding the 100 million mark in 1987-89. Cf.. I. Schleicher: Statstische Angabeln zur ,Solidartact nut Bfr-eiungshewegungen und Staaten ini suedlichen ,.fiika, in U. %an I-leyden /H.-G. and I. SchleiclierEngagiert fuer Afrika. Die DDR und A,\rika, vol. 11. -Iamburg/Muenster 1994, p. 150, tab. I. 51b Misc. includes, inter alia, annual expenses to print Numibia Todai' and to maintain SWAPO's office in Berlin. For the 1975-77 period , expenses to produce Nutnibia Today and other printed material may be estimated at TM 50 yearly. 178,450 marks must be added to the 1978 figure for fu.nishing SWAPO's office and paying its staff. (SAPMO Barch voi. SED 40567 vol. I). From 1979, the annual expenses to maintain SWAPO's office varied from TM 200 (1979), TM 300 (1980-82) up to TM 400 in later years (e.g. in 1987, 237

Namnibia: The GDR s solidarity with SWAPO according to SAPMO BArch vorl. SED 40567. vol. I TM 50 printing costs, TM 400 to maintain SWAPO's office). In years for which sources give no figures for miscellaneous expenses, estimated costs for printing material and maintaining SWAPO's office are in italics. It is not clear what else was covered by miscellaneous expenses. 2 According to records of Solidaritaetsdienst-international e.V. (SODI)TM 6,009.00; according to SAPMO Barch vorl. SED 40567: TM 3,648; according to SAPMO BArch J IV 2/2 A-4036 (SED Secretariat decision of 18 Jan. I 984)TM 7,800. -1 Cf. Wochenpost 13/1990, p. 12. This figure for the period from 1978/79 to 1989/ 90 appears realistic, given the fact that approx. 2 mill. marks were spent on medical treatment in four years. 1985-88, alone. By contrast, the figures published by Wochenpost on the Solidarity Committee's material aid (80 mill. marks) and trainining/education services (60 mill. marks) for the period from 1979 to I 989/early 1990 seem to be too high. s 'b After Zimbabwean independence, the Solidarity Commit-tee financed. Nujoma asked for assistance during a longer stay in GDR (16 July to 28 Aug. 1981).(Cf. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3692), decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 29 Sept. 1981 Report on Nujoma's visit). "' Cf SAPMO BArch DY/30 vorl. SED 16592, Schuerer's letter dated 15 Sept. 1981. 6'2 Cf . SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3692, decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 29 Sept. 198 1. 63 Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/ 7423-660, draft report of the Solidarity Committee's secretary-general to its Political Council, undated (1982). " Ct. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3745. decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 27 Jan. 1982Survey on the appropriation of the Solidarity Committee funds in 1981. Measures for the targetted use of solidarity funds in 1982. " Cf. BArch. P DZ 8/7423-660, draft report of the Solidarity Committee's secretarygeneral. "" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/iJ IV 2/3 A-3799, decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 26 May 1982. The preliminary papers were submitted by Mittag and FDGB chainnan Harrv Tisch. 7Cf. ibid. '" SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/3 A-3948, decision of the SED CC Secretariat dated 8 June 1983. " From 1983 on, the considerable services to Mozambique and Angola, e.g. in vocational training. which had pre\ iously been funded friom the governmental budget for techno-scientific cooperation, \%erc for the greater part financed by solidarity funds raised from the public. Cf. 1. Schleicher: Bers'bildung und Wirisclhaijsbe:iehungen DDR-Afosambik in U. van der Heyden/ll.-G. and 1. SchleicherEngagiert fuer Afrika, loc.prim.cit.. p. 187. Interview with Wolfgang Krause, one-time deputy secretary-general of the GDR Solidarity Committee, on IOluL. 1995. 238

Special Flights to Southern Africa "' Interview % ith Rica Hodgson, ex-staff member of IDAF, on 26 Dec. 1995. '2 Interview vith Lucas Pohamba on 24 ,an. 1996. " Interview with Obed Emvula on 18 Jan. 1996. " Interview\ with Festus Naholo on 20 Feb. 1996. Cf. Also Solidaritaet. Information der Solidarltaetsbewvegung der DDR (East) Berlin 1985/2-3. p. 1. 75 Interview with Festus Naholo on 20 Feb. 1996. '"The Solidarity Committee president's report to the UN secretary-general, dated 12 Nla\ 1977. on assistance for the peoples in southern Africa specified that 250 Angolan army and S\A() soldiers were treated in the GDR between early 1976 and May 1977. Cf. ,Against Racism, loc.prim.cit., p. 83. " Cf. Report of the Solidarity Committee's president to the UN secretary -general, dated 31 Mar. 1978. inibid., p. 138. Speech of the Solidarity Committee's president before the LIN Special Committee against Apartheid on 13 Sept. 1978. in ibid.. p. 173. ".' In 1987, 47 PLAN personnel were in the GDR for medical treatment- in 1988, 20. Private notes. , Wochenpost 13/1990, on p. 12, mentioned 300 wounded in Berlin-Buch. Interview with Pohamba on 24 Jan. 1996. ' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/ IN 2/2 A-2601, decision of the SED Politbureau dated 18 Oct. 1983Report on the Nujoma's visit (8 to 25 Sept. 1983). 92 Interview with Dr. Zippel on 13 March 1996. K3 The following description is based on an interview with Dr. Kwiatkowski on 18 Feb. 1996. 11 Interview with Dr. Zippel on 13 Mar. 1996. '- C. Zippel: i'edersehen in Narnibia, in Wochenpost 13/1990, p. 12. 'bCf. I'ochenpost 30/1989, p. 9. "Interview with Prof Dr. Johannes Pilz on 10 Oct. 1995. Interview with Naholo on 20 Jan. 1996. ' Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1873, Politbureau decision dated 15 Apr. 1975Orientation paper for the further development of GDR relations with subSaharan Africa, annex 5. '-" The SED CC Secretariat endorsed vocational training for wounded SWAPO members late 1978. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/ IV 2/3 A-3237, Secretariat decision dated 4 Dec. 1978; cf. also BArch, P DQ 4/5336, information paper on the situation concerning vocational training of SWAPO members in GDR enterprises. undated (1979)). ' Cf. BArch, P DQ 4/5336, inlbrmation paper on the situation in vocational traineeships of SWAPO members (1979). Annual admissions 1978-1990 1978106; 1979102; 198092; 1981222; 1982272; 1983162; 1984157; 1985102; 198690209. (Cf. BArch, P DQ 4/5336, survey on cooperation with SWAPO (1986-1990); BArch, P DQ 4/5388, statistics of the State Secretariat for Vocational Training on new admissions for vocational training, 1981-1985). 92 Cf. BArch, P DQ 4/5336, appraisal of vocational training of SWAPO members, 2 3 9

Numibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWA PO dated 9 Feb. 1982. , Cf. ibd. and BArch. 1' DQ 4/5336, survey on cooperation 1986-1990. , Interview with Angula on 16 .an. 1996. Intcrviewv with Prof Piiz on 10 Oct. 1995. " Cf BArch, l) 1)Q 4/5336, file notes dated 19 Feb. 1985. ,7 Cf. BArch. P DQ 4/5336, information paper on the situation in vocational traineeships of SWAPO members (1979). " Cf. BArch. 1) DQ 4/5336, information paper on the progress otfGerman- language courses, dated 5 April 1983. '' Cf BArch. P DQ 4, 5336.-,bschlutiberichl ueber.htwJenthat, .lusbildngsfiel.-weg ude, gIb)itsse soitie gesellsc'haftlicl/e Tuetigkeiten von /5 nuntibisAhen Biuergern in der DDR (Februc' 1981 his Fehritar 1984 (Concluding report on the stay of 15 Namibian nationals. the objectives, methods and results of their training, and their involvement in social activ ities, February 1981 to February 1984). "' Cf. ibid. (0i Ut. BArch. P DQ 4/5336. report of an inspection team trom the vocational training and career counselling department. Rostock County Council. dated 8 Jan. 1986. 1112 Cf. footnote 98. "'I Cf. ibid. 114 Ibid. 1113 Ibid. ""' The debate has centred on problems associated w:ith contract labour fiom Mozambique, Vietnam and other developing countries in the GDR, called "guestyorkers" in official parlance. Cf. e.g. Auslaenderlnnnen in Osideuischlundvor und nach der I[Vende. Erlahrungen der I'ertragsarbeitnehMer caus Nlosambik. Bremen 1993. R. Gudat/A. Ial Ein Job Ein wuerdiges Leben 1 r alle Aosanbikaner... Zur hitegration ehelnaliger DDR-I'e-rtragsarbeiterhInen tnd Studentlnnnen ats losambik, Interviews, edited b\ Entwicklungspolitische Gesellschafte.V.. Berlin 1993. 117 Interview with Naholo on 20 Jan. 1996. "'" Cf SAP'MO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3366, SED CC Secretariat decision dated 12 Sept. 1979. '"' Cf ibid. IN Cf. SAPM() BArch DY 30/IV B 2/9.05/80. report on the public education delegation's visit to SWAPO, 17-24 Oct. 1979. '"" Cf. C.Gleichmann: Evaluation Study of the Follo\%-up Programinc of the Otto Bennecke Foundationl in Namibia ( 1 1993), Bonn 1993. S. 18. ...C'. ibid.. concluding report on the SWAPO delegation's 'visit, 16-27 Nov. 1979. The delegation \\ as also received by Margot -lonecker, minister of public education. 1,2 See oIbotnote 108. ' Berliner Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1990. The Solidarity Committee assumed the function of financing the children's home in Bellin as weIl as the School ofFriendship in Stassfurt. which first accommodated only Mozambican children, probably in 1983. after the SED Politbureau had decreed in November 1982 that Solidarity Committee donation 240

