The Tank and Mechanized Fantry Battalion Task Force

THE TANK AND MECHANIZED FANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE

71 2

Pentagon Libra (A fa R-PL) ATTN: Military cum V- ■s Section o • ^ Room 1A518, Pe¡% Washington, DC r ■j

.,**1 *-■ 3 a. 7/ AUTHOR NA ■y OUB TIT LC ft t f 1 - *7'-sfe, 2.-7 FM 71-2* {eld Manual

Jo. 71-2 ^ A \ I CN^ . / HEADQUARTERS N ^Yir liJ/Tr DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

(j^3--vyfvW| v^as*1'ngton' June 1977 THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE ■PREFACE

THE BATTALION TASK FORCE is a combination of tank and mechanized infaWry companies and other units grouped under command of the headquarters of a tank or mechanized infantry battalion. Frequently, attack helicopter units may operate with the battalion task force, which will normally be supported by field and air defense Artillery. Sometimes it’s supported by USAF tactical fighter Nbombers. A wide range of engineer, signal, and logistics support is available and may, from time to time, be part of the battalion, task force. The battalion task force is then a combined arms team. This manual describes how the battalion task force fights. Da doing so, it discusses employment of company teams which may be part of the battalion task force. For additional details about how company teams fight, the reader should use FM 71-1, Tfye Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. The battalion task force fights as part of a brigade. The brigade is a combination of tank and mechanized infantry task forces and other units grouped under Command of a brigade headquarters. How the brigade fights isi described in FM 71- 100, Brigade and Division Operations (Mechanized/ Armor). To fight successfully in modern battle, tqe battalion task force must accomplish several basic tasks. These tasks are common to all combat operations, and are so important they must be discussed briefly before describing how che task force fights. The first battlefield task the battalion task fèrce must perform is to SEE the enemy and the battlefield, to SEE them better than the enemy does so the task force has the advantage—gets the drop on the enemy.

•This publication supersedes FM 17-1,14 October 1966, including all changes, and FM 17-15, 25 March 1966, including all changes. Pentagon Library (ANR-Pfc ATTN: Military Doeuments^ection Room 1A518, Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-6050' —FM 71-2

In order to see the enemy, it will be necessary to MOVE. The task force MOVES to SEE and MOVES to fight. For when fighting outnumbered, which the task force must expect to do most of the time, it will be necessary to MOVE to mass sufficient force to accomplish its mission. In order to move and see and move and fight, it will be necessary for the task force to suppress enemy weapons that can interfere with the task force’s ability to accomplish its mission. Direct and indirect fires must be organized and employed in such a manner that sufficient SUPPRESSION is provided to enable the battalion task force to move. In order to accomplish its mission, it will be necessary for the task force to destroy enough of the enemy to convince him to break off his attack, to give up a defensive area, or to move away from an area vital to friendly forces. To see, suppress, move, and destroy requires effective command control. The battalion task force is equipped with communications equipment that will enable the commander to control the maneuver and fires of his forces. This equipment, however, is extremely vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, and Threat forces are well-equipped and trained to conduct electronic countermeasure operations. Therefore, tight discipline and imaginative control alternatives must be employed by the task force commander to insure positive control at all times. Finally, the battalion task force must be supported with combat support, and with the sinews of war— that is, the fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support necessary to keep the battalion task force seeing, suppressing, moving, and destroying. Careful organization and aggressive operation of support activities are essential to task force operations. The purpose of this manual is to describe how the battalion task force fights—how it conducts operations to see, suppress, and move to destroy the enemy, and how it maintains control and supports itself in battle. ii FM 71-2

THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE

TTaibD© ©if ComraeDTiis

PAGE

Preface i CHAPTERS: 1. The Battalion Task Force on the Modern Battlefield .. .1-1 2. The Enemy in Modern Battle 2-1 3. Organization andOperation of a BattalionTaskForce..3-1 4. Offensive Operations 4-1 5. Defensive Operations 5-1 6. ReconnaissanceandSecurity 6-1 7. Combat Support 7-1 8. Combat Service Support 8-1

APPENDICES: A. Command, Control and Communications- Electronics A-1 B. Warning, Operation, and Fragmentary Orders B-1

C. Records and Reports C-1 D. Breakoutfrom Encirclement D-1 E. Linkup, Passage of Lines and Relief in Place E-1 F. Military Operations in Built-up Areas(MOBA) F-1 G. Operations in Active Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Conditions G-1 H. Road Marches and Assembly Areas H-1 I. Air Defense 1-1

J. Antitank Platoon J-1 K. Prisoners of War and Captured Enemy Documents K-1 Hi Table of Contents (continued)

APPENDICES: L. Training the Battalion Task Force L-1 (continued) M. Functions of the Staff M-1 N. Symbols and Control Measures N-1 0. Relevant Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) .. 0-1

iv CHAPTER 1 The Battalion Task Force on the Modern Battlefield

- OVERVIEW DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES, the nature of battle has changed—not abruptly, but nonethelesss significantly. As a result, the modem battlefield presents challenges greater than the battalion task force commander has ever had to face. Recent wars and weapons development may well portend the nature of future wars:

PROLIFERATION—The major powers and understand their capabilities and limitations client states have developed and fielded an and also understand battle dynamics. He unprecedented array of sophisticated weapon must be able to concentrate his forces so that systems. a favorable force ratio exists at the critical INTENSITY—Recent wars have demon- place and at the critical time. The history of strated heretofore unknown intensity in armored battle tells us that this can be done. terms of materiel and weapon systems losses But, in order to do it, the task force over short time periods. commander must maximize his own COMPLEXITY—The number of sophisti- weapons capabilities while at the same time cated systems that must be brought together minimizing their vulnerability to the enemy. to achieve the full measure of combat power has tremendously increased the complexity of battle. CONTENTS DISTANCE—New sophisticated weapons have greater range and lethality than those PAGE of previous wars. As a result, the engagement OVERVIEW 1-1 will begin at distances far greater than has MODERN WEAPONS CAPABILITIES 1-2 been the case in the past. Tanks 1-2 MOBILITY—With the increase in the Mechanized Infantry 1-4 proportion of armored and mechanized forces Antitank Guided Missiles 1-5 and the advent of the helicopter, mobility has Field Artillery 1-6 greatly increased, facilitating the rapid Mines 1-7 concentration of forces. Air 1-8 TEMPO—The shorter duration of Observation Devices 1-8 engagements and the resultant decrease in MOBILITY 1-9 time to engage large numbers of highly SUPPRESSION 1-11 mobile targets in enemy armored formations places a premium on well-trained, highly NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL proficient crews and units. OPERATIONS (NBC) 1-13 COMMAND CONTROL 1-13 To win on this lethal battlefield, the task SUMMARY 1-14 force commander must skillfully apply his weapon systems. He must thoroughly 1-1 — FM 71-2 MODERN WEAPONS CAPABILITIES Tanks—The tank with its cross-country mobility, its armor protection, and its formidable firepower, has been and is likely to remain the most important weapon in the battalion task force. The accuracy of tank guns gives them a high probability of a first round hit and the lethality is such that if the target is hit it will be killed.

PROBABILITY OF A T-62 HITTING AN M60A1 PMETERS -» 0 1500 2000 1 r^i.o

A Soviet T-62 tank has a better than 50/50 chance of hitting an M60 tank standing in the open at a range of 1500 meters (about 1 mile), and just less than a 50/50 .5 chance of killing it. However, if the M60A1 is moving at 12 mph, ■ssi it is 25% less vulnerable. If it is hull down (so that all but the turret is behind cover), it is 50% less vulnerable. Thus, these charts .0 dramatically illustrate to the battalion task force commander the importance of demanding that ÊSgâgl his tanks and APCs use hull down firing positions to the maximum o Ü u Jo 9/(o 9/(o extent possible. q)(ô)(ô)@(5)(5 STANDING MOVING HULL DOWN

1.0

^METERS* 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 , PROBABILITY OF A T-62 KILLING AN M60A1

1-2 FM 71-2 —

It is important to remember that capabilities of US and Threat weapons are about equal. While one side may gain temporary advantage from materiel developments, the other soon offsets the advantage with similar improvements.

RANGE IN METERS 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

(APFSDS) 100%

The probability of kill of the M60A1 and the T-62 are approximately equal. Therefore, 60 any significantadvantage must be 50 gained by skillful tactics, sound 40 training, and good leadership. For (ARDS) example, it is possible to gain a significantadvantage by FIRING- 20 FAST-FIRST. Statistics also show that good crews firing fast do not sacrifice accuracy. In a 60-second tank duel with both tanks stationary, a well- trained tank crew that FIRES-FAST-FIRST- 100% ACCURATELY multiplies the i W160Ä1 FIRING ARDS chance of winning from two to i I i 80 nine times, depending on range.

WHEN FIRING FIRST 40 WHEN FIRING SECOND 20

The task force commander deals personally conceal movement. The task force with these facts of life on the modem commander must orchestrate suppression battlefield. He controls or supervises the and obscuration to cover exposed elements employment of his armored elements. His teams must be employed to lessen their that are moving to new positions or closing vulnerability by utilizing hull down and hide with the enemy. The task force commander positions when defending. In the offense they who fails to do these things and do them well must skillfully use the terrain to cover and will lose. 1-3 — FM 71-2

Mechanized Infantry—Mechanized infantry plays an important role in the operations of combined arms forces on the modern battlefield. The infantry’s mobility is sufficient to enable it to maintain the pace of highly mobile armored warfare and it is equipped with a broad spectrum of weapons ranging from highly sophisticated ATOM to rifles. Thus, the commander is provided with flexible forces capable of performing a wide variety of missions.

