Practical Contextualism in Chinese Philosophy Yuzhou Yang a Thesis

Practical Contextualism in Chinese Philosophy

Yuzhou Yang

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Languages

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

November 2016

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School: School of Humanities and Languages Faculty: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Title: Practical Contextualism in Chinese Philosophy

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'Practical Contextualism' is a multifaceted concept which, I will argue, permeates various ancient Chinese texts. The central focus of practical contextualism is to be aware of, and sensitive to, the contextual environment or situation, including the relationships involved in those contexts. On an individual level, this has important implications for one’s daily engagement with others and the world. On a socio-political level, this is essential to creating and implementing well-functioning social and political institutions and policies. Practical contextualism means, among other things, that one must be prepared for possible changes that might occur in these contexts, and calls for the fostering of optimal and timely responses and solutions. In this light, the cultivation of the self is an arduous process whereby one develops epistemic cognition and skills in order to be able to detect and deal with exigent situations.

This thesis studies four pre-Qin Chinese texts: the Yi Jing, the Han Fei Zi, the Zhuang Zi, and the Analects. Each of these arguably exemplifies the particular tradition or practical field it represents, and has received extensive and long-term scholarly attention. The current study unveils practical contextualism as a common theme that exists in the four texts, but with different philosophical emphases. The Yi Jing is one of the earliest texts abundant with contextual and practical ideas that are not necessarily limited to any particular philosophical discipline. In the Han Fei Zi, practical contextualism constitutes an overt theme in political discourse. The Zhuang Zi is ideal for examining practical contextualism in Chinese epistemology. The Analects explores how practical contextualism is played out in human societies.

The current study proposes a theoretical framework to describe 'practical contextualism', which does not appear specifically in ancient Chinese texts, and has yet to be studied systematically. The framework identifies six distinctive dimensions of contextualism and four different types of practice. It could serve as a viable interpretive framework for reading other Chinese philosophical texts on their own terms.

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Date ……………………………………………...... Abstract ‘Practical Contextualism’ is a multifaceted concept which, I will argue, permeates various ancient Chinese texts. The central focus of practical contextualism is to be aware of, and sensitive to, the contextual environment or situation, including the relationships involved in those contexts. On an individual level, this has important implications for one’s daily engagement with others and the world. On a socio-political level, this is essential to creating and implementing well-functioning social and political institutions and policies. Practical contextualism means, among other things, that one must be prepared for possible changes that might occur in these contexts, and calls for the fostering of optimal and timely responses and solutions. In this light, the cultivation of the self is an arduous process whereby one develops epistemic cognition and skills in order to be able to detect and deal with exigent situations.

This thesis studies four pre-Qin Chinese texts: the Yi Jing (易經), the Han Fei Zi (韓非子), the Zhuang Zi (莊子), and the Analects (論語). Each of these arguably exemplifies the particular tradition or practical field it represents, and has received extensive and long-term scholarly attention. The current study unveils practical contextualism as a common theme that exists in the four texts, but with different philosophical emphases. The Yi Jing is one of the earliest texts abundant with contextual and practical ide as that are not necessarily limited to any particular philosophical discipline. In the Han Fei Zi, practical contextualism constitutes an overt theme in political discourse. The Zhuang Zi is ideal for examining practical contextualism in Chinese epistemology. The Analects explores how practical contextualism is played out in human societies.

The current study proposes a theoretical framework to describe ‘practical contextualism’, which does not appear specifically in ancient Chinese texts, and has yet to be studied systematically. The framework identifies six distinctive dimensions of contextualism and four different types of practice. It could serve as a viable interpretive framework for reading other Chinese philosophical texts on their own terms.

Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my principle supervisor, Associate Professor Karyn Lai, for her guidance, support, and patience throughout my candidature. It is because of her help that my interest in studying Chinese philosophy is fulfilled. The current project was inspired by her broad knowledge in this field which allowed me to explore a wide range of different topics while still receiving effective and valuable guidance and advice. Her continuous and merticulous efforts helped me refine my writing and thinking, and make this a better thesis that I could have hoped for.

I would like to thank the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW), for the external research grant it provided, which assisted me to conduct six months of research in Taipei. I would also like to thank the UNSW International for organizing the Practicum Exchange Program on my behalf. I thank the Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University (NTU), for the opportunity to learn new perspectives in studying Chinese philosophy, and expand my knowledge and reading skills on ancient Chinese texts. I was also grateful to participate in the four- week 2013 Nishan Confucian Studies Summer Institute before my trip to Taipei. This program allowed me to gain valuable insgihts into the comparative nature of Western and Chinese philosophies.

I would like to thank Professor Pei-Jung Fu, my host supervisor at NTU, for his guidance that helped me read through the entire text of the Mencius and all the Innter Chapters of the Zhuang Zi, and for his valuable advice on part of the thesis chapter on the Zhuang Zi. I thank Professor Hsien Chung Lee, whose seminars opened my mind to the methodological enquires on Chinese philosophy; Professor Masayuki Sato, who helped me see Confucianism from a wider scope; and Professor Chen-feng Tsai, who shared his knowledge on the Dao De Jing from a literary perspective. I was deeply motivated by the passion of all the scholars from whom I have learnt much on Chinese thinking during my stay at NTU.

I would like to thank Professor Roger Ames, Professor Chenshan Tian, and many other scholars at the 2013 Nishan Confucian Studies Summer Institute, for their lectures and seminars that shed the comparative lights on Western and Chinese philosophies. They helped to deepen my understanding of philosophical perspectives from both sides.

I also thank Dr Simon Lumsden, Dr Melissa Merritt, and Professor Paul Patton, for their feedback on part of the framework chapter. I thank Professor Peimin Ni and Professor Marthe Chandler for their suggestions on the conference paper extracted from the thesis chapter on the Analects; and Professor Chung-yi Cheng and Assistant Professor Winnie Sung, for comments on the chapter on the Han Fei Zi. I thank Assistant Professor Wai Wai Chiu for his help with the English materials on the Han Fei Zi.

I also thank Andrew Koh and Thomas McConochie for their valuable feedback on the thesis abstract, and Joshua O'Rourke for his handy help.

I thank Dr Rhonda Siu for her supportive friendship and excellent work in proofreading the entire thesis.

I also thank my family, especially my parents, for their understanding, encouragement, and support. Without them, my passion on this project may never be fulfilled.

It is impossible to name all individuals who witnessed the journey of this project and offered their generous help. My thanks go to all of them.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... i Acknowledgements ...... ii Table of Contents ...... iv Introduction ...... 1 Chapter One ...... 9 Probing the Underlying Practical and Contextual Message in Classical Chinese Thinking ...... 9 1.1 Contextualism in Anglophone Studies ...... 10 1.1.1 Contextualism in Western Metaphysical and Epistemological Discourse ...... 10 1.1.2 Contextualism and Logic ...... 13 1.1.3 Historical Contextualism in Western Political Philosophy ...... 15 1.1.4 A Preliminary Comparison of Contextualism in Western and Chinese Philosophy .. 18 1.2 Contextualism in Chinese Language Literature ...... 20 1.2.1 Contextualism and the Chinese Character ‘境’ (Jing) ...... 22 1.3 Six Dimensions of Contextualism in Chinese Philosophy ...... 24 1.3.1 Context and Relationality ...... 25 1.3.2 Context and its Limits ...... 26 1.3.3 Context as Dynamic ...... 28 1.3.4 The Interspace in Context ...... 30 1.3.5 The Practical Denotation of the Six Dimensions ...... 32 1.4 Four Types of Practices in Chinese Philosophy ...... 33 1.4.1 Self-cultivation ...... 33 1.4.2 Problem-solving ...... 36 1.4.3 Epistemological Development ...... 36 1.4.4 Public Policy ...... 36 1.5 Practical Contextualism in Four Different Ancient Texts ...... 37 1.5.1 The Yi Jing ...... 38 1.5.2 The Han Fei Zi ...... 39 1.5.3 The Zhuang Zi ...... 39 1.5.4 The Analects ...... 40 Chapter Two...... 43 The Yi Jing: Dealing with Change ...... 43 2.1 Understanding Change in Chinese Philosophy: The Yi Jing ...... 45 2.1.1 Change: An Analysis of Yi...... 45

2.1.2 Change versus Transformation ...... 48 2.1.3 Dynamism in the Yi Jing ...... 51 2.1.4 Change and Transformation in the Yi Jing: A Practical Appreciation ...... 52 2.2 Context and Change ...... 60 2.2.1 Context and the Application of the Yi Jing ...... 63 2.2.2 Context and the Hexagrams ...... 67 2.2.3 Context and Philosophical Meanings in the Yi Jing ...... 68 2.2.4 Interspace and Metaphor ...... 72 2.2.5 Contextualism in the Yi Jing ...... 74 2.3 A Contextually Intelligent Response to Change ...... 77 2.3.1 Dogmatic Response...... 77 2.3.2 Indecisive Response ...... 79 2.3.3 Theoretical versus Practical Contextualism ...... 81 2.3.4 Practical Contextualism in the Yi Jing ...... 84 2.4 The Implication of the Yi Jing on Self-cultivation ...... 88 2.4.1 ‘Jun Zi’ as the Key Phrase to Understanding Self-cultivation ...... 88 2.4.2 The Significance of Self-cultivation ...... 90 2.4.3 The Contextual Cultivation of Yan Xing (言行) ...... 92 2.4.4 The Rich Meaning of Contextualism in the Yi Jing ...... 93 Conclusion ...... 94 Chapter Three...... 99 The Han Fei Zi: Practical Contextualism in Political Discourse ...... 99 3.1 Han Fei Rejects Confucian Ren and Yi ...... 101 3.1.1 Governing through Authentic vs Inauthentic Ren and Yi ...... 105 3.1.2 The Public (公, gong) and Private (私, si) Contexts of Ren and Yi ...... 110 3.1.3 To Distinguish Ming Zhu (明主) from Luan Zhu (亂主) ...... 116 3.2 Han Fei’s 法 (Fa) and Context-Insensitivity ...... 121 3.2.1 Han Fei and Mencius’ Contextual Debate on Human Nature ...... 125 3.2.2 The Amoral Aspect of Human Nature ...... 131 3.3 Xing Ming (刑名 or 形名) as the Standard Evaluation in Han Fei’s Philosophy ...... 135 3.3.1 The Missing Contextual Considerations in the Principle of Xing Ming...... 137 3.3.2 The Contextual Status of Fa in Han Fei’s Philosophy ...... 141 Conclusion ...... 143 Chapter Four ...... 147

The Zhuang Zi: Practical and Contextual Epistemology ...... 147 4.1 Contextual Epistemology in the Zhuang Zi ...... 148 4.1.1 Shi-fei (是非) and Zhuangzi’s Ming (明) ...... 152 4.1.2 A Contextual Appraisal of Ming ...... 157 4.1.3 Relativism and Its Contextual Implication in the Zhuang Zi ...... 161 4.1.4 Zhuangzi’s Precision in Evaluating Knowledge ...... 167 4.2 Zhuangzi’s Practical Wisdom ...... 174 4.2.1 The Way in Cook Ding’s Dissecting Skills ...... 176 4.2.2 The Key Concept of No Thickness (無厚, Wu Hou) ...... 177 4.2.3 Knowledge, the Way, and the Relations ...... 179 4.2.4 The Way of “Carving” Epistemologically ...... 180 4.2.5 The Contextual Transformation of Knowing ...... 182 Conclusion ...... 184 Chapter Five ...... 189 The Analects: Practical Contextualism in Human Relationships ...... 189 5.1 The Transformed ‘Ren’ in the Analects ...... 191 5.1.1 The Transformation of ‘Aesthetic’ Ren to ‘Moral’ Ren ...... 192 5.1.2 The Etymological Origin of Ren ...... 196 5.1.3 The Practical and Contextual Approach of Ren ...... 198 5.1.4 Ren and Self-Cultivation ...... 204 5.2 To Learn to Cultivate the Self ...... 206 5.2.1 The Importance of Xue (學) ...... 207 5.2.2 To Love to Learn (好學, Hao Xue): Xue as the Ends Not Just the Means ...... 210 5.2.3 Xue (學) and Si (思) ...... 214 5.2.4 Xue (學) and Jiao (教; To Teach, To Educate) ...... 216 5.3 Ren and Li: An Intricate Relationship ...... 222 5.3.1 The Significance of “Li Comes After” ...... 225 5.3.2 Ren and Li in the “Painting” Metaphor ...... 227 5.3.3 The Practically Contextual Rendering of Ren and Li ...... 229 Conclusion ...... 230 Conclusion ...... 233 Bibliography ...... 245 Primary Texts ...... 245 Secondary Sources ...... 248

Introduction

The main aim of this thesis is to plumb the sensitivities and deeper meaning of Chinese philosophy through an exploration of its themes and concepts via a framework of ‘practical contextualism’. Practical contextualism is a multifaceted concept which, I will argue, is latent in various ancient Chinese texts. In contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy, terms like ‘context’, ‘situation’, and ‘circumstance’, etc. and their derivatives are often encountered in English-language publications. This phenomenon suggests that the prevalence of a contextual theme in Chinese philosophy has already been realized amongst Western academic communities. Unfortunately, this theme is not explicitly articulated (or readily available) in ancient (e.g., pre-Qin, 先秦) Chinese texts. The near absence of corresponding character(s) or phrase(s) in ancient Chinese obstructs a systematic investigation of contextualism in Chinese philosophy. To overcome this hurdle, this thesis will not attempt a direct analysis of the relevant character(s) or phrase(s) in ancient Chinese, but will instead accomplish the investigation through more indirect and unconventional means. This task (to which Chapter One is dedicated) needs to be performed so that the meaning and idea of contextualism in classical Chinese texts can be revealed in a systematic manner.

The existence of a contextual theme in Chinese philosophy seems to be widely recognized in contemporary studies of the relevant fields, especially in those concerning the Chinese way of viewing the ‘Self’. The contextually-embedded self implies a relationship between the self and the situated environment (including the people who populate it). Taking the Confucian perspective, Tu Wei-ming recognizes that “The self as the center of relationships has always been the focus of Confucian learning.”1 Chad Hansen, who takes the Zhuangzian viewpoint, remarks that “our confidence in our know-how depends on a regress of norms and context… others have equal confidence in their different contexts.”2 Tu and Hansen clearly approach the self-environment relationship from two distinct perspectives, namely the humanistic versus

1 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985, p. 55. 2 Chad Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi.” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook, New York: SUNY Press, 2003, p. 150.

1 epistemological ones. However, this should not prevent us from seeing the shared, underlying assumption of the contextual ‘Self’ on which they both rely.

This shared theme of the contextual ‘Self’ in Chinese philosophy is also recognized by many other scholars. For instance, Lai argues that “the pictures of self-realization in the different [Chinese] philosophies are dramatically different…. Nevertheless, they share a similar fundamental…view that individuals are inextricably relational and are contextually situated.”3 The notion of a contextually-embedded self has a significant implication for individual moral practices, namely, that it “shatters the theoretical dichotomy of self and society, commonly assumed and unquestioned, in moral theories in the Western philosophical tradition.”4 Brindley points out that the idea of the contextually-embedded self does not request “individuals to abandon their own autonomous faculties of judgment and choice of action.”5 Nevertheless, this idea treats “individual potential for moral cultivation and autonomy not as something universal, but context-dependent.”6 Generally speaking, the contextual ‘Self’ calls for a contextual practice of individual development known as self-cultivation in Chinese philosophy, which is grounded on the perception that the Self is always “immersed”, to certain extent, in the situated context(s). Therefore self-cultivation is intimately associated with the practices paying attention to the contextual surroundings of the Self.

Hall and Ames address this ‘contextual’ theme conceptually and symbolically, and which, to a certain extent, captures the contextual essence presented in both Confucian and Zhuangzian (or general Daoist) thinking:

… the relations of ‘part’ to ‘whole’ are best characterized in terms of the notions of ‘focus’ and ‘field.’ A particular is a focus that is both defined by and defines a context—a field … The particular focus [de] is not understood in terms of discrete and essentialistic self-nature; rather, it is focus in the process of existence. When disclosing its uniqueness and difference, it is apprehended as a

3 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 7. 4 Karyn Lai, Learning from Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self, 2006, p. 11. 5 Erica Brindley, “Moral Autonomy and Particularistic Sources of Authority in the Analects,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38:2, 2011, p. 269. 6 Ibid., p. 270.

particular; when considered in terms of the full complement and consequence of its determining conditions, it is a field of existing things.7

Hall and Ames do not limit their contextual perspective to examining the Self, but expand it to include more phenomenal and conceptual cases (or processes) that embody the contextual relationship of ‘part’ and ‘whole’, or ‘focus’ and ‘field’. Unlike ‘part’ and ‘whole’, whose denotations may be too specific, ‘focus’ and ‘field’ as a pair represents a ‘fluid’ or dynamic perception of contextuality. Hall and Ames’ focus-field framework not only reveals an implicitly contextual theme in Chinese philosophy, more importantly, it represents an innovative way of approaching Chinese philosophy (or philosophy in general) through a contextual outlook. Chung-ying Cheng asserts that “the origins of Chinese philosophy consist of creative efforts to reach totality, stability, balance and harmony in an ever-fluid context of social, political and moral and historical developments.”8 From the perspective of creativity, Wen recognizes that Chinese thinking values “ars contextualis” (the art of contextualizing)9 which entails creation in situ (creation out of situational context).10

On the one hand, there is already significant realization of the contextual theme in Chinese philosophy; on the other hand, this does not entail an intensive and comprehensive understanding of this theme: a systematic analysis of contextual thinking (or further philosophizing and developing the contextual outlook) is largely missing in the study of Chinese philosophy. Moreover, despite the prevalence of contextual thinking, it is peculiar that, in ancient China, no consistent characters or phrases were dedicated to the concept of ‘context’ (equivalent to that found in the West). It seems that, in Chinese philosophy, contextualism is often exercised in practice while rarely specified in words. Since, as indicated above, contextual thinking permeates different areas and traditions of Chinese philosophy; investigating it may provide us with an alternative (or new perspective) to understanding Chinese philosophy in general.

7 David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking through Confucius, State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 238. 8 Chung-ying Cheng, “The Origins of Chinese Philosophy,” in Companion Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy, ed. Brian Carr and Indira Mahalingam, London: Routledge Publishing, 1997, 445–480, p. 478. 9 Haiming Wen, Confucian Pragmatism as the Art of Contextualizing Personal Experience and World, New York: Lexington Books, 2009, p. 13. David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 1987, p. 248. 10 Haiming Wen, Confucian Pragmatism as the Art of Contextualizing Personal Experience and World, 2009, p. 1.

To more precisely capture the practically significant (but textually/conceptually implicit) characteristic of contextualism in Chinese philosophy, and to distinguish it from that in Western philosophy, I propose that Chinese contextualism is, in essence, ‘practical contextualism’. Practical contextualism is both a theoretical framework and a multifaceted approach that emphasises the practical orientation of Chinese philosophy arising from its awareness of the significance of context. While, in Chinese philosophy, practicality and contextualism are both multi-dimensional concepts (as will be shown in Chapter one), these two should not be treated as separate issues. First of all, ‘practicality’ and ‘contextuality’, as two primary themes of practical contextualism, have their own sub-dimensions. As I will demonstrate in Chapter one, there are six sub-dimensions for contextualism and four for practicality. (However, because of the complicated nature of practical contextualism, it is impossible to exhaust all of its relevant dimensions in the current thesis. It is expected that more subtle and meaningful dimensions may be revealed in the future.) Secondly, the ‘practical’ and ‘contextual’ notions of practical contextualism are not two independent but interdependent ideas. In other words, Chinese contextualism is essentially practical contextualism. In the texts under investigation, it is extremely rare (if not entirely impossible) that a contextual theme can be examined without taking into consideration its practical character. (Even in the epistemological and conceptual domains, contextualism is still unmistakably practical in Chinese philosophy.) The further the investigation of each text progresses, the more this intricate and indispensable relationship will become visible.

Due to limited space, and in order to optimize the demonstration of the richness and diversity of practical contextualism in Chinese philosophy, I have chosen to examine four different ancient texts from the pre-Qin (先秦, xian Qin; before 221 BCE) period. The texts under investigation are the Yi Jing (易經, aka. the Book of Changes), the Han Fei Zi (韓非子), the Zhuang Zi (莊子), and the Analects (論語). The Yi Jing is one of the earliest texts abundant with ideas about contextualism and practicalism that are not necessarily limited to any particular philosophical discipline. The Han Fei Zi is a text with arguably the most explicit concerns on practical contextualism in relation to political issues. The Zhuang Zi is one of the best texts to examine practical contextualism in Chinese epistemology. The Analects explores how practical contextualism is played out in a human society. The contextual themes, as the current study indicates, are explicit in the Yi Jing and the Han Fei Zi, and are more

4 comprehensive in the former than in the latter. The current thesis sets out to explore contextualism in the Yi Jing before the Han Fei Zi, then moves on to the Zhuang Zi and the Analects where contextualism is less explicit. The distinctive philosophical concerns involved in these texts help to tease out (as rich as possible) the multiple dimensions of the framework of practical contextualism. These different dimensions, in turn, repeatedly reflect or highlight their underlying theme of practical contextualism in all the texts at hand.

Chapter one is dedicated to the establishment of the theoretical framework and the demonstration of the multiple dimensions of practical contextualism. In Western philosophy, a relatively new doctrine called “contextualism” appears to share certain similarities with the contextual theme in Chinese philosophy. To start with, I will borrow, and briefly introduce, this term, ‘contextualism’, as it is understood in Western philosophy. I will then move on to delineate the outlook of contextualism and its practical nature in Chinese thinking through a comprehensive examination of the Chinese character 境 (jing, border) in pre-Qin texts.

Chapter two endeavours to reassess the Yi Jing’s philosophy of discerning and dealing with change through the proposed framework. The Yi Jing is famous for its attempt to provide interpretations and solutions for the changing and transforming situations in people’s daily lives. Through exploring the ideas of change and transformation, this chapter ventures to unveil the implicitly contextual denotation embedded in the concept of yi (易, change) as well as in the hexagrams of the Yi Jing. In proposing optimal responses based on the evaluation of situational change, this chapter also strives to discern practical contextualism from its theoretical counterpart. The latter arguably can potentially hinder instead of promote the choice of optimal responses.

Chapter three examines political philosophy in the Han Fei Zi through the perspective of practical contextualism. When judged from Confucian moral perspectives, the political philosophy of the Han Fei Zi might seem to be morally questionable. The practically contextual significance of its political thinking, which is explicitly exhibited in the text, may be overlooked when viewed from the perspective of moral dubiousness. The current investigation attempts to take a new approach so that a more comprehensive picture of Han Fei’s philosophy can be brought to light and appreciated. This chapter attempts to demonstrate the practically contextual thinking in Han Fei’s argument for

5 the suitable ruling strategies that can faithfully address the challenges of his time. It also demonstrates how this thinking is missing in (or contradicted by) his proposal of ruling under fa (法, penal laws), which, Han Fei believes, is a universal solution to social disorder.

Chapter four aims to trace the practical and contextual theme in Chinese epistemology through investigating the Zhuang Zi. The notion of context in Zhuangzian and Chinese epistemology in general can be both conceptually- and environmentally-oriented. On the one hand, the significance of the environmental context in Chinese epistemology indicates that knowledge may not be taken as universal truth independent of contextual factors; on the other hand, the notion of conceptual context as implied by the concept of ming (明, illumination) highlights the intricate relationship between the ‘known’ and ‘unknown’, or the ‘intelligible’ and ‘unintelligible’. However, no matter which dimension (conceptual vs environmental) of contextualism the Zhuang Zi is concerned with, one thing is unmistakable. This is that individual epistemological development relies on practice instead of contemplation. The practical nature of Chinese (or Zhuangzian) epistemology has been best represented in stories concerning “honing the knacks”, e.g., the story of Cook Ding Dissecting an Ox (庖丁解牛, Pao Ding jie niu).

Chapter five provides practically contextual interpretations of the human ethics that the Analects promotes. Understanding Chinese ethics and moral ideas on their own terms can be challenging, especially in a different philosophical discourse or language. This chapter strives to meet that challenge by analysing two central Confucian moral ideas, ren (仁, humanness or benevolence) and li (禮, rites or behaviour propriety). This will ensure that these distinctively Chinese characteristics (ren and li) can be made manifest. An in-depth examination of the Confucian idea of xue (學, learning or to learn) is also undertaken in order to highlight the practically contextual approach, which is indispensable to ethical issues in the Analects, as well as Chinese philosophy in general.

The Conclusion reviews and sums up the current research under the framework in order to present a holistic picture of practical contextualism and its different appearances in the investigated texts. The first part reviews the establishment of the framework, and its significant meanings in Chinese philosophy. The different emphases of contextual thinking between Western and Chinese philosophies help highlight the practical character of Chinese contextualism, which is essential to proposing the framework. To

6 elaborate the picture of practical contextualism in Chinese philosophy, the second part is dedicated to summarizing different dimensions of practical contextualism in the four investigated texts.

I would like to acknowledge here that the idea of practical contextualism was originally developed in my Honours thesis concerning the study of the Yi Jing, and has been expanded in the current dissertation.11 Considering the consistency between the two, some of the discussions and topics from my Honours thesis will appear in Chapter Two (concerning the Yi Jing) of the current dissertation. The main topics reappearing in the current thesis concern 1) the idea of 易 (yi), its meaning of change, and the subtle differences between change and transformation; 2) the implication of the divinatory practice of the Yi Jing on the ideas of change and transformation; 3) the differentiation between theoretical vs practical contextualism, and the implication of the difference on different types of responses to the changing context. Some of the figures and diagrams employed in the Honours thesis also appear in the current thesis, and they will be indicated in the relevant footnotes.

11 The title of my Honours thesis is Contextual Intelligence: The Yi jing’s Wisdom of Dealing with Change (submitted to the School of Philosophy, University of New South Wales, in Oct 2011).

Chapter One

Probing the Underlying Practical and Contextual Message in Classical Chinese Thinking

Although the current thesis is dedicated to the investigation of both practical and contextual aspects, key to understanding the term, ‘practical contextualism’, is an understanding of the meaning of contextualism in Chinese philosophy. In order to achieve the latter we need to first comprehend what contextualism means in the discourse of Western philosophy, because, as indicated previously, this is a term borrowed by me from the Western philosophical discourse. In the first section of this chapter, I will survey the idea of contextualism in contemporary Western philosophy in order to delineate an image of ‘Western contextualism’. This image will serve as a contrast against which ‘Chinese contextualism’ can be better identified. This will be achieved through conducting a brief comparison of these two contextualisms both during and after the philosophical survey.

To overcome the barrier that the term ‘contextualism’ or the phrase ‘practical contextualism’ is not readily available in traditional Chinese texts, the second section will be dedicated to identifying the key Chinese character (in this case, 境, jing) in contemporary Chinese that corresponds to the English term ‘contextualism’. The third section will focus on providing a comprehensive picture of ‘contextualism’ concerning the character jing in classical Chinese literature. The fourth section will delineate a detailed image of ‘practicality’ in Chinese philosophy. The discussions in the third and fourth sections will constitute the theoretical framework of practical contextualism. In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss in preliminary terms how the framework of practical contextualism is played out in the four ancient texts examined in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

It is worth pointing out that the current dissertation is not one of comparative nature. Instead of performing a panoramic comparison of contextualism between different philosophical traditions (Western vs Chinese in the current case), it is more pragmatic to explore the theme of practical contextualism in Chinese philosophy as comprehensively as possible. In doing so, it is hoped that readers will form their own comparative images

9 with distinctive patterns and paces, according to their own personal experiences and journeys, and with the awareness of their daily activities and practices.

1.1 Contextualism in Anglophone Studies Due to limited space, the idea of contextualism will only be investigated in four primary disciplines in Western philosophy: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic, and Political Philosophy. Investigations undertaken in these four disciplines will be comprehensive enough to understand contextualism and its development in Western philosophy. A brief comparison of contextualism in both traditions (Chinese and Western) will also be provided at the end of this section.

1.1.1 Contextualism in Western Metaphysical and Epistemological Discourse One of the earliest uses of the term ‘contextualism’ appeared in 1929 in J. Laird’s paper, Concerning Epistemology: The Presidential Address.12 In his paper, Laird argued against a form of contextual approach to philosophy which he terms “the argument from mental atmosphere.”13 Basically, the aim of this argument is to give weight to the perspectives of individuals in epistemological inquiries. Laird takes a strong metaphysical position in critiquing these individualistic approaches as “ego-centric”. He believes that any “ego-centric” approaches to epistemology are trivial because none of them can affect the metaphysical identities, properties, and/or qualities of objects, as well as the logical relations between different terms. In brief, Laird suggests that contextual approaches to epistemology are insignificant both metaphysically and logically.

This view, however, was challenged in Manley Thompson’s 1964 paper, the “Metaphysics”.14 Thompson dedicated some sections of his paper to exploring the implications of context in metaphysics. Thompson suggests that the label “contextualism” marks an “opposition to any form of absolutism, to any attempt to fix the meanings of key terms absolutely without regard for context.”15 Thompson does not deny the significance of contextualism in the study of metaphysics; however he is concerned about how the concept of context ought to be understood in metaphysics.

12 J. Laird, “Concerning Epistemology: The Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 30, 1929-1930, pp. 1-30. 13 Ibid., p. 10. 14 Manley Thompson, “Metaphysics,” In Philosophy, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm and others, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 125-232. 15 Ibid., p. 199.

This is also the issue that concerns Pepper, who, in his 1942 book, conducts a comprehensive survey of different world hypotheses known as “root metaphors”.16 Contextualism is regarded as one of the relatively adequate root metaphors amongst the other three, namely formism, mechanism, and organicism.17 The metaphor for contextualism, according to Pepper, is the “dynamic dramatic active event” that features change and novelty, and with “quality and texture as the basic categories”.18 Pepper’s root metaphor of contextualism seems to supplement those discussed in Thompson’s paper.

Thompson analyses distinctive approaches to ‘context’ from the works of three different philosophers: John Dewey, Arthur Murphy, and Earnest Nagel. Thompson argues that Dewey’s interpretation of contextualism treats each context as an ultimate reality, which means that “the ultimately real comprises a continuum of problematic situations and not a continuum of events or a series of independent substances.”19 However Dewey’s suggestion of a multiplicity of contexts has been challenged by Murphy, who refuses to give metaphysical recognition to each and every contextual situation.20 Although being more sympathetic to Dewey’s view, Nagel disagrees with both philosophers’ approaches to the concept of context.

Thompson characterises Nagel’s philosophy as “contextualistic naturalism,” which Thompson describes as “an irreducible plurality of contexts or situations and insists that cognitive issues can be settled only within the specific contexts that give rise to them.”21 From this, one might infer that Nagel’s philosophy focuses more on epistemological issues than metaphysical ones. However, Thompson points out that Nagel’s contextualistic naturalism may provide a third interpretation of the ultimately real. According to Thompson, Nagel’s “reality” “is not a continuum or series of contexts, problematic situations, substances or events, or anything else;” rather, “there is no ultimate reality behind the diverse realities which different contexts take as ultimate.”22

16 Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses A Study in Evidence, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, p. 85. 17 Ibid., pp. 141-2. 18 Ibid., pp. 232 & 235. 19 Ibid., p. 200. I think that Thompson may have over-interpreted Dewey’s contextualism. 20 Ibid., pp. 199&202. 21 Ibid., p. 201. 22 Ibid.

Nagel does not accept the idea of a metaphysical reality in which diversity dissolves; he suggests instead that diversity itself is the reality.

Because of this diversity, Thompson calls for the establishment of a consistent idea of what constitutes a context, as he believes that this is essential for metaphysical investigations. However, achieving consistency when determining a concept, such as the concept of context, already reflects the core characteristics of metaphysical thinking: it presumes and permits no or minimum variations of a given term. The request to find a universal definition of “context” which can be applied in all contexts is simply begging the question, and presents us with an unsolvable puzzle. If a universal idea of context has to be pre-defined, it may be preferable to investigate contextualism from an epistemological, rather than metaphysical, perspective. And that is exactly what has happened in the philosophical literature on contextualism.

The emergence of contextualism in epistemology started in the 1970s;23 since then it has become a popular topic in contemporary epistemology.24 Initially, contextualism was formulated as a key to answering some of the most difficult questions raised by epistemic scepticism; later it developed into a wide range of theories.25 However, there is a common thesis amongst these theories: according to Keith DeRose, “the truth- conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’ and ‘S does not know that p’ and related variants of such sentences) vary in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered.”26 For example, you may be very sure that a particular individual had been in a crime scene, although you did not actually see her there. When asked by a friend whether you knew she was there, you may give a positive answer. However, when questioned by a policeman, you may give a negative one (due to the lack of direct evidence). According to epistemic contextualism, your seemingly inconsistent claims are both true. You are telling the truth in both contexts despite the fact that the truth-condition of the first context is lower than that of the second. In epistemology, contextualism is challenged

23 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 26-28. 24 Elke Brendel and Christoph Jäger, “Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects,” In Contextualisms in Epistemology, ed. Elke Brendel and Christoph Jäger, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer 2005, p. 1. 25 E.g., Peter Unger’s skeptical invariantism, David Lewis’ relevant alternatives account of knowledge (RA), and the later studies based on these theories. Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, 2009, pp. 26-28. 26 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, 2009, p. 2.

12 by invariantism. According to the latter, one cannot claim to know and not know something simultaneously, meaning that one either knows or does not know something.27 In this sense, it is fair to say that epistemic contextualism provides solutions for justifying truth-conditions of knowledge, but it does not give moral or value judgments to issues concerning individual actions and practical reason. However, this has recently been changed.

1.1.2 Contextualism and Logic In Contextuality in Practical Reason, A. W. Price (2008) introduces contextualism as an approach to practical reason. He argues that the principles of logic, although assumed to be ‘invariant and universal’, when applied to practical inference, will be influenced by contextual factors which have significant effects on our behaviours.28 Price contends that, when making practical judgments, agreement can be drawn from, or justification can be provided for, apparently incompatible ‘ought’s. This applies when they are interpreted contextually, with an eye to the different ends and aspects of a situation.29 For example, consider the following two conditional statements:

(a) If you want to get drunk every evening, you should work in a bar.

(b) If you want to get drunk every evening, you shouldn't work in a bar.

In conditional (a), the consequent, ‘you should work in a bar’, seems merely an intuitive, instead of a rational, response to the antecedent, ‘if you want to get drunk every evening’. If we were to really achieve the goal of the antecedent, then the consequent ‘you should not work in a bar’ of the conditional (b) seems to be a better and more rational choice. Price argues that this is merely the impression we may receive from the logical form of these two conditionals, but this would be subject to alternative interpretations when taken in a wider and implicit context. “Suppose”, Price suggests, “that working in a bar is the only way you can afford to get drunk every evening.”30 In this regard, it seems that conditional (a) may not be as irrational as it first appeared (merely in its logical form).

27 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 28 Price, A. W., Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 23. 29 Ibid., p. 34. 30 Ibid., p. 61.

However, under the new condition, conditional (a) as a ‘hypothetical imperative’ still seems logically or rationally ineffective or even implausible. E.g., given the premises that 1) ‘You do want to get drunk every evening’, and 2) ‘Working in a bar is the only way you can afford to get drunk every evening’, we can certainly rule out the consequent of conditional (b) that ‘you shouldn’t work in a bar’ (i.e., you have to because it is the only option). However, given these two premises, the consequent of conditional (a) that ‘you should work in a bar’ may still sound a bit unfeasible, because, under usual circumstances, one cannot perform paid work while drunk. In light of this, conditional (a) still seems problematic. With a strong commitment to the contextual approach, Price, however, contends that logical effectiveness and plausibility are not something fixed in logical forms, but are also subject to contextual variations and interpretations. Price attempts to establish these points through investigations of logic. However, for the purposes of the current thesis, it may be better to represent his arguments in a different way in order to avoid overusing the jargon and formulae employed in philosophical logic.31

Essentially, what Price argues is that a logical form can only provide so much information to one who reads it; there is so much underlying information in a statement which is impossible to grasp by simply reading the statement itself. Because of this, depending on one’s ability to grasp these implicitly conditional, situational, and contextual messages, a statement which initially appears to be irrational, ineffective, or implausible in its logical form may, in fact, turn out to make perfect sense in real situations and practices. (Following the same logic, a statement which initially appears to be rational, effective, or plausible in its logical form may, in fact, end up being the opposite after contrasting contextual information has been taken into account.) For instance, in the previous example of the contradictory conditionals of ‘being drunk’, suppose that, in addition to the situation where ‘working in a bar is the only way you can afford to get drunk every evening’, your workplace happens to be a theme bar where some of the bartenders are allowed to drink with their customers in order to promote or increase the sales of beverages. Moreover, you are one of these bartenders. If this is the case, it would be strange to see conditional (a) as irrational, but conditional (b) as rational. In the current case, the additional contextual information or

31 To make them more appealing and accessible to readers who find reading the content of philosophical logic difficult, I have rephrased and even rewritten some of Price’s expressions in the relevant discussions.

14 considerations have the effect of reversing the rational judgments of the competing logical statements.

As a logician, Price challenges the conventional perception that logic is a means through which an ‘invariant and universal’ meaning can supposedly be bestowed on a statement. In the field of practical reason, however, this view of logic is challenged by almost endless contextual factors in which a practical decision is made. In other words, the practical reason of a statement (such as the aforementioned conditionals of ‘ought’s) is no longer decided solely by its logical form, but by many implicit contextual factors which are not immediately available in, or provided by, the statement itself. When taking into account these contextual factors, certain statements which initially appear to be logically unreasonable may become sensible in practice. This has been clarified by way of Price’s arguments.

However, while focusing primarily on the ‘hypothetical imperative’, Price’s approach to practical reason can appear to be overly relativistic. It seems that, hypothetically, for Price, when adequate contextual factors are provided, most (if not all) of the statements of the conditional ‘ought’s can be reasonably acceptable, and hence justified. This certainly rings alarm bells for certain statements of practical reason where moral or ethical concerns are at stake. However, what is more significant to the current thesis is that, as a logician, Price’s focus is still on the hypothetical or theoretical aspect of practical reason. This aspect involves the infinite possibilities of contextual variations that can affect a practical decision. This means that our exploration of practical reason should focus not only on hypothetical possibilities but may also need to encompass the optimal solution(s) pertinent to a particular contextual condition. The latter has been repeatedly emphasised in some contextual theories of Western political philosophy.

1.1.3 Historical Contextualism in Western Political Philosophy In “From historical contextualism, to mentalism, to behaviourism” (from Political Philosophy versus History?), Jonathan Floyd (2011) analyses a form of political philosophy called historical contextualism. The latter aims to justify or legitimize Western Liberal Democracy from a historical perspective. According to Floyd, historical contextualism rests on two basic convictions. First, political enquiries cannot and should not be examined without taking into consideration the political context within which certain fundamental political agreements have been formed throughout

15 history. Second, since the political context is informed by historical development, recognizing the former requires an understanding of the latter.32

Floyd analyses two different versions of historical contextualism: one proposed by Charles Larmore and another by Bernard Williams. On the one hand, Larmore argues that, despite the significantly divergent attitudes towards political ideas and values in contemporary Western societies (such as equality, liberty, justice, and etc.), people seem to agree on at least two basic political norms: ‘rational dialogue’ and ‘equal respect’. According to Larmore, these two fundamental norms are the products of the historical context of modernity. On the other hand, while also valuing modernity, Williams does not seek people’s agreement on political norms, but on the political form itself. According to Williams, the only acceptable political form is a liberal one as a result of the cultural circumstances and political attitudes developed in modernity.33

Floyd criticizes both approaches of political justification for their underlying assumption. He is sceptical about the suggestion in both theories that fundamental political agreements can currently be found in highly divided or polarized Western societies and communities. According to Floyd, “human beings tend to disagree with each other.” He continues, “And not just with each other … they also disagree even within their own individual minds.”34 Floyd refers to ‘mentalism’ as a mode of political philosophy that is grounded in human thoughts on a particular political form (e.g. liberal). David Hume and John Rawls’ political theories, according to him, are both in the ‘mentalist’ camp, and, of course, Larmore and Williams’ versions of historical contextualism are also in the same category.35

Realizing the ineffective and even unrealistic elements of the mentalist approach, Floyd proposes re-examining political philosophy from a practical or behaviourist angle. He states, “That is, rather than only studying how humans think, perhaps they would do well, sometimes, to consider how they act.”36 Conventionally speaking, human thinking usually offers guidance as to how we should behave, whereas human action embodies

32 Jonathan Floyd, “From Historical Contextualism, to Mentalism, to Behaviourism,” in Political Philosophy versus History?: Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 40. 33 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 34 Ibid., p. 62. 35 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 36 Ibid., p. 57.

16 how we actually behave. Floyd suggests that many contemporary philosophers, such as Gerald Cohen, tend to disconnect an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’, or, better put, a ‘fact’ from a ‘principle’. These philosophers, Floyd argues, let the latter (‘principle’ or ‘ought’) guide the former (‘fact’ or ‘is’), something with which he himself disagrees. To make this point, Floyd compares the hive-building behaviours of bumblebees with the political behaviours of human beings. While bumblebees build their hives at the top of the trees in order to avoid attacks from bears, humans practice liberal democracy to avoid “famine, crime, war and political instability”.37 In both cases, the actions are the result of previous effective behaviours that have been undertaken for the purpose of having a better life. These actions, however, have not been informed by certain pre-empirical guiding principles. In this sense, David Hume, according to Floyd, is also in the camp of behaviourism. Or, it is fairer to say that, in the former’s political thinking, Humean mentalism is grounded in his behaviourism, not vice versa. Observations made over the long term have proven that liberal democracy has worked effectively in avoiding the aforementioned disasters. In light of such a historical context, if we want to be safe in the future, we should continue to practise liberal democracy.

In comparison with Price’s logical arguments about conditionals, Floyd’s notion of a political conditional from a behaviourist perspective is less relativistic and certainly very ‘concrete’. Floyd depicted the developmental history of political philosophy in the West (especially during the period of modernity), and decided that under the specific cultural, historical, and political context, liberal democracy was, is, and will remain at least in the foreseeable future the best choice. While Price’s contextual theory might be overly relativistic, it is equally worrisome that Floyd’s theory could be overly rigid and absolute. According to Price’s theory, plausibility and rationality cannot be assessed by examining the statement (or the consequent of a conditional) itself. Rather, this assessment depends on the context within which a statement or conditional is understood and/or interpreted. More importantly, unlike Floyd, Price’s context is an infinite possibility, which is not limited in quantity, space, and time, and is thus most likely also subject to change. If context is a dynamic (variable) concept, the rationality and plausibility of a conditional, whose interpretation depends on contextual factors, will be subject to variations as well. In this sense, the conditional promoted by Floyd is

37 Ibid., p. 58.

17 also contingent on the change of historical context, which has not been probed in his work.38

1.1.4 A Preliminary Comparison of Contextualism in Western and Chinese Philosophy So far, we have explored the idea of contextualism in Western philosophical discourse in relation to the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and political theory. The decision to begin my discussion of contextualism in the metaphysical tradition was because of its appearance first in this tradition. This metaphysical tradition, however, lacks a counterpart in Chinese thinking. This by no means suggests that there are no metaphysical elements or ideas whatsoever in Chinese philosophy, it just entails that there may be no Chinese concepts and ideas that bear as strong, transcendental, or fundamental, a metaphysical connotation as those found in the Western philosophical tradition. As will be seen in Chapter Two on the Yi Jing, the awareness of change (易, yi) dominates the thinking patterns of Chinese people; the idea of non-change (不易, bu yi) is defined in contrast to change, instead of having its own meaning. In this sense, what may sound conceptually peculiar, but practically feasible, is that Chinese metaphysical concepts or ideas should be approached epistemologically in order to achieve a better understanding of them.39 Coincidentally, in Western philosophy, this seems to be reflected in the transition from metaphysical approaches to contextualism to epistemological ones (as indicated above). This transition took place in the 1970s.

The contextual re-examination of logic occurred only recently in Western thinking. However, as can be seen in Price’s argument, it introduces a strong or even evolutionary influence on the conventional way of seeing Logic. The contextual reasoning of logical statements (such as the ‘ought’ conditionals) means it is conceivable to envisage almost infinite possibilities in the practice of decision-making. The efficacy of decision-making is difficult to judge until it has been examined in a concrete environmental, situational, or logical context. This is very different from the conventional approach, which takes logical statements as having innate, unmistakable and invariant meaning(s). Price’s critiques of conventional views about logic, especially in the area of practical reasoning,

38 Floyd’s work leaves at least two questions unanswered (or open): 1) Will liberal democracy also be legitimate for nations which have not been experiencing the same cultural, historical, and political development as Western nations? 2) Will liberal democracy still exist and be practised in an unforeseeable future or forever? (In other words, will it change at certain stages in history even in the West?) 39 For instance, the focus of Chinese philosophy may not be on the objective truth, but on different approaches to what constitutes the truth.

18 are both revolutionary and disconcerting, for they could potentially pave the way for relativism, especially in cases concerning moral issues. This, in fact, echoes similar concerns raised by various scholars who are wary of the potentially relativist nature of the prominent Daoist text, the Zhuang Zi. This text will be explored in Chapter Four. Besides contextual concerns, practical thinking (and the close connection between these two) is becoming increasingly prevalent in Western philosophy.

Another major strand of contextualism, which has taken shape in the field of Western Political Philosophy, plays quite a different role from that in Logic. Instead of highlighting the infinite possibilities brought about by diverse contexts, Political Philosophy stresses the determinate power of historical context (in Modernity in particular) in shaping contemporary Western liberal democratic ideals and institutions. Traditionally, political thinkers have attempted to justify the legitimacy of Western politics through people’s agreement on certain political ideas, such as ‘rational dialogue’ and ‘equal respect’. Floyd, however, criticizes this mentalist approach of historical contextualism by proposing a practical revision. He contends that, since Modernity, the political legitimacy of Western liberal democracy has not been founded on political agreement but on actual political practices. That is, political practices should be justified by what we always do, but not what we always believe.

On the one hand, Floyd’s proposal of a practical approach to historical or political contextualism echoes the ideas put forward in the current thesis; on the other hand, it offers a curious contrast with how practical contextualism appears, or is viewed, in traditional Chinese thinking. For example, as will be seen in Chapter Three, Han Fei, one of the Chinese ancient political thinkers, perceives practical contextualism in politics in different terms. He argues that, because political, social, and economic situations constantly change throughout history, no methods of governing or political principles can be implemented permanently, and in all historical contexts. As the historical context changes, so too do the political principles and institutions. I am not suggesting that Floyd’s view completely contradicts that of Han Fei. Nevertheless, the differences between them are salient. Floyd emphasizes the need for consistent political practices in a given context perceived as stable. By contrast, Han Fei highlights the necessity of adjusting political practices in order to reflect, address, and respond to the changing historical context. The view of changing context is arguably recognized by most, if not all, ancient Chinese thinkers.

Instead of exhausting all aspects and areas of contextualism in Western philosophy here, I have selected those that are most relevant to my topic of ‘practical contextualism’ in order to conduct a very brief comparison on an introductory level. The discussions of the books and publications about contextualism are presented in chronological order to reflect, to a certain extent, the evolving history of ‘contextualism’ in Western philosophy.

1.2 Contextualism in Chinese Language Literature Following this introduction of contextualism in Western philosophy, the current section will explore the concept of contextualism in contemporary Chinese. It will then trace and explicate the different origins of this idea in both the Chinese and Western traditions. Before these, a brief review of ‘contextualism’ in English dictionaries may help provide a better insight into the cultural difference underlying this concept.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED)40, ‘contextualism’, as a philosophical term, refers to “Any doctrine emphasizing the importance of the context of inquiry in solving problems or establishing the meaning of terms.”41 This definition highlights both the ‘practical’ and ‘conceptual’ dimensions of the term ‘contextualism’: it can be adopted to either solve problems or establish meanings. This definition is quite peculiar given the fact that ‘contextualism’ as a word appeared very recently in 1929 (according to the OED). It also seems highly innovative in its meaning due to the fact insofar as it is a derivative of its etymon ‘context’. In the OED, the descriptions of ‘context’ and ‘contextual’ are almost exclusively confined to the textual analysis. However, the term ‘contextualism’ (which appeared only in the OED but not the other surveyed dictionaries42) has the environmental denotation implied by its practical dimension. Based on the definition of ‘context’ in the OED, it is difficult to fathom why ‘contextualism’ can mean things that extend beyond the meanings of its etyma (‘context’ and ‘contextual’). 43 What seems to be missing here is a clear roadmap that helps to

40 This chapter attempts to reveal the distinctive origins of the concept of ‘contextualism’ in English and ‘境’ in Chinese. In this regard, the investigations of different English, Chinese, English-Chinese, Chinese- English dictionaries are an essential part of the current research. 41 Retrieved November 15, 2014, from https://www.oed.com. 42 Other than the OED, the English dictionaries surveyed include: The Collins Dictionary Online, The Macmillan Dictionary and Thesaurus Online, The Macquarie Dictionary Online, and The Merriam- Webster Online. 43 The OED provides the detailed quotations in the chronological order in which the term ‘context’ has appeared, but other dictionaries can hardly match such precision. For instance, in the Macquarie Dictionary, other than its textual meaning, ‘context’ also means “the circumstances or facts that

20 explain the evolution between the meaning of “context” and “contextual” to that of “contextualism”.

What is clear, however, is that in English, the ‘textual’ denotation came first in defining the contextually relevant concept (such as context, contextual, and eventually contextualism) before the ‘environmental/circumstantial’ meaning took shape. The contrast between the textual/conceptual and environmental/circumstantial foci of contextualism in Western and Chinese discourses, respectively, will become salient in the following discussions.

Readily available and “authoritative” Chinese translations of the term ‘contextualism’ are rare. In all the English-Chinese dictionaries that I have surveyed, only one of them, the New Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary (NOECD; 新牛津英漢雙解大詞典, Xin Niu Jin Ying Han Shuang Jie Da Ci Dian), includes the term ‘contextualism’ and provides Chinese translations of it.44 In the NOECD, ‘contextualism’ has been translated as ‘【哲】語境主義, 背景論, 具體環境論’, and involves three meanings.45 The first meaning ‘語境主義’’ (yu jing zhu yi)—the doctrinal context of a text or passage—is used mostly in relation to literary texts.46 We might find the phrase ‘語境’ (yu jing) used, for example, in an expression such as “後殖民主義語境下的當代澳大利亞文學” (contemporary Australian literature in the postcolonial context). In relation to the second meaning ‘背景論’ (bei jing lun), the Chinese phrase ‘背景’ (bei jing) literally means ‘background’, ‘backdrop’, or even ‘context’ in English.47 This meaning bei jing

surround a particular situation, event, etc.” (Retrieved November 15, 2014, from https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/) The definitions of ‘context’ in the OED have been strictly linked to its ‘textual’ dimension. In one place where the word ‘circumstance’ appears in the definition, it actually still means the ‘textual circumstance’ or the ‘circumstance in a text’. Only in a very small section of the whole definition, one can see the meaning detours from its ‘textual’ meaning, yet this small section only offers quotations but not definitions or explications. The roadmap of how the term ‘context’ acquired the non-‘textual’ meaning later appeared in its derivative ‘contextualism’ seems to be missing here. This makes the definitions of the term ‘context’ in those NON-OED dictionaries suspicious: whether the non-‘textual’ meaning of ‘context’ appeared necessarily earlier than that of ‘contextualism’, or it was actually the other way around. 44 The surveyed English-Chinese dictionaries (other than the NOECD) include: 朗文高階英漢雙解詞典 (The Longman Advanced American Dictionary (Bilingual), First Edition), 牛津高階英漢雙解詞典第六版 (The Oxford Advanced Learner’s English-Chinese Dictionary, Sixth Edition), 牛津英漢漢英詞典 (The Oxford Chinese Dictionary), 英漢辭海 (The English-Chinese Word-Ocean Dictionary). 45 新牛津英漢雙解大詞典 (The New Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary), 上海:上海外語教育出版社 (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press), 2007, p. 454. 46 ‘主義’ (zhu yi) in Chinese can be treated as ‘-ism’ in English. 47 ‘論’ (lun) in Chinese means ‘theory’.

21 can be used in the previous sense of a doctrinal or textual environment, as in “朦朧詩產生的現代主義文學背景” (the modernist literary background of menglong poetry). However, it is also more comprehensive in that it can also be used to describe physical surroundings, such as in “藍色天空的耀眼背景” (a brilliant background of blue sky). The Chinese phrase ‘環境’’ (huan jing) in the third translation usually denotes specific or concrete environments or circumstances, as in “幸福的家庭環境” (a happy home environment). The meaning of huan jing differs from the textual and doctrinal denotation of yu jing, but approximates the notion of physical surroundings captured by bei jing.

1.2.1 Contextualism and the Chinese Character ‘境’ (Jing) Of the three provided Chinese translations of ‘contextualism’, the first centres on its ‘textual/conceptual’ dimension, the third on its ‘environmental/circumstantial’ aspect, and the middle (second) shares features of both. On the one hand, the Chinese phrase bei jing refers to either the ‘textual/conceptual’ or ‘environmental/circumstantial’ dimension of ‘contextualism’; on the other hand, from the other two translations exclusively referring to either of these two standpoints, we can find the common Chinese character ‘境’ (jing). The Chinese language, including its contemporary usage, carries this unique contextual characteristic: the meaning of any particular Chinese character varies significantly depending on the other character(s) with which it is coupled. In this case, when jing is coupled with ‘語’ (yu, language), it specifically denotes the ‘textual/conceptual’ dimension of this character; whereas with ‘環’ (huan; to surround, surrounding), jing exclusively represents the sense of ‘environment/circumstance’. This contextual feature of the character ‘境’ reflects not only a general characteristic of ‘contextualism’ in Chinese thinking, but also suggests that the character ‘境’ may be a starting point to exploring ‘contextualism’ in Chinese, despite its contemporaneity. While the current study focuses on the idea of ‘contextualism’ in classical Chinese texts, these texts, as mentioned before, lack characters or phrases that correspond exactly with ‘contextualism’. In light of this, it may be constructive to examine the ancient meaning(s) of the character ‘境’ in order to reveal possible insights into the concept of contextualism in classical Chinese thought.

In a reference book about ancient Chinese characters, the Shuo Wen Jie Zi, ‘境’ refers to ‘疆’ (jiang), which means the border(s) between two states.48 In some classical texts, ‘境’ is often replaced by ‘竟’ (also pronounced jing) to mean the same thing.49 On the one hand, while ‘境’ does not appear at all in the Book of Poetry, the Book of Changes, the Analects or the Dao De Jing, it can be found in the Mo Zi, the Mencius, the Zhuang Zi, and the Han Fei Zi. In all the texts in which it appears, jing exclusively refers to the border(s) between two states, ‘疆’ (i.e., its meaning in the Shuo Wen).50 On the other hand, the character ‘竟’ appears in some of the aforementioned texts, such as the Mo Zi and the Zhuang Zi, it does possess a meaning interchangeable with ‘境’ (as border), but not exclusively mean the border(s). It seems that, in classical Chinese, ‘境’ does not possess significantly philosophical meaning(s) other than its geographical denotation. Does this therefore indicate that the investigation of jing in classical Chinese is a worthless task? It is my contention that it may be too hasty to arrive at such a conclusion.

First of all, let us not forget that jing has acquired explicitly philosophical meanings in contemporary Chinese literature. The existence of the classical and purely geographical concept of jing thus prompts an inquiry into the transformation of this concept from its earlier meanings to its current ones. The current investigation attempts to bring to light this overlooked issue. Like its English counterpart ‘contextualism’, perhaps ‘jing’ deserves more attention in the academic realm. For instance, with its increasingly enriched meanings over the history of Chinese literature, it may be brought into a full- blown theoretical construction regarding the idea of jing. With the entrenched practical denotation (as will be seen in section 1.3.5) it is expected that the theoretical construction(s) of jing will continue to have ample practical meanings. However, the current project is to probe the classical period of Chinese thinking where jing has yet to be transformed into the deep philosophical idea it is today. This project is to carefully extract, from the perspective of contextualism, some basic philosophical dimensions of jing in its initial phases when it was still conceived of as a geographical concept.

48 境：疆也。從土竟聲。經典通用竟。(《說文解字》) 49 These interchangeable words, such as ‘境’ and ‘竟’ are known as 通假字 (tong jia zi). 50 E.g. 孔子三月無君，則皇皇如也，出疆必載質。(《孟子•滕文公下》) When Confucius was not in the service of a lord for three months, he became agitated. When he left [the border] for another state, he always took a present for the first audience with him. (D. C. Lau, Mencius, p. 108.)

Secondly, from our investigation of the English term ‘contextualism’, we may recall that its etyma were almost exclusively restricted to its textual or conceptual dimension, with its environmental, circumstantial, and situational aspects cast aside. However, this seems to contrast directly with the development of the Chinese character ‘境’. The latter’s meaning was originally related to the physical or geographical environment and only attained its textual and conceptual features during the later stages of its development. Is this not intriguing and peculiar?

In the following section, I will advance my analysis of English ‘contextualism’ and the Chinese ‘jing’ to reveal the implicit meanings of both. I will pay particular attention to exploring the idea of contextualism in ancient Chinese literature in order to demonstrate six different dimensions, as well as the practical nature, of contextualism in Chinese thinking. Based on that, I will further illustrate four different types of practices that are central to the pragmatic nature of Chinese philosophy. These will help in the formulation of a proposed theoretical framework for the investigation of various classical Chinese texts in the following chapters.

1.3 Six Dimensions of Contextualism in Chinese Philosophy The previous discussions have revealed two fundamental dimensions of contextualism (textual/conceptual and environmental/circumstantial). Originally, unequal amounts of attention were devoted to each of these two dimensions in both the Western and Chinese philosophical traditions. (Arguably, this asymmetry is becoming less apparent in each tradition, but has by no means disappeared.) While, in Western philosophy, preference has been given to the textual/conceptual aspect, the environmental/circumstantial aspect has been privileged in Chinese philosophy. Despite this difference in emphasis, it is obvious that both dimensions can nevertheless coexist in both philosophical traditions.

Chinese contextualism is unmistakably environmentally/circumstantially oriented; in comparison with the sidelined textual/conceptual dimension, this environmental/circumstantial dimension seems to be more relevant to the practical nature of Chinese contextualism. However, this does not entail that the textual/conceptual focus is in any way contradictory to the idea of practical contextualism. On the contrary, as will be iterated multiple times in the following chapters (e.g., in Chapter Two on the Yi Jing and Chapter Five on the Analects), under

24 pragmatic thinking, this textual/conceptual dimension can contribute to, rather than hinder, the realization of practicality in practical contextualism. In addition to these two fundamental dimensions (textual/conceptual and environmental/circumstantial), there are at least four other important dimensions of contextualism in Chinese philosophy that are worth exploring in the current section. The dimensions explored in the following discussion are relationality, limitedness, dynamism, and interspatiality.

1.3.1 Context and Relationality The Latin etymon of ‘context’ is Contextus, which means “connection” in English. In the OED, the definitions of ‘context’ contain terms such as ‘connection’, ‘connectedness’, and ‘weaving together’. These terms emphasise the notions of ‘interconnectedness’, ‘interdependence’, and ‘interrelatedness’ of the term ‘context’. On the one hand, the ‘interconnected’, ‘interdependent’, and ‘interrelated’ context has a textual and conceptual focus in the OED, however its derivative, ‘contextualism’, has been extended to include the circumstantial, environmental, and situational domains. On the other hand, the Chinese character ‘境’ originally referred to the border(s) (疆) between states. This definition seemed to imply the notion of separation instead of connection. However, as we all know, borders usually exist between states adjacent to each other and indicate, at least on a very basic level, certain geographical relationships between the involved states. In the ancient texts, jing is often paired with the character ‘四’ (four, si) to form the phrase ‘四境’ (four borders, si jing), e.g. “雞鳴狗吠相聞，而

達乎四境” (The sound of cocks crowing and dogs barking can be heard all the way to the four borders; ji quan gou fei xiang wen, er da hu si jing.)51 The number si (four) does not necessarily mean that a state has exactly four borders, but may imply instead that it is surrounded by other states from four different directions (presumably eastern, southern, western, northern). The phrase si jing describes, in visual terms, a comprehensive geographical situation of a state amongst others, which unavoidably leads to the complicated political (dis)connections between and amongst the states. In this sense, jing implies both separation and connection, or more precisely, connection overshadowed by the mere appearing separation. In light of the overshadowed connection, it is possible, from both the textual/conceptual and circumstantial/environmental perspectives, to decode the meaning of ‘interrelatedness’ or ‘relationality’ with respect to contextualism and jing.

51 Dim-Cheuk Lau, Mencius, revised edition, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1979, p. 53.

1.3.2 Context and its Limits The term “border” indicates not only the connection between two states, nations, or entities, but also their limitations, insofar as it signifies the edge of an entity. This particular interpretation of a “border” as a “limitation” was extremely dominant in the pre-Qin context. This dominance was indicated by the characters with which “border” was coupled. In pre-Qin texts, ‘境’ was often paired with the character ‘內’ (within/inside, nei) to form the phrase ‘境內’ (within the borders, jing nei). The phrase jing nei seems to appear most frequently in the Legalist texts, such as the Han Fei Zi. In Chapter 34 外儲說右上 (Outer Songeries of Sayings, The Upper Right Series, wai chu shuo you shang) of the Han Fei Zi, there are short sections where Han Fei puts his own words into Confucius’s mouth, and jing nei appears in one of Confucius’s sayings:

夫禮，天子愛天下，諸侯愛境內，大夫愛官職，士愛其家，過其所愛曰侵。 52

… according to the rules of propriety, the Son of Heaven [is concerned for] All- under-Heaven, the feudal lords love [all] within their respective domains, High Officials love their official duties, and [scholar-officials] love their families. Who goes beyond the sphere of his love is called ‘offensive’.53

To Han Fei, the Confucian view of society is hierarchical, and captured in the idea of 禮 (li, rules of propriety). Each social stratum seems to have its own “assigned” boundaries to manage. At the top is 天子 (the Son of Heaven, tian zi), who is assigned the most comprehensive duty of looking after 天下 (All-under-Heaven, tian xia). The scope of duty tapers off as the stratum descends, and at the bottom are 士 (scholars and warriors, shi) who only have to care for their families. It is doubtful whether such a simplistic categorization of social strata, each with its own roles and responsibilities, really came from Confucius himself. Nevertheless, it represents the idea of limitation and boundary in ancient Chinese texts. Second to the tian zi are the feudal lords who possess their own fiefs. In the later East Zhou period when Han Fei lived, these feudal lords had already gradually transformed their fiefs into regional states by usurping the authority of the

52《韓非子•外儲說右上》 53 This is adapted form the transaltion by Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu: a Classic of Chinese Political Science, volume II, London: Arthur Probsthain, 1959, p. 93.