Special Flights to Southern Africa funds should substitute state budget allocations for education and training assistance for developing countries. Solidarity fund spending for Bellin and Stassfurt was first mentioned in an SED CC Secretariat decision dated 18 Jan. 1984 (Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/.1 IV 2/3 A-4036lnformation paper on the uses of GDR solidarity resources in 1983). "1 Cit. from U. Sikora "Die Oshi-Deutschen Namibische Jugendliche acus der ehemaligen DDR als AMittel der Politik. Diploma paper at Bremen University. Social Science Faculty. October 1995, p. 60. "1 ND, 2 Jan. 1990. l" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/i IV 2/3 A-3657, Politbureau decision, dated 13 Jul. 1981. 1" On 26 Jul. 1985, the SED CC Secretariat decided, e.g., to admit another 50 preschool children (cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4525). After reconstruction of the home in Bellin in 1987, it wasenvisaged to admit another 40 children (cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4525, Secretariat decision dated 23 Mar. 1987). "I Cf U. Sikora"Die Oshi-Deutschen ", loc.prim.cit. p. II. 19 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision dated 18 Oct. 12, Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3/3620, Secretariat decision dated 8 Feb. 1984. 21 Cf U. Sikora"Die Oshi-Deutschen", prim.loc.cit., p. 12. 122 Hans-Georg Schleicher had to refute those charges during his function as head of the GDR Observer Mission to Namibia. See his interview with Namibia Nachrichten, 22/23 October 1989. 23 An overview of these matters is contained in the M.A. thesis of U. Sikora "Die Oshi-Deutschen", prim.loc.cit. 124 Interview with Hopf on 26 Jan. 1996. 5 U. Sikora"Die Oshi-Deutschen", prim.loc.cit., p. 6 1. ",Cf. A. Birschel: Die schwierige Heimkehr in den Busch - I'orjitenjfahren mudten 400 "SPWAPO- Kinder" aus der DDR zurueck nach Namibia, in epd Dritte Welt no. 189 i Sept. 1995, p. 8f. The German Foreign Office has so far spent DM 1.5 million on tuition fees, boarding school accommodation and related expenses. The aid programme will terminate at the end of 1998. 127 Interview with Hopf on 26 Jan. 1991. 12 Interview with Emvula on 18 Jan. 1996. 129 Six teachers were assigned to SWAPO by 1980. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/132, information paper for the SED Politbureau dated 18 Aug. 1980). I'll Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/ IV 2/3 A-3830, Secretariat decision dated 17 Aug. 1982. "I Interview with Prof. Pilz on 10 Oct. 1995. "3 Interview with Lempy Kalungu on 22 Jan. 1996. "3 Sabine Zinke died in Namibia in a tragic car accident. Fier assistance in SWAPO's education effort was commemorated in a official funeral service in Windhoek. 1.14 Interview with P. Shoombe on 22 Jan. 1996. Together with a group of PLAN commanders she attended a course at the SED regional party school in Rostock in 1984/85.

Namibia: The GDR 's solidarity with SWAPO 'As early as March 1966, a SWAPO delegation with Peter Nanyemba and Solomon Milima intormed GDR contacts about intentions to organise resistance in Namibia with the aim of an armed uprising (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/7305. file notes of the international relations department of the FDGB National Executive. dated 18 Mar. 1966). "" Cf. BArch, P [)Z 8/7306-662, Nanyemba's letter to the Solidarity Committee dated 5 May 1967. "I Cf'. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A4/20/115, Solidarity Committee list of liberation movements' requests. undated (1969). '1xCf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/1093, Politbureau decision dated 10 Jan. 1967. , Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nujoma's letter dated 29 Sept. 1972. Cf BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Solidarity Comrnitttee list dated 2 Sept. 1974. 141 Cf. BArch MA Strb AZN 32637, Hoffmann's letter to Honecker dated 4 Jan. 1978. 142 Cf'. SAPMO BArch DY/30 J IV 2/2 A-2155. SED Politbureau decision dated 30 May 1978Report of the military delegation's visit to Guinea, Angola and the Congo in May 1978. At this point of time PLAN operated very successful in the north of Namibia. Cf. S. Brown: Diplomacy by other Means. SWAPO's Liberation War. in C. Collins/I.s Saul (Eds.): Namibia's Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword. London Athens 1995. pp. 29f. Cf. BArch MA Strb AZN 32657, Hoffminann's letter to lonecker dated 31 Oct. 1978 " Cf. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2.035-146, file notes on Honecker's talks with Nuioma in Luanda on 18 Feb. 1979. Honecker's promises were endorsed by the Politbureau.(Cf. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-22 14. Politbureau decision dated 27 Feb. 1979). The request to provide uniforms for 2.000 soldiers who were to be stationed in Namibia under the UN plan and for another 10.000 PLAN fighters had previously been communicated viathe GDR embassy in Luanda during preparations for a SWAPO military delegation's visit to the GDR. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 132/12/55. memo fiom the SED CC's international relations department to the security affairs department, dated 7 Feb. 1979). Accordingto Colonel-general Ielmut Fleissner, deputy defence minister in charge of equipment and procurement, the National People's Army \as at that time not in a position to supply the uniforms. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 132/12/55, memo from the security affairs department to the international relations department, dated 13 Feb. 1979). ' Cf'. SAPMO RArch DY 30/IV B2/12/55. telegram from the GDR embassy in Moscow to the CC's international relations department. dated 23 Apr. 1979: telegram from the GDR embassy in Prague to the international relations department. dated 25 Apr. 1979. 1, Cf. SAPN1O BArch DY 30/IV 132/12/55, memo from the CC security department to I lonecker. dated 3 May 1979. With increasing South African attacks on SWAPO bases after the Cassinga massacre (4 May 1978) and the occupation of Angolan territory in the south of the country ( 1981 ) conditions for PLAN's actions worsened however. PLAN had to mo~e its bases far to the north and the Namibian population 242

Special Flights to Southern Africa in Ovamnboland was terrorised by the counter-insurgency unit . Cf. S. Brown: Diplomacy by other means, loc.prim.cit.pp.3 I fI '4 Cf. memo from the CC secutiry affairs department. See footnote 146. '"Cf. ibid. 14,1 Cf. ibid. '' BArch MA Strb AZN 32639. Hoffmann's letter to Honecker dated 8 Oct. 1979. '"Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/i IV 2/3 A-3585. SED CC Secretariat decision dated 30 Jan. 1981: SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2601. Politbureau decision dated 18 Oct. 1983. 152 SAPMO BArch DY 30/J 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision dated 18 Oct. 1983. 03 Group interview in the Namibian Defence Ministry onl 19 Jan. 1996. 114 Interview with General George Meiring on 29 Nov. 1995. 15. Interview with Chris Thirion, Major-General ret., on 5 Dec. 1995. .". Concerning the Cuban/Angolan/Plan military co-operation see S. Brown: Diplomacy by other means, loc.prim.cit.pp.34ff. Issb Cf SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV2/20/216, information paper for the Politibureau dated 26 June 1987. IM, ZAPU (1977-80)/ZANU (1982-90)330; ANCover 125: MPLAover 60, FRELIMOover 40. Cf. Annual reports of the SED CC propaganda department which are included in CC Secretariat's decisions, in SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3333 (2 July 1979). 3508 (23 July 1980), 3675 (20 Aug 1981), 3764 (15 March 1982), 3900 (7 Febr. 1983), 4059 (21 March 1984), 4214 (27 Febr. 1985). 4365 (3 March 1986), 4520 (11 March 1987), 4654 (19 Febr. 1988). 4797 (3 March 1989). ' SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3508. SED CC Secretariat decision dated 23 Jul. 1980. "" Ibid. '.59GDR Solidarity Committee chairman Heinz H. Schmidt reported a display of great sympathy and surprisingly much interest towards the GDR during an AAPSO conference in Winneba (Ghana) in 1965, reflected in his delegation being constantly approached to discuss experiences of the GDR in terms of political. socitil and economic development. Others taking part in the discussion had told him that this development was commended by the Soviets as well as the Chinese and the Yugoslavs. (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, Schmidt's report, August 1965). The Soviets made use of the GDR experience to argue against the Chinese views: the Chinese obviously had fewer difficulties with it since it was not Soviet: and the Yugoslavs, judged as revisionists in the communist movement, welcomed it as confirming their insistence on national autonomy in the pursuit of socialism, independent of the Soviet model. ""' Interview with Prof. Pilz on 10 Oct. 1995. 161 Interviews with SWAPO officialsNghidimonjila Shoombe (18 Jan. 1996), Pashukeni Shoombe (22 Jan. 1996), Lucas Pohalnba (24 Jan. 1996); and with Prof. Dr. Gerhard Toetemeyer (23 Jan. 1996). 1,2 Interview with N. Shoombe on 18 Jan. 1996. 161 The relevant SED CC Secretariat decision of 15 May 1986 described Prof. Pilz's 243

