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The Tank and Mechanized Fantry Battalion Task Force

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The Tank and Mechanized Fantry Battalion Task Force THE TANK AND MECHANIZED FANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE 71 2 Pentagon Libra (A fa R-PL) ATTN: Military cum V- ■s Section o • ^ Room 1A518, Pe¡% Washington, DC ■j AUTHOR a. ■y 3 ft 7/ TIT LC OUB NA .,**1 *- ■ t f 1 r - *7'-sfe, 2.-7 FM 71-2* {eld Manual Jo. 71-2 ^ A \ I CN^ . / HEADQUARTERS N ^Yir liJ/Tr DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (j^3--vyfvW| v^as*1'ngton' June 1977 THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE ■PREFACE THE BATTALION TASK FORCE is a combination of tank and mechanized infaWry companies and other units grouped under command of the headquarters of a tank or mechanized infantry battalion. Frequently, attack helicopter units may operate with the battalion task force, which will normally be supported by field and air defense Artillery. Sometimes it’s supported by USAF tactical fighter Nbombers. A wide range of engineer, signal, and logistics support is available and may, from time to time, be part of the battalion, task force. The battalion task force is then a combined arms team. This manual describes how the battalion task force fights. Da doing so, it discusses employ- ment of company teams which may be part of the battalion task force. For additional details about how company teams fight, the reader should use FM 71-1, Tfye Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. The battalion task force fights as part of a brigade. The brigade is a combination of tank and mechanized infantry task forces and other units grouped under Command of a brigade headquarters. How the brigade fights isi described in FM 71- 100, Brigade and Division Operations (Mechanized/ Armor). To fight successfully in modern battle, tqe battalion task force must accomplish several basic tasks. These tasks are common to all combat operations, and are so important they must be discussed briefly before describing how che task force fights. The first battlefield task the battalion task fèrce must perform is to SEE the enemy and the battlefield, to SEE them better than the enemy does so the task force has the advantage—gets the drop on the enemy. •This publication supersedes FM 17-1,14 October 1966, including all changes, and FM 17-15, 25 March 1966, including all changes. Pentagon Library (ANR-Pfc ATTN: Military Doeuments^ection Room 1A518, Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-6050' —FM 71-2 In order to see the enemy, it will be necessary to MOVE. The task force MOVES to SEE and MOVES to fight. For when fighting outnumbered, which the task force must expect to do most of the time, it will be necessary to MOVE to mass sufficient force to accomplish its mission. In order to move and see and move and fight, it will be necessary for the task force to suppress enemy weapons that can interfere with the task force’s ability to accomplish its mission. Direct and indirect fires must be organized and employed in such a manner that sufficient SUPPRESSION is provided to enable the battalion task force to move. In order to accomplish its mission, it will be necessary for the task force to destroy enough of the enemy to convince him to break off his attack, to give up a defensive area, or to move away from an area vital to friendly forces. To see, suppress, move, and destroy requires effective command control. The battalion task force is equipped with communications equipment that will enable the commander to control the maneuver and fires of his forces. This equipment, however, is extremely vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, and Threat forces are well-equipped and trained to conduct electronic countermeasure operations. Therefore, tight discipline and imaginative control alternatives must be employed by the task force commander to insure positive control at all times. Finally, the battalion task force must be supported with combat support, and with the sinews of war— that is, the fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support necessary to keep the battalion task force seeing, suppressing, moving, and destroying. Careful organiza- tion and aggressive operation of support activities are essential to task force operations. The purpose of this manual is to describe how the battalion task force fights—how it conducts operations to see, suppress, and move to destroy the enemy, and how it maintains control and supports itself in battle. ii FM 71-2 THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE TTaibD© ©if ComraeDTiis PAGE Preface i CHAPTERS: 1. The Battalion Task Force on the Modern Battlefield .. .1-1 2. The Enemy in Modern Battle 2-1 3. Organization andOperation of a BattalionTaskForce..3-1 4. Offensive Operations 4-1 5. Defensive Operations 5-1 6. ReconnaissanceandSecurity 6-1 7. Combat Support 