King and the Court of Zhou.54 Moreover, they had been fighting each other with the aim to either keeping or expanding their lands. It was then that the character ‘境’ gained significance in the political discourse.

Although these feudal lords might have wanted to expand the borders of their states, their first imperatives were to competently manage the matters taking place within their own borders (jing nei). This initially required them to know where the boundaries of their states were. Knowing the boundaries of jing nei is important: on the one hand, it could potentially prevent the territorial disputes between states which lead to unnecessary wars; on the other hand, it allowed the rulers to manage their domestic affairs more effectively. A more comprehensive expression of the phrase jing nei is the composition of ‘四境之內’ (within the four borders, si jing zhi nei), which combines the two phrases ‘四境’ (four borders, si jing) and ‘境內’ (within the borders, jing nei). In Chapter 2 梁惠王下 (Liang Hui Wang II) of the Mencius (孟子), King Xuan of Qi’s (齊宣王, Qi Xuan Wang) ruling capability was questioned by Mencius: “If the whole realm within the four borders was ill-governed, then what should be done about it?”55 (四境之內不治，則如之何？si jing zhi nei bu zhi, ze ru zhi he?). Mencius’ unspoken words to King Xuan of Qi questioned the latter’s legitimacy in holding the position of ruler “The King [of Qi] turned to his attendants and changed the subject.” (王顧左右而言他, wang gu zuo you er yan ta). From these texts, it seems that knowing one’s scope of responsibility and performing to the best of one’s ability within one’s own boundaries were crucial issues in ancient Chinese political thought.

This sense of limitation is not readily available in the OED definition of ‘context’ as a textual concept. However, it can be clearly discerned in its extended meaning, that is, in the notion of ‘contextualism’ as this concerns the environment and situation (or situatedness). The limitation of an environment or situation may not be as clear-cut as that of the border of states/nations or the edge of things. However, careful scrutiny can be used to reveal the “border” (boundary) existing between what is surrounding and what is surrounded, and by the same token, the situating and the situated. In addition, in order to define and identify the environmental and situational condition in which things

54 Feng Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, the Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-771 BC, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 140. 55 Dim-Cheuk Lau, Mencius, revised edition, 1979, p. 37.

27 situate themselves or questions at hand are raised, the environment and situation should be limited to certain scenarios and/or boundaries.

As suggested by the definition of ‘contextualism’, an environment or situation with no identifiable boundaries or limitations may not be so helpful in solving problems or establishing meanings. In light of this, the conditional context may not necessarily refer exclusively to the physical world, but also to the conceptual or even idealistic realm. For instance, the idea of good/bad or right/wrong cannot stand on its own, and there seems to be a boundary between each of the pairs. Although such a boundary can be extremely vague under certain circumstances, this does not thereby negate the limitation and demarcation between good and bad, right and wrong. Moreover, in terms of ‘contextualism’, this intersection can exist between the idealistic and empirical or realistic realms. For instance, to act rightly in one circumstance does not guarantee its universal rightness in all circumstances. Value judgment can vary depending on the circumstances. In light of this, instead of formulating universal values, it is wiser to practise contextual judgment in a world characterised by diversity.

1.3.3 Context as Dynamic The limitation implied by border(s) is not a static but dynamic concept. Experience tells us that both geographical and political borders are subject to change. Over the course of human history, there may have been very few, if any, borderlines that have never been changed. In fact, this was one of the feudal lords’ key concerns during the East Zhou period: how to expand their borders and increase their territories in order to prevent the opposite from happening. However, a territorial expansion cannot take place unless the original boundaries of a state have been overstepped and its borders invaded. Thus, the phrase ‘入境’ (crossing the borders, ru jing) appears in the ancient texts.

In the so-called global village of today’s world, crossing the borders to enter into a foreign country is considered fairly normal practice in most countries. In contemporary Chinese, the phrase ‘入境’ is displayed on various signs at the Custom Services of diverse districts. However, this may not have been the case in the ancient Chinese world, where ru jing was a less political but more military-oriented event. In the last chapter of the Mohist text, the Mo Zi, the phrase ru jing appears in a passage that describes how to

28 be prepared for an intrusion.56 The idea is to gradually light up a total of five beacon fires at different stages of the enemy’s intrusion, e.g. one beacon fire is lit when the enemy is in sight, two when the enemy crosses the borderline(s) (ru jing), etc. This procedure has been seen as an extremely serious and pressing matter by defence strategists, such as Mozi himself.57 A similar meaning of ru jing can be found in the Legalist text, the Han Fei Zi.58 Interestingly, in the Confucian text, the Xun Zi, ru jing seems to refer to its contemporary meaning. That is, it refers to the notion of crossing the border to enter into another country as an individual, but lacks the implication of an invasion.59 Common to all of these cases is the idea that the borders of a state are not static but subject to change. At the level of the state, these changes may be caused by military means and can completely reshape the physical borderlines. On an individual level, these changes may be caused by political methods that have the effect of overcoming and circumventing the symbolic barrier that the borders designate.

The dynamic nature of the limitation that the boundaries signify can be observed not only in the phenomenal world, but also in the development of the conceptual domain. For instance, our perceptions of good or bad, and of right or wrong can extend beyond being “black and white” (i.e. clear-cut) to encompass some so-called “greyer” areas. It is through this possibility of extension that the dynamism of our cognitive boundaries can be made even more salient. (On the one hand, our ever-enriched life experience allows us to constantly expand the boundary of our understanding of the world; on the other hand, this same development calls for attention to greater detail—to focus.) It seems that the dynamism of human cognition can function in both ways—to expand or contract—depending on the task at hand and the context in which it is identified, processed, and attended to. Moreover, the boundary of the particular context itself, whether textually/conceptually- or environmentally/situationally-oriented, is also subject to dynamic variation. Therefore, to attain the optimum response(s) when solving problems or establishing meanings, a contextual approach should pay attention not only

56 And that is the only appearance of ru jing in the Mozi. 57 The Mozi: A Complete Translation, trans. Ian Johnston, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2010, pp. 906-7. 望見寇，舉一烽；入境，舉二烽；射妻，舉三烽三藍；郭會，舉四烽四藍；城會，舉五烽五藍；夜以火，如此數。守烽者事急。(《墨子•雜守》) 58 韓使人之楚，楚王因發車騎，陳之下路，謂韓使者曰：「報韓君，言弊邑之兵今將入境矣。」 (《韓非子•十過》) 59 入境，觀其風俗，其百姓樸，其聲樂不流汙，其服不挑，甚畏有司而順，古之民也。(《荀子• 疆國》)

29 to the problems or meanings themselves but, more importantly, to the situational context that shapes and reshapes the problems or meanings.

1.3.4 The Interspace in Context Borders carve out not only the domain(s) they enclose, but also the interspace(s) they preclude. The latter is particularly apparent between two nonadjacent territories (e.g., the shorelines of oceans between different continents). However, what is implicit, but can be revealed when placed under careful scrutiny, is the idea that interspatial area(s) can also exist between states which share the same borderline(s). Theoretically, when two states share the same borderlines, there should be no extra space in between them. However, in reality, these states may wish to set up some kind of buffer zone near the border areas to avoid unnecessary conflict, especially if they are on unfriendly terms or even in a standoff. These buffer zones are inhabited primarily by military personnel rather than civilians. Occurrences of frequent trading in certain border areas are not excluded, but these activities are extremely susceptible to the variations of military and political relationships between the states. In ancient times, conflicts between states (which had the potential to become full-blown wars) were most likely to break out around those remote ‘frontiers’, which were known as ‘邊境’ (bian jing) in ancient (and contemporary) Chinese.

While both terms concern wars, the phrase ru jing (入境) emphasizes invasive action, whereas bian jing (邊境) highlights the actual venue where the invasion is taking place. If ru jing signifies the underlying dynamic nature of limitary borders, bian jing implies an often invisible and unnoticed interspace around the border areas between different states. On the one hand, when no crises occur, the frontiers will remain guarded and will not be a cause for concern; but when an emergency arises, the interspatial areas around the frontiers will emerge as issues that warrant the state rulers’ full and urgent attention. On the other hand, the unstable situation at the frontiers can be caused by unpredictable relationships between state rulers. In Chapter 27 Heaven’s Intention II (天志中, Tian Zhi Zhong) of the Mo Zi, Master Mozi points out that “When grievances among the feudal lords do not arise, then warfare on the borders does not occur.”60 (諸侯之冤不興矣，邊境兵甲不作矣。zhu hou zhi yuan bu xing yi, bian jing bing jia bu zuo yi.) In

60 The Mozi: A Complete Translation, trans. Ian Johnston, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2010, pp. 248-9.

30 other words, if those feudal lords are able to pay attention to the possible unrest caused by their impetuous disputes in the often overlooked interspatial areas around their borders, they may be less willing to air their “grievances”.

In fact, the interspatial and limitary features of borders supplement each other: the notion of “interspace” does not make sense unless we consider how this space is circumscribed by limitary boundaries. In this sense, bian jing signifies both the intra- spatial and interspatial boundaries of borders. To prescribe ways to prevent unrest at the frontiers, Master Mozi suggests that a ruler’s imperative is to develop the state from within.61 A very similar idea appears in the Legalist text, the Han Fei Zi, where the rulers are advised to mind their own business within their domains to make their states a better place. Following this thought, it may help maintain a dynamic equilibrium of power and territory amongst different states.62

Similarly, the interspatial denotation is not readily available in the English definitions of ‘context’ and ‘contextualism’. Fortunately, however, it is not very difficult to infer the former from the latter. On a textual level, a discourse comprises words and phrases that form different contexts and/or sub-contexts when communicating cohesive meanings. There are at least two kinds of interspatial “gaps” within a discourse: those between any two particular (sub)contexts, and those yet-to-be-revealed ((sub)context(s)). For instance, the limitary and interspatial features of borders in ancient Chinese texts constitute the distinctive (sub)contexts of a discourse in this chapter in that they indicate the different aspects of the framework of contextualism. The previous discussions have suggested that there are other characteristics, such as relationality and dynamism, embedded in the idea of borders. These characteristics form the sub-contexts of the discourse in addition to the limitary and interspatial features. In the current case, these sub-contexts play contextual and complementary roles in explicating the framework of contextualism. Between any of these sub-contextual domains (e.g., the limitary and interspatial ones), the other domains (e.g. the relational and dynamic ones) will serve as an interspatial supplement. What is more implicit yet nonetheless significant is that

61 Ibid., 內有以食飢息勞，持養其萬民，則君臣上下惠忠，父子弟兄慈孝。故唯毋明乎順天之意，奉而光施之天下，則刑政治，萬民和，國家富，財用足，百姓皆得煖衣飽食，便寧無憂。(《墨子•天志中》) 62 故其治國也，正明法，陳嚴刑，將以救群生之亂，去天下之禍，使強不陵弱，眾不暴寡，耆老得遂，幼孤得長，邊境不侵，君臣相親，父子相保，而無死亡係虜之患，此亦功之至厚者也。 (《韓非子•姦劫弒臣》)

31 these sub-contextual features may not exhaust “all” the features that borders potentially have in ancient Chinese texts. Therefore, there is room for more features or characteristics to be rediscovered in the future.

Other than the textual perspective, there is the practical implication of the interspatiality of context (and contextualism). For example, in our daily conversations, we may come across unspoken words and intentions. Very often, we may recognize that this unspoken content is much more subtle yet nevertheless more important than the uttered content. In these cases, we have to pay attention not only to the spoken messages but, more importantly, to the unspoken messages that lie, and are delivered through, the gaps between utterances. The “interspatial” elements of a dialogue may involve aspects such as the tone and pace of one’s speech, the non-verbal body languages and facial expressions, etc. Both the textual and practical dimensions of a discourse suggest that interspatial awareness plays a very important role in forming a comprehensive and contextual understanding of the terms ‘context’ and ‘contextualism’.

1.3.5 The Practical Denotation of the Six Dimensions The current investigation has revealed that, other than the textual/conceptual and environmental/situational dimensions, at least four additional characteristics can be inferred from the idea of contextualism. These are relationality, limitedness, dynamism, and interspatiality. Arguably, all these six characteristics of contextualism can be appreciated in a practical sense, that is, in terms of their manifestations in the concrete, phenomenal world. However the textual/conceptual dimension suggests that contextualism can be understood theoretically and conceptually when needed. The exploration of ‘境’ (in terms of the notion of borders) in classical Chinese texts suggests that the theoretical approach to contextualism is not as important in ancient Chinese traditions as it is in Western traditions. On the contrary, as the comparison between the ancient Chinese ‘境’ and English term ‘context’ has revealed, the traditional Chinese approach to contextualism is more practical and pragmatic than theoretical in nature. This pragmatic emphasis of Chinese thinking is also recognized by Coutinho in his book, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. He compares the fundamental modes of thinking between the Western and Chinese cultures, and argues that Chinese thinking is

32 more ‘pragmatic’ focused than its Western counterpart.63 This is certainly not to contrast these two approaches (theoretical and practical) in an antithetical manner, but to raise awareness of the difference between the two. (The differences between the theoretical and practical approaches of contextualism will be further examined in the following chapter concerning the Yi Jing.) Recognizing this demarcation can further our understanding of contextualism, and enable us to execute an effective analysis grounded in contextualism.

The six dimensions developed from the classical concept of jing serve to assist in analysing contextualism in the ancient Chinese texts at hand. Moreover, because of the practical and pragmatic nature of contextualism in these texts, it is inevitable that the six dimensions also appear to be guiding and promoting the optimal practices in these analyses. In light of this, it may be anticipated that these dimensions may be both perceived as theoretical constructs for interpreting the contextual themes in the texts, and as practical guidance on how the contextual themes contribute to optimal practices that each text promotes. Due to limited space, the current thesis focuses on utilizing the different dimensions as theoretical construct in exploring contextualism in the selected ancient Chinese texts.

1.4 Four Types of Practices in Chinese Philosophy As the investigations of the classical character jing have revealed, classical Chinese philosophy has a practical focus; in light of this, the practical approach may be more appropriate than the theoretical one in the study of Chinese philosophy. This does not mean that the theoretical approach to contextualism will be completely avoided in this dissertation, but will instead play an ancillary, rather than dominant, role. Let us first focus on the four basic types of practices in Chinese Philosophy, namely, self- cultivation, problem-solving, epistemological development, and public policy. The interrelated and interdependent nature of these practices will be shown in the following discussion.

1.4.1 Self-cultivation Self-cultivation (修身, xiu shen) is an important topic in Chinese philosophy. In Confucian philosophy, xiu shen is amongst the fundamental (本, ben) practices that

63 Steve Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 20.

33 enable one to establish oneself in human society.64 In this sense, xiu shen is a life-long journey that ideally should be practised by any individual (from the ruler to her subjects) who wants to pursue a meaningful life that can benefit both herself and others.

Confucian philosophy focuses on the development of the individual. This emphasis leads to a harmonious society that comprises morally superior individuals who embrace the values of ren, yi, as well as other desired moral qualities. The ideal Confucian society is one that relies on few or no external regulators, such as fa (法, penal law), which the Legalists are keen to promote. Confucius believes that external regulators, such as penal laws, when exercised excessively and exclusively, can distract people from engaging in their own moral development and cause them to focus instead on how to avoid punishment.65 In this sense, self-cultivation is amongst the central practices in Confucian philosophy. Without self-cultivation, it is very unlikely to have enough politically, morally, practically, epistemologically, or even psychologically able individuals surrounding us to form an ideal, functional and harmonious society.

It is inevitable that self-cultivation will be practised by interacting with others insofar as it is socially-oriented. This implies that 1) the cultivated ‘self’ is not an independent subject or agent, but an interdependent human being amongst other fellow human beings; 2) self-cultivation should therefore be practised while attending to one’s situational context. Otherwise, each individual may simply act in self-serving ways, which means that 1) one’s relationships with others may not be recognized adequately in one’s moral perspective, and 2) one’s interactions with others will reflect few or no situational concerns. This kind of self-cultivation is obviously not anticipated by a Confucian thinker.

In Chinese philosophy, it is expected that cultivation enables a person to deal with different circumstances. One’s capacity (or lack thereof) for self-cultivation is most discernible when one is undergoing undesirable circumstances. For example, these

64 古之欲明明德於天下者，先治其國；欲治其國者，先齊其家；欲齊其家者，先修其身；欲修其身者，先正其心；欲正其心者，先誠其意；欲誠其意者，先致其知，致知在格物。物格而後知至，知至而後意誠，意誠而後心正，心正而後身修，身修而後家齊，家齊而後國治，國治而後天下平。自天子以至於庶人，壹是皆以修身為本。其本亂而末治者否矣，其所厚者薄，而其所薄者厚，未之有也！此謂知本，此謂知之至也。(《大學》) (This passage from the Confucian text, Da Xue, shows the fundamental role of xiu shen amongst Confucian practices.) 65 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」(《論語·為政》)

34 circumstances may make acting morally or knowing how to act morally more difficult and thus test a person’s ability to engage in self-cultivation. Mencius suggests that life and death are not two completely separate issues for a person practising self-cultivation. Rather, s/he has to prepare for both in order to establish himself/herself as a responsible individual.66 He also stresses that, poor or prosperous, one should not depart from the way(s) of practising self-cultivation as well as valuable moral principles; by doing so, one can remain true to oneself and others; when in a prosperous situation, one should consider helping and benefitting others; when in a poor condition, one should let oneself be recognized through one’s commitment to self-cultivation.67 Mencius’ words indicate that self-cultivation should not be practised arbitrarily, in that it cannot simply proceed and stop based on the circumstances. Self-cultivation should be practised at all times, especially during the most difficult situations. By doing so, self-cultivation becomes one of the most salient characteristics of those who practise it.

A similar implication appears in the Yi Jing, and is reflected by hexagrams that represent the aforementioned undesirable situations. For instance, in the situation of stagnation represented by the hexagram Pi (否, Stagnation), the jun zi (君子, superior man or exemplary person) is advised not to pursue fame and wealth but to cultivate virtuous conduct so as to avoid unnecessary trouble.68 Since the Yi Jing is one of the important Confucian classics, its interpretations and connotations inevitably bear Confucian overtones. But unlike other Confucian classics, which educate people on how to become a moral person or good citizen, the Yi Jing provides insights into how to identify, or even predict, different situations in order to facilitate optimal responses appropriate to the situation. In this sense, the Yi Jing is morally neutral in comparison with texts like the Analects and Mencius.

However, this does not mean that self-cultivation has to be always morally-oriented or - focused. In fact, the theme of self-cultivation in Daoist traditions is more epistemologically-oriented and tends to focus less on moral development. I will examine this in more detail in my later discussions concerning the third kind of practice

66 殀壽不貳，修身以俟之，所以立命也。 (《孟子·盡心上》) 67 士窮不失義，達不離道。窮不失義，故士得己焉；達不離道，故民不失望焉。古之人，得志，澤加於民；不得志，脩身見於世。窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下。(《孟子•盡心上》) 68 天地不交，否；君子以儉德辟難，不可榮以祿。(《易經•否》)

35 proposed here, namely, the practice of “epistemological development” in Chinese philosophy. First, however, let us focus on the practice of “problem-solving”.

1.4.2 Problem-solving Unlike self-cultivation, which emphasizes personal development, problem-solving focuses more on the problem at hand in a particular context and the timely solutions or responses to the situation. The Yi Jing is arguably one of the best examples of exploring this kind of practice in Chinese philosophy. However, this does not mean, in any sense, that self-cultivation and problem-solving are two entirely separate practices in Chinese philosophy. In fact, problem-solving helps to expand the scope of self-cultivation, and self-cultivation helps to improve the effectiveness of one’s problem-solving skills. This type of practice, and its relationship with self-cultivation, will be explored further in the following chapters, especially the one concerning the Yi Jing.

1.4.3 Epistemological Development The third type of practice, epistemological development, is best presented in Daoist texts, such as the Zhuang Zi. Epistemological development plays an important role in the process of an individual’s development. In this sense, it is closely related to the practice of self-cultivation. However, the general idea of self-cultivation, as mentioned above, is coloured with moral and social considerations. This is not necessarily the case with the practice of (epistemologically oriented) self-cultivation in a text like the Zhuang Zi, in which anthropocentric and Confucian moral values are heavily criticized. Zhuangzi’s visions are not limited to human societies but include one’s environmental surroundings in general, and even the entire Cosmos. As can be seen in the chapter dedicated to the investigation of the Zhuang Zi, the Chinese approach to epistemology can be significantly different from its Western counterpart. I argue that it is this practically contextual way of understanding the world which makes Chinese epistemology a unique alternative to its Western counterpart.

1.4.4 Public Policy Last but not least is the practice concerning public policy. I refer here to public policy instead of political leadership because, in a typical Chinese political text, such as the Han Fei Zi, the best leadership is expected to be exercised under, and according to, the rule of policy, such as fa (法, standards or penal laws). This type of practice, of course, is not usually exercised by ordinary people, although an ordinary individual can

36 contribute to public policies. Rather, it is aimed in particular at rulers and leaders, that is, those who are responsible for enacting and implementing effective social, political, and economic policies that help ensure a well-functioning state or society. The ability of a ruler or leader to adopt and implement ideas and methods of ruling that are appropriate to his/her era determines the success or failure of his/her regime. In this sense, it is utterly important that the sovereign chooses the right ruling strategies. The Han Fei Zi is one of the key pre-Qin classics that dedicate itself to political issues such as these. Han Fei argues that a ruling strategy should faithfully reflect the social, political, and economic conditions of a regime. A ruler should thus change his/her strategy as the ruling conditions change over time. The sovereign who ignores the need for these variations based on context by blindly adopting established but outdated strategies is doomed to fail.

Of course, the processes involved in establishing the public policies in Han Fei’s time cannot be compared to those operating in contemporary political systems. However, as will be shown in the relevant discussions in the chapter on the Han Fei Zi, there are two key points that should not be overlooked in Han Fei’s philosophy. First of all, these policies (fa in particular) are not expected to be established under a dictatorship, and according to personal interest and desire, but by wise and competent rulers and/or ministers who take the public interest to heart. Secondly, it is difficult to deny that policies founded by wise and competent rulers and/or ministers who take the public interest to heart can, to a certain extent, faithfully reflect the genuine interest of their subjects. In light of this, one may not overlook the public nature of policies in Han Fei’s philosophy, although they may not completely resemble those in a contemporary context.

1.5 Practical Contextualism in Four Different Ancient Texts So far I have distinguished six dimensions of contextualism (textual/conceptual, environmental/circumstantial, relationality, limitedness, dynamism, and interspatiality) through the investigation of the Chinese character ‘境’ (jing). I have also provided a brief outline of the four distinctive aspects of practices in Chinese philosophy (self- cultivation, problem-solving, epistemological development, and public policy), especially in terms of the texts at hand. This introduction to different types of practices has already shown that not every type of practice is given an equal amount of attention

37 in all the texts; a certain type is emphasized more in one text than in others. This is also the case with different dimensions of contextualism: not all dimensions necessarily appear in every text, or at least are not highlighted in equal measure. In this last section, I will provide a very brief introduction to how ‘practical contextualism’, as an integrated theme, is played out in each text studied in the current thesis.

1.5.1 The Yi Jing As a text dedicated to the study of change (變, bian) and transformation (化, hua), the first impression of the Yi Jing is its deep realization of the dynamic nature of contextualism. The central interest of the Yi Jing is the study of the changing and transforming environments and situations as well as optimal responses to the changing context. In this sense, the Yi Jing also deals with the environmental/situational dimension of contextualism (instead of the textual/conceptual one), in addition to the practice of problem-solving.

Since the Yi Jing covers a wide range of concepts and ideas, it is necessary that we should also investigate the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism in order for its full meaning to be uncovered for those unfamiliar with the Chinese way of thinking. The investigation of the Yi Jing in Chapter two indicates that the meanings of different concepts and ideas are made contextually coherent through the loose links that connect them metaphorically. In this sense, the relational and interspatial characteristics of the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism are also a salient feature of the Yi Jing.

The current study has also found that, although the practice of problem-solving is the primary concern of the Yi Jing, the practice of self-cultivation also permeates this text. This is because, in many hexagrams which represent different contexts, such as Pi (否, Stagnation) and Kun (困, Oppression/Exhaustion), the situations or conditions described are so difficult that no problems can be effectively solved in the short run. In these circumstances, the only option is to focus on self-cultivation and wait for an appropriate time and circumstance for executing the necessary actions.

Highlighting these aspects does not mean that the other aspect(s) of practical contextualism (such as limitedness) do not appear at all in the Yi Jing. In fact, this limited scope is implied in the different hexagrams themselves: no single hexagram (and therefore situation) can endure forever, it is doomed to change and transform to become

38 the different hexagram(s), and the cyclical process goes on and on. In this sense, the limitary character of contextualism is fundamentally embedded in the Yi Jing. However, as stressed above, there are certain features of practical contextualism that are more salient and prominent in one text than in others. The current thesis will devote more attention to these salient features instead of covering all aspects of practical contextualism in all texts indiscriminately. Insofar as different texts display unique philosophical interests (as can be seen in section 1.3 and the following chapters), the investigation of practical contextualism will also reflect these differences.

1.5.2 The Han Fei Zi The second text examined is one of the Legalist classics, the Han Fei Zi, which is named after its author, Han Fei. The central interest of the Han Fei Zi concerns political theories, especially those pertaining to ruling strategies. Han Fei criticizes untimely ruling strategies and principles, including the Confucian principles of ren and yi. He argues that a successful ruling strategy should reflect the particular historical context in which the ruling is taking place. Failure to do so will result in the failure or even collapse of the regime. It is clear that Han Fei’s theories primarily concern the environmental/circumstantial, limitary, and dynamic perspectives of contextualism, together with the implementation of public policy and the practice of problem-solving. However, the practice of self-cultivation is largely missing from Han Fei’s philosophy. This results in his one-sided preference for the ruling system (especially penal laws (fa)) which is expected to function according to minimum contextual considerations. The negative result of this is that, although knowing the importance of practical contextualism well, Han Fei’s idea of fa is more or less non-contextual in practice. This is understandable given the chaotic era wherein Han Fei’s philosophy arose: cruel penal laws had to be implemented to fix or at least get the situation under control. However, this may have also contributed to the short lifespan of a regime that was built on the political theory that Han Fei promotes.

1.5.3 The Zhuang Zi As one of the core Daoist classics, the Zhuang Zi has its own unique perspective of, and approach to, the practice of epistemological development. One of the most salient features of Zhuangzian epistemology is that it does not focus simply on the “known”, but also on that which is “unknown”. To Zhuangzi, the “known” and “unknown” are not two fundamentally separate issues, but two interrelated aspects of the same

39 epistemological issue. However, too much attention seems to have been given to the “known” aspect while too little has been given to the “unknown” one. He argues that the best epistemological position lies at the pivot and/or verge of the “known” and “unknown”, and true wisdom forms at the interspatial loci of unintelligible “knowledge” (instead of concrete and effable knowledge itself). Interestingly enough, in the text, Zhuangzi does not recommend that people attain wisdom through contemplation; he seems fascinated instead by all sorts of exercises aimed at the getting of wisdom which teach people how to become skilled at doing certain things. For example, one of the wisest figures in the text is a butcher, Pao Ding, who “knows” very well how to dissect an ox in an almost perfect manner. On the other hand, Zhuangzi remains sceptical about the conventional belief that true wisdom comes from intelligible knowledge alone.

Zhuangzi is aware of the limitations of knowledge, especially that of the definitive and effable nature. He points out the existence of interspatial boundaries between the “known” and the “unknown”. Zhuangzi’s insights into knowledge reflect the limitary and interspatial features of contextualism that are apparent in his unconventional approach to epistemology. On the one hand, in the text, Zhuangzi baffles people with all sorts of contradictory ideas, stories, and examples; on the other hand, he suggests that people are able to gain wisdom through cultivating certain skills in their daily activities. In this sense, Zhuangzi’s philosophy also concerns the textual/conceptual and environmental/situational aspects of contextualism. Self-cultivation is certainly the desired practice that Zhuangzi promotes; however, the purpose of self-cultivation in the Zhuang Zi is primarily to serve epistemological development rather than virtuous practices.

1.5.4 The Analects Contextualism, as it is presented in the Analects, is particularly pertinent to people’s daily lives and activities. Confucius, whose sayings and conversations dominate the text, is especially interested in human relationships. To him, if humans cannot cultivate their moral characters in order to live peacefully with each other, establishing and maintaining a truly harmonious state would be hopeless. The environmental/situational and relational aspects are certainly the primary concerns of Confucian contextualism. However, in the Analects, it is not just any kind of environment and relationship that concerns Confucians, but specifically (the) human environment (or context) and relationships. In the human context, one is expected to cultivate one’s moral

40 responsibilities. To guide people in their moral practices, Confucius provides a series of core moral ideas and values, such as ren and li. These are not conceptually irrelevant or isolated concepts but interrelated and interdependent ones. In this sense, the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism is also implicit in the Analects. However, it ultimately appears that Confucius is not interested in analysing or discussing concepts and ideas and making arguments. Instead, he is more concerned with ways of making moral ideas accessible to individuals, so that they can understand, adopt, and practise these moral codes in the most effective ways, and according to their own personalities. In light of this, the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism facilitates the moral practices of self-cultivation in the human context instead of dominating the latter.

The textual/conceptual and environmental/circumstantial dimensions also indicate the limitary and dynamic features of contextualism in the Analects. This is particularly embodied in the contextual approach in which moral ideas, such as ren and yi, are conveyed by Confucius to his disciples. When asked about the meaning(s) of ren, Confucius “tailors” his answers to his disciples so that they can understand and practice ren according to their own personal traits. The Analects depicts Confucius as an adaptable and flexible educator who recognizes and acknowledges the existence of possible variations of conceptual meanings when these are applied to a limited and concrete situation or context (in this case, the adaptable idea of ren to different individuals with distinctive characters).

The interspatial dimension of contextualism is reflected significantly in one of the core concepts, li, in the Analects. Ren and li represent two interconnected aspects of self- cultivation: if ren is the guiding principle of self-cultivation, li prescribes the actually conduct of how cultivation should be carried out, e.g. how to cultivate a healthy and mutually beneficial relationship with others. According to the Analects, li helps to highlight 1) the interspace and distance between individuals, 2) the importance of maintaining the public space in a constructive and creative condition, 3) the necessity of developing positive interpersonal relationships which take place in the public space. If ren represents the ideal character of human beings, li seems to offer a blueprint for an ideal society (including the ideal living space).

The practice with which the Analects is concerned is dedicated to self-cultivation. Although, in the Analects, Confucius comments on or criticizes some of the then public

41 policies or political practices, his ultimate purpose is still to highlight the importance of self-cultivation. To Confucius, self-cultivation is the first and foremost problem that requires a solution, because it is one of the most (if not the most) difficult issues to solve in everyone’s life. If there is an idea in the Analects which is the most pertinent to the practice of epistemological development, it would be the idea of xue. However, Confucius promotes this idea not simply for the sake of developing one’s epistemological skills but ultimately one’s moral competence.

Chapter Two

The Yi Jing: Dealing with Change

Interest in studying the phenomenon of yi (易) (also known as change in English) can be dated back three thousand years to the time when some of the earlier parts of the Yi Jing (易經, the Book of Changes) was reportedly composed around the ninth century BCE.69 The book initially consisted of three parts: sixty-four symbolic hexagrams (卦, gua) comprising six lines, the interpretations of each hexagram (卦辭, gua ci), and the statements for each line of a hexagram (爻辭, yao ci). The lines that constitute the hexagrams are of two kinds: a non-divided line () that symbolizes yang (陽), and a divided line () that symbolizes yin (陰). Yang represents the general concept of firmness, while yin represents receptiveness. These three parts constituted the earliest layers of the Yi Jing, in which the hexagrams and line statements were allegedly attributed to King Wen of Zhou (周文王, 1099-1050 BCE).70 In the later period of the Zhou Dynasty (Dong Zhou) (東周, 770-256 BCE), new contents known as Ten Wings (十翼, Shi Yi) or Yi Zhuan (易傳, Commentaries on the Yi Jing) were added to the first layers. Amongst them, the ‘Wings’ titled Da Zhuan (大傳, Great Commentary) or alternatively Xi Ci Zhuan (繫辭傳, Commentary on the Appended Phrases) are considered to be the most philosophically significant.71 The Yi Jing was initially used as a divinatory manual. However, as time progressed, its philosophical significance began to emerge as a result of the addition of the new layers and their use in daily life.

Philosophical discussions of the Yi Jing started as early on as the Dong Zhou when these philosophically enriched layers were first added. Ancient Chinese Scholars, such

69 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 1. Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed. rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes and Forword by C G. Jung, London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003, xlvii. 70 David R. Knechtges (ed.) and Taiping Chang (ed.), Ancient and Early Medieval Chinese Literature: A Reference Guide, Part Three, Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section Four: China, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2014, p. 1884. Karyn L. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 199. 71 Ibid., pp. 200-2.

43 as Wang Bi (王弼, 226-249 CE), offered their inspirational insights into this classic.72 The Yi Jing has also been widely discussed amongst many contemporary scholars. Discussions have touched upon a wide range of philosophical topics, such as logic73, ethics74, metaphysics75, and even religion76.

In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the notion yi from the perspective of its etymological origin. This will make way for the recognition of the subtle difference between the concepts of ‘change’ and ‘transformation’. The discussions of the Yi Jing’s unique approach of consulting the oracle will intensify our understanding of these concepts.

The second section will be dedicated to exploring the theme of contextualism and its comprehensive dimensions embedded in the idea of change (and transformation) and the Yi Jing in general. I examine the contextual implications of change in three ways: the divinatory application of the Yi Jing, the hexagrams; and the conceptual denotation of the text. These investigations will lend support to my argument that the Yi Jing directly or indirectly covers the full spectrum of contextualism proposed in the framework of practical contextualism.

The third section will move on to discuss desirable responses to change. I will first contrast these with two kinds of undesirable responses, namely dogmatic and indecisive responses. In doing so, I hope to distinguish practical contextualism from theoretical contextualism. I will argue that practical contextualism is what the Yi Jing promotes.

In the last section, I propose that the aim of practical contextualism does not solely concern problem-solving (marked by effective responses) but also self-cultivation. In particular, I will demonstrate how the cultivation of 言行 (words and practices, yan xing) can play a significant role in helping a jun zi to survive tough situations.

72 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 5. Wang Bi’s Zhouyi Zhu (Commentary on the Changes of the Zhou), including Wang’s interpretations of the sixty-four hexagrams and his treatise on the Changes, the Zhouyi Lueli (General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou). 73 Jesse Fleming, “A Set Theory Analysis of the Logic of the Yijing,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 36:s1, 2009, pp. 37–47. 74 Eric S. Nelson, “Introduction: Onto-Hermeneutics, Ethics, and Nature in the Yi jing,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38:3, 2011, pp. 335–8. 75 Andreas Schöter, “The Yijing: Metaphysics and Physics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38:3, 2011, pp. 412–26. 76 Whalen Lai, “The Yijing and the Formation of the Huayan Philosophy: An Analysis of a Key Aspect of Chinese Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 36:s1, 2009, pp. 101-12.

2.1 Understanding Change in Chinese Philosophy: The Yi Jing The current chapter sets out to analyse the concept of change (yi) in the Yi Jing and draws out the contextual implications embedded in this concept. Pursuing this task further, I will first analyse the character ‘yi’ which symbolizes the word ‘change’ in Chinese. In analysing ‘change’, I hope to reveal the slightly different concept of ‘transformation’, which still contains the notion of ‘change’ but also denotes something more specific. The Yi Jing’s emphasis on change and transformation reflects its dynamic view of the cosmos, which, I will argue, is also reflected in its interpretation of the trigrams and hexagrams.

The dynamic view of the Yi Jing, however, is not only embodied in its text but, more importantly, reflected in its practice. The study of the Yi Jing’s divinatory practice provides even greater insight into the concepts of change and transformation and the intricate interactions between the two, which will also be subjected to an in-depth investigation in the current section.

2.1.1 Change: An Analysis of Yi. The Chinese character ‘yi’ is found in various ancient Chinese classics. Among them, the Yi Jing (Book of Changes) and the Shi Jing (詩經, The Book of Poetry) are known as the most ancient, both appearing in the period 1046-771 BCE.77 Yi appears in the Shi Jing fewer than a dozen times. The dominant meanings of Yi presented in this text seem to be ‘easy’ (in adjectival form) or ‘easily’ and ‘lightly’ (in adverbial form). Only in one place in the Shi Jing is the character yi interpreted as ‘change’.78 However, the Yi Jing presents us with a different case insofar as the meanings of yi as ‘change’ or ‘easy’ (as well as ‘easily’ and ‘lightly’) are almost equally distributed across the whole text.79 In the places where yi bears the meaning of ‘change’, it acts as an abbreviation of the text’s name that replaces ‘Yi Jing’ with a single character ‘Yi’. This seems to suggest that the Yi Jing is a demonstrative, instead of a descriptive, book of yi. That is, instead of describing or defining what yi is in the text, the Yi Jing demonstrates the meanings of yi through concrete instantiations in various situations.

77 周揚 (Zhou Yang); 錢仲聯 (Qian Zhonglian); 王瑤 (Wang Yao); 周振甫 (Zhou Zhengfu), 中國文學史通覽 (Zhong Guo Wen Xue Shi Tong Lan, A Comprehensive Review of the History of Chinese Literature), 上海: 東方出版中心 (Shanghai: Dong Fang Chu Ban Zhong Xin), 1995, p. 579. 78 詩經 (Shi Jing, Book of Poetry), trans. 楊憲益 (Yang Xianyi); 戴乃迭 (Dai Naidie), reinterpreted (in Chinese) by 野莽 (Ye Mang), 北京: 外文出版社 (Beijing: Wai Wen Chu Ban She), 2001. 79 郭建勳 (Guo Jianxun), 新譯易經讀本 (Xin Yi Yi Jing Du Ben), 臺灣: 三民書局 (Taiwan: San Min Shu Ju), 1998.

The etymology of yi (易) is derived from the pictogram, ‘lizard’. A 2nd century CE Chinese character lexicon, Shuo Wen Jie Zi (說文解字, The Lexicon of Chinese Character), endowed yi with the meanings, ‘lizard’ and ‘gecko’ (蝘蜓, yan ting or 守宮, shou gong) (Figure 1), whose behaviours express the idea of change. In his etymological work on Chinese characters, Léon Wieger actually presents one form of the pictograph of the character yi (Figure 1), specifically pointing out that yi “represents a lizard, probably the chameleon. A primitive. On the top, the head; at the bottom, the light feet of the reptile; 象形 (xiang xing, pictographic).”80 Moreover, the pictogram seems to suggest that the character yi may consist of two individual characters: the sun (日, ri) on the top and the moon (月, yue) at the bottom, thereby representing a unified picture of yin (the moon) and yang (the sun).81

In the Analytic Dictionary of Chinese and Sino-Japanese, Bernhard Karlgren demonstrates that the character yi is actually the “picture of a chameleon”, which represents a situation in which an event is always “superseded by next” like the adaptation of a chameleon’s skin colours to its environment. This therefore implies something that is “changing”, “to change”, or “exchange”.82 In addition, the meanings of yi as ‘easy’, ‘careless’, and ‘treat slightingly’ are also present in Karlgren’s work.83 Being the pictographic image of the character ‘yi’, the chameleon signifies not only the explicit meanings of yi as ‘change’ but also the implicit association between change and the environment in which it occurs.

80 Léon Wieger, Chinese Characters, p. 246. 81 許慎 (Xu Shen, d. 120?), 說文解字 (Shuo Wen Jie Zi), 北京: 中國書店 (Beijing : Zhongguo Shu Dian), 1989. 說文解字第九 (The Ninth Chapter of Shuo Wen Jie Zi). (Note: This book does not have page numbers, so I can only provide the chapter number here.) Shuo Wen Jie Zi is a Chinese character dictionary composed around 2nd century CE during the Han dynasty. Here is the description of yi (易) in Chinese: 蜥易，蝘蜓，守宮也。象形。《祕書》說：日月為易，象陰陽也。一曰從勿。凡易之屬皆從易。 82 Bernhard Karlgren, Analytic Dictionary of Chinese and Sino-Japanese. Ch’eng-Wen Publishing Company, Taipei. 1973, p. 82. 83 In the Ancient and Early Medieval Chinese Literature: A Reference Guide, Part Three, Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section Four: China, edited by David R. Knechtges and Taiping Chang. It suggests that, for the denotation of yi as jianyi (简易, simple), the most common explanation is “that the Yi divination system, which used yarrow stalks, was easier to perform than the older turtle shell divination.” p. 1877.

Figure 1. Pictographs of the Character 易 (yi) from the Dictionaries of 說文解字 (Shuo Wen Jie Zi)84 (left) and Chinese Characters85 (right) respectively.

Hellmut Wilhelm argues that, when considering this pictogram, “we come to the concept of easy mobility and changeableness which became associated with this word […], one of the lizards, the chameleon, is the epitome of changeableness.”86 The etymological evidence suggests that the Chinese character yi took the image of a lizard, which has a sinuous body, moves rapidly, and when necessary, can change its body’s colours in order to adapt to its environment. These characteristics of the lizard or chameleon gave birth to the primary definitions of yi. The appearance of this character in the name of the Book of Changes seems to justify the book’s central focus: it captures the awareness of change and, more importantly, how to adjust oneself to better adapt to it.

The character ‘yi’ represents the continuous alteration of things. Taking the human existence as an example: the physical and mental states of individuals are not only constantly changing, but so too are their physical surroundings. Most of the time, these day-to-day changes are the quantitative modifications of events, and unavailable to our consciousness. Because of the largely obscure and seemingly inconsequential nature of the small or incremental ordinary changes in our lives, we have a tendency to perceive things and events as constant and unchangeable. For instance, we may perceive a chair that is used on a daily basis as being in the same condition as it was yesterday. We may also take it for granted that it will still be in the same condition tomorrow. But we may

84 許慎 (Xu Shen, d. 120?), 說文解字 (Shuo Wen Jie Zi). 說文解字第九 (The Ninth Chapter of Shuo Wen Jie Zi). 85 Léon Wieger, Chinese Characters: Their Origin, Etymology, History, Classification and Signification; A Thorough Study from Chinese Documents. trans. L. Davrout, S.J., 2nd Edition, New York: Paragon Book Reprint & Dover Publications, 1965, p. 246. 86 Hellmut Wilhelm, Change: eight lectures on the I Ching. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1973, p. 14.

47 fail to notice that the joints between the chair’s tenons and mortises are getting loose as a result of daily use, which may lead to its total collapse at a certain time in the future. This static impression of the world will remain dominant until, at some stage, it is undermined by our realization of the transformation taking place in our daily lives.

2.1.2 Change versus Transformation Evidence suggests that the character yi denotes both ‘change’ and ‘transformation’. In analysing the character yi, Wieger suggests that, “by extension,” yi can mean “alert, easy, to change, to transform.” (Italics added)87 In the Yi Jing, there is often a combination of two characters, 變化 (bian hua), representing the meanings of change and transformation as the character yi does. For example, in the Yi Jing’s Xici Zhuan, it is suggested that change and transformation are represented by the Yi Jing’s hexagrams and their lines (which will be expounded later in this chapter):

聖人設卦，觀象繫辭焉而明吉凶，剛柔相推而生變化。88

The sages instituted the hexagrams, so that phenomena might be perceived therein. They appended the judgments, in order to indicate good fortune and misfortune. As the firm and the yielding lines displace one another, change and transformation arise.89

In Richard Wilhelm’s translation of the Yi Jing, the character 變 is usually interpreted as ‘change’, and 化 as ‘transformation’. Similar instances also appear in James Legge90 and Richard Lynn’s91 translations. The adoption of two different Chinese characters (變 and 化, change and transformation) may suggest that, although change and transformation can be represented by just the single character yi, they are not identical.

The subtle differences between the ‘change’ and the ‘transformation’ of things lie in their qualitative (or value) implications. In English, the definition of the term ‘transformation’ is grounded in the concept of change. Transformation is the sort of

87 Léon Wieger, Chinese Characters, 1965, p. 246. 88 《樂天知命》 (Rest Content with the Mandate of Heaven), interp. 傅佩榮 (Fu Peirong), 臺北: 天下遠見 (Taipei: Tian Xia Yuan Jian), 2011, p. 590. 89 This is adapted from the translation by Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 287. 90 James Legge, The I Ching., New York: Dover Publications, 1963. 91 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 1994.

48 change that is judged as ‘complete’ and ‘extensive’.92 The aforementioned discussion suggests that we hardly pay any attention to the changing nature of things until the quantitative changes accumulate to the point where they produce a qualitative transformation. In the human world, such a transformation often triggers a value judgment. For instance, we seldom notice that something has changed over time until the swap of good or bad quality, condition, or value resulting from such change occurs. In this sense, through its ‘complete’ and ‘extensive’ character, the concept of ‘transformation’ may be distinguished from that of ‘change’ on a qualitative instead of a quantitative level. Referring back to the previous example of the chair, although its utility is constantly undermined by its daily use, we nevertheless tend to see the chair as unchanged because our expectations shape what we see. But this misconception of the chair’s quality will be challenged at the point where the previously unnoticed damage culminates in its diminished utility. The intimate relationship between the change and transformation of things is arguably one of the central theses in Chinese philosophy.

Mindfulness of the transformative nature of things and events was depicted in many early Chinese texts. A story extracted from a classic text, the Huai Nan Zi (淮南子), which was written in 139 BCE, is a typical representation of this idea:

As for the revolutions and the mutual generation of calamity and good fortune, their alterations are difficult to perceive. At the near frontier, there was a [family of] skilled diviners whose horse suddenly became lost out among the Hu [people]. Everyone consoled them. The father said, “This will quickly turn to good fortune!” after several months, the horse returned with a fine Hu steed. Everyone congratulated them. The father said, “This will quickly turn to calamity!” the household was [now] replete with good horse; the son love to ride, [but] he fell and broke his leg. Everyone consoled them. The father said, “This will quickly turn to good fortune!” After one year, the Hu people entered the frontier in force; the able and strong all stretched their bowstrings and fought.

92 Susan Butler, Macquarie Dictionary. Sydney: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2009. The Oxford English Dictionary Online, Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://www.oed.com/. In the Macquarie Dictionary, to transform is “to change in appearance, condition, nature, or character, especially completely or extensively.” In The Oxford English Dictionary Online, transformation is “A complete change in character, condition, etc.”

Among the people of the near frontier, nine out of ten died. It was only because of lameness that father and son protected each other. Thus,

good fortune becoming calamity,

calamity becoming good fortune;

their transformations are limitless,

so profound they cannot be fathomed.93

The diviners’ family underwent a series of considerable changes: from the loss of their horse, to the accession of “a fine Hu steed”; from the son’s broken leg, to the family’s escape from the war. Each time an unfortunate change occurred, the father, who possessed foresight, was always able to identify the temporary nature of the current situation and point out that the present misfortune would eventually be transformed into its opposite. In short, change is itself subject to change. Therefore, the evaluation of the current change relies on not only the factual but also the developmental nature of the current situation and change: the very fact that no situations and changes are fixed but always subject to change, including their evaluations. The life experiences and divinatory knowledge enabled the father to claim that what had appeared to be unfortunate in the current situation may well be transformed into good fortune in the future. What the father essentially meant is, if changes are inevitable, so too are the transformations of the changes themselves. This reflects, to a certain extent, the ideas of change and transformation in the Yi Jing.

According to the Book of Changes, human beings are thought to dwell in an ever- changing cosmos in which the fundamental elements and forces are constantly in dynamic movement.94 The dynamic nature of the universe suggests that change is a natural tendency of all things: nothing can remain in a fixed condition for all time. The Yi Jing’s insight into this dynamism allows it to depict and interpret human events on

93 John S. Major, Sarah Queen, Andrew Meyer, Harold D. Roth. The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China. Columbia University Press, 2010, pp. 728-9. 94 E.g., “故水火不相逮，雷風不相悖，山澤通氣，然後能變化也，既成萬物也。” (《樂天知命》p. 680) “This is why Water and Fire drive each other on, why Thunder and Wind do not work against each other, and why ‘Mountain and Lake reciprocally circulate.’ Only in consequence of all this can change and transformation take place, thus allowing the myriad things to become all that they can be.” (Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 122.)

50 the basis of this cosmological principle. In order to appreciate the Yi Jing’s philosophy of change (and transformation), it is important to first explore its dynamic perspective.

2.1.3 Dynamism in the Yi Jing Dynamism permeates the entire book of the Yi Jing, which is reflected in the binary structure it employs. The Yi Jing contains sixty-four hexagrams, and each hexagram can be subdivided into two trigrams. There are eight trigrams in all, and each is composed of three lines, which are either broken () or unbroken (). For example, the cascade of three unbroken lines ☰ represents the concept of Heaven, while the assembly of three broken lines ☷ symbolizes the notion of Earth.95 Each of these eight trigrams represents a basic concept in the Yi Jing, and is elementally dynamic instead of static. In the Xi Ci Zhuan, a vivid picture of a dynamic cosmos is captured running in a binary fashion:

It [the Dao] arouses things with claps of thunder, moistens them with wind and rain. Sun and moon go through their cycles, so now it is cold, now hot. The Dao of Qian forms the male; the Dao of Kun forms the female. Qian has mastery over the great beginning of things, and Kun acts to bring things to completion.96

In this image, the universe is in dynamic harmony, things are running in certain courses, both successively and interdependently. It is really the awareness of the dynamic nature of the dao (道) that encourages the exploration of the changes and processes of things and events in Chinese philosophy.

In order to explore the dynamism embedded in the images of the Yi Jing, I will employ the hexagram Pi  (否), Stagnation, as an example. This hexagram is composed of two trigrams: heaven on top and earth at the bottom. When heaven and earth are taken as static concepts, this hexagram seems to represent a perfect image of a world in which things are located in their ideal positions. Therefore, to a conventional mind, this hexagram could be overall a favourable representation. However, the positions of heaven and earth should not be taken as fixed in the world of the Yi Jing, as Wilhelm

95 The representations of the trigrams are simplified for easy understanding. Their actual meanings are far more complicated than what has been described in this paper. This simplification has also been applied in the interpretation of the hexagrams. 96 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 48.

51 suggests, “heaven has the tendency to rise and [earth] to sink.”97 The dynamic mind of yi recognizes this hexagram as an unfavourable picture, because heaven and earth are becoming increasingly distanced from each other. Nothing will thrive in this image of a disintegrating world.98

The hexagram Pi communicates the idea that the universe is in constant change; likewise the diviners’ story presented a similar concept of change (and transformation). However, there is a fundamental difference between these two. In the diviners’ story, the transformations between good and bad fortune are deemed to be unfathomable. The Yi Jing may concede that quantitative changes may not always be perceivable; however it denies this unfathomability (or unintelligibility) of transformations, but looks for patterns and principles embedded in, or embodied by, the continuous processes of change and transformation.

2.1.4 Change and Transformation in the Yi Jing: A Practical Appreciation The Yi Jing is the inductive depiction of the ever-changing universe in a symbolical manner. It aims to infer general patterns from particular instances through prolonged observations conducted by its contributors over many generations. In the Xi Ci Zhuan of the Appendices, the text states:

古者包犧氏之王天下也，仰則觀象於天，俯則觀法於地，觀鳥獸之文與地之宜。近取諸身，遠取諸物，於是始作八卦，以通神明之德，以類萬物之

情。99

When in ancient times Lord Bao Xi ruled the world as sovereign, he looked upward and observed [guan] the images in heaven and looked onward and observed [guan] the models that the earth provided. He observed the patterns on birds and beasts and what things were suitable for the land. Nearby, adopting them from his own person, and afar, adopting them from other things, he thereupon made the eight trigrams in order to become thoroughly conversant with the virtues inherent in the numinous and the bright and to classify the myriad things in terms of their true, innate natures.100

97 Hellmut Wilhelm. Change: eight lectures on the I Ching, 1973, p. 45. 98 “天地不交，而萬物不通也；上下不交，而天下無邦也。” (《樂天知命》p. 158) 99 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 634. 100 Richard John Lynn. The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 77.

The endeavour to effectively expound “the true, innate natures” of the phenomenal world reflects the central interests of the ancient Chinese who composed the Yi Jing. By learning the Yi Jing, people can benefit from its insightful knowledge and respond more effectively to changes in their lives. Illustrating this point, Lynn states, “[l]ooking up, we use it [the Changes] to observe the configurations of Heaven, and, looking down, we use it to examine the patterns of Earth. Thus we understand the reasons underlying what is hidden and what is clear.”101 Hence, the vision of the Yi Jing reveals that change is intelligible and not necessarily unfathomable.

In order to make greater sense of the concept of change in the Yi Jing, it is appropriate to compare this concept briefly with the Western perspective of change (particularly that concerning metaphysics). The above analysis suggests that the way of the ancient Chinese people was to use insightful observation (觀, guan) to examine their surroundings and start to comprehend the ‘world’. The substance of the world, or the universe in the modern sense of this word, was not their primary concern. Lai argues that “Chinese philosophy focuses on processes, responses, and relational interactions, rather than on events, absolute states, or individual entities, conceived of in independent and atomistic terms.”102 It is arguable whether the ancient Chinese explored questions of metaphysics, and equally doubtful that traditional Chinese philosophies had developed a fully-fledged metaphysical enquiry into substance(s). In discussing the ontological implication of the dao, Chung-ying Cheng describes dao “as a process of creative development of things in which generation, transformation, and ending or return of things are parts of the process.”103 In this sense, where change is concerned, a tendency to look at substances that withstand change may typify a perspective in which the study of change merely holds a peripheral position hence is metaphysically inferior to that of substance. By contrast, the concept of change is central to the Yi Jing. Hence, the importance of change in the Yi Jing is comparable to that of substance in metaphysics. In other words, in Chinese philosophy, the term ‘change’ is not viewed from the metaphysical perspective. Chinese philosophy is interested in the question, “How are things changed?”, whereas metaphysics focuses on the question, “What is changing?”

101 Ibid., p. 51. 102 Karyn Lai, “Understanding Change: The Interdependent Self in its Environment,” in Karyn Lai (ed.), New Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Chinese Philosophy, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 85. 103 Chung-ying Cheng, “Dimensions of the Dao and Onto-Ethics in Light of the DDJ,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 31:2, 2004, p. 148.

The discrepancy between the two also highlights the pragmatic characteristics of Chinese philosophy. In the case of the Yi Jing, the purpose of understanding change is primarily to help people deal with life’s changes more efficiently. The observable changes of the world were all that could be known to the ancient Chinese, who were intrigued by the question of the involvement of change in their lives. To them, changes were phenomena that could be perceived, and thus learned and studied in order to decode their relevance to life. Lai argues that “the belief that individuals and situations are susceptible to change will prompt one who is practically wise to prepare for change and to think about strategies to deal with change.”104 In this sense, the concept of change in the Yi Jing is experiential, and thus essentially reflects an epistemological curiosity amongst the ancient Chinese.

As mentioned earlier, transformation is change that is 1) at its climax, 2) embodied in a qualitative exchange, and 3) usually accompanied by a value judgement. In the Yi Jing, such an exchange is symbolized by either of the binary lines  (yin) and  (yang), and is often judged as either 吉 (ji, good fortune) or 凶 (xiong, misfortune). Since the Yi Jing is an extremely practical book, it is hard to appreciate its philosophical concept of change and transformation without first examining how the oracle is consulted. Taking the abovementioned hexagram Pi  (否) as an example, it looks like this in the Yi Jing:

1.  2. 否 Pi/Standstill [Stagnation] 3. THE JUDGMENT STANDSTILL. Evil people do not further The perseverance of the superior man. The great departs; the small approaches. 4. Commentary on the Decision “Evil People of the time of STANDSTILL do not further the perseverance of the superior man…” 5. THE IMAGE Heaven and earth do not unite: the image of STANDSTILL.

104 Karyn Lai, “Understanding Change,” 2007, p. 93.

Thus… 6. THE LINES Six at the beginning means: … Six in the second place means: … Six in the third place means: … Nine in the fourth place means: … Nine in the fifth place means: … Nine at the top means: ... 105 In the given example, part ① is the hexagram itself; part ② the name of the hexagram, and the rest are the interpretations of the hexagram. A thorough study of the structural arrangement and overarching meanings of the hexagram is not the interest of this thesis; therefore a brief appreciation will be sufficient in understanding this practice.

How the oracle is consulted, obtained and read into interpretations reflects the Yi Jing’s philosophical insight into the difference between change and transformation. There are usually two ways of consulting the oracle and obtaining the hexagram: either through the yarrow stalk method or the coin method.106 I will only introduce the coin method here because the yarrow stalk method is so complex that it may need a dedicated paper to justify its complexity.107 More importantly, the complicated method is not superior to the simpler coin method in appreciating the message I am about to convey here.

In the coin method, three antique Chinese coins are needed for consulting the oracle. The archaic Chinese coins used for divination were usually made of bronze, and each had a square hole in the middle (to be strung together) with an inscription on one side (see Figure 2).108 To consult the oracle, one first formulates an inquiry, and then takes up the coins and throws them down together to obtain a hexagram line. A value of 2 is assigned to the inscribed side, and 3 to the other side.109 Every throw may result in any of the four possible values: 6 (2+2+2), 7 (2+2+3), 8 (2+3+3), and 9 (3+3+3): 6 and 8 are even numbers representing the yin line (), whereas 7 and 9 are uneven numbers that

105 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, pp. 446-50. 106 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes. 1994, pp. 19-22. 107 For those who are interested in the yarrow stalk method, Richard Lynn has provided a very detailed illustration. Please refer to pages 19-20 in his book, The Classic of Changes for more details. 108 Ibid., p. 21. 109 The inscribed side is the ‘yin’ side of the coin and thus possesses the even number, 2, whereas the other side is the ‘yang’ side and possesses the uneven number, 3. I have included this explanation in the footnotes just in case it is confused with the yin line and yang line of a hexagram.

55 represent the yang line (). A complete hexagram with six lines will be obtained after six throws.110

Figure 2. The Type of Archaic Chinese Coins Used for Consulting the Oracle. The TAIPING (太平) Silver Coin111 (the left pair with the inscribed side on the left) and the 1-Mace SINKIANG (新疆) Silver Coin112 (the right pair with the inscribed side on the left).

The interesting fact is that, while the yang lines (7 or 9) or yin lines (6 or 8) have different values, they are not given equal weight when interpreting a hexagram. The yin line with value 8 is called the ‘young’ yin, which means that this particular yin is still in the middle of a change in progress. Hence, it will be in the state of yin for some time. By contrast, the yin with the value 6 is the ‘old’ yin, which is the change of yin at its climax. That is, it is about to transform into a ‘young’ yang (the yang with the value 7). This ‘young’ yang is similar to the ‘young’ yin in that both are in the process of undergoing change and are thus in a relatively stable condition. However the ‘young’ yang, just like the ‘young’ yin, will gradually lose its stability upon reaching the developmental peak, whereupon an ‘old’ yang with the value 9 will emerge. And again, the ‘old’ yang shares the same transformative quality as the ‘old’ yin, which will soon transform into a ‘young’ yin with the value 8.113 If we take the ‘old’ yin (6) as a starting point, we will get a 6-7-9-8-6-… cycle of change-transformation-change- transformation-change-… (Figure 3).114 Moreover, it is interesting that the change of yin consists of a decrease from 8 (young yin) to 6 (old yin), whereas the progression of yang consists of an increase from 7 (young yang) to 9 (old yang). When referring to the

110 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, pp. 21-22. 111 Eduard Kann, Illustrated Catalog of Chinese Coins (Gold, Silver, Nickel, and Aluminum), 2nd Ed., New York: Mint Productions, 1966, p. 25. 112 Ibid., p. 347. 113 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes., 1994, p. 22. 114 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed. lii-liv.

56 previous discussion about the symbolic movement of the trigram Heaven ☰ (all yang lines) and Earth ☷ (all yin lines)115, you may recall that Heaven ‘rises’ and Earth ‘sinks’, which corresponds to the increasing yang and the decreasing yin. This analysis shows that the concepts of change and transformation are embodied in the Yi Jing’s practice of consulting the oracle.

Transforming

7 6 Young Yang Old Yin Relatively Unstable Stable

Changing Changing

8 9 Young Yin Old Yang Relatively Unstable Stable

Transforming

Figure 3. A Cyclic Representation of the Yi Jing’s Concepts of Change within Yin or Yang and Transformation between Yin and Yang.

In addition to the processes of consulting the oracle, the way of reading the obtained hexagram reveals an even deeper philosophical implication of the Yi Jing’s notions of change and transformation. To expound my point, I would like to simulate a complete process of generating and reading a hexagram. Say, for instance, we employ the coin method to make an inquiry about a situation that concerns us. After six throws, six values 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7 are generated and represent 3 yin lines (7, 7, 7) and 3 yang lines (8,

115 Imagine the three lines of a trigram corresponding to the three coins employed by the coin method. The trigram Heaven ☰ has three yang lines, and thus has the total value of 9 (3+3+3), whereas the trigram Earth ☷ has three yin lines, and thus has the total value of 6 (2+2+2).