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO function as an "adviser on matters of cooperation between SED and SWAPO-. (CIf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4395). "I Interview with Prof. Pilz on 10 Oct. 1995. '' Ibid. "'i Interviews with Pohamba (24 Jan. 1996), Naholo (20 Jan. 1996), 0. Emvula (18 Jan. 1996), Toivo ya Toivo (25 Jan. 1996). 1"7 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3936, A-4085 and A-4218. SED CC Secretariat decisions dated 12 May 1983, 14 May 1984 and 7 Mar. 1985. "" Interview with Pohamba on 24 Jan. 1996. '( Cf. SAPMO BArch J IV 2/2 A-2601, SED Politbureau decision dated 18 Oct. 1983. '70 Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/2.115/25. Expos,, dated 15 Oct. 1984, by the SED CC international relations department for the Politbureau's Foreign Affairs Commission Polercen und Perspektiven der Laender Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas in der internationalen Klassenauseinanderselzung, insbesondere im Kampfum Frieden. Abruestung und sozialen Fortschritt (Potential and prospects for Asian, African and Latin American countries in the international class struggle, in particular the struggle for peace, disarmament and social progress). " Ibid. 171 For the policy of "constructive engagement" and its consequences, see P. Johnson/ D. Martin, D. (ed.): Destructive Engagement. Southern Africa at War. Harare 1986. '7 Statement by GDR deputy foreign minister Gerd Koenig at the International Conference in support of the struggle of the Namibian people for independence, held in Paris, 27 Apr. 1983, inDAP 1983 vol. XXXI, (East) Berlin 1986, p. 284. "I Cf. Statement of Harry Ott, GDR deputy foreign minister and permanent representatives to the UN. at the 39th session of the UN General Assembly on 30 Nov. 1984, in DAP 1984, vol. XXXII, (East) Berlin 1987, p. 613. " Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/ IV 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision dated 18 Oct. 1983Report on Nujoma's visit (8-25 Sept. 1983). ""Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/2.115/25, expos, Zur gegenwaertigen Entwicklung in der Region des suedlichen Afrika und Schludfolgerungen fuer die Audenpolitik der DDR (current developments in the southern African region, and conclusions for the GDR's foreign policy), dated 30 Nov. 1984, drawn up for submission to the Politburo's Foreign Affairs Commission. '"Ibid. " The GDR displayed understanding for the Angolan negotiation effort with the USA and South Africa and for the Nkomati agreement between Mozambique and South Africa, although it warned against overrating the opportunities which the Mozambican leadership had been told it could expect after Nkomati. ' Ibid. 's" Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-3012, Politbureau decision dated 28 Apr. 1987 Report on the visit (20-21 Apr. 1987). " Cf H.G. Schleicher: UNTAG und der internationale Faktor im Unabh,, ngigkeitsprozess Namibias, inafrika spectrum (Hamburg), 3/1992, p. 328f. 244

Special Flights to Southern Africa 0", Cf. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/30/J/IV/928, notes on the talk, undated. WN Message from foreign minister Oskar Fischer, inAu&denpolitische Korrespondenz (APK) (East Berlin), 35/1988, p. 274. "I Cf. Statement by Dr. Siegfried Zachmann, GDR permanent representative to the UN, at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly on 15 Nov. 1988, inAPK 50/ 1988, p. 399. "I Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4735, SED CC Secretariat decision dated 8 Sept. 1988. "' Cf ibid.Annex I. ""'Cf. ibid.Annex 2. "7 Cf SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-3183, SED Politbureau decision dated 20 Dec. 1988Madnahmen zur Entwicklung der politischen und oekonomischen Zusammenarbeit mit Namibia (measures for the development of the economic and political cooperation with Namibia). "' Cf ibid. Interviews with Theo-Ben Gurirab on 8 Feb. 1996 and Hidipo Hanutenya on 10 Feb. 1996. ',, Cf. ND, 27 Apr. 1989. ',' On the eve of the elections, the head of the GDR Mission issued a press statement reaffirming this support and underlining the importance of the political settlement for the entire region. (Cf. ND, 4/5 Nov. 1989). 192 Cf. ND, 19 and 25 July 1989. '" The pertinent decision of the SED CC Secretariat, dated 25 May 1989, recorded that SWAPO members who studied at technical schools, colleges or universities would be allowed to continue their education in the GDR as of September 1990, under agreements with SWAPO. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J 2/3 A-4834). Most of the returning vocational trainees had been enabled to finish their training ahead of schedule. '94Cf. BArch. P DQ 4/5433, Solidarity Committee report, dated 2 Aug. 1989. on the repatriation of Namibian refugees. 193 The SED Politibureau took the relevant decision on 12 Sept. 1989. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/2345). 'l, Cf. Opinion poll in Namibia Nachrichten, Windhoek, I Oct. 1989. 197 ND, 22 Nov. 1989. 'I' Dr. Karin Behl, sent by the Gossner Mission, was threatened and had to seek protection by UN Blue Helmets in an UNTAG base. Cf The Namibian, Windhoek, 21 Nov. 1989. , " SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/3 A-4868, SED CC Secretariat decision dated 30 Aug. 1989Draft of the fisheries agreement. 24M) Cf Allgemeine Zeitung. Windhoek. 19 Jan. 1990; Namibia Today, 4 Apr. 1990; Times ofNamibia. 5 Apr. 1990. 245

Appendix The GDR's association with the South African, Zimbabwean and Namibian liberation movements has been described here mainly in terms of the motives, interests and aims of GDR solidarity and the structures through which it was organised. A first perusal of the abundant source material in the areas of cooperation selected for review permits the conclusion that the GDR's solidarity with the struggle against colonial and racist oppression was much livelier and more diverse than the generally sterile propaganda in GDR times suggested. At the same time some of the conflicts and structural deficits of the GDR society were reflected in this solidarity contradicting the once painted glorious picture. Solidarity was part of this society; its achievements, limits and deficits can be understood only in this context. The same is true in regard to the international environment which left its rubber stamp on GDR's cooperation with national liberation movements. Last but not least, the dynamics of the liberation struggle and the active international work of the liberation movements themselves shaped the content, the quantity and the quality of this cooperation. While solidarity rested on the general internationalist principles of socialist ideology, it also served as a vehicle for specific foreign policy interests of the GDR in its drive to achieve recognition as an equal member of the community of nations. The solidarity with the liberation struggle in southern Africa was largely determined by the constellations of the Cold War and the confrontation between the two German states. The heavy impact of the inter-German quarrels on the cooperation with the liberation movements lost its momentum very late due to the improving relations between the two Genman republics. This was clearly the case around the time when Namibia gained its independence. As a junior partner of the Soviet Union GDR played an important role in shaping the relations of the Eastern bloc with the liberation movements. The successful cooperation with them allowed GDR some room to move. The failure in improving relations with ZANU, however, demonstrated how limited this room was. At the same time this conflict illustrates how strongly the Sino-Soviet conflict influenced development of relations with the liberation movements in southern Africa. The political players in the GDR were in theory agreed on the principle of solidarity, but had to manage conflicts of political and economic interests in the practical pursuit of policy. It was always a problem to find ways of practising material support without overstreching the possibilities of the GDR economy. With the deepening of the economic crisis in the 1980s the limits of international solidarity in terms of material help became more and more obvious. Despite of this situation the help for the liberation movements was, however,

