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Country of Origin Information Report on Libya (June 2020)

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Country of Origin Information Report on Libya (June 2020) Country of origin information report on Libya June 2020 Page 1 of 77 Country of origin information report on Libya – June 2020 Publication details The Hague Sub Saharan Africa Department Department for country of origin information reports (DAF/AB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 77 Country of origin information report on Libya – June 2020 Error! Unknown document property name. Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents .............................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political situation ......................................................................................... 7 1.1 Recent political developments ...........................................................................7 2 The security situation ................................................................................ 14 2.1 General ........................................................................................................ 14 2.2 Restrictions on civilians’ freedom of movement due to the conflict ....................... 16 2.3 Civilian casualties .......................................................................................... 17 2.3.1 General ........................................................................................................ 17 2.3.2 Civilian casualties in Tripoli and Tripolitania ...................................................... 18 2.3.3 Civilian casualties in Murzuq ........................................................................... 19 2.3.4 Migrants ....................................................................................................... 20 2.4 Warring factions and areas under their control .................................................. 20 2.4.1 General ........................................................................................................ 20 2.4.2 The GNA in Tripoli.......................................................................................... 20 2.4.3 The LNA and the HoR in Tobruk ....................................................................... 22 2.4.4 Control of other areas in Libya ........................................................................ 24 2.5 Security situation in the provinces ................................................................... 24 2.5.1 General ........................................................................................................ 24 2.5.2 Province of Tripolitania ................................................................................... 24 2.5.3 Fezzan ......................................................................................................... 28 2.5.4 Cyrenaica ..................................................................................................... 29 2.5.5 Airports ........................................................................................................ 30 2.5.6 Border posts ................................................................................................. 32 2.5.7 Recruitment .................................................................................................. 32 3 Documents and nationality ........................................................................ 34 3.1 Documents ................................................................................................... 34 3.2 Nationality .................................................................................................... 36 4 Human rights ............................................................................................. 38 4.1 General ........................................................................................................ 38 4.1.1 General ........................................................................................................ 38 4.2 Monitoring and legal protection ....................................................................... 38 4.2.1 Legislation .................................................................................................... 39 4.2.2 Family law and penal law ................................................................................ 39 4.2.3 Freedom of movement and conditions imposed for entering and leaving the country ................................................................................................................... 40 4.2.4 Recourse to the judiciary and the role of the police ............................................ 40 4.2.5 Legal procedure and the status of detainees during interrogation and detention .... 41 4.2.6 Protection of civilians ..................................................................................... 42 4.3 Compliance and violations .............................................................................. 44 4.3.1 Internet and mobile telephone services ............................................................ 44 4.3.2 The death penalty.......................................................................................... 44 4.3.3 Acts of violence and abductions committed by armed groups .............................. 45 4.4 Specific groups .............................................................................................. 46 Page 3 of 77 Country of origin information report on Libya – June 2020 4.4.1 General ........................................................................................................ 46 4.4.2 Opponents .................................................................................................... 46 4.4.3 Demonstrators .............................................................................................. 47 4.4.4 Journalists and human rights activists and lawyers ............................................ 47 4.4.5 Members of the judiciary ................................................................................ 49 4.4.6 Apostates, moderate Muslims and Muslim converts to Christianity ....................... 49 4.4.7 Individuals involved in honour-based violence and killings and blood feuds ........... 51 4.4.8 Qadhafi loyalists or alleged Qadhafi loyalists ..................................................... 52 4.4.9 Ibadi and Sufi Muslims ................................................................................... 53 4.4.10 Residents of Tawergha ................................................................................... 53 4.4.11 Palestinians and Syrians ................................................................................. 54 4.4.12 Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgenders and Intersexuals (LGBTI) ...................... 55 4.4.13 Women ........................................................................................................ 55 4.4.14 Minors .......................................................................................................... 57 4.4.15 Libyan personnel working for international organisations in Libya ........................ 58 5 Displaced persons, migrants and refugees ................................................ 59 5.1 The flow of migrants, refugees, and displaced persons ....................................... 59 5.2 Displaced persons .......................................................................................... 60 5.3 Refugees and migrants ................................................................................... 62 5.4 Repatriation .................................................................................................. 64 6 Appendixes ................................................................................................ 66 6.1 Public sources consulted ................................................................................. 66 6.2 List of abbreviations ....................................................................................... 76 6.3 Map of Libya ................................................................................................. 77 Page 4 of 77 Country of origin information report on Libya – June 2020 Introduction This country of origin information report was prepared using the questions asked and concerns stated by the Ministry of Justice and Security as set out in the terms of reference (ToR) dated 18 December 2019. An anonymised version of this ToR, together with this country of origin information report, has been published on the central government’s website. This country of origin information report describes the situation in Libya, insofar as this is important for the assessment of asylum applications from persons originating from this country, and for decision-making regarding the repatriation of rejected Libyan asylum seekers. This country of origin information report is an update of the country of origin information report on Libya published in April 2019. The reporting period covers the period from April 2019 through April 2020. This report is a factual, neutral and objective account of the findings during the period under investigation and does not offer any policy recommendations. This country of origin information report is based on public and confidential
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