8, 8). It is worth pointing out here that hexagrams are organized in the order of bottom- to-top, which means that the earlier the line is generated, the lower its position is in the hexagram. In this case, we will get a hexagram that looks like this:  which, as we already know, is the hexagram Pi. How then should we interpret it? Referring back to the previous example, we now know that we already have ① the hexagram and ② its name, so we can continue to read ③ The Judgment, ④ The Commentary of The Decision, and ⑤ The Image.116 However, the intriguing point here is that, in the current hexagram, we do not have to read ⑥ The Lines. Why is that? You may have noticed that the lines generated here are all ‘young’ lines (with the value 7 or 8) irrespective of whether they are yin or yang. We already know that the young lines represent things in the process of change and are thus in a relatively stable condition. In this specifically generated hexagram, all the lines are ‘young’ lines and are therefore relatively stable (but not static). This in turn endows the whole hexagram with stability. In reading this hexagram, only the overall message rather than the single lines are of concern. Furthermore, if we look at the actual statements of part ⑥, we may find that only sixes and nines (the ‘old’ values) appear at the beginning of each statement. We do not see sevens and eights. This suggests that our attention is only aroused when we see these ‘old’ line(s). The previous discussion has suggested that the old lines represent things that have almost reached their points of transformation and are heralding dramatic transformations.

Bearing the preceding in mind, let us continue to examine the interpretation of a hexagram consisting of ‘old’ lines. Let us still take the hexagram Pi  as our example. If, at this time, we assume that, after six throws, we are left with the lines with the values 6, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, we would still have the same hexagram Pi . However, this Pi is different from the previous Pi as it has an ‘old’ yin line with the value 6 situated at the bottom (according to the bottom-up order). You may recall that ‘old’ lines, regardless of yin or yang, are ready to undergo transformation to become their ‘young’ counterparts. Therefore, in this case, we have to examine not only parts ①-⑤, but also pay particular attention to the corresponding statement in part ⑥ The Lines.117 What is even

116 Here, I only introduce the basic application of the Yi Jing, and will not look into each part in detail. Looking into the detailed content of a hexagram is not in the central interest at the current stage of this thesis. 117 The arrangement of lines in a hexagram is from bottom to top, as is the order in which it is read: the bottom line is the beginning, while the top line is the end.

58 more inspiring in this new case is that, because an ‘old’ yin line here heralds a potential transformation at the bottom of the hexagram, the immediate hexagram Pi is not the only one of concern: attention should also be paid to the expected hexagram after the metamorphosis of the ‘old’ line takes place. In this case, the hexagram Wu Wang  (無妄, Innocence) is the result of such a metamorphosis. Therefore, in the current instance, other than consulting all the necessary parts of Pi, parts ①-⑤ of the Wu Wang should also be taken into account.118

This analysis of the rationale in the application of the Yi Jing suggests that the elaboration of change versus transformation in the Yi Jing is twofold: one is explicitly conveyed in the text and the other can only be comprehended in its actual usage. In addition to this, the ingenious categorization of yin and yang with the statuses of ‘young’ or ‘old’ reflects the Yi Jing’s in-depth understanding of the intricate relationship between change and transformation: the latter is the former at the peak of its progression, and hence subject to qualitative shift. When consulting the Yi Jing, only these ‘old’ lines of an obtained hexagram require special attention, otherwise a general interpretation of the hexagram would be enough. The difference between the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ in the featured hexagram lines also reflects how change and transformation are realized differently in a real-life situation. You may recall the previous example of a chair: people rarely take notice of changes in a chair whose stability is undermined by everyday use. It may be due to the fact that to pay constant attention to minute changes to a chair is both uneconomical and unrealistic to human consciousness. But if these changes to the chair accumulate over time to the point where it becomes unstable and unusable, then its user might start to worry about its sudden collapse and think about its replacement. Nevertheless, paying less attention to the details of change does not entail that we should ignore everyday change altogether; although change usually takes place in the background, completely ignoring it may result in a shock when we are confronted with transformation. The text of the Yi Jing shows a theoretical awareness of change in general, whereas its practice suggests an application of the theory in reality: a central focus on transformation with an eye on progressive changes.

The pragmatic approach of understanding change not only unveils an epistemological implication of the Yi Jing, but also expects its expression of change to be both concise

118 Annotations of all hexagrams share a similar structure, but their contents differ.

59 and inclusive. In this sense, the alternative meaning of ‘yi’, that of ‘easy’ or ‘easily’, is also applicable to the Yi Jing. This portrayal represents collective knowledge of change that can be easily accessed and put into practice. The dynamic nature of change and transformation implied by the concept of yi corresponds with the dynamic dimension proposed in the framework of practical contextualism. The intricate relationship created and appreciated in the cyclic transformation of yin and yang reflects, to a certain extent, the relational dimension of practical contextualism. This signifies a potential connection between the ideas of yi (as change and transformation) and context (where change and transformation take place). Further investigation of the Yi Jing will reveal that, to the ancient Chinese, a comprehensive understanding of seemingly arbitrary changes in our lives can be developed through prolonged observation of the world that surrounds us.

2.2 Context and Change I have just presented a comprehensive picture of the concept of yi as change and transformation and explained how transformation is a special kind or stage of change. Let us now further the investigation by surveying the contextual notions embedded in the concept of yi (or change). To do so, I will first continue the previous discussions of the divinatory function of the Yi Jing in order to unveil its underlying contextual implications. I will also explore the contextual theme embedded in the hexagrams. As the discussion progresses, the rich philosophical meanings of contextualism that are reflected in the diverse ideas in the text of the Yi Jing will also unfold. I argue that interspatial and metaphorical approaches are important means of examining the contextual theme in the text of the Yi Jing, while also acknowledging that developing an appreciation of the ideas in the Yi Jing is very difficult. (This does not contradict the notion of yi as easiness, if easiness is interpreted as a kind of ‘skilfulness’ that can be developed through arduous practice and thorough understanding of the ideas in the Yi Jing). At the end of this section, I will draw out the connections between the theme of contextualism in the Yi Jing and the framework presented in the current thesis.

As we have already discussed, the Yi Jing is a book that centres on change and transformation, meaning that the concept of context is not explicitly addressed in the text. However, in the Xi Ci Zhuan, the theme of contextual awareness is alluded to in

60 the discussion concerning the value judgment (good fortune vs misfortune) of the position of hexagram lines119:

八卦以象告，爻彖以情言，剛柔雜居，而吉凶可見矣！120

The eight trigrams point the way by means of their images; the words accompanying the lines, and the decisions, speak according to the circumstances. In that the firm and the yielding are interspersed, good fortune and misfortune can be discerned. [Italics added]

And this notion of circumstances is further elaborated:

變動以利言，吉凶以情遷。是故愛惡相攻而吉凶生，遠近相取而悔吝生，情偽相感而利害生。凡《易》之情，近而不相得則凶，或害之，悔且吝。 121

Changes and movements are judged according to the furtherance […]. Good fortune and misfortune change according to the conditions. Therefore: Love and hate combat each other, and good fortune and misfortune result therefrom. The far the near injure each other, and remorse and humiliation result therefrom. The true and the false influence each other, and advantage and injury result therefrom. In all the situations of the Book of Changes it is thus: When closely related things do not harmonize, misfortune is the result: this gives rise to injury, remorse, and humiliation. [Italics added]122

Although these passages do not explicitly address the issue of context, they nevertheless raise the subject of relationships, conditions, and circumstances. (All of these are connected to the relevant dimensions of the framework of practical contextualism). Although Xi Ci Zhuan here attempts to illustrate the relationship between the lines in the ‘circumstance’ of a hexagram, we may find less difficulty in applying these descriptions to worldly phenomena that are familiar to us. This is because the

119 Richard Wilhelm (The I Ching, 2003, pp. 360-364) points out that the character and position of lines can serve as the indicator of the overall feature of a hexagram; there are certain rules concerning the lines’ character and position which can help to decide whether a hexagram is favourable or not. This line of thinking was also reinforced in Wang Bi’s annotation, Considering the Line Positions (Lynn, The Classic of Changes, pp32-4). 120 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 668. 121 Ibid. 122 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, pp. 354-5.

61 hexagrams in the Yi Jing are symbolized situations in reality.123 Therefore, the linear relationship found in the hexagrams resembles real relationships in worldly situations.124 The Yi Jing does not deny the inherent feature (or metaphysical character) of a line “as firm [yang] or yielding [yin], as central, as correct, or as not central or not correct.”125 Nevertheless making a judgment that is based solely on the fixed features of a single line is less pragmatic and wise. For instance, a yang line in a supposed yang place may be considered unfavourable because it might have shown too much firmness126; conversely a yin line in the same place can be desirable because its yielding character can counterbalance the rigid character of the place.127 As Cheng points out, “the strength or lack of strength of a yao postion lies in its quality and relational support, hence it could lead to goodness or badness, fortune of misfortune (Itatics added).”128

It is worth noting that, in these passages, what has been employed to demonstrate the idea of conditions, circumstances, or situations is the Chinese character 情 (qing). The main reason that the theoretical framework of practical contextualism is grounded in the character 境 (jing) instead of 情 (qing) is not simply because the latter does not appear in the contemporary Chinese definition of the term contextualism. More importantly, the meaning of qing is very complicated to the point of being ambiguous.129 Qing appears four times in the current passages. In three instances, it means “condition, circumstance, or situation” (as a noun). By contrast, in one instance, it is used in combination with ‘情偽’ (qing wei) to mean ‘real’ or ‘true’ (as an adjective), where wei here means ‘fake’ or ‘false’. This reflects, to a certain extent, A. C. Graham’s argument that in early Chinese writings, qing, as a noun, means “facts,” and as an adjective,

123 E.g., as indicated in section 2.1.3, the situation of Stagnation is symbolized by the hexagram Pi  (否), 124 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 28. 125 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, pp. 360-1. In a hexagram, even numbered (2, 4, 6) places are correct places for yin lines, uneven numbered (1, 3, 5) places are correct places for yang lines. “The middle lines of the two primary trigrams, the second and the fifth, are central irrespective of their other qualities.” 126 Ibid. Firmness is considered one of the major features of the yang line. 127 Ibid. The correct places are not always the favourable places in a hexagram. Favourability is situationally dependent and depends on the overall situation of the hexagram. 128 Chung-ying Cheng, “Zhouyi and Philosophy of Wei (Positions),” Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident, 18:18, 1996, p. 165. Yao (爻) means the line of a hexagram. 129 Martin W. Huang, Desire and Fictional Narrative in Late Imperial China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 24.

“genuine” or “essential.”130 What complicates the idea of qing even further is that qing can also mean feelings, emotions, or even passions, which can be found in the text Xun Zi (荀子).131 Chad Hansen criticises what he perceives as Graham’s negligence in omitting from his argument the emotional denotation of qing. He puts forward the argument that the coexistence of the factual and emotional aspects of qing implies a unification of “external reality” and the “internal response” in the idea of qing.132 However, Hansen’s interpretation of qing, which overemphasizes individual responsiveness instead of subjectivity, is also questionable.133 Due to the ambiguous nature of the character qing, it is very unlikely that proposing a framework based on this character will not cause undesirable complications. However, this does not mean that the idea of qing cannot be included in the study of practical contextualism; in fact, qing and jing can be perceived as semantically related even in contemporary Chinese, such as in the phrase ‘情境’ (the actual situation, qing jing). This may be valuable to the future studies of practical contextualism.

2.2.1 Context and the Application of the Yi Jing As mentioned earlier, although the concept of context (or contextualism) is only alluded to in the text of the Yi Jing, it is distinctly demonstrated in the latter’s applications. In the previous section, we have learnt that the yin line () and the yang line () are employed in the Yi Jing to indicate the contrasting states of things and events.134 More significantly, the Yi Jing adopts the concepts of ‘young’ and ‘old’ to demonstrate the different phases of change: in the ‘young’ phase, change progresses gradually and things are still in a relatively stable condition; whereas in the ‘old’ phase, change has reached its summit, and things are ready for their transformation into the opposite ‘young’ phase. These distinguishable but continuous phases of change give rise to a unique way of reading the hexagrams: the ‘old’ lines call for attention because transformations are about to take place in them. In addition to this, the new hexagram

130 A. C. Graham, “The Meaning of Ch’ing 情,” appendix to “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature”, in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 59, 63. 131 Martin W. Huang, Desire and Fictional Narrative in Late Imperial China, 2001, pp. 31-2. 132 Chad Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” in Joeal Marks and Roger T. Ames, eds., Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 201. 133 Martin W. Huang, Desire and Fictional Narrative in Late Imperial China, 2001, p. 32. 134 There are far more profound implications associated with the concept of yin and yang than just the indicators of opposite status. It is only for the convenience of the discussion that this particular aspect of yin and yang has been selected here.

63 that results from the metamorphosis of these ‘old’ lines also requires consideration. The question then becomes: How can a contextual concept of the Yi Jing be inferred from these factors?

The contextual implication in the application of the Yi Jing’s hexagrams is twofold. In the previous discussions I have employed Pi  as an example to describe the generation and interpretation of a hexagram. I have pointed out that, just as all the ‘young’ lines that are generated (8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7) are relatively stable, so too is the hexagram itself. Therefore, examining the general messages of such a hexagram is adequate. However, if not all of the obtained lines are ‘young’ (e.g., 6, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7), things will become a little complicated. In addition to what should be consulted in the all-young-line situation, we also have to look into two other factors: the statement(s) of the ‘old’ line(s) in the current hexagram and the new hexagram that has resulted from the transformation of the ‘old’ line(s). In the current case (Pi  with 6, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7), the new hexagram would be Wu Wang  (無妄, the Innocent/Unexpected). How then does this imply a contextual concept? In previous discussions, I have described the practice of the Yi Jing mainly to illustrate the intricate relationship between change and transformation. But if we look at the current example from a different angle, we may arrive at something different. Let us return to the example of the chair. If there is a chair in a room that has been used for some time but is still in a reasonable condition, as long as it functions well, we may notice neither any change in the chair nor in the room in which it is situated. However, if someday the chair becomes worn out, shaky, and may collapse at any time, it will certainly catch our attention. But how should we consider the room that accommodates the chair? Should we say that only the chair has been changed or ‘transformed’ in terms of its utility whereas the room has remained the same? Or because the chair is part of the room, changes in the chair will inevitably affect the character of the whole room? We may be tempted to agree with the former suggestion; whereas the Yi Jing, defying convention, endorses the latter. As I have suggested, a hexagram is a symbol of situations in the real world. It is therefore safe to assume that the lines signify elements that constitute the situation at hand. Say we replace the room with the hexagram Pi , the bottom (old) line with the chair, and the rest of the (young) lines with other elements in the room. When the chair is in a stable condition and nothing else undergoes a qualitative transformation, we tend not to worry about anything in relation to the room as a whole, despite having an overall image of the room.

However, when the chair becomes worn out and is about to collapse, it will certainly catch our attention. However, if everything else in the room is still in a stable condition, we may think that the room is still the same. That is, only the shaky chair needs repair or replacement. This is naïve, however. In ordinary experience, we might feel that a rickety chair requires urgent attention because it is in a room with hard, concrete flooring and whoever falls will surely be hurt. As we can see, if the chair represents the bottom line of the hexagram Pi  (as the room), when it undergoes a qualitative transformation as an ‘old’ line, the room of hexagram Pi is also about to change to that of hexagram Wu Wang . This is the first level of the concept of context in the Yi Jing: the change of a single element of a situation will inevitably affect the situation as a whole. One may ask: If we have fixed the broken chair or replaced it with a new one, will the room then be restored to its previous condition, and the hexagram Wu Wang reversed to the hexagram Pi ? The answer is ‘No’, not because the repaired or replaced chair is no longer the original chair, but because, for an easy understanding, the example I have used is an oversimplified one. I am going to rectify this oversimplicity alongside my discussion of the second level of the concept of context in the Yi Jing.

When revealing the first level of the concept of context in the Yi Jing, I established an analogy that compared a room to a hexagram and a chair in the room to a hexagram line. I discussed the situation where nothing in the room is ‘transformed’ except the chair, and also stated that this is obviously an oversimplified situation. In our imagination, we may be able to stop certain things from changing; whereas in reality, we simply cannot designate change only to particular things but not others. The change of a room and its contents is overcomplicated: there are things in the room of which we are conscious but others of which we are not; we may notice that things are changing at certain times but not at others. More importantly, different things within the same room are in different phases of flux: e.g., a chair may be still stable whereas a table is about to collapse; a computer may still be functioning whereas a pen is running out of ink, etc. All of these complicate the phenomena of change that take place in a room, which also explains why it is impossible in the previous example to reverse the hexagram Wu Wang  to the hexagram Pi . This applies even when the chair has been repaired or replaced.

A hexagram primarily captures a situation in its totality rather than merely the individual entities that it contains. Bearing this in mind, if the transformation of an ‘old’

65 line in hexagram Pi can turn it into hexagram Wu Wang, how many other hexagrams are potentially correlated with Pi when the number and position of the ‘old’ line(s) are varied? There are six lines in a hexagram. When it is generated for an inquiry, each line can be either ‘young’ or ‘old’, so there are in total twelve (2*6) possible permutations and combinations of ‘young’ and ‘old’ lines in a particular hexagram that has been generated. Except for the instance that only contains ‘young’ lines, the rest (11) all have ‘old’ line(s) with different positions in the hexagram. This means that each hexagram has eleven potential counterparts due to the variation of the ‘old’ line(s).135 What does this imply? On the one hand, all eleven of them are just possible counter-hexagrams: Once a hexagram is generated, depending on the number and position of the ‘old’ lines, its counter-hexagram has also been determined. On the other hand, before a particular hexagram has been generated, we would expect that it would have neither a counter- hexagram (all ‘young’ lines) nor any of the eleven counter-hexagrams. This may sound trivial to a novice, but it is certainly significant to those who are experts in the Yi Jing: whenever a hexagram is brought to mind, so too are all other 11 counter-hexagrams in a simultaneous fashion. In light of this, the second level of the context in the Yi Jing might only be apprehended by a contextually intelligent mind: the situations themselves are contextual to one another (at least in the form of mental representations). In other words, the inclusive mind is not only aware of the situation at hand and its contents, it is also able to mentally represent possible situations that might eventuate from changes to, and transformations of, the current situation. In short, a contextually intelligent mind tends to be both inclusive in its scope and flexible in its function. Contextual awareness, intelligence, and wisdom are rooted in the ideas pertaining to the change and transformation of our surroundings in the Yi Jing, and vice versa. Context and change can be two perspectives of looking at the same thing. In section three, I will discuss how contextual intelligence can affect our daily practices of problem-solving. Let us first delve further into the text to expand our understanding of contextualism in the Yi Jing.

135 Take the hexagram Pi  as an example, if the generated lines are 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, there is no transformed counterpart in this situation because they are all ‘young’ lines. However, if the lines are 6, 8, 8, 7, 7, 7, we are left with an ‘old’ bottom line. Although we still get the same hexagram Pi, because of the ‘old’ line, we should also pay attention to the transformed hexagram Wu Wang  in this case. Again, if the generated lines are 6, 6, 8, 7, 7, 7, it is still Pi, but we have two ‘old’ lines in the first and second positions, respectively. In this case, other than Pi itself, we have to also give consideration to the transformed hexagram Lü (履) . By the same reasoning, we will have, in total, eleven similar transformed hexagrams corresponding to the single hexagram Pi, depending on the ‘old’ line(s) that are actually generated.

2.2.2 Context and the Hexagrams Although the world is subject to constant yet often imperceptible change, the Yi Jing seems to suggest that, by employing careful observation (as discussed in 2.1.4), variations in the universe will not be entirely impenetrable to us, and certain rules can be deduced from them. However, the Yi Jing does not present us with an exhaustive set of rules that correspond with all possible situations. Instead, it employs symbols, composed of a binary system of lines, which sort all possible changes into 64 different categories known as hexagrams. For instance, as mentioned above, the trigram Heaven ☰ indicates a rising tendency, and its counterpart Earth ☷ specifies a sinking force.

One possible combination that can be produced form this is the hexagram Pi , which denotes an unfavourable image of a world that is falling apart. However, if the image of Pi is turned upside down, a new hexagram  known as Tai (泰), Peace, is presented. In this hexagram, the earth sits at the top of heaven, thereby representing a favourable image. This is because, in this hexagram, two primal powers, heaven (天, tian) and earth (地, di), are moving against each other to eventually form a world that is unified instead of falling apart.136

The Judgment (卦辭, Gua Ci) states that the hexagram Pi represents a condition which is unfavourable for individual development; in such a situation, individuals who seek self-cultivation often find it difficult to stick to principles of upright behaviour (否之匪人, 不利君子貞; pi zhi fei ren, bu li jun zi zhen).137 This is because the individual engaged in self-cultivation is surrounded by petty men, and is thus distanced from kindred spirits (大往小來, da wang xiao lai).138 The image of Pi differs from the situation depicted by the hexagram Tai, where those engaged in self-cultivation congregate and shield themselves from the influence of petty persons (小往大來, xiao wang da lai).139 In comparison with Pi, the overall image of Tai is deemed to be auspicious and smooth (吉亨, ji heng).

136 “天地交而萬物通也；上下交而其志同也。” (《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 150) 137 In their books, both Richard John Lynn and Richard Wilhelm translate “匪人” as “evil men/people”. Fu Peirong interprets “匪人” as “違背人的需求” (that which goes against the needs of human beings, or that which is unfit for/unfavourable towards human beings). Fu’s interpretation gives more weight to environmental/contextual concerns, and is thus more pertinent to the current thesis. 138 傅佩榮,《樂天知命》, 2011, pp. 157-8. 139 Ibid., p. 149.

The images of the hexagrams Tai and Pi may provide a more intuitive alternative to understanding contextualism in the Yi Jing. The hexagrams Tai  and Pi  both exemplify the dynamic nature of tian (heaven) and di (earth) in the Yi Jing. However, the contrast between the different combinations of the same trigrams suggests that, when placed in different situations, the same elements can produce entirely different outcomes. In the current case, despite being composed of the same trigrams, heaven ☰ and earth ☷, the value judgement of the hexagram is malleable because of the shift in position.

It is worth pointing out that people can be easily misled by the concepts of rising Heaven and sinking Earth, because they sound so abstract or even mysterious that they may carry certain metaphysical implications. This may be a common misperception held by those who are less familiar with Chinese cultures. In order to make more sense of the pictorial concepts represented by the Yi Jing, one is encouraged to imagine, in this case, the rising Heaven as the dynamic force possessed by a seed. On the one hand, when a seed is placed above the earth (as the hexagram Pi demonstrates), it will most probably wither and die because of the lack of nutrition from the soil. This helps to explain why the hexagram Pi is interpreted as Stagnation. On the other hand, if the same seed is properly sown into a piece of nourishing land (as the hexagram Tai portrays), its exuberant vitality will manifest itself rather effortlessly. This in turn provides a prosperous and peaceful image of the world. This analogy demonstrates the vital importance that a proper environment or situation has for the flourishing of natural beings. Human beings are not exempt from this, or similar, principles.

2.2.3 Context and Philosophical Meanings in the Yi Jing The examples of the seed and the self-cultivating individuals indicate that the dynamic contexts with which the Yi Jing is concerned are not limited to one or two kinds, but cover a wide range, for example, the environmental contexts of natural and human beings, or contexts bearing metaphysical, epistemological, and/or phenomenological meanings. These aspects of context can be found, for instance, in the ‘Commentary on the Judgments’ (彖傳, Tuan Zhuan) of the hexagram Tai:

泰，小往大來，吉亨。則是天地交而萬物通也；上下交而其志同也。內陽

而外陰，內健而外順，內君子而外小人。君子道長，小人道消也。140

“The petty depart, and the great arrive, so good fortune will prevail.” That is, Heaven and Earth interact perfectly, and the myriad things go smoothly. Those above and those below interact perfectly, and their will becomes one. The inner trigram is yang, and the outer is yin. The inner signifies strength and dynamism, and the outer signifies compliance and obedience. Inside is the noble man, and outside is the petty man. The Dao of the noble man is increasing, and the dao of the petty men is deteriorating.141

One who reads this passage for the first time may be baffled by the strange mix of words and ideas it contains and conveys, and wonder what the underlying logic could be behind these ideas. However, when reading them from the contextual perspective, we may be able to free ourselves from habitual or conventional thinking, which attempts to interpret the assortment of ideas and symbols based on the assumption of a unified logic and/or meaning. More importantly, the contextual perspective(s) can spare us the initial confusion and help us to understand the contextual meaning(s) of the Yi Jing better.

In this short passage, various pairs of concepts, ideas, and symbols appear, all of which have distinctive philosophical concerns. The pair of petty (小, xiao) and great (or noble) (大, da) contains a value judgment, and thus implies the potential ethical denotations specified in the previous example of the individual engaged in self-cultivation. The pairs, Heaven (天, tian) and Earth (地, di), above (上, shang) and below (下, xia), yin (陰) and yang (陽), can all have symbolic, metaphysical, phenomenological meanings in Chinese ways of thinking. And the concepts of inner/inside (內, nei) and outer/outside (外, wai) seem to have a salient epistemological implication on top of the aforementioned meanings. Even before having discussed all the pairs, a highly complex image has been conjured up that may be difficult to understand if the conventional approach to philosophical thinking is applied. How should we interpret this passage, and from which angle: symbolic, ethical, metaphysical, phenomenological, and/or epistemological? If we have to approach it from more than one angle, how can we arrive

140 Ibid., p. 157. 141 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 205.

69 at a single meaning, and would this meaning, if it indeed exists, make sense to us? Under the conventional framework of philosophy, it is expected that all of these questions and concerns would be addressed.

Under the contextual perspective, the solution to interpreting the current passage may not be as difficult as we expect. If the Yi Jing is not to give an absolute answer, we may let these ideas reside in their philosophical domain(s) as much as they can, without limiting them to a particular one or two for the purpose of attaining universal meanings. This may be the optimal option for reading this passage, as well as the entire text.

Despite its openness, this does not mean that the Yi Jing cannot provide relatively decisive answers. One may recall that the Yi Jing is a text that has a divinatory function. This means that the person who seeks a particular piece of advice from the oracle will get a relatively concrete and meaningful answer from the relevant statements of the obtained hexagram. In the current case, for instance, when getting the same hexagram Tai, the ancient Minister of Agriculture’s interpretation of seed sowing may be different from that of the Minister of Education or Culture in relation to educational and cultural affairs, or that of a sovereign in relation to ruling strategies. Faced with the same statements, different diviners may arrive at distinctive interpretations according to the nature of the questions posed and the enquirers’ own social, economic or political roles. However, this should not be seen as the only characteristic of the contextualism that the Yi Jing exhibits. If this were the case, the Yi Jing might give the impression that it promotes relativism, employs arbitrary words and stories, and is too comprehensive to be concrete and reliable. This is, in fact, a misconception of contextualism in the Yi Jing, and needs to be dealt with subtly and carefully.

Underneath the apparent arbitration in the Yi Jing’s application, the symbols, words, and ideas of the Yi Jing have their underlying consistency, which is not readily available to those who seek them in the Yi Jing’s immediate expression. The semantic coherence of the Yi Jing does not lie solely in its language, or even in its textual and/or linguistic context. Rather, its consistency is validated through its daily practices in which each inquirer arrives at his or her own independent interpretation. However, while these interpretations may be independent, they are not completely disconnected and unrelated. To continue with the aforementioned example, it can be expected that, when reading the same hexagram Tai, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Education or Culture,

70 and the King will each have their own concrete and distinctive interpretations of the same passage. From a merely superficial perspective, their interpretations, which concern different socio-economic and political areas, can be regarded as disconnected from each other. However, the enquirers know that these ideas are not totally irrelevant to them because they come from the same oracle. The scholars of the Yi Jing may further point out that these ideas are related not simply because they come from the same source, but because these seemingly irrelevant expositions are coming from different, yet semantically interconnected, perspectives of the same text. Also, they are contextually, but not absolutely, independent perspectives.

The previous discussions suggest that the current passage may involve symbolic, ethical, metaphysical, phenomenological, and/or epistemological descriptions of the hexagram Tai. Upon reading the passage, the Minister of Agriculture may be particularly attracted to its phenomenological and epistemological denotation, and take it as a good omen for farming, and subsequently a year of harvest. The Minster of Education or Culture, however, may be more interested in its ethical implication, and ponder the ways through which exemplary persons (君子, jun zi) can be educated and cultivated. Moreover, the ideal ruler, of course, is expected to perform a systematic analysis. This would enable him/her to arrive at a holistic image of the passage which encompasses as many philosophical domains as possible in order to enhance his/her ruling strategies and power.

These expectations, goals, concerns, and philosophical domains may, to a certain extent, overlap with each other, but none replicate each other. In this respect, they are independent concepts. It may be argued that, although they may appear independent, the expectations of the ministers and the kings are to create a better society; from this angle, their readings are interconnected and interrelated. This interpretation of interdependence is not irrational, but can be too vague and general to be significant. It may also be true that each reading concerns multiple philosophical or practical domains which overlap with each other. This is where the interconnections and interdependencies between the ideas in the current passage reside. However, this is more of a taxonomic explanation than a philosophical one. The taxonomic explanation can interpret this interconnectedness and interdependence from their taxonomic relations; however, this does not necessary capture the philosophical significance embedded in the interrelationship. In searching for a philosophical insight into the interrelated and

71 interdependent nature of the text of the Yi Jing, the interspatial perspective of contextualism, which is under a metaphorical discourse, may be of great help.

2.2.4 Interspace and Metaphor The interpretations of the current passage may appear discrete to different readers, and belong to several philosophical domains. However, this does not prevent the different interpretations from being semantically related through the loose metaphorical links that exist between the key ideas in the passage. When reading this passage carefully, we may discern the key word 交 (jiao; interact, communicate), which makes the contextual situation represented in the hexagram Tai an overall favourite one. This is the primary difference between the hexagrams Tai and Pi because the latter symbolizes a situation in which things are not interacting and communicating (不交, bu jiao) with each other. The importance of interaction and communication is that, as the passage shows, it is through these characteristics that a variety of things can run smoothly (萬物通, wan wu tong) and people can live in harmony and concord (其志同, qi zhi tong).

One may notice that, instead of giving separate explications of the ideas, ‘wan wu tong’ and ‘qi zhi tong’, the text of the Yi Jing employs them to explain each other metaphorically. ‘Wan wu tong’ is the result of the interaction between Heaven and Earth (天地交, tian di jiao), which is similar to ‘qi zhi tong’ being benefitted from the good communication between those above and below (上下交, shang xia jiao). The danger of giving specific definitions to these ideas is that, by doing so, we may fail to grasp the pragmatic and contextual nature of the Yi Jing. In the current translation, the ideas of Heaven (天, tian) and Earth (地, di) can be natural, empirical, conceptual, phenomenological, and/or metaphysical. By contrast, the pair, ‘above’ (上, shang) and ‘below’ (下, xia), seems to be of a more socio-political quality.142 From an “ontocosmological” perspective, Cheng argues that “what really differentiates the high and low are the inherent powers and functions in the spatial positions.”143 In the case of hexagram Tai, jiao (communication) seems to be an important function in its spatial positions. Moreover, the true nature and picture of the hexagram Tai can be richer and

142 In fact, the ideas, ‘above’ (上, shang) and ‘below’ (下, xia), can also be physical and conceptual, phenomenological and metaphysical, just like those of Heaven (天, tian) and Earth (地, di). 143 Chung-ying Cheng, “Zhouyi and Philosophy of Wei (Positions),” 1996, p. 151.

72 more complicated than that which can be found in the current verbatim (or literal) translation.

In order to form a deeper appreciation of the current passage, let us look at Richard Wilhelm’s interpretation of the same passage on the relationship between shang and xia, and tian and di:

This hexagram denotes a time in nature when heaven seems to be on earth. Heaven has placed itself beneath the earth, and so their powers unite in deep harmony. Then peace and blessing descend upon all living things.

In the world of man it is a time of social harmony; those in high places show favor to the lowly, and the lowly and inferior in their turn are well disposed toward the highly placed. There is an end to all feuds.144

In this version, Wilhelm unveils the intricate metaphorical relationship between the ideas of shang and xia and tian and di. First of all, shang and xia denote the desirable position of tian and di, which makes the current hexagram auspicious. However, this is not directly shown in a verbatim reading or translation of the passage itself. Rather, it may be inferred from the image of the hexagram as discussed at the beginning of the current section. Here, Prosperity is expected when Heaven is underneath (xia) the Earth, or the Earth is above (shang) Heaven. This image overturns the conventional perception of that Heaven is positioned on top of the Earth or that the Earth is below Heaven. One way to better understand this point is to compare it with how socio-political relationships take place in a society: social harmony is to be expected when those in high places show humility to the lowly, and the lowly respect those in high places. Here we can see that the shang-xia binary can mean both above-beneath), and high-lowly placed. It therefore may not merely be restricted to human affairs as the verbatim translation suggests.

Wilhelm’s translation helps to uncover the specific, but often hidden, metaphorical link(s) between and amongst distinctive ideas in the text of the Yi Jing. These ideas are related neither simply because they serve certain political ideals nor because the philosophical domains to which they belong may overlap with each other. Wilhelm’s interpretation implies that, when viewed from a metaphorical perspective, these ideas

144 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 48.

73 are contextually interconnected and therefore attain coherent semantic and philosophical meanings. However, it is worth pointing out that, despite its lucidity, Wilhelm’s interpretation may have unnecessarily restricted the meaning of Heaven and Earth to the realm of nature, and thereby overlooked other possible interpretations of tian and di.

It is also worth mentioning that the interspatial and metaphorical links make not only the seemingly discrete ideas of the text coherent, but also the different roles and duties played and enacted by different social members consistent and meaningful. It is desirable if 1) the Minister of Agriculture plans ahead for a year of harvest, 2) the Minister of Education or Culture works hard to ensure that the highest standards of educational or cultural qualities are met, or 3) the ruler devotes her life to serving all her subjects by serving the greater good. However, the question of why all of these actions are good is not always easy to answer, especially if we are seeking a holistic and coherent view. Instead of providing tedious explanations of each and every aspect of these social endeavours, the text of the Yi Jing puts forward a new approach. As I have just discussed above, through appreciating the metaphorical links within the interspatial context, one is able to comprehend the “big picture” that the Yi Jing offers. This is certainly another way of understanding the worldview embedded in the ideas of the Yi Jing.

The current discussions of the relationship between the pairs, shang and xia, and tian and di, suggest that the ideas in the current passage and in the Yi Jing are only loosely, instead of definitively, connected through metaphorical links. These loose links only reveal themselves if we attempt to decipher them from an interspatial viewpoint. All the ideas in the current passage can be explored from contextual perspectives: we can either arrive at a specific and personal answer which emerges from the inquirer’s own situation, or we can create a holistic image via a deep meditation on the metaphorical relationships between the ideas in the Yi Jing.

2.2.5 Contextualism in the Yi Jing Compared with the rather complicated implication of contextualism found in the text of the Yi Jing, the philosophy of yi suggests that there are basic patterns and elements that remain constant throughout change (e.g., the cyclic process between yin and yang). These patterns and elements are not subject to personal manipulation. However, those with a sensitive mind are not only clearly aware of these patterns and elements, they are

74 also able to tell the direction towards which these changes may lead. This ability of foresight may not necessarily be a product of evolution; on the contrary, it may be as simple as accepting that things are bound to change, including change itself. Taking the previous fable of the diviners’ family as an example, the Yi Jing certainly cannot cover all possible events, such as the loss of several horses and the dysfunction of the character’s legs in this story. Nevertheless the Yi Jing suggests that events and their circumstances are temporal phenomena, and are thus subject to change. Various permutations and combinations of two different lines are employed in the Yi Jing to demonstrate the immediate change and the possible directions to which this change may lead. As has been discussed above, not only does each hexagram represent a distinct situation, each line in any one hexagram symbolizes possible change evolving in different situation.

The discussions in the current section indicate that context in the Yi Jing means first and foremost a dynamic environment in which things, individuals, and events are situated. The changing nature of an environment involves both the dynamic and environmental dimensions of contextualism in the Yi Jing. Other than the environmental aspect of context, in 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, we were able to see the importance of the textual/conceptual perspective in providing a comprehensive image of the contextually related ideas in the Yi Jing, in particular, the interspatial relationships between these ideas. In this sense, the textual/conceptual dimension is closely related to the interspatial dimension of contextualism that is reflected in the complicated ideas in the Yi Jing. The different ideas in the text of the Yi Jing are both related to, and yet independent from, each other (as shown in 2.2.3 and 2.2.4), which can be compared with the relationships between the contextual environments represented by the hexagrams. Both indicate the relational and limitary dimensions of contextualism in the Yi Jing (and its applications), which are reflected in the independent boundaries between the ideas and hexagrams. In short, we can see more explicitly the evidence of the complete framework of contextualism in the Yi Jing.

Although there are discussions that try to vindicate the divinatory function of the Yi Jing, justifying the authenticity of its prognosis for any specific enquiry is not the aim of this thesis. However, one should not overlook the inclusive wisdom proffered by the Yi Jing. Things or events are situated in the environments that accommodate them; it makes less sense to perceive and judge them in isolation. Their innate interdependence and

75 interrelatedness entail that, when circumstances change, the judgment of any particular event is likely to change as well. The Xi Ci Zhuan advises that individuals be vigilant about such possibilities:

子曰：「危者，安其位者也；亡者，保其存者也；亂者，有其治者也。是故君子安而不忘危，存而不忘亡，治而不忘亂；是以身安而國家可保也。

《易》曰：『其亡其亡，繫于苞桑』。」145

The Master said: “To get into danger is a matter of thinking one’s position secure; to become ruined is a matter of thinking one’s continuance protected; to fall into disorder is a matter of thinking one’s order enduring. Therefore the noble man when secure does not forget danger, when enjoying continuance does not forget ruin, when maintaining order does not forget disorder. This is the way his person is kept secure and his state remains protected. The Changes say: ‘This might be lost, this might be lost, so tie it to a healthy, flourishing mulberry.’”146

This suggests that the recognition of the transformative nature of various events can remind us to respond in ways that may be crucial to achieving desirable outcomes. In order to attain such vigilance, a watchful person may argue that only paying attention to what is changing is necessary but inadequate. The broader context in which change occurs is also worth considering.

Discerning the situational context in which one resides, however, is not simply aimed towards attaining optimal solutions. Under some difficult circumstances (e.g., those represented by the hexagram Pi), there is only so much we can do to make things better or work in our favour. Self-cultivation plays a particularly prominent role in the Yi Jing in relation to these circumstances. Promoting the ability to identify and adapt to one’s circumstances in order to facilitate self-cultivation when the circumstances seem undesirable and unfavourable, is not exclusive to the Yi Jing; in fact, it is an idea shared by many classical Chinese texts. The famous Confucian saying: “窮則獨善其身，達則

兼善天下”147 by Mencius is a good example of such an ideal that exemplary individuals

145 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 649. 146 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 1994, p. 83. 147 《孟子·盡心上》 English translation: when being “nobody”, better oneself through self-cultivation; when being “somebody”, help to better all beings under the Heaven.

76 embrace. In the last section of the chapter, I will elaborate the idea of practising self- cultivation with contextual awareness in relation to the Yi Jing. Before doing this, let us first examine, in an in-depth manner, the role that the contextual comprehension of change plays in facilitating optimal responses to a dynamic environment and to solving the problem at hand.

2.3 A Contextually Intelligent Response to Change In previous sections, I discussed the concept of change in the Yi Jing and the underlying contextual implications the concept contains. I also argued that the contextual theme is not only suggested in the text of the Yi Jing but is also embedded in its applications. Because one’s response to change is mediated by one’s understanding of it, I would like, in this section, to discuss the importance of the contextual comprehension of change in the adoption of the optimum response as the means of solving the problem at hand. I will name the optimal response the contextually intelligent response in order to distinguish it from some of its ineffective counterparts. This will be done to highlight the contextual inference in optimal responses.

Change is the central concern of the Yi Jing with context being its underlying subject. If understanding change is to deal with it more effectively, grasping its underlying contextual theme allows us to work out the optimal responses to different situations. However, what does a contextually intelligent response specifically mean? In order to answer this question, I will first propose two kinds of responses that may not be contextually intelligent, and I would like to call these dogmatic responses, and indecisive responses, respectively.

2.3.1 Dogmatic Response What I mean by dogmatic response is one that is insensitive or less sensitive to change, particularly to situational change. Dogmatists are not those who are less responsive to change, but those who are less flexible in responding to different situations. In other words, dogmatists tend to take a previous successful response to a certain change in a particular situation as ultimate. They will apply this response indiscriminately to all other circumstances. This way of responding to situations may be the result of a view of things and events as isolated from one another, all the while forgetting that they belong to a broader context. Because of the neglect of the ‘bigger’ picture, dogmatists’ reaction to change is expectedly invariable and rigid. Dogmatic responses are feasible so long as

77 the situation in which they operate remains the same. However, whenever the situation changes, such responses will fail.

A story from the Chapter Zhi Le (至樂, Perfect Enjoyment) of the Zhuangzi illustrates Confucius’s worry that employing a dogmatic response would put his disciple’s life in jeopardy.

When [Yan Yuan]148 went east to [Qi], Confucius had a very worried look on his face. Tzu-kung [Zi Gong] got off his mate and asked, “May I be so bold as to inquire why the Master has such a worried expression now that Hui has gone east to [Qi]?”

“Excellent—this question of yours,” said Confucius. “[Guan Zhong] had a saying that I much approve of: ‘Small bags won’t hold big things; short well ropes won’t dip up deep water.’ […] I’m afraid that when Hui gets to [Qi] he will start telling the marquis of [Qi] about the ways of Yao, Shun, and the Yellow Emperor, and then will go on to speak about [Sui Ren] and [Shen Nong].149 The marquis will then look for similar greatness within himself and fail to find it. Failing to find it, he will become distraught, and when a man becomes distraught, he kills.”150

Confucius was not worried that Yan Hui, his favourite disciple, did not have messages to convey to the marquis of Qi (齊); he was worried about the way Yan Hui was going to deliver them. Yan Hui’s average audiences consisted of those who had the same interests and ideals as he did. To such audiences, his words were expected to elicit meaningful debates and receive positive feedback. However, by the time he went east to Qi, the environment with which he was familiar no longer existed. When Confucius realized this, he started to worry. His disciples obviously had not realized the seriousness of this issue, so one of them asked what had worried their master so much. Confucius nevertheless praised Zi Gong for the latter’s sensible response (in words) to the change made in Confucius’s expression. He then cited Guan Zhong’s saying and established an analogy between the marquis of Qi to ‘small bags’ or ‘short well ropes’.

148 Yan Yuan (顏淵) or Yan Hui (顏回) was the favourite disciple of Confucius. 149 Yao (堯), Shun (舜), and the Yellow Emperor (黃帝) were Chinese sages in ancient times; Sui Ren (燧人) and Shen Nong (神農) were mythical cultural heroes to whom the discoveries of fire and agriculture are attributed, respectively. 150 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 115.

These lacked the capacity to hold large objects or reach the bottom of the well. Confucius was worried that Yan Hui had not realized this. Hui might treat the marquis of Qi as one of his ordinary audience members, and talk about these historical figures in front of the marquis. Since the marquis was unable to match himself with these significant figures, he might become upset and direct his anger at Yan Hui, or even put the latter to death. In this Zhuangzian story, not only does the marquis of Qi find himself in a new ‘situation’, but so too does Yan Hui. Confucius had obviously examined the issue from both sides and foreseen the disastrous outcome that would ensue when both people assumed a dogmatic approach to the situation. If the marquis had not been dogmatic, Yan Hui’s message might certainly have sounded annoying, but should not have elicited anger or the desire to kill. This is because the marquis would have understood that Yan Hui just did not know the proper way to convey messages that would be aligned with the character of the recipient. Of course, like the marquis of Qi, whether a ‘small bag’ or ‘short well rope’ could have knowledge of its own smallness or shortness is a different topic.

2.3.2 Indecisive Response An indecisive response is another form of a non-contextual response that I would like to examine here. By indecisive response, I mean the kind that perceives limitless directions that a particular change might lead to, and therefore equally as valid as each other. What distinguishes an indecisive response from a dogmatic one is that, while the latter tends to be less or not sensitive to situational change, the former is oversensitive to it. And this oversensitivity, I will argue, is the direct result of being overwhelmed by the infinite number of possibilities that one could take up. I will demonstrate my point by employing the example of a psychological examination of the cognitive processes of chess players.

The human mind used to be compared to a computing machine.151 However, in a review paper concerning the thinking process of expert chess players, Pertti Saariluoma argues that this computational model of the human mind may be true of a novice, but is hardly the case for an expert.152 On the one hand, studies have found no difference between novices and masters in terms of their capacity of memory. On the other hand, in

151 Pertti Saariluoma, “Chess and Content-Oriented Psychology of Thinking,” Psicológica, 22:1, 2001, pp. 143-64. 152 Ibid.

79 comparison with novices, master players tend to possess a much larger number and size of learned patterns as a result of decades of training. These patterns, which pertain to chess positions and movements, are stored in their long-term memory in the form of chunks on the backdrop of a chess board. Saariluoma calls these memorized chunks functional constrains. He argues that functional constrains explain “why subjects do not generate more than ten to a hundred moves for positions in which computers would generate millions of alternatives, but it also explains why some moves are selected and why some other moves are neglected.”153 He believes that “The number of moves fulfilling the functional constraints is always very small compared to all possible moves. The whole economy of chess players’ apperception is based on these very simple principles. They define what is essential and what is not in a network of moves.”154 What Saariluoma essentially means is that, when the movements of chess pieces are calculated individually (in the same way that a computer or novice would perform these calculations), their possible positions and outcomes are overwhelmingly large, if not infinite. It would be impossible for the human mind to cope with these calculations. However, if these movements are stored as chunks as a result of many years of experience, the actual number of valid movements that a particular chess piece can make would be significantly reduced. Furthermore, when considering memorized networks, the movements enacted by a particular chessman can also be prioritized: some would be expected to produce better results than others. “Interestingly,” Saariluoma points out, “the functional constraints presented here are not widely known among chess players. […] They are too primitive to have a prominent place in chess theory. Nor can they be found in protocols. Yet chess players use them all the time when calculating variations.”155 In other words, this tactic only ‘exists’ in chess players’ practices but not in their minds or theoretical understanding of the game.

In order to further clarify the message conveyed in this study, I would like again to employ the aforementioned example of the chair. In the previous discussion, I suggested that the stability of a chair can be undermined by its daily usage. Foreseeing this possibility can help us to extend the chair’s lifespan by paying attention to the way we use it. But we all know that everyday use is not the only factor that would have an impact on the chair’s solidity. Assuming that this chair is made of wood, it may be

153 Ibid., p. 159. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid.

80 consumed by termites or even be slashed by an angry person. Any of these three occurrences are equally as possible in terms of rendering the chair a useless piece of wood. Or are they? An indecisive person would certainly agree with this assessment and pay close attention to all three factors. She or he may even conceive of further possibilities and become even more preventive and cautious. A person who is contextual-oriented certainly does not deny any of these three possible detrimental occurrences. However, instead of rushing to take action, she would seek further knowledge. For instance, she may want to know whether the place occupied by the chair has ever been infested with termites, and the likelihood that it would be attacked by these creatures in the future. Or she might also want to know whether vandalism has happened in this place before and the likelihood of it occurring in the future. If answers to all of these questions are in the negative, using the chair with greater care would be the optimal response to extending its lifespan. The most appropriate question here is probably not: “Are these the three possible directions of change?” but rather, “Are these the three possibilities that are pertinent to the current situation?” Without considering the scope of situation, the parameters of an evaluation of the change in a particular thing or event could be limitless, and hence impracticable. Therefore, unlike a dogmatist who tends to function indiscriminately in all situations, an indecisive person may be paralysed by the overwhelming choice of options. In this sense, dogmatists need to increase their sensitivity to situational variations through experiencing more alternatives. By contrast, those who are indecisive should reduce their excessive sensitivity by considering the questions at hand in terms of the concrete situations from which they emerge. Only, by doing this, can both types of people achieve a response that is optimal.

2.3.3 Theoretical versus Practical Contextualism Some may argue that indecisive people are one step ahead of dogmatists in responding to change, because they seem to be comparatively more aware of contextual elements. It may be true that indecisive people have a contextual awareness that the dogmatists lack. However mere realization of contextual variations is not enough—arriving at an effective response also requires one to know what the essential contexts are in relation to the current situation. This cannot be achieved without undertaking hard work in the long-term. To some extent, this echoes the Confucian and Daoist term 修身 (xiu shen, self-cultivation). For instance, a newcomer cannot have detailed information about the place until she has settled into it. The information about context she has gathered over

81 time can help her to make more accurate and effective decisions as to how to respond to a particular change in her environment. Lai argues that “In Chinese philosophy, the environmental context is the locus within which an individual lives, acts, and interacts.”156 Therefore, to a certain extent, an individual’s responses to environmental changes are inevitably ‘lodged’ in her concrete situations.157 In this sense, the indecisive person has a certain kind of awareness of contextual factors, but only at the stage of what I would call theoretical contextualism. This can be contrasted with the proposed practical contextualism. To distinguish between the two types of contextualism, I would like to refer back to the previous discussion of the hexagrams. One may still recall that, on the one hand, a hexagram can potentially have eleven counter-hexagrams depending on the variations of its ‘old’ lines; on the other hand, any hexagram that is generated can have either itself only or itself and its counterpart (whenever an old line has been generated). Theoretical contextualists are like those novices to the Yi Jing: they may be aware of the eleven possibilities, but cannot provide any details about them without referring back to the text of the Yi Jing. By contrast, practical contextualists have knowledge not only of the possible counter-hexagrams. More importantly, they know the specific details of each hexagram by heart. This example yields a primary difference between theoretical and practical contextualists: the former may be erudite in theory but lacking in substantial content to put theory into practice. In this sense, these two differ in practice, but not in theory, despite the fact that the former is always and most relevant for the latter. (E.g., Despite the practical focus, in the context of the current thesis, we are inevitably theorizing the differences between practical and theoretical contextualism.)

To further expound the difference between practical and theoretical forms of contextualism and dogmatism through a concrete example, I would like to examine an interesting story called Tian Ji Sai Ma (田忌賽馬, Tian Ji’s Horse Racing), which originated in the Shi Ji (史記, Records of the Grand Historian).158

The Lord of Qi and General Tian Ji held a horse race every year. They selected three horses each that ran in pairs for three races. The owner of two out of three

156 Karyn Lai, “Understanding Change,” 2007, p. 81. 157 Karyn Lai, “Philosophy and Philosophical Reasoning in the Zhuangzi: Dealing with Plurality,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 33:3, 2006, pp. 365-74. 158 This story is from 孫子吳起列傳 (Biographies of Sun Zi and Wu Qi) in 史記 (Shi Ji). Shi Ji was composed by Sima Qian in Western Han (109 BC-91 BC).

of the winners got a trophy. The Lord of Qi would consistently win as each of his horses ran a little faster each than the General’s. One year, shortly before the race, General Tian Ji was at a loss as to how he might win the trophy from his Lord. Well-known strategist Sun Bin called to see him at this time, and on the General telling him about the race, his advice was to alter the racing sequence of his horses. The General accordingly pitted his third horse against the Lord’s first—a race he was bound to lose. He then raced his first horse against the Lord’s second, and won, and paired his second horse with Lord’s third, winning again. He thus won two of the three races and collected the trophy for the first time.159

The well-known strategist Sun Bin certainly represented a figure with contextual wisdom. He had put his wise strategy in practice to save his advisee, General Tian Ji, from losing the same game again. It is interesting to analyse, from the perspective of contextual intelligence, how Sun Bin did it. General Tian Ji and the Lord of Qi each had three horses ranked in terms of first, second, and third class. In each of these three classes, the Lord of Qi’s horse always ran a little faster than the General’s. In previous races, the contests were always categorised in terms of these three classes: first class to first class, second class to second class, and third to third. In fact, this arrangement of the horse races already reflected a dogmatic thinking pattern: in order to win the entire game, one only has to outrun the other two times out of three.

A dogmatic mind might see the ranking as having absolute quality; therefore pairing the horses according to their classes is a native way of organizing the races. If a dogmatist is consulted in this case, she might reply with despair: there is no way that Tian Ji can win the game because, in each class, the horse of the Lord of Qi is always quicker than that of the General. Therefore, the horses of Tian Ji do not stand a chance of winning even one race. And this belief is only reinforced by previous results.

Indecisive persons (theoretical contextualists) may not see the ranking as absolute as dogmatists believe. They may therefore propose that, depending on the situation, the ranking of horses may vary. For instance, they may suggest that the health condition of the horses would affect their performances on the day of the races, or the variable conditions of the racing tracks may bring about similar effects. Indecisive persons may

159 Wang Keping, Chinese Philosophy on Life, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2005, pp. 64-5.

83 provide endless theories about possible outcomes, all of which could be condensed into two words: It depends. This may render theoretical contextualists some sort of opportunists who can conjure up infinite possibilities but who are unable to work out a strategic solution to a particular case.

On the contrary, practical contextualists, when asked about a certain issue, will look into the details of the issue as well as the situation from which the issue has emerged. There are certainly endless possibilities that could stem from a particular case. However, are they given equal weight with respect to the solution? The answer is “Probably not!” With attentiveness and open-mindedness, Sun Bin carefully examined the previous results, the racing arrangement, and the criteria for winning. He eventually discovered something that had been overlooked the whole time. If the criteria for winning are fixed and the previous results were relatively steady, a blind spot can be found in the racing arrangement. This is not in any way mentioned and defined in the criteria and is thus amendable. It is true that the Lord of Qi’s horses run a little faster than the General’s in each class; however, it is certainly not the case when they are compared across the classes. When the Lord of Qi’s first class horse competes with the General’s third class horse, the latter’s failure is sealed. But what would happen if the Lord of Qi’s third and second class horses competed with the General’s second and first class horses, respectively? The General’s horse would probably have a better chance of winning both races, which would be enough to win the whole game. It is true that Sun Bin’s strategy may fail due to other, ever-present uncertainties hypothesized by the theoretical contextualists; however, as I have argued, Sun Bin has honed in on the crucial point of the case and, accordingly, worked out the optimal solution to it. In this case, Sun Bin successfully identified the fixed, stable, and amendable aspects of the current situation and facilitated the desirable change based on his judgment. To use the hexagram as a metaphor, Sun Bin knew the ‘young’ and ‘old’ lines of the hexagram as well as its counter-hexagram very well. This is what helped him to achieve the best outcome by applying the optimal solution.

2.3.4 Practical Contextualism in the Yi Jing I have examined the notion of a contextually intelligent response through contrasting it with its counter-examples: dogmatic and indecisive responses. I have also differentiated indecisiveness (theoretical contextualism) from practical contextualism. It is time to investigate how practical contextualism is implied in the text of the Yi Jing.

As I have already mentioned in the first chapter, the main purpose of the Yi Jing is to illustrate the concept of change (易). However, when reading the text, one will find a particular character appearing in almost all of the hexagram texts, namely, 貞 (zhen, perseverance).160 In the text, zhen is sometimes paired with the character 凶 (xiong, misfortune), but more often it is coupled with the character 吉 (ji, good fortune). For instance, the statement in the fifth line of the hexagram Tun (屯, Difficulty at the

Beginning)  says:

九五。屯其膏，小貞吉，大貞凶。161

Tun:

Nine in the fifth place means:

Difficulties in blessing.

A little perseverance brings good fortune.

Great perseverance brings misfortune.162

This statement basically means that, if you obtain the hexagram Tun through divination with an ‘old’ yin line in its fifth position, you will have to watch out for the degree of perseverance committed to the current situation.163 Things can be a little difficult at the beginning (as the name of this hexagram suggests), but one should be wary of pushing too hard because this may bring about the opposite result. Nevertheless, perseverance is important; so as is holding a good degree in persevering.

Taking chess-playing as an example, a beginner might find herself overwhelmed by the infinite number of possible moves. She might wish that she could master the game as soon as possible. However, this would not happen overnight. In the early stages, pushing oneself too hard will only result in excessive stress instead of the desired progress. The right strategy may be to make it a long-term commitment and practise the

160 In James Legge’s translation, 貞 was unanimously translated as ‘correct and firm’ or ‘correctness and firmness’ (e.g., p. 63.) , which bears a strong association with the characters of the lines, but which may be less revealing in terms of the hexagrams as symbolized situations. 161 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 88. 162 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 19. 163 Please refer to the discussion in the first chapter on how to read the hexagram according to the character (either yin or yang) of the lines.

85 skill step by step. Only time and hard work can yield a desirable result. Perseverance and practice serve as the prerequisites for achieving the optimal response. Not only can it improve one’s skills, but it will also further one’s understanding of the situation as a whole. And knowing one’s situation is the more important factor in eliciting the optimal response to change. Cheng and Lai are both deeply aware of this important aspect of the Yi Jing.164 Cheng argues that the way of understanding and thinking that the Yi Jing promotes “consists in letting reality speak to us, and in our learning from concrete reality, being both context-transcendent and context-inclusive. It is focal, contextual, concrete, correlative, and dynamic.” 165

In this sense, the character 貞 (zhen, perseverance) denotes the practical aspect of the Yi Jing in terms of dealing with change. On the one hand, perseverance helps augment one’s understanding of the situation through practice. On the other hand, it seems to assume the existence of a relatively stable situation in which one’s response can become more effective through a better understanding of that situation. However, this suggestion of a stable situation seems to go against the Yi Jing’s central interest of change. An indecisive person may also argue specifically against this assumption. However, further analysis will reveal the Yi Jing’s contextualistic approach to dealing with change.

In the text of the Yi Jing, other than ji (good fortune) and xiong (misfortune), another character that is often paired with zhen (貞) is 厲 (li, danger). When it appears with zhen, the actors are warned to be cautious about the potential danger involved in exercising perseverance in a mindless or unthinking manner. Consistent with what has just been discussed, persevering without paying attention to unexpected change in a situation can bring misfortune. For example, in the hexagram Lü (履, Treading [Conduct]) , the statement in the fifth line runs as thus:

九五。夬履，貞厲。166

Lü:

164 Chung-ying Cheng, “The Yijing (《易經》) as Creative Inception of Chinese Philosophy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 35:2, 2008, pp. 201-18. Chung-ying Cheng, “The Origins of Chinese Philosophy,” 1997, p. 453. Karyn Lai, “Understanding Change,” 2007, p. 85. 165 Chung-ying Cheng, “The Yijing (《易經》) as Creative Inception of Chinese Philosophy,” 2008, p. 216. 166 傅佩榮,《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 146.

Nine in the fifth place means:

Resolute conduct.

Perseverance with awareness of danger.167

This passage promotes resolution in conduct. However, at the same time, it highlights the fact that keeping an eye on the potential danger associated with, or even brought about by, such resoluteness is also crucial to achieving success. Li (厲, danger) often signifies a transitional state which, if monitored carefully, can bring about good fortune; otherwise, misfortune will probably set in. Li differs from ji and xiong in that the latter denote judgments of a particular situation that have already been determined (good fortune or misfortune). In the condition where ji and xiong are provisional, one has to be mindful of the potential danger of exercising reckless perseverance when pursuing success, because it may bring the undesirable xiong instead of the desirable ji. Therefore, li (厲), when paired with zhen (貞), complements the latter with its vigilant attitude. In this sense, if zhen denotes the practical nature of one’s response to change, li seems to be particularly associated with the circumstantial/contextual aspect of this response, for instance, the indecisive viewpoint.

As I have suggested, optimal responses are contextually intelligent. However, such intelligence does not stop at the level of indecisiveness; it is able to ‘zoom’ in on the specific situation wherein one is called on to respond to a particular change. In order to form a comprehensive understanding of the situation at hand, consistent hard work in the long-term is essential. An indecisive person may doubt the necessity of arduous practice when the theoretical possibilities of change are limitless. However, the study of chess players has revealed that consistent practice over a period of ten years can help to reduce the hypothetically infinite changes that can take place on a chess board to more manageable networks of movements. The involvement of practice in improving efficient responses to change has long been promoted in the Yi Jing with the inclusion of the character zhen (perseverance). Zhen is paired more often with ji (good fortune) than with xiong (mistfortune). The frequency of the appearance of such a character in the Yi Jing implies the prominent position of practice in achieving success. However, the theoretical aspect of developing a response has not been overlooked by the Yi Jing,

167 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed, 2003, p. 47.

87 and the character li (danger) reflects such vigilance to hypothetical variations in, or of, a context. The pair, 貞厲 (zhen li), depicts the comprehensive understanding of change in the Yi Jing as well as its recommended pragmatic responses to possible variations.

2.4 The Implication of the Yi Jing on Self-cultivation So far, the focus of our discussion of practical contextualism in the Yi Jing has mainly been on working out optimal solution(s) so that favourable outcomes can be attained. However, as has been addressed at the end of the first section, practical contextualism in the Yi Jing is not restricted to problem-solving but also comprises self-cultivation. This does not mean that problem-solving and self-cultivation are two independent domains of pragmatism, but rather interdependent ones. The previous discussions have revealed that problem-solving helps with the progress of self-cultivation, and self-cultivation in turn promotes optimal solutions when engaging in problem-solving. Nevertheless, there are situations (such as the condition represented by the hexagram Pi) where one finds the least (or no) hope of working out solutions to overturn them immediately or in the relatively short run. This is the time period where self-cultivation becomes really prominent, while problem-solving is only of secondary importance. Given the fact that the unfavourable conditions of the oracle are by no means rare in the Yi Jing, the contextual practice of self-cultivation should not be overlooked when studying practical contextualism in the Yi Jing.

2.4.1 ‘Jun Zi’ as the Key Phrase to Understanding Self-cultivation The appearances of the phrase ‘君子’ (exemplary person, jun zi) in the text offers arguably one of the best means of understanding the contextual practice of self- cultivation in the Yi Jing. The phrase jun zi appears in the statements in the overwhelming majority of the hexagrams, particularly under the section, 象傳 (Commentary on the Images, xiang zhuan).168 A xiang zhuan is normally a statement containing one or two sentences, which explicates the whole hexagram and its revelation and implication for human lives under the particular context the hexagram

168 In any given hexagram, there are two kinds of 象傳. One is located directly after the 彖傳 (Commentary on the Judgements, tuan zhuan), and is supposed to describe the image of the whole hexagram. The other is located after each of the 爻辭 (Statements of the Lines, yao ci), to offer a relevant explanation of the statements in the line.