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO not reduced. It can be concluded that the support - be it in the form of solidarity supplies and medical aid or in the field of training and education was a valuable contribution for the struggle of the liberation movements in general and during emergency situations in particular. Training of cadres in the military and security fields at the request of liberation organisations became a special feature of the cooperation. The considerable support for the armed struggle had always to be carefully balanced with the policy of peaceful coexistence between the Eastern and the Western blocs. There was a broad sense of solidarity among the GDR population to draw on - but the centralistic and administrative way of organising solidarity trimmed initiatives from below and prevented a democratic grass-roots solidarity movement. Furthermore the undemocratic character of the state-socialist society where political rights of its own people where painfully curtailed clashed with the official claim to champion the right to self-determination of colonially and racially oppressed people. This was undoubtedly the major weakness of GDR solidarity. The potential inherent in the conformity of the Government's foreign policy of support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa and the readiness of many GDR citizens to express their solidarity could not come into full effect under these conditions. At the same time it is to be observed that the efficiency of the support for and the close relations of the GDR with the liberation movements are after all results of the sincere personal and convincing committment of many East Germans. Finally, similar or identical political ideologies, inspirations and evaluations of international developments provided ample common ground for the liberation movements and their partners in the GDR to establish and maintain a stable mutual relationship. This, of course, did not exclude differences of opinion, for example on how to judge political adversaries or devise strategies and tactics of the liberation struggle. True, the GDR and the liberation movements in southern Africa shared common overall interests, which were to a very great extent conditioned by the East-West Cold War confrontation, but their specific interests were not always the same. The smooth picture, the natural alliance between socialism and the movement for national liberation which used to be painted in the days of the GDR certainly has to be rectified. If and when we take a good look at all the facets of the ties between the GDR and the liberation movements, we can help to do justice to the real achievements of the GDR's solidarity, with all its strengths and weaknesses. This is particularly important, as recent years have brought a wave of sweeping negative statements in the ongoing debate over the history of the GDR and its international relations. A critical and factual scrutiny of the cooperation with liberation movements in southern Africa facilitates access to the heritage which East Gennans can, with self-esteem, contribute to the united Germany. 248 Selected Bibliography Archival Sources and Unpublished Documents SAPMO BArch Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenor ganisalionen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin DY30 stock SED J IV 2/2/ final protocol/decision of the Politbureau J IV 2/2 A- working protocol/decision of the Politbureau* J IV 2/3/ final protocol/decision of the CC Secretariat J IV 2/3 A- working protocol/decision of the CC Secretariat* * The text of decisions in the final and working protocols are identical. The working protocols sometimes contain annexes missing in the final protocols. all others International relations dept. and other depts. of the CC DY34 stock FDGB NY4182 papers Walter Ulbricht Barch Abteilungen Reich und DDR, Berlin DZ 8 stock Solidarity Committee DQ4 stock State Secretariat for Vocational Training BArch MA Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Militaerarchiv, Freiburg Potsdam (now in Freiburg/Breisgau) MfAA / A Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes Bestand Ministerium fuer A uswaertige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Berlin BStU Der Bundesbeauftragtef r die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape, Belville. Hilda Bernstein Collection. Mayibuye Centre Oral History, University of the Western Cape, Belville. Oral History of Exile Project, Mayibuye Centre, University of Western Cape, BelviIle.

Interviews * Angula. Nahas on 16 Jan. 1996, Berlin " Brickhill, Jeremy on 17 Nov. 1995. Harare " Cargill, Jenny on 5 Dec. 1995. Johannesburg " Dabengwa, Dumiso on 8 Nov. 1995, Harare * Eggebrecht. Lucie on 15 Nov. 1995, Berlin " Emvula, Obed on 18 Jan 1996. Windhoek " Interview with leading representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Nanbia on 19 Jan 1996, Windhoek. " Gurirab, Theo-Ben on 8 Febr. 1996, Windhoek * Hamutenya, Hidipo on 10 Febr.1996, Windhoek * Hodgson, Rica, on 26 Dec. 1995. Cape Town * Hoffmann. Ursula 23 Apr. 1996, Berlin " Hopf Hannelore on 26 Jan. 1996. Windhoek " Kahari, George on 8 Nov. 1995, Harare * Kalungu, Lempy on 22 Jan. 1996. Windhoek * Kasrils, Ronnie on 4 Dec. 1995, Pretoria * Kern, Karl-Heinz on I 1 Apr. 1995, Berlin " Krause. Wolfgang on 10 July 1995, Berlin " Kwiatkowski. Erich on 18 Febr. 1996, Berlin " Mumabolo, Jeremiah Kingsley on 30 Oct. 1995, Harare * Meiring, George on 29 Nov. 1995, Pretoria * Moyo. Simon K. on 13 Nov. 1995, Harare " Msika, Joseph on 3 Nov. 1995, Harare " Mutasa, Didymus on 10 Nov. 1995, Harare " Naholo, Festus on 20 Febr. 1996. Windhoek. " Pilz, Johannes Pilz on 10 Oct. 1995, Berlin * Pohamba, Lucas on 24 Jan. 1996, Windhoek * Quart, Elisabeth on 8 Oct. 1995, Berlin " Reichel. Detlev on 7 Febr. 1996, Berlin " Selby, Arnold on 31 May 1996, Berlin " Shamuyarira. Nathan on 4 and 8 and Nov. 1995. Harare " Shoombe, Nghidirnonjila on 18 Jan 1996, Windhoek * Shoombe, Pashukeni 22 Jan. 1996, Windhoek " Sieber. GtLenter on 8 Dec. 1995, Berlin * Simons, Ray on 28 Dec 1995, Cape Town " Thirion, Chris on 5 Dec. 1995, Pretoria " Toetemeyer, Gerhard on 23 Jan 1996, Windhoek * Vogel, Johannes on 15 Dec. 1993, Berlin " Zippel. Christian on 13 March 1996. Berlin " Ellert, H. The Rhodesian Front war. Counter-insurgency and guerilla war in Rhodesia 1962-1980, gweru 1993 * Cliffe. L.e.a.: The transition to Independence in Namibia, Boulder/London 1994 * Gleichmann. C.: Evaluation Stud\ of the Follow-up Programme of the Otto Bennecke Foundation in Namibia (May 1993), Bonn 1993 * Brown. S.: Diplomacy by Other Means. SWAPO's Liberation War, in C. Collins/J.S.Saul (Eds.): Namibia's Liberation Struggle. The TwoEdged Sword. London Athens 1995 * H.G. Schleicher/U. Engel: A Classified Affair: GDR Policy on Africa and the MfS. in: Aussenpolitik (Hurnburg)47( i 996)4,pp.399ff

Books and Articles African National Congress. A short history, no year. Ansprenger. F.Die. SWAPO. Profitl einer Befreiungsbewegung, Mainz/Munich 1984. Apartheid Who is for it - who is against it? (edited by DAFRIG) (1964). Baske. S./Zieger, G. (eds.) Die Dritte Welt und die beiden Staaten in Deutschland (= Jahrbuch der Gesellschafifter DeutschlandJorschung 1982), Asperg b. Stuttgart 1983. Bernstein, H.Die Maenner von Rivonia, Suedafrika im Spiegel eines Prozesses, (East) Berlin 1970. Bhebe, N./T. Ranger (eds.), Soldiers in Zimbabwe 's Liberation War, Vol. one, Harare 1995. Bigler, R. M. The role of the German Democratic Republic in the communist penetration of Africa, in Grieves, F. L. (ed.)Transnationalisn in World politics and business, New York 1979. Birschel, A.Die schwierige Heimkehr in den Busch - Vor fuenfJahren mudten 400 "S WAPO-Kinder" aus der DDR zurueck nach Namibia, inepd Dritte Welt(Frankfurt/M), no. 169, 1 Sept.1995. Bley, H./Tetzlaff, R. (eds.)Afrika und Bonn, Versaeumnisse undZwaenge deutscher Afrikapolitik, Hamburg 1978. Boege, , Militaerische und militaerisch relevante Aspekte der DDRSuedpolitik. Problemaufrid, Literaturbericht, Bibliographie, Hamburg 1989. Brickhill, J, Daring to Storm the Heavens; The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979, in N. Bhebe/T. Ranger (eds.): Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, vol. one, Harare 1995. Brock, L./Spanger, H.J.Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt. Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR - eine Herausforderungfier die Bundes-republik Deutschland?, Opladen 1987. Bunting, B.Moses Kotane, South African Revolutionary, London 1983.

