DIVIDED WE STAND: LIBYA’S ENDURING CONFLICTS Middle East/North Africa Report N°130 – 14 September 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND: LIBYA’S COMMUNAL CONFLICTS ........................................... 2 A. LEGACIES OF QADHAFI AND THE 17 FEBRUARY REVOLUTION ...................................................... 2 B. THE TUMULTUOUS BORDERLANDS: ZUWARA, KUFRA AND SEBHA .............................................. 5 III. FILLING THE SECURITY VACUUM .......................................................................... 8 A. MILITARY COUNCILS ................................................................................................................... 8 B. THE FLEDGLING STATE .............................................................................................................. 10 C. REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS AND THE LIBYAN SHIELD FORCES .............................................. 17 IV. IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRES ................................................................................ 21 V. UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS IN THE WEST ........................................................... 24 VI. FORGING PEACE ......................................................................................................... 28 VII. IMPLEMENTING PEACE: THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE ........... 30 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LIBYA ................................................................................................................................. 36 B. TAXONOMY OF ARMED GROUPS ...................................................................................................... 37 C. NOTE ON THE TERM “NOTABLES” (HUKAMA’) ................................................................................. 39 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 40 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2009 ... 41 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 43 Middle East/North Africa Report N°130 14 September 2012 DIVIDED WE STAND: LIBYA’S ENDURING CONFLICTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The 11 September killing of the U.S. ambassador and three to keep the country whole. The ad hoc security patchwork of his colleagues is a stark reminder of Libya’s security registered significant and even surprising success. But it is challenges. It also should serve as a wake-up call. There no model; even as it manages to contain conflicts, it sim- is, of course, more than one way to look at the country ultaneously fuels them. Some armed groups cannot resist today: as one of the more encouraging Arab uprisings, the temptation to target foes and settle scores; battle for recovering faster than expected; or as a country of regions political and economic influence; evade accountability; and localities pulling in different directions, beset by and entrench geographic and community rivalries. intercommunal strife and where well-armed groups freely roam. Evidence exists for both: successful elections on Until now, central authorities have acted chiefly as by- one hand, violent attacks on the other. In truth, the most standers, in effect subcontracting security to largely auton- and the least promising features of post-Qadhafi Libya omous armed groups. They had a reason: the army and stem from a single reality. Because the country lacks a fully police were in disarray, suffering from a deficit in person- functioning state, effective army or police, local actors – nel and equipment; officers and soldiers had either defected, notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary bri- fled, been killed or jailed. The rebels who rose up against gades – have stepped in to provide safety, mediate disputes Qadhafi were much better armed and – both suspicious of and impose ceasefires. It will not be easy and will have to remnants of the old regime and pleased with their new- be done gingerly, but it is past time to reverse the tide, found power – unwilling to either surrender their auton- reform army and police and establish structures of a func- omy or come under state control. Yet, it would be wrong tioning state that can ensure implementation of ceasefire to see the parallel military and police forces that emerged agreements and tackle root causes of conflict. as having done so against the central authorities’ wishes. Rather, and although they were set up by revolutionary Colonel Qadhafi’s bloody end and the collapse of Libya’s brigades themselves, the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme police and armed forces left in its wake an armed popula- Security Committee – the former operating parallel to the tion with 42 years worth of pent-up grievances. Qadhafi’s army, the latter to the police – were authorised and en- longstanding divide-and-rule strategy set communities couraged to take action by the ruling National Transitional against one other, each vying for a share of resources and Council, which viewed them as auxiliary forces without the regime’s favour. Some towns grew wealthy thanks to which the state simply could not secure the country. connections with the ruling elite; others suffered badly. Meanwhile, the security apparatus at once fomented, ma- Just as armed groups physically have kept warring parties nipulated and managed intra-communal conflicts. Once the apart, so have local notables led negotiations designed to lid was removed, there was every reason to fear a free-for- achieve longer-lasting ceasefires. Appealing to the higher all, as the myriad of armed groups that proliferated during ideals of Libyan identity and Islam and resorting to social the rebellion sought material advantage, political influence pressure as well as customary law, they have proved re- or, more simply, revenge. This was all the more so given the markably effective mediators. security vacuum produced by the regime’s precipitous fall. However, none of this offers a sustainable solution. Truces A measure of chaos ensued, but up to a point only. Com- are fragile, local conflicts frozen rather than durably re- munal clashes erupted across the nation both during and solved. In stepping into the breach, local notables and after the 2011 conflict. Tensions that had long been left armed groups have done what the government could not. simmering on the back burner came to a boil, aggravated But effective implementation of ceasefire agreements by the diverging positions various communities took vis- depends in large part on an impartial authority capable of à-vis Qadhafi’s regime. That most of the fighting ended providing services and enforcing decisions. The involve- relatively quickly owes in no small measure to the efforts ment of revolutionary brigades and local armed groups in of local leaders, revolutionary brigades and the variety of efforts to end hostilities blurs the line separating neutral civilian and military councils that took it upon themselves mediation from partisan meddling. In some instances, their Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°130, 14 September 2012 Page ii attempts to simultaneously play the role of army, police, c) authorising a special inter-ministerial task force mediator, judge and jury have helped revive old commu- answering to the prime minister to implement any nal hostilities or competition for control over smuggling decisions related to peace settlements or extraor- routes. The hope is that the central state can set up truly na- dinary governance issues arising within “military tional forces equipped to deal with local disputes, notably zones”. a gendarmerie and elite auxiliary corps within the army. 2. Create a special inter-ministerial task force answer- Until then, reliance on revolutionary brigades and local ing to the prime minister, with representatives from armed forces will continue to be an uncertain wager. the interior and defence ministries, that would: Perhaps most serious is the fact that, in the absence of a a) send representatives from the aforementioned strong state, agreements mostly have remained dead letters. ministries to councils of notables to observe peace Disputes are rooted in competing claims over land, prop- negotiations and operate a direct line of commu- erty and power that pre-existed Qadhafi and were first nication to relevant ministers and GNC represent- exacerbated by his regime’s clientelism and patronage net- atives during these; works, next by communities’ varying positions during the b) ensure peace agreements are written and specific uprising, and finally by acts of revenge in its aftermath. To enough to be implemented; and resolve them requires clear, written understandings, govern- ment follow-up, genuine enforcement and accountability. c) monitor and oversee implementation of peace set- Too, it necessitates proper policing of borders; fair deter- tlements through the justice system or relevant mination of land ownership where the old regime resorted ministries and ensure local notables and affected to confiscation; and some form of transitional justice. All communities are aware of what