88 denotes.169 We may recall in the previous discussions that the hexagram Pi denotes a primarily unfavourable situation. The xiang zhuan of the hexagram Pi writes:

天地不交，否。君子以儉德辟難，不可榮以祿。170

Heaven and earth do not unite:

The image of STANDSTILL.

Thus the superior man falls back upon his inner worth

In order to escape the difficulties.

He does not permit himself to be honored with revenue.171

The dis-integrity and dis-communication (不交, bu jiao) between Heaven and Earth is the image of the hexagram Pi, which results in the stagnation of myriad things in such a situation of despair. According to the ‘metaphorical character’ of contextualism in the Yi Jing (which was specified in 2.2.4), Pi can denote an undesirable situation in the phenomenal world or symbolize a difficult situation for the diviner, and xiang zhua is dedicated to proposing the connection between the two. The jun zi (superior man or exemplary person) is expected to be inspired by the image Pi, and to discern the message of caution it conveys. Under the condition of stagnation, a jun zi may be wise to restrain herself and cultivate the virtues conducive to avoiding unnecessary troubles (儉德辟難, jian de bi nan). Also, she is expected to refrain from pursuing fame and wealth (不可榮以祿, bu ke rong yi lu).

The hexagram Pi reveals that it is unrealistic to expect to turn each and every difficult situation into a favourable one. From time to time, there will be conditions which cannot be changed through the use of one’s intelligence and efforts, no matter how smart you are and how hard you try. Under these conditions, not much can be done to overturn or change them; one must simply adapt to them. However, in the Yi Jing, this kind of adaptation is never merely passive. First, the conditions and situation change as time goes by; second, a jun zi may not be able to change the world but can nevertheless cultivate herself. A jun zi never just adapts passively to a condition of despair, but

169 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, pp. 13-4. 170 Ibid., p. 158. 171 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 53.

89 utilizes it as a way to spur self-cultivation. In the extreme case presented in the hexagram 困  (Oppression/Exhaustion, Kun), a jun zi may risk her life to uphold her ideals (君子以致命遂志, jun zi yi zhi ming sui zhi).172

This suggests that problem-solving is not the only theme associated with practical contextualism in the Yi Jing. Self-cultivation is another equally important aspect. Despite the difference between these two aspects, both self-cultivation and problem- solving share a particular characteristic: both deal actively with the issues at hand, although the former targets the development of the self and the latter focuses on the transformation or reconstruction of the phenomenal world. In turn, the active role of self-cultivation and problem-solving again highlights the practicality (instead of theoretical-ity) of contextualism in the Yi Jing.

2.4.2 The Significance of Self-cultivation The Yi Jing not only specifies the concrete practices of self-cultivation in the statements of the hexagrams, it also provides the reasons for why self-cultivation is important for the jun zi, and how a jun zi can benefit from practising self-cultivation. In the section, 大傳 (The Great Treatise, Da Zhuan; also known as the 繫辭傳, Xi Ci Zhuan), the Yi Jing speaks through the mouth of Confucius:

子曰：「君子居其室，出其言，善則千里之外應之，況其邇者乎，居其室，

出其言不善，則千里之外違之，況其邇者乎，言出乎身，加乎民，行發乎

邇，見乎遠。言行君子之樞機，樞機之發，榮辱之主也。言行，君子之所

以動天地也，可不慎乎。」173

The Master said: The superior man abides in his room. If his words are well spoken, he meets with assent at a distance of more than a thousand miles. How much more then from near by! If the superior man abides in his room and his words are not well spoken, he meets with contradiction at a distance of more than a thousand miles. How much more then from near by! Words go forth from one’s own person and exert their influence on men. Deeds are born close at hand and become visible far away. Words and deeds are the hinge and bowspring of the superior man. As hinge and bowspring move, they bring honor or disgrace.

172 澤無水，困。君子以致命遂志。(傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, p. 439.) 173 Ibid., pp. 604-5.

Through words and deeds the superior man moves heaven and earth. Must one not, then, be cautious?174

The first impression of this passage is that a jun zi should be mindful of, and therefore cautious about, the influence and consequences that his/her words might bring about. The words may come from the mouth of the jun zi who is sitting in her own room and speaking to those around her. This does not mean that she can be less mindful and careful about what she says due to the privacy of her environment. Instead, while speaking to those nearby, a jun zi will never lose vision of the fact that her words (especially in relation to important issues) may, one day, spread to faraway places. Therefore, a jun zi always speaks with extreme caution, and does not discriminate between different audiences.

The words of the jun zi are meant to be expressions of a personal nature, but can influence many others (言出乎身，加乎民; yan chu hu shen, jia hu min). These words are embodied in the jun zi’s everyday practices, which arise from her interactions with others, but can influent those in distant places (行發乎邇，見乎遠; xing fa hu er, xian hu yuan). Since the words (言, yan) are a form of self-expression for the jun zi, which go hand in hand with her daily practices, it is unimaginable that, without ongoing self- cultivation, a jun zi can speak and practice appropriately (善, shan), which can be then imitated or echoed (應, ying) by people from different places.

Moreover, the words and practices (言行, yan xing) constitute the ‘core component’ (樞機, shu ji) of the character of the jun zi, the actions that emanate from the shu ji are the determining (主, zhu) factors as to whether these actions can bring the jun zi glory or disgrace. To take one step further, yan xing are what the jun zi utilizes to “move” Heaven and Earth (天地, tian di). This echos Cheng’s argument that “a human person…could develop himself to match heaven and earth; and in understanding reality in terms of creative change one would thus develop capacities, and hence virtues, to achieve harmony on a higher plane.”175

In the current passage, we are able to progressively see the importance of the words and practices of a jun zi. The yan xing are closely related to the self-cultivation of a jun zi

174 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 305. 175 Chung-ying Cheng, “Zhouyi and Philosophy of Wei (Positions),” 1996, p. 155.

91 and reflect her character. This passage therefore unveils the importance of self- cultivation in the daily life of a jun zi from the alternative angle of yan xing.

2.4.3 The Contextual Cultivation of Yan Xing (言行) If yan xing constitute the important aspects of self-cultivation, how should they be cultivated? Also in The Great Treatise, the Yi Jing further instructs (again through the mouth of Confucius):

子曰：「君子安其身而後動，易其心而後語，定其交而後求，君子脩此三

者，故全也，危以動，則民不與也，懼以語，則民不應也，無交而求，則

民不與也，莫之與，則傷之者至矣。」176

The Master said: The superior man sets his person at rest before he moves; he composes his mind before he speaks; he makes his relations firm before he asks for something. By attending to these three matters, the superior man gains complete security. But if a man is brusque in his movements, others will not co- operate. If he is agitated in his words, they awaken no echo in others. If he asks for something without having first established relations, it will not be given to him. If no one is with him, those who would harm him draw near.177

This passage specifies three tasks and aspects that a jun zi should be cultivating (修, xiu): ‘safeguarding the body’ (安身, an sheng), ‘freeing the heart-mind from fears’ (易心, yi xin), and ‘establishing relationships with others’ (定交, ding jiao). In short, a jun zi should make efforts to cultivate the body, the heart-mind, and relationships with others to make them safe, free from fear, and steady, respectively. People will not follow (與, yu) those who ‘move with her body in a dangerous situation’ (危以動, wei yi dong), or respond to (or accept the words of) (應, ying) those who ‘speak with deep fears’ (懼以語, ju yi yu), or offer help (與, yu) to those who ‘ask for favour with no established relationships’ (無交而求, wu jiao er qiu). When those who endorse and support you are absent, those who harm you may come close.

176 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 652. 177 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes 3rd Ed., 2003, p. 343. (The same passage also appears at the end of the hexagram Yi (益, Increase) in Wilhelm’s book.)

When read in isolation, the last of the three cultivating objects, the relationship, may be, relatively-speaking, the most obvious in terms of contextuality. This is normally because relationships cannot be established without an available human context: no one can ask nobody for favours. In this sense, the establishment of relationships and seeking help are both contextually related. However, it is not very clear, when divorced from the (textual) context, that cultivating the body and the heart-mind needs to be performed contextually. Furthermore, when moving our bodies and speaking words, we are not necessarily required to pay attention to the contextual environment. For example, there are no constrains or others around us when we move and speak. When talking to ourselves, our words do not even have to be con-textually coherent and consistent if we are not aiming for some kind of teleological meaning.

However, when reading about the cultivation of yan xing in context, we know that the contextual-free aspects of bodily movement and oral expression are not the primary concerns in the Yi Jing’s discourse on self-cultivation. Instead, the words and actions of the jun zi are measured, almost without exception, by the ways she relates to, interacts with, and influences the world and many others. As shown in the current passage, a jun zi cultivates herself with others in mind, and does not do this just for her own sake. In the world of humans (that the Yi Jing focuses on), the ‘self’ does not make any particular sense on its own. Also, when not interacting with others and the world, cultivation becomes less meaningful for its own sake. Self-cultivation enables the jun zi to settle down peacefully and safely, which allows her to act as a model for others to follow. Also, self-cultivation enables the jun zi not to speak out of fear, so that people can trust in, and pass on, her words and ideas. In a word, through self-cultivation, the jun zi equips herself with a rich assortment of abilities, which can be put to good use at and in the optimal time and situation (君子藏器於身，待時而動;178 jun zi cang qi yu shen, dai shi er dong).

2.4.4 The Rich Meaning of Contextualism in the Yi Jing While it may seem obvious in the current passage, the ‘context’ concerning self- cultivation should not be restricted to the domain of the ‘human context’. This becomes clear when comparing the current passage with the one quoted immediately before it. The character 民 (people, min) denotes the idea of a human context and appears directly

178 傅佩榮, 《樂天知命》, 2011, p. 646.

93 and indirectly in both passages. This constantly reminds the jun zi of what and whom the self-cultivation is for. However, in the previous passage, other than 民, there is also the phrase 天地 (Heaven and Earth, tian di) that denotes the context which is beyond the human domain. Tian di is a very complicated concept in Chinese thinking insofar as it can mean the natural and phenomenal heaven and earth, or something that is, relatively speaking, metaphysical and transcendental. Depending on the text where it appears, it can be either or both. According to the context of the excerpt, tian di seems to lean more towards the phenomenal domain than the metaphysical one. On the one hand, as a phenomenal context, tian di means in particular the world that accommodates and nurtures human beings. It is therefore not a merely naturalistic concept. On the other hand, tian di is beyond the human context, and therefore the transcendental representation of it. In this sense, it may be fair to assert that tian di is a phenomenal concept with metaphysical implications, where the human context is situated.

The phrase and characters tian di (and min) suggest that contextualism is a multifaceted and multilayered idea in the Yi Jing. The different aspects and layers of contextualism, however, are interconnected and interrelated with each other like the idea of min and tian di in the passages quoted in the previous discussions. This, in turn, echoes the findings at the end of the first section of the current chapter, which suggested that the contextual ideas in the Yi Jing are both independent and interdependent. These ideas are connected with each other through loose metaphorical link(s), despite having their own designatums and being understood in distinct ways by people with different backgrounds. In the current case, tian di and min are interconnected ideas. Min as the representative of human context is included in tian di phenomenally. Moreover, as a transcendent body of min, tian di is compared with the former in evaluating the jun zi’s influences through self-cultivation.

Conclusion The Yi Jing is a text that exhibits the deep awareness of change, which is reflected in its adoption of the character 易 (yi). The Yi Jing’s interest in change also suggests its profound understanding of the dynamic nature of the cosmos. The contributors to the Yi Jing were aware not only of change in general, but also of the subtle difference between change and transformation. This awareness was not only addressed in the text but also embodied in its practice. The Yi Jing’s practice of consulting the oracle indicates that

94 the concepts of change and transformation are carefully differentiated from, but at the same time subtly interrelated with, each other. This is reflected in the Yi Jing’s adoption of the concepts of ‘young’ and ‘old’ in describing the binary (yin and yang) lines of the hexagrams. The examination of the Yi Jing’s awareness of change has also unveiled a specific feature of Chinese philosophy: the emphasis on process instead of substance.

The study of the Yi Jing’s hexagrams and trigrams has suggested that the ancient Chinese tended to perceive things as interdependent rather than isolated from each other. This, in turn, highlights the Yi Jing’s contextual implication. The Yi Jing’s perception of context is twofold: 1) a situation is susceptible to the variations of the parts that constitute it; 2) situations themselves are, at least represented mentally, contextual to each other. The second level highlights the distinguishable feature of contextual intelligence in the Yi Jing.

An optimal response to change comes from a comprehensive understanding of change and the situations in which it takes place. A contextually intelligent mind plays a crucial role in facilitating optimal responses. Two kinds of responses (dogmatic and indecisive) do not encompass the appraisal of context and therefore cannot be deemed as optimal. Dogmatists are without awareness of contextual variations, and believe that certain ways of dealing with things can be unanimously applied to all situations. Indecisive people, however, can be oversensitive to contextual influences. They may have abstract ideas about context but lack concrete knowledge of the situation at hand, and are thus unable to arrive decisively at solutions. This suggests that, in order to formulate an optimal response, non-practical contextualism is undesirable; we need practical contextualism, which encourages perseverant practices in concrete situations. The contextually intelligent mind, therefore, is a mind capable of both metaphysical appraisal and epistemological evaluation.

In the Yi Jing, the practical importance of understanding the current situation has been emphasized through the use of the character 貞 (zhen, perseverance). It is through perseverance that we are able to gain concrete information about the situation at hand, which, in turn, helps to facilitate the desired response. In the text, the character 貞 (perseverance) is often paired with the character 厲 (li, danger). The character li denotes the danger of being overfamiliar with a situation (through perseverance), which may prevent us from perceiving danger signalled by its alterable nature. To promote optimal

95 responses, we are advised to work hard at familiarizing ourselves with the situation at hand. However, we must simultaneously keep an eye on the changeable nature of the situation, which can render our overfamiliarity with it a disadvantage.

The current investigation has shown that contextualism in the Yi Jing is first and foremost of an environmental/situational nature. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, this does not mean that the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism is absent from the Yi Jing. This has been indicated by the Yi Jing’s emphasis on the ‘fluidity’ of the changing phenomenal world, which also showcases the Yi Jing’s fundamental dynamic viewpoint of contextualism. Of course, from the Yi Jing’s standpoint, things coexist with each other and cannot (and should not) be treated as completely independent from their environmental, circumstantial, and situational context. In other words, contextualism in the Yi Jing also highlights the contextual relationality both between things and between things and their contextual environment(s). In addition, the different contextual circumstances indicated by the sixty-four hexagrams imply the limitary boundary between the circumstantial contexts.

Although the environmental/circumstantial dimension dominates the notion of contextualism in the Yi Jing, the discussions in section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 have revealed the textual/conceptual significance of this notion. The textual/conceptual feature is mainly decided by, and associated with, the divinatory nature of the Yi Jing. The question here is: How can we simultaneously make a cluster of different ideas and concepts accessible to different diviners and semantically coherent with each other? The current investigation has suggested that different ideas and concepts in the Yi Jing seem to be “united” under metaphorical links. This signifies the interspatial quality associated with the textual/conceptual feature of contextualism in the Yi Jing.

As shown by the extensive discussions in section 2.3, although the dominant feature of practicality in the Yi Jing is problem-solving, one should not overlook the practical dimension of self-cultivation implied in the hexagrams standing for the gloomy situations. Not all problems can be solved immediately, especially in some difficult situations, where the Yi Jing offers a more realistic “solution”—to make the practice of self-cultivation the first priority. Cultivating oneself when faced with a difficult situation not only helps one to gain more insight into oneself and the contextual environment; in the process of self-cultivation, one can also wait for the right time to

96 carry out new actions in the future. In this sense, self-cultivation may be seen as one form of epistemological development. However, the examination of the latter in the Yi Jing is not as well-defined as that in other texts, such as the Zhuang Zi.

Chapter Three

The Han Fei Zi: Practical Contextualism in Political Discourse

The name of the text Han Fei Zi literally means Master Han Fei. Han Fei (died 233BCE) is recognized as a thinker who belongs to the tradition of fa jia (法家), one of the six doctrinal schools or groups (家, jia, means a school, group, and/or tradition here) classified by the Chinese historian, Sima Tan (died 110BCE) during the Western Han (202BCE-8CE) period.179 Conventionally, fa jia has been translated as the Western term “legalism”, which is deemed to be problematic.180 The term “legalism”, according to Goldin, may have arisen from the impression or assumption that fa corresponds to the Western term “law”.181 No doubt the Chinese character 法 (fa) has the meaning of law, but its meanings extend far beyond the scope of law. Goldin argues that fa is affiliated more closely with the terms “government program” or “institution” than with “law.”182 Goldin’s argument indicates that the philosophy of the Han Fei Zi and other texts of fa jia should be categorized under Political Philosophy rather than the Philosophy that is merely associated with penal law.183 In this sense, the idea of fa in the Han Fei Zi and other fa jia texts is more of a political rather than legal term, or more precisely, a political term with the incorporated legal dimension. Fa can mean standards, principles, and/or penal laws, which, as Han Fei had hoped, served to optimize the statecraft of the rulers of his time, that is, one of the extremely chaotic eras in Chinese history.

179 For more details, please refer to A. C. Graham, “Legalism: An Amoral Science of Statecraft,” in Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. Open Court Publishing Company, 1989, pp. 267-8. Benjamin Schwartz, “Legalism: The Behavioural Science,” in The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 321. Karyn Lai, An introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, pp. 3-4. 180 Benjamin Schwartz, “Legalism: The Behavioural Science,” 1985, p. 321. Herrlee G. Creel, “The fa-chia: ‘Legalists’ or ‘Administrators’?,” in What Is Taoism? and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 92–120. Paul R. Goldin, “Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese ‘Legalism’,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38, 2011, pp. 88–104. 181 Paul R. Goldin, “Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese ‘Legalism’,” 2011, p. 91. 182 Ibid. 183 Yuri Pines argues for a multifaceted nature of the Han Fei Zi, which reflects “different stages of the thinker’s intellectual development, at different circumstances, and for a different audience.” Yuri Pines, “Submerged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 68.

It is worth noticing that the text Han Fei Zi has an extremely rich body of studies behind it. There are many interpretations of its fundamental meaning, which indicates, to a certain extent, the text’s internal inconsistencies and lack of clarity on which terms have priority, or how they are integrated.184 Nevertheless, as a political text, the Han Fei Zi reflects the disappointment of a political thinker regarding the severe political disorder of the turbulent era, and the endeavour to reverse the situation by providing timely political solutions.

Han Fei attributes the disorder to the then ruling strategies, which followed outdated ancient modes and failed to address the historical, situational, and contextual challenges of his time. In this sense, the context in the Han Fei Zi is first and foremost an environmental/circumstantial/situational one. Han Fei’s critiques of the untimeliness of the then ruling methods also suggest his awareness of the limitation of a particular ruling strategy when facing the dynamic historical context. This limitation, of course, does not only concern the strategy itself, but also reflects Han Fei’s awareness of the specific situation of his time, which is different from that of previous ages. Also, as a political text, the primary focus of the Han Fei Zi is to promote, implement, and exercise a set of appropriate public policies, which, as Han Fei hoped, could meet challenges in a timely manner. In light of these, one expects to see in the current chapter, from the perspective of practical contextualism, how the development and implimentation of public policies is affected by an environmental/circumstantial/situational, dynamic, and limitary comprehension of the political context in the Han Fei Zi.

As will be seen in the following discussions, Han Fei seldom gives specific definitions for some of his key political ideas, such as fa. Instead, he is expert at making his own

184 For instance, in the compendium Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei (ed. Paul R. Goldin, 2013), Goldin suggests that the text reflects Han Fei’s different responses to different audiences instead of a primary and coherent argument. See also the discussion in Pines “Submerged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” from the same compendium, especially at p. 67. Many scholars read the text in different ways whether as a treatise on statecraft or simply one to maintain the ruler’s power. In the “Han Fei's Enlightened Ruler”, Bárcenas (2013) argues that Han Fei is not simply seeking to maintain the power of the ruler, unchecked. Rather, the text is concerned with the ruler’s inability to control his officials but also sought to rein in the literati – the Ru. Contrary to what the literati promoted (behaviour and performance aligned with their moral commitments), they sought to gratify their private interests at the cost of public welfare (pp. 241-5). Bárcenas’ view stands in contrast to Goldin’s proposal that we should understand the promotion of gong in the Han Fei Zi as an attempt to secure what is in the ruler’s interests (Goldin, 2013: 2-8). It seems that much turns on the interpretation of the primary motivation in the text or, indeed, whether there is one (Goldin, 2013).

100 points by positioning his ideas in a wider political context. For instance, it is through Han Fei’s critiques of all sorts of outmoded ruling strategies that his own positions and ideas become clear. The text Han Fei Zi provides arguably the most overt (but not necessarily the most comprehensive) contextual theme amongst all the texts examined in the current dissertation. Section one will be dedicated to highlighting this theme in Han Fei’s philosophy by looking into his critiques of the untimely ruling strategy that is grounded in Confucian ideas of ren (仁, Humanness or Benevolence) and yi (義, Righteousness or Appropriateness). This will be undertaken from a contextual perspective instead of the conventionally adopted moral one.

Despite his contextual perspectives in promoting political reforms on the public and historical levels, Han Fei tends to overlook the contextual considerations on an individual or private level. Also, insufficient attention is given by Han Fei to issues such as how to best implement and exercise a strategy or policy in concrete situations. This will be examined in sections two and three. Section two will raise the issue of the inadequate consideration of context in Han Fei’s idea of fa by examining his perception of human nature. Fa is adopted by Han Fei to curb self-centred human nature. However, in comparison with Mencius’ view, Han Fei’s take on human nature seems less contextually aware. This thereby leads to the similar shortcoming in his idea of fa, which gives very limited consideration to individual situations. Section three will further the investigation by looking into the idea of xing ming (刑名/形名), one of the concrete forms of implementing and executing fa. The analyses reveal the defect in Han Fei’s philosophy in dealing with political issues on an individual level and in concrete situations.

3.1 Han Fei Rejects Confucian Ren and Yi Let us first take a close look at the arguments in the Han Fei Zi against Confucian ren and yi. The most prominent ones can be found in chapter 49, The Five Vermin (Wu Du, 五蠹), in the text. In that chapter, Han Fei draws an analogy between the five adverse insects and the five different kinds of misconceptions that can do potential harm to a ruler’s reign over a state.

101

Han Fei argues that amongst these misbeliefs is the fallacy of governing a state through promoting ren and yi.185 Ren is one of the two core doctrines of Confucian teaching (another one is 禮 (Li, Rites or Behavioural propriety)).186 However, Han Fei believes that “the Confucians with their learning bring confusion to the law”187 (儒以文亂法188, ru yi wen luan fa), and thus attacks Confucian teaching by targeting the concept of ren and yi. Harris argues that Han Fei’s political thought questions “the Confucian attempt to expand virtue ethics into the political realm.”189 In The Five Vermin, Han Fei criticizes Confucian ren and yi from various angles. This section, however, will focus on those contextually-relevant arguments.

Amongst Han Fei’s multifarious disapprovals of ren and yi is his criticism of their outmodedness, which made them unsuitable for the then situations. To argue his point, Han Fei compares the distinctive outcomes of two rulers from two different historical periods who employed the principle of ren and yi as their ruling strategies:

In ancient times King Wen […] practiced benevolence and righteousness, […] and eventually became ruler of the world. King [Yan] of [Xu] […] practiced benevolence and righteousness, and thirty-six states […] [paid] him tribute, until King Wen of [Chu], fearing for his own safety, […] attacked [Xu], and wiped it out. […] [B]enevolence and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today. So I say that circumstances differ with the age.190

Han Fei admits that the successful reign of King Wen in ancient times benefited from his adoption of benevolence and righteousness as ruling principles. However, he suggests that the same practice failed King Yan of Xu.191 This is not a very difficult

185 Lai, Karyn L., An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, p. 185. 186 Ibid., p. 21. 187 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 105. Wenkui Liao offers the complete translation of the Han Fei Zi; however the English of his version is a bit outdated. Burton Watson offers a relatively better, however incomplete, translation of the text. In this regard, Watson’s translation is preferable, and Liao’s translation will be employed when the former’s translation is missing for passages quoted in the current chapter. 188 張覺 (Zhang Jue), 韓非子全譯 (Han Fei Zi Quan Yi, The Complete Annotation of Han Fei Zi), 貴陽: 貴州人民出版社(Gui Yang: Gui Zhou Ren Min Chu Ban She), 1993, p. 1042. 189 Eirik Lang Harris, “Han Fei on the Problem of Morality,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 108. 190 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 99. 191 King Yan of Xu (徐偃王) is believed to be a legendary figure. There are many conflicting records as to the era to which he belonged. However, the general consensus is that he was famous for his practices of ren and yi. (《韓非子全譯》, p. 331.)

102 passage to read. However, by simply reading the text, one cannot decide whether King Yan’s practice of benevolence and righteousness resulted in the fear of King Wen of Chu, and set the scene for the latter to attack and subsequently defeat Xu.192 In other words, the correlation between King Yan’s practice of benevolence and righteousness and the fear of King Wen of Chu is not clear.

It seems peculiar to suggest that one’s benevolence is responsible for another’s fear for their own safety. If Han Fei is not suggesting here that the fear of King Wen of Chu was correlated with King Yan’s practice of benevolence and righteousness, then it may be false to claim that benevolence and righteousness led to the fall of King Yan’s regime. In this sense, we need to be careful in suggesting that Han Fei is claiming that benevolence and righteousness are themselves detrimental to a regime. If he is not, then what is Han Fei really critical of here? We may need to refer to the last two sentences of the above passage for the answer.

It is not that the ruling principles themselves, such as benevolence and righteousness, are the measures of the failure or success of a regime, it is the time and the circumstances in which they are employed that matter. In short, things and circumstances have changed—the practices which had worked before no longer work now; failures are to be expected when old methods are inappropriately applied to a new situation. If we link this to the current example, we can easily see why benevolent ruling worked for ancient King Wen but not for King Yan. The main reason for this, according to Han Fei, is because

上古競于道德，中世逐于智謀，當今爭於力氣。193

Men of high antiquity strove for moral virtue; men of middle times sought out wise schemes; men of today vie to be known for strength and spirit.194

If Han Fei is right, then it may not be too hard to understand why King Wen of Chu, a ruler from a weaker state, returned King Yan’s benevolence with hostility instead of the anticipated gratitude and friendship. In fact, Han Fei was so pessimistic about ren and yi

192 This passage does look awkward. It depicts that one of the state rulers reacts to another’s benevolence and righteousness in fear and with aggression, which seems to go against common sense. Han Fei seems to employ it to enhance his later argument by showing how extremely awkward (or bad) the political situation was during his time. 193 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, pp. 1032-3. 194 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 100.

103 in his era that he claimed that “only one man—[Confucius] himself—was truly benevolent and righteous”195 (仁義者一人196, ren yi zhe yi ren). This extreme claim again suggests that Han Fei is not standing against benevolence, righteousness, and even Confucius himself; what he is really suggesting is that all these once invaluable virtues had already faded away, and it is unrealistic and inappropriate to apply them as governing policies of a state in a dim circumstance during a dark age like his time.197

Not only did Han Fei point out the fact that ren and yi were extremely rare in his time, he actually attempted to develop his own account for such a phenomenon. In doing so, Han Fei again subscribed to a contextual explanation, this time, one that is associated with the issue of resource scarcity:

In ancient times […] people were few, there was an abundance of goods, and so no one quarrelled. [People] of themselves were orderly. But nowadays […] the number of people increases, goods grow scarce, and men have to struggle and slave for a meagre living. Therefore they fall to quarrelling, […] [and] cannot be prevented from growing disorderly.198

In a circumstance where survival is not an issue, people are more likely to live with each other peacefully, and practice ren and yi. However, when people are living under threat because of insufficient resources, they may compete with each other in order to maximize their own chances of survival. They will more likely resort to dispute or even violence than to ren and yi. Again, circumstances change over time, as will people’s minds and practices.

When examining Han Fei’s critiques of the practices of ren and yi, we may need to put them into the perspective of a circumstantial, situational, and temporal context, instead of taking them at face value. Pines suggests that, in the studies of Chinese philosophy, there seems to be a consense that “Chinese political thought in general was dominated by premises of timeliness, flexibility and responding to situational challenges rather

195 Ibid., p. 102. 196 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, p. 1036. 197 As will be discussed later in the chapter, the exhibition of human nature in his time was extremely undesirable according to Han Fei’s observation. This caused him to propose the reforms of political and governing strategies. In terms of virtues, Han Fei may uphold at least some of them. This can be seen from his words on Confucius, and his own aspiration shown in chapter Consulting Tian Jiu (問田, Wen Tian) (see 3.1.1 for the detailed discussions). 198 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 97.

104 than by stasis and blind conservatism.”199 And the “Legalists” (including Han Fei) are amongst the least conservative in promoting political reforms.200 This is because, according to Pines, “[t]hinkers such as … Han Fei presented an incomparably more dynamic vision of the evolution of human society, presupposing major changes in political institutions, social structure and even in human morality.”201

The contextual reading of Han Fei’s work may help unveil many of its underlying messages otherwise concealed from us. It also provides insights into those sometimes conflicting views of Han Fei on certain ideas. For instance, in the following discussion, Han Fei holds high regard for the values of ren and zhi (智, wisdom), and is willing to guard or even die for these ideals. This is certainly in conflict with his usually negative attitudes towards ren and yi, which indicates that Han Fei seems to differentiate between ren and yi which are authentically practised from those which are not.

3.1.1 Governing through Authentic vs Inauthentic Ren and Yi The direct evidence in the text against the suggestion that Han Fei completely negates ren and yi is presented in the passage that shows his willingness to die for his own ideals. In the short chapter Consulting Tian Jiu (問田, Wen Tian)202, a person named Tang Xi Gong (堂谿公) points out to Han Fei the life-threatening dangers involved in promoting the idea of ‘demolishing the outdated ruling conventions inherited from the previous rulers or ancient kings’ (廢先王之教, fei xian wang zhi jiao). Two previous reformists Wu Qi (吳起, 440-381 BCE) and Shang Yang (商鞅, 395-338 BCE) both lost their lives due to advocating similar ideas.203 Han Fei acknowledges Tang Xi Gong’s advice, and replies with a strong aspiration:

夫治天下之柄，齊民萌之度，甚未易處也。然所以廢先王之教，而行賤臣之

所取者，竊以為立法術，設度數，所以利民萌便眾庶之道也。故不憚亂主闇

上之患禍，而必思以齊民萌之資利者，仁智之行也。憚亂主闇上之患禍，而

199 Yuri Pines, “From Historical Evolution to the End of History: Past, Present and Future from Shang Yang to the First Emperor,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 27. 200 Ibid., p. 28. 201 Ibid., pp. 30-1. 202 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 907. 田 is the surname of 田鳩 (Tian Jiu). 203 Ibid, p. 911.

105

避乎死亡之害，知明夫身而不見民萌之資利者，貪鄙之為也。臣不忍嚮貪鄙

之為，不敢傷仁智之行。204

Indeed, the exercise of the ruling authority of All-under-Heaven and the unification of the regulation of the masses is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the reason why thy servant has given up your honourable teachings and is practising his own creeds is that thy servant personally regards the formulation of the principles of law and tact and the establishment of the standards of regulations and measures as the right way to benefit the masses of people. Therefore, not to fear the threat and outrage of the violent sovereign and stupid superior but to scheme definitely for the advantages of unifying the people, is an act of benevolence and wisdom; whereas to fear the threat and outrage of the violent sovereign and stupid superior and thereby evade the calamity of death, is a clear understanding of personal advantages, and to ignore the public benefit of the masses, is an act of greed and meanness. Since thy servant cannot bear entertaining the act of greed and meanness and dare not destroy the act of benevolence and wisdom.205

Han Fei understands that it is difficult to advocate and implement his ideas and strategies of ruling and governing. The difficulties become prominent when the ruler, who receives the admonishment, is not a wise, rational, or enlightened one. In the most undesirable scenario, the one who provides the admonishment will incur the death penalty. Han Fei and Tang Xi Gong both know this well. Despite this, Han Fei asserts that it is cowardly and selfish to ignore the public good and give up one’s ideals when facing difficulties or even death brought about by unwise and ignorant rulers. By contrast, fighting for the public good and one’s own ideals (despite these threats and obstacles) is benevolent (仁, ren) and wise (智, zhi) conduct. Han Fei insists that he embraces benevolent and wise conduct instead of that which is cowardly and selfish.

Han Fei’s responses to Tang Xi Gong’s advice stress the former’s advocacy of ren, the public good, and the benefits of the majority. These contradict the suggestions that 1) Han Fei’s philosophy is anti-humanistic and non-humanitarian,206 and 2) Han Fei opposes Confucian ren (and yi) unconditionally. As suggested previously, Han Fei’s

204 Ibid, pp. 909-10. 205 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 211. 206 Some scholars held this view on Han Fei’s philosopy. E.g., Chung-ying Cheng, “Legalism versus Confucianism: A Philosophical Appraisal,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8, 1981, p. 293.

106 opposition to ren (and yi) is not unconditional. His critique of ren (and yi) is limited to certain circumstances in that ruling and governing according to the principles of ren and yi were no longer suitable for his own time, and improvements were required in order to reflect the real demands of the situation. It is not that he is trying to convince ordinary people or the rulers to give up on, or get rid of, ren and yi entirely (which is reflected in his strong preference for benevolent and wise/rational conduct); rather he is ensuring that the ruling strategies take into account the challenges brought about by a new circumstance.

In addition, Han Fei believes that, given the circumstances of his time, practising ren and yi is not necessarily compatible with the public interest, to the contrary, it can be detrimental to the latter. In other words, practising ren and yi does not automatically result in humanistic benefits—the benefits that can be enjoyed by the majority. In the chapter The Treacherous, Larcenous, Murderous Ministers (姦劫弒臣, jian jie shi cheng), Han Fei argues:

世主美仁義之名而不察其實，… 夫施與貧困者，此世之所謂仁義；哀憐百姓不忍誅罰者，此世之所謂惠愛也。夫有施與貧困，則無功者得賞；不忍誅罰，

則暴亂者不止。國有無功得賞者，則民不外務當敵斬首，內不急力田疾作，

皆欲行貨財、事富貴、為私善、立名譽以取尊官厚俸。207

[R]ulers of the present age have praised the names of benevolent and righteous men but have never examined their realities … Indeed, to give alms to the poor and destitute is what the world calls a benevolent and righteous act; to take pity on the hundred surnames and hesitate to inflict censure and punishment on culprits is what the world calls an act of favour and love. To be sure, when the ruler gives alms to the poor and destitute, men of no merit will also be rewarded; when he hesitates to inflict censure and punishment upon culprits, then ruffians never will be suppressed. If men of no merit in the country are rewarded, the people will neither face enemies and cut heads off on the battlefield nor will they devote their strength to farming and working at home, but all will use articles and money as bribe to serve the rich and noble, accomplish private virtues, and make personal names, in order that they may thereby get high posts and big bounties.

207 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 204.

107

Here, Han Fei’s observation is more descriptive than analytic. Unlike the Analects, in which the idea of ren is given enormous attention, in the text Han Fei Zi, ren (and yi) are treated more empirically than idealistically. Instead of striking up a discussion on the ideal ren, Han Fei immediately outlines what is believed to be the practice of ren and yi (or what the practice of ren and yi appears to be) in his time. In this case, provision of help or relief to the poor and destitute is considered ren and yi according to Han Fei’s observations. In fact, Han Fei is quite cynical about the superficial conduct of ren and yi, and offers his own alternative interpretation of what might be behind its motive. In the chapter, the Precautions Within the Palace (備內, Bei Nei), it is written: “The carriage maker making carriages hopes that men will grow rich and eminent; the carpenter fashioning coffins hopes that men will die prematurely. It is not that the carriage maker is kindhearted (仁, ren) and the carpenter a knave. It is only that if men do not become rich and eminent, the carriages will never sell, and if men do not die, there will be no market for coffins.”208 Han Fei argues that the conduct of ren and its motive may not always be as consistent as we like or believe it to be. That is why it is wise to always examine the realities within which the conduct is taking place before making any judgments. In the case of the carriage maker, it is not that he does not wholeheartedly wish the best for her potential clients, rather, what she wishes cannot truly reflect her personal quality (e.g. whether she is a person of ren or not?) given the circumstance in which such a wish is held. Han Fei may be overconfident in asserting that the kindheartedness of the carriage maker is completely motivated by profit, but it is at least plausible to consider such a possibility in the specific context of running a business.

The potentially superficial conduct of ren can take place not just in business but also in government. In the chapter The Five Vermin, Han Fei points out the possible detriment that the five different kinds of advocates can bring about in relation to the success and effectiveness of running a government and ruling a state. Those who advocate ren and yi are the first in the list. Han Fei suggests that these advocates may appear to practise ren and yi for the benefit of the majority, but their practices, whether advertently or inadvertently, serve their own individual interests and benefits (成其私…利, cheng qi

208 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 86. The original text: 故輿人成輿則欲人之富貴，匠人成棺則欲人之夭死也，非輿人仁而匠人賊也，人不貴則輿不售，人不死則棺不買，情非憎人也，利在人之死也。(《韓非子•備內》)

108 si…li)209 (e.g., to “bribe” the majority for their support). Han Fei’s seemingly cynical disapproval of the so-called conduct of ren and yi is based on his pessimistic observation of the political environment of his time and the type of human nature exhibited in the then context. He believes that “to choose safety and profit and leave danger and trouble, this is human nature.”210 Therefore “to honor benevolence is a rare thing, and to adhere to righteousness is hard”211 (貴仁者寡, 能義者難; gui ren zhe gua, neng yi zhe nan). Sato points out that, like many of his contemporaries, Han Fei believes that “[a]ll human beings have a basic inclination to pursue profit and avoid harm”.212 Based on this observation, the individuals who were genuinely practising ren and yi may not be as rare as Han Fei believed (i.e. that Confucius was the only person of ren). However, it may be safe to assume that those, in Han Fei’s age, who appeared to be persons of, or practised, ren and yi were doing this in order to disguise their own self-interest. In this sense, the motives behind those who advocated ren and yi were suspicious.

Not only may advocating and implementing the policy and conduct of ren and yi be motivated by self-interest and individual benefits, it can also help reinforce a self- serving attitude and habits across society as a whole. It is this “flood-gate” effect of implementing a ruling policy based on ren and yi that worries Han Fei the most. This is one of the central concerns reflected in the previous excerpt from the chapter The Treacherous, Larcenous, Murderous Ministers. The reasons for why people are poor and destitute vary. Some may be the victims of the unequal distribution of wealth, while others may simply create and produce nothing that society perceives as deserving of reward. It is certainly debatable whether the latter group deserves no financial aid whatsoever because of their lack of creativity and productivity. However, it is undeniable that providing financial assistance indiscriminately to individuals of “no merit” (無功, wu gong) might inadvertently fuel the public’s perception that accruing

209 是故亂國之俗，其學者則稱先王之道，以籍仁義，盛容服而飾辯說，以疑當世之法而貳人主之心。其言古者，為設詐稱，借於外力，以成其私而遺社稷之利。其帶劍者，聚徒屬，立節操，以顯其名而犯五官之禁。其患禦者，積於私門，盡貨賂而用重人之謁，退汗馬之勞。其商工之民，修治苦窳之器，聚弗靡之財，蓄積待時而侔農夫之利。此五者，邦之蠹也。人主不除此五蠹之民，不養耿介之士，則海內雖有破亡之國，削滅之朝，亦勿怪矣。(《韓非子•五蠹》) 210 夫安利者就之，危害者去之，此人之情也。(《韓非子•姦劫弒臣》, trans. WenKui Liao) 211 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 102. (《韓非子•五蠹》) 212 Masayuki Sato, “Did Xunzi’s Theory of Human Nature Provide the Foundation for the Political Thought of Han Fei?” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 162.

109 rewards does not necessarily require hard work. Once this becomes widely accepted, how many would still be willing to work hard given the predominant self-serving aspect of human nature in Han Fei’s time, let alone the fact that the states were facing not only domestic instability but also threats caused by mutual hostility? The answer might not be optimistic. If this becomes the new social norm, its effects will spread to government officials and ministers who are not exempt from self-serving inclination. This will then result in large-scale corruption that will most likely exacerbate social instability and ultimately jeopardize the regime.

Han Fei provides a roadmap and picture of how adopting and implementing policy based on Confucian ren and yi might result in the collapse of a regime and state. And this seems to be grounded in a pessimistic perspective of human nature. On the one hand, the self-centred officials and ministers might take advantage of the superficial practice of ren and yi to collect personal wealth or win public support; on the other hand, the policy of ren and yi might be abused by those who contribute very little or nothing to society. Either way, the public good, wealth, and interest are undermined or even sacrificed in the hands of self-interested individuals. These self-interested individuals, according to Han Fei, are the majority instead of the minority, which makes him extremely sceptical about 1) the sincerity of those who claim to practise ren and yi, and 2) the actual effects of the practice on a society or regime. Han Fei believes that Confucius was one of only few who practised ren and yi wholeheartedly and genuinely. Han Fei not only approves of the authentic quality of ren and yi, but also is inspired by them, and wants to practise them himself (as shown in previous discussions). An essential aspect of differentiating authentic from inauthentic ren and yi in Han Fei’s “evaluating system” is this: those which serve the public good and interest are genuine and authentic practices of ren and yi, those which do not are suspicious. This suggests that both Han Fei’s approval and disapproval of ren and yi are not unconditional but contextual. They should be evaluated under the context of either public (公, gong) or private (私, si) perspectives.

3.1.2 The Public (公, gong) and Private (私, si) Contexts of Ren and Yi The discussion in 3.1.1 suggests that the concepts gong and si play important roles in Han Fei’s philosophy, as they largely function as the touchstones of the various widely accepted social and political values and practices of his time. Han Fei believes that as a

110 ruler, one has to be sensitive to the different motivations (either for public or private purposes) behind these values and practices, because, at face value, they may look the same while being inherently different. Failing to do so may result in social or political disorder. This has been expressed in the etymology of the characters gong and si in the chapter The Five Vermin (五蠹, Wu Du):

古者蒼頡之作書也，自環者謂之私，背私謂之公，公私之相背也，乃蒼頡固

以知之矣。今以為同利者，不察之患也。213

In ancient times when [Cang Jie] created the system of writing, he used the character for “private” to express the idea of self-centeredness, and combined the elements for “private” and “opposed to” to form the character for “public.” The fact that public and private are mutually opposed was already well understood at the time of [Cang Jie]. To regard the two as being identical in interest is a disaster which comes from lack of consideration.214

The character si (私) evolved from the pictograph “厶”, which was originally written as

“ ”, and looks like a self-contained circle. By contrast, the character gong (公) was initially drawn as “ ”, which has the two strokes “ ” added outside the self-centred circle to indicate the public domain.215 Han Fei employs the etymological forms of these two characters in order to point out that the difference between the public and private domains has long been recognized since antiquity, and are therefore not newly discovered phenomena. The ruler should pay great heed to this difference, and understand the distinct interests and motives behind the practices that occur in the different domains. Those, who disregard the difference between gong and si but measure the supposedly admirable practices in terms of their superficial values, will be doomed to fail at making good judgments and decisions for effective ruling and governing.

In order to make good judgments and decisions, the ruler is advised to refrain from following his/her emotions, but rather to think carefully. For instance, in taking others’ advice, Han Fei suggests that “the ruler, when pleased by any counsellor, would

213 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 1044. 214 Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, 1964, p. 106. 215 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 1045.

111 examine the accepted counsel in detail; when angered by any counsellor, he would reconsider the whole contentions for the argument, and profane his judgment till his feelings have become normal in order that he may thereby find sufficient reason to award the counsellor honour or disgrace and determine whether his motive is public justice or private greediness.”216 Often, the advice or admonishment that is good for the public interest may not sound so pleasant to the ears of a ruler. Conversely, those detrimental to the public but conducive to personal gain may evoke the opposite emotions in a ruler. A good ruler has to be aware of this and does not let good judgment fall prey to his/her emotions. Only through practising extreme caution in observing one’s emotions and preventing bad judgments and decisions from forming in the midst of one’s emotions can a ruler discern good advice from bad, according to the (public or private) motives behind them. Here Han Fei illustrates how easily our contextual perspectives of gong and si can be affected by our emotional reactions, and how we should prevent this from happening.

It is worth noting the issue raised by Goldin of translating ‘gong’ as the English term ‘public’ in the Han Fei Zi.217 Goldin points out that, if si refers to the private interest of the ministers and/or officials, gong means the private interest of the ruler. He argues that the ruler (the feudal lord) of a particular state in ancient China is not identical to that of the “abstract state”. Therefore, the private interest of a feudal lord does not always echo the public interest of a state. In this respect, translating gong as the contemporary term ‘public’ can be problematic.

In a footnote that discusses the idea of the “abstract state”, Goldin admits that, under the formation of “a united and uncontested empire, the interests of the sovereign and those of all humanity began to converge.”218 This process is present in the text 吕氏春秋 (Spring and Autumns of Mr. Lü, Lü Shi Chun Qiu, completed in 241 BCE), in which the idea of gong also appears.219 Goldin argues that the idea of gong in the Han Fei Zi is different from that in the Lü Shi Chun Qiu. Presumably, gong in the latter is closer to

216 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 270. 明主之道，己喜則求其所納，己怒則察其所搆；論於已變之後，以得毀譽公私之徵。(《韓非子• 八經》) 217 Goldin, Paul R., “Introduction: Han Fei and the Han Feizi,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, pp. 3-4. 218 Ibid., p. 4, in the footnote. 219 Ibid. See also James D. Sellmann, Timing and Rulership in Master Lü's Spring and Autumn Annals (Lüshi Chunqiu), New York: SUNY Press, 2002, p. 1.

112 the contemporary concept of ‘public’ than in the former, just as a unified empire is closer to the “abstract state” than any competing state. Goldin believes that it is impossible for Han Fei to envision the ruler as an emperor in the text Han Fei Zi, which reinforces the notion that translating the idea of gong in the Han Fei Zi as ‘public’ is problematic.

However, Goldin’s self-assurance seems self-defeating. Han Fei’s philosophy deeply influenced the future First Emperor of China, under whose reign the text Lü Shi Chun Qiu took shape.220 (Han Fei died in 233 BCE, and the Lü Shi Chun Qiu was completed in 241 BCE.) In light of this, saying that Han Fei had no idea whatsoever about an empire or the interests of an emperor is as questionable as saying that he knew exactly what they were. Moreover, evidence shows that the denotation of gong as ‘public’ (in contrast to si as ‘private’) has been well recognized during the fourth to third centuries BCE, a time approximately the same as, or even earlier than, Han Fei’s.221

Goldin is right to point out the potential problems in translating gong as ‘public’ in the Han Fei Zi. However, in attempting to strengthen his case, Goldin seems paradoxically to provide some evidence which weakens or even contradicts his initial proposal. In this respect, Goldin’s argument actually provides a good case for why it is possible to retain the translation of gong as ‘public’ in the Han Fei Zi, while simultaneously being cautious of this translation. Further discussions regarding this issue will take place in section 3.1.3.

Han Fei’s claim that “public and private are mutually exclusive” (公私之相背也, gong si zhi xiang bei ye) may be an overstatement, however, one should not overlook the situation in which it was made. According to the Han Fei Zi, human nature seemed to assume its worst manifestations in its time, which prompted Han Fei’s extremely sceptical attitudes towards types of human conduct that were previously regarded as

220 James D. Sellmann, Timing and Rulership in Master Lü's Spring and Autumn Annals, 2002, p. 1. Yuk Wong, “Han Feizi (Han Fei Tzu),” In Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Antonio S. Cua, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 285. 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 3. 221 Erica Brindley, “The Polarization of Si 私 and Gong 公 (“Private interest” and “Public Interest”) in Early Chinese Thought,” Asia Major, 26:2, 2013, p. 28. Also, in his article, Pines recognizes that Han Fei is a thinker “who lived on the eve of the imperial unification”. Yuri Pines, “From Historical Evolution to the End of History: Past, Present and Future from Shang Yang to the First Emperor,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 39.

113 praiseworthy and outstanding. Those once widely accepted values, such as ren and yi, should be carefully re-examined under the perspectives and contexts of gong and si. Any conduct and practices which are harmful to the public good, albeit widely valued and practiced, should be labelled as selfish hence bad. The secret motives behind them should be exposed. For instance, he points out that “Who distributes alms with public money, is called a benevolent man. … However, the presence of benevolent men, the losses of public funds….”222 Being regarded as a benevolent man (仁人, ren ren) seems amongst one of the highest honours in Han Fei’s time. However, Han Fei frowns upon such a “good name”, and suggests that this reputation could be earned at the cost of the public interest (as the previous discussion suggests), insofar as it only benefits those who hold it, but is detrimental to those who do not. Or, it is ultimately bad for all, including those who own the reputation, because, in the long run, everybody is affected by the loss of the public good. Amongst Han Fei’s critiques of those once cherished values and practices (under the perspectives of gong and si), those concerning the idea of 義 (righteousness, justice; yi) seem to stand out from the rest.

According to the previous discussion, in Han Fei’s theory, gong denotes the comprehensive domain within a state. Since the ruler is the sovereign of a state, he or she is also the embodiment of the domain of gong. The ministers and officials cannot represent gong because they operate within their delegated duties, which may prevent them from seeing the big picture, and sometimes even cause them to seek private interests. Although this is not directly expressed by Han Fei, it can be inferred from the following passage from the chapter To Rectify Harmful Ruling Methods (飾邪, Shi Xie)

禁，主之道，必明於公私之分，明法制，去私恩。夫令必行，禁必止，人主

之公義也；必行其私，信於朋友，不可為賞勸，不可為罰沮，人臣之私義也。

私義行則亂，公義行則治，故公私有分。人臣有私心，有公義。修身潔白而

行公行正，居官無私，人臣之公義也。汙行從欲，安身利家，人臣之私心也。明主在上則人臣去私心行公義，亂主在上則人臣去公義行私心，故君臣異心。 223

222 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 248. 以公財分施謂之仁人，… 仁人者，公財損也。(《韓非子•八說》) 223 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 264.

114

It is the duty of the sovereign to make clear the distinction between public and private interests, enact laws and statutes openly, and forbid private favours. Indeed, to enforce whatever is ordered and stop whatever is prohibited, is the public justice of the lord of men. To practise personal faith to friends, and not to be encouraged by any reward nor to be discouraged by any punishment, is the private righteousness of ministers. Wherever private righteousness prevails, there is disorder; wherever public justice obtains, there is order. Hence the necessity of distinction between public and private interests. Every minister cherishes both selfish motive and public justice. To refine his personality, improve his integrity, practise public creeds, and behave unselfish in office, is the public justice of the minister. To corrupt his conduct, follow his desires, secure his personal interests, and benefit his own family, is the selfish motive of the minister. If the intelligent sovereign is on the Throne, every minister will discard his selfish motive and practise public justice. If the violent sovereign is on the Throne, every minister will cast public justice aside and act on his selfish motive. Thus, ruler and minister have different frames of mind.224

Here, Han Fei posits a clear demarcation between the ideas of gong and si, and more specifically those of 公義 (public justice, gong yi) and 私義 (private righteousness, si yi). Han Fei explicitly points out that the ministers’ conduct can potentially oscillate between attending to public justice and private righteousness. One example of the latter would be to “practise personal faith to friends” (信於朋友, xin yu peng you). Without having been examined in the context of gong, practising personal faith to friends sounds like an admirable and desirable characteristic. However, Han Fei seems to realize the potential conflicts between being faithful to personal friends and being faithful to the public interest when the public domain is taken into consideration. This may be because, 1) the ministers are unable to see the complete picture of the public interest, hence inadvertently overlook the domain of gong; or 2) by purposefully ignoring the realm of gong, the ministers can fully operate according to self-interest. Going either way, according to Han Fei, will drag the whole society or state into chaos, a situation least desired by a wise ruler.

224 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume I, 1959, pp. 167-8.

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The context of gong and si is proposed by Han Fei as a new moral perspective to evaluate the practices of ren and yi that are dopted by some of the officials or ministers, and even rulers. As the following dicussion will show, the context of gong and si also serves as a political touchstone, through which the differences between an intelligent ruler and a dysfunctional ruler are discerned.

3.1.3 To Distinguish Ming Zhu (明主) from Luan Zhu (亂主) In contrast to the ministers, the ruler does not seem to have the imminent problem of slipping into the realm of si. This is, at least, not directly reflected in the current passage. Here, Han Fei only describes the ministers’ potential problem of oscillating between the gong and si (or gong yi and si yi), but not that of the ruler. How should this be interpreted according to the current passage? Does this mean that Han Fei believes that those feudal lords are incapable of being selfish or even that it is impossible for them to be selfish, and therefore cause harm to the public interest? In order to answer these questions, we first need to understand Han Fei’s assessment of the rulers. Han Fei’s theory seems to be based on the assumption that, since the whole state is the property of the ruler, only the ruler should and will be interested in the welfare of the society as a whole. Theoretically, the wealth of a sovereign depends on the prosperity of all the communities within the state. As indicated in the above excerpt, the ruler can only live a continuously prosperous and wealthy life when everyone else is satisfied with their own. A sovereign who is able to understand this is considered a wise and intelligent one (明主, ming zhu). By contrast, rulers who are stupid enough to care only about their own welfare (or worse, extravagant and wasteful lifestyle), while ignoring the welfare of the majority, are denounced as disorderly or dysfunctional (亂主, luan zhu).

It is now clear that Han Fei does not assume that the sovereign is incapable of pursuing self-serving conduct and harming the public interest. His differentiation between ming zhu and luan zhu suggests that he is fully aware of these possibilities.225 The fundamental assumption here is that his philosophy will only function for ming zhu, for if he advises or admonishes luan zhu, his life and theory will most likely be defeated in

225 In chapter 40 of the Han Fei Zi, A Critique of the Doctrine of Position (難勢, Nan Shi), the well-known ‘story of spear and shield’ (矛楯之说, mao dun zhi shuo) suggests that the benevolent ruler is incompatible with fa (法, penal law) as the ruling system, which is like the incompatible relationship between the spear and shield. However, it is worth noticing here that ming zhu does not mean the benevolent ruler, but a ruler who is capable of understanding, adopting, and implementing Han Fei’s ideas of ruling by fa.

116 the first place. The latter has been predicted by Han Fei in the statement of his own resolution and aspiration of pursuing public good in the excerpt at the beginning of section 3.1.1. Given the scarce resources in ancient time for recording and documenting, what is the point of wasting time and words on rulers who are doomed to fail themselves and their states? The “slim” discourse in Han Fei’s philosophy dedicated to the assessment of the luan zhu also reflects the helpless situation of his time: criticizing those dysfunctional or even tyrannical feudal lords is not meaningful and useful because people cannot choose their sovereigns. The ideal way may be to wait for the inevitable failures of the luan zhu and hope for the rising of the ming zhu. Eventually, more and more people will be under the rule of the latter instead of the former. It is worth mentioning here that Han Fei’s evaluation of the ming zhu is not based on one’s virtuous conduct but on whether one can rationally distinguish between private and public interests and embrace the latter. While these are not explicitly expressed in Han Fei’s philosophy, they can nevertheless be inferred from the current passage.

Given the political and social systems in Han Fei’s era, a sovereign’s aptitude for conducting private or public affairs can directly affect or even decide the destiny of the state. The number of factors that can potentially shape one’s aptitude are overwhelmingly large (if not limitless) and these factors are not easily controllable. As can be inferred from the text, Han Fei seems to believe that it is relatively rare to have a ming zhu who cares for the public good in his era. The worst thing is that the people often have no other choice but to accept their destiny. In this sense, Han Fei was obviously wise enough to propose things that can be improved (in this case, how to regulate the behaviour of the ministers) rather than things over which one has very little or no control (e.g., to “fix” the sovereign).

We have ascertained from the passage that a minister’s interest can swing between the public and private territories just as the sovereign’s can. The difference between these two cases is that, whereas the selfishness of the minister has to be contained, regulated, or even “fixed”, not much can be done about that of the feudal lord. It is interesting to see here that Han Fei uses the phrase “修身” (to cultivate oneself, xiu shen) as the practical discipline to curb and correct the self-centredness of the ministers. He condemns the officials who follow their own interests and desires and care only about their own benefits and those of their families. This is one of two places where the phrase

117 xiu shen appears in the entire text. The other place is in the chapter Clear the Doubts (說疑, Shuo Yi), where it is also the ministers who are expected to practice self- cultivation.226 On the one hand, Han Fei is extremely sceptical about human nature; on the other, he seems to believe that the ministers can cultivate themselves purely according to their own motivations. But from the rare appearances of the phrase xiu shen, one can tell that Han Fei’s confidence in the latter is limited.

Han Fei’s actual attitude towards xiu shen is also revealed by the words in the above excerpt concerning the influence of the ruler on the ministers (in terms of gong and si). Just when we were about to believe that Han Fei is suggesting that the ministers can conscientiously cultivate themselves to relinquish self-interest and care for the public good, the conditions that he provides afterwards tell a different story. Han Fei claims that only those who are under the rule of the ming zhu will promptly commit themselves to the public good and justice instead of the private good and justice, whereas those under the luan zhu will ignore the public good and justice and pursue self-serving desires. It seems that the ministers’ and officials’ cultivation for caring about the public’s welfare is not unconditional and self-motivated (or at least not completely so). Rather, it is largely determined by the ruler’s own attitude towards both public and private affairs. The ruler’s exemplary influences over the ministers and officials were even stronger in Han Fei’s era because the states were steeped in an atmosphere of selfishness. In this sense, the ministers’ and officials’ conduct largely reflects their ruler’s interests. This, from another angle, reflects the severe political situation Han Fei experiences, and the importance to raise awareness of the rulers on the political and contextual perspectives of gong and si.

In light of this, Han Fei might well conclude at this point that the ministers and their ruler share the same interests, however his actual claim here suggests the opposite: the desires of the minister are different from those of his/her ruler (君臣異心, jun chen yi xin). Not only is Han Fei’s statement here not self-contradicting hence self-defeating, but it also supports the previous discussions concerning the underlying assumption of

226 是以群臣居則修身，動則任力，非上之令、不敢擅作疾言誣事，此聖王之所以牧臣下也。 (《韓非子•說疑》) For this reason, the officials in daily life will cultivate their personalities and in action will exert their abilities. But for the superior’s orders, they will not dare to do anything as they please, utter irresponsible words, and fabricate affairs. That is the way the sage-kings superintend the ministers and the inferiors. (Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, pp. 228.)

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Han Fei’s thinking and his sceptical disapproval of human nature. These assumptions and observations (as addressed in the previous discussions) are as follows. 1) The sovereign but not the ministers or officials can represent the domain of gong (or the public interest), because presumably the entire state is the property of the former but not the latter. 2) Han Fei is clearly aware of the differences between the attitude of a ming zhu and a luan zhu towards gong and si, and the former but not the latter is the expected sovereign in the text,227 because, as I have suggested, it is not very meaningful and helpful to describe or even condemn the latter. 3) Human nature was miserable in Han Fei’s time, almost everyone, including the ministers and officials, considered only their own benefits and ignore others’; however, although not self-motivated, the selfish conduct of the ministers and officials can be curtailed and amended under the influences of the ruler (presumably a wise and intelligent one who puts the public’s interests before his/her private ones). Given these premises, we may conclude here that Han Fei proposes that the fundamental interests of the ruler and ministers/officials are in conflict, insofar as the focus of the former, ideally, is on gong and the latter is on si. Nevertheless, the ruler can exert a certain degree of influence over the ministers and officials, and thereby turn the latter’s focus back to gong, which is compatible with the ruler’s own interests in the public domain. The ruler is advised to retain his influences through political authority or power (势, shi), an idea allegedly inherited and further developed by Han Fei from Shen Dao (慎到, ca. 350–275 BCE).228

There is much debate on how much, or to what degree, the ruler has his/her grip on political authority or power in Han Fei’s philosophy. Hsiao suggests that Han Fei promotes the absolute authority or power of the ruler who “in his own person became the ultimate objective of politics and its sole standard”.229 Whereas, Graham contends that the political system that Han Fei delineates can and should be best appreciated from

227 In the text Han Fei Zi, both the Chinese characters ‘主’ (zhu) and ‘君’ (jun) mean the sovereign or the ruler. 228 This is challenged by Soon-ja Yang, who argues that the central focus of Shen Dao’s theory is on fa instead of shi. See his work “Shen Dao’s Theory of fa and His Influence on Han Fei,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 47. Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, p. 282. 229 Hsiao Kung-chuan, A History of Chinese Political Thought. Vol. I: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D. Tr. F.W. Mote, Princeton Library of Asian Translations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 385-6.

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“the viewpoint of the bureaucrat rather than the man at the top”.230 Recent studies challenge the assumption that Han Fei promotes the absolute power of an absolute ruler. Galvany suggests that in the Han Fei Zi the ruler is stripped of emotion, passion, or desire, and “dissipates into pure abstraction, becoming a mere impersonal expression of a device for total domination.”231 Pines affirms that the ruler is expected to be a symbolic figure whose “personal input in policy-making is unwelcome.”232 The reason for restricting the actual administrative power of a ruler, according to Pines, is to prevent incompetent rulers from “endangering themselves and, implicitly, … overburdening their subjects.”233

In terms of sovereign power, Xunzi also advocates the political system that demands the minimum involvement of the ruler. Xunzi, however, has faith in the moral and political competence of the ministers, whom he believes are capable of serving the interest of the ruler and the state.234 This seems to contradict, as shown in previous discussions, Han Fei’s take on minister-ruler relationships. If, as Han Fei stresses, the interests between the ministers and the ruler are in fundamental conflict, and the ruler is not expected to execute political power based on personal judgment, the question arises as to where the power comes from. In other words, “who” run(s) the state?