252 Books and Articles Bunting, B., The rise of the South African Reich. London 1986. Cervenka, Z./Dederichs, M.R., The two Germanies in Africa, in Africa Contemporary RecordAnnual Survey and Documents 1978-79, New York 1980. Cervenka, Z./Dederichs, M.R.,The two Germanies in Africa, in Africa Contemporary RecordAnnual Survey and Documents 1979-80, New York 198 1. Cervenka, Z. The two Germanies and Africa during 1980. Rivals for influence, in Africa Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents 1980-8 1. New York 1982. Croan, Melvin DDR-Neokolonialismus in Afrika. Bonn 198 1. Czaya, E.Achse zum Kap, Berlin 1964. Dabengwa, D, ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation, in N. Bhebe/T. Ranger (eds.): Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. Vol. one, Harare 1995. DDR-Entwicklungspolitik zwischen A b- und A ujbruch, inepd- Entwick- lungspolitik, Frankfurt/Main, V/I 990. Die Apartheid am Pranger, (East) Berlin 1965 (Schriftenreihe ueber den WGB, no.4 7). Doernberg, S. (ed.), A udenpolitik der DDR. Sozialistische deutsche Friedenspolitik, (East) Berlin 1982. Drechsler, H., "Let Us Die Fighting". The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1984-1915), London 1980. Drechsler, H. Suedwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, Berlin 1966. Engel, U., The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Zimbabwe (1980-92), Hamburg 1994. Florin, P.,The German Peace Treaty and Africa, in The African Communist, No. 8, 1962. Gudat, R./A. IlalEin, Job! Ein wuerdiges Leben f_r alle Mosambikaner... Zur Integration ehenaliger DDR-Vertragsarbeiterlnnen und Studentinnen aus Mosambik, Interviews hrsg. von der Entwicklungspolitischen Geselischaft e.V., Berlin 1993.

Books and Articles 253 Guerilla Warfare., South African Studies No. 1, 197 1. Reese, H.Trotz Sanktionen - DDR-Fahrzeuge rollen in Suedafrika, in Heyden, U. van der/ Schleicher, H.-G. and 1. (eds.)Engagiertfuer Afrika. Die DDR und Afrika, vol. 11, Hamburg/Muenster 1994. Hillebrand, E.Das Afrika-Engagement der DDR, (Muenchener Studien zur internationalen Entwicklung, vol. 5), Frankfurt am Main/ Ben/New York/Paris 1987. How to outwit the enemy, in Sechaba 1/1977. Johnson, P./D. Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War, Harare 1986. Kasrils, R, "Armed and Dangerous ". My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid, Oxford 1993. Kistner, H.Die Erfahrungen beim Aufbau des Sozialismus - eine wertvolle Hilfe fr die progressive Entwicklung national befreiter Staaten, inasien, afrika, lateinamerika ((East) Berlin), 3/1978. Kuehne, W./ Plate, B. von, Two Germanies in Africa, in Africa Report (New York), 4/1980. Kuehne, W.Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika. Bedingungen und Dynamik ihres ideologischen, oekonomischen und militaerischen Engagements, Baden- Baden 1983. Kum 'a Ndumbe 111. Was will Bonn in Afrika? Zur Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Pfaffenweiler 1992. Kuppe, J. Die Parteiauäenpolitik der SED gegenueber Staaten "sozialistischer Orientierung" in Afrika, inBaske, S/ Zieger, G. (eds'.) Die Dritte Welt und die beiden Staaten in Deutschland, Asperg b. ,Stuttgart 1983 (Jahrbuch Gesellschaft fuer Deutschlandforschung 1982). Kuratorium Internationale Solidaritaet, Afro-Asiatisches Solidaritaetskomitee (ed.)Solidaritaet in Aktion ((East) Berlin), 1/1970.

Books and Articles Leimgruber, I. Kalter Krieg um Afrika. Die amerikanische Afrika-Politik 1961- 1963, Stuttgart 1990. Lerurno, A., Fifty Fighting years. The Communist Party olSouth Africa /921- 1971, London 1971. Mandela, N. Der lange Weg zur Freiheit. Autobiographie, Frankfurt/1994. Martin, D./P. Johnson, The Strugglejbr Zimbabwe. The Chimurenga War, Harare 1981. Moleah, A.T., Namibia. The Struggle for Liberation, Wilmington 1983. Moore, D. The Zimbabwe People's ArmyStrategic Innovation or more of the Same?, in N. Bhebe/T. Ranger Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation war, Vol.one, Harare 1995. Ndlovu, S., Zimbabwe. Some facts about its liberation struggle, sin. loc., 1973. Nzombe, S., Negotiations with the British, in C. S. Banana (ed.) Turmoil and Tenacity. Zimbabwe 1890-1990, Harare 1989. Pe I a, B., Two German States and the New Africa, in The African Communist, no. 6, 1961. Plate, B. von, Revolutionat, Change in Africa some implications for East German policy behavior, in Nation, R. C./Kauppi, M.V. (eds.) The Soviet impact in Africa, Lexington/Mass. 1984. Post, U./Sandvoss, F. Die, Afrikapolitik der DDR, Hamburg 1982 (Arbeiten aus dem lnstitut for Afrika-Kunde, Bd. 43). Probleme des Neokolonialismus und die Politik der beiden deutschen Staaten gegenueber dem nationalen Befreiungskampf der Voelker. Wissenschaftliche Konferenz 5.- 8. April 1961 in Leipzig, Berlin 1961. Rode, R. Die Suedafrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1968-1972) Studien zum Konflikt im Sueden Afrikas (Wissenschaftliche Reihe Entwicklung und Frieden), Munich 1975. 254

Books and Articles 255 Sandvoss, F.The German Democratic Republic's policies in Africa 198283. Balancing aid with trade, inAfrica Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents 1983-1984, New York 1985. Sandvoss, F., The German Democratic Republic's policies in Africa 1983-84. A balance of losses and gains, in Africa Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents 1984-198, New York 1986...... The German Democratic Republic's policies in Africa. Africa remains lower priority in Th ird World relations, in Africa Contemporary RecordAnnual Survey and Documents 1986-1987, New York 1988. Scheer, M.Schwarz und Wei6 am Waterberg. Suedwestafrika heute und gestern, Schwerin 1952. Schleicher, H.-G./ Schleicher, LI Wafifenfuer den SuedenAf~iikas. Die DDR und der bewaffnete Befreiungskampf inHeyden, U. van der/Schleicher, H.-G. and!. (eds.)Engagiertfuer Afkika. Die DDR undAfi/ka, vol. II, Hamburg/Muenster 1994...... Die Afrikapolitik der DDR Versuch einer Nachbeira-chiung, in Hojmeier, R. (ed.) Afrika Jahrbuch 1990, Op laden 1991...... Die DDR im suedlichen Afrika, in Mosambik Rundbrief (Wien), 2/1994...... Juniorpartner der Sow/etuniondie DDR im suedlichen Afrika, in Behrens, M./Rimscha, R. von (eds.)Suedafrika nach der Apartheid, Baden-Baden 1994...... UNT4G und der internationale Faklor im Unabh, ngigkeitsprozed Namibias, inafi'ika spectrum (Hamburg), 3/1992. Schleicher, L Statistische Angaben zur Solidaritaet mil Befreiui.gsbewegungen und Staaten im suedlichen Afrika, inHeyden, U. van der / Schleicher, H. -G. and . Engagiert fiter Afrika. Die DDR und Afrika, vol. /I., Hamburg/Muenster 1994. Schulz, B., East German Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Proletarian Inter- nationalism vs. "Mutual Advantage", Working Papers No. 100,

Books and Articles African Studies Center Boston University, Boston MA 1985. Schulz, B., The two German states and apartheid, in .ournalbr Entwicklungspolitik (Wien), 1/1988. Sikora, U."Die Oshi-Deutschen ", Namibische Jugendliche aus der ehemaligen DDR als Mittel der Politik. Diplomarbeit an der Universitaet Bremen im Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaft, October 1995. Singh, E., "Sechaba" - ANC-Zeitschrift printed in GDR, in Heyden van der, U./Schleicher, H.-G. and I.Engagiert fuerAfrika. DieDDR und Afrika, Vol. II, Hamburg/Muenster 1994. Slovo, J.Slovo., The Unfinished Autobiography, Randburg 1995. Somerville, K., The Soviet Union and Zimbabwe: The Liberation Struggle and after, in Nation, C.R./Kauppi, M.V. (eds.) The Soviet Impact in Africa; Lexington/Mass., Toronto 1984. Summary of Proceedings of the Scientific Conference "Against Racism andNeo- Colonialism, for the Liberation of Southern Africa" in Berlin, 22-25 May 1968, (East) Berlin 1968. The South African Trade Union Movement. South African Studies No. 2, (1971). Vale, P., The Soviet Union, Southern Africa and Sanctions, in Sanctions against Apartheid edited by Mark Orkin for the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, Claremont 1989. Verheugen, G., Apartheid. Suedafrika und die deutschen Interessen am Kap., Colone 1986. Voice of Freedom, in Sechaba 4/1976/4. Weiss, R.Der Rhodesien-Konflikt, die Politik der Frontstaaten und die Haltung der Bundesrepublik inH. Bley/Tetzlaff* R. (eds.)Afrika und Bonn. Versacumnisse und Zwaenge deutscher Afrika-Politik, Hamburg 1978. Willerding, K., Die Au6enpolitik der DDR und die Laender Asiens, 256

