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Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-Military Policy Towards Taiwan Under Hu Jintao, In: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 3, 99-118

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Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-Military Policy Towards Taiwan Under Hu Jintao, In: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 3, 99-118 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs China aktuell Chang, Wu-ueh and Chien-min Chao (2009), Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-Military Policy towards Taiwan under Hu Jintao, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 3, 99-118. ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) The online version of this and the other articles can be found at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> Published by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies in cooperation with the National Institute of Chinese Studies, White Rose East Asia Centre at the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield and Hamburg University Press. The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. To subscribe to the print edition: <[email protected]> For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes: Africa Spectrum • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs • Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs • Journal of Politics in Latin America • <www.giga-journal-family.org> Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2009: 99-118 Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-Military Policy towards Taiwan under Hu Jintao Wu-ueh Chang and Chien-min Chao Abstract: China’s Taiwan policy has been one of coupling intimidation (the “stick” approach) with coercion (the “carrot” approach), a policy mix which, in the near term, is not likely to change, as is evidenced by the passage of the “Anti-Secession Law” in March, 2005. However, un- der Hu Jintao, the focus has been on pragmatism. The warm atmosphere that presently reigns in the Taiwan Strait area is unprecedented. Further talks are expected before the two cross-Strait leaders are slated to step down, simultaneously, in 2012. An era of reconciliation and negotiations has dawned. For the first time there is consensus regarding norms of interaction between the two sides. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized after years of tumult. More open, stable and predictable cross-Strait rela- tions are in the interests of both sides. Difficulties surely lie ahead, but they will be dealt with in a different manner than what has been wit- nessed in the past. Manuscript received May 15, 2009; accepted July 25, 2009 Keywords: Taiwan, Hu Jintao, cross-Strait relations, Leading Small Group, ARATS. Dr. Wu-ueh Chang is currently director and associate professor at the Institute of Mainland China Studies, Tamkang University, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. from the Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University. E-mail: <[email protected]> Dr. Chien-min Chao is currently a distinguished professor at Sun Yat- sen Graduate Institute for Development Studies, National Chengchi University. He has been a visiting distinguished professor at George Washington University and visiting teaching professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. E-mail: <[email protected]> 100 Wu-ueh Chang and Chien-min Chao Introduction On April 29, 2005, a historic meeting took place between Hu Jintao, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Dr. Lien Chan at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. Al- though the previous year, the KMT had been deposed as the ruling party and Lien lost the election, the meeting was significant in that it was the first between leaders of the former arch-enemies in more than six dec- ades. The “Common Aspiration and Prospects for Cross-Strait Peace and Development” produced as a result of that meeting heralded a new policy line that now constitutes the core of the current mainland-China policy formulated by President Ma Ying-jeou who reclaimed the regime for the KMT in March, 2008, after an eight-year hiatus, during which the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ruled. Two months after the power transition, Hu met with Taiwan’s new ruling party chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Their eventful meeting was followed, in mid-June, by a resumption of talks between the two semi-official organi- zations, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). These events established Hu’s reputation as the Chinese leader who successfully brought cross- Strait relations back from the brink of disaster and spurred the normali- zation process. These are no small steps and what Hu faces is an entirely new ball game. The international scene, cross-Strait interactions, and domestic concerns on both sides of the Strait, have changed drastically in the past decade. China’s rise and war in the Middle East have given Beijing a signifi- cantly stronger voice in international affairs, especially in East Asia. Tai- wan’s pursuit of a more autonomous status under the previous Chen Shui-bian administration placed China in a very precarious situation and Chen’s quest for a new constitution and a referendum seeking approval to officially use the name “Taiwan” upon entry to the United Nations, led Beijing to declare that the island republic was, in effect, seeking de jure independence (Chao 2005). The perception that the Taiwan Strait was in a state of emergency prompted Jiang Zemin’s enactment of a more assertive policy – known as wengong wuhe (“to attack with pens and intimidate with coercion”; a parallel to Theodore Roosevelt’s “Walk softly and carry a big stick”). Cross-Strait relations at the beginning of the new millennium became more tenuous than at any other time since the early 1980s when China began to de-radicalize its policies. When the Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait 101 fifth-generation leadership, headed by Hu Jintao, took power in 2002, the challenge in the Taiwan Strait region was so daunting that the area was considered, by some, to be on “the brink of war”. The passage of the “Anti-Secession Law” in March 2005, cast a heavy shadow over the Taiwan Strait. However, in a dramatic about-face, Hu Jintao reduced the coercive (“stick”) part of the two-pronged policy and weighing in, in- stead, more heavily in favour of a “carrot” approach. With this new en- gagement policy in place, cross-Strait relations were poised for a change when Taiwan’s second power transition occurred in March 2008. Does, in fact, the “blue sky after a heavy rain” exist, as described by Chen Yunlin, head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (SCTAO) until his reappointment as chairman of the ARATS (China’s window of communications with Taiwan) on the eve of the second talks (SCTAO website 2008b). What is the rationale behind Hu Jintao’s great change? Are cross-Strait relations set for a great leap forward? Ma Ying-jeou’s landslide victory – along with the defeat of the “Tai- wan for [the] UN” referendum – ushered in a new era in the, heretofore, difficult cross-Strait relations. With a president who publicly contests advocacy for independence and a ruling party, the KMT, that controls over three-quarters of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, it is safe to say that the worst period in relations is probably over. Engagement, rather than nationalistic confrontation, has become the very core of policy- thinking on both sides.1 The provocative “desinification” policy that was believed to be the pivotal part of Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to consolidate “Taiwan consciousness” is probably a thing of the past.2 Trust between the two sides is likely to be restored, gradually. The power shift in Tai- wan has also put a halt to the instability caused previously by the minor- ity DPP government, which had retained only 23.9% of the seats in the 1 What worries Beijing the most is that Taiwan might attempt to add the “state-to- state” theory, via amendment, to the constitution. This is what is meant by “de jure” independence. According to the ROC’s constitution, an amendment proposal must be passed, first, by three-quarters of the Legislative Yuan and it is, then, sub- ject to a popular referendum. During this second stage, half of all registered voters are required to vote, and the approbation of half of those voting is necessary for the process to be complete. With the KMT in power, there is little likelihood that any such amendment would succeed. 2 Many of the congratulatory dispatches from foreign dignitaries sent to Ma Ying- jeou following his election, including those from U.S. President George W. Bush and the Japanese and U.K.’s foreign anticipation of fresh opportunities for dialogue and peace in the Taiwan Strait area. 102 Wu-ueh Chang and Chien-min Chao 2008 Legislative Yuan election despite having garnered 39.1% of the popular vote. As Taiwanese politics stabilize so should relations between the two sides. This article argues that Hu Jintao is more pragmatic than any previ- ous Chinese leader in his handling of the thorny issue of cross-Strait relations. As a result, the two Taiwan Strait neighbours currently have more in common than at any other time in the past. China’s ultimate goal of national unification has been delayed and cross-Strait relations are now instrumental to the advancement of the PRC and ROC’s mutual economic interests. Policies – and the relevant organizations dealing with them – have been reshaped in order to accommodate this new reality. Storm Clouds before Hu Jintao: Jiang Zemin and the Wengong Wuhe Beijing’s Taiwan policy was changed in the context of the post-Mao era policy shift, injecting incentives into its enervated economic system. The new policy, promulgating “peaceful unification”, featured Deng’s “one country, two systems” formula, which allowed for an interim period leading to eventual unification.
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