At short ranges, infantry can engage and destroy armored vehicles with LAW, RPG, and other similar weapons. Since the LAW is classified as a round of ammunition, US mechanized infantry can carry large quantities, providing them a great density of MECHANIZED INFANTRY close-range antiarmor support. Other armies PROVIDES HIGH DENSITY have likewise provided high densities of these ANTIARMOR SUPPORT AT type weapons. The Threat infantry has an SHORT RANGES antiarmor capability in its 73-mm cannon on the BMP. At longer ranges, mechanized forces have ATOM such as Dragon and SAGGER. These ATGM are highly effective when engaging both stationary and moving targets and their accuracy is largely unaffected by range.

Using the light and heavy machineguns on their carriers, mechanized infantry can kill or suppress dismounted infantry out to ranges of 1000 meters. US infantry is fully capable of fighting from their armored carriers while maneuvering, adding the suppressive fires of their automatic weapons to the total combat power of the combined arms team. Other nations have fielded sophisticated infantry fighting vehicles that enable infantry to effectively suppress with their light automatic weapons while buttoned up and moving. In the near future, the introduction of the MICV and new, more powerful cannon will further add to the infantry’s suppression capability.

The capabilities of mechanized infantry complement armor. The task force commander must capitalize on these capabilities and fully integrate them to win. 1-4 FM 71-2 —

Antitank Guided Missiles—Modern ATGM have very high hit and kill probabilities against point targets at long ranges.

1.0 ~Y Ÿ T~. Y .8

.6 While the probability of a Tow hitting a T-62 is greater than the chance of a SAGGER hitting an .4 M60A1, especially at shorter PROBABILITIES OF FIRST ROUND HITSj ranges, they are roughly .2 equivalent at longer range.

0 A Soviet SAGGER has a much greater than 50/50 chance of 1.0 hitting an M60A1 tank sitting in PROB; the open at a range of 1500 .8 meters and a greater than 50/50 JAR G ET EXPOSED AN D chance of killing it. If the M60A1 STATIONARY ; is exposed, moving at 12 mph, it is .6 equally vulnerable. However, when in hull defilade it is 50% less V TARGET EXPOSED AND MOVING .4 vulnerable. The Dragon has much the same hit probability as the TOW, 4- .2 TARGET STATIONARY AND IN. however, only to a range of 1000 HULL DEFILADE T meters. 0 effect—that is, at long ranges. The task force The task force commander must take these commander should not normally employ facts into account and employ his teams TOW with the infantry. Infantry will accordingly. Fighting elements should normally be employed in areas that are remain concealed until it is absolutely particularly suited to its weapons; terrain necessary for them to break into the open for that is highly cross-compartmented, wooded an attack or counterattack. Even then, terrain, and on covered and concealed overwatching or suppressing elements of the avenues of approach into the defender’s task force should remain covered and position. In this terrain, infantry employs concealed to the maximum extent possible. LAW and DRAGON. On the other hand, Tearns moving forward must use covered and TOW must be employed where full benefit can concealed routes. Every wrinkle of the terrain be made of their long range fires. The task should be used to decrease vulnerability. force commander must be careful not to allow In the defense, the task force commander enemy armor to close on his A TGMpositions strives to optimize the employment of his where the tank would then have the TOW. To do this, he employs them where advantage of its armor protection, high their capabilities are utilized to the greatest mobility, and high rate of fire. 1-5 FM 71-2

Field Artillery—Firepower immediately responsive to a US battalion task force has doubled in lethality and achieved range increases of almost 60 percent. Improved conventional munitions when compared to ordinary HE rounds provide up to four times the amount of casualty effect against personnel targets. Projectiles with time delay sub-munitions extend the suppression capability of a single round over a considerable time after impact.

In the near future, the task force commander will have an indirect fire tank killing capability in the cannon launched guided projectile (CLGP), and also the ability to effectively emplace mine fields with artillery munitions as the tacticed situation develops. Self-propelled artillery supporting the battalion task force is able to move with quick armored thrusts and also able to displace laterally to concentrate fires quickly in a threatened defensive sector. The Soviets, in contrast, support their mechanized forces with extensive numbers of towed cannon and motorized rocket launchers. The battalion task force can therefore expect to be confronted by 70-100 tubes per kilometer if defending in an attempted breakthrough sector. Recent indications do however, show an increasing trend toward self-propelled artillery as the Threat recognizes the mobility limitation of towed artillery to support fast and deep offensive operations. The task force commander’s indirect fire resources are his primary means of providing REACTION TIME TO PROVIDE suppression and obscuration. Reaction time INDIRECT FIRE HAS BEEN to provide these fires has been reduced from GREATLY REDUCED minutes to seconds by streamlining fire control procedures and by providing dedicated batteries to company teams moving to contact. The task force commander must skillfully coordinate, with his fire support officer’s help, the fire support for his teams according to his operational concept. Often, concentration of massive firepower will save manpower. Failure to properly use fire support assets will reduce the task force’s maximum combat power at the critical times and places. 1-6 FM 71-2 —

Mines—In an active defense, the task force commander must skillfully use mines to complement his defensive scheme. The defender’s problem is one of destroying large numbers of targets in a short period of time.