Books and Articles Afrikas, Lateinamerikas, inasien, afrika, lateinamerika, (East Berlin), 4/ 1979. Winrow, G.M., Thejbreign policy of the GDR in Africa. Cambridge etc. 1990. Yea rbooks/Col lection of Documents/Reference books Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents, New York. Against Racism, Apartheid and Colonialism. Documents published by the GDR 1977-1982, Dresden 1983. ANC speaks - Documents and statements of the ANC 1955-1976, (1977). Auienpolitische Korrespondenz(APK), (East) Berlin, 1986-1989. Barth, B.R. and others (eds.)Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein iographisches Handbuch, Frankfurt/Main 1995. Dokumente der A udenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DAP), 1958-1962 (vol. VI-X), (East) Berlin; Dokumente der Audenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1963-1985 (vol. XI- XXXII) (DA P), (East) Berlin. Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, (East) Berlin Dokumente zur Geschichte der Suedafrikanischen Kommunistischen Partei 1915- 1980, (East) Berlin 1983. Dokumente. Die Afro-Asiatische Solidaritaetsbewegung, (East) Berlin 1968. Erklaerung der Beratung von J'ertretern der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien November 1960, (East) Berlin 1961. Forward to Freedom. The Strategy, Tactics and Programme of the African National Congress, (1970). Gegen Rassismus, Apartheid und Kolonialismus. Dokumente der DDR 1949- 1977, (East) Berlin 1978. 257

Yearbooks, Documents, Rejerence books Jahrbuch Asien-Afrika-Lateinamerika. Bilanz und Chronik, 1970-1983, (East) Berlin. Legum, C./Drysdale, J. (eds.)Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents, London. Luthluli speaks. Portrait of Chief Luthluli. Published by the Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic in Co-operation with the UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1982. Memorandum on the Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of South Africa in the military and atomic field, (East) Berlin 1964. Mwenje No. 2 ZANU Political Programme, I st August 1972 Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawel, Pretoria 1q89. Nelson Mandela speaks. Speeches, statements and articles by Nelson Mandela, (1969). Organisation der Afrikanischen Einheit (OA U). Resolutionen und Erklaerungen 1963-1981, (East) Berlin 1983. Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe 1989. Central Statistical Office Harare Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1959, (East) Berlin 1960. The Alliance Bonn - Pretoria. Memorandum of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee ofthe GDR, Dresden 1967. The Ideological Programme ofthe Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Lusaka, Nov 1978. The Road to Freedom is via the Cross (Speeches of Albert Luthuli), (1971). The South African Communists speak (1912-1980). Documents from the History of the South African Communist Party, London 1981. 258

Yearbooks, Documents, Reference books 259 Year Book of the UN (YBUN), Office of Public Information UN, New York. Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Ideological Concept, Lusaka(1971)

Index Author Index Abdul, S, 41, 42 Appolus, Emil, 166 Armdt, Rudi, 79 Axen, Herman, 25, 34, 177, 178 Balkow, Julius, 10, 24 Bella, Ahmed Ben, 42 Bernstein. Lionel, 44 Bethanie, 232 Bolzi, Luther, 21 Brandt, Willy, 38 Brasch, Horst, 9, 29, 87, 99 Brickhill, Jeremy. 83, 122 Brutus, Dennis, 26 Bunting, Brian, 60 Bunting, Sonja, 56 Chikerema, James 93, 101, 102, 104, 112 Chinamano, Josiah, 126 Chissano, J., 134, 138 Chitepo, Herbert, 99, 115, 117 Collins, Cannon 46, 109 Correns, Erich, 85 Dabengwa, Dumiso, 82, 122, 124, 126 Dadoo, Yusut; 7, 35, 40, 58 Diederichs, Nicholas, 36 Dube, Ethen, 113, 114 Dzasochov, A. S. 100 Eggebrecht, Heinrich, 9, 99, 103 Etzdorf, Hasso vob, 38 Felsenstein, Walter, 48 Fiji, 231 Fischer, Abraham, 27, 45, 46, 48, 49 Fischer, Oscar, 119, 139, 176, 226 Florin, Peter, 29, 42, 169, 137 Fritsch, Guenter 101, 102 Geingob, H 228 Gibeon, 232 Gurirab, Theo-Ben, 174 Gyptner, Richard, 84 Harmel, Michael. 16 Hartmann, Dieter, 81 Heese, Hans, 24 Hellao, Hellao Jarneulu, 194, 196 Henkes, Kluas, 81 Higgs, Barry, 51 Hitlerite, Fascim,43 Hoffman, H, 212 Honecker, Erich, 43, 81, 82, 119, 120, 123, 125, 130, 131, 135, 137, 138, 141,176, 189 llyichov, 128, 129, 130 Indongo, lyambo, 176 Jaeger, Richard, 38 Jaldati, Lin, 44 John, Frank-Rolf, 82 Johnson, Clarence H,, 26 Jordan, Pallo, 64 Kaba, Zinakele, 45 Kahunguan, Jacob, 166 Kalungu, Lempy, 210 Kasrils, Ronnie, 61 Kaul, Friedrich Karl. 47 Kaunda, Kenneth 107, 121 Kelenga, Linekela, 176 Kenyatta, Jomo, 42 Kern Karl-Heinz, 105, 136 Kgokong, Alfred, 46 Khayinga, Wilson, 45 Kieswetter, Wolfgang, 84 Kissinger, Henry, 169 Koehler, Horst, 84 Koeing, Gerd, 222 Kosi, Mandla, 51 Kotane, Moses, 8, 34, 50 Kozonguizi, Jariretundu, 166 Krug, Manfred, 44 Kwiatkowski, Erich, 194, 195, 196, 197 Lamberz, Werner, 122 Lentzner, Kurt-Andreas, 201, 202, 203. 204 Lessing, Gottfried, 59, 60, 102 Letalo, Patrick, 51 Leuschner, Bruno, 20 Luthuli, Albert, 17, 46 Machel, Samora, 129 Maharaj, Mac, 59 Makombe, Trainos 98 Makonese, Philemon, 113 Malianga, Moton, 95, 98 Malianga, Washington, 87 Mandela, Nelson, 28, 44, 45, 46. 48. 49, 54 Mangena, Nikita, Alfred, 126 Maphosa, Florence, 48 Mariental, 232 Markov, Walter, 41 Marks, John B. 35, 50 Masuku, Lookout, 126 Mataure, John, 98, 114 Mathews, Joe, 52 Mielke, Erich, 179 Mini, Vuyisile, 45 Mittag, Guenter, 24