Pines suggests that, in criticizing the ministers, Han Fei in fact restricts his criticism to an exceptional minority whose interest is in congruence with the interest of the ruler and the public. Han Fei compares these ministers, who have superior understanding of “techniques” (術, shu), “methods” (數, shu) and “laws” (法, fa), to himself.235 In light of this, Pines asserts that it is the ministers who possess techniques (有術, you shu) who “can be entrusted with supreme power” to “lead the country and to instruct the ruler.”236 In this sense, the difference between Han Fei and Xunzi seems not to depend on the trustworthiness of the ministers, but on what kind of ministers can be entrusted with

230 A. C. Graham, “Legalism: An Amoral Science of Statecraft,” in Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. Open Court Publishing Company, 1989, pp. 290-2. 231 Albert Galvany, “Beyond the Rule of Rules: The Foundations of Sovereign Power in the Han Feizi”, In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 105. 232 Yuri Pines, “Submerged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, pp. 78 & 81. 233 Ibid., p. 81. 234 Yuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009, pp. 90-7 & 129-31. 235 Yuri Pines, “Submerged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” 2013, p. 82. 236 Ibid., p. 83.

120 power. Pines suggests that “the only measure of loyalty is practical success of the state.”237 In other words, the trustworthy ministers are those who are responsible for the greatest good for the greatest number instead of the individual at the top of the hierarchy.238

However, on being entrusted with power, ministers face the same problem as rulers: the competent and wise ministers (and rulers) can only appear serendipitously. The chance of having a few ideal ministers may be greater than having an ideal ruler. However, this does not rule out the possibility that both the ministers and their ruler are incompetent and dysfunctional. In this circumstance, “who” can then be entrusted with power? The answer may not be any particular individual or a group of individuals, but a series of political or administrative policies created and developed by capable ministers (like Han Fei) and/or rulers alike. The political authority or power of the ruler and ministers is not expected to transgress or indiscreetly modify these policies once the latter are established (at least not by ministers and/or rulers who are incompetent and dysfunctional).239 Amongst the public policies promoted by Han Fei, fa is arguably the most influential and central one in Han Fei’s political system that embodies the ideal of gong.

3.2 Han Fei’s 法 (Fa) and Context-Insensitivity In the previous discussions, the investigations have focused on 1) Han Fei’s critiques of Confucian ren and yi from a contextual perspective according to a specific historical background, and 2) more specifically, the practical implications of ren and yi in the social and political domains of gong and si. On the one hand, Han Fei believes that ruling and governing strategies based on the principles of ren and yi could no longer fit the reality of the times because the social situation had changed dramatically. In the old good days, people were prone to applying ren and yi because, according to Han Fei, the population was small and the resources abundant, and they therefore did not have to fight for survival. In Han Fei’s time (as the text indicates), the situation had turned around: the resources had become scarce because of the increased population. Therefore,

237 Ibid. p. 84. 238 Hsiao-po Wang and Leo S. Chang, The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fei’s Political Theory, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986, p. 117. 239 Ibid., pp. 77-81. Albert Galvany, “Beyond the Rule of Rules: The Foundations of Sovereign Power in the Han Feizi”, 2013, pp. 101-3.

121 people paid more attention to themselves because of the pressure to survive. On the other hand, the increasingly self-centred population resulting from the changes in the situation highlighted the demarcation between the domains of gong and si in people’s political lives and made this distinction more salient than ever before. When selfishness dominated the way in which human nature manifested itself, a sovereign was forced to rethink the ruling strategies that were grounded in the old assumptions and principles of ren and yi, and test the conduct of their ministers in the distinctive contexts of gong and si. Under the then social influences, the ministers were most likely practising ren and yi according to all sorts of self-serving motives and interests. Knowing that it would be difficult to prevent their subordinates from abusing the ruling principles of ren and yi for personal gain, the reasonable ruler has to resort to some other means in order to regulate the conduct of his/her subordinates to reverse their selfish intentions or even “force” them to work for the public good and interest. And this is where the idea of fa fits in.

In the chapter The Anachronistic Ruling Methods (詭使, Gui Shi), Han Fei presents a long list that contrasts timely ideal ruling methods with those that were actually implemented, and which were already outdated during his time. According to Han Fei, the former brings with it social order (治, zhi), whereas the latter leads to social disorder (亂, luan). Amongst the list is the specific contrast between the practice of punishment according to penal laws (刑罰, xing fa) and the practice of punishment according to private righteousness (私義, si yi). The former, as Han Fei suggests, guarantees social order, while the latter, although widely accepted and promoted, will eventually lead to social disorder.240

To Han Fei, fa (法; standards, principles, penal laws) and si (私; self-centredness) are incompatible with, or contradict, each other, and the former can be employed to regulate, curtail, or even abolish (廢, fei) the latter. The restraining forces of fa on si are expressed in the same chapter as follows:

240 凡所治者刑罰也，今有私行義者尊。(《韓非子•詭使》)

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夫立法令者以廢私也，法令行而私道廢矣。私者所以亂法也。… 故《本言》曰：“所以治者法也，所以亂者私也；法立，則莫得為私矣。”故曰：道私

者亂，道法者治。上無其道，則智者有私詞，賢者有私意。241

Indeed, the purpose of enacting laws and decrees is to abolish selfishness. Once laws and decrees prevail, the way of selfishness collapses. Selfishness disturbs the law. … Therefore, in my main discourse I say: "The cause of order is law, the cause of chaos is selfishness. Once law is enacted, no selfish act can be done." Hence the saying: "Whoever tolerates selfishness finds chaos, whoever upholds law finds order." If the superior misses the right way, astute men will use selfish phraseology and worthies will cherish selfish motives, principals will bestow selfish favours, and subordinates will pursue selfish desires.242

It is clear here that fa and si are incompatible, for the former promotes social stability while the latter invites social chaos. In this light, the wise ruler is expected to promote fa while inhibiting si. However, promoting fa and inhibiting si are not two separate processes; instead, the latter is the aim of the former. According to this passage, we know that fa, for Han Fei, is established particularly to counter the self-serving si, which is believed to be the cause of social instability. The ultimate goal of fa is to abolish si completely, for the very existence of the latter will disturb the former. In this sense, si will not readily retreat when confronted with fa. To Han Fei, the “battle” between fa and si is a zero-sum, rather than win-win, game.

It is clear that fa and si are two opposing ideas in this passage, but the idea of gong (公, public) seems to be missing from the picture. The previous discussions in 3.1.2 have shown that gong and si are two incompatible and competing ideas in Han Fei’s philosophy. In this sense, it is not very difficult to infer that fa and gong are compatible with each other; moreover, since fa aims to counteract si, therefore the former is expected, at least to a certain extent, to promote gong. In fact, the phrase 公法 (laws for the common good, gong fa), that consists of the two characters gong and fa, appears in

241 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, pp. 956-7. 242 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 235.

123 various places and chapters in the text.243 However, one cannot find a phrase that combines si and fa within the text.

Just as the previous discussions have shown that human nature in Han Fei’s time was prone to selfishness (si) and ignored the common good (gong), it therefore favoured chaos instead of fa (which promotes social order).244 In this sense, si is part of human nature, whereas gong requires intentional efforts to go against the current of human selfishness. As a means to fight against si in order to manifest gong, fa also requires huge efforts to enact and implement. In the processes of enacting and implementing fa, it is impossible that these processes will be immune from the disturbances and troubles caused by si. Fa and si will most likely compete with each other for dominance. In this sense, it is not too difficult to understand why Han Fei intends, ambitiously, to employ fa to abolish si for good. Si is the natural tendency of human nature, whereas practising public affairs under the guidance and principle of fa and gong requires significant efforts to go against the tendency of being self-centred. Relatively speaking, the efforts to overcome si are expected to be exponentially larger than following the trend of si. Since human nature is, according to Han Fei’s observation, also averse to hard toil and fond of leisure,245 it is predictable that the people would be less willing to fight against their own self-interest than to embrace or even promote it. In this sense, even a small proportion of si requires a huge effort of fa to counteract or overcome it. In order to promote the common good (gong), it is no wonder that Han Fei wants the effects of si to be kept to a minimum, or ideally, eliminated altogether. Either way, the Chinese character ‘廢’ (abolish, fei) reveals Han Fei’s astute insights into the enormous influence and powers of si in undermining the common good and social order of his time. This also reflects the then tough social and historical reality and context of implementing his political ideals.

According to Han Fei, very few people in his time would have taken the initiative to work for the public good, and the majority would have only considered their own benefits. Therefore, relying on people’s kind-heartedness to rule a state was basically unrealistic. The better approach would have been to deter people from acting

243 The phrase 公法 appears in the chapters《有度》, 《孤憤》, and 《五蠹》. 244 夫民之性，喜其亂而不親其法。(《韓非子•心度》) 245 夫民之性，惡勞而樂佚 (《韓非子•心度》)

124 completely according to their self-interest. In the chapter The Famous Schools (顯學, Xian Xue), Han Fei argues that:

夫聖人之治國，不恃人之為吾善也，而用其不得為非也。恃人之為吾善也，

境內不什數；用人不得為非，一國可使齊。為治者用眾而舍寡，故不務德而

務法。246

Indeed, the sage, in ruling the state, does not count on people’s doing him good, but utilizes their inability to do him wrong. If he counts on people's doing him good, within the boundary there will never be enough such persons to count by tens. But if he utilizes people's inability to do him wrong, an entire state can be uniformed. Therefore, the administrator of the state affairs ought to consider the many but disregard the few. Hence his devotion not to virtue but to law.247

Here, Han Fei seems to reinforce the gloomy situation of his time in terms of the type of human nature that was exhibited here. Under the then condition described by Han Fei, governing a state by resorting to virtuous conduct (considering the public good) to which very few were willing to subscribe was like winning the lottery. However, governing according to rewards and punishments which conform to the established rules is different: it assesses the conduct of almost everyone in the communities on the same scale, and forbids anyone to commit wrongdoings that serve self-interest only. In other words, counting on people’s conscientiousness to think of promoting the public and common good is unrealistic, therefore fa has to be introduced and implemented to ensure that people take the public interest into consideration. A wise ruler, according to Han Fei, will not rely on things that are unreliable, but resort to principles which can guarantee promising results (in this case the principle of fa to guarantee the common good and social stability).

3.2.1 Han Fei and Mencius’ Contextual Debate on Human Nature Here, we can already sense Han Fei’s faith in the universal solution of fa to correct the “crooked” human nature, which has been made even more salient in some of the metaphors from the same passage as it continues:

246 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, pp. 1079-80. 247 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 306.

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夫必恃自直之箭，百世無矢；恃自圜之木，千世無輪矣。自直之箭、自圜之

木，百世無有一，然而世皆乘車射禽者何也？隱栝之道用也。雖有不恃隱栝而有自直之箭、自圜之木，良工弗貴也，何則？乘者非一人，射者非一發也。

不恃賞罰而恃自善之民，明主弗貴也，何則？國法不可失，而所治非一人也。

故有術之君，不隨適然之善，而行必然之道。248

Similarly, if one should always count on arrows which are straight of themselves, there would be no arrow in a hundred generations; if one should only count on pieces of wood which are round of themselves, there would be no wheel in a thousand generations. Though in a hundred generations there is neither an arrow that is straight of itself nor a wheel that is round of itself, yet how is it then that people of every generation ride in carts and shoot birds? It is because the tools for straightening and bending are used. To rely not on the tools for straightening and bending but on arrows straight of themselves and wheels round of themselves, is not thought much of by the skilful carpenter. Why? Because riding is not a matter of one man alone, nor is archery a question of a single shot. Reliance not on rewards and punishments but on people who are righteous of themselves, is not highly considered by the enlightened sovereign. Why? Because the law of the state must not be dispensed with and whom it regulates is not one man only. Therefore, the tactful ruler does not follow the good that happens by accident but practises the Tao that prevails by necessity. Reliance not on rewards and punishments but on people who are righteous of themselves, is not highly considered by the enlightened sovereign. Why? Because the law of the state must not be dispensed with and whom it regulates is not one man only. Therefore, the tactful ruler does not follow the good that happens by accident but practises the Tao that prevails by necessity.249

This passage is important, as it clearly indicates Han Fei’s understanding of human nature on a very basic level. This in turn reveals the one dimensional idea of si in Han Fei’s philosophy, which needs to be extended to accommodate at least one additional dimension (the morally neutral dimension as the discussion unfolds), which is not necessarily incompatible with, or does not contradict, the idea of gong. If this is true,

248 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 1080. 249 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 307.

126 then the additional dimension will affect the whole assumption behind Han Fei’s proposition of fa as one of the principal ruling methods in his proposed political system. That said, the purpose of the analysis here is not to negate Han Fei’s philosophy altogether, because, as the discussion unfolds, we will see the historical legitimacy of Han Fei’s claims. Rather, the analysis attempts to establish a distance (interspace) between Han Fei’s philosophy and its historical background to allow some of its hidden dimensions to be revealed. In doing so, we will be able to better understand Han Fei’s philosophy, together with some of its fundamental ideas, such as human nature, gong, and si. A deeper understanding of these basic ideas in Han Fei’s philosophy will in turn allow us to perform a more effective evaluation of Han Fei’s idea of fa, including its contextual and non-contextual dimensions.

In this passage, Han Fei compares human nature with bamboo250 and wood, and more specifically, the selfishness of human nature with the natural shape of bamboo and wood.251 In order to make good arrows, the bamboo is ideally expected to be perfectly straight; in order to make good wheels, it is anticipated that the wood will grow into the shape of a wheel of its own accord. Han Fei argues that, if we rely on wishful thinking, we may never be able to produce a single arrow or wheel, because these natural materials will never grow the way we want them to, unless we turn our wishful thinking into actions and exert external force or influence to amend them. The same idea also applies to human nature: human beings are “naturally” self-centred, it is unwise to expect people to become other-regarding of their own accord. Han Fei does not deny the possibility that some human beings are born to be unselfish, but these individuals are very rare in a society in the same way that the naturally straight bamboo and wheel- shaped wood are. A political system built on the ideal human image or model will not function well when the majority of human beings seem to be inherently self-centred. By the same token, it is very unlikely that manufacturing technologies that rely on the existence of ideal shapes of bamboo or wood will be able to mass produce arrows or wheels. These technologies will therefore be useless or at least unproductive. To

250 The English translation misinterpreted the Chinese character ‘箭’ (jian) as ‘arrow’, although the latter is the ordinary translation of the former. Here, jian actually denotes a kind of thin bamboo used to produce the arrows. (《韓非子全譯》, p. 136.) 251 It is worth noticing here that one cannot find the phrase ‘性恶’ (as Xun Zi’s description of human nature as selfish) in the Han Fei Zi. However, one can find phrases, such as ‘民之性’, ‘萬民之性’, ‘民性有恆’, and even ‘天性’ which convey the similar idea of human nature in the Han Fei Zi (See Sato, 2013). Also both Sato (2013: 159) and Wei (2012: 39) points out Han Fei’s pessimistic perception of human nature in general.

127 guarantee positive outcomes from his/her ruling methods, a wise ruler will, of course, choose strategies that work for the majority and deliver promising results. These methods or strategies are expected to be the ways of certainty (必然之道, bi ran zhi dao), not those that depend on the ideal human model (適然之善, shi ran zhi shan).

The dispute about Human Nature, such as that between Menzi (Mencius) and Xunzi on whether human nature is innately benevolent (性善, xing shan) or selfish (性惡, xing e), is one of the prominent themes in classical Chinese texts. Han Fei’s perception of selfish human nature seems compatible with Xunzi’s, but incompatible with Mencius’. The latter argues that human nature is fundamentally benevolent (or other-regarding). Mencius provides an example of how anyone will be naturally distressed by the scene of a child who is about to fall into a well, and try to rescue the child.252 Mencius suggests that all human beings are capable of having compassion when confronted with the suffering of others (惻隱之心, ce yin zhi xin). This serves as the foundation of benevolence and humanity (仁, ren). More specifically, Mencius points out that one without externally-motivated reasons feels compassion for the child on the verge of falling into a well, “not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villages or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child.”253 In other words, one’s compassion for others is deeply embedded in human nature but not in a way that stems from self-concern or a calculative mindset. If both Han Fei and Mencius ground their theories in empirical evidence and we cannot disregard the former’s observation of human nature, then we should not ignore the latter’s either.

Why does this contradiction occur? One reason may be that human nature, as a concept, is much more complicated than what we believe or wish it to be. In Han Fei’s view, the interests of the self and others are mutually exclusive, because we have limited resources in a society, and everyone wants their own fair share. From a social and political perspective, we have to compete with each other in order to get our own portion. It is very hard to deny, from the socio-political and socio-economic perspective, that this kind of self-regard is also part of our human nature. It is just that this aspect of human nature was not so significant in ancient times because people then were less

252 《孟子•公孫丑上》 253 Dim-Cheuk Lau, Mencius, revised edition, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1979, p. 73.

128 concerned about resource scarcity. This might be the case in Han Fei’s era and is most likely still the case in today’s world. Han Fei’s ideas of gong and si seem to be associated with his insights into human nature, and correspond to the ideas of ‘other- regard’ and ‘self-regard’ respectively. It is very hard to blame Han Fei for highlighting the negative aspect of human nature in the then significant socio-political and socio- economic context.

However, Mencius’ primary concern about human nature is not quite the same as that of Han Fei. Mencius’ take on human nature emerges from a totally different perspective— that of individual-development or self-actualization: How does human nature reveal itself in a pre-social context, and how should one make the best of it? The example of a child who is about to fall into a well vividly portrays the capacity of human compassion to take precedence over calculations of a social, political, and economic nature. According to Mencius, one of the most desirable characters in Confucian philosophy, ren (仁 benevolence, humaneness) is the result of the fully developed capacity of our fundamental compassion for others.254 However, in Han Fei’s philosophy, this aspect of human nature is very rarely discussed. Although, as indicated in the first section of this chapter, Han Fei does not deny that, throughout human history and even in his own society, a few individuals (such as Confucius himself) have fully realized and achieved some extraordinary human attributes, including ren and yi.

When the possibility exists that some ministers or officials will practice ren and yi superficially to either advertently or inadvertently disguise their own selfish motives, distinguishing the genuine practices of ren and yi from the non-genuine ones becomes urgent. In order to solve the problem, Han Fei promotes the concepts of gong and si as the new moral benchmark in evaluating the ministers’ and officials’ conduct. In this sense, ren and yi are no longer ideal moral criteria in Han Fei’s philosophy, because they can be faked. Gong is desired as it promotes the public good, whereas si has to be prohibited, because it looks for ways to indulge oneself at the expense of everything else. According to Han Fei, human nature is naturally si-inclined. Therefore, it takes huge efforts (combined with some strict external force or influence, such as fa) to amend the selfish human nature to include others in one’s own vision and work for the public (gong). Han Fei’s view implies that selfishness (si) is one of our natural

254 Ibid.

129 dispositions, whereas selflessness (gong) is a quality or characteristic that needs to be nurtured; and that these two are certainly incompatible with, and even contradict, each other.

We have already seen, via the discussions in section 3.1.2, that gong and si are in fact a pair of socio-political and socio-economic concepts. Empirically speaking, Han Fei’s view of human nature reflects, to a certain extent, reality, at least in a socio-political and socio-economic context. But it may also be fair to say that his view reveals only a part (or one aspect) of the bigger picture, especially when juxtaposed against Mencius’ perspective of the same matter. First, as pointed out previously, Mencius’ approach to human nature is a pre-social one. He does not examine human nature in a social (including political and economic) context; instead he is interested in observing how human beings react to others’ suffering before being influenced by utilitarian concerns.255 He also uncovers the fundamental compassion in most, if not all, human beings. Second, Mencius’ finding about human nature in a non-utilitarian context is a peculiar one: compassion emanates from within the self, but also concerns others. Mencius’ understanding of human nature suggests that it is impossible for compassion to be fully realized and developed unless others are involved in its development. Comparing this with Han Fei’s socio-political and socio-economic ideas of gong (the public or others) and si (the private or oneself), it is interesting to note that, in a non- utilitarian context, the demarcation between gong and si has been blurred.

Mencius’ observation about human nature provides a distinctive perspective from which to re-examine Han Fei’s proposed ideas of gong and si, as well as the latter’s concept of fa which promises to convert human beings in order to promote gong and abolish si. Again, on the socio-political and socio-economic level, no doubt, fa can exhibit the power in fulfilling its promises, but can its influences be extended to the pre- social/political/economic domain? The answer is negative, because it will be very difficult for fa to unleash its full power when a clear boundary between gong and si cannot be discerned in the non-utilitarian domain. That said, Han Fei is still able to argue that human nature cannot and should not stay in the non-utilitarian domain

255 Here, the term ‘utilitarian’ is employed for two reasons. First, it refers to the kind of value judgment based on the social/political/economic consequences of certain acts. Secondly, the judgment evaluates how certain acts can benefit individuals and groups other than one’s own, which exemplifies the idea of gong. In the current case, I suggest that this is not the perspective from which human nature are perceived by Mencius. In the following discussions, however, this term will continue to be used to show that the ‘utilitarian’ perspective is the one based on which Han Fei examines human nature.

130 forever if human beings are still keen to seek the full development, achievement, and actualization of themselves. At some stage or moment, human nature has to be tested in the socio-political and socio-economic reality. And Han Fei may be confident that most of us, when undergoing such a test (of gong and si), will fail miserably. It seems that most of us will have difficulty in ignoring Han Fei’s prophecy. Or will we? In order to respond to this tricky question, we have to return to Han Fei’s own text (the last excerpt).

3.2.2 The Amoral Aspect of Human Nature256 The analogy used by Han Fei in the previous excerpt suggests that humans are born selfish, just as bamboo is not naturally perfectly straight and wood is not naturally wheel-shaped. In order to produce highly functional arrows or wheels, bamboo or wood needs to be either straightened or bent with the help of external forces. This can be compared to the claim that, in order to serve the public good, selfish human tendencies have to be corrected by harsh measures like fa. This analogy sounds sensible, at least superficially. However, an in-depth analysis reveals that at least two aspects of this analogy are flawed.

First, in the analogy between bamboo and human nature, only two states seem to exist. Bamboo is either perfectly straight or it is not; wood is either wheel-shaped or it is not; human nature is either selfish or it is not. For external purposes (such as becoming a well-functioning arrow or wheel, or serving the public good), it is understood that this either-or type of measure is both desirable and necessary. However, the question here is whether every single piece of bamboo or wood, or human being is born to become an arrow, wheel, or serve the public good? If they inevitably have to serve certain purposes, are these purposes their only and ultimate choice or goal? If the answer to both questions is ‘No’, then it becomes doubtful as to whether external purposes are the only legitimate criteria with which to evaluate things, including human nature.

Let us continue to take bamboo and wood as our example. When not considered solely in terms of their utility, we know that their natural shapes vary dramatically, and cannot simply be reduced to the simple dichotomist categories of straight and non-straight, round-shaped and not-round-shaped. Even if, for certain reasons or purposes, we have

256 The term ‘amoral’ attempts to highlight the morally neutral aspects of human nature which are arguably overlooked by both Mencius and Han Fei. More details will be shown in the following discussions.

131 to put them into these categories, we should not overlook the fact that, between straightness and non-straightness (round and non-round), there is an unlimited number of degrees. The shapes of bamboo may be different from each other merely in degree, but this already gives each bamboo its own unique characteristic. This is in addition to the fact that they are distinctive not only in terms of “straightness”, but also in relation to countless other features. When not judged simply according to their utility, bamboo and wood can be appreciated for their own existence, diversity, and beauty. Arguably, these dimensions of beings have not been given enough attention in Han Fei’s philosophy. This leads me to the second flaw of the analogy between bamboo/wood and human nature.

Just as bamboo and wood have countless forms, human beings are diverse and distinct, even at birth. There are no two identical human beings, not even in the case of twins. If humans are not judged simply according to their “moral dispositions”, human nature is more complicated than just being good or bad, selfish or selfless. There are so many prenatal features, either in degree or in kind, which can distinguish us from each other, even without considering the possible combinations of these features. These morally neutral, but genetically significant, aspects of human nature have been overlooked by both Han Fei and Mencius, whose examinations, although arising from different perspectives, converge at the same point of morality. This does not mean that the moral and genetic concerns of human nature are competing for our attention; to the contrary, we may have to expand our moral views of human nature to include the genetic aspect. Unless the genetic dimension is taken care of, a thorough understanding of human nature, including its moral aspect, is not possible. I shall explain what I mean by this in the following discussions. I will compare the different views of human nature held by Han Fei and Mencius from a contextual perspective in order to improve our understanding of human nature and its amoral dimension.

Although restricted in terms of morality, Mencius’ proposal regarding human nature recognizes its non-utilitarian dimension. This means that there is something in human nature which cannot and should not be measured from a socio-political and/or socio- economic perspective. Han Fei, on the other hand, does not give too much attention to the non-utilitarian dimension of human nature. If he does, his theory will be self- contradicting. Let us suppose that what Han Fei argues is that human nature is innately selfish. This will lead to the conclusion that becoming selfless in order to serve the

132 public good will require one to either change or sacrifice one’s own nature or being. It is quite doubtful 1) whether human nature can be changed if it is an innate quality, and 2) whether sacrificing one’s own being for the sake of serving others is morally appropriate. Until the answers to both questions are certain, we cannot accept the proposition that human nature is innately selfish. Following this reasoning, if Han Fei’s theory of human nature is not to contradict itself, it must be grounded in the socio- political and/or socio-economic perspective instead of the non-utilitarian one.

In fact, Mencius specifically points out that injuring one’s own nature or being (in a non-utilitarian sense), even for moral purposes, does not help, but harms, morality.257 This has been employed by Mencius to highlight the inborn compassion of human beings. Mencius’ reasoning is essentially this: Where does human compassion come from if it is not an inborn quality? If it is acquired through manipulating, controlling, or reshaping our human nature, then it is simply something that a truly moral person will not accept. Therefore, human compassion must be embedded in our human nature as an innate moral quality. If we adopt Mencius’ view of human nature to examine its amoral dimension (from the non-utilitarian perspective), we may conclude that manipulating human nature (whether in its moral or amoral dimension), even to serve certain external moral purposes, may not be as moral as we believe it to be. This helps explain why dealing with the amoral (e.g., genetic) aspect of human nature is as important as developing the moral aspect (e.g., inborn human compassion).

If, as Mencius suggests, human compassion is a common characteristic of human nature, then what makes individuals unique must arise from their amoral characteristics. When developing ourselves, can we pick out and nurture only our moral quality but ignore or even supress our amoral ones? Although not specified in the text, Mencius will most likely disagree with or deny this possibility. Developing human nature selectively is not only implausible but, more importantly, immoral. For example, under a usual

257 告子曰：「性，猶杞柳也；義，猶桮棬也。以人性為仁義，猶以杞柳為桮棬。」孟子曰：「子能順杞柳之性而以為桮棬乎？將戕賊杞柳而後以為桮棬也？如將戕賊杞柳而以為桮棬，則亦將戕賊人以為仁義與？率天下之人而禍仁義者，必子之言夫！」(《孟子•告子上》) Kao Tzu said, ‘Human nature is like the [qi] willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow.’ ‘Can you,’ said Mencius, ‘make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make it into cups and bowls? If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls, must you, then, also mutilate a man to make him moral? Surely it will be these words of yours men in the world will follow in bringing disaster upon morality.’ (Dim-Cheuk Lau, Mencius, revised edition, 1979, p. 223.)

133 circumstance, expecting someone who is tone-deaf to make a contribution to music may appear to be an insult to the person, and thus morally problematic. It is true that nurturing and developing our moral nature to contribute to the common good is desirable, but this cannot be fully achieved unless it is developed alongside our own genetic dispositions.

This brings us back to Han Fei’s perception of human nature and his proposal of fa. Other than our moral disposition (human compassion), human nature also has the amoral characters. Because these characters are amoral, without certain moral guidance, they can easily become the source of our selfishness in a socio-political and socio- economic context. For example, a person who is tone-deaf can be guided to help society by using her other talents, but she can also become a musician-killer who wants to eliminate everyone who is musically gifted.258 Han Fei’s society was obviously swamped with people of the latter kind. When moral guidance failed, he had to resort to fa to curb or eliminate those selfish behaviours.

It is certainly reasonable and necessary to employ fa as a means to contain people’s selfishness and encourage them to think about and work for the common good. But this is different from suggesting that the standards of fa can be employed to interpret and evaluate human behaviour (selfless vs selfish) regardless of personal and situational differences. For example, if someone is tone-deaf, it will be more appreciated if he does not “contribute” to a concert musically (and simply enjoys himself) than if he does. In this particular case and situation, no contribution is in fact a better contribution.

258 Nevertheless, Mencius admits that our moral dispositions do not necessarily always prevail; the environmental influences on human nature can be very strong. 告子曰：「性猶湍水也，決諸東方則東流，決諸西方則西流。人性之無分於善不善也，猶水之無分於東西也。」孟子曰：「水信無分於東西。無分於上下乎？人性之善也，猶水之就下也。人無有不善，水無有不下。今夫水，搏而躍之，可使過顙；激而行之，可使在山。是豈水之性哉？其勢則然也。人之可使為不善，其性亦猶是也。」(《孟子•告子上》) Kao Tzu said, ‘Human nature is like whirling water. Give it an outlet in the east it will flow east; give it an outlet the west and it will flow west. Human nature does not show any preference for either good or bad just as water does not show any preference for either east or west.’ ‘It certainly is the case,’ said Mencius, ‘that water does not show any preference for either east or west, but does it show the same indifference to high and low? Human nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is not water that does not flow downwards. Now in the case of water, by splashing it one can make it shoot up higher than one’s forehead, and by forcing it one can make it stay on a hill. How can that be the nature of water? It is the circumstances being what they are. That man can be made bad shows that his nature is no different from that of water in this respect.’ (Dim-Cheuk Lau, Mencius, revised edition, 1979, p. 223.)

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Other than the countless varieties of innate human dispositions, temperaments, and aptitudes, individual differences are also influenced and shaped by the social/political/economic factors that affect an individual throughout his/her growth and development. Human adaptation also gives individuals the capacity to adjust their responses according to what a specific situation calls for. Taking all of these under consideration, we may better understand the complexity of human behaviour, and the difficulty of evaluating it under normative standards.

3.3 Xing Ming (刑名 or 形名) as the Standard Evaluation in Han Fei’s Philosophy In order to curb the evil or selfish conduct of the ministers and officers, Han Fei introduces the method and idea of xing ming as one of the standards of evaluation.

人主將欲禁姦，則審合刑名者，言異事也。為人臣者陳而言，君以其言授之

事，專以其事責其功。功當其事，事當其言，則賞；功不當其事，事不當其

言，則罰。故群臣其言大而功小者則罰，非罰小功也，罰功不當名也。群臣

其言小而功大者亦罰，非不說於大功也，以為不當名也害甚於有大功，故罰。

昔者韓昭侯醉而寢，典冠者見君之寒也，故加衣於君之上，覺寢而說，問左

右曰：“誰加衣者？”左右對曰：“典冠。”君因兼罪典衣與典冠。其罪典

衣、以為失其事也，其罪典冠、以為越其職也。非不惡寒也，以為侵官之害

甚於寒。故明主之畜臣，臣不得越官而有功，不得陳言而不當。越官則死，

不當則罪，守業其官所言者貞也，則群臣不得朋黨相為矣。259

The lord of men, whenever he wants to suppress culprits, must see norm accord with name and word never differ from task. Whenever a minister utters a word, the ruler should in accordance with his word assign him a task to accomplish, and in accordance with the task call the work to account. If the work corresponds with the task, and the task corresponds with the word, he should be rewarded. On the contrary, if the work is not equivalent to the task, and the task not equivalent to the word, he should be punished. Accordingly, any minister whose word is big but whose work is small should be punished. Not that the work is small, but that the work is not equivalent to the name. Again, any minister whose word is small but

259 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 83.

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whose work is big should also be punished. Not that big work is not desirable but that the discrepancy between the work and the name is worse than the accomplishment of the big work. Hence the minister should be punished. Once in by-gone days, Marquis Chao of Han was drunk and fell into a nap. The crown- keeper, seeing the ruler exposed to cold, put a coat over him. When the Marquis awoke, he was glad and asked the attendants, “Who put more clothes on my body?” “The crown-keeper did,” they replied. Then the Marquis found the coat-keeper guilty and put the crown-keeper to death. He punished the coat-keeper for the neglect of his duty, and the crown-keeper for the overriding of his post. Not that the Marquis was not afraid of catching cold but that he thought their trespassing the assigned duties was worse than his catching cold. Thus, when an intelligent ruler keeps ministers in service, no minister is allowed either to override his post and get merits thereby nor to utter any word not equivalent to a fact. Whoever overrides his post is put to death; whoever makes a word not equivalent to a fact is punished. If everyone has to do his official duty, and if whatever he says has to be earnest, then the ministers cannot associate for treasonable purposes.260

In Chinese philosophy, xing (刑 or 形) usually means the actual things, and ming (名) their names.261 In Han Fei’s philosophy, ming means in particular the job descriptions or words (言, yan) used by a minister or official to define her jobs, and xing means the actual jobs (事, shi) she accomplishes. The key function of xing ming is to evaluate whether the conduct or accomplishment of the ministers and officers is in accordance with (當, dang) what they claim to do, and to decide the punishments or rewards based on this evaluation. If the accomplishment (功, gong) accurately reflects the job requirements (shi), and is also in compliance with the initial promises (yan), the minister or officer should be rewarded. By contrast, if the accomplishment is not what the job requires, and the job description is also incongruent with the initial promises, the minister or officer deserves to be punished. Moreover, not only those who have promised much but achieved little will be punished, so too will those who have done the opposite (promised little but accomplished much). The measurement is not decided by the size or degree (big or small) of the accomplishment but by the level of accordance between the accomplishment (gong) and the promise (yan).

260 Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume I, 1959, p. 48. 261 張覺, 《韓非子全譯》, 1993, p. 52.

136

To clarify his point, Han Fei uses an example that concerns two different official positions, coat-keeper (典衣, dian yi) and crown-keeper (典冠, dian guan). The job titles are self-explanatory, in that they describe what their duties are. The point is that each official should fulfil exactly what the job requires without either neglecting or overstepping his/her duty. In the current case, the coat-keeper violated the former (失其事, shi qi shi) and the crown-keeper the latter (越其職, yue qi zhi), and both suffered punishments as a result. According to the text, we may infer that the crown-keeper who fulfilled the other person’s job must have been put to death, because those who overstep their official duties receive the death penalty (越官則死, yue guan ze si). The heavy punishment is justified by Han Fei as being the effective means to prevent the ministers and officials from colluding with each other (群臣不得朋黨相為矣, qun chen bu de peng dang xiang wei yi) through, for instance, sharing their jobs and duties.

It seems that the ministers and officials have been given opportunities to define their official duties using their own words. It is certainly helpful to match the job with one’s own personal traits and environmental context. However, what has been neglected in Han Fei’s theory is 1) that people understand themselves, and learn to improve their performances through trial and error, 2) that circumstances are subject to change, and 3) the non-utilitarian aspect of human nature.

3.3.1 The Missing Contextual Considerations in the Principle of Xing Ming Let us continue to take the case of coat- and crown-keepers as our example. Initially, each officer may promise that they will fulfil their own duty. This may be because they had no previous experiences of looking after the clothing of their master. However after performing their own duties for a while, they become very skilful at their own jobs, and start to look beyond these, which is arguably a natural process of learning in human beings. While fulfilling his/her own duty well, the crown-keeper has spare time to observe the performance of the coat-keeper. After a while, the crown-keeper has practiced this in his mind for thousands of times, and waits for just a “right” moment to “enact” it. And the opportunity comes when the crown-keeper finds that the master sleeps while drunk, and the coat-keeper is momentarily away. To prevent his master from catching a cold, the crown-keeper almost spontaneously performs the duty expected of the coat-keeper, and thereby brings the death penalty upon himself. When given the opportunity, the crown-keeper could have learnt the idea of xing ming, and

137 refrain from performing another’s duty in the future. However, because of the extreme punishment that was imposed on him, he did not get the chance. In light of this, Han Fei’s xing ming seems to be more a principle of deterrence than of rehabilitation.

However, if human nature was really so evil or selfish in his era, it is questionable whether this principle would have achieved what it intended. For example, instead of learning the principle of xing ming through the message of deterrence symbolised by the execution of the crown-keeper, the ministers and officials could have actually learnt to lie in order to evade severe punishment while still practising ultra vires and colluding with each other. In this sense, the universal solution of fa when practised using the principle of xing ming may not be as promising as Han Fei wished it to be. The famous saying in the Analects suggests that, if people are guided by government orders, and regulated by penal laws, their skills of evading the punishments will be enhanced at the expense of their sense of shame.262

If the crown-keeper had not been given the death penalty, he would have still had opportunities to learn the ‘xing ming’ principle and to henceforth only perform his own duty. Of course, the situation could get worse that the crown-keeper would plot with the coat-keeper against their master. It seems that, in order to eliminate the second possibility (e.g, Han Fei’s idea of “the way of certainty” mentioned in section 3.2.1), Han Fei prefers severe penalties over more lenient ones. However, as shown in the above discussion, even a severe penalty alone cannot guarantee a promising result.

The contextual approach of xing ming as an alternative may help yield a better result. First of all, the natural learning ability of human beings should be respected. Human beings are not living in isolation, but with many others and their environments. The principle of xing ming seems to go against (or at least limits) the learning capacity of human beings. This does not therefore mean that xing ming is a bad principle. In fact xing ming is needed most when defining the scope of the official duties, otherwise the governing and administrative systems will be in chaos. Although it may appear basic,

262 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」 (《論語•為政》) The master said: “Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng 政) and keep them orderly with penal law (xing 刑), and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de 德) and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety (li 禮) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.” (Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 76.)

138 xing ming is actually amongst the high-end political skills, which requires the acquisition of greater learning and practice through trial and error. Sometimes, it may not simply be a personal skill, but a political agreement with others, including the ministers, officials, and even departments and institutions in a contemporary political system. It can be much more complicated than it may sound. If one incurs the death penalty simply by committing one mistake, such a severe punishment does not help, but is rather detrimental to, the doctrine of xing ming.

Secondly, the punishments and rewards corresponding to xing ming also need to be considered and evaluated according to the actual situation. If the reason behind the coat- keeper’s neglect of duty was because he was really sick that day and therefore failed to be attentive to his master’s drunken, somnolent state, our views of the final punishment may become much less favourable. In a usual condition, people are expected to be responsible for their own duty; however, in a special condition (e.g. when someone is unable to perform the duty because of sickness), it is reasonable and appreciated if others can reach out a helping hand. Knowing the coat-keeper’s sickness, the crown- keeper tried to help the coat-keeper by covering their master with a coat, which resulted in him incurring the death penalty. Even in the name of xing ming, a punishment like this does not sound right. Let us assume, in a horrific natural disaster, the ministers who oversee the rescue squads are killed. Does that mean, according to the principle of xing ming, that helpless people will be left to die because other ministers should not take up the work of their dead colleagues? If the answer to this is ‘Yes’, then it is obviously against Han Fei’s principle of gong. In light of this, certain contextual factors and exemptions should be considered when implementing the principle of xing ming.

Thirdly, in exercising xing ming, both (self-seeking and non-utilitarian) domains of human nature should be taken into consideration. According to Han Fei’s understanding of human nature, human beings are born selfish. Therefore the crown-keeper’s good intention (of covering his master with a cloth) must be motivated by something selfish. If it is true, his ultra vires behaviour must come from certain selfish purposes. Under the self-seeking view of human nature, any performance that violates the xing ming principle must be accompanied by self-interest, and must therefore deserve the severest punishment.

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In analysing Han Fei’s theory of human nature, I have pointed out that Han Fei’s view of human nature is limited to the utilitarian (social, political, and economic) domain, and disregards the non-utilitarian domain that most concerns Mencius. From the non- utilitarian perspective, the crown-keeper’s action may come from his sincere wish to ensure the good health of his master. In light of this, the death penalty inflicted upon him may appear to be extreme or even unreasonable, despite the doctrine of xing ming. Of course, like Han Fei’s assumption, the possibility should not and cannot be ruled out that the real motivation behind the crown-keeper’s apparent act of good will may have come from certain selfish purposes. How should we then discern an action motivated by an insincere purpose from that motivated by a sincere one while still taking into consideration the non-utilitarian aspect of human nature? One of the best approaches may be to examine the actions on a case-by-case basis. In the current case, to identify whether the apparently good-willed action of the crown-keeper was sincerely motivated, we may need to collect more information, such as the character, reputation, and integrity of this person and the consistency between the current action and his previous ones. Through this additional information, we will be able to tell whether or not his non- utilitarian human characteristics have been well nurtured. If, according to his previous records, a person’s behaviour has been largely dominated by utilitarian purposes, we may have good reason to suspect that his current action is also not all that sincere. With respect to this, even exercising the death penalty under the xing ming principle still seems extreme. However, it would be much more justifiable than on a sincere action from a sincere individual. In this sense, including the non-utilitarian perspective of human nature in the doctrine of xing ming requires the ability to perform the careful contextual (case-based) examinations.

In sum, the perspectives missing from Han Fei’s theory of xing ming (namely human beings’ natural capacity and tendency of learning through trial and error, the changing circumstances, and the non-utilitarian dimension of human nature) all concern the contextual employment and application of xing ming. But Han Fei’s unconditional belief in the ruling method of fa through the principle of xing ming obviously runs against the contextual perspective. This makes his methods and principles overly rigid and less adaptable, and thus hard to meet the anticipated aims. The current critiques from the contextual perspective help futher explain why Legalist philosophy (especially

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Han Fei’s version) can often be described as “anti-humanistic” and “non-humanitarian”, or dubbed as the “amoral science of statecraft”263 or simply “the behavioural science”264.

3.3.2 The Contextual Status of Fa in Han Fei’s Philosophy On the one hand, Han Fei expects fa to be “the way of certainty” (必然之道, bi ran zhi dao) in ruling a state, so that it can be adopted effectively as a ruling method by even a mediocre ruler (中主, zhong zhu).265 As Yang observes, Han Fei seems to suggest that “[i]n order to bring about social order, average rulers in a position of power should depend on fa.”266 Fa should be consistent and unvaried (固, gu) so that it can be learned and remembered by the majority.267 On the other hand, he understands that fa, as a ruling method, can be employed by a wise ruler (明主, ming zhu) as an effective tool to assist her in running the state, but does not necessarily dominate her decisions.268 He stresses that there are no constant (無常, wu chang) ruling methods but only effective (治, zhi) ones. The effective ruling methods always reflect the demands of the age and situation. If the ruling methods are unable to respond to the challenge originating in their circumstances, then chaos (亂, luan) will be sure to set in. Therefore, when governing the people, a sage will ensure that fa moves with time, and prohibitions

263 Angus Charles Graham, “Legalism: An Amoral Science of Statecraft,” in Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, Open Court Publishing Company, 1989, pp. 267-92. 264 Benjamin Schwartz, “Legalism: The Behavioural Science,” in The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 321-49. 265 釋法術而心治，堯不能正一國。去規矩而妄意度，奚仲不能成一輪。廢尺寸而差短長，王爾不能半中。使中主守法術，拙匠守規矩尺寸，則萬不失矣。君人者，能去賢巧之所不能，守中拙之所萬不失，則人力盡而功名立。 (《韓非子•用人》) Casting law and tact aside and trusting to personal judgments, even Yao could not rectify a state. Discarding compasses and squares and trusting to optional measures, even His Chung could not make a single wheel. Giving rulers up and thereby attempting to make shortness and length even, even Wang Erh could not point out the middle. Supposing an average sovereign abode by law and tact and an unskilful carpenter used compasses, squares, and rulers, certainly there would be no mistake in … myriad cases. Who rules men, if he casts aside what the wise and the skilful fall short of and maintains what the average and the unskilful never fail in, can then exert the forces of the people to the utmost and accomplish his achievement and reputation. (Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume I, 1959, p. 270.) 266 Soon-ja Yang, “Shen Dao’s Theory of fa and His Influence on Han Fei,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 59. 267 法莫如一而固，使民知之。 (《韓非子•五蠹》) 268 故以有餘補不足，以長續短之謂明主。 (《韓非子•觀行》) Therefore, the ruler who supplies scarcity with abundance and supplements shortness with length is called “an intelligent sovereign.” (Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume I, 1959, p. 259.)

141 change in response to people’s capabilities.269 In light of this, the status of fa in Han Fei’s theory depends on the character of the ruler. Fa can dominate the ruling system in an absolute way if the ruler is not a politically gifted one; otherwise, it merely serves as a necessary aide to a talented ruler.

Xing ming as the principle of fa may also inherit a flexible interpretation and contextual application. If the decision-maker is a wise ruler, then she is free to use the principle of xing ming as she wishes and treat the principle as merely a tool to assist her in decision- making. In the previous case, the crown-keeper’s action will be evaluated thoroughly and comprehensively before the final decree. A much more subtle and nuanced decision may be made by the wise ruler who is able to devise a contextual examination of the issue at hand, and take all the three aforementioned dimensions (and perhaps more) into consideration before arriving at the final decision. This reflects, to a certain extent, Van Norden’s insights that it is possible to synthesize “the best of Han Fei’s Ligalism with Confucianism.”270 However, if the ruler is a mediocre one, then the xing ming principle may be utilized as shown in Han Fei’s text. In this sense, although not directly specified, Han Fei seems clearly aware of the room available for context in the application of xing ming: the principle is by no means fixed, rather, its implementation is affected by the character of the one who applies the principle. The mediocre ruler may not bother to consider the comprehensive context in which principles are devised,271 whereas a wise ruler will take for granted the contextual application of principles, such as xing ming. Of course, the results from these two utterly distinct attitudes would be very different.

269 故治民無常，唯治為法。法與時轉則治，治與世宜則有功。故民樸、而禁之以名則治，世知、維之以刑則從。時移而治不易者亂，能治眾而禁不變者削。故聖人之治民也，法與時移而禁與能變。 (《韓非子•心度》) Hence there is no constant method for the government of men. The law alone leads to political order. If laws are adjusted to the time, there is good government. If government fits the age, there will be great accomplishment. Therefore, when the people are naive, if you regulate them with fame, there will be good government; when everybody in the world is intelligent, if you discipline them with penalties, they obey. While time is moving on, if laws do not shift accordingly, there will be misrule; while abilities are diverse, if prohibitions are not change, the state will be dismembered. Therefore, the sage in governing the people makes laws move with time and prohibitions change with abilities. (Wenkui Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, volume II, 1959, p. 328.) 270 Bryan W. Van Norden, “Han Fei and Confucianism: Toward a Synthesis,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 135. 271 According to Pines, Han Fei seems to suggest that the mediocre or incompetent ruler is expected to reduce his or her “personal intervention into policy-making to the degree of almost complete nullification of the ruler’s personality.” Yuri Pines, “Submerged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin, New York: Springer, 2013, p. 69.

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However, Han Fei did not even bother to evaluate and compare which approach (contextual or rigid) is better, and this may be because the existence of a wise ruler was only hypothetically during his time. Given the words left in the text for the potentially wise ruler, he may not have completely lost hope.

Conclusion The political philosophy of Han Fei appears to oppose the Confucian values of ren and yi, and thus be amoral and anti-humanistic. However, the current investigation suggests that Han Fei’s disapproval of ren and yi is not unconditional but contextual. First of all, no ruling principles (including ren and yi) can and should be implemented unconditionally, but depends on the social and historical situations. In Han Fei’s time, the social and historical reality was no longer suitable for adopting ren and yi as the ruling principles. In this sense, Han Fei essentially disapproves of the untimely employment of inappropriate ruling policies, instead of the moral values of ren and yi themselves. Secondly, from the perspective of individual development, ren and yi are two fundamental moral principles; however, in a social, political, and economic context, the practice of ren and yi may not necessarily and always reflect the true moral quality of the actors. Realizing the then reality, Han Fei promotes gong and si as the new benchmark in evaluating the moral nature of individuals’ behaviour.

In light of these, the contextual concerns in Han Fei’s political philosophy pay great attention to the environmental/circumstantial factors that affect the implementation of a ruling system, which is expected to be answerable to the changing and dynamic historical context. A particular social, political, and economic situation can also expose the limitary nature of certain ruling strategies, if they are not able to answer situational challenges. Moreover, Han Fei also challenges the moral ideas of ren and yi from a social, political, and economic perspective. When the practices of ren and yi can no longer faithfully reflect the true motives (self- or other-regard) behind a seemingly moral action, the doctrines of gong and si are introduced as the new standards to perform the job of moral evaluation more effectively. In this light, Han Fei’s philosophy may also imply the conceptual aspect of contextualism, e.g., the conceptual moral context of ren and yi versus that of gong and si over the historical and situational changes.

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Han Fei’s political theories are closely related to his pessimistic view of the type of human nature that prevailed during his time, a view which appears to contradict that of Mencius on the same subject. Mencius’ promotion of ‘xing shan’ is grounded in his observation of human compassion in a non-utilitarian context, whereas Han Fei’s advocate of self-serving human nature results from the empirical evidence of his contemporaries’ self-centred behaviour in the social, political, and economic context. Both reflect the distinctive aspects of human nature. However, these two aspects complement, instead of contradict, each other in terms of the bigger picture.

Although it may appear that moral issues are amongst Mencius’ central concerns but not Han Fei’s, both in fact give too much attention to the moral aspect of human nature while overlooking the amoral aspect. Our prenatal and genetic features decide that, when contributing to the public good, each and every one of us will do it in our own way. Moral requests and disciplines that ignore the amoral aspect of human nature may not be as moral as they claim to be. Although not specified in the text, Mencius implies that the moral standards which violate human nature are not genuinely moral. In this sense, Mencius’ understanding of human nature may be more thoughtful and inclusive than that of Han Fei.

The dispute between Han Fei and Mencius on human nature serves as the best example to reveal the fact that limited contextual perspectives can lead to partial views. The view of human nature seems rational when considered within each philosopher’s context of examination, however become insensible from another’s perspective. The missing amoral aspect of human nature in both theories suggests that, without the awareness of the limitation of our perspectives, we may easily fall into the illusion that a particular view has universal value when it does not. This can potentially prevent us from seeing the bigger picture that a theory or idea represents.

Han Fei seems to favour the ‘xing ming’ principle in the application of fa, and promotes this principle as the “universal” measure of reward and punishment. However, this “universality” is not promoted unconditionally—an extremely gloomy view of human nature in Han Fei’s time. Han Fei believes that, when the ruler is mediocre and the majority of human beings are selfish, it is better to implement harsh penal laws following strict measures, such as the principle of xing ming. However, in the text, he does not rule out the possibility of the emergence of wise rulers, who are able to use

144 principles in an adaptive manner and even amend the fa when they deem it suitable. It seems that the dynamic and limitary natures of contextualism are again reflected in Han Fei’s philosophy.

In terms of practicality, Han Fei’s philosophy aims to solve the problems of, and offer public policies to, the political disorders of his time. Therefore, it is less concerned with the practical aspects of epistemological development, especially self-cultivation.

The missing practical concern of self-cultivation results in his unbalanced preference for the ruling system, especially penal laws (fa), over the peoples who are either ruling or ruled. The negative result of this is that, although knowing the importance of practical contextualism well, Han Fei’s idea of fa could be implemented non-contextually. This is understandable given the chaotic era in which Han Fei’s philosophy arose. However, this may have also contributed to the short lifespan of a regime that was built on the heavy punishment promoted by Han Fei’s philosophy.

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Chapter Four

The Zhuang Zi: Practical and Contextual Epistemology

In studying the epistemological perspectives in Chinese thinking, there are very few ancient texts that can be compared with the Zhuang Zi (莊子, literally meaning Master Zhuang), one of the prominent Daoist texts. The text is named after a historical figure called Zhuang Zhou (莊周), who is believed to have lived in the period 375-300 BCE.272 His studies, according to Sima Qian, left nothing uncovered or untouched (其學無所不窺, qi xue wu suo bu kui). Sima Qian’s appraisal of Zhuangzi reflects, to a certain extent, the findings in the current chapter which suggests that the text Zhuang Zi concerns almost every single dimension of contextualism outlined in the first chapter of the current thesis. The received version of the text is the result of editorial treatment by an ancient Chinese scholar called Guo Xiang (郭象, 252-312 CE).273 By the time he had compiled the text, it only contained thirty-three chapters, whereas, according to the Record of Arts and Literature in the History of Former Han Dynasty (漢書藝文誌, Han Shu Yi Wen Zhi), the original manuscript had fifty-two chapters.274 It is obvious that much had been done to the text through the definitive work of Guo Xiang.275

There is much debate about whether the entire text was written by Zhuangzi himself, the common belief seems to attribute the ‘Seven Inner Chapters’ to him while the authorship of the rest is in dispute. Whether or not it is true that the seven Inner Chapters were originally written by the historical Zhuangzi, some commentators suggest that one should read through the entire text in order to appreciate its beauty.276 This has been exemplified in an interesting story from one of the ‘Outer Chapters’, Autumn Floods (秋水, Qiu Shui), in the Zhuang Zi. This short story presents a fascinating debate between Zhuangzi and his friend (and rival), Huizi, over whether the happiness of fish can be known. Tackling this together with other gripping fables and

272 Vincent Shen, “Daoism (II): Zhuang Zi and the Zhuang-zi,” In History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mou, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 237. 273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. 275 Livia Knaul, “Kuo hsiang and the Chuang Tzu,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 12:4, 1985, p. 429. 276 Vincent Shen, “Daoism (II): Zhuang Zi and the Zhuang-zi,” 2009, p. 237.

147 insightful arguments in the Zhuang Zi will help further expound the idea of practical contextualism.

The current chapter is comprised of two parts with the first one exploring Zhuangzi’s contextual approach to epistemology and the second highlighting Zhuangzi’s unique advice of accessing, acquiring, and even transforming knowledge through practice (instead of contemplation). The first part starts with Zhuangzi’s elegant critiques of the familiar topic of personal biases inherent in what people deem to know, and transitions to the contextual dimension of ‘knowing things’ unique to Zhuangzi’s philosophy. The Chinese character ming (明, illuminating) will be the focal point of the first part. Ming is adopted by Zhuangzi to describe the optimal (contextual) epistemological perspective. The contextual dimension of ming will be unveiled 1) by comparing it with ‘relativism’, and, more importantly, 2) in terms of its implication in the perplexing story of Zi Fei Yu (子非魚, You Are not a Fish) from the Outer Chapter Qiu Shui (秋水, The Autumnal Floods).

The second part aims to probe how the optimal (contextual) epistemological approach can be achieved. According to Zhuangzi the contextual acquisition and application of knowledge should be accomplished through long term and repeated practice instead of contemplation. The well-known story of Pao Ding Jie Niu (庖丁解牛, Cook Ding Carves up an Ox) from the Inner Chapter Yang Sheng Zhu (養生主, The Secret of Caring for Life) will be employed as the key example to explicate Zhuangzi’s practical approach to contextually epistemological status or even transformation. The intriguing concept of Wu Hou (無厚, No Thickness) from the story of Cook Ding will be examined together with the ideas from the other Daoist cannon, the Dao De Jing (道德經), to uncover the interspatial implication of the contextual transformation of knowledge in the Zhuang Zi.

4.1 Contextual Epistemology in the Zhuang Zi Like his Western counterparts, Zhuangzi realizes that our assessment and understanding of the world can be easily biased by our individual preferences and emotional appeals.

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In the Inner Chapter Impartial Observations of Things (齊物論, Qi Wu Lun),277 Zhuangzi offers his insights into this.

Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, willfulness, candor, insolence - music from empty holes, mushrooms springing up in dampness, day and night replacing each other before us, and no one knows where they sprout from.278

喜怒哀樂，慮嘆變慹，姚佚啟態；樂出虛，蒸成菌。日夜相代乎前，而莫

知其所萌。(Zhuangzi, 4/2/13-4/2/14)279

It is interesting that in this short passage Zhuangzi lists twelve different human emotions (喜怒哀樂慮嘆, xi nu ai le lü tan; joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret) and attitudes (變慹姚佚啟態, bian zhi yao yi qi tai; fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, wilfulness, candour, insolence) all at once, and performs a metaphysical analysis of these emotions and attitudes. He suggests that although sentimental expressions are real phenomena of human reactions, they tend to be ephemeral in nature. They supersede each other recurrently over time (日夜相代乎前, ri ye xiang dai hu qian), yet are not necessarily aware of where they sprout from (而莫知其所萌, er mo zhi qi suo meng). Despite their ephemeral nature, Zhuangzi is acutely aware that emotions are subject to situational changes. An interesting story from the same chapter wittily illustrates this for us.

A monkey keeper handing out nuts said, ‘Three every morning and four every evening.’ The monkeys were all in a rage. ‘All right then,’ he said, ‘four every morning and three every evening.’ The monkeys were all delighted. Without anything being missed out either in name or in substance, their pleasure and anger were put to use.280

277 Translation by the current author. 278 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, 1964, pp. 3-33. 279 洪業主編《莊子引得》，哈佛燕京學社引得特刊第 20 號，哈佛燕京學社引得編 Zhuangzi Yinde (A Concordance to Chuang Tzu), Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 20 (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956) 280 A. C. Graham, Chuang-tzŭ: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-tzŭ, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 54.

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狙公賦芧，曰：「朝三而莫四。」眾狙皆怒。曰：「然則朝四而莫三。」

眾狙皆悅。名實未虧，而喜怒為用，亦因是也。(Zhuangzi, 5/2/38-5/2/39)

There is no difference in the total number, but just the difference of one nut between ‘three in the morning and four in the evening’ (朝三而莫四, zhao san er mo si) and ‘four in the morning and three in the evening’ (朝四而莫三, zhao si er mo san). However, it has stirred an emotional reaction amongst the monkeys, who are happy (悅, yue) about the latter but angered (怒, nu) by the former, despite the fact that ‘neither the name nor the substance has been reduced’ (名實未虧, ming shi wei kui). Still this swap of distributive differences is already effective enough to ‘elicit the feelings of happiness or anger’ (喜怒為用, xi nu wei yong) in the monkeys. This intriguing story seems to suggest that a small circumstantial change can have a significant impact on emotions. It is unlikely that human beings can be exempt from such an effect.

If our visions and beliefs are clouded by emotions, then it is hardly possible that an impartial picture of the world, and of what is really happening around us, can be accurately perceived. In his philosophy, Zhuangzi may not be promoting the idea of ‘impartiality’ as some commentators rightly point out.281 Nevertheless, the story about the monkeys suggests that it is difficult for most creatures (human beings included) to escape the pitfall of reacting in a partial and biased manner because of our emotions. For instance, immediate gratification of having more now (four nuts in the morning) seems emotionally more appealing than deferred satisfaction of having more later (four in the evening). “Creatures” including human beings seem to be inclined to react in certain ways instead of others. Zhuangzi recognizes partiality and prejudice in human emotions and the potential harm they incur. In Zhuangzi’s eyes, the association between our habitual ignorance of the “bigger” picture and the negative impact of our emotions may render our reactions as laughable as those of the single-minded monkeys.

The difficulties of human understanding are caused not only by the emotions but also the capricious context itself. The latter can undergo countless variations from moment to moment. To pin down the evolving context seems an impossible mission, yet a well-

281 Karyn Lai, “Philosophy and Philosophical Reasoning in the Zhuangzi: Dealing with Plurality,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 33:3, 2006, pp. 365-74. David Wong, “Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 22:2, 2005, pp. 91-107.

150 known figure in the Zhuang Zi called Cook Ding (庖丁, Pao Ding) seems to have marvellous skills in dealing with changes in the context:

When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now—now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest ligament or tendon, much less a main joint.282

始臣之解牛之時，所見無非牛者。三年之後，未嘗見全牛也。方今之時，

臣以神遇，而不以目視，官知止而神欲行。依乎天理，批大郤，導大窾，

因其固然。技經肯綮之未嘗，而況大軱乎！(Zhuangzi, 7/3/5-7/3/7)

This is one of the “knack-passages”283, as Joseph Needham labels them, with rich meanings in expounding Zhuangzi’s practical and contextual epistemology, and will reappear in section 4.2 for a further analysis from a different angle. Concerned by the potentially epistemologically relativist interpretation of Zhuangzi’s skepticism, Robert Eno makes the following observation: “Following as it does the destructive analysis of the [Qi Wu Lun], the thrust of the Cook Ding tale stands as a positive counterpoint: a portrait of ‘ordinary practice’ raised to the level of nonrelativized knowing.”284 This knack-passage, just as other similar counterparts, does, to a certain extent, relieve the readers from the overwhelmingly sceptical approach to knowledge in the Zhuang Zi. However, before acknowledging this “nonrelativized knowing,” let us first appreciate the contextual dimension of epistemology in this passage.285

At the very early stage of his practice, Cook Ding does not seem to pay close attention to the distinctive biological structures of oxen. All he sees is an ox. However, this has been changed after three years of practice, where an ox is no longer just an ox as a whole, but comprised of very concrete anatomical parts which are 1) different between

282 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 50-1. 283 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, p. 121. 284 Robert Eno, “Cook Ding’s Dao and the Limits of Philosophy,” In Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, New York: SUNY Press, 1996, p. 135. 285 The “nonrelativized knowing” refers to the relativistic issues in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, which will be discussed in 4.1.3.

151 oxen, and 2) impossible to be observed before they are cut open. Human perception and knowledge stop (官知止, guan zhi zhi) at the boundaries they are unable to penetrate. The biggest hurdle to Cook Ding’s performance is probably the fact that each ox constitutes a novel context. He is expected to operate expertly on every ox despite the fact that ligaments, tendons, and joints can grow very differently in each ox. These differences are unpredictable prior to dissection, but they do not seem to bother Cook Ding, who ‘goes along with the natural makeup’ (依乎天理, yi hu tian li), and ‘follows things as they are’ (因其固然, yin qi gu ran). It is worth noticing here that the Chinese term zhi (知) for ‘knowing’ or ‘knowledge’ does not appear in Cook Ding’s solution. Instead Cook Ding explains his skills in distinctively practical and situational terms, such as yi (依, to go along with) and yin (因, to follow). This suggests that awareness of context may be mastered more practically than contemplatively. The practical implications of contextual epistemology will be elaborated in section 4.2, but, first of all, let us look at how knowledge can be interpreted contextually under the key term ming (明, illumination) in the Zhuang Zi.