To gain additional time, the commander should use mines to canalize and slow the enemy, thereby multiplying the effectiveness of his tank and ATOM fires. In the past, the laying of minefields required great expenditures of manpower and time.

'OM! U©SS i]®®® i]©©®

2500

2000

1500 GEMSS

1000 Ml5 (W/M57) X -C Ml 5 500 Mb*. M21

The ground-emplaced mine scattering system (GEMSS) has brought almost a fourfold increase in mine laying capacity of one engineer platoon.

In the near future the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), ground, air, and artillery emplaced, will further increase the task force commander’s flexibility. 1-7 Air—Unlike wars of the past, the US Army can no longer operate on the battlefield without fear of air attack. Threat forces are capable of controlling at least portions of the air over the battlefield and may subject forward task force elements to intense air attack.

The battalion task force commander must the air. Active air defense must be well include in his battle plans a scheme for planned. The task force commander must countering Threat tactical fighter bombers fully utilize any Vulcan air defensive support and attack helicopters. Both active and that he is provided by brigade. He must also passive measures are required; that is, carefully coordinate his REDEYE weapon concealment from the air and effective air systems to insure protection of his most defense fires. Extensive use must be made of critical assets. Individual soldiers and crews natural camouflaged and camouflage nets. must be trained to engage enemy aircraft Armored elements must carefully conceal with small arms and machineguns on their their tracks where they have gone in and out of positions to preclude identification from particular armored vehicles.

Observation Devices—Smoke, fog, snow, and darkness are conditions which limit visibility on the modern battlefield. Although observation devices which enable modern armies to see during smoke, fog, and snow are still under development, modern armies are increasingly able to fight at night using sophisticated sighting and sensing equipment. The task force commander must make full use of his image intensification and active and passive night vision equipment. Even with the new night observation devices, most weapons are still somewhat less effective at night than in the day.

Threat forces are skilled in night fighting. Therefore, defending against Threat forces They take advantage of reduced visibility requires that the task force commander make offered by darkness or other conditions to maximum use of his night fighting continue to press the attack. To do this, they equipment, especially his passive night try to: viewing equipment. If he does, he can retain the tactical advantages that normally lies •Achieve surprise. with the defender. Modern night vision equipment makes it possible to fire and •Breach or bypass defensive positions maneuver at night almost as in daylight. and obstacles. Therefore, it is possible to attack at night •Destroy or disrupt command, control with more freedom of movement and fewer and support systems. restrictive control measures them in the past. However, night offensive operations still 1-8 FM 71-2—

require more preparation and carefully designed control measures than are in most cases required in daytime. These include:

Careful preparation and reconnaissance during daylight hours to reduce confusion.

Carefully planned primary and alternate means of communication to insure command and control.

Carefully planned and coordinated firepower to include suppressive fires.

Concentration of forces at the selected place and time.

The force which can operate at night as it does in the daytime by making full effective use of cover, concealment and suppressive NIGHT COMBAT TRAINING fires and night vision equipment has a IS IMPERATIVE considerable advantage over the force that does not. The task force commander must train his task force to fight at night.

MOBILITY Modem armies are largely mechanized. Tank and infantry combat vehicles of the battalion task force give it a degree of mobility not available to armies of the past. Mobility enables the task force commander to: • Change the force ratio in his favor so that his unit has the best chance of winning by concentrating overwhelming combat power at the critical place and time. • Seize the initiative from the enemy, increasing his chance of winning.

1-9 —FM 71-2 •*

SUPPRESSIVE FIRES

In an attack, mobility enables the r-h. task force commander to ■ ■ *$1 a concentrate forces against enemy •Vi weak points, penetrating the enemy defensive system.

/ cw— Whether in the attack or defense, mobility allows the task force commander to concentrate his forces, facilitating the full integration of all elements of his combat power. In the defense, the concentration of force is essential to winning. To win outnumbered, concentration at the critical time and place is even more important.