Namibia: The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO Moyo, J.Z, 94, 102, 103, 115, 119, 126 Moyo, Simon, K. 121 Mpongo, David 104 Msika, Joseph, 124, 126 Msimang, Mendy, 18 Mtainbanengwe, V.S. 99 Muchachi, Clement, 118, 119 Mugabe, R, 93, 94, 127, 129, 137, 139, 141 Mutasa, Didymus, 98, 143 Muzorewa, 135, 136 Naholo, Festus, 205 Naicker, Marimuthu P. 51 Nanyemba, Peter, 166, 213 Nauyala, Kapuka, 176 Ndindah, Albert, 113, 120, 123 Ndjoze. Uanivi, 176 Ndlovu, A., 92, 94, 111 Ndlovu, Edward , 92 104. 113, 114, 126 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 42 Nehwati, F.M., 93 Nelengani, Loius, 166 Neugebauer, Bernhard, 139 Ngwenya, Amos, 114 Nkomo, John, 126 Nkomo, Joshua, 80, 82, 84-87, 92- 94, 102, 120, 127, 129, 130, 136- 138 Nkrumah, Kwame, 42 Nodern, Albert, 29 Nokwe, Duma, 34 Nujoma, Sam, 166, 176, 178, 182, 189, 208, 212, 213, 220, 228 Nyandoro, George, 100, 102. 104, 123 Nyati, Isaac. 123 Nyerere, J. 129 Pahad, Aziz, 64 Perez, de Cullar, Javier. 226 Petershagen, Rudolf, 44 Petty bourgeois, 90 Pillay. Villa, 16 Pilz, 219 Rau. Heinrich, 12. 13 Saillant, S. 13 Schalck-Golodkowsi, Alexander, 24 Schleicher, H.G., 138 Schmidt, Heinz H., 53, 97 Schnitzler, von KarI-Eduard, 35 Scholz, Ernst, 84 Schuerer, Gerhard, 188 Seedat, Tony, 33 Seibt, Kurt, 80, 176, 178 Sekou Tour, 100 Selby, Arnold, 33 Selby, Janet, 33 Shamuyarira, Nathan, 132 Shikwambe, Monica. 196 Shirihuru, Edison, 138 Shoombe, Pashukeni, 211 Silundika, George 84, 87, 94, 104, 107, 110, 117, 119, 126 Sisulu, Walter, 28, 36, 48 Sithole, Ndabaningi, 93, 94 Slovo, Joe, 60, 61 Smith, lan, 57. 105 Stein, Gerhard, 84, 85 Steiniger Peter A. 47, 109 Steiniger, Peter Adolf (Dr.) 104 Steyn, M. 171 Stibi Georg 104 Stoph, Willi, 20 Strauss, Franz Josef, 48 Takawira Leopold, 93, 94 Tambo. Oliver, 50 Telli, Diallo, 21, 105 Tito, Josip, Broz, 42 Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba, 192 Toure, Sekou, 42 Ulbricht, Walter, 20, 22, 42, 163 Umlauft, Horst, 81 Verheugen, Guenter, 40 Verwoerd Regime, 31, 39 Walpe, Harald, 41 Wanke, Herbert, 32 Warnke, Herbert, 12, 13 Whitehead, John C., 226 Willerding, Klaus. 134 Wilsdorf, Jochen, 81 Winzer. Otto. 38, 105. 165 Wolpe, Harold, 32 Zinke. Sabine, 211 Zippel, 194, 195, 196 Subject Index AAPSO 80, 94, 97,99. 100, 101, 103, 114, 115 African classes. 90 communist, 55 liberation movement, 88 Rural Population, 90 Trade Union Congress (ATUC), 92 Afro-Asian solidarity committee, 46, 54 262 agricultural development, 220 specialits, 199 aid supplies, 188 All Africa People's Conference, 10, 85 Alliance Bonn-Pretoria, 41 ANC. 3. 7, 13. 21. 24, 34, 57, 58. 94, 108 100 ANC/ZAPU, 118 AND, 105, lOb Angola, 107 Angolan Liberation Movement, 173 anti-apartheid movement, 25 anti-Marxist Policy, 55 apartheid, 21, 37, 42. 44 armed Struggle, 50.56. 57, 106 operations, 57 arms embargo. 174 Asia and Latin America Sciences (ZENTRAAL), 100 Austria, 231 Balkow, Julius. 10, 24 Bangladesh. 23 I Berlin Association of Lawyers, 47 bilateral relations, 141, 143, 144 British anti-apartheid movement, 26 Cairo, 92 Central African Federation. 85, 88, 90 Centralistic Structure, 28 China, 100, 101 Chinese Aid, 130 Chinese Foreign Policy, 95. 96, 100. 132 Chinese in AAPSO, 97 Chinese, CP, 16 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 47 Christian Socialist Union. 38 civil rights, 50 CIVPOL 231 class enemy, 89 struggle, 220 Cold War I, 2, 13, 35, 39. 50 colonial policy, 163 repression, 163 Comit Revolucionario in Mozambique (COREMO), 100 Communist Party of Soviet Union, 40, 45 Conakry, 100 Conferederation of Free German Trade Unions (FDGB), 8. 93 Congress Alliance in South Africa, 36, 45 constructive engagement, 222 Cooperation with Zapu 110 COREMO 100 Correns, Erich. 85 COSArU, 7 Council for Namibia, 171 Cuba, 107 Cuba-Crisis, 96 CUBA-SWAPO Relations, 227 Cuban leadership, 57 troops. 226 cultural exchanges, 141 DAFRIG. 32, 41, 45 democracy, 15, 48, 217 Democratic self-determination, 164 Turnhalle Alliance(DTA), 181 Women's League of Germany, (DFD) 33 destabilisation policy, 223 developmental process, 216 Diplomatic Observer Mission to Namibia, 229 diplomatic relations, 138, 228 disarmarment. 144 East Germany I, 2 Eastern Europe , 101 Economic and Trade mission in Ghana, 105 coperation, 143, 180 constraints, 190 development, 88 sanctions, 14 education and training, 233 Evengelical Lutheran Church in Namibia, 195 fascist terror, 45 FDGB 13, 30, 32, 33, 41. 97. 99, 106, 110. I11, 183, 184, 190 FDJ, 33 Federal Republic of Germany, I I Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 91,183 Felsenstein, Walter, 48 Fiji, 231 Fischer, Abraham, 27, 45, 46, 48, 49 Fischer, Oscar, 119, 139, 176, 226 fisheries industry, 233 food aid, 189 Foreign affairs commission, 21, 12 foreign trade, I0 Free German Youth Brigade, 192 Free German Youth Organisation (FDJ) 30, 176

264 FRELIMO, 58, 100, 103. 108, 127, 173, 179 Fritsch, Guenter 101, 102 FROLIZ, 116 Front Line states, 80, 116, 128, 124. 125. 135, 171 fund-raising campaigns, 190 GDR's African Policy. 79, 117, 219, 221 African agenda, 142 cooperation with SWAPO, 175 loreign policy, 30, 49, 133, 138, 140 material solidarity, 188 medical assistance, 194, 195, 197 Observer Mission, 232 State Planning Commission, 188 GDR -Zimbabwe Economic Commission, 141 GDR and Resolution 435, 168 ZANU, 93 GDR Assistance, 123 Association of Democratic Lawyers, 47 Association of the Blind and Visually Handicapped, 196 Committee for the protectionof human rights, 109 foreign trade, 23 Journalists Association, 85 leadership, 125, 177 mission, 230 nationalism, 204 Peace Council, 33 Solidarity Campaign, 35 Solidarity Commitee, 21, 25, 93, 97. 98, 112, 113, 166, 178, 182. 188 Solidarity Supplies, 191 GDR-Namibia bilateral relations, 180 GDR-ZANU relationship, 84 GDR-ZAPU cooperation, 121 General elections, 105 German colonies, 206 Communist Party, 133 Democratic Republic (GDR) 7 history, 28, 37, 163 language courses. 201 Social Democratic Party, 133 South West Africa, 163 teachers, 202, 203 Trade Union Federation, 13 unification process, 209 Working Class Movement, 164 working class, 164 German-Nambian relations, 210 cooperation, 200 relations, 233 Gennany 1,2, 3 Germany Democratic Republic I, 2, 3 Ghana, 19 Gibeon, 232 grassroots movement, 28 Guinca-Bissau, 107 Hallestien doctrine 19, 29, 40 ICFTU, 13, 20 IDAF, 46, 109, 191 imperialism, 62, 96, 134 India, 231 industrial training. 178, 198, 199 industrialisation. 22 I Institute for Socialist Economic managment, 219, 220 intelligency training, 61 inter-party cooperation, 179 interflug, 81, 82 internal settlement, 128, 171 International Boycott Movement, 11, 12 class struggle, 223. 225 Communist movement, 95 Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU), 12 Cooperation. 41 Court of Justice. 165 demonstrations, 42 Organisation of Journalists, 51 relations, 130 conference, 16 Society for Human Rights, 209 Solidarity Movement 45, 189 Trade Sanctions, 15 Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with Workers and People of South Africa, 13 Trade Union Committee, 41 Trade. I I Weighting Federation, 25, 26 Internationalism, 36. 204 Ireland, 231 Journalists Union (VWJ), 184 Kaiser troops. 231 Kissinger plan 118 Lancaster House Agreement 135, 136 Conference, 136 Negotiations, 83 Index