4.1.1 Shi-fei (是非) and Zhuangzi’s Ming (明) Zhuangzi hopes that, unlike monkeys, our understanding of the world can be expanded: not through limited sensory or habitual thinking, but by virtue of our capability of “illuminating” (明, ming) our understanding of things.286 This illumination largely depends on how well we can decipher a complementary, interdependent, and contextual relationship between ideas, opinions, things, and events. This has been illustrated in the Chapter Impartial Observations of Things:

Everything has its “that,” everything has its “this.” From the point of view of “that” you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, “that” comes out of “this” and “this” depends on “that”—which is to say that “this” and “that” give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; there is death there must be birth…. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong…. Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven. He too recognizes a “this,” but a “this” is also “that,” a “that” which is also “this.” His “that” has both a

286 In Chinese, 明 can mean both “to understand” (e.g., 明白) and “to illuminate” (e.g., 照明).

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right and a wrong in it; his “this” too has both a right and wrong in it. So does he still have a “this” and “that”? Or does he in fact no longer have a “this” and “that”? A state in which “this” and “that” no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness. So I say, the best thing to use is clarity.287

物無非彼，物無非是。自彼則不見，自知則知之。故曰：彼出於是，是亦

因彼。彼是，方生之說也。雖然，方生方死，方死方生；方可方不可，方

不可方可；因是因非，因非因是。是以聖人不由，而照之於天，亦因是也。是亦彼也，彼亦是也。彼亦一是非，此亦一是非。果且有彼是乎哉？果且

無彼是乎哉？彼是莫得其偶，謂之道樞。樞始得其環中，以應無窮。是亦

一無窮，非亦一無窮也。故曰「莫若以明」。(Zhuangzi, 4/2/27-4/2/31)

This passage provides a great amount of information about the idea of the contextual and dynamic interdependence between things and ideas. A sage is able to recognize opposing ideas, such as “this” (此, ci) and “that” (彼, bi), “right” (是, shi) and “wrong” (非, fei), and “death” (死, si) and “birth” (生, sheng). However, according to Zhuangzi, a sage will not take any of these ideas as having definitive (定, ding) values. Rather, when ideas or things are perceived, their immediate or potential correlates (whether similar or different) are identified simultaneously.

The denial of absolute standards has been embodied in the discussions of the term shi- fei (是非). As indicated in Watson’s translation, shi and fei have been translated as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Unlike the aforementioned pair of bi (this) and ci (that), or sheng (birth) and si (death), which is usually morally neutral, the shi-fei pair can involve value judgment, and can hence be ethically significant. Chris Fraser argues that “There is no definitive or ultimate way to distinguish ‘this’ from ‘that’ or shi from fei. By some standard or another, anything can be deemed either.”288 Chad Hansen adopts a radically skeptical approach to the idea of shi-fei in the Zhuang Zi. He argues that “any standard,

287 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, 1964, pp. 34-5. A.C. Graham’s translation of the same passage has stronger contextual “feelings” as it is saturated with the word “circumstances”. I did not choose it as the excerpt because it also gives stronger relativistic feelings which I try to deflate in this thesis. 288 Chris Fraser, “Zhuangzi and the Heterogeneity of Value,” In New Visions of the Zhuangzi, ed. Livia Kohn, Three Pines Press, 2015, p. 44.

153 any distinction, any dao as a guide is to make a prior shi-fei judgment. Some arbitrary standard must be assumed before selecting any guide.”289

Just as the English words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ can function as nouns, adjectives, or verbs, so can shi and fei in Chinese. This is best exemplified in the following passage from the same chapter.

…then we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the [Moists]. What one calls right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if we want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is clarity.290

故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，

則莫若以明。(Zhuangzi, 4/2/26-4/2/27)

Shi and fei are translated as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, respectively, in this passage. Shi and fei are used as nouns in the phrase ‘the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Moists’ (儒、墨之是非, ru mo zhi shi fei), as adjectives in the phrase ‘what one calls right the other calls wrong (and vice versa)’ (以是其所非, 而非其所是; yi shi qi suo fei, er fei qi suo shi), and as verbs in the phrase ‘right their wrongs and wrong their rights’ (是其所非而非其所是, shi qi suo fei er fei qi suo shi). Graham offers a slightly different translation of the first sentence: “…so we have the right and wrong of Confucians and Mohists, by which what is it for one of them for the other is not, what is not for one of them for the other is.”291 Graham’s translation has added an extra dimension of shi and fei as ‘what is this’ and ‘what is not this’ (that) or ‘one’ and ‘other’, which is similar to the pair bi (this) and ci (that).The later Mohists believe that settling the issues of right and wrong is a matter of determining fixed distinctions like shi-fei, tong-yi (同異, same or different), and etc. in (or from) a given context (or perspective).292 Whereas Hui Shi (惠施, 370?–310? BCE), a master from the School of Names (名家, Ming Jia) famous for presenting difficult paradoxes and analogies, adopts an utterly opposite stand to

289 Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, USA: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 279. 290 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, 1964, p. 34. 291 A. C. Graham, Chuang-tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 2001, p. 52. 292 Dan Robins, “Names, Cranes, and the Later Moists,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39:3, 2012, pp. 381. Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, pp. 115-8.

154 suggest that “true” distinctions are purely an illusion because names can be randomly given.293 However, Gongsun Long (公孫龍, b. 380 BCE?), another Ming Jia master famous for his debate of ‘White Horse Is Not a Horse’ (白馬非馬, bai ma fei ma), seems more interested in employing peculiar cases to challenge people’s conventional assumptions about language. Despite the disagreements between the later Mohists and Ming Jia, both recognize the importance of language. However, Zhuangzi seems doubtful about putting so much faith in words.

The previous passage seems to suggest that Zhuangzi believes that language itself constitutes the fundamental issue of the shi-fei problem. According to the later Mohists and the scholars from Ming Jia, it seems that, in order to “sort out” our understanding of the world and settle arguments, we must first and foremost acquire the ability to distinguish shi (as this) from fei (that) in naming things. The underlying assumption behind this is that words are able to map things out in an objective manner.294 Apparently, Zhuangzi is not convinced by an assumption like this. Amongst the various reasons behind Zhuangzi’s scepticism, Lai highlights his doubt about whether language can adequately capture the complexity and diversity of the world.295 Chad Hansen is also concerned with a similar question, and argues that, in the Zhaung Zi, we are encouraged to “focus on how language works as a natural phenomenon instead of on the abstract separation of language and its object.”296 Both scholars seem to suggest that the assumption that language can help objectify things not only fails to capture the reality of the world (e.g., can we name all natural colours?), but more importantly, it also ironically overlooks the different perspectives upheld by those who are involved in the very practice of naming things. In other words, the act of objectifying things seems to contradict the inevitably subjective nature of this process. In this sense, no sound results can be expected from this linguistic approach to things.

Obviously, Zhuangzi has rightly spotted the antinomy involved in this wishful thinking of “naming objectively”. If, unfortunately, it is impossible to give fixed names to things, then it seems inevitable that, according to Graham, we are ‘saying from a lodging place’

293 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, pp. 115-8. 294 The simplest version of this will be “if one thing is ‘this’, then it cannot be ‘that’.” In this way, people can identify things from each other. 295 Karyn Lai, “Philosophy and Philosophical Reasoning in the Zhuangzi: Dealing with Plurality,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 33:3, 2006, pp. 365-74. 296 Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 2000, p. 274.

155 when involved in a debate.297 ‘Saying from a lodging place’ means that it is very unlikely, if not impossible, to distill language of personal opinions or perspectives. According to Lai, ‘saying from a lodging place’ can easily render our disputes (over the “truths”) the ad hominem arguments.298 Whether or not this makes Zhuangzi a relativist is still subject to further discussion. At least, little confirmation of this view can be found in the text.299 Section 4.1.3 will be dedicated to this issue of relativism in the Zhuang Zi. At this stage, I will only give a brief account of it.

If words can only reflect one’s personal views, then Zhuangzi seems to be really pessimistic about language. However this ‘if’ is based on the supposition that the ‘self’ (as the spokesperson) has an isolated identity that is not recognized by others. It is probably true that most of the time we judge others from our own perspectives; however, if we can recognize our habit of ‘saying from a lodging place’, there may still be room for us to limit this tendency. Although it may demand a significant amount of effort and practice, Zhuangzi certainly believes that we are capable of understanding our own limitations when making judgments. This is confirmed by an important concept in the Zhuang Zi called ming (明, illumination or clarity). It is hard to envision why the term ming is proposed if our understanding of the world cannot be extended beyond ourselves. Ming seems only to make sense when different perspectives are appreciated. However, the text frequently emphasizes the difficulty of lodging oneself in somebody else’s perspective.

To Zhuangzi, each individual seems to view things from their own contextual perspective. As I have mentioned above, the difference between ordinary people and sages is that the latter are aware of their contextualized view while the former can barely realize it. To use an analogy, ordinary people identify things by “illuminating” them with a torch that has a concentrated, and hence narrow, beam of light. Due to the limited coverage of the torch light, things will appear as standalone objects. Therefore, only things or ideas of immediate concern will glow before consciousness. To a sage, however, things present themselves differently, because it is as if they are exposed under a fluorescent lamp with a much broader scope of illumination. In other words,

297 A. C. Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 2001, pp. 25-6. 298 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, p. 151. 299 Ibid., p. 152.

156 one can simultaneously and immediately see more things and their relations.300 This analogy assumes an association between illumination and light.301 However, should this be the only perception of ming? I contend that this may not be the case.

4.1.2 A Contextual Appraisal of Ming In an article exploring ming in the Zhuangzi, Yuet Keung Lo offers three important observations in relation to the concept ‘ming’: 1) “Zhuangzi’s ming is … ironically darkness par excellence. It is darkness that subsumes illumination.”,302 2) “Ming is intimately correlated with knowledge in the Zhuangzi.”,303 and 3) “[T]he Daoists would block all conduits of perception and intellect to create a twilight zone within their own minds, which affords them graceful and non-competitive tranquillity and an ever open- minded and encompassing perspective that accommodates differences and respects diversity.”304 Lo’s observations raise an important question to which the article itself does not offer a specific answer: if Zhuangzi’s ming is an epistemological concept, then what does the darkness of ming imply? If, as suggested above, the lightness (or illumination) of ming represents the status of ‘known’, it may be viable to suggest that the darkness of ming signifies the state of the ‘unknown’. Ming is an ability to “know”, and also a constant awareness of the limitation of our capacity for perception and intellect in the act of grasping knowledge.305 Because of this last point, Zhuangzi’s ming does not “dwell” in broad daylight but “wanders” around “a twilight zone” (as Lo puts it). It oversees both sides (light and dark), and appreciates the value and power of the ‘unknowable’(s). Therefore Zhuangzi’s ming is a self-composed idea, and does not have to fear its own dark side. Lo writes: “They [the Daoists] would orient their inner light inwardly toward their own spiritual universe so that it will resemble the chaotic structure of the ever inchoate universe.”306 It is very difficult not to write poetically or even mystically when expounding the text Zhuang Zi. Lo’s explication appears to be very metaphysical and even mystical, it resembles a certain personal experience which

300 This interpretation of illumination as Heavenly light has been specifically promoted in Graham’s translation (2001: 52). 301 Passages in the Zhuangzi, such as 奏之以陰陽之和，燭之以日月之明 (《莊子·天運》), indicate this kind of interpretation of 明. 302 Yuet Keung Lo, “To Use or Not To Use: The Idea of Ming in the Zhuangzi,” Monumenta Serica, 47, 1999, p. 150. 303 Ibid., p. 157. 304 Ibid., p. 159. 305 The focus here may not be on the actual contents of knowledge, but rather on the way of knowing things. 306 Yuet Keung Lo, “To Use or Not To Use: The Idea of Ming in the Zhuangzi,” 1999, p. 159.

157 is difficult to describe in words. However, the epistemological denotation of ming suggested in his work is unmistakably clear that ming is an epistemological concept and as illumination (known/knowable) also has its dark side (unknown/unknowable). Since the pair, ‘known/knowable’ and ‘unknown/unknowable’, exemplifies an interrelational dimension of contextualism, a contextual approach may offer another possible angle when examining the concept of ming.

We may compare the twilight zone where ming is “wandering” to ‘the hinge of the Way’ (道樞, dao shu). Other than the “light”, ‘illumination’ (ming) can also mean one’s capacity of adopting an epistemologically “optimal” position in response to things (or knowledge). The story of Cook Ding discussed at the beginning of this chapter illustrates such a capacity. An “illuminating” pivot is the “spot” where one can reach out in different directions (bright, twilight, dark, and etc.) whenever necessary. When positioning oneself at such a pivot, one is able to answer “calls” from unlimited directions (以應無窮, yi ying wu qiong).307 This interpretation of illumination, however, does not necessarily negate the analogy of light: they both work to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the contextual interpretation of ming, which emphasizes the pivot position in understanding and responding to things or events, plays an important role in comprehending Zhuangzi’s speculation on knowledge raised in Lo’s article.

As indicated above, one of the unique features of Zhuangzian epistemology is its inclusive evaluation of the known and unknown. The following example provides a good idea of what I mean by this. The discussion of “knowable” and “unknowable” is particularly intriguing in this example. The very concern of one’s “knowing-ability” buttresses the suggestion that “illumination” may imply a contextual adjustment of one’s epistemological “position” rather than the meaning of omniscience. The passage goes like this:

[Nie Que] asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things agree in calling right?” “How would I know that?” said Wang Ni. “Do you know that you don’t know it?” “How would I know that?” “Then do things know nothing?” “How would I know that? However, suppose I try saying something. What way do I have of knowing that if I say I know something I don’t really not know it? Or what way

307 Karyn Lai, and Wai Wai Chiu, “Ming in the Zhuangzi Neipian: Enlightened Engagement,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 40:3-4, 2013, p. 533.

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do I have of knowing that if I say I don’t know something I don’t really in fact know it? Now let me ask you some questions. If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches and he ends up half paralysed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a tree, he is terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place to live? Men eat the flesh of grass-fed and grain-fed animals, deer eat grass, centipedes find snakes tasty, and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of these four, which knows how food ought to taste? Monkeys pair with monkeys, deer go out with deer, and fish play around with fish. Men claim that Mao-Ch’iang and Lady Li were beautiful, but if fish saw them they would fly away, and if deer saw them they would break into a run. Of these four, which knows how to fix the standard of beauty for the world? The way I see it, the rules of benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong are all hopelessly snarled and jumbled. How could I know anything about such discriminations?”308

齧缺問乎王倪曰：「子知物之所同是乎？」曰：「吾惡乎知之！」「子知

子之所不知邪？」曰：「吾惡乎知之！」「然則物無知邪？」曰：「吾惡乎知之！」雖然，嘗試言之。庸詎知吾所謂知之非不知邪？庸詎知吾所謂

不知之非知邪？且吾嘗試問乎女：民溼寢則腰疾偏死，鰌然乎哉？木處則

惴慄恂懼，猨猴然乎哉？三者孰知正處？民食芻豢，麋鹿食薦，蝍且甘帶，

鴟鴉耆鼠，四者孰知正味？猨，猵狙以為雌，麋與鹿交，鰌與魚遊。毛嬙、

麗姬，人之所美也，魚見之深入，鳥見之高飛，麋鹿見之決驟。四者孰知天下之正色哉？自我觀之，仁義之端，是非之塗，樊然殽亂，吾惡能知其

辯！(Zhuangzi, 6/2/64-6/2/70)

Wang Ni has been portrayed here as someone who is deeply aware of the limitations of claiming knowledge, insofar as he is extremely cautious when addressing the questions raised by Nie Que. Wang Ni acknowledges Nie Que’s three questions with the same answer “how would (should) I know that?” (吾惡乎知之, wu e hu zhi zhi). To Wang Ni, Nie Que’s questions may be inherently problematic as they seek the conventional black- or-white (shi-fei) answers of known and unknown. If we set the puzzle of “know” and “not know” aside, the rest of this passage seems to centre on the debate of creature-

308 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, 1964, pp. 40-1.

159 specificity: different species have distinctive living habits (處, chu), appetites for foods (味, wei), and preferences for mating (色, se). Therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, to have a fixed standard (正, zheng) for all creatures which implies that they share the same (同, tong) preferences and habits in living, eating, and mating.

This passage may be seen as serving the purpose of challenging the Confucian and Mohist emphasis on the compliance with fixed standards. Different philosophical schools have their own sets of norms. The Confucian doctrines of benevolence and righteousness (仁義, ren yi) may not be acceptable to others who believe in different or even opposing standards. The same is applicable to Mohist norms.

However, because of the frequent use of the term zhi (知; know, known, or knowledge) in this passage, it is implausible that Zhuangzi’s true intention is simply to attack other thinkers’ ideas. On the contrary, it is more likely that Zhuangzi’s focus is to postulate his own unique understanding of knowledge. For instance, in examining the three aspects of the distinctive preferences of different creatures, the term zheng, meaning ‘correct’, has always been coupled with zhi to form the meaning of ‘knowing the correct way of living, eating, or mating’ (知正處, 知正味, and 知正色). In fact, the Zhuang Zi suggests that it is not possible to have any of these ‘correct’ positions. This again confirms that epistemological issues (presented by the term zhi) play an important role in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.

The examples employed in this passage prompt the question: “What is significant in knowing the different preferences between creatures?” If not read with the concern of human understanding, they are just trivial factors that we have already known very well. We may claim that we know that different species have different habits, but to what extent do we really know this? Do we know this from the perspective of the species in question? Can we put ourselves into their “shoes”? Do we really know this as if we were in their skins? The answer to all of these is “No.” We feel comfortable when sleeping in a cosy bed; most of us have learnt that sleeping on the floor in a damp place for a long time will make us ill. We may agree that a loach (鰌, qiu) does not have this problem when sleeping in a wettish place (溼寢, shi qin), but do we really know that a loach will feel the same when sleeping in such a place as we do when lying in a cosy bed? Since knowledge is inevitably contextually-based or -bound, we can only claim to

160 have knowledge to a certain extent. We even feel compelled to claim that we “know” that a loach feels as comfortable in a moist environment as we do in a lovely bed, but we know it is probably wise not to make such an overstatement. In this sense, knowing one’s own epistemological limitations is a vital part of knowledge. This has been indicated by the term 孰 (shu; Which, Who), which is coupled with 知 to form a question instead of an assertion about knowledge (e.g., 孰知正處, 孰知正味, and 孰知正色; who, or which one knows the right way of living, eating, and mating?).

If knowledge cannot be claimed in the absence of its context, then it is most likely that each of us has our own limitations in knowing things. It is difficult to imagine that someone can be in everyone else’s shoes and know their perspectives. The inescapable imperfection of our knowledge suggests that we may need to cultivate a more cautious attitude towards our epistemological capabilities, and be willing to take an inclusive approach to knowledge that concerns both the knowable/known and unknowable/unknown. In addition, the boundaries between the known and unknown are not always clear but vary individually and contextually. Froese suggests that “[n]ot- knowing must accompany knowing if we are to engage in the dynamism of life.”309 Considering the complexity involved, it is prudent to be careful when claiming knowledge. Ideally, one is able to learn to position oneself at the epistemological pivot in dealing with knowledge. In this sense, the analogy of lighting everything up may not be adequate in articulating Zhuangzi’s notion of ‘illumination.’ In fact, it may be an exaggeration to claim that we can know all correlates of a thing or idea.

4.1.3 Relativism and Its Contextual Implication in the Zhuang Zi The limitations of our knowledge seem to be the reason for why ‘saying from a lodging place’ and judging according to shi-fei standards are unfavourable to Zhuangzi. One’s shi can easily be another’s fei if both are holding opposite shi-fei standards. This brings us to the familiar topic of relativism in Zhuangzi’s philosophy. To further the analysis of ming, it would be interesting to find out how relativism can be understood in light of a contextual interpretation of knowledge.

Several passages in the Zhuang Zi have been interpreted as having relativist overtones. The concept of relativism is too often associated with radical scepticism, which Chad

309 Katrin Froese, “Humour as the Playful Sidekick to Language in the Zhuangzi,” Asian Philosophy, 23:2, 2013, p. 151.

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Hansen terms as ‘relativistic scepticism’310 and Philip Ivanhoe as ‘strong relativism’311. Whether it is called ‘relativistic scepticism’ or ‘strong relativism’, the suggestion is that, since we are all limited by our particular circumstances and situations, it is not possible that we can form an objective view of the world around us. In other words, if each of us only occupies a cramped corner of the world, how can any individual claim that she holds objective knowledge of truth and reality (or can there be any objective knowledge)?312 This has been illustrated in the chapter Autumn Floods.

You can’t discuss the ocean with a well frog—he’s limited by the space he lives in. you can’t discuss ice with a summer insect—he’s bound to a single season. You can’t discuss the Way with a cramped scholar—he’s shackled by his doctrines. Now you have come out beyond your banks and borders and have seen the great sea—so you realize your own pettiness.313

…井蛙不可以語於海者，拘於虛也；夏蟲不可以語於冰者，篤於時也；曲士不可以語於道者，束於教也。今爾出於崖涘，觀於大海，乃知爾

醜…(Zhuangzi, 42/17/5-42/17/7)

This passage suggests that limitations in our lives can result from different contextual restrictions, such as space (虛, xu), time (時, shi), and even doctrines (教, jiao). To become aware of our own pettiness (醜, chou), it is important that we can think beyond our “banks and borders” (出於崖涘, chu yu ya si).

The emphasis on knowledge- and perspective-limitations constitutes a less radical (or weak) form of relativism, which is often overlooked.314 What distinguishes radical (or strong) relativism from its weaker version is the former’s claim that, because our views are equally as limited, they are equally as valid.315 Recalling the conversation between Nie Que and Wang Ni, their discussions seem unresolved concerning the different

310 Chad Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook, New York: SUNY Press, 2003, p. 129. 311 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, New York: SUNY Press, 1996, p. 197. 312 Ibid. 313 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, pp. 175-6. 314 Ivanhoe does not seem to deny that epistemological scepticism in the Zhuang Zi can be of “a moderate and social form”. (Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 61:4, 1993, p. 642.) 315 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” 1996, p. 197.

162 perspectives of knowing things. The question, “How could I know anything about such discriminations?” (吾惡能知其辯, wu e neng zhi qi bian), gives the impression that preference for any particular view is difficult to decide. Zhuangzi’s indecisiveness when selecting his preferred perspectives may be interpreted as some form of strong relativism.

The dispute over relativism in Zhuangzi’s philosophy is essentially a debate about the extent to which Zhuangzi’s scepticism is radical. Both versions of relativism (whether strong or weak) seem to agree with a basic contextual reference as discussed above that knowledge cannot be claimed in the absence of its context. However, some scholars, such as Ivanhoe, seem to talk less about context(s), and instead interpret Zhuangzi’s scepticism as a kind of instrument that can help people open their minds to different ideas;316 whereas others, such as Hansen, hold a strong version of relativism, and do not see the contextual restriction of human understanding as a big issue. The interesting question here is how both approaches can be explored under the current framework of practical contextualism.

Scholars arguing against strong relativism seem willing to say little or nothing about context. In “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?”, it seems that a certain association between Hansen’s frequent use of the term ‘context’ and his strong stance on radical scepticism has been identified by Ivanhoe, who avoids using the same term.317 It is interesting to read how he interprets Zhuangzi’s scepticism without mentioning the term “context” even once:

[Hansen’s] reading is mistaken in that he takes Zhuangzi’s occasional use of a god’s-eye point of view as his definitive perspective. From such a point of reference it is true that all perspectives are equal and none can be said to be better than the next. I have argued that Zhuangzi only uses this perspective as a therapy to free us from the confines of our cramped and narrow perspective and give us a greater and more accurate appreciation of our true place in the world. His use of the Heavenly perspective is also part of his attempt to undermine what he regards as our

316 Ibid., p. 210. 317 Ibid., pp. 197-214.

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overreliance upon the intellect…to overintellectualize [our] lives and corrupt [our] basic nature.318

Ivanhoe stresses that Zhuangzi’s perspective is neither definitive nor from “above”; he suggests that, like many ancient Chinese thinkers, Zhuangzi stands amongst everyone else on earth. In other words, we are inevitably in a contextually-based situation. Instead of taking ‘context’ as self-evident fact,319 Ivanhoe argues that what Zhuangzi really cares or worries about is the consequence of contextual restrictions and limitations on our epistemological development (especially on both intellectual and linguistic levels)—it traps us in our own context.320 Instead of accepting imprisonment, Ivanhoe insists that Zhuangzi wants to employ scepticism as a remedy (or therapy) to free us from our own cramped corner. In other words, context should be taken as a means instead of the ultimatum. During our own captivity, we tend to forget other possibilities outside of our own “prison cells”.

As stressed above, one of the weaker interpretations of relativism in the Zhuang Zi is to take it as having a therapeutic function.321 In his work, Ivanhoe suggests that, by being sceptical about our intellectual knowledge and language, it is possible to arrive at “a proper perspective: the Heavenly view of the world”. This therapeutic function seems to be missing in strong relativism, which takes contextual constraints as granted and does not see the need for a remedy. For instance, Hansen’s relativism seems to suggest that, because we are all born in “cells”, it is alright to stay in them. This suggests that Hansen is promoting some sort of epistemological “self-imprisonment”. And that may be why

318 Ibid., pp. 209-10. 319 That is, because we all dwell in certain contexts, therefore contextualized points are all equal and valid. 320 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 61:4, 1993, pp. 648-9. 321 For the ‘therapeutic’ interpretation of Zhuangzi’s scepticism, please refer to Philip J. Ivanhoe,” Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao,” 1993, pp. 644-9. It is worth noticing here that, although Ivanhoe acknowledges that there are sceptical and relativistic interpretations of the Zhuang Zi, he does not endorse the suggestion that Zhuangzi was a skeptic or a relativist. Eric Schwitzgebel, “Zhuangzi’s Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism,” In Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, New York: SUNY Press, 1996, pp. 68-96. Victor Mair (ed.), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, Honolulu: Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1983. Yearley, Lee H., “The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-tzu,” In Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor Mair, Honolulu: Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1983, pp. 137-8.

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Hansen’s relativistic account of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is strongly opposed by those holding a similar view to Ivanhoe’s.

It may be odd to support a radical interpretation of context as a self-sufficient idea: do we not hope to destroy the “cells” in order to free ourselves from imprisonment? Before answering this intriguing question, let us first look at how Hansen himself sees his own account of relativism:

The Zhuangzi uses relativism to support skepticism. Relativism illustrates how our confidence in our know-how depends on a regress of norms and context. Zhuangzi reminds us that others have equal confidence in their different contexts. The dependency relativism fuels the skepticism.322

Hansen suggests that our attitudes about knowledge are contextually bound. To him, it may be problematic to suggest that our own pursuit of knowledge comes from the desire to eliminate the constraints of context, so that we can be free from our “natural imprisonment”. Hansen is certainly pessimistic about the suggestion that epistemological problems can be solved by eliminating context. Is there the possibility that we are too hasty to condemn “self-containment” as a bad thing? In fact, sometimes, what we believe to be a constraint can also provide protection. For example, the glass walls in an aquarium may restrain us from directly touching the beautiful sea creatures behind them, but they also prevent us from drowning. By the same token, we inevitably grow up in different contexts, which may limit our views, but, as Hansen puts it, “that gives us no reason to abandon our own way of life. Nor do we have reason to generate a gnawing, recurrent doubt about how we live.”323 In this sense, it is safe to assume that what seems ‘constraining’ can, at the same time, be ‘protective’.

Practical contextualism offers a more dynamic way of thinking about context. By a dynamic way I mean that which does not take context as a fixed, rigid entity (e.g., comparing context to cells or cages).324 The metaphor of illumination used to explain the term ming, which is not considered in either version of relativism (strong or weak), can provide an alternative interpretation of our epistemological limitations. Instead of

322 Chad Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi,” 2003, p. 150. 323 Ibid., p. 153. 324 I am not suggesting that both soft and strong relativisms specifically refer to context as either a prison cell or cage. However, my previous analyses have suggested that both seem to have this kind of perception of context in their theories.

165 seeing our own limitation as a cage, why not compare it with a light source which makes things visible?325 The difference between these two metaphors is that, in relation to a cage, one has to destroy it in order to extend one’s view (unless it has been constructed with some sort of elastic materials), but with the light, such a destruction is unnecessary. To expand the visibility of things, it is expected that the coverage of the light will be enlarged. David Wong highlights the theme of the text which promotes “the possibility of changing perspectives, even broadening one’s original perspectives, to take in more of what the world has to offer.”326 In light of this, both analogies on flexibility and illumination indicate a dynamic perception of the idea of context. In view of this approach, contextually-dependent knowledge neither has to be regarded as problematic and require a remedy, nor given the absolute legitimacy promoted by radical relativists.

One possible solution indicates the accumulative nature of knowledge acquisition. Our knowledge can increase as we pursue it: the initially restrictive torch beam can be replaced by a lamp. However, the question here concerns the extent of the lamp’s coverage: the issue of limitation. We would like to think that our pursuit of knowledge can eventually allow us to attain the status of omniscience, with which Zhuangzi disagrees. Instead of encouraging people to become more “knowledgeable”, Zhuangzi seems more interested in raising awareness about dealing with knowledge with the recognition that it will always be limited.327 This is exemplified in section 4.1.2 by the fact that Wang Ni’s reply to Nie Que’s questions three times with the same answer, “how would (should) I know that (吾惡乎知之, wu e hu zhi zhi)?”

The Zhuang Zi is often perceived as a surreal and mystic text328, whereas its realistic attitude to knowledge tends to be ignored. A Zhuangist sage is the one who is reluctant to claim knowledge but feels comfortable staying in a twilight zone (玄冥, xuan

325 Recalling the discussions of 明 in section 4.1.2, interpreting 明 as a light source should be complemented by the more important contextual approach of 明, as the latter is arguably the ‘gist’ of 明. It is obvious that both (strong and weak) relativistic theories have not taken into consideration the analysis of 明. 326 David Wong, “Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 22:2, 2005, p. 92. 327 This is actually coherent with both Ivanhoe and Hansen’s theories. As I have addressed above, the divergence between Ivanhoe and Hansen is not on identifying the problem, but on how it should be dealt with after recognition. 328 Burton Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, 1964, p. 3.

166 ming)329 where known meets unknown. The very idea of “knowing things”, in this sense, can mislead many who conceive of it ostensibly. For example, it may lead someone to believe that to know things is to sit comfortably at a well illuminated centre and take the surrounding visible things for granted. However, in doing so, one might have fallen into the trap of ignorance and lost touch with the unknowable. Wu points out that “[o]ur understanding of our own ignorance is something that is not due to our stupidity, but to our profound understanding of the impossibility of understanding the mystery of non- being.”330 According to Zhuangzi, a sage is knowledgeable because she knows where the limitations reside.

4.1.4 Zhuangzi’s Precision in Evaluating Knowledge Zhuangzi’s epistemological contextualism is not only embodied in the known/unknown distinction and one’s position when dealing with it. It also manifests itself in Zhuangzi’s precision of distinguishing between the questions, “how to know?” from “what to know?” The ability to discern between these two portrays a thinker who has an extremely acute and flexible mind towards epistemological issues. The story You Are Not a Fish (子非魚, Zi Fei Yu,) from the chapter Autumnal Floods (秋水, Qiu Shui,) exemplifies Zhuangzi’s “peculiar” wisdom on this.

Chuang Tzu and Hui Tzu were strolling along the dam of the Hao River when Chuang Tzu said, “See how the minnows come out and dart around where they please! That’s what fish really enjoy!” Hui Tzu said, “You’re not a fish—how do you know what fish enjoy?” Chuang Tzu said, “You’re not I, so how do you know I don’t know what fish enjoy?” Hui Tzu said, “I’m not you, so I certainly don’t know what you know. On the other hand, you’re certainly not a fish—so that still proves you don’t know what fish enjoy!” Chuang Tzu said, “Let’s go back to your original question, please. You asked me how I know what fish

329 且夫知不知論極妙之言，而自適一時之利者，是非埳井之鼃與？且彼方跐黃泉而登大皇，無南無北，奭然四解，淪於不測；無東無西，始於玄冥，反於大通。(《莊子·秋水》) He whose understanding cannot grasp these minute and subtle words, but is only fit to win some temporary gain—is he not like the frog in the caved-in well? Chuang Tzu, now—at this very moment he is treading the Yellow Springs or leaping up to the vast blue. To him there is no north or south—in utter freedom he dissolves himself in the four directions and drowns himself in the unfathomable. To him there is no east or west—he begins in the Dark Obscurity and returns to the Great Thoroughfare. (Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, p 187.) 330 Kuang-ming Wu, Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion, no. 26, New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1982, p. 88.

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enjoy—so you already knew I knew it when you asked the question. I know it by standing here beside the Hao.”331

莊子與惠子遊於濠梁之上。莊子曰：「儵魚出遊從容，是魚樂也。」惠子

曰：「子非魚，安知魚之樂？」莊子曰：「子非我，安知我不知魚之樂？」

惠子曰：「我非子，固不知子矣；子固非魚也，子之不知魚之樂，全矣。」莊子曰：「請循其本。子曰『汝安知魚樂』雲者，既已知吾知之而問我，

我知之濠上也。」(Zhuangzi, 45/17/87-45/17/91)

On the first reading, Zhuangzi may be seen as practising some sort of sophism: his self- esteem does not allow him to concede defeat to Huizi, so he evades the question by changing the subject. Or is this so? This passage is at the end of the chapter The Autumnal Floods, which usually communicates important messages of each chapter. It would be insensible to think that this passage has been placed here just to portray a cunning Zhuangzi. If there is something more than this, then it is worth the effort to think about and interpret this passage carefully.

Guo Xiang, the main editor of the text, offers his witty interpretation of this passage. Guo Xiang’s argument goes like this: Huizi is not Zhuangzi, however, he is able to tell that Zhuangzi is not a fish (how did he know this if he is not Zhuangzi himself?); following the same rationale, Zhuangzi is, for sure, not a fish, but he may still be able to claim that he knows that the fish is happy.332 In short, Guo Xiang’s argument suggests that, in the story of Zi Fei Yu, Zhuangzi attempts to show that he really is able to know how a fish feels.

Guo Xiang’s interpretation is inspirational however a bit problematic at the same time, because it seems to contradict the important concept of ming discussed in section 4.1.2. In the conversation between Nie Que and Wang Ni about the limitation of knowledge, especially that across different species, Zhuangzi points out specifically that individuals

331 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, pp. 188-9. 332 “尋惠子之本言雲，非魚則無緣相知耳。今子非我也，而雲汝安知魚樂者，是知我之非魚也。苟知我之非魚，則凡相知者果可以此知彼，不待是魚然後知魚也。故特循子安知之雲，已知我之所知矣，而方複問我。我正知之於濠上耳，豈待入水哉。夫物之所生而安者，天地不能易其處，陰陽不能回其業。故以陸生之所安，知水生之所樂，未足稱妙耳。” from 郭慶藩 (Guo Qingfan), 莊子集釋 (The Collected Annotations of the Zhuangzi), 諸子集成本 (by Multiple Masters), 上海: 上海書店 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shu Dian), 1986, p. 286.

168 lack the ability to know how others appreciate certain things. To address this issue, let us return, again, to a contextual perspective for an alternative interpretation.

If we read the conversations between Zhuangzi and Huizi as a logical debate on addressing the issues of knowing things, then we may have the following first impressions: 1) Zhuangzi’s claim of knowing a fish’s happiness has been a failure; and 2) Huizi defeats Zhuangzi in this debate. Before confirming these judgments, let me first point out the fact that it is doubtful that Zhuangzi is interested in exploring knowledge as a closed system. This approach takes knowledge as a self-sufficient system without taking into consideration its contextual aspects, e.g., the different conditions upon which knowledge is built, and the interdependence between what is known and what is not known. If we were to believe that Zhuangzi conceives of epistemological issues in a self-sufficient manner, then we may well overlook the brilliance of his observations pertaining to crucial issues on epistemological inquiries. In his work “Knowing in the Zhuangzi, ‘From Here, on the Bridge, over the River Hao’”, Roger T. Ames points out that

In classical Western theology, shaped and given definition by Greek metaphysical assumptions … a single-ordered universe [is] assumed by the early systematic philosophers. ... The Chinese world is not “one” in the classical Greek sense of a single-ordered “uni”-verse. … It is not “one” in the sense that would make it a closed system, defined in terms of abstract, universal, necessary, and unchanging natural and moral laws.333

Bearing in mind Ames’ suggestion, it is also easy in the study of epistemology to fall into the trap of interpreting or defining knowledge as a closed system. Ames believes that Zhuangzi’s philosophy goes against the way of thinking of epistemological issues in predefined terms.

Through providing a different approach, Hansen seems to suggest that, although Huizi has often been considered as an outstanding thinker (even by Zhuangzi himself334), the former unfortunately lacks the same breadth and depth of epistemological visions that

333 Roger T. Ames, “Knowing in the Zhuangzi, ‘From Here, on the Bridge, over the River Hao’,” In Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames, New York: SUNY Press, 1998, p. 228. 334 In Chapter 24, 徐無鬼 (Xu Wugui), of the Zhuangzi, the text describes how, one day Zhuangzi passes by Huizi’s grave and sighs because, since the death of Master Hui, there are no real rivals to argue with (自夫子之死也，吾無以為質矣，吾無與言之矣). 黃錦鋐, 《新譯莊子讀本》, 1999, p. 331.

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Zhuangzi possesses.335 In other words, Huizi’s cleverness is undermined by his presumption of knowledge, which restricts and clouds his vision. The problem of limiting knowledge in a systematic definition is that we will overlook other contextual factors or aspects that shape knowledge. We may not be aware of some of these until they are perceived in actual situations, and some may undergo environmental change themselves. In this sense, making knowledge a closed system may cost us both our receptivity to the richness of epistemological inquiry and our vision of the relationship between the known/knowable and unknown/unknowable. I believe that both Ames and Hansen may agree that, in the Zi Fei Yu story, Huizi’s thinking pattern or habit reflects a conventional approach to knowledge: to confine knowledge in a one-dimensional and self-contained system after which subtle interpretations of knowledge are no longer possible.

In order to identify the ingenuity of Zhuangzi’s thinking, I will separate the conversations between Zhuangzi and Huizi from each other. Doing so can help us “escape” the impression that there is a systematic debate between these two. Let us read only Huizi’s words first. In response to Zhuangzi’s claim of knowing, at the dam of the Hao (濠) River, the happiness of fish (魚樂, yu le), Huizi questions the former by asking how (安, an) a fish’s happiness can be known to someone who is not (非, fei) a fish herself. After Zhuangzi throws back the same question, Huizi claims that, because he is not Zhuangzi, he certainly (固, gu) cannot know what Zhuangzi knows; likewise, Zhuangzi is not a fish, therefore he certainly cannot know whether a fish is happy or not. If Huizi’s words are read carefully, we may quickly identify in them a sense of inconsistency. His first question to Zhuangzi is about “how to know” (安知, an zhi). However in replying to Zhuangzi’s counter-question, he moves on to assert “what can or cannot be known in certain” (固知/固不知, gu zhi or gu bu zhi). This clearly depicts an image of Huizi as being insensitive to the difference(s) between the two (安知 and 固知/固不知), unless we think that they are essentially one thing. But for Zhuangzi, they are clearly not.

Zhuangzi’s first rejoinder to Huizi is a “how to know” (安知) question—an additional clarification of Huizi’s initial question. Huizi fails to grasp the point and returns with

335 Chad Hansen, “The Relatively Happy Fish,” Asian Philosophy, 13:2/3, 2003, p. 159.

170 something utterly different—a what-to-know assertion (固知/固不知). This is why, in the last rejoinder, Zhuangzi asks Huizi to return to the initial question—the question of how-to-know? Unintentionally, Huizi has changed the topic. Recognition of this change is subtle to this debate. When interpreting this passage as a systematic debate about claiming knowledge, we may condemn Zhuangzi’s cunningness by accusing him of evading the topic. However, if we suspend our one-dimensional thinking habit here for a moment, we may well recognize that it was Huizi who has changed the topic and has been inconsistent.336 In these conversations, Zhuangzi clearly demonstrates the image of an individual who is capable of exploring knowledge with an acute mind, rather than someone who explores things through a one-dimensional perspective. This does not mean, however, that providing knowledge with a workable definition is not important, or that Zhuangzi rejects such an attempt altogether. I am questioning whether a systematic definition should be the only approach to epistemological inquiry.

Zhuangzi’s discernment of the difference between the “how to know” (安知) and “what to know” (固知) questions reflects not only the acuity of his mind, but also raises an issue crucial to this chapter—the question of epistemological contextuality. The previous discussion has revealed that, to Zhuangzi, the essential issue is not limited to the question of what we know, but more importantly, it focuses on how (where/when) things become known to us. In other words, two different questions reveal two distinctive epistemological emphases. When Zhuangzi says “I know it by standing here beside the Hao” (我知之濠上也, wo zhi zhi hao shang ye), is he making a joke? We may believe that he is, but I would like to argue that his comment conveys an important message to those who are not familiar with Zhuangist ideas and have been ignoring contextual elements in claiming knowledge.

It is worth pointing out here that the question of “how do you know what P is (or does)” is itself ambiguous. Intriguingly, when one is asked this question, it is normally translated as “how can you justify that your claim to know what P is (or does) is a true belief?” If Zhuangzi’s last rejoinder is to be taken seriously, we may ask ourselves this question: does a how-question have to be interpreted like this and more than what it is?

336 Despite Hansen’s disapproval of Huizi’s epistemological competency, it cannot be ruled out that Huizi knows Zhuangzi’s intention, but deliberately sets up an epistemological snare for Zhuangzi to fall in. Of course, the result, as everyone knows, has been proven to be unsuccessful in the face of Zhuangzi’s wisdom.

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Why should we always be concerned about whether we know something or not (固知/ 不知)? Zhuangzi points out that Huizi’s how-to-know (安知) question can also mean that he already knows (已知, yi zhi) that Zhuangzi knows that fish are happy, but wants to know more about how (e.g., under what circumstances) Zhuangzi gets this knowledge. In other words, the how-to-know (安知) question does not have to be raised only to address and justify the certainty of knowledge (固知); it can also be asked in order to get more information about something that is already known (已知).

The discussions in section 4.1.3 have suggested that Zhuangzi does not want to fret over the questions of “what do we know?” and “how do we become omniscient?” Instead Zhuangzi may be more interested in the question “how should we deal with the limitation of our knowledge?” Zhuangzi suggests that the key to this is to mindfully locate oneself closely to where the epistemological pivot is, and be open to different perspectives as much as possible. In this sense, Zhuangzi’s witty rejoinder to Huizi serves to provoke the latter to abandon a habit of thinking that is overly-concerned with the questions of “what do we know?” and “how can we justify that what we know is a true belief?” It is not that these questions are not important, they certainly are, but our vision of knowledge should not be clouded and restricted by them. They are certainly not the only ones that concern knowledge; what about unknowables? Our instinct toward unknowability may prompt us to treat it as the biggest obstacle to knowledge, and hence banish it. However, Zhuangzi seems less worried about unknowability: instead of fretting about making the unknowable knowable, or justifying one’s possession of knowledge, he is more interested in figuring out ways to position oneself at a contextually preferential situation where multiple possibilities can be assessed.

It may be argued that, at a certain point, Zhuangzi establishes the claim that it is impossible for us to really know how a fish feels; yet on another occasion, he seems to suggest that he “knows” that a fish enjoys being in the water. Does Zhuangzi not fall into the trap of inconsistency, or is his claim not self-defeating? If knowledge is perceived as a black-or-white question whose answer relates to either the known or unknown, then Zhuangzi’s claims do seem inconsistent. One possible response is to suggest that, because the Zhuang Zi was produced by multiple authors, this kind of inconsistency is expected because it is inevitable, and thus forgivable. But what if the black-or-white kind of attitude to knowledge is not what the authors of the Zhuang Zi

172 uphold? What if, as previously discussed, they have the black-and-white perception of knowledge, which dismisses the preconceived ideas that we either know or do not know at all? As shown in my previous discussions, I do not think that Zhuangzi’s intention is to categorize our knowledge into the realms of being either saturated with bright light or immersed in endless darkness. As Hansen has bluntly put it: “the issue is not simply Zhuangzi’s knowing or not knowing, it is an issue of the standard of knowing (and the pragmatic and perspectival reasons for different standards in different contexts).”337 Instead of concocting an infallible way of knowing things, Zhuangist sages may be more inclined to bring people’s attention to the place where epistemological daylight meets its dark night—all sorts of colours manifest themselves beautifully in a great range of shades. If this is the case, then I would like to argue that the seemingly contradictory claims made by Zhuangzi about a fish do not contradict his view of knowledge at all. On the contrary, it actually enhances his view which portrays knowledge as an overarching contextual pivot where multiple possibilities can flourish.338 Zhuangzi seems to have a mind that is incredibly open, inclusive, flexible, and acute. Moreover, the apparent contradiction in Zhuangzi’s comments about a fish also reminds us not to read his words out of context: We will certainly miss the point if we do. If we assume that the same idea is communicated wherever “fish” is mentioned in the text, then we will misinterpret for certain not only the Zhuang Zi, but also many other Classical Chinese texts.

Here the scope of the context has been expanded to the point where it becomes almost limitless: Zhuangzi urges people to expand their awareness of the world and their understanding of themselves, and to stop being narrow-minded.339 But the problem is that those who understood the Zhuang Zi are already open-minded. How, then, do we extend the scope of the mindsets of narrow-minded? Does Zhuangzi have any ideal solution for this? In order to answer these questions, let us look at the passages in the Zhuang Zi that concern skill development. As a very dynamic book, I certainly doubt that Zhuangzi will ask people to gain contextual awareness of knowledge through nothing but contemplation.

337 Chad Hansen, “The Relatively Happy Fish,” 2003, p. 160. 338 A similar view has been expounded in Karyn Lai, and Wai Wai Chiu, “Ming in the Zhuangzi Neipian: Enlightened Engagement,” 2013. 339 Both our understanding of knowledge and our awareness of epistemological context(s) and different perspectives can be “expanded”; these are not necessarily incompatible domains.

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4.2 Zhuangzi’s Practical Wisdom At the beginning of the third chapter The Secret of Caring for Life (養生主, Yang Sheng Zhu), which succeeds the second chapter Impartial Observations of Things (齊物論, Qi Wu Lun), it is written, “Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to pursue what has no limit, you will be in danger. If you understand this and still strive for knowledge, you will be in danger for certain!”340 This passage, I will argue, perfectly sums up the motif of the preceding section, and at the same time sets the tone for the current one. An epistemological approach will help us better appreciate its core issue, and at the same time, lift our understanding of zhi to a new level. In order to expound the new level of zhi, let’s start by looking at one of the well-known fables in the Zhuang Zi—the story of Cook Ding Carves up an Ox (庖丁解牛, Pao Ding Jie Niu).

This story begins with an orchestic image of an extraordinarily skilful cook, Ding, who performs his usual business of dissecting an ox. It is certainly intriguing to see that Zhuangzi can find the beauty in this kind of activity that is performed in a kitchen.

Cook [Ding] was cutting up an ox for Lord Wen-hui. At every touch of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every move of his feet, every thrust of his keen— zip! zoop! He slithered the knife along with a zing, and all was in perfect rhythm, as though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the [Jing Shou] music341

“Ah, this is marvellous!” said Lord Wen-hui. “Imagine skill reaching such heights!”342

庖丁為文惠君解牛，手之所觸，肩之所倚，足之所履，膝之所踦，砉然嚮

然，奏刀騞然，莫不中音。合於《桑林》之舞，乃中《經首》之會。文惠

君曰：「譆！善哉！技蓋至此乎？」(Zhuangzi, 7/3/2-7/3/4)

Lord Wen-hui is impressed by Cook Ding’s skills in cutting up an ox, and cannot help but exclaim with admiration. However, Lord Wen-hui’s acclaim does not make Cook

340 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, p. 50. The original passage goes like this: 吾生也有涯，而知也無涯。以有涯隨無涯，殆已；已而為知者，殆而已矣。 341 “The Mulberry Grove is identified as a rain dance from the time of King T’ang of the Shang dynasty, and the Ching-shou music as part of a longer composition from the time of Yao.” from The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, trans. Burton Watson. 342 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, p. 50.

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Ding complacent. In fact, he is not sure whether Lord Wen-hui really appreciates the essence of his skill. So he elaborates a bit.

Cook [Ding] laid down his knife and replied, “What I care about is the Way, which goes beyond skill. When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now—now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest ligament or tendon, much less a main joint.343

庖丁釋刀對曰：「臣之所好者道也，進乎技矣。始臣之解牛之時，所見無

非牛者。三年之後，未嘗見全牛也。方今之時，臣以神遇，而不以目視，

官知止而神欲行。依乎天理，批大郤，導大窾，因其固然。技經肯綮之未

嘗，而況大軱乎！(Zhuangzi, 7/3/4-7/3/7)

This passage appeared at the beginning of the first section of this chapter where its contextual implications were unveiled. It reappears here at the opening of the second section because of its practical significance in relation to Zhuangzian self-cultivation, the latter of which is epistemologically-oriented. In this passage, one can hardly ignore Cook Ding’s opening remarks: he cares about the Way (道, Dao) more than skill (技, ji) itself. If this is true, then it is most likely that this passage describes how Cook Ding conveys his own understanding of the Way through his knife skills. After years of practice, Cook Ding’s perception of an ox as an object (全牛, quan niu) has changed. More importantly, the perception itself as the means for ordinary people to understand the world has lost its dominance for Cook Ding. Instead of seeking to deal with something tangible, Cook Ding now looks for “big hollows” (大郤, da xi) and “big openings” (大窾, da kuan) and avoids even the smallest ligament or tendon (肯綮, ken

343 Ibid., pp. 50-1.

175 qing). These ideas seem to resemble the debate of “something” (有, you) and “nothing” (无, wu) in Laozi’s Dao De Jing.344

4.2.1 The Way in Cook Ding’s Dissecting Skills The story of Cook Ding seems to suggest that our understanding of the world can be transformed to work in harmony with the Dao so that we are able to go along with “Heavenly” patterns (依乎天理, yi hu tian li) and follow things as they are (因其固然, yin qi gu ran). In the previous discussions, I have argued that knowledge that is congruent with the Dao is embodied in the concept of ming (illumination or clarity). Ming is explicated by a contextual interpretation which incorporates the visions of both the known and unknown. From this contextual observation, Zhuangzi finds out or believes that, in comparison with petty knowledge (小知, xiao zhi), which is usually conveyed and understood through language(s), great wisdom (大知, da zhi) is itself ineffable. This is again highlighted in the story of Cook Ding: propositional understanding (which can be conveyed by or learnt from language) is no longer the main source of knowledge for a highly skilful knower, like Cook Ding himself. One way to become a transformed (or skilful) knower, who is capable of great wisdom, is through arduously practising certain skills, which can be perceived as the Zhuangzian practice of self-cultivation. Although Zhuangzi suggests that practice can improve our knowledge and help us gain deeper insight into it, it is intriguing to know whether Zhuangzi also means that great wisdom is also, and always has to be, something which is practical. This is an interesting question which unfortunately cannot be covered in this dissertation.

Mastering the Way of cutting an ox takes time. This constitutes another salient theme in the story of Cook Ding. Developing a certain skill to its perfection requires one to keep exercising it over many years, sometimes even decades. In most cases, only performers themselves know the actual hardships involved in this development. Of course, this is part of tacit knowledge, but it is also the knowledge of the Dao. As the story of Cook Ding unfolds, the temporal effect involved in deepening our appreciation of knowledge and the possible outcome of this development are also unveiled.

344 It is worth noticing here that there may be a salient difference between the Dao De Jing and the Zhuang Zi: the former mainly focuses on metaphysical inquiry, while the latter is more epistemologically-oriented.

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“A good cook changes his knife once a year—because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month—because he hacks. I’ve had this knife of mine for nineteen years and I’ve cut up thousands of oxen with it, and yet the blade is as good as though it had just come from the grindstone. There are spaces between the joints, and the blade of the knife has really no thickness, if you insert what has no thickness into such spaces, then there’s plenty of room—more than enough for the blade to play about it. That’s why after nineteen years the blade of my knife is still as good as when it first came from the grindstone.345

良庖歲更刀，割也；族庖月更刀，折也。今臣之刀十九年矣，所解數千牛

矣，而刀刃若新發於硎。彼節者有間，而刀刃者無厚，以無厚入有間，恢

恢乎其於遊刃必有餘地矣，是以十九年而刀刃若新發於硎。(Zhuangzi, 7/3/7-8/3/10)

This passage certainly reflects the aforementioned temporal theme and the artful performance of cutting oxen. It is intriguing to see how Cook Ding reflects on each step of the skill development indirectly through delineating the status of a knife. Those who dissect oxen through either cutting (割, ge) or hacking (折, zhe) will have their knives replaced annually or monthly, respectively, whereas Cook Ding can perform the same task thousands of times (解數千牛, jie shu qian niu) for nineteen years (十九年, shi jiu nian) with the blade of his knife being as good as when it first came from the grindstone (刀刃若新發於硎, dao ruo xin fa yu xing). This certainly suggests that the knife may be the key to understanding the passage. However, does the knife have to be interpreted as an object employed to exercise one’s cutting skills, or can we look at it as an epistemological metaphor? I would like to argue that the latter is entirely plausible in interpreting the current passage.

4.2.2 The Key Concept of No Thickness (無厚, Wu Hou) We may well be convinced that the passage on Cook Ding is all about how to increase our cutting skills if we did not perceive the necessity of explaining the concept of “a knife with no thickness (無厚, wu hou)”.346 But, after carefully thought, we may find

345 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, p. 51. 346 I suggest that whenever the character 無 (Wu) is encountered as part of a compound phrase (such as 無為, 無厚 etc.), one should pay close attention to the passage where the character and phrase appear. This can be a really “magic” and important character in ancient Chinese texts.

177 out that the phrase ‘no thickness’ is really the key to understanding this passage. If we were to think that this phrase is used to describe the physical appearance of a knife, then wu hou may be seen as an exaggerated metaphor for depicting a knife with an extremely thin blade—in fact, the phrase wu hou literally means ‘no thickness’! However, no matter how thin a knife is, it is still an object that fulfils the function of cutting things up. There are two problems involved in this view of ‘no thickness’. First of all, a thin knife can have a sharp edge, which is supposed to be beneficial to a cook; but an extremely thin knife can also mean that it can be easily break when cutting things up, even if its blade is in good shape. Secondly, if Cook Ding’s skills are benefitted by using a very thin knife, then it may be supposed that every cook with a well-forged thin knife can perform as well as Cook Ding. But obviously, this is not the case. These facts suggest that Cook Ding may not just be referring to a particular (thin) status of knife here.

If wu hou is not used to describe the physical appearance of a knife, what else can it convey? This reminds us of the character wu (無, nothing or nothingness) in the Dao De Jing, whose metaphysical significance opposes that of the character you (有, something or somethingness).347 The phrase wu wei (無為, non-active), wu xing (無形, formless), or wu shi (無事, not meddling) from the Dao De Jing also has a metaphysical instead of a physical emphasis.348 In this sense, it may be safe to assume that the phrase wu hou also has a metaphysical implication instead of just depicting the particular status of a knife. If this is the case, then it will be even more intriguing to draw an epistemological interpretation out of this seemingly metaphysical concept of wu hou. This new approach does not come into our view easily but is nevertheless obtainable.

When wu hou is perceived as a metaphorical (instead of a literal) description of a knife, the passage may be interpreted in epistemological terms. Cook Ding’s words, “What I

347 I am not suggesting that there is a definitive connection between the two texts (the Dao De Jing and the Zhuang Zi); however, examining and comparing the related concepts and ideas can enhance our understanding of these concepts and ideas in both texts. 348 E.g., 道常無為而無不為。 (The Dao De Jing, 37) The way never acts yet nothing is left undone. (D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2001, p. 55.) 大音希聲；大象無形；道隱無名。(The Dao De Jing, 41) The great note is rarefied in sound; the great image has no shape. The way conceals itself in being nameless. (Ibid., p. 63.) 為無為，事無事，味無味。(The Dao De Jing, 63) Do that which consists in taking no action; pursue that which is not meddlesome; savour that which has no flavour. (Ibid., p. 93.)

178 care about is the Way, which goes beyond skill”, cannot be fully justified unless the knife is taken as a metaphor instead of a physical object. In order to elaborate my point, let us first look at Chapter Forty-eight of the Dao De Jing.

In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the way one does less every day. One does less and less until one does nothing at all, and when one does nothing at all there is nothing that is undone.

It is always through not meddling that the empire is won. Should you meddle, then you are not equal to the task of winning the empire.349

為學日益；為道日損。損之又損，以至於無為。無為而無不為。取天下常

以無事。及其有事，不足以取天下。350

Once the excerpt is put side by side with that of Cook Ding, a certain relationship between the two can be discerned. Before looking into the details, let us first pay attention to the passage from the Dao De Jing.

4.2.3 Knowledge, the Way, and the Relations Because of the highly abstract nature (compared with the Zhuang Zi) of Laozi’s Dao De Jing, different interpretations concerning the relationship between knowledge and the Way (道, Dao) are anticipated. One may suggest that the pursuit of knowledge and that of the Dao is a zero sum game: the more you know the further you distance yourself from Dao. Therefore, in order to pursue Dao, one is encouraged to leave knowledge behind. It is certainly imprudent to say that this interpretation is wrong. However, according to the passage, this interpretation is at least not well supported. This leads to the second possible reading: learning and knowledge are just employed as two contrasting aspects to highlight the unique feature of pursuing the Way—its tendency to decrease. Therefore, there is no necessary innate correlation between these two. In the current context, this reading is not entirely implausible. Is there a third interpretation? When connected with the story of Cook Ding, there may well be a third one.

I think that there is a connection between gaining knowledge and exercising the Way, but it does not have to be an either-or relationship. So what is it? In the previous discussion, I have suggested that we take the knife as an epistemological metaphor

349 Ibid., pp. 69 & 71. 350 Ibid., pp. 68 & 70.

179 instead of a physical object. If we read the story of Cook Ding side by side with the second part of the passage from the Dao De Jing, we can easily find a similarity between the two. The passage in the Dao De Jing says that “It is always through ‘not meddling’ (無事) that the empire is won.” On the one hand, what the less skilled cooks do is to “meddle” heavily with oxen: they not only cut but also hack. On the other hand, what Cook Ding does is to insert “no thickness” into “plenty of room”. He meddles with nothing, or more accurately, nothing meddles with nothing. Froese recognizes the powerful and important role of ‘nothingness’ played in Daoist writings. She argues that “[a]s the ‘in-between’ aspect of all things, ‘nothing’ is something to be celerated, for it brings particular beings into harmonious accod.”351 According to the Dao De Jing passage, those who do not meddle win the empire. No wonder Lord Wen-hui is so overwhelmed by Cook Ding’s skills.

4.2.4 The Way of “Carving” Epistemologically However, what does the epistemological “knife” really mean here? The simple answer is that the epistemological “knife” aims for that which is known and knowable. If we were to return to the passage about Cook Ding to think about the knives again, we may not only just see knives now. Instead we may see that the use of a knife demonstrates particular ways of acquiring and practising knowledge (compared to dissecting oxen in this case). Just as Cook Ding suggests, at the beginning of his own career, oxen were just objects to him. Those novice cooks dealt with an ox heavy-handedly either through cutting or hacking. They might have been thinking that this is how an ox should be dissected. It is similar to when we first developed our knowledge of the world, and desired to know things that were concrete, determined, decisive, tangible, or at least graspable. And we cherished the methods which allowed us to gain knowledge in such a way. This is like those novice cooks who cut decisively into the oxen. However, during our growth, we soon found ourselves in the position of constantly adjusting our knowledge as well as the ways we approached it. In order to maintain the “right” knowledge, we found ourselves constantly updating, renewing, or even discarding what we had learnt, and at the same time adjusting the way we learn it. Our epistemological “knives” were constantly carving into the “concrete” world, and our literal, determined, and decisive interpretations of the world were continually challenged. We were forced

351 Katrin Froese, “From Nihilism to Nothingness: A Comparison of Nietzschean and Daoist Thought,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 4:1, 2004, p. 98.

180 to renew or rethink our approaches to knowledge and ways of dealing with it. It is like those novice cooks who replaced their knives with new ones. This process does not stop knowledge “expansion.” However, if one keeps pursuing this way or takes this as the only way of pursuing knowledge, then what Zhuangzi warns us about at the beginning of the chapter on Cook Ding will become a true prophecy: “Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to pursue what has no limit, you will be in danger.” If we compare this with the skill of cutting an ox, then those who keep cutting and hacking will find themselves constantly replacing the knives. If we do not compare this to Cook Ding, we may think this dissecting method is just normal. However, Cook Ding’s performance tells us that this way of dissecting an ox is not in accordance with the Way. To put it epistemologically, there is an alternative to this kind of approach to knowledge—an alternative that is not obsessed with knowable contents but which attends to contextual positions. This approach, according to Zhuangzi, is in agreement with the Way.