O O ED O O im o

m m In some cases, the task force may be required to make long moves. o As an example, during the conduct of the active defense a battalion on the right flank of the «s division may be required to reinforce a battalion task force operating on the left flank of the division. In this case, the task -X force may be required to move rv long distances very rapidly. SÄ, CZ_3 9^6 -03 X*

Q: OBI N 2 1-10 Mobility enables the commander to mass his forces against an enemy main attack, changing the force ratio in his favor so that he can defend successfully. The battalion task force commander must be able to shift company teams rapidly from one area to another. If the enemy attacks with a regiment, US Army forces must concentrate tank killing systems of three or four company THREE OR FOUR COMPANY teams to stop him—one company team will TEAMS REQUIRED TO STOP AN not be able to do the job. Concentration of ATTACKING REGIMENT force and superiority of firepower are essential to do this. The helicopter has added a new dimension to battlefield mobility which enables commanders to more rapidly concentrate dismounted ATOM teams against an enemy force. From time to time, the battalion task force may be reinforced by attack helicopters. This is described in detail in FM 17-50, Attack Helicopter Operations.

SUPPRESSION Suppressive fires are those fires, direct and indirect, brought to bear on known or likely enemy locations to degrade the enemy’s ability to place effective fires on friendly units. High explosive ammunition or smoke, skillfully employed, can in effect remove enemy weapons from the battle. The commander who cleverly suppresses or obscures enemy vision can change the force ratio in his favor. The task force commander must minimize his own vulnerability by covering and concealing his own forces while at the same time suppressing or destroying the weapons of the enemy. If he does that he can dominate any battlefield, even against a much larger force. Therefore, a key element on the dynamic modem battlefield is the suppression/ counter-suppression battle. If the battalion task force commander fires artillery on a distant woodline to suppress enemy antitank guided missiles which could destroy his advancing tanks, he has demonstrated an understanding of the dynamics of modem battle. Artillery suppresses antitank guided missiles by using high explosives to drive the gunners from their sights or smoke to block or obscure their vision. Smoke munitions can — FM 71-2

also block the vision of attacking tanks; HE (high explosives) fired at tanks causes them to button-up; reducing the crews’ effectiveness by as much as 50 percent. The task force commander must use overwatching elements to provide direct suppressive fires for his teams that are maneuvering on the enemy. In the active defense, he must also provide Indirect fire weapons are used to suppress overwatching fires for his teams as they known enemy locations with high move from battle position to battle position. explosives. Smoke is used on likely enemy locations and along routes of movement to conceal the movement of task force teams. All elements of the task force must move using covered and concealed routes whenever possible. Fire from infantry carriers and tanks is used to suppress antiarmor weapons.

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The task force commander is making full use of his indirect and direct fire assets to cover the movement of his teams. If the enemy takes an exposed element under fire, the overwatching element suppresses him while the exposed element moves to covered positions. FM 71-1 describes how company teams and platoons move on the modern battlefield. The task force commander must skillfully use all of his organic and supporting assets to provide suppression and obscuration.

1-12 FM 71-2—

The battalion task force commander who biological environment. The force that can correctly uses suppression can gain the force live in this environment, still moves, use necessary to defeat the enemy. terrain, concentrate superior force and employ suppression will defeat the side that NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND cannot. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS (NBC) With the advance of nuclear technology in COMMAND CONTROL the world, many armies will soon be able to employ tactical nuclear weapons. The US Reliable, flexible, and responsive Army must therefore be prepared to fight and command control systems are essential to win when and if tactical nuclear weapons are successful employment of the battalion task used. While the destructive power of nuclear force. They provide for: weapons makes the nuclear battlefield an Control of the maneuver of highly even more dangerous place than it might be mobile, fast-moving mechanized forces without them, it is important to remember which must be massed to bring superior force that: to bear at the proper time and place. Direction and coordination of fires of © many weapons, sited at different ranges and Nuclear weapons effects must be locations, and firing in support of battalion exploited by ground forces to be truly task force operations. useful. The enemy has a significant electronic © warfare capability. He can block out radio Nuclear weapons effects are transmissions during critical periods in the degraded considerably by errors in target locating and weapon delivery. fight. He can listen to transmissions to gain The ability of armored units in the information. He can give false instructions task force to move rapidly can through imitative transmissions. The prevent the enemy from locating commander must be able to command and them accurately enough to make an control the battalion task force throughout effective nuclear strike. the battle, in spite of enemy efforts to disrupt the system. To do this, members of the task force must effectively counter enemy Armor protection and mobility are electronic warfare efforts against command the best defense against tactical and control systems by: nuclear weapons—the battalion task force has both. ■ Planning for control through alternate means in case the primary means is suppressed—messengers, personal contact, The United States has renounced the first prearranged signals and visual means use of chemical agents and all use of should be used whenever possible. biological agents. However, other armies of the world possess these weapons. ■ Using radio only when necessary and Introduction of these weapons on the modern then transmitting as quickly as possible. battlefield could severely reduce mobility and Some confusion in battle is certain to occur. the ability to concentrate force—unless the However, if the commander has positive task force commander understands the control and issues clear, concise orders, effects of chemical and biological weapons confusion and misunderstanding will be and knows how to fight in chemical and minimized. 1-13 — FM 71-2

SUMMARY The characteristics of modern battle pose a formidable challenge to the battalion task force commander. He and his soldiers must understand the dynamics of the modern battlefield. If he is to win, the battalion task force commander must be able to:

Take advantage of the strengths of his weapon systems and minimize the capabilities of Threat weapons.