Inde x 265 Leipzig Trade Fair, 20 Leninism, 126 Liberation, 15 force, 82 movements, 2, 15, 16, 65, 86, 99. 100, 107 organisations, 175 struggle, 5. 82, 94 Malawi Congress Party, 88 manifesto, III Mao clique, 55 Maoism ideology. 60 Maoist theory. 221 Mariental. 232 Marxism- Leninism doctrine. 60. 62. 89. 90, 216, 217 Marxist part5. 89 Theory "bourgeois democracy", 89 material solidarity. 182 May Day celebration 102 medical care, 193, 195 military drill, 64 strategy I I I intelligence. 64 operations, 109 relations, 143 training, 61 Mittag Commission, 180 Mozambican Leadership, 128 Liberation Movement, 173 Mozambique, 107 MPLA, 57, 100, 103, 108. 173, 179 Muzorewa-Smith regime, 135, 124 NAM Summit, 141. 142. 1441 Namibia, 1, 2, 3, 107 history, 195 Today, 167 Namibian's Liberation, 173 armed struggle, 179 219 cultural tradition, 207 elections, 171, 181 independence process, 226 liberation movement, 67, 16 plan, 179 problem. 170 refugees. 191, 192, 193, 210 National Police Army, 231 Council of the National Front, 30, 32 Democratic Party, 84 economic reasons. 189 Front, 29 independence. 48 liberation movements 7, 58, 119, 228 NATO, 25 Nazism, 9 Negotiated settlement, 105, 177 Negotiating process, 174 Neo-colonialist Policy, 39 Netherlands, 231 Neugebauer, Bernhard, 139 Ngwenya, Amos, 114 Nigeria. 231 Nkomati Agreement. 224 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 133 non-civilian supplies, 213, 214 Northern Rhodesia, 93 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 97 Nursery Teacher Training Course, 206 OAU Liberation Committee, 21 OAU, 16, 105 Operation Mayibuye, 28 Otto Bennecke Foundation, 200 PAC, 100. 112 PAIGC, 100, 103, 108 Pakistan, 231 Pan-Africanism, 89 Pan-Africanist Congress, 60 Paramilitary assistance, 114 Paramilitary equipment. 211 Patriotic Front government, 138 peace, 97, 144 peaceful coexistence 127 People's Republic of China. 126, 97 Perestroika, 225 petty bourgeois, 90 PLAN Camps, 212 PLAN. 182, 192, 228 political cooperation. 180, 182 political detainees, 137 political development, 88 political education, 218 political prisoners, 42, 44, 45 political rights, 50 political struggle, 56 Postdam Agreement, 37 Pre-school Education Management, 207 propaganda aid, 10 public education, 205 Reagan administration, 221

Index 266 reconciliation, 218 Red Cross Society, 184 refugees, 122 Regional Committee of the Christian Peace Conference. 47 regional conflicts, 225 RENAMO, 222 repatriation operation, 231 Republic of South Africa, 36 Resolution 435, . 172, 229 revolutionary people's war, 58 revolutionary way out, 17 Rhodesia, 90 Rivonia Trail . 27,30, 35, 44, 45 Robben Island. 46 Rostock Seaport, 198 SACP CC, 14, 27 SACP. 7, 8, 13, 17, 21, 34, 41, 48, 56, 58. 87 Sanctions, 10 Scandinavian Humanitarian Aid, 191 School of Friendship, 208 Sechaba, 51, 56, 167 Second World War, 164 security training, 61 SED CC, 8, 81, 87, 101, 103, 136, 176, 231 Department of International Research, 96 International Relations Department, 14, 18, 27 Secretariat, 30 SED Foreign Affairs Commission, 19 leadership, 185 SED-SWAPO Communique, 177 SED-SWAPO party relations, 215 SED-ZANU relations, 141 SED-ZAPU cooperation, 118 self-determination, 50. 170, 175 Sinoia, 107 Social democracy, 163 Democratic Party, 40 development, 88 injustice, 46 progress, 97. 217 reintegration, 196 socialism, 218 Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) 4 , 5, 61, 82 Socio-Economic Development, 221 Solidarity against UDI, 101-106 Solidarity campaigns, 30, 31, 49 committee. 9. 34, 37. 40, 41, 52, 47, 63, 85. 92, 93, 99. 101, 102, 104, 106. 183, 184 , 186 freight. 119 services. 189 supplies. 80 ward, 193 South Africa . I. 2, 3, 100 South Africa Suppression of Communism Act 8 South Africa/UNITA, 215 South African Army. 80 Communist Party, 55. 61 Destabilisation Strategy, 222 Liberation Movement 4, 5, 24. 27, 31. 35. 40, 44, 56. 59, 61. 63, 65, 87 Non-Racial Committee. (SANROC)26 political exiles. 50 liberation movement, 50 South West Africa, 100 National Union (SWANU), 166 South West African National Union (SWANU), 100 South West African People's Organization 3 Southern Africa I, 2, 3 Liberation Movments, 5, 115. 186, 212 Southern African Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 99 Southern Rhodesia ANC, 84 Rhodesia. 85, 87, 92 104, 106, 109 Soviet-Chinese conflict 4, 5 Soviet Military hardware, 124 Soviet Solidarity Committee, 47 Soviet Union, 15. 95, 97, 112 Soviet-Chinese dispute, 95 Soviety Chinese rivalry, 83 Spanish Civil War,12 special freight, 79 sports sanctions. 25 SWANU, 100 SWAPO, 4, 5, 100. 166-169, 179, 228, 230, 231, 233 armed forces, 199 cadres, 178 camps, 210

Index 267 Youth League. 210 Sweden, 231 Tanzania, 107, 110, Tanzanian leadership, 128 technological modernisation, 221 technology transfer, 38 Third world countries, 90 Trade relations, 105 Union Movement. 92 Unions International of transport workers. 13 Unions, 12. 143 Tricontinental Solidaritv Conference 51 Turnhalle talks, 168, 170 Turning Point Strategy, 82, 124. 125, 135 UDI, 105, 106 Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 28, 64 UN. 16 Convention. 233 Charter, 20 General Assembly, 18, 28, 167, 169, 170 Independence Process. 226 Namibian Plan. 168, 227 process, 229 Secretary General, 231 Security Council, 17, 137, 167 Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid, 21, 42, 43 Special Committee, 21 UNHCR's Solidarity Committee, 230 UNHCR, 230 UNIP, 88, 90, 91 UNITA, 112 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 172, 231, 227 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 43 USA, 90 USSR, 13. 101 Policy. 224 Verwoerd Regime, 31, 39 Vietnam, 97, 107. 132 Vocational Training 186, 196, 198, 200, 201, 203 Walvis Bay, 170 Wankie Operation, 59, 109 Weimar Republic. 39, 54 WFT,13 Women's International Democratic Federation in Berlin, 48 Working Class, 36 World Campaign, 32 Council of Churches, 232 Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 12, 94 peace, 98 Peace Council. 94, 100 Revolutionary movement, 95 revolutionary process, 173 xenophobia, 205 ZACU, 106, III Zambia, 110 ZANU, 3, 57. 80, 94, 95, 97. 98, 99, 100, 101, 112. 117 guerrilas, 107 ZANU-ZAPU cooperation, 118 Zanzibar, 101 ZAPU, 57-58, 65,79-80, 82, 90-94. 98 100-105. 107-113 Revolutionary Council, 114 ZAPU-ZANU dilemma, 125 Zimbabwe i, 2, 3, 100 Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions (ZACU), 93 armed struggle. 116, 129 liberation movement. 83-84, 87, 92, 95, 101, 106, 116. 119. 134. 136 liberation struggle, 83, 135, 141, 144 Military Cadres, 124 People's Army, (ZIPA)! 17 Review, 167 Zimbabwe-GDR Friendship Society, 143 ZIPRA, 81

AFRICA a'___ Southern African Political Economy Serips SAPES TRUST Special Flights to Southern Africa This book is intended as a reflection of the Germany Democratic Republic, East Ge any's past, notably its links with the national liberation movements in Southern Africai Liberation movements had neither time nor the resources to keep records and dcuments because of the business of waging a war against colonial rule. This book orides those interested in understanding facts and relationships to help them appre te the history of both sides. This applies to the conflict-ridden evolution of the liberation movements. Similarly, e GDR's specific interests, the interplay between the leading powers of East and We- as a major factor in the GDR's foreign policy on its association with the liberation m ements is described in great detail.The authors have attempted to present this rela nship within the context of evolutions and on the other of internal developments withi e liberations movements themselves against the background of overall conditions in e southern African region and the Cold War confrontation of that era. About the Authors? Hans-Georg Schleicher is a historian. He served as a GDR diplomat in Zambia, the N and Zimbabwe. Ilona Schleicher works at the Institute of Labour Movement (Be ). Together they spent 10 years in Southern Africa SAPES Trust The Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust is a not-for p fit organisation whose main objectives are to promote and nurture social science resea h, debate, teaching and publications in Southern Africa. Its programmes, which operat n a network-concept, are built around the major theme of Issues on The Post-Cot al State, Democracy and Human Rights; Peace and Security; and Regional Cooperaa ; and seek to relate academic research to policy issues and public concerns in the re n. The policy research and publishing activities of the SAPES Trust are coordinated thro h its institute, the Southern Africa Research Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS). Am g its multiple fora, SAPES Trust publishes a monthly research journal, the Southern A a Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM), the only journal of its kind on the contin t. SAPES Trust research results are also disseminated through the monograph, occasi al and seminar series, in addition to the SAPES Book Series. The SAPES Trust's Ce al Secretariat is located at 4 Deary Avenue, Belgravia, Harare, Zimbabwe. ISBN: 1-77905-071-2 a I ,