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S. HRG. 106±230 S. 693: THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION AUGUST 4, 1999 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 60±900 CC WASHINGTON : 1999 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:53 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 60900 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee STEPHEN E. BEIGUN, Staff Director EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:53 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 60900 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 CONTENTS Page Allen, Hon. Richard V., Allen & Co., Washington, DC ......................................... 31 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 34 Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from Montana ................................................... 4 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 5 Campbell, Dr. Kurt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense .............................................................. 15 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 16 Lampton, Dr. David M., director of China Studies, School of Advanced Inter- national Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC ....................... 39 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 41 Roth, Hon. Stanley O., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State ................................................................... 7 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 11 Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, prepared statement of ........ 7 Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., chairman, Forbes, Inc., Washington, DC ............ 37 Woolsey, Hon. R. James, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC .............................. 46 APPENDIX Responses of Assistant Secretary Stanley O. Roth to questions submitted for the record ........................................................................................................ 59 Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell to questions submit- ted for the record .................................................................................................. 61 ``Dynamic Elements in the Cross-Straits Military Balance,'' a study by Rich- ard D. Fisher, Jr. .................................................................................................. 63 (III) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:53 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 60900 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 S. 693: THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT AUGUST 4, 1999 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room SD±419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chair- man of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Coverdell, Thomas, Biden, and Kerry. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We have an array of distinguished witnesses today, a full sched- ule. And on behalf of the committee, I extend our welcome to each and every one of them. The first being Senator Max Baucus, who is known to all of us, as is Assistant Secretary Roth, Deputy Assistant Secretary Camp- bell, and our private panelists. We are genuinely grateful to all of you for coming today. Specifically, our purpose is to examine S. 693, the Taiwan Secu- rity Enhancement Act, which Senator Torricelli and I introduced sometime earlier this year. I think it was in March. This legislation will ensure that Taiwan will have essential self-defense capabili- ties. And to accomplish that, we propose to bolster the process for defense sales to Taiwan, and help Taiwan achieve and maintain an adequate military readiness. Now, the need to enhance our defense relationship with Taiwan, I think, is obvious. First, the reunification of Taiwan has become an increasingly high agitation issue for Beijing now that they have reabsorbed Hong Kong and, as of this coming December, Macau. Second, Beijing constantly demonstrates a willingness to use in- timidation to achieve its goals. China fired missiles off of Taiwan's coast in 1995 and 1996, and is now engaged in a massive missile buildup opposite Taiwan, according to the February 1999 Pentagon report to Congress. Beijing is also undergoing a multifaceted mili- tary buildup, which includes increased emphasis on logistical im- provements for a Taiwan scenario. And if one adds to this buildup the ugly, threatening rhetoric aimed at Taiwan by the highest lev- els of the Chinese Government, one can see the very real threat that Taiwan may face. Third, part of Beijing's strategy is to continue its pressure on the United States to limit or cease arms sales to Taiwan. And this had the effect at various times on successive administrations in this country. Of course, it was the Reagan administration that signed the regrettable 1982 communique, which set a ceiling on arms (1) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:53 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 60900 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 2 sales to Taiwan, and promised China that we would gradually re- duce these sales. Over the years, the United States has refused to sell Taiwan needed defense items, such as submarines and missiles, solely to assuage China. Just 2 weeks ago, the Clinton administration with- held several arms sales notifications to Congress, and is reported to be considering further such measures in an obvious attempt to curry favor with Beijing and punish Taiwan for President Lee's re- cent remarks on Taiwan's status. And, last, our friends in Taiwan have military capabilities that have operated in virtual isolation for more than 20 years. Taiwan's military does not conduct joint exercises with the U.S. military, and is not even able to observe many of our exercises. No U.S. offi- cers above the rank of colonel or Navy captain can go to Taiwan. And those who do are limited in the things they can do and say. This has certainly had a corrosive effect on Taiwan's military pre- paredness at exactly the time Taiwan faces a growing military threat from China. So, United States strategic interests, United States law, and United States moral values dictate, it seems to me, that we assist our long-time friends in Taiwan in meeting these challenges. And that is why Senator Torricelli and I have introduced this bill. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses, but, first, I look forward to hearing from Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that we occasionally need an important bill like this to both attract the caliber of witnesses you have assembled today, as well as to prove to people that we do not agree on everything. Be- cause, of late, that has been the case. Mr. Chairman, let me first commend you for holding this hearing to examine S. 693, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. And let me also welcome the very distinguished panel of witnesses. I look forward to hearing each of their testimony. As some in this hearing room may know, the chairman and I are among a handful of current Members of the Senate who were here to vote for the Taiwan Relations Act, or against it, 20 years ago. As I have said many times before, over the past 20 years, there has been no Member of the Senate who has been a more loyal friend of Taiwan than the chairman. Like the chairman, I, too, am proud of my vote 20 years ago to help pass the Taiwan Relations Act. And the TRA has helped preserve, in my view, peace and stability in the Western Pacific and created an environment in which Taiwan has thrived. Taiwan today is an economically and culturally vibrant, multi- party democracy. And Taiwan's transformation, I think, would not have been possible without the United States' commitment to its security, as enshrined in the TRA. China should have no doubt that our commitment remains firm. The United States believes China and Taiwan should settle their differences peacefully, through dialog, on the basis of mutual respect. Mr. Chairman, it is precisely because I share your commitment to Taiwan's security, and to the Taiwan Relations Act as the law of the land, that I have such grave reservations about the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which is the subject of today's hearing. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:53 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 60900 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 3 Far from enhancing Taiwan's security, I am concerned that passage of this legislation would be the equivalent of waving a red cape in front of Beijing and inviting China to charge. First, there is no security measure included in this act that is precluded by the Taiwan Relations Act, the TRA.
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