Detect and identify the enemy at maximum possible distances from the friendly main body to prevent engagement of the task force under adverse conditions—unwarned, poorly deployed, not poised to fight.

Move only along covered and concealed avenues making skillful use of terrain to avoid or evade enemy long range observation and fire.

Employ suppressive fires from overwatch positions by direct fire weapons and also use suppressive fires from all available indirect fire resources to reduce the chance that maneuvering forces can be seen and engaged by the enemy.

Operate in darkness and other conditions of reduced visibility to reduce the range and accuracy of enemy observation and fire.

Skillfully control and distribute tank and antitank fires to kill large numbers of targets rapidly.

Operate with precision, discipline, speed, and security in directing and reporting the battle, and be able to do so unimpeded by enemy countermeasures.

1-14 4623-77 CHAPTER 2 The Enemy in Modern Battle

OVERVIEW

WAR IS NOT A ONE-SIDED AFFAIR. The enemy has organized his forces and decided upon a doctrine he believes will bring success. Unless we understand his weapons capabilities, his patterns of employment, his doctrine, we cannot counter his moves effectively. The US Army needs commanders and soldiers who understand the potential of the adversary and seek incessantly to learn more of his capabilities.

CONTENTS

PAGE

OVERVIEW 2-1

DOCTRINE 2-2

COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE 2-3

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS 2-4

TANK UNITS 2-5

THREATVEHICLES 2-6

ARTILLERY 2-8

AIR DEFENSE 2-12

RADIOELECTRON 1C COMBAT 2-15

AIRCRAFT 2-17

Tactical Air Support 2-17

Helicopters 2-18

ENGINEER SUPPORT 2-20

SUMMARY 2-21 — FM 71-2

The Threat adheres to certain principles which advance his doctrine of high-speed offensive action. DOCTRINE □ SEEK SURPRISE at all times to paralyze the enemy’s will to resist DEFENSE IS TEMPORARY; and deprive him of the ability to react AWAITING OPPORTUNITY effectively. FOR OFFENSE Ö ACHIEVE MASS in decisive areas bv rapidly concentrating men, materiel, and firepower for the minimum time The enemy—the “Threat”—has fielded a necessary to rupture the enemy’s modem, highly mobile and well-balanced defenses. fighting force trained to seize and maintain a □ ACHIEVE FLANK SECURITY by high tempo of offensive action. Even aggressive advance. defensive doctrine is developed as part of an □ BREACH ENEMY DEFENSES at overall offensive strategy. The defense is weakly defended positions and considered only as a temporary expedient rapidly advance deep into rear areas. while awaiting an opportunity for offensive □BYPASS STRONGLY DEFENDED action or as an economy of force measure to AREAS, leaving them for neutra- support the overall offensive. lization by following echelons. □ LAUNCH MASSIVE ARTILLERY In the offense, the Threat advocates the SUPPORT to include mortars, concentration of numerically superior forces multiple rocket launchers, antitank and firepower for a combination of frontal guns and tanks (where necessary) for attacks, enveloping maneuvers, and deep all operations, and achieve up to 100 tubes per km for the deliberate attack offensive thrusts into the enemy rear by (breakthrough). armor-heavy combined arms forces. The Threat anticipates achieving an offensive □ CONDUCT OPERATIONS under a dense and redundant air defense momentum which will allow his forces to umbrella. advance 30-50 kilometers a day in a □ DEDICATE A HIGH PRIORITY to conventional environment and 60-100 the destruction of the enemy’s kilometers a day in a nuclear environment. nuclear and antitank weapon systems. □ EMPLOY TACTICAL AIR SUP- PORT to achieve air superiority and conduct air strikes in the enemy’s rear areas. □ EMPLOY RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT as a primary element of combat power. □ ACCEPT HEAVY LOSSES and the isolation of units in the assault. □ OVERCOME natural and man-made obstacles with speed. □ CONDUCT OPERATIONS 24- HOURS A DAY under all visibility and NBC conditions.

Tactics to support these principles are viewed in the context of US battalion task force actions. Chapter 4 discusses Threat defense tactics; Chapter 5 covers their offensive tactics. 2-2 FM 71-2 —

COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE Threat forces advocate the concept of combined arms, and units are organized accordingly. Motorized rifle troops and tanks consistently operate together; ground SWIFT ADAPTABILITY IS operations are always supported by ACHIEVED BY UTILIZING AN ABUNDANCE OF meticulously planned artillery fires. The unit SUPPORTING UNITS structure is designed to be adapted readily to changing combat requirements by the attachment of large numbers of supporting units.