So what is the epistemological performance of using a knife that conforms to the Way? Instead of using a tangible knife to cut up, or hack into, a solid, Cook Ding finds another way of cutting up an ox: instead of making physical contact, Cook Ding has become more interested in avoiding making direct impact on the concrete chunks and instead finds the crucial points between them. While his attention was being directed away from the cutter (the knife) and the carved object (the solid parts of an ox), both were becoming “nothing” to him: the knife became thick-less and the ox was replaced by operable spaces. What Cook Ding really enjoys now is the “plenty of room” to operate. This may inspire us to rethink the conventional way of acquiring knowledge and skills, which tend to employ our concrete perceptions to capture things that can be known. To compare Cook Ding’s skill to the pursuit of knowledge, those who conform to the Way will relinquish their obsession with the “who knows what can be known” kind of questions. They may start to look for the crucial and delicate pivots located in between or even amongst tangible and graspable chunks or pieces of knowledge. Because this kind of knowledge does not have solid content or form, it is difficult to convey. These are the knowledge (or skills) that can only be understood and performed after years of decisive and dedicated training. In the example of Cook Ding, even Cook Ding can draw an image of where those crucial joints are in an ox, but because every ox is unique, the image can only present abstract locations. Those who really want to

181 perform as well as Cook Ding have to undergo years of arduous practice by themselves. There will be no shortcuts for acquiring this kind of knowledge or these skills. Nevertheless, it is important to be open to the idea that cutting up an ox does not always mean one has to cut or hack into the very solid parts of an ox. There is an alternative to this, and it is in accordance with the Way.

4.2.5 The Contextual Transformation of Knowing However, relinquishing the conventional obsession with the tangible concepts of knower and knowable does not mean that we should dispense with conventional knowledge altogether. This is also why I suggested above that gaining knowledge and following the Way do not necessarily contradict each other. The problem here is not whether we should accumulate or expand our knowledge, but whether we can transform the way of understanding knowledge and its acquisition.

In sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, I suggested that a person of ming does not seek to become omniscient but to be attentive to her own limitations. She cares about not only what she knows but also where her limitation sits. By positioning herself at the pivot where known/knowable and unknown/unknowable352 meet, she can respond to either side more thoroughly and effectively. As suggested, this kind of knowledge is simultaneously contextual and ineffable. Comparing this with the story of Cook Ding, we may find a similarity between the notion of cutting skills and epistemological inquiries. After years of self-cultivation acquired through dissecting oxen, Cook Ding has realized that it is the subtle joints connecting the solid parts of an ox that matters the most to his performance. His attention was therefore shifted away from the concrete knife and the solid objects it encountered. Instead, the knife has now become thick-less and is navigating in abundant spaces.353 How can one express this wonderful feeling in words and teach others to perform the same? It is impossible: it can only be attained through self-discipline, relentless hard work and utmost dedication. As Ivanhoe puts it that “[a] skill lies between the lines of any description, in an intuitive knack which one must come to feel for oneself.”354

352 I propose that the unknown or unknowable are the concrete counterparts of the known or knowable. They are things that we believe we do not know. The transformation of knowledge does not focus on what we know or do not know, but pays more attention to the subtle axes where know-ability ramifies. The transformed knowledge does not necessarily have certain concrete expressions of its own. 353 Please notice the contextual sentiment expressed here. 354 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao,” 1993, p. 650.

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However, this does not mean that accumulating knowledge is not important: we still need tangible knowledge to discern the crucial points that are waiting to be recognized. This again reminds us of a contextual approach to knowledge, but from a different angle. The crucial points, therefore, are the contextual pivots 1) of different pieces of knowledge, 2) where the known/knowable and unknown/unknowable meet, and 3) only made possible through its own contextual gesture to both 1) and 2). In this sense, without the contextual contribution from all the necessary elements, there will be no contextual pivots in the first place. From an epistemological perspective, the contextual pivot indicates the interspatial locus where “known” and “unknown” converges, and unintelligible “knowledge” (instead of concrete and effable knowledge itself) emerges. In other words, it is still a kind of knowledge, only a transformed one. Because of its ineffability, it can be and actually is largely ignored by ordinary people. To just realize it takes real effort, and calls for the transformation of one’s focus. To enact it needs even more commitment. The remaining passage in the story of Cook Ding reveals this.

Whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I’m doing, work very slowly, and move the knife with the greatest subtlety, until—flop! The whole thing comes apart like a cold of earth crumbling to the ground. I stand there holding the knife and look all around me, completely satisfied and reluctant to move on, and then I wipe off the knife and put it away.”355

每至於族，吾見其難為，怵然為戒，視為止，行為遲。動刀甚微，謋然已

解，如土委地。提刀而立，為之四顧，為之躊躇滿志，善刀而藏之。 (Zhuangzi, 8/3/10-8/3/11)

This passage continues to elaborate Cook Ding’s cutting skills. People may still pay attention to the knife, whereas I would like to highlight the term complicated place (族, zu) that appears in the current passage. It is because of the intricacy of a position that subtle and scrupulous watchfulness is called for. Without the knowledge of the concrete parts that constitute the intricate space, to move a knife through it smoothly is an impossible mission. That said, Cook Ding’s attention has been transformed at these places: instead of paying great heed to concrete parts, his focus has now shifted away from components to the empty spaces they form.

355 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 1968, p. 51.

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The knowledge of these spaces is ineffable. First of all, they cannot be easily perceived and realized. At the very least, they would be much harder to realize than the concrete components. Secondly, quantitatively speaking, they are tiny and hence not easily observed; the better way to grasp them is through actual practice. Thirdly, they do not have decisive forms, but depend on the objects creating them. In this sense, to be able to capture these complex spaces, one needs to already know the perceivable parts surrounding it, but, at the same time, learn to shift one’s attention away from the components themselves to the crucial pivotal points they create, and under which they are integrated. It is a daunting task for a novice who has not yet even mastered the concrete objects, let alone the more intricate and delicate spaces between the objects. However, mastering tangible knowledge is still not adequate for pursuing knowledge or developing skills. The metaphor of Cook Ding’s skills suggests that the next step is probably to transform our conventional impression of knowledge from knowing the knowable and tangible to experiencing the unknowable (from a conventional perspective) and ineffable. This new level of “knowing” things does not reject what has been learnt but questions our old learning habit.

The story of Cook Ding shows us the importance of context in relation to knowledge, and how contextual knowledge can be acquired. More importantly, it pays great heed to the issue of the limitations of knowledge, and gives the known/knowable and unknown/unknowable a balanced evaluation. In doing so, it calls for our attention to be directed to the pivotal points that integrate distinctive knowledge as well as the known/knowable and unknown/unknowable. These pivots do not have a tangible and decisive form themselves, but are dependent on and shaped by the things that constitute them. The great value of these points is that they act like an “information exchange hub” that holds all the information needed for formulating a contextually-based response to the question at hand. At these pivotal points, we will be well prepared (like having abundant spaces) to act in the same way as Cook Ding when he dissected the ox. In practising this contextual approach to knowledge, could we not claim that we have found in it true freedom?

Conclusion The current investigations have revealed that, as indicated at the beginning of the current chapter, the text Zhuang Zi leaves no single dimension or element of

184 contextualism untouched.356 What is more intriguing is that every dimension of contextualism coexists with others harmoniously, and is given equal weight; one almost cannot decide which aspect is, or should be, emphasised more than the rest. This equilibrium presented in the Zhuang Zi’s contextualism may be because of the specific dimensions investigated in the current thesis, or the unique character of equilibrium in the text itself. It is difficult to overlook the aesthetic character of the Zhuang Zi when exploring the different aspects of contextualism in the text.

The textual and conceptual aspect of contextualism is best unveiled in Zhuangzi and Huizi’s discrepant understandings of the same question “How do you know a fish’s happiness?” Huizi is aware of only one aspect of the meanings of the question by the time he asks Zhuangzi, which is “how can you justify that you know a fish’s happiness?” Zhuangzi, however, apparently understands the ambiguity (or a double meaning) involved in the question: in addition to Huizi’s anticipated meaning, it can also mean “please let me know how you found out that a fish is happy.” Without appreciating the transformative nature of ideas corresponding to their contextual settings, Huizi lost the debate he had anticipated to win. The same story also exhibits Zhuangzi’s open- mindedness to the surroundings where things are taking place. For example, at the end of the story, he asserts that he knows the happiness of a fish by observing it at the riverside. At best, Zhuangzi may be regarded as both a theoretical and a practical contextualist. To him, nothing should be taken out of context, whether textually/conceptually or situationally/environmentally.

Of course, one of the best representations of Zhuangzi’s environmental/situational perspective of contextualism comes from the story of Cook Ding. Although the general biological structure is similar between the oxen, any particular ox possesses its own anatomical feature which is not shared by others. The degree or type of variation encountered by a butcher is basically limitless and unpredictable, words cannot exhaust its scope. If Cook Ding is unable to master the subtle anatomical differences between oxen when dissecting them, it is impossible for him to perform his skills almost effortlessly. How did he achieve such a level of skilfulness? Through endless practice by paying attention to the situational and contextual anatomies of the joints in each ox that he dissected.

356 Unfortunately, due to the lack of space, the comprehensive picture of practicality in the Zhuang Zi cannot be fully presented and appreciated in the current chapter.

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Cook Ding’s endless practice of the limitless anatomical possibilities is decided by the limitary feature of a context (in this case, each ox represents a new anatomical context to a butcher). If all oxen have the same features, (which means that there is literally just one anatomical context instead of many), the amount of practice that Cook Ding has to undertake will be significantly lower. The variable anatomical context also indicates the dynamic feature of contextuality.

The debate on relativism between Hansen and Ivanhoe helps uncover the limitary dimension of contextualism, and how the disagreement can be reduced (if not solved) by referring to the dynamic aspect of contextualism. Both thinkers recognize our inborn limitation of knowing the world and others from our own contextual perspectives. The divergence between their views lies in how we should deal with such a limitation. Ivanhoe suggests that if we try hard enough, we will eventually free ourselves from the confinement of a limited context; Hansen interprets this limitation differently: he argues that we may need to realize this limitation first, then learn to live peacefully with it instead of “breaking” it. If we understand the limited feature of contextualism dynamically, we may temper, to some extent, the tension between these two theories. The epistemological cage of each of us from our own limited contextual perspectives is not essentially a rigid but dynamic one: it may be our destiny to live with limited knowledge throughout our lives, but this does and should not prevent us from expanding the limitation. The dynamic perspective of contextualism validates the points about relativism made by both thinkers, but does not resemble any of them. In short, the contextualism proposed in the current thesis is much more comprehensive than being simply relativistic.

The relationality and interspatiality of contextualism have been presented hand in hand with the central theme of knowledge in the Zhuang Zi. To Zhuangzi, knowledge cannot and should not be comprehended without understanding its implicit relationship with the unknowable/unknown. In relation to knowledge, we tend to fall into the trap of, or be biased, when talking about ‘what we know’, and ignoring the significant role that ‘not-knowing’ plays in our perception of the world. To form a comprehensive image of knowledge, we have to be aware of both aspects and their relationships with each other, which in fact helps us transform our view of knowledge. The creative interspace between the ‘known’s or ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ allows the epistemological transformation to take place in a skilful and wise individual, be she a thinker or even a

186 doer. Interestingly enough, to Zhuangzi, this transformation seems to be realized more by the latter than the former. Of course, if a thinker often writes (or says) what she thinks, it is more likely that this kind of transformation will take place than if she merely contemplates.

As we navigate the comprehensive features of contextualism in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, some of its practical dimensions are also revealed, such as self-cultivation (e.g., honing the knack of cutting an ox) and epistemological development in the stories of Pao Ding and Zi Fei Yu. The theme of practicality in the Zhuang Zi, of course, is not limited to these two aspects, The applications of strategy (problem-solving) and ruling methods (public policy) in Zhuangzi’s contextual thinking can be found in many chapters, such as the Inner Chapter Ying Di Wang (應帝王, ‘Know How’s for Emperors and Kings) the Miscellaneous Chapter Geng Sang Chu (庚桑楚), etc. However, these are not the central focuses of the current chapter. In short, of all the ancient texts in which the theme of practical contextualism can be uncovered, the Zhuang Zi is an ideal and unique one.

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Chapter Five

The Analects: Practical Contextualism in Human Relationships

The Analects (論語, Lun Yu) is an anthology of short passages that are purported to be the sayings of, and the dialogues between, Master Confucius (孔子, Kongzi, 551-479 BCE) and his disciples.357 The text was compiled long after the Master’s death, and is known as one of the key texts that contain Confucian ideas.358 Amongst studies of the text, enormous attention has been paid to one of the central Confucian concepts, the concept of ren (仁, benevolence/humaneness) (the other one is li (禮, rites/behaviour propriety), which will be explored in the third section of this chapter). In the Analects, the character 仁 appears 105 times in 58 of the 499 passages, which constitutes ten percent of the discussions in the Analects, more than any other concept (such as filial piety (孝, xiao), Heaven (天, tian), and rites (禮, li)).359 It may be farfetched to judge the importance of a concept through sheer statistics, although the number itself is significant. However, in the text, Confucius claims that he seldom talks about ren (9:1), which clearly contradicts the frequent appearance of this character in the Analects. One possible explanation is that, since it is hard to give a decisive definition or description of ren, Confucius is reluctant to talk about this concept until it is necessary to do so (for instance, when asked by his disciples). The indecisiveness and indeterminacy of ren may be of scholarly interest when exploring this very concept throughout the philosophical history of the Confucian tradition.

This chapter will start by investigating the transformed meaning of the concept ren from its etymological origin to its Confucian moral denotation. In doing so, I hope to reveal the contextual and practical implication of this moral concept of ren, and its guiding significance for the Confucian practice of self-cultivation (修身, xiu shen). The chapter then proceeds to investigate the idea of xue (學, to learn/learning) in the text, one of the key practices in cultivating the self. In the discussions of xue and its relationships with

357 Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 61. 358 ibid. 359 Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese and Western Interpretations of Jen (Humanity),” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2:2, 1975, p. 107.

189 two other key practical concepts si (思, to contemplate/contemplation) and jiao (教, to teach/teaching), I hope to reveal the contextual implications embedded in these practical concepts. The last part of the chapter will focus on examining the two central Confucian concepts of ren and li according to the perspective of practical contextualism.

In the Analects, Confucius portrays himself as a transmitter instead of a maker (7:1), which raises more questions about the concept of ren: if ren is just another idea transmitted by Confucius from his predecessors, then why is it so hard to convey its meaning? Is it because the meaning has been lost in the transmission, or because Confucius is not an ordinary transmitter? An ordinary transmitter may just relay messages from one dimension of space and/or time to another, whereas a transmitter like Confucius may not be simply transferring ideas, but also making sure that the ideas transferred from a previous time period are also appropriate for the current situation or circumstance. There were thinkers throughout early Chinese intellectual history who spoke out against Confucian traditionalism, and accused Confucian thinking to be out of its time. Amongst them were prominent thinkers, such as Mozi (墨子, 480? BCE–390? BCE), Zhuangzi (莊子, 399? BCE–295? BCE), and Han Fei (韓非, 280? BCE–233 BCE), who attacked Confucian ideas from various angles and aspects.360 However, it is worth pointing out that the prominent idea of ren in Confucian philosophy was not one that was directly inherited from Confucius’s predecessors. Rather, as will be shown in the following sections, Confucius made a significant contribution to the idea of ren by adding a new dimension to this idea. Through the study of the transformed meaning of ren, I hope to reveal the unique practical and contextual features of Confucius’s inheritance and transmission of the idea of ren. These features may not be completely unfamiliar to those who disagree with Confucius’s ideas.

Also, the different dimensions of practical contextualism in the Analects are fairly self- explanatory. As suggested by Herbert Fingarette’s book title, Confucius: The Secular As Sacred, extraordinary ideas are conveyed in the Analects through ordinary words.361 To

360 For example, Mohists accuse Confucian teaching of being narrow and exclusive by focusing too much on relationships based on kinship and hierarchical order. Zhuangzi criticizes Confucians as narrow- minded moralists, and Han Fei simply points out that the time for ruling according to the Confucian tradition has gone, it is time for fa (法, penal law), shi (勢, power), and shu (術, technique) to play roles in political arena. For further details, please refer to Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, pp. 170-86. 361 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

190 maintain the logical flow and smooth reading experience, I will not interrupt the discussions and investigations by inserting extra explications of the corresponding dimensions of practical contextualism. Rather I will only summarize them in the Conclusion to the current chapter.

5.1 The Transformed ‘Ren’ in the Analects The period during which Confucius lived is known as the Eastern Zhou period (東周, Dong Zhou, 770-221 BCE),362 which was preceded by the Western Zhou period (西周, Xi Zhou, 1122-771 BCE).363 The Western Zhou is valued by Confucius as “the paradigm of political perfection and social harmony;”364 whereas the Eastern Zhou was marked by the breakdown of the Zhou territory into states, which resulted in the most turbulent period in ancient Chinese history.365 The struggles for power within and between different states in this period gave rise to wars that lasted for centuries. Confucius and many other prominent thinkers from the social class of the scholar- official (士, shi) emerged in this disordered era and sought ways to deal with the widespread turmoil.366

The concept of ren was passed down from the previous era and was allegedly given special consideration by Confucius as a prescription for remedying the chaotic situation of his time. Considering the aforementioned difference between the era (the Western Zhou) admired by Confucius and that (the Eastern Zhou) in which Confucius was living, one may be wrong if one expects that the meaning of ren was preserved and then transmitted by Confucius without adjustment. To better understand the possible amendment made by Confucius to the term ren, it is worth first exploring the meaning of ren in the pre-Confucian era.

362 The Eastern Zhou includes the Spring and Autumn period (春秋, Chun Qiu, 722-476 BCE) and the Warring States period (戰國, Zhan Guo, 475-221 BCE). 363 List of Dates (in Chronological Order) in Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008. P. xiii. Also see Bo Mou (ed.), History of Chinese Philosophy, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 113. 364 Feng Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, the Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-771 BC, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. i. 365 Charles O. Hucker, China to 1850: A Short History, Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 37. 366 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, p. 3.

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5.1.1 The Transformation of ‘Aesthetic’ Ren to ‘Moral’ Ren Research suggests that the Chinese character 仁 did not appear until a few decades after 770 BCE,367 which is between the beginning of the Eastern Zhou and the end of the Western Zhou periods. Ren was first found in two poems from the Book of Poetry (詩經, Shi Jing) composed during this period, namely the Shu Yu Tian (叔于田)368 and the Lu Ling (盧令)369. An intensive investigation performed by Takeuchi on these poems suggests that, in its first appearances, ren did not mean anything more than praise for a hunter’s exceptional external manly beauty.370 Takeuchi argues that, in these poems, “[ren]…should be taken as an adjective merely modifying such external beauty as ‘elegant, nice-looking’ or ‘handsome, brave’ instead of expressing the conception relating to humaneness or affection.”371

Takeuchi’s view was later buttressed by Lin Yü-sheng in a similar research project relating to the same poems. In addition, Lin argues that

A more reliable way of approaching the meaning of [ren] in these poems is, first, to investigate the origins of the word [ren]; second, to free ourselves from the influence of moralistic interpretations of traditional commentaries; and, third, to weigh possible meanings of [ren] in the context of the poems and against the background of the evolutionary process of Chinese civilization.372

Essentially, Lin points out that the meaning of ren had most likely evolved under Confucius’s influence, a fact which should not, but can easily, be overlooked because of the dominance of the Confucian interpretation of ren. Lin also calls attention to the amoral nature of ren in its early appearances, which was later endowed with a moral meaning by Confucius.

It now seems clear that moral implications did not exist in the initial meaning of ren until later emphasized by some thinkers like Confucius. There are theories regarding

367 Lin Yü-sheng, “The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy,” Monumenta Serica, 31, 1974-75, p. 179. 368 鄭風·叔于田: 叔于田、巷無居人。豈無居人、不如叔也、洵美且仁。叔于狩、巷無飲酒。豈無飲酒、不如叔也、洵美且好。叔適野、巷無服馬。豈無服馬、不如叔也、洵美且武。 369 齊風·盧令: 盧令令、其人美且仁。盧重環、其人美且鬈。盧重鋂、其人美且偲。 370 Teruo Takeuchi, “A Study of the Meaning of Jen 仁 Advocated by Confucius,” Acta Asiatica, 9, 1965, p. 67. 371 Ibid. 372 Lin Yü-sheng, “The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy,” 1974-75, p. 177.

192 how the moralization of ren took place. Lin suggests that the two centuries between the first appearance of ren and the later innovative re-rendering of ren by Confucius saw the gradual expansion of the meaning of ren to incorporate moral connotations. This process was later accelerated because of Confucius’s advocacy.373 Takeuchi expresses a similar and more thoughtful view of this transformation. He suggests that the decline of the Western Zhou period and the consequent breakdown of the House of Zhou had led people to live in a chaotic condition. A sense of morality had developed amongst people dealing with complicated, confusing, and often conflicting situations.374 With the emergence of this pervasive moral sentiment came the formation of moral overtones in the evolving meaning of ren. Both Lin and Takeuchi believe that, as a consequence, ren turned from being a depiction of external beauty into being a representation of personal moral qualities.

Lin and Takeuchi are both right in detecting the social movement behind the evolving meaning of ren. According to the Analects, social order had long dissolved by Confucius’s time, and therefore ‘Heaven’ (天, tian) “selected” Confucius as the wooden bell-clapper (木鐸, mu duo) to reverse the tide and turn the tables (3.24).375 As a transmitter, Confucius was probably aware of those social changes and hence promoted moral ideas appropriate to his time. However, the story should not end here. It may be widely acknowledged that Confucius took the social context of his time into account in order to expand the meaning of ren by adding moral values, but this does not entail that only the newly added layers should warrant our attention. This is particularly true if Confucius’s claim in the Analects that he is only a transmitter but not a maker is taken into account. It is, of course, not unlikely that Confucius pretends to be humble here by toning down his own creativity. However, it is equally possible that he is reminding us of the importance of acknowledging the originality of an idea, such as ren. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that, in conveying the idea of ren, Confucius devotes

373 Ibid., pp. 182-3. 374 Teruo Takeuchi, “A Study of the Meaning of Jen 仁 Advocated by Confucius,” 1965, p. 75. 375 天下之無道也久矣，天將以夫子為木鐸。(《論語•八佾》) In Confucius’s time, a wooden bell- clapper (mu duo) was an instrument employed to bring people’s attention to important issues of the state, such as the announcement of educational and political policies. Here, mu duo is a metaphor indicating Confucius’s role as an influential educator of the then turbulent time. (《人能弘道: 傅佩榮談論語》 (The Human Being Manifests the Dao: Fu Peirong Interprets the Analects), interp. 傅佩榮 (Fu Peirong), 北京: 東方出版社 (Beijing: The Eastern Publishing Co., Ltd), 2012, p. 57)

193 attention to both layers, that is, the original one and the one that has been further developed.

The initial meaning of ren as depicting and admiring the virile beauty of hunters certainly has an aesthetic connotation. In “The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue,” Nicholas Gier points out that, in the Hellenistic Age, virtue was a thoroughly gendered concept that favoured men. He also indicates an intrinsic link between aesthetic performances and virtue ethics. Because of the early denotation of ren in the Book of Poetry as the manly beauty of hunters, he suggests that “Chinese virtue was gendered as well.”376 By making such a comment, it is certain that Gier believes that ren already had a moral or ethical meaning in the Book of Poetry. However, the previous discussions of the originality of ren have certainly disputed this assumption. This thesis will not discuss whether Chinese virtue was gendered or not. However, the reason provided by Gier to support this claim seems inadequate.

Despite the suggested link between aesthetics and virtues, the early ren seems to be aesthetic and amoral instead of aesthetic and moral; however, the link between aesthetics and virtues, and the original aesthetic notion of ren, seem to herald a natural transition of the early aesthetic ren to the later moral ren. Before we become too comfortable with this theory, let me point out the difference discerned by Gier between rule-based ethics and virtue-ethics. Gier suggests that the former is primarily judged according to normative principles whereas the latter is largely evaluated according to aesthetic performances, and contends that Confucian ethics is virtue-oriented.377 He, however, does not rule out the normative elements involved in virtue-ethics. All seems well until efforts are made by Gier that attempt to propose a model of ‘fine arts’ for virtue ethics. Gier has since realized the potential problem with this model, which already concerned Aristotle centuries ago that an evil man can be a good artist. Gier, however, insists that “the single disanalogy of the evil artist does not undermine the many fruitful analogues that we have drawn from the arts.”378 This is certainly just one counter-example to the fine-art-model, but this may not be an insignificant one.

376 Nicholas F. Gier, “The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue,” Philosophy East and West, 51:2, 2001, p. 282. 377 Ibid., p. 300. 378 Ibid., p. 298.

194

Instead of magnifying the imperfection of the fine-art-model, the more important task is determining the lesson we can learn from the weakness of this model, and applying it to the current study of the transformed meaning of ren. The counter-example of the fine- art-model at least suggests that there may not be an inevitable link between aesthetics and morality: an aesthetic performance does not also have to be a moral one, and moral conduct may not necessarily appear aesthetically. This indeterminate relationship between aesthetics and morality has been implied, to a certain extent, by one of Confucius’s evaluations of different types of music (樂, yue) in the Analects. Confucius comments that the music of shao is perfect both in its aesthetic and moral values, whereas the music of wu may be flawless in its aesthetic form but not necessarily in its moral quality.379 Music is one of the six forms of art (六藝, liu yi) in the Confucian practices of self-cultivation.380 Confucius’s comparison between the different types of music (in this case, between shao and wu) suggests that he is well aware that the aesthetic value of art or artistic performance is not necessarily or always positively correlated with its moral value(s).

Of course, it is desirable for a practice to be both aesthetic and moral, like that suggested by Gier as moral aesthetics or virtue ethics,381 which could be embodied by the music of shao of which Confucius approves; but if both cannot be covered simultaneously, the moral aspect should probably be given priority. In this sense, the previous assumption of a “natural” transition of early aesthetic to later moral ren may not be as promising as it first appeared. Aesthetics may have an intrinsic link with virtuous performance, but it may not have a similar link with moral practice. In this light, it may be safe to assume that certain moral aspects underlying the original aesthetic meaning of ren, instead of the aesthetic layer itself, caught Confucius’s attention and prompted him to promote ren as a moral concept.

The moral layer of ren may be a response to the call for a solution to ease the chaotic social condition. Confucius clearly played an important role in promoting the ‘moral’

379 子謂韶，「盡美矣，又盡善也。」謂武，「盡美矣，未盡善也」。(《論語•八佾》) 380 The Six Arts are 禮 (rites or etiquette), 樂 (music), 射 (archery), 禦 (charioteering), 書 (calligraphy or literacy), and 數 (mathematics or reckoning). “藝。六藝也。一曰五禮，二曰六樂，三曰五射，四曰五禦，五曰六書，六曰九數。” (劉寶楠 (Liu Baonan) (ed.), 《論語正義》 (Lun Yu Zheng Yi, An Extensive Note of the Analects), 北京: 中華書局 (Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju), 1957, p. 138.) 381 Nicholas F. Gier, “The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue,” 2001, p. 298.

195 ren. However, as a transmitter, it is unlikely that Confucius had lost grasp of the original meaning of ren during such a process. To the contrary, it may be safe to assume that this original denotation led to the adoption of ren (but not any other characters) as the key character of Confucian ethics in the Analects. That ren is a fundamental term in the Analects reveals important assumptions about how human relationships were conceived. To test this, it is worth re-examining the original meaning of ren to see whether it can mean something more philosophical than just external manly beauty (i.e. its pre-Confucian usage).

5.1.2 The Etymological Origin of Ren Where 仁 is concerned, it is hard to overlook its unique pictographic nature: the combination of the Chinese character 人 (also pronounced as ren, meaning person, human, or humanity) at the left, and the character 二 (er, meaning ‘two’) at the right. 仁 has various antiquated forms, such as . There is a consensus that 仁 and 人 share the same etymological origin. Adding the character 二 to 仁, according to Lin’s argument, is simply an indicator of repetition—to repeat the character 人, which means more than just one person.382 Gier has rightly pointed out that “the concept of relationality is at the origins of this character.”383 As Herbert Fingarette puts it wittily: “Where there are not at least two truly human beings, there is not even one.”384

These bear important implications for the original and pre-ethical meaning of ren. As has been mentioned above, ren was originally used by poets to denote the exceptional

382 Lin Yü-sheng, “The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy,” 1974-75, p. 178. The unearthed Guo Dian Bamboo Slips (郭店竹簡, also known as 郭店楚簡, Guo Dian Chu Slips) in 1993 complicated the current etymological study, and subsequently, the interpretation of the character 仁. According to some studies, there are at least three alternative forms of 仁 appearing in the Guo Dian Bamboo Slips, these being “ ”, “忎” and “ ”. Debates have taken place in the relevant academic literature regarding the relationships between these forms. Despite many bifurcations, the consensus is that the character 仁 may have undergone a complicated development before settling into its current form. However whether the existing debates will have a direct impact on the study of 仁 in the Analects is still uncertain, as the text itself does not appear in the collection of the Guo Dian Bamboo Slips. For further details, please refer to 梁濤 (Liang Tao), “郭店竹簡‘ ’字與孔子仁學 (The Character ‘Ren’ in the Guo Dian Bamboo Slips and Confucian Idea of Ren),” 哲學研究 (Philosophical Researches), 5, 2005, pp. 46- 52; and 余蘭蘭 (Yu Lanlan), “郭店楚簡中的‘仁’字研究 (The Character ‘Ren’ in the Guo Dian Chu Slips),” 湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版) [Journal of Hubei University (Philosophy and Social Science)], 1, 2012, pp. 23-7. 383 Nicholas F. Gier, “The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue,” 2001, p. 282. 384 Herbert Fingarette, “The Music of Humanity in the Conversations of Confucius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 10:4, 1983, p. 340.

196 manly appearance of a hunter. The hunter’s manly beauty was so outstanding that no other hunters were able to match up to it. Both Lin and Takeuchi point out that the amoral nature of the initial meaning of ren is different from its later one, which included a moral layer. However, both scholars may have overlooked a shared feature of these two interpretations—without an existing human context, neither amoral nor moral judgements would have made any sense to us. In this sense, if there is anything that can be seen as being transmitted by Confucius, it is not the explicit meaning of ren in relation to either layer (amoral or moral), rather it is the common implication of the human context that runs through both levels.

The pictograph and etymology suggest that an individual person (人) needs to live with others (in a community) to be able to understand and achieve 仁. This contextual interpretation of ren has been highlighted by many scholars. Karyn Lai points out the underlying ‘human relatedness’ embedded in the meaning of ren.385 David Hall and Roger Ames argue that the character er (二, two) attached to the notion of human being (人) indicates “that authoritative humanity is attainable only in a communal context through interpersonal exchange.”386 Antonia Cua contends that Confucius advocates the cultivation of masterful skills instead of infallible judgement and authority when dealing with difficult and varying situations.387 Gier claims that “At the heart of Confucian ethics is virtuous relationality rather than rational autonomy.”388 In all of these interpretations, a strong sense of a practical and contextual approach to ren can be clearly detected on top of the conventional moral interpretation of ren. Ren no longer merely serves as an umbrella term that sums up all moral codes or norms; instead it is more of a practical mindfulness exercised when developing and perfecting one’s life skills while interacting with others. In short, ren both emerges from and reaches out to one’s contextual engagement with the world. This aspect of ren has certainly been understood by many scholars of Chinese philosophy, including those mentioned above. Their insights have helped to free the idea of ren from a conventionally dogmatic approach which confines ren to ethical norms and standards. If, as I have suggested

385 Karyn L. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2008, p. 23. 386 David L. Hall; Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 116. 387 Antonio S. Cua, “The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals in the Ethics of Confucius,” Inquiry, 14, 1971, p. 47. 388 Nicholas F. Gier, “The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue,” 2001, p. 282.

197 above, a human context is at the core of Confucius’s concerns, the practical and contextual approach seems to deal more adequately with the essence of ren. However, where the contextual aspect of ren is concerned, is there anything that deserves more scrutiny? I believe there is.

5.1.3 The Practical and Contextual Approach of Ren The contextual investigation of ren has mainly focused on two aspects: 1) the interpretation of ren from a contextual perspective, and 2) the development of a contextual methodology for the cultivation of ren. In either domain, ‘context’ is not simply perceived as a conceptual term; rather it is, and should be, rendered practically; here, context specifically means the human-related context, in which ren can be realized, understood, cultivated, and perfected. However, there seems to be only one problem with this contextual approach to ren—the precondition and presumption that a human context is already and therefore will always be there. This kind of perception might have been acceptable in the pre-modern age, but became a less consensus thanks to the scientific advancement.389 Raising this issue does not in any way deny the validity of the contextual approach to ren, it merely puts forward the proposition that a new dimension may need to be incorporated into the existing investigation of ren. This new dimension should give heed to the role of the concept of ren in the preservation of human context, which is arguably a more fundamental feature of ren, for it concerns the very foundation of contextual analysis. Although Confucius may not have been able to foresee the destructive future that faced the human race during his time, his perspective of human context continually fuels the concept of ren with new inspirations. In this light, his timeless wisdom continues to engender solutions to the problems that endanger humans’ survival.

In the previous discussion, I have suggested that Confucius lived through one of the most turbulent periods in ancient China that was permeated with prolonged wars which took place between and within states. Despite these wars, technology in those days did not possess the power to extinguish the entire human race in comparison to the technology we have today. However the loss of life was not, by any measure, of less

389 In ancient times, it may have been understandable that the preservation of that human race was not an urgent concern. Other than natural disasters, there seemed to be no expectation that the entire human race (along with the home planet) could be annihilated in the very hands of human beings. From this century onwards, however, scientific advancement has brought with it the dangerous prospect that the subsistence of the entire human race is in jeopardy.

198 concern to Confucius as he is presented in the Analects. In fact, human lives may have been of the highest value to Confucius. A short story from the Analects may attest to this. One day, upon his return from the court, Confucius hears that a stable was burnt down while he was away. He immediately checks by asking whether there were any casualties in this incident, without mentioning the horses (10.17).390 The Textual Study and Variorum of the Four Books (四書章句集注, Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu)391 notes that this does not suggest that Confucius is not at all concerned for the horses, but this concern cannot be compared to that for human lives in degrees. This story shows how human lives have been ranked “the highest” by Confucius.392 Confucius once suggested that the way we associate with animals cannot be compared to the way we associate with other human beings. We live with other humans, if we do not communicate and associate with them, with whom should we associate? (18.6)393

In the Analects, Confucius seems to suggest a link between the preservation of human lives and the quality of ren. This is implied in a conversation between Confucius and one of his disciples, Zi Lu (子路):

Zilu said, “When Duke Huan had his elder brother Prince Qiu killed, the tutor Shao Hu died with him, but Guanzhong did not.” “In this instance,” he added, “did Guanzhong fall short of authoritative conduct (ren 仁)?”

The Master said, “Many times did Duke Huan assemble the various feudal lords, and it was always through Guanzhong’s influence rather than a resort to arms. Such was his authoritative conduct, such was his authoritative conduct.” (14.16)394

390 《論語·鄉黨》：廄焚。子退朝，曰：「傷人乎？」不問馬。 391 《四書章句集注》內容分為《大學章句》（1 卷）、《中庸章句》（1 卷）、《論語集注》（10 卷）以及《孟子集注》（14 卷）。(The Textual Study and Variorum of the Four Books is comprised of one volume of the Textual Study of the Da Xue, one volume of the Textual study of the Zhong Yong, ten volumes of the Variorum of the Analects, and fourteen volumes of the Variorum of the Mencius.) 392 《四書章句集注·鄉黨第十》 (13.1) ：非不愛馬，然恐傷人之意多，故未暇問。蓋貴人賤畜，理當如此。 393 《論語·微子》：……鳥獸不可與同群，吾非斯人之徒與而誰與？…… 394 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 1998, p. 175.

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子路曰：「桓公殺公子糾，召忽死之，管仲不死。」曰：「未仁乎？」子

曰：「桓公九合諸侯，不以兵車，管仲之力也。如其仁！如其仁！」(憲問, 14.16)

In a conversation with Confucius, Zi Lu raises his concern about whether Guan Zhong (683 – 642 BCE) is a man of ren. (The Chinese character 仁 has been highlighted here to clarify the English translations.) Zi Lu seems to doubt this as Guan Zhong did not follow the conventional practice of dying with his master, as the other tutor did. Although Zi Lu did not make a specific judgment of Shao Hu, it seems that he has higher regard for Shao Hu than for Guan Zhong because the former faithfully died with the master whereas the latter did not. Confucius has a totally different view of Guan Zhong: his focus is on Guan Zhong’s ability to bring all the states together by not resorting to military force (不以兵車, bu yi bing che). The character 合 (he; to unify, unification) is particular interesting here: unification can be achieved either through violent wars or peaceful deals and negotiations. To Confucius, Guan Zhong was the person who knew how to unify states through peaceful means, thereby avoiding destructive wars that can potentially take away countless lives. This quality in Guan Zhong is, for Confucius, the highly regarded quality of ren.

However, there are different interpretations regarding Confucius’s approval of Guan Zhong. For instance, Benjamin Schwartz believes that Guan Zhong’s good works were not based on the “purity of motive and intent” but merely a result of his great talent as a statesman.395 Schwartz’s belief is based on Confucius’s comment that Guan Zhong is a man who lacks the knowledge of li (禮; ritual, behavioural propriety).396 Schwartz therefore believes that Confucius’s comment suggests that Guan Zhong is a man with “grave moral defects.”397 It seems that, to Schwartz, knowing how to perform according to li amounts to having moral excellence. To put it another way, lacking knowledge of li suggests a moral deficiency. However, textual support for this claim can hardly find in the Analects. Instead we find Confucius saying: “What is the point of performing li when the one who does it lacks in ren?” (3.3)398 This clearly suggests that one’s moral

395 Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 110. 396 《論語•八佾》：……管氏而知禮，孰不知禮？(If Guan Zhong knew li, then who does not?) 397 Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 1985, p. 109. 398 《論語•八佾》：……人而不仁，如禮何？……

200 depth cannot be judged merely according to behavioural propriety. If this is true, then Confucius’s criticisms of Guan Zhong’s wilful conduct may not be tantamount to the former’s censure of the latter’s moral defects. Therefore, it is hard to simply accept that Guan Zhong’s peaceful deals were the mere political means of achieving what without any moral motive and intent.

In fact, if we look carefully into Ames and Rosemont’s translation of this passage, we may realize that ren has been translated as “authoritative conduct” instead of the better known translation of “benevolence” or “humanity”. Ames and Rosemont argue that “benevolence” confines the meanings of ren to the psychological realm at the expense of its diverse connotations, meanwhile “humanity” may not be able to reflect the arduous process of ren-becoming.399 Ames and Rosemont emphasize particularly the authoritative role a person of ren takes within a community. From this angle, they may also agree that Guan Zhong deserves the name of an authoritative person who does his duty and makes efforts to protect the safety of his own community, but not at the expense of other communities. The political power of Guan Zhong is not necessarily something that he was born with, but the result of hard discipline and relentless cultivation in an environment where political struggles were the commonplace. Even from a contemporary point of view, it is widely acknowledged that political arenas can produce brutally efficient people who have little regard for public niceties. When viewing the personal development of Guan Zhong from the perspective of the actual political environment and context, we may have more sympathy for him as a survivor of cruel political struggles who, despite his extravagant manner, was still willing to put his political skills to good use. From this contextual perspective, we may feel reluctant to impose the idea of a ‘pure’ moral motive and intention on Guan Zhong’s character and judge him accordingly. Guan Zhong may not be the person from whom one can observe and learn li, but he is certainly someone who can look after the community so that others can learn li from those who have mastered it in the community. After all, how can li be preserved and practised in a community that has already been destroyed by wars? I think this is why, on the one hand, Confucius criticizes Guan Zhong’s inadequacy in enacting li, and, on the other hand, approves of his conforming to ren.

399 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 50.

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The examination of Guan Zhong’s character has suggested that the approach of practical contextualism may help us form a comprehensive understanding of an individual: instead of evaluating someone based on norms and abstract rules, looking into someone’s environment and process of development may prove to be more fruitful and effective. In his work, Tu Wei-ming insightfully reveals that “[p]ure morality and spirituality, admitting no biological, psychological, or sociological factors, is a kind of formalism as unacceptable to the East Asian mode of thinking as an extreme kind of [behavioural] reductionism would be.”400 Confucius is certainly less likely to promote this kind of idealistic approach to ren. Questions such as “where does one come from?”, “what has the person experienced?”, and “how has s/he become the way s/he is now?” may help us discover an individual’s quality and character that may otherwise be overlooked through the lens of stereotypes. In the case of Guan Zhong, the perspective of practical contextualism not only helps reverse our biased impression of Guan Zhong, but more importantly, provides a new angle for examining the Confucian idea of ren. The ability and desire to preserve human context, not for any particular community but for all humans in general, constitute a very important and even fundamental quality of being, becoming, and practising ren. We have seen this quality in Guan Zhong, whose authoritative conduct, which conformed to ren, had the effect of earning Confucius’s admiration and approval.

The great amount of attention devoted to preserving human context can even be seen in a military text—The Art of War by Sun Zi (孫子兵法, Sun Zi Bing Fa). Sun Zi (孫子, ca. 544–496 BCE) (also known as Sun Wu (孫武)) is a well-known ancient Chinese military thinker and strategist. He is a contemporary of Confucius. Although these two thinkers specialize in two utterly different fields, this does not prevent them from sharing a similar view of human values. At the very beginning of the third chapter, Offensive Strategy (謀攻, Mou Gong), of The Art of War, Sun Zi argues:

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them.401… [To] win

400 Tu Wei-ming, “The ‘Moral Universal’ from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought,” Philosophy East and West, 31:3, 1981, pp. 266-7. 401 Regiment, company, and squad are lü, zu, and wu in Chinese. In ancient China, five hundred soldiers made up a lü, one hundred a zu, and five a wu.

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one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.402

凡用兵之法，全國為上，破國次之；全旅為上，破旅次之；全卒為上，破

卒次之；全伍為上，破伍次之。是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈

人之兵，善之善者也。

In ancient China, five hundred soldiers constituted a lü (旅, regiment), one hundred a zu (卒, company), and five a wu (伍, squad).403 In this passage, Sun Zi asserts that destroying (破, po) your enemy to win a war is not of central interest to a great strategist; where possible, the best strategist is capable of defeating the enemy without resorting to war. The size of your enemy does not matter: your enemy could be a whole state (國, guo) with a population of hundreds or thousands, or simply a five-person squad. The best of all the good options (善之善者, shan zhi shan zhe) is always that which can preserve the lives of the enemies. It may be that one perceives an evil quality within the enemy that would justify a war against it, but the solution may not be that the enemies therefore need to be destroyed in order to eliminate what is bad or evil. In doing so, the human context is threatened. It is true that without human beings, there will be much less conflict and contention in the world, but then it seems more problematic to have a world without human beings. While Sun Zi was Confucius’s contemporary, it is unclear as to whether Confucius had read his work. However, if the preservation of the human context is one of the central values of Confucius’s ren, it may be safe to assume that in the eyes of Confucius, Sun Zi may also be a person of ren, for the same as Guan Zhong. Furthermore, the Art of War, amongst others, may be viewed as another good analogue of Geir’s model of fine arts for virtue ethics: when not being employed to win over or kill others, even a war can have aesthetical qualities. From this angle, how can this be denied that there is a virtuous quality in Guan Zhong’s authoritative conduct, which promoted peaceful deals and prevented the massive loss of life in warfare, not just once but many times?

402 袁士檳 (Yuan Shibin), The Art of War (孫子兵法), 北京：外語教學與研究出版社 (Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press), 1997, p. 13. 403 Ibid.

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5.1.4 Ren and Self-Cultivation It is certainly true that the existence of a human context is a necessary condition for the quality of ren to be appreciated, perceived, practised and achieved; however, it is not necessarily a sufficient condition. Human beings, other than being merely alive, are also prone to further development. Confucius maintains that a person of ren will wish to establish (立, li) others the way she establishes herself, to enrich (達, da) others the way she wants herself to be enriched (6:30).404 Here, ren is no longer displaying a willingness to preserve human lives. A new dimension of ren relating to the further development of human beings has been raised by Confucius as a requirement for attaining a higher level of self-cultivation or -actualization. Moreover, self-cultivation should not be limited to improving one’s own personal qualities, but should extend to developing skills that serve the community. This task is much more complicated and difficult in comparison with the aforementioned quality of ren. In fact, it is so difficult that even sages like Yao and Shun will feel challenged by this dimension of ren (堯舜其猶病諸, Yao Shun qi you bing zhu) (6:30).

Self-cultivation (修身, xiu shen) plays an important role in developing human beings in Confucian philosophy, and it is aligned well with the concept of ren. Previous discussion has suggested that Confucian ren is different from its original meaning, and is more inward- than outward-looking. However, differentiating inward- from outward- ness may be an oversimplified way of approaching ren, as in fact, both dimensions can be seen in the practice of self-cultivation. David Hall and Roger Ames argue that ren is “a process of integrative person making in which one incorporates the interests of others as his own and conducts himself in a manner that addresses the general good.”405 On the one hand, ren is a personal decision to develop the self internally to attain higher moral and spiritual values. To achieve this, one has to look inwardly to appreciate these values and meanings, but more importantly, look beyond oneself for a more contextual perspective, as values and meanings cannot be decided by any particular individual. On the other hand, ren cannot and should not only be practised privately, silently, and internally. In fact, ren (as person making) cannot be properly developed without a sincere and patient engagement with others, which, in the end, will also be the touchstone of the quality of ren. As Hall and Ames straightforwardly put it, person-

404 《論語·雍也》：夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。 405 David L. Hall; Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 1987, p. 122.

204 making of ren “engages the whole person: his ‘public,’ ‘active,’ and ‘outer’ self as well as those dimensions that are ‘private,’ ‘contemplative,’ and ‘inner.’” This process of “‘personing’ goes far beyond ‘a principle of inwardness,’ and requires reference to one’s environing conditions.”406 Not only that, as an individual, we mindfully develop the quality of ren by practising it in the human context where the value of ren can unfold, be manifested, and embodied; but more importantly, during this process, one can be made aware of the contextual and interdependent relationship between the internal and external ‘good’. If one fails, the other will less likely attain success by its own.

Understanding this is important, as it gives an unbiased picture of how self-cultivation should be portrayed and practised. In the eyes of Confucians, ren is arguably the ultimate object of self-cultivation. If the methodology of cultivating ren is biased, how can one anticipate an unbiased ren? Or, more fundamentally, can it even be called ren if it is biased? Of course, it is an oversimplification to say that the final result of self- cultivation is ren, as these two are in more of a “symbiotic” relationship, developing alongside each other in a collaborative manner. Tu Wei-ming advises that “the ontological postulate of human perfectibility must be supplemented by an experiential assertion about the concrete path by which one’s own “germinations” and “seeds” can eventually be brought to fruition.”407 Self-cultivation is certainly a journey on one’s own concrete path towards the ideal of human perfection encapsulated by ren. However, there seems to be no sharp line between the journey and the destination in the process of “personing”, therefore ren may not be seen as a pure ontological objective to which self-cultivation is a mere empirical process of development. If the word ‘development’ sounds too teleological, it may be safer to assert that ren and self-cultivation mutually benefit each other: self-cultivation is an ongoing process of approaching ren, and ren is a lifelong journey of self-cultivation.

It is worth noting that ‘修身’ (self-cultivation) does not appear in the Analects (it can be found in another important Confucian text The Classic of Rites (禮記, Li Ji)). The closest match for it in the Analects may be the phrase ‘修己’ (meaning ‘self-cultivation’ or ‘cultivating the self’ in English) which appears just once in the chapter Xian Wen (憲

406 Ibid., p. 124. 407 Tu Wei-ming, “The ‘Moral Universal’ from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought,” 1981, p. 264.

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問). If the phrase ‘修身’ did not appear in the Analects, can we then therefore assume that self-cultivation is not one of the principal topics in the Analects? The answer is ‘No.’ First, the previous discussion has suggested that ren is not something that we are born with408, but the result of the life-long cultivation of each individual. Second, ‘self- cultivation’ is not necessarily confined to the phrase ‘修身’, and there may be other character(s) that can better address this practice in the Analects. And I would like to argue that the character ‘學’ (xue; to learn, to be educated, or to practise) provides a practical and contextual approach to ren, and plays an important role in drawing a comprehensive picture of self-cultivation in the Analects.409

5.2 To Learn to Cultivate the Self As mentioned above, in order to cultivate ourselves, the first priority is to make sure that we do not cultivate ourselves inappropriately. This does not necessarily mean that we should refer to some sort of universal standards to decide what is appropriate and what is not. However, before figuring out one’s individual way of cultivation, it may be wise to first learn from, or at least draw lessons from, what has been adopted and practised by our ancestors. I believe this reflects Confucius’s saying that he is only a transmitter but not a maker. We can certainly borrow ideas about self-cultivation from Confucius, who himself has done so from many revered ancestors. How did Confucius practise it, and what did he want his disciples to do? The simple answer may be “to learn”: to learn from both good and bad, from as many resources as one can, and from each other (regardless of social and economic status)410. Apart from many other admirable qualities, Confucius is certainly a great learner, which also makes him a great teacher.

408 Mencius (孟子) suggests that we are born with the “heart” of commiseration (惻隱之心, ce yin zhi xin), which is the root of ren if we care to nurture and cultivate it (《孟子•公孫丑上》&《孟子•告子上》). 409 The unique feature of contextual-aware cultivation in Confucian moral practices is highlighted by Antonio S. Cua in his Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics, (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998), pp. 267-9. 410 For example, a well-known aphorism in the Analects proposes that when three people are walking together, they can all be each other’s teachers. They can learn from each other to follow what is good, and to avoid what is bad. (7.22, 三人行，必有我師焉。擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之。(《論語•述而》)). Other examples, like 不恥下問 (not ashamed to ask those of a lower status), and 博學 (to learn broadly) etc. are all reflections of the quality of 學 (to learn). Note: the English translation for 7.22: “In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Idenfitying their strenths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.” (Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, pp. 115-6.)

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5.2.1 The Importance of Xue (學) The importance of xue in the Analects can never be overemphasized. In the very first chapter Xue Er (學而), the first advice from Confucius is about how we should learn (學而時習之, xue er shi xi zhi). I will retain the English translation of this phrase here because its interpretation has varied so much between different scholars throughout Chinese history. The different interpretations of this sentence actually reflect the distinctive philosophical positions of these philosophers and scholars. In other words, the room for flexible interpretations starts at the beginning of the Analects.411 Its open- endedness provides enormous space for exploring this text.

In terms of xue, the room for interpretation is also significant. However, before going to discuss the details, let’s further explore the importance of xue in the Analects. There are several repeated aphorisms spread across different chapters of the Analects, which are believed to be important and hence worth repeating.412 Amongst them are two very similar aphorisms on Confucius’s response to the question, ‘which of his disciples love(s) xue (to learn)?’ This question is asked by two different governors of the state Lu (魯), Duke Ai (魯哀公, d. 468 BCE) and Ji Kang Zi (季康子, d. 468 BCE).413 Confucius’s answer remains consistent: Yan Hui (顏回, 521-481 BCE) (Confucius’s favourite disciple) was the one who loved to learn; unfortunately, Yan Hui died young, and since then, Confucius has not heard of anyone who loves to learn. In the entire text, one can hardly see any criticism from Confucius of Yan Hui. When Yan Hui dies, Confucius laments: “Alas! Heaven is destroying me! Heaven is destroying me!” (噫！

天喪予！天喪予！) (11.9) Zi Gong (子貢), another disciple, when asked by Confucius to compare himself with Yan Hui, replies that, when learning a subject, Yan Hui can figure out ten other related subjects whereas he himself can only figure out two (5.9). Moreover, Confucius praises Yan Hui for his prolonged adherence to ren (三月不違仁, san yue bu wei ren) when his other disciples can only practise it sporadically (6.7).414

411 張昭煒 (Zhang Zhaowei),《論語》首句"學"詮釋中的仁學分化 (Two Humanity Doctrines and Annotations of First "To Learn" of Confucian Analects), 南昌大學學報（人文社會科學版）(Journal of Nanchang University (Humanities and Social Sciences)), 40:5, 2009, pp. 30-4, 86. 412 For instance, Confucius’s comments on “巧言令色” appear three times in three different chapters: the first chapter 學而, the fifth chapter 公冶長, and the seventeenth chapter 陽貨. 413 These two aphorisms can be found in the sixth chapter Yong Ye (雍也) (6.3) and the eleventh chapter Xian Jin (先進) (11.7). 414 In his 《人能弘道: 傅佩榮談論語》(The Human Being Manifests the Dao: Fu Peirong Interprets the Analects), Fu Peirong (2012) suggests that, in this passage, ‘三月’ does not denote ‘three months’

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Confucius’s attitude towards, and words about, Yan Hui suggest not only a potential link between xue and ren, but also reflect the important status of xue in Confucius’s philosophy.

The philosophical investigations of Confucian xue from modern scholars may not be as extensive as those done by scholars in the Song (宋, 960-1260) and Ming (明, 1368- 1644) dynasties, such as Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200), and Liu Zongzhou (劉宗周 also known as 蕺山先生 (Ji Shan Xian Sheng, Master Ji Shan), 1578-1645).415 The latter, in the Learning Notes of the Analects (論語學案, Lun Yu Xue An), even claims that xue is the most important idea in Confucian philosophy (學字是孔門第一義, xue zi shi kong men di yi yi).416 Comparing Liu’s words with those of Confucius, it is at least clear that to be approved by Confucius as ‘loving to learn’ is as hard as being recognized as being ren. The compliment ‘loving to learn’ is mainly given by teachers to students. This suggests that in order to cultivate ourselves according to the Confucian virtues of ren, yi, li, zhi, and xiao (仁義禮智孝) etc., we should first know what they mean, which requires that we learn them in the first place.

The conventional perception of learning and study usually separates the learner from the learned. A learner is expected to, and is therefore expecting to, acquire ultimate truth or knowledge of the learned. This is different from the Confucian perception of xue. Taking the aforementioned idea of ren as an example, to learn ren is not to first contemplate what ren is, and then to follow the “ultimate truth” of ren so as to cultivate ourselves to become a person of ren. In Confucian philosophy, to learn ren is to immerse ourselves into the human context long before the concept of ren has formed in, and is present to, our consciousness. That may be the reason for why Confucius cherishes and emphasizes family relationships so much. To most individuals, family is usually the first place where we expend much effort to build and maintain our relationships with others. Right after the first passage in the Analects conveying the idea of xue, the second passage explicates the ideas and practices of xiao (孝; filial piety,

exactly, but is a metaphor to describe a very long time, or more specifically, ‘persistent’ or ‘prolonged’ in this passage. Please refer to p. 112 of this book. 415 張昭煒 (Zhang Zhaowei),《論語》首句"學"詮釋中的仁學分化 (Two Humanity Doctrines and Annotations of First "To Learn" of Confucian Analects), 2009, p. 30. 416 劉宗周 (Liu Zongzhou), 劉宗周全集 (The Complete Works of Liu Zongzhou). 杭州: 浙江古籍出版社 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Classics Publishing House), vol.2, 2007, p. 267.

208 filial responsibility) and ti (弟, 悌; fraternal affection, fraternal responsibility), and specifies that xiao ti are at the root of ren (孝弟也者，其為仁之本與！xiao ti ye zhe, qi wei ren zhi ben yu!). (1:2)417

The ideas of xiao and ti suggest that a healthy family relationship may help us form a basic image of what ren could be, even if there are many missing details. In this sense, Confucius’s xue is obviously different from the dualistic, teleological, and truth- oriented practice of learning. Confucian xue means to be involved in, and to engage and interact with, the context (e.g., a domestic environment, an educational institution) of which the learner is an inseparable part. Learning happens before the learner and the learned have been consciously differentiated. Hall and Ames point out that Confucian xue “refers to an unmediated process of becoming aware rather than a conceptually mediated knowledge of a world of objective fact.”418 They suggest that “it is important that xue be construed as an unmediated process of becoming aware … rather than as conceptually mediated knowledge of an objective world described in sentences that are ‘true,’ ….”419

Unlike the conventional learning, which seeks norms and universal truths, Confucian xue focuses on the process of learning. Due to the differences between individuals, we all learn differently, and the learning process is therefore private and personal. We all have our own unique ways of learning and developing ourselves. Moreover, we are all living in real situations, which change all the time. There will never be a lack of opportunities for us to learn from new situations. In fact, to applaud Yan Hui’s passion for learning, Confucius says: “Alas! I saw his constant advance. I never saw him stop in his progress.” (9.21) In this light, people practising Confucian xue may find the teleological view of learning problematic.

417 有子曰：「其為人也孝弟，而好犯上者，鮮矣；不好犯上，而好作亂者，未之有也。君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其為仁之本與！」(《論語•學而》) Master You said: “It is a rare thing for someone who has a sense of filial and fraternal responsibility … to have a taste for defying authority. And it is unheard of for those who have no taste for defying authority to be keen on initiating rebellion. Exemplary persons … concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having taken hold, the way … will grow therefrom. As for filial and fraternal responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root of authoritative conduct ….” (Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 71.) 418 David L. Hall; Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 1987, p. 44. 419 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 59.

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5.2.2 To Love to Learn (好學, Hao Xue): Xue as the Ends Not Just the Means Since we never stop learning, it may be wise to pay more attention to the process of learning rather than to what has been learned. If we do not maintain this process in a sensitive manner, we may become easily obsessed with the knowledge we have acquired and forget that it can become outdated, rigid, and dogmatic even without us realizing it. Confucius suggests that learning can save us from being stubborn (學則不固, 1.8, xue ze bu gu).420 It is through learning that knowledge (regardless of whether it is absolute or contingent, ultimate or proximate) is kept alive, and we can keep ourselves informed and up-to-date through persistent learning.

However, xue is not an automatic process, it takes effort. When xue is taken as the means to knowledge, fame, success, and fortune, it seems that xue can be quantified or measured by these outcomes in terms of whether it has been worth our effort. It is not that we cannot quantify and measure the outcomes of xue, or that xue works against, or is incompatible with, these desired things in our lives. Confucius once suggested that learning can bring the opportunity to make emolument in the court.421 The danger is that, the more these things are attained, the more xue is cast aside. Eventually, we will become fully occupied by things that hinder our progress of xue. The process of xue may gradually slow down and eventually stop. When xue is taken as a means and not its own ends, the deviation from xue starts to take effect. Confucius is not unaware of this caveat regarding xue. According to his own observation, only the disciple Yan Hui understands what xue really means and takes xue as its own ends. Yan Hui’s character can be inferred from one of Confucius’s comments on him:

The Master said, “A person of character (xian 賢) is this Yan Hui! He has a bamboo bowl of rice to eat, a gourd of water to drink, and a dirty little hovel in which to live. Other people would not be able to endure his hardships, yet for Hui it has no effect on his enjoyment. A person of character is this Yan Hui!” (6.11)422

子曰：「賢哉回也！一簞食，一瓢飲，在陋巷。人不堪其憂，回也不改其樂。

賢哉回也！」(雍也, 6.11)

420 Please refer to Fu Pei-Jung (2012)’s interpretation of the Analects. (《人能弘道: 傅佩榮談論語》, 2012, p. 9) 421 學也，祿在其中矣。 (《論語•衛靈公》, 15.32) 422 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 106.

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This passage depicts a disciple who is far from wealthy and successful; rather, he is poor and barely able to survive. Others may find Yan Hui’s situation worrisome; Hui himself, however, does not seem to be worried about his own situation, and stop enjoying life because of it.

Confucius admires Yan Hui’s character, and knows why Hui can lead a simple and virtuous life. Yan Hui focuses more on the process of xue than its outcomes. Yan Hui and Confucius himself certainly share the same characteristics of hao xue. Zi Lu (子路), one of Confucius’s disciples, was once asked by Ye Gong (葉公) about the kind of person his teacher was. Zi Lu did not answer on the spot. Later, Confucius found out about this, and told Zi Lu: “Why didn’t you tell Ye Gong that your teacher is a man who often ‘immerses himself in learning and forgets the need for food’ (發憤忘食, fa fen wang shi), who ‘enjoys his innermost happiness and forgets sorrows’ (樂以忘憂, le yi wang you), and who is ‘not concerned by the process of aging’ (不知老之將至, bu zhi lao zhi jiang zhi), etc.”423 (7.19) Confucius’s self-depiction is consistent with his comments about Yan Hui’s quality of loving to learn, which suggests that Confucian xue is not a means to certain ends, but is its own end. Confucius was once extolled as ‘博學而無所成名’ (bo xue er wu suo cheng ming, learning extensively without being famous for any particular skill), and he acknowledged this approbation.424 The deviation of xue is not simply a contemporary phenomenon, it had already appeared in Confucius’s time. To remind his contemporaries of this, he points out that, in ancient times, people learnt in order to cultivate and develop themselves; people these days now learn for the purpose of showing off. (14.24)425 This suggests that Confucius was deeply aware of, and hence concerned by, the diminishing fondness for learning.

To be fond of xue (好學, hao xue) is to love no other benefits than self-cultivation, - development, and -improvement in the process of learning. Confucius is aware of the additional interests that come with xue. He neither opposes nor promotes these interests.

423 葉公問孔子於子路，子路不對。子曰：「女奚不曰，其為人也，發憤忘食，樂以忘憂，不知老之將至雲爾。」(《論語•述而》) 424 達巷黨人曰：「大哉孔子！博學而無所成名。」子聞之，謂門弟子曰：「吾何執？執禦乎？執射乎？吾執禦矣。」(《論語•子罕》) (A villager from Daxiang said, “How grand is Confucius! He is broad in his learning, and yet he is not renowned in any particular area.” The master on hearing of this, said to his disciples, “What should I specialize in? Perhaps charioteering? Or maybe archery? No, I think I’ll take charioteering.” Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 126.) 425 子曰：「古之學者為己，今之學者為人。」(《論語•憲問》)

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However, in the cockles of his heart, Confucius has a very high standard in mind when he describes someone as ‘loving to study’ (好學, hao xue). This can be seen in his appraisals of his favourite disciple, Yan Hui, and of himself, and is also embodied in the description or definition of hao xue in the first chapter (學而, Xue Er):

The Master said: “In eating, exemplary persons (junzi 君子) do not look for a full stomach, nor in their lodgings for comfort and contentment. They are persons of action yet cautious in what they say. They repair to those who know the way (dao 道), and find improvement in their company. Such persons can indeed be said to have a love of learning (haoxue 好學).” (1.14)426

子曰：「君子食無求飽，居無求安，敏於事而慎於言，就有道而正焉，可謂好

學也已。」(學而, 1.14)

This passage reflects at least three aspects of hao xue. First, hao xue means to keep away from things that can potentially distract us from learning effectively, such as seeking physical and sensual gratification. Second, hao xue means to practise learning wisely and vigorously while speaking discreetly. Third, hao xue means to cultivate and rectify the self in accordance with the Dao (道). Compared with previous discussions, this passage looks like a portrait of Yan Hui. It may be that Confucius has created the definition with the exemplary character of Yan Hui in mind. Hui’s virtue completes Confucius’s teaching. No wonder Confucius desperately laments the death of Yan Hui. However, it is worth mentioning that, from a contemporary point of view, Confucius’s standard of hao xue may be too tough to follow. In Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian (史記, Shi Ji), it is mentioned that, at twenty-nine, Yan Hui was already covered with silver hair. Yan Hui’s untimely death may be ascribed to the harsh living conditions he endured. Expecting people to be passionate about xue as much as Yan Hui may not have been realistic. However, Yan Hui’s hao xue can certainly show us the value and meaning of learning, and reminds us of the things that may distract us from, and eventually erode our passion for xue.