7-1 8. Combat Service Support 8-1 APPENDICES: A. Command, Control and Communications- Electronics A-1 B. Warning, Operation, and Fragmentary Orders B-1 C. Records and Reports C-1 D. Breakoutfrom Encirclement D-1 E. Linkup, Passage of Lines and Relief in Place E-1 F. Military Operations in Built-up Areas(MOBA) F-1 G. Operations in Active Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Conditions G-1 H. Road Marches and Assembly Areas H-1 I. Air Defense 1-1 J. Antitank Platoon J-1 K. Prisoners of War and Captured Enemy Documents K-1 Hi Table of Contents (continued) APPENDICES: L. Training the Battalion Task Force L-1 (continued) M. Functions of the Staff M-1 N. Symbols and Control Measures N-1 0. Relevant Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) .. 0-1 iv CHAPTER 1 The Battalion Task Force on the Modern Battlefield - OVERVIEW DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES, the nature of battle has changed—not abruptly, but nonethelesss significantly. As a result, the modem battlefield presents challenges greater than the battalion task force commander has ever had to face. Recent wars and weapons development may well portend the nature of future wars: PROLIFERATION—The major powers and understand their capabilities and limitations client states have developed and fielded an and also understand battle dynamics. He unprecedented array of sophisticated weapon must be able to concentrate his forces so that systems. a favorable force ratio exists at the critical INTENSITY—Recent wars have demon- place and at the critical time. The history of strated heretofore unknown intensity in armored battle tells us that this can be done. terms of materiel and weapon systems losses But, in order to do it, the task force over short time periods. commander must maximize his own COMPLEXITY—The number of sophisti- weapons capabilities while at the same time cated systems that must be brought together minimizing their vulnerability to the enemy. to achieve the full measure of combat power has tremendously increased the complexity of battle. CONTENTS DISTANCE—New sophisticated weapons have greater range and lethality than those PAGE of previous wars. As a result, the engagement OVERVIEW 1-1 will begin at distances far greater than has MODERN WEAPONS CAPABILITIES 1-2 been the case in the past. Tanks 1-2 MOBILITY—With the increase in the Mechanized Infantry 1-4 proportion of armored and mechanized forces Antitank Guided Missiles 1-5 and the advent of the helicopter, mobility has Field Artillery 1-6 greatly increased, facilitating the rapid Mines 1-7 concentration of forces. Air 1-8 TEMPO—The shorter duration of Observation Devices 1-8 engagements and the resultant decrease in MOBILITY 1-9 time to engage large numbers of highly SUPPRESSION 1-11 mobile targets in enemy armored formations places a premium on well-trained, highly NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL proficient crews and units. OPERATIONS (NBC) 1-13 COMMAND CONTROL 1-13 To win on this lethal battlefield, the task SUMMARY 1-14 force commander must skillfully apply his weapon systems. He must thoroughly 1-1 — FM 71-2 MODERN WEAPONS CAPABILITIES Tanks—The tank with its cross-country mobility, its armor protection, and its formidable firepower, has been and is likely to remain the most important weapon in the battalion task force. The accuracy of tank guns gives them a high probability of a first round hit and the lethality is such that if the target is hit it will be killed. PROBABILITY OF A T-62 HITTING AN M60A1 PMETERS -» 0 1500 2000 1 r^i.o A Soviet T-62 tank has a better than 50/50 chance of hitting an M60 tank standing in the open at a range of 1500 meters (about 1 mile), and just less than a 50/50 .5 chance of killing it. However, if the M60A1 is moving at 12 mph, ■ssi it is 25% less vulnerable. If it is hull down (so that all but the turret is behind cover), it is 50% less vulnerable. Thus, these charts .0 dramatically illustrate to the battalion task force commander the importance of demanding that ÊSgâgl his tanks and APCs use hull down firing positions to the maximum o Ü u Jo 9/(o 9/(o extent possible. q)(ô)(ô)@(5)(5 STANDING MOVING HULL DOWN 1.0 .6 .4 .2 ^METERS* 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 , PROBABILITY OF A T-62 KILLING AN M60A1 1-2 FM 71-2 — It is important to remember that capabilities of US and Threat weapons are about equal. While one side may gain temporary advantage from materiel developments, the other soon offsets the advantage with similar improvements. RANGE IN METERS 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 (APFSDS) 100% The probability of kill of the M60A1 and the T-62 are approximately equal. Therefore, 60 any significantadvantage must be 50 gained by skillful tactics, sound 40 training, and good leadership. For (ARDS) example, it is possible to gain a significantadvantage by FIRING- 20 FAST-FIRST.
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