The Threat commander normally employs his forces in echelons, both in the offense and defense. Each tactical command level down to battalion determines from the situation the number of echelons required for a particular operation. In the offense, two echelons are normal. As a unit attacks in echelons, each with a preplanned scheme of maneuver and objective, the offensive appears to the defender to be a series of attacking waves.

The first echelon is the assault unit which attempts to rupture and pass through enemy defenses. The second echelon is the follow-up element used to defeat bypassed enemy units and to continue or maintain the momentum of the attack.

In addition to echelonment, the Threat commander normally retains a reserve which may consist of motorized rifle or tank units and reserves of artillery, antitank, engineers, chemical troops and other type units as SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND required by the tactical situation. The size of FUNCTION OF RESERVE FORCES the reserve varies, but is relatively small. The ARE ALL VARIABLE reserve is considered the commander’s contingency force, which he uses to replace destroyed units, to repel counterattacks, to provide local security against airborne/ helibome and partisan operations, and to act as an exploitation force to influence the outcome of the operation. 2-3 — FM 71-2

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS The motorized rifle troops are the basic and most versatile arm of its armed forces. Doctrine considers motorized rifle units to be capable of employment under any condition of climate or terrain and at any time. Critical missions for the motorized rifle of the combined arms team are seizing and consolidating terrain in the offense and defending this terrain in the defense. Motorized rifle units are seldom employed without strong artillery,“ tank, and engineer support. rao^oji [IMWäILO©^ M/KiOH® TORDOS ©©RflTORDV

HQ CBT SPT

A-"1 :: *»*»**.«A INDIRECT FIRE WPNS INFANTRYSMALLARMS ' y y > Rifles AKM 7.62mm 356 BMP.. 32 * 120mm Mortar 6 LMG PK7.62mm (BMP) 64 SAGGER LAUNCHER 34

‘Äs AI R.tD E FE N S Eî»W PN S,»,4 COAX MG 7.62mm SPG-9 2 (BMP&T-62A) 45

RPG-7 27 SA-7 Launcher 9 HMG12.7mmTKMtd 13

TANK.. 13 Sniper Rifle SVD 7.62mm 9

*One SAGGER Launcher and one 73mm Smooth Bore Gun with Automatic Loader mounted on each BMP. Each BMP carries four SAGGERS. There are also two man-pack launchers in the battalion, each with two missiles.

2-4 FM 71-2 —

TANK UNITS Tanks may be employed at all echelons. Exploitation is the principal role of Threat tanks. In the offense, tanks are often employed in mass to seize deep objectives. Tank units attempt to seize such objectives before the enemy is able to reorganize for the defense or counterattack. In the defense, the majority of a unit’s tanks are held in reserve to be utilized in counterattacks to destroy enemy penetrations and resume the offense.

THREAT TANK BATTALION FROM TANK REGIMENT REINFORCED W/MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY c

c HQ CBT SPT

I' ANTIARMOffWPNS JNfAmRt^JMAfilf^lJ MS! 'S BMP. 10 Rifles AKM7.62-mm 212 120-mm Mortar 0

LMG PK7.62-mm(BMP) 20 SAGGER LAUNCHER 10 ^ AIR DEFENSE WPNS A

RPG-7 9 COAX MG 7.62-mm (BMP&T-62A) 41 SA-7 Launcher 9

TANK. 31 HMG12.7-mmTK Mtd 31

'One SAGGER Launcher and one 73mm Smooth Bore Gun with Automatic Loader mounted on each BMP. Each BMP carries four SAGGERS.

2-5 — FM 71-2 THREAT VEHICLES

ms¡ 330 iS® 'M&m*

Medium tank T-62. The most significant feature of the tank is its 115-mm smoothbore gun. The T-62 has standard infrared night sightand driving equipmentas # well as a snorkel capability. Additional armament includes a 7.62-mm coaxial T-62 Tank machinegun. The T-62 A tank appeared in 1970 and is identical in appearance to the T- 62 with the exception that the right-hand side of the turret has been redesigned to allow the mounting of a 12.7-mm AA machinegun at the loader's position.

Medium tank T-.55. The T-55 wassdeyeloped afterWorld War Ifas.their main battle tank. The vehicle is armed with a 10O-mm rifjedbore main gun, a 7.62-mm coax, and T-55 Tank a 7.62-mm hull-mounted machinegun. Ithas.standard infrared night sight and driving eauiomentandsnorkelcaDabilitv.Thistankisfoundinmostcombaturiitshutis being replacéd"by~the T:62 as7ííte ^ifriary main battle tank.