Further reflection on xue (and hao xue) may reveal the link between xue and ren. This can be inferred from Confucius’s praise of Yan Hui’s hao xue and his bu wei ren (不違

426 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, pp. 74-5.

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仁; not to transgress ren, to adhere to ren). In the Analects, Confucius is very parsimonious in describing someone as ren, which brings into relief the special status of Yan Hui. As a junior and a disciple, it is a high honour to be regarded as hao xue by Confucius. In fact, to be thus described may not be, in any sense, less honourable than being described as ren, because hao xue suggests that a junior is on the right track to becoming a person of ren.

Hao xue is crucial to the cultivation of not just ren but also other virtues. In a conversation with his disciple, Zi Lu, Confucius points out possible drawbacks of being fond of certain virtues without the support from hao xue:

The Master said, “Zilu, have you heard of the six flaws that can accompany the six desirable qualities of character?” “No, I have not,” replied Zilu. “Sit down,” said the Master, “and I’ll tell you about them. The flaw in being fond of acting authoritatively (ren 仁) without equal regard for learning is that you will be easily duped; the flaw in being fond of acting wisely (zhi 知) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to self-indulgence; the flaw in being fond of making good on one’s word (xin 信) without equal regard for learning is that it leads one into harm’s way; the flaw in being fond of candor without equal regard for learning is that it leads to rudeness; the flaw in being fond of boldness without equal regard for learning is that it leads to unruliness; the flaw in being fond of firmness without equal regard for learning is that it leads to rashness.” (17.8)427

子曰：「由也，女聞六言六蔽矣乎？」對曰：「未也。」「居！吾語女。好仁不好學，其蔽也愚；好知不好學，其蔽也蕩；好信不好學，其蔽也賊；好直不

好學，其蔽也絞；好勇不好學，其蔽也亂；好剛不好學，其蔽也狂。」(陽貨, 17.8)

Ren (仁; humaneness, benevolence), zhi (知/智; knowing, knowledge), xin (信; sincerity, good faith), zhi (直; honesty, straightforwardness), yong (勇; bravery, boldness), and gang (剛; firmness, perseverance) are six virtues a moral person loves to follow. However, without reflecting on good learning practices, these virtues can easily go against our wishes, and turn into something undesirable, or even detrimental. The

427 Ibid., p. 205.

213 reason for this is that any virtue cannot be adopted and practised outside of a particular context. For example, to be the person of ren, we should practise benevolence when interacting with others. However, acting in the same towards someone who intends to harm us is unwise. This also applies to the other five virtues mentioned in this passage. We can certainly avoid these drawbacks by learning from practising these virtues in real situations. According to the Analects, Confucius’s wisdom is simple but pragmatic. Can the adaptation to context become some sort of hedging strategy? It certainly can. How do we become sensitive to, therefore avoid, this? I believe we do this through learning as well. Through practising xue, we continually come across new things and situations; while being open to new possibilities, we are also gaining new experience and knowledge. With the help of si (思, contemplation), we may enhance the efficacy and efficiency of xue.

5.2.3 Xue (學) and Si (思) Compared with xue (appearing 66 times), si appears in the Analects significantly less frequently (25 times, and one as a person’s name). Numbers can reveal certain factors, but the actual text can tell us more. In the text, xue and si appear three times in the same passage. These offer the good starting points for the current investigation.

There is the famous saying from Confucius in the Analects: Learning without thought is fruitless, thought without learning is perilous (學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆, xue er bu si ze wang, si er bu xue ze dai). (2.15)428 If we learn without thinking, it is as if the learning had never occurs. Without thinking, things that we learn cannot be fully understood and appreciated. To put both xue and si into perspective, thinking is like a processing centre which helps digest and absorb the information that we have learnt, and then turns and transforms it into something that can be integrated and incorporated into our understanding of the world. Through thinking, we can also employ and apply what we have learnt in real situations. In this sense, thoughtful practices help prove what has been learnt; this in turn improves the efficaciousness and productivity of these practices. Moreover, ‘learning’ provides the resources and materials for ‘thinking’ to process. Common sense tells us that allowing things to run idly for a long time may not be a good idea. At its best, it may be just a waste of energy; at its worst, however, it may lead to grave danger. For example, imagine that one’s stomach runs idly without

428 《論語•為政》, adapted from James Legge’s translation (retrieved June 26, 2015, from https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a/book2.html).

214 taking in food, or one’s heart keeps pumping without any blood being fed in. These two examples suggest that, from an ecological perspective, xue provides si not only with resources but also nutriment. It is certainly open to question whether xue and si exactly form an ecological relationship; however, from this well-known saying, it seems undeniable that xue and xi are two closely related practices. Without one, the other will not function well.

Although xue and si are both crucial to self-cultivation, it seems that we can easily fall prey to the trap of over-thinking but under-learning. This problem has also been addressed in the Analects:

The Master said, “I used to indulge in my own thoughts for days and nights without having foods and sleeps, but reaped nothing. It is no better than to learn and study.” (15.31)

子曰：「吾嘗終日不食，終夜不寢，以思，無益，不如學也。」(衛靈公, 15.31)

The passage suggests that, in the early stage of self-development, Confucius may favour si over xue. Thinking has almost dominated his whole life. The need for food and sleep was giving way to contemplation and rumination. It did not seem to be a healthy life to lead. To continue the previous analogy, it is like a stomach working day and night with no food in it. Eventually, Confucius realizes that practising over-thinking is not a good idea, and might even be harmful, if not combined with learning. He shares his own experience with his disciples and reminds them again of the importance of xue. His own experience seems to imply that we may have the tendency to think too much but practise too little.

Learning seems to be an excellent practice for self-cultivation, but what if we learn things which are “bad” and counterproductive to improving ourselves (such as over- contemplation in the above example). This is certainly a valid concern because there is no guarantee that we only learn good things. However, if we extend this question a bit further, we may ask, ‘how can we discern good from bad?’ We may realize that we do this through no better way than learning itself. Learning something is not to insulate us from any bad influence and infection; learning is about persistently refining ourselves so that one can become a better person, a person of ren. We were not born with the idea of ren or of how ren should be practised. We understand and know this through learning.

215

We learn from our parents, teachers, and predecessors. But we do not just accept what we have learnt without doubt. We have to practise them in our own lives to be able to appreciate its real meanings and turn it into something inseparable from ourselves. During this process, we may commit some wrongdoings, but we should not just stop learning because of them. Instead we should become more cautious in the process of learning, while never closing the door to new possibilities. In this sense, xue is so important for self-cultivation: if we stop learning, the path to ren and other accompanying virtues will be closed and lost forever.

If ‘ren’ sounds too teleological and ideological, we can certainly choose whether we want to become a person of ren. However, if we are people who love to learn, we may already be on the right track becoming ren, regardless of whether we call it ren or not. Ren is not simply a destination, it is more of a process and journey. If one keeps learning, one will always be in the vicinity of ren. Confucius suggests that ren is never far from our reach, it is a matter of whether you want to practise ren or not. From the time one puts ren into practice, ren is already with oneself. (7.30)429 This is probably why Yan Hui, Confucius’s favourite disciple and a person who loves to learn, is praised by Confucius as bu wei ren (不違仁; not to transgress ren, to adhere to ren). As shown in the Analects, Confucius’s teaching does not attempt to define what is right or wrong, or ask his disciples to simply do what is right and avoid wrongdoing. He may want to show us without reservation what he has personally learned from his predecessors and his own life, hoping that this might be helpful and interesting to people who also want to cultivate themselves to become individuals of ren.

5.2.4 Xue (學) and Jiao (教; To Teach, To Educate) The previous discussions have shown the importance of the idea ‘xue’ in Confucian philosophy, and that Confucius himself is a person who loves to learn; however, there are very limited descriptions or depictions of how Confucius himself actually practises learning and study in the Analects. It is apparent that Confucius has high regard for the idea of xue, but it is not as evident as to how this is put into actual practice. It would be desirable to see evidence of the latter in the Analects. Although we may not be able to

429 子曰：「仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。」 (《論語•述而》) The master said, “How could authoritative conduct (ren 仁) be at all remote? No sooner do I seek it than it has arrived.” (Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 117.)

216 see direct descriptions and depictions of Confucius’s practice of xue in the text, we should be able to observe it indirectly through how xue is practised by Confucius’s disciples. I am not suggesting that the disciples’ application of xue can precisely reflect that of their master’s, so that by observing these disciples we may understand their master. What I want to point out here is that, because the Analects is a text that documents Confucius’s ideas and his interactions with his disciples and others, we may see a lot of exchanges taking place between the master and the enquirers in relation to xue and jiao (教; to teach, to educate).

Observing the enquirers’ questions and the master’s responses may provide an alternative angle from which to better understand Confucius’s exercise of xue, for xue and jiao are a pair of inseparable concepts. Ames and Rosemont point out that, during Confucius’s time, scholars “engaged in both studying and teaching as one pursues the goal of becoming a learned person. It was only later in the tradition that the focus of xue came to rest on studying.”430 They suggest that “[l]earning, in the xue sense, also involved inheriting, reauthorizing, and transmitting one’s cultural legacy, it not passive acquisition of ‘the facts.’”431 Learning is certainly not a passive process of absorbing and accepting whatever is given to us, instead si is employed to discern, according to previous learning experiences, what is good for us as particular and unique individuals and what is not. We then accept, digest, and absorb those that are meaningful to us as individuals who have grown up and are dwelling in a context that is most likely different from others’. In this sense, xue is both an interpersonal and intrapersonal process: the environments and others who live therein provide the resources for us to learn, whereas the outcomes, generally speaking, are reserved for and are only entirely meaningful to ourselves.

Learning is certainly important for self-cultivation. Is it also valuable for attaining the common good, given the fact that the process and outcome of learning can both be very personal? The answer to this question may be negative if the aforementioned indispensable link between learning and teaching/educating is neglected. What is not specifically defined but inadvertently expressed in the text is the meaning of ‘sharing’, ‘communicating’, and ‘exchanging’ that belongs to the character jiao (教; to teach, to educate). If we can share, communicate, and exchange what has been learned and what

430 Ibid., p. 60. 431 Ibid.

217 is meaningful to us as individuals, we may be able to realize and understand the individual differences involved in learning. If we understand the relationships between the learning process and outcome and the role of context played in individual learning, we may be able to understand each other better, and even learn from others instead of judging them from our own perspectives. In doing so, we can expand our own scope of learning to incorporate others’ by taking into account the contextual factors in an individual’s learning. In this sense, the outcome of learning may not merely be meaningful to ourselves. By learning with, rather than simply from, others, we will treat others as their own ends instead of the means of our own learning. This contextual, reciprocal, and practical connotation of jiao as ‘sharing’, ‘communicating’, and ‘exchanging’ is implied in the text.

The conventional impression of teaching and education is that they involve a unidirectional process of instillation from the educators to the students or learners. It can, to a certain extent, even possess a hierarchical implication. For example, in terms of knowledge, the well-educated person is normally considered worthier than the less- educated person, and the former therefore resides at a higher position in the socio- political order than the latter. In the Analects, however, the legitimacy of rulers or educators is primarily judged according to their moral and virtuous qualities that can be implemented, practised, and nurtured in human relationships. This can be ascertained from the fact that the character jiao is employed 7 times in total in the Analects. For instance, Confucius claims that he teaches “under four categories: culture (wen 文), proper conduct (xing 行), doing one’s utmost (zhong 忠), and making good on one’s word (xin 信).”432 (7.25) All four teachings cannot be realized outside of a human context. However, when read with another relevant character shi (師; the master, teacher, or educator), we may realize that this unidirectional and even hierarchical interpretation does not constitute the complete image of jiao.

In general, shi is the one who is considered as well-educated or -developed, and is therefore qualified to administer, facilitate, and perform jiao (teaching, educating). In this sense, there seems to be a unidirectional or hierarchical relationship between shi and sheng (生; 學生, xue sheng; pupil, student), which is embodied in the performance of jiao. However, the Analects provides a different image of the idea of shi. In the text,

432 Ibid., p. 116.

218 where shi means ‘teacher’ or ‘educator’ (which appears 4 times, and it can mean other things as well), it almost always implies the idea of xue (learning).433 The text seems to suggest that, as a teacher/educator (shi) who teaches (jiao), one should never stop learning (xue). From whom does a teacher/educator learn? Confucius suggests that one can learn from one’s ancestors and predecessors (reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new; 溫故而知新, wen gu er zhi xin)434 (2.11), peers and contemporaries (in strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher; 三人行，必有我師焉。san ren xing, bi you wo shi yan.)435 (7.22), and all available sources (who then does the Master not learn from? Again, how could there be a single constant teacher for him? 夫子焉不學？而亦何常師之有？fu zi yan bu xue? er yi he chang shi zhi you?)436 (19.22). This interpretation of shi actually brings us back to the previously discussed idea of hao xue (to be fond of learning, to love to learn), and suggests that shi is someone who loves to learn. In this sense, the teacher/educator who teaches/educates is the one she who never stops learning herself. The Confucian teacher learns when teaching; in doing so, she is open to boundless resources. When learning, she does not discriminate between different resources, because she can choose and follow what is good, and uncover and rectify what is bad. (擇其善者而從之，其不善

者而改之。ze qi shan zhe er cong zhi, qi bu shan zhe er gai zhi) (7.22).

The investigations of xue (學), hao xue (好學), jiao (教), and shi(師) have helped to provide a comprehensive context, in which our ability to understand these ideas has significantly increased. The idea of jiao (teaching) in Confucian philosophy is certainly

433 子曰：「溫故而知新，可以為師矣。」(《論語•為政》, 2.11) The master said: “Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new—such a person can be considered a teacher.” (Ibid., p. 78.) 子曰：「三人行，必有我師焉。擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之。」(《論語•述而》, 7.22) (For the English translation, please refer to footnote 400) 子曰：「當仁，不讓於師。」(《論語•衛靈公》, 15.36) The master said, “In striving to be authoritative in your conduct (ren 仁), do not yield even to your teacher.” (Ibid., p. 192.) 衛公孫朝問於子貢曰：「仲尼焉學？」子貢曰：「文武之道，未墜於地，在人。賢者識其大者，不賢者識其小者，莫不有文武之道焉。夫子焉不學？而亦何常師之有？」(《論語•子張》, 19.22) Gongsun Chao of Wei asked Zigong, “With whom did Confucius study?” Zigong replied, “The way (dao 道) of Kings Wen and Wu has not collapsed utterly—it lives in the people. Those of superior character (xian 賢) have grasped the greater part, while those of lesser quality have grasped a bit of it. Everyone has something of Wen and Wu’s way in them. Who then does the Master not learn from? Again, how could there be a single constant teacher for him?” (Ibid., p. 223.) 434 Ibid., p. 78. 435 Ibid., p. 116. 436 Ibid., p. 223.

219 not a unidirectional and hierarchical concept, a fact which was made apparent when it was investigated alongside the idea of shi (teacher). In Confucius’s view, shi can learn from her peers, contemporaries, and even those she regards as her inferiors. In this sense, jiao is more of a contextual, reciprocal, and practical form of conduct that aims to share, communicate, and exchange knowledge, values, and ideas with others, instead of instilling, implanting, or engrafting these in them. This is particularly reflected in the implication that shi is the one who loves to learn, which suggests that teaching and learning are not two independent processes. In light of this, we may further infer that one’s teaching style reflects one’s learning pattern.

A good example of how Confucius simultaneously utilizes teaching and learning lies in how he conveys the idea of ren to various disciples.437 In the previous discussions, we have seen that ren is a multilayered idea. Above its original aesthetic dimension and moral implication are the explicit moral and ethical contents and denotations that have been developed along with other Confucian ideas. However, to put the idea of ren into real practice, a teaching method, which is contextual, particular, and specific to individual development and cultivation, needs to be adopted. This tailored teaching method is, as will be discussed later, not just restricted in communicating the idea of ren;

437 顏淵問仁。子曰：“克己復禮為仁。” (《論語•顏淵》, 12.1) Yan Hui inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied, “Through self-descipline and observing ritual propriety (li 禮) one becomes authoritative in one’s conduct…” (Ibid., p. 152.) 仲弓問仁。子曰：“出門如見大賓，使民如承大祭。己所不欲，勿施於人。在邦無怨，在家無怨。” (《論語•顏淵》, 12.2) Zhonggong inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied, “In your public life, behave as though you are receiving important visitors; employ the common people as though you are overseeing a great sacrifice. Do not impose upon others why you yourself do not want, and you will not incur personal or political ill will.”… (Ibid., pp. 152-3.) 司馬牛問仁。子曰：“仁者，其言也言訒。”(《論語·顏淵》, 12.3) Sima Niu inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied, “An authoritative person is slow to speak (ren 讱)…. (Ibid., p. 153. ) 子貢問為仁。子曰：“工欲善其事，必先利其器。居是邦也，事其大夫之賢者，友其士之仁者。” (《論語·衛靈公》, 15.10) Zigong inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied, “Tradesmen wanting to be good at (shan 善) their trade must first sharpen their tools. While dwelling in this state, then, we should serve those ministers who are of the highest character (xian 賢), and befriend those scholar-apprentices (shi 士) who are most authoritative in their conduct.” (Ibid., p. 186.) 子張問仁於孔子。孔子曰：“能行五者於天下，為仁矣。”“請問之。”曰：“恭、寬、信、敏、惠。” (《論語·陽貨》, 17.6) Zizhang asked Confucius about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). Confucius replied, “A person who is able to carry into practice five attitudes in the world can be considered authoritative.” “What are these five attitudes?” asked Zizhang. Confucius replied, “Deference, tolerance, making good on one’s word (xin 信), diligence, and generosity….” (Ibid., p. 204.)

220 more importantly, it cannot be realized until the educator fully understands, through learning, the unique character of each learner.

Confucius is well-known for his device of teaching students in accordance with their aptitudes (因材施教, yin cai shi jiao). We can see this on various occasions in the text. For example, when asked by two disciples Zi Lu (子路) and Ran You (冉有) about how quickly one should act upon learning something, Confucius urges the former to think twice (about their family members) before acting, while he urges the latter to take action as soon as possible. The other disciple Gong Xi Hua (公西華) is confused by Confucius’s responses and asks for an explanation. The Master replies, “[Ran You] is diffident, and so I urged him on. But [Zi Lu] has the energy of two, and so I sought to rein him in.”438 (11.22) This example has been conceived as the typical example of Confucius’s practice of contextual awareness and intelligence in his interactions with his disciples, interactions which can benefit them for a lifetime.439

Confucius’s device of using contextual wisdom to teach the disciples according to their aptitudes can be seen in his responses to questions from his disciples on all sorts of issues and ideas, such as ren (仁), li (禮), zheng (政, politics), and jun zi (君子; exemplary person, paradigmatic person), etc. Depending on the situations and their characters, Confucius always provides distinctive and appropriate advice to his disciples. Unfortunately, due to the lack of space, an intensive discussion on this is not possible here. However, these examples depict the image of an educator who never ceases to learn in the process of teaching. To provide effective and productive teaching and communication, other than the contents and messages themselves, the educator will keep an eye on her subjects, the environmental factors, and even timing. In other words, the focal point does not always concern what has been expressed, but perhaps more importantly, how, where, when, and to whom it is expressed. In this sense, learning can and should never be stopped during the process of teaching, and that is the practical and contextual wisdom that we may learn from Confucius’s learning and teaching patterns in the Analects.

Many crucial ideas in the Analects have been investigated thoughtfully up until this point. These investigations suggest that the majority, if not all, of the central ideas in the

438 Ibid., p147. (《論語•先進》) 439 傅佩榮, 《人能弘道: 傅佩榮談論語》, 2012, p. 234.

221 text are closely related to each other. These ideas should be investigated side by side but not in isolation. Only by doing so can we deepen our understanding of, and at the same time, form a more comprehensive and holistic picture of, the ideological system of the Analects and even Confucian philosophy. It seems that the moral and virtuous qualities and conduct promoted by Confucius are mindful and careful responses to situational and contextual demands that involve numerous things and other people. This environmental/circumstantial dimension exists alongside the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism in the Analects. The central ideas in the Analects buttress and answer each other’s call constantly, thereby forming explicitly a contextual relationship with one other. It is not that other texts, schools, traditions, philosophical systems do not possess the feature of interrelatedness of different ideas, but the current investigations seem to suggest that the Analects lifts this textual/conceptual interrelationality to an entirely different level.

5.3 Ren and Li: An Intricate Relationship Investigating li, one of the two cardinal ideas of the Analects other than ren, may help to enhance our understandings of the interrelationships between Confucian ideas. The practice of li implies a virtuous process of self-cultivation, which is in line with the previous discussions on the aesthetic and ethical nature of ren. I hope the discussions on li here can serve as a conclusion to the current chapter to further our understanding of ideas, such as ren, li, aesthetics, and ethics in the Analects.

There are debates amongst scholars who hold opposing positions as to which idea, ren or li, is more important and fundamental in the Analects. This is caused primarily by the relevant passages in the Analects which convey apparently contradictory messages on this issue.440 Tu Wei-Ming suggests that “[ren] as an inner morality is not caused by the mechanism of li from outside. It is a higher-order concept which gives meaning to li.”441 Herbert Fingarette, however, contends that ritual activities hold “primary” and “irreducible” positions in the philosophy of the Analects.442 There are continuing

440 Kwong-Loi Shun, “Ren 仁 and Li 禮 in the Analects,” In Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, ed. Bryan W. Van Norden, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 53-72. Chenyang Li, “Li as Cultural Grammar: On the Relation between Li and Ren in Confucius’ Analects,” Philosophy East and West, 57:3, 2007, p. 311. 441 Tu Wei-ming, “The Creative Tension between Jên and Li,” Philosophy East and West, 18:1-2, 1968, p. 34. 442 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

222 debates on the inner moral quality of ren versus the outer ethical practice of li, concerning whether it is reasonable to dichotomise ren and li in this way.443 Kwong-Loi Shun takes a different approach by labelling them as instrumentalist and definitionalist interpretations.444 In general, the ideal ren is more fundamental in the instrumentalist interpretation than in its definitionalist counterpart where the observance of li takes the dominant position.445 Whether the relationship between ren and li in the Analects should be characterized as inner quality vs outer practice, or instrumentalist vs definitionalist, the conflicts between the different characterizations and interpretations of the relationship are unmistakably clear.

Shun argues that the conflict caused by these two extreme interpretations of the relationship between ren and li is unnecessary, and therefore promotes a third approach in an attempt to accommodate both. In expounding his argument, Shun resorts to a linguistic analogy. He compares the ideal ren to the goal of mastering a concept and the practice of li to the actual linguistic practice employed to attain the goal.446 It is difficult to present the complete set of his arguments here due to limited space; however, we may sum up the discussions that are closely related to his new approach as follows: a) in any given community, a particular concept and the manifestation of the concept in concrete linguistic practice(s) are inseparable issues; b) however, a particular concept can manifest itself in different forms of linguistic practices across different communities; c) therefore the members in a community are allowed to revise, reform, and/or optimize their linguistic practices which correspond to the “transcendental” concept; d) given the existing linguistic practices of the concept, the reform/revision/optimization is not limitless.447 Shun employs this analogy to argue for his third position, which demonstrates the intricate relationship between ren and li: ren is not independent of, and, at the same time, not determined by, li.

To Kwong-Loi Shun, Fingarette’s approach to the relationship of ren and li is neutral and inclusive although he appears to be in favour of li. 443 Karyn Lai, “Ren 仁: An Examplary Life,” In Dao Companion to the Analects, ed. Amy Olberding, Springer, 2014, pp. 86-7. 444 Kwong-Loi Shun, “Ren 仁 and Li 禮 in the Analects,” 2002, p. 56. 445 Ibid., pp. 56-8. Shun (2002) provides meticulous explications of what he means by these two different kinds of interpretations of the relationships between ren and li. The details of his analyses are beyond the scope of the current discussions. To acquire an accurate picture of the differences between these two interpretations (instrumentalist vs definitionalist), please refer to his Ren 仁 and Li 禮 in the Analects. 446 Ibid., pp. 64-5. 447 Ibid.

223

Shun’s centrist approach to this issue is acknowledged by Chengyang Li. The latter, however, recognizes a possible weakness in Shun’s use of the analogies. Li argues that Shun’s linguistic analogy does not allow room for interpreting certain textual evidence in the Analects which suggests that “li may not always result in ren and that persons of ren may not always follow the rules of li.”448 Also, the examples of the singular concept and the particular linguistic practice (to attain the concept) in Shun’s analogy lack the ability to properly capture the holistic and systematic nature of ren and li in the Analects.449 To solve these problems, Li introduces a new set of analogies which combines both the linguistic and cultural ideas. He compares li to cultural grammar and ren to the mastery of a culture.450 Again, due to limited space, we cannot further explore the details of Li’s argument.

Despite this divergence, both Shun and Li rely on analogies and metaphors to expound their approaches to the issue of the intricate relationship between ren and li in the Analects. Both the original and revised versions succeed in clarifying the philosophy underlying the relationship itself; however, it still remains unclear, or at least implicit, as to how we could describe the possible meaning(s) and significance of the relationship between ren and li in the Analects. In other words, in addition to knowing the relationship between ren and li, it may also be desirable to know what this relationship implies. In unveiling the philosophical significance/meaning(s) implied in the relationship, a) a philosophical (aesthetic and ethical) metaphor may work better than a linguistic metaphor; and b) the metaphor which is available in the text itself may function better than less relevant metaphor. Fortunately, we can find a metaphor that satisfies both conditions. More importantly, this metaphor also allows a smooth integration of the framework of practical contextualism into the exploration of the significant meanings of the intricate relationship between ren and li. Due to limited space, it is not the purpose of this thesis to illustrate this in great detail. However, it is desirable that the discussion here can provide a good starting point for illustrating the picture of the possible relationship between ren and li in real practice. The starting point of the investigation is a conversation between Confucius and his disciple Zi Xia (子夏) on the technique of drawing.

448 Chenyang Li, “Li as Cultural Grammar,” 2007, p. 314. 449 Ibid., p. 323. 450 Ibid., p. 317.

224

5.3.1 The Significance of “Li Comes After” It seems to be a coincidence that the investigation of ren started from its aesthetic origin in the Book of Poetry, and the discussion here on li centres on the fine-art skill of drawing described in the same text. Perhaps, it is not just a coincidence but also a matter of philosophical interrelatedness. Let us first read the conversation between the Master and the disciple on drawing:

Zixia inquired: “What does the song mean when it says: Her smiling cheeks—so radiant, Her dazzling eyes—so sharp and clear, It is the unadorned that enhances [colour]?” The Master replied: “The application of [colour] is to the unadorned.” “Does this mean that observing ritual propriety (li 禮) itself comes after?” asked Zixia. The Master replied: “Zixia, you have stimulated my thoughts. It is only with the likes of you that one can discuss the Songs.” (3.8)451

子夏問曰：「『巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮，素以為絢兮。』何謂也？」子曰：

「繪事後素。」曰：「禮後乎？」子曰：「起予者商也！始可與言詩已

矣。」(八佾, 3.8)

Afer reading various historical interpretations, it seems that the key point of this passage lies in the rendering of the words “繪事後素” (hui shi hou su), which has not been clearly reflected in the quoted translation. There are basically two different ways of understanding the words. The one that is represented by Zheng Xuan (鄭玄, 127-200) affirms that, in Confucius’s time, the white colour is applied last to set off the other colours of a completed drawing. By contrast, Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) believes that “繪事後素” means “whitening the grounding before drawing.”452 These two are contrasting interpretations, and recent archaeological studies affirm the former while denying the latter.453

Understanding the words “繪事後素” is important because it directly impacts our appreciation of li raised by Zi Xia, who compares li with the skill of drawing and asks Confucius whether “繪事後素” means “li comes after.” (禮後乎？) Confucius

451 Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 84. 452 邵碧瑛 (Shao Biying), 從出土漆畫、帛畫看“繪事後素” (Studying Hui Shi Hou Su from the Excavated Lacquer Painting and Painting on Silk), 江西社會科學 (Jiangxi Social Sciences), 4, 2007, p. 233. 453 Ibid., p. 235.

225 approves of Zi Xia’s analogy. This, however, immediately raises the question of what colour(s) (white or the rest) Confucius thinks li is. If Confucius means that the white colour is applied last in the drawing, as in Zheng Xuan’s suggestion, then li is white or the process of whitening; but if Confucius thinks in the same way Zhu Xi does about drawing, in which bleaching the grounding comes first, then li is multi-coloured or the process of colouring. Zheng Xuan and Zhu Xi understand the same words “li comes after” differently. Zheng Xuan’s interpretation suggests that the role of li is similar to the “cleansers” that help to remove the blemishes in order to enhance the beauty of the drawing. In other words, a painting exists before being perfected by li; without the final treatment, a painting is still a painting, but it may be less radiant and beautiful. In this sense, we can easily determine Zhu Xi’s thoughts about li. Zhu Xi believes that li is like the painting itself; without li, the painting would not even exist in the first place. This debate on li between Zheng Xuan and Zhu Xi reminds us of the aforementioned dispute over whether ren is more fundamental than li, and vice versa. Zhu Xi certainly belongs to the camp of the li-essentialists, but can we say that Zheng Xuan is in the other camp, ren-essentialists? Things may not be as simple as this because of the complicated relationship between the concepts of human nature and ren.

In relation to the discussion of the current passage, Pei-Jung Fu suggests that human beings are born with the potential and disposition to practise ren. This potential and disposition is just like a painting with all sorts of beautiful colours, but which is still waiting to be embellished through filling in the gaps or spaces between the colourful contents with white pigment (li).454 It does not resemble Zhu Xi’s proposition that li represents the colourful contents of a painting: without li, we are colourless, and cannot be identify as human beings. Fu argues that the analogy of the “colourful” human potential and disposition which can be highlighted by the white embellishment fits well with Confucius’s saying: “Without the quality of ren, what is the point of performing li?” (人而不仁，如禮何！) (3.3)

Of course, the beautiful potential of ren cannot be tantamount to the realized and manifested quality of ren itself: what can be done is not what has been done. So what can possibly go wrong with our inborn true potential of becoming a ren person? What is the role of li in the process of cultivating ren? What is the priority and relationship

454 傅佩榮 (Fu Pei-Jung), 《予豈好辯哉》 (Do I Intend to Be Contentious?), 臺北：聯經出版 (Taipei:Linking Publishing), 2013, p. 48.

226 between ren and li? How does the proposed practical contextualism offer insights into both the process and relationship? And what is the new aesthetic model implied by all of these? In order to respond to these questions, let us continue to expand our vision of the metaphorical painting “drawn” here.

5.3.2 Ren and Li in the “Painting” Metaphor Understanding the metaphorical painting rests on developing an awareness of the dynamic process of aesthetic creation. If, human beings, as Zheng Xuan and Fu suggest, are born with original colours, does this then guarantee that we all grow up to be beautiful persons? Empiricism tells us that this is not always the case. What then could be wrong with these colours? Returning to the painting metaphor, we may imagine that if we expand our true colours intemperately without allowing for spaces, the drawing will become extremely chaotic and even irritating. A painting crowded by colours is as meaningless as one with no colours at all. Space within an object in a painting is as important as that between different objects. In this sense, we are expected to create space for the self and for others as well. What then is expected to fill the space? According to Confucius’s painting metaphor, li is anticipated to “whitening” the gaps in order to enhance the beauty of the painting. The practice of li makes the true colours of an individual even more dazzlingly brilliant. But if we overpower li and allow its white colour to expand immoderately, soon the individual objects on the painting will lose their colours as if they had been bleached. There needs to be a delicate balance between the development of human nature and li.

I have not equated the individual true colours with ren, as I would like to argue that ren represents the space between the colours rather than the colours themselves. Or more precisely, ren constitutes the colours and the surrounding space in a moral image. The colours themselves are neither good nor bad, but if they expand without restriction or without leaving space for others, then this is bad. After the space of ren has been created, the next step is to fill in the white colour of li in order to highlight the space and set off the true colours of ren. When answering Yan Hui’s question on ren, Confucius replies: “Being ren is to restrict the self for the application of li.” (克己復禮為仁, ke ji fu li wei ren) (12.1)455 Comparing this with another comment made by Confucius on Yan Hui, in which the latter is praised for his prolonged adherence to ren (三月不違仁, san yue bu

455 In this phrase, the character 為 (wei) seems also worthy of careful study. For more details of the analyses of wei, please refer to Chenyang Li, “Li as Cultural Grammar,” 2007, p. 315.

227 wei ren) (6.7), we may infer that, in Confucius’s mind, Yan Hui has already shown the basic quality of ren. All he has to do to improve is to further enhance this quality and make it even more magnificent.

There are existing disputes over the translation of ke ji fu li (克己復禮). According to Shun, this phrase can be translated either as “subduing oneself and returning to the observance of li,” or as “succeeding in aligning oneself with li.” And either translation favours the camp which holds a higher regard for li over ren in the Analects.456 These two translations are in fact grounded in the different translations of the character 克 (ke).457 Ke can be translated as “to restrain or subdue”, or as “to be capable of or succeed in”; the former specifies the means (of containing oneself) through which one is able to follow the principle or practice of li, whereas the latter merely states one’s capacity of following li. It is difficult to judge which translation is correct. A translation is affected not only by the immediate context of the targeted text, but also by the angle and perspective that a particular interpretation adopts. The current framework of practical contextualism seems to favour the translation that takes ke to mean “to restrain or subdue”, and therefore interpret the phrase “ke ji fu li” as “subduing oneself and returning to the observance of li.” Our daily experiences also seem to suggest that, in real practice, abiding by li (or li-like principles) takes effort, and sometimes significant effort. At least this is true for those who are still on the way to cultivating themselves to follow the practice of li.458 In this respect, translating ke as “to subdue or restrain” is by no means unreasonable.

Yan Hui’s case in turn echoes Confucius’s comments on Guan Zhong, who was praised by Confucius as conforming to ren but lacking in li.459 As I have discussed in section 5.1.3, Guan Zhong’s merits, according to Confucius, come from his efforts and political wisdom in uniting different states at various times without even once resorting to war. However, he is certainly incompetent at practising li. If we compare Guan Zhong’s case with the painting metaphor, we may find that Guan Zhong is the one who can create the space between the colours of individuals and communities, but not the one who is able

456 Kwong-Loi Shun, “Ren 仁 and Li 禮 in the Analects,” 2002, pp. 60-1. 457 傅佩榮, 《人能弘道: 傅佩榮談論語》, 2012, p. 242. 458 Please refer to Karyn Lai’s analyses of the three different stages of cultivating the self according to the practice of li in Karyn Lai, “Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility,” Philosophy East and West, 56:1, 2006, pp. 69-83. 459 This echoes Li Chengyang’s (2007: 314) suggestion (presented at the beginning of 5.3) that “li may not always result in ren and that persons of ren may not always follow the rules of li.”

228 to fill in the gaps with the immaculate li. However, it seems unfair to deny him the former because of the latter.

Guan Zhong’s case, in fact, demonstrates the model of double-layered ren that was proposed at the beginning of this chapter. The underlying layer focuses on the preservation of human context; in terms of the analogy of painting, it represents the basic need to create space in a drawing. The upper layer is the more virtue-oriented dimension, which has always been entangled with li. When ren is investigated from an individualistic perspective, its contextual (underlying) layer is hard to spot, and the contextual elements in its practical (upper) layer will also be blurred by the dimension of li. Only through the perspective of practical contextualism can Confucius’s idea of ren be revealed thoroughly and clearly.

5.3.3 The Practically Contextual Rendering of Ren and Li The primary difference between the individualistic and contextual approaches to ren is that the former tends to narrow and restrict the idea of ren within an idiosyncratic domain whereas the latter takes both the individual and his/her environments into consideration. From the individualistic perspective, the quality of ren and the practice of li are possessed by a particular person, and therefore self-cultivation aims to improve the quality of a specific individual. The practically contextual approach of ren is different; its focus is not just on a particular individual but also on the surrounding environment, space, and relationship. Viewed from this perspective, self-cultivation is not merely self-focused; instead, it gives attention to both the self and the environment. Li functions as the moral mediator that is practised between the self and others, instead of merely being the virtuous quality of a particular personal. Under the perspective of practical contextualism, the scope of the ideas of ren and li has been significantly extended. In this sense, ren and li are the architecture and blueprint of a human society. They are the fundamental elements of the Way of Heaven (天道, tiao dao) in the Analects.

When examining the Chinese character 仁 (ren) in section 5.1.2, emphasis was given to its component character 二 (er), which means “more than one person”. This has been further supported by the discussion of contextuality and relationality that are implied by the idea of ren. In these discussions and perspectives, however, individuals still remain the focal point. Comparing this with the character 二, attention is directed at the two

229 strokes (representing two individuals). However, the current discussions seem to suggest that, besides the two strokes (persons), the interspace between them is equally as important. This rediscovery of the character 仁 makes contextuality and relationality not just the subsidiary but the substantial part of an individual. In turn, this change of perspective calls for the need to give ren a new meaning and description, if this is indeed possible.

Ren, from the perspective of practical contextualism, is the capacity and willingness to create the spaces of contextuality, so that the practice of li can then highlight these spaces. Moreover, these spaces allow human relationships to grow, and for the exhibition of the full and true colours of each individual. In this light, ren is not the quality or a set of characters that belongs to, or is possessed by, any individual. It is the humanistic context or reality that can only be realized by at least two individuals together with the interspace (accommodating contextual relations) between them. In an ideal condition, the space in-between has been aesthetically harmonized in order for the subjects from both sides to radiate their true colours to the optimal extent. In this sense, we cannot say that ren is just an idea for moral encouragement. At a fundamental level, together with li, ren has a substantial philosophical denotation that depicts how a human society expects to function and what it is expected to look like. It also offers inspirations as to how we can live with each other peacefully, meaningfully, co-operatively, constructively, and productively in an ideal situation in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion The examination in the current chapter has exhibited a comprehensive image of contextualism in the Analects. As with the Zhuang Zi, the Analects covers almost every single aspect of the proposed framework of contextualism.

It is probably true that every single key concept discussed here, such as ren, li, xue (hao xue), si, jiao, or etc., can be understood independently. However, interpreting them according to the perspectives to which they give rise, together with forming a comprehensive conceptual context, can help us to better understand these individual ideas as well as the Analects as a whole. In this sense, the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism in the Analects is embodied in the highly interconnected network of concepts the text provides, which, on the other hand, also reflects the relational feature of contextualism.

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Unlike the other texts explored in the current thesis, the environmental/situational context that the Analects concerns is decisively the humanistic (or human) context. This has been made particularly apparent in the investigation concerning the transformation of aesthetic ren to moral ren. As I have proposed in the first section, the common feature underlying both the aesthetic and moral ren is that both share the same foundation of human context. Without the precondition and pre-existence of the human context, neither the idea of ren itself nor the transformation of its meaning would have made any sense to us.

The investigation of li and its relationship with ren imply at least four aspects of contextualism in the Analects: (a) interpersonal relatedness, (b) self-regulating limitation, (c) the dynamic process of personal development, and (d) the respectful interspace maintained between individuals. These four dimensions of contextualism are all played out simultaneously in the human context promoted in the Analects. The component character 二 (er, two) of 仁 (ren) means “more than one person”, and also implies the inevitable interpersonal relatedness. During the dynamic process of person- making, the cultivation of ren cannot be successful unless it is practised through interacting with others in a human context. However, one should practise it with temperance and be aware of the boundary and limitation of individual development. The “white colour” metaphor of li, which comes at the last stage of painting, helps highlight the interspace that is normally overlooked between the two strokes (meaning “more than one person”) in the character 仁 (ren). In light of this, the Confucian ideas of ren and li together depict a balanced image of how human beings are expected to develop their selves and live with each other.

The first and foremost practice emphasized by the Analects is no doubt self-cultivation or person-making. Whether it is ren or li, or any other moral principle or quality, in order to realize and accomplish it, one has to learn and practise it through self- cultivation. Of course, in the most notable human context in the Analects, self- cultivation never happens solely within the self, but through one’s interactions with others. Since xue (learning/to learn) plays an important role in self-cultivation, and is also closely related to our epistemological development, it seems that these two (self- cultivation and epistemological development) are intimately intertwined practices in the

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Analects. There are aphorisms concerning public policy in the Analects460, however, very few (or none) of them can be read independently of self-cultivation.

460 E.g., 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」 (《論語•為政》, 2.3) The Master said: “Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng 政) and keep them orderly with penal law (xing 刑), and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de 德) and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety (li 禮) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.” (Roger T. Ames; Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 1998, p. 76.)

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Conclusion The current investigation has shown that the emergence of, and attention to, the theme of ‘contextualism’ is relatively new phenomenon in Western philosophical traditions. In Chinese philosophy, however, contextualism serves as one of its fundamental thinking patterns, even though the explicit specification of this theme is rarely seen in various traditions of Chinese philosophy, especially in the early texts. What I mean by the early texts is those from the pre-Qin period which have been investigated by the current thesis. The more explicit concerns of this theme may be found in one of the ancient texts I have explored, the Han Fei Zi. The primary author, Han Fei, argues that (if translated into modern language) no political system fits all situations at all times; if it fails to address contemporary issues and meet the challenges of the times, then an amendment should be considered and implemented. Despite such a level of explicitness, it is still extremely difficult (if not impossible) to find the specific Chinese characters and/or phrases which refer in particular to the term ‘contextualism’ in the Han Fei Zi.

Many contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy from the pre-Qin period are concerned with contextualism. However, these studies are mostly associated with the understandings of the ‘Self’. Despite their specific focus, these studies reveal that the theme ‘contextualism’ has already had a widespread existence in Chinese philosophy (although in an implicit form because of the lack of specific Chinese characters and phrases for the term ‘contextualism’). Without first making explicit what Chinese contextualism means, it is difficult to explore the theme of ‘practical contextualism’ in Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, the lack of specificity for contextualism in ancient Chinese texts adds another layer of difficulty to the current project. This additional problem should be solved so that an effective investigation of the aims of the current project can be accomplished.

In order to achieve its goal, the current study has undertaken a retrospective approach to that extra layer. It has first explored the concept of ‘contextualism’ in contemporary Western philosophy in order to give an initial impression of what ‘contextualism’ entails. Since the current study is not a comparative one, the picture of Western contextualism that it has presented primarily served to familiarize us with such a theme. A brief contrast has been provided to make us aware of the differences between Western

233 and Chinese forms of contextualism, but this may not be comprehensive enough to tell the full story.

After introducing contextualism from the Western perspective, the dissertation has then proceeded to make a connection between it and the Chinese perspective by surveying the meaning of the term ‘contextualism’ in contemporary Chinese. The key character ‘境’ (jing) has been identified during the investigation. By looking at the different meanings of the character jing in texts from the same period (of the texts in question), a comprehensive and multifaceted picture of Chinese contextualism has been delineated. The current investigation has revealed at least six different dimensions or features of contextualism which can be identified in Chinese philosophy, namely, its textual/conceptual, environmental/circumstantial, relational, limitary, dynamic, and interspatial dimensions or features.

During the investigation of contextualism conveyed by the character jing in the ancient texts, one of the significant findings was that Chinese contextualism is particularly pragmatic. This is different from its Western counterpart. This does not at all mean that the practical theme is unique to Chinese contextualism, and that Western contextualism does not have (or deal with) pragmatic matters at all. In fact, the current investigation has shown that the practical theme certainly also exists in contemporary Western thinking. Despite this, one can hardly ignore the finding of the current study, which has suggested that both Western and Chinese forms of contextualism seem to have arisen from different philosophical focuses. The comparison of the English term ‘contextualism’ (and its etyma) with the Chinese character jing has revealed that, unlike the term ‘contextualism’, which originally had a textual/conceptual connotation, jing originally had an environmental/circumstantial/situational focus. In other words, Chinese contextualism, from the very beginning, paid great attention to dealing with the issues taking place in the phenomenal world. In contemporary language, however, both (English) ‘contextualism’ and (Chinese) jing have acquired textual/conceptual and environmental/circumstantial connotations. This shows that the difference between Western and Chinese forms of contextualism has narrowed significantly in contemporary discourse. However, it is still hard to ignore their distinctive emphases.

As shown in Chapter one, the development and investigation of contextualism in Western philosophy began in the field of metaphysics and was later extended to also

234 encompass epistemology. As the investigation continued, contextualism had increasingly become an important theme in most fields of Western philosophy, including Logic.

When environmental/circumstantial factors became salient in discussions of practical reason, the awareness of contextualism had, no doubt, reached another level. The current research has found that construing practical reason meaningfully through logical statements involves taking into consideration the relevant environmental/circumstantial factors as well as the textual/conceptual structure of the logical statements. However, since the focus was still on justifying the meaningfulness of the logical statements and the rationality of a practice, the environmental/circumstantial factors played a secondary role. This is different from Chinese contextualism, where environmental/circumstantial factors are a primary focus in thinking about right or appropriate action.

The importance of the environmental/circumstantial aspect continued to increase when contextualism became prominent in the study of Western political philosophy, especially in the debate of so-called ‘historical contextualism’. Contemporary scholars of political philosophy, such as Floyd, have astutely pointed out the limitation of the perspective of historical contextualism, namely its overemphasis on mental representation(s) (e.g., seeking consensus). He proposes a new approach which gives more weight to the practical (in comparison with the theoretical) aspect of ‘historical contextualism’, and therefore treats historical contextualism more environmentally/circumstantially than textually/conceptually. However, when compared with a similar idea in Chinese philosophy (e.g., the political philosophy of Han Fei), one still cannot overlook the fact that political practices are constantly answering the call from, and need to adjust themselves according to, environmental/circumstantial factors. In Chinese philosophy, 1) the environmental/circumstantial context seldom plays a secondary role in justifying certain textual/conceptual ideas; 2) the primary concern of practices is on how they can be adjusted, instead of how they can be justified, in a given context.

To present a comprehensive picuture of practical contextualism, the current thesis investigates four ancient Chinese texts, the Yi Jing, the Han Fei Zi, the Zhuang Zi, and the Analects. In these texts, the different dimensions of practical contextualism are not necessarily given the same weight or expressed equally as explicitly. To take the six

235 aforementioned dimensions of contextualism as an example, the dynamic feature of contextualism may play a more prominent and explicit role in the Yi Jing than in the Analects; and human relationality may be more salient in the Analects than in the Han Fei Zi. Also, the philosophical concerns of these dimensions of contextualism are not exactly the same in different texts. For example, the interspatial feature is epistemologically significant in the Zhuang Zi, whereas it is ethically and/or morally relevant in the Analects. The limitary dimension is associated with political issues in the Han Fei Zi, whereas it is associated with epistemological interpretations in the Zhuang Zi. (The similar situation also applies to the four different practical dimensions appearing in these four texts as will be shown in the later discussions). The openness of these rediscovered dimensions of Chinese contextualism provides flexible ways of examining Chinese philosophy from a contextual perspective.

To help attain a clear understanding of practical contextualism, I will end the thesis by outlining the relevance of the different dimensions of practical contextualism to the four major texts that have been investigated. I will, following the order laid out in Chapter one, discuss the six dimensions recognized in Chinese contextualism followed by the four different types of practices that Chinese philosophy concerns.

The textual/conceptual dimension of Chinese contextualism: this dimension seems to be less practically-oriented, and is arguably rooted more deeply in the Western perception of contextualism than in its Chinese counterpart. The reason for including it as one of the significant dimensions of Chinese contextualism was two-fold. First of all, “practicality over conceptuality” in Chinese philosophy and contextualism do not exclude the important conceptual elements in the tradition(s). Including this dimension helps to bring out both the discrepancy and the connection between these two traditions. Secondly, the practical orientation of the Chinese texts examined here is unmistakably strong. Instead of diminishing the importance of the practical feature(s), recognizing the textual/conceptual dimension of Chinese contextualism helps us to understand the practical ideas in Chinese philosophy better, and to practise these ideas better in real situations.

Good examples to illustrate this second point can be found in two texts, the Yi Jing and the Analects. In the Yi Jing, a cluster of complicated ideas can be rendered meaningfully through metaphorical and interspatial interpretations of their textual/conceptual

236 relationships. In doing so, the practical meanings of these ideas can be better captured, which in turn facilitates the practices of these ideas in different and novel situations. This also happens in the Analects. By paying attention to the textual/conceptual dimension of contextualism, we are able to gain insight into the interrelationality between the different core ideas in the Analects. This is both meaningful and significant for both understanding these core ideas and putting them into practice.

The environmental/circumstantial dimension: unlike the textual/conceptual dimension, the environmental/circumstantial dimension can be widely recognized in many ancient Chinese texts. As has been discussed in Chapter one, this dimension represents the fundamental element of Chinese contextualism, and appears in all the texts examined in the current thesis. However, in each of these texts, what this dimension denotes may not necessarily be the same. The Yi Jing possesses the most inclusive and comprehensive connotations, as the Yi Jing concerns the environments/circumstances/situations on a cosmological level, and with potentially metaphysical implications (although, noticeably, metaphysics may not be central to early Chinese philosophy). The environmental/circumstantial context in the Han Fei Zi is evidently the political situation associated with a particular historical condition, in which suitable ruling strategies and public policies need to be adopted and practised. In the Zhuang Zi, it refers primarily to the natural environment(s) around us, and more importantly, the intellectual and epistemological context through which we can improve, or even transform our understanding of the world. In the Analects, the context is unmistakably the human context, in which we gain knowledge of, and (re)discover our humanity through lifelong learning and self-cultivation.

The relational dimension: this unique dimension of Chinese contextualism highlights the importance of interrelational thinking in Chinese philosophy. Moreover, this fundamental interrelationship exists between and/or amongst not only things but also ideas. Recognizing the relationships between ideas also helps to justify the inclusion of the textual/conceptual dimension of Chinese contextualism in the framework. This conceptual interrelationship is the key to understanding the paired or clustered, complicated, and interdependent ideas in the Yi Jing, such as the basic interdependence of yin and yang. The symbolic interrelationship is the key to understanding the sixty- four different hexagrams and their lines, representing distinct situations or contexts in which things reside and events take place. The text focuses on the optimal ways of

237 dealing with the constantly changing situations in the phenomenal world based on contextual interpretations of interrelated symbols and ideas. Although contextualism is an explicit theme in the Han Fei Zi, many dimensions of Chinese contextualism are underdeveloped in the text, and the interrelated dimension is amongst these. The most scrutinized relationships are those between the rulers and their ministers and officials. Most, if not all, of these relationships are viewed unfavourably by Han Fei, who may think that they are not worth cultivating and developing. This reflects the pessimistic view of Han Fei on the overall political environment of his era. The interrelatedness in the Zhuang Zi is strikingly epistemologically related, specifically in terms of the indispensable relationship between the known and unknown. Zhuangzi seems interested in enhancing or even transforming our epistemological capacities through recognizing the contextual value(s) of the interrelationship between the ‘known’ and ‘unknown.’ In the Analects, this interrelatedness is both interpersonal and conceptual. It is interpersonal because, as human beings, we all ought to learn how to live with ourselves and other human beings in a peaceful relationship; it is conceptual because, to achieve this goal, we have to learn and practise a set of values that are innately related to promoting the former.

The limitary dimension: this dimension indicates that contextualism is opposed to the idea of universality. The limitary dimension in the Yi Jing reminds us of the importance of identifying the specific situational context in which issues are raised and solutions are expected. It is unlikely that we can effectively solve problems that face us without knowing the scope and specific context of the issues at hand. Interpreting this in the Han Fei Zi involves recognizing that most political ruling strategies and public policies are not universally applicable. Each of these political ruling strategies and public policies has its own limitations, and is therefore expected to be adaptable to change where necessary. Limitation in the Zhuang Zi is, again, epistemologically related. Recognizing the limitation of our knowledge is the foundation of epistemological transformation. The situational limitation in an environmental/circumstantial sense is also a concern in the Zhuang Zi. Ultimately, however, it exists to support the concern of epistemological limitation in the text. In the Analects, limitation is embodied in the individuals’ understanding and personal interpretations of the core ethical values the text promotes. Confucius’s insights into this kind of limitation allow the ideas to be conveyed more meaningfully, and practised more effectively.

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The dynamic dimension: this dimension basically specifies one of the core ideas in Chinese philosophy which highlights that things and events are constantly in flux. It is also closely associated with the dimension of limitation, as change inadvertently “creates” a sense of contextual limitation(s). The changing natural of things and events is arguably the fundamental theme of the Yi Jing. In the Han Fei Zi, it is precisely the dynamic/changing nature of the historical and political situation(s) that triggers the re- evaluation and adoption of the appropriate ruling principles and public policies to meet new challenges. As with the former texts, environmental/situational dynamism also exists in the Zhuang Zi. However, the more fascinating aspect of dynamism in the Zhuang Zi is also epistemologically-oriented: to notice how our understanding of the world can be transformed and can thereby reach an entirely new level. In the Analects, dynamism is both environmental/situational and inter-/intra-personal. It is environmental and situational when we learn to perfect li (behavioural propriety) according to its suitability for the particular situation; it is also interpersonal as we cultivate ren and li to gradually become better people, and also adjust so that we can live with others in peaceful and harmonious ways.

The interspatial dimension: this last dimension of Chinese contextualism is the least obvious because it does not partake in our immediate perception of Chinese philosophy. This is also reflected in the initial proposal of the framework in the first chapter. However, both the initial proposal and the relevant analyses and discussions in the subsequent chapters have all demonstrated that it is entirely possible to extract and unveil the interspatial dimension of Chinese contextualism. Like other dimensions, the interspatial dimension is multifaceted. In the Yi Jing, it is embodied in the interspatial and metaphorical relationship between different sets of ideas. It is intimately associated with the relational and textual/conceptual dimensions of Chinese contextualism. However, just like the dimension of relationality, the interspatial theme is also under- examined in the Han Fei Zi. Many of the flaws in its arguments are arguably both the result and evidence of its lack of in-depth consideration and evaluation of the interspatial dimension of contextuality. Some of its flaws can be better illustrated by contrasting it with Confucian texts, such as the Mencius. In the Zhuang Zi, epistemology is, again, the central theme of the interspatial dimension of Chinese contextualism. According to the argument offered here, Zhuangzi seems to introduce the approach of the interspatial pivot to deal with the epistemological dilemma of

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“knowing” things. In the Analects, the involvement of interspatiality is two-fold. First, it is deeply involved in the individual practice of self-cultivation based on ren and li. Secondly, it is deeply involved in the expectation to harmonize human relationships following li as a social blueprint and a cultivating principle.

It has been specified in the framework of practical contextualism that Chinese contextualism is essentially practical. The contextual thinking of Chinese philosophy has emerged through, and in turn facilitated, some of the practices in people’s daily lives. Corresponding to the environmental/circumstantial emphasis of Chinese contextualism, practices in Chinese philosophy aim to deal with the changing context instead of fulfilling certain normative ideals. It is not that there are no normative concerns in Chinese philosophy, but rather that seeking ways to manifest these ideals in daily practices is more important than categorizing people’s activities under pre- construed norms. The four key practices are self-cultivation, problem-solving, epistemological development, and public policy. If read carefully, all of them, in fact, have appeared implicitly in the previous review of the six dimensions of contextualism owing to the innate connection between Chinese contextualism and practicality.

The four types of practice identified in the current thesis signify the different practical features of contextualism in Chinese philosophy. Similar to the multifaceted features or dimensions of Chinese contextualism, different types of practice are highlighted with distinguishing emphases in the four different texts that have been explored here. For example, more attention has been paid to the practice of problem-solving in the Yi Jing and Han Fei Zi than in the Zhuang Zi and the Analects, while the latter two place more emphasis on the practice of self-cultivation. Also, the same type of practice can have distinct orientations. For example, self-cultivation in the Analects has a strong moral and ethical denotation, which is different from the same practice in the Zhuang Zi, which in turn accentuates the epistemological aspect of self-cultivation. Similarly, in the Han Fei Zi, problem-solving has a strong political implication, whereas, in the Yi Jing, it is more of the general idea of attaining the optimal response to the environmental/circumstantial/situational context. In the current investigation, epistemological development and public policy (or political leadership) have been singled out as two types of practice instead of being categorized under the different types of self-cultivation and/or problem-solving. The reason for doing this was because, as has been shown in the respective chapters, these two are too significant, both from

240 the specific perspective of contextualism and under more general philosophical considerations, to be hidden behind other types.

Self-cultivation: self-cultivation, as a concern, is treated differrently in different texts. Due to the evidently Confucian influences in the commentary of the Yi Jing, self- cultivation is closely associated with the idea of jun zi (君子, the authoritative or exemplary person). Other than paying attention to the changing nature of the universe (which the text apparently advises), a jun zi is also expected to continuously cultivate their yan (言, words) and xin (行, practices), especially in those extremely difficult situations represented by certain hexagrams, such as Pi (否, Stagnation) and Kun (困, Oppression/Exhaustion). Unfortunately, just like some of the underrepresented contextual dimensions, self-cultivation is also under-evaluated in the Han Fei Zi. In the text, Han Fei provides abundant advice to the rulers as to how to cultivate themselves to become competent governors; however, deep down, he chooses to trust an effective political system or institution rather than a wise, educated, and cultivated king. Due to his very pessimistic view of human nature, Han Fei believes that the chance of having a desired ruler is too minor to be counted on. Self-cultivation is one of the central concerns in both the Zhuang Zi and the Analects. In the former, it is related to epistemological issues; in the latter, it is related to the ways of cultivating the moral self and its relationships with others. Both have been reinforced in the contextual dimensions concerning the relevant topics. I will not repeat them here.

Problem-solving: this is arguably a generic theme regarding practice in Chinese philosophy. However, the core concern of the problems varies in different texts. In the Yi Jing, the core concern is how we can weather through, or even survive, the constant change in our lives in order to improve ourselves and live wisely. In this regard, the scope of the problem in the Yi Jing is too broad to be defined. In the Han Fei Zi, the central theme seems to be how to rule a state in the most effective ways. With very little faith in human nature, Han Fei recommends an “automatic” political system which can work even for mediocre rulers. From a superficial perspective, it seems that the epistemological issues are the central problems of the Zhuang Zi: how can we understand the world better and become wiser? However, a further investigation of the text seems to depict a Zhuangzi who may be fond of questions such as: if there are problems, could you please define what you mean by ‘problem’? Zhuangzi is a much

241 more “unpredictable” epistemological thinker than usually imagined. The very idea of ‘problem-solving’ itself may be harshly ridiculed by Zhuangzi. In the Analects, the core concerns are unmistakably how to become a moral individual, and help others develop their own moral competence, so together we can create a society in which, ideally, everyone enjoys living.

Epistemological development: this is the practical dimension best represented by the Zhuang Zi. As shown in the above discussion on problem-solving, the Zhuangzi is the only text among those examined in this thesis which disturbs the very foundation of the concepts we receive and form during our epistemological development. It is a text that is particularly valuable for reminding ourselves of our own epistemological limitations and therefore in promoting active and creative thinking habits. It could be categorized under the concept of self-cultivation. However, the investigations of the current thesis have suggested that epistemological development is too unique and significant to be treated as one of the subcategories of practicality in Chinese philosophy.

Public policy: this is another underappreciated domain of practicality in Chinese philosophy that is worth highlighting, as has been proposed in the current research. It is a particularly dominant theme in the Han Fei Zi. There are public practices in the other texts that have been investigated, such as the Yi Jing and the Analects (e.g., the idea of li promoted by the latter). However, most of the suggested public practices seem to be morally-oriented, and amongst the less dominant issues in those texts. Although having limited success, the Han Fei Zi attempts to provide the political solutions to ruling a state when most of the moral values and practices fail. Han Fei’s last hope lies in a set of public policies which he believes can fix the problems caused by the unreliability of human nature, when morality is no longer a viable option. The type of human nature exhibited in certain historical situations may not always display moral accountability. However, without taking human nature into consideration, political systems and institutions will not work in the long run, as shown by historical evidence. Nevertheless, Han Fei’s attempt of developing a new approach to amend the social disorder of his time is by all means valuable to the later thinkers who dealt with relevant political and philosophical issues.

Although practicality and contextuality are not the new concepts in the contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy, it is rare that each of these concepts is investigated in a

242 specific and systematic manner, let alone studies that deal with these two as one comprehensive idea. The current dissertation attempts to address these issues by introducing the theme of ‘practical contextualism’ that, as the current investigation shows, permeates various ancient Chinese texts. Through specifying the multifaceted dimensions of contextuality and practicality, and demonstrating their presence in different ancient texts, the current study helps to define the potential meanings of practical contextualism. In so doing, the current investigation has also highlighted the inseparable connection between contextuality and practicality in Chinese philosophy. This study may help to provide a new perspective of reading and studying ancient Chinese texts in their own terms under the proposed framework of practical contextualism. However, it may not exhaust all the perspectives that practical contextualism entails. For instance, other than the interpretative framework, practical contextualism may also serve as a practical guide for promoting optimal practices that involves contextual wisdoms. In particular, the six dimensions of contextualism may form an interdependent unity that is conducive to better practical consideration of one’s action and practical realization as a human person. It is expected that further studies may be required to address these issues.

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