Amphibious tank PT-76. The PT-76 tank is lightweight and amphibious. It mounts Amphibious a 76-mm main gun and a 7.62-mm coax machinegun. It will normally be found forward of the main Threat forces in reconnaissance units of divisions and regiments. Tank PT-76

2-6

fc FM 71-2—

Amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle BMP. The BMP is used asbotha reconnaissance and an armored infantry fighting vehicle. The armored infantry version of the BMP has a crew of 3: gunner, driver, and vehicle commander. The rear compartment has a troop capacity of eight. There are four periscopes and firing ports on each side and one firing port in the rear door, allowing the infantry to fire from BMP inside the vehicle while on the move. Its main armament is a 73-mm smoothbore gun with a SAGGER missile rail mounted over the gun. In addition, each BMP has a rack for 2 SA-7 GRAIL missiles. The BMP is an amphibious vehicle.

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BRDM (SAGGER MISSILE) BRDM-2 BRDM j Armored reconnaissance vehicle BRDM. The BRDM-2 is a 4-wheel drive amphibious scout car adaptable for many uses on the battlefield. It is a more improved version of the BRDM having greater range and added firepower. Crosscountry ¡ mobility is improved by the use of a centralized tire pressure regulation system, and by ! two sets of small belly wheels that can be lowered to aid flotation and assist in BRDM I crossing gaps. The rear mounted power plant is improved over that of the first BRDM. I Itsarmament is a small turret mounting a 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machinegun.

2-7 — FM 71-2

ARTILLERY Artillery is a major component of Threat combined arms combat and is employed at all tactical echelons. With few exceptions, all offensives include an extensive artillery preparation with a large number of weapons.

Threat artillery support saturates areas with massive barrages so as to cover all likely targets. Threat artillery also employs the concept of “fire strike,” a severe and intense bombardment by artillery weapons to destroy the enemy without using ground troops. Direct fire is extensively used on targets of opportunity, fortifications, and to support tank and motorized rifle attacks (especially by countering or suppressing ATOM and similar systems). Threat artillery is organized for combat at army, division, and regimental level by combining organic assets with any assets from higher headquarters. Each of these ARTILLERY GROUPS ARE groups, the Army Artillery Group (AAG), the IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO Division Artillery Group (DAG) and SUPPORTED MANEUVER Regimental Artillery Group (RAG) can be UNIT COMMANDERS immediately responsive to the level of command it supports. For example, the RAG, led by a senior artillery battalion commander, is under the control of the maneuver regiment commander to whom it is assigned.

A group will normally contain from two to four battalions. Each of the various types of artillery groups are flexible in their organization and can be altered during an operation. Fire planning and the execution of fire support for the AAG, DAG and RAG will be centralized at Army level at the beginning of a battle and then proceed to the DAG. Through this procedure, Threat forces obtain the capability to weight the main effort. 2-8 FM 71-2 —

LC 1 to 1.5 km Indirect and direct fire support for 120 MORT 120 MORT first echelon battalions in the rti rti attack is provided by an 2.4 km accompanying battery of 122mm SP howitzers and the organic • I 122 SP HOW 120-mm mortar batteries in each motorized rifle battalion. Massive indirect fires will come from the 4.7 k fYLarjraiiinri-j Regimental Artillery Groups RAG which consist of two to four battalions of 122-mm and 152mm howitzers. The Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) consists of NOTE two to four battalions (primarily INDIRECT FIRE: DEPLOYED2 TO 130-mm guns and 152-mm 3 KM FROM LINE OF CONTACT gun-howitzers and fires both in DIRECT FIRE: DEPLOYED AS support of the attack and in CLOSE AS 1000 METERS FROM counterbattery. UNE OF CONTACT DAG

Under this system of organizing for combat, it is not uncommon for a Threat division conducting a main attack to have thirteen battalions of artillery, with representative calibers from higher command levels. These artillery battalions are in addition to the organic artillery batteries of the motorized rifle regiments within the division which are not normally placed in the RAG. It should be kept in mind that the artillery assets available to a division leading a main effort can be further augmented by the attachment of artillery organic to second echelon divisions. As maneuver forces begin their attack, the decentralization process begins. The first artillery formations to be decentralized are the RAG to the first echelon regimental commanders. Threat doctrine calls for continuous artillery support right up to accomplishment of the mission, providing for 2-9 — FM 71 -2

continuous, concentrated fires to support high rates of advance. As maneuver forces move forward, artillery units are displaced forward to insure continuous support. Normally, two-thirds of the fire support assets will be in position to fire at any given time. As maneuver forces approach an opponent’s reserve areas, the DAG will be decentralized to the division commander’s control to support an exploitation. RAG will remain under the control of regimental commanders. The amount of fire support that will be placed on a given target will depend upon the nature of the target and relative importance. The amount of ammunition to be expended on a target will be defined in terms of so many units of fire, which vary as a function of nature of target and range. At any rate, expenditures can be expected to be large when supporting a main attack.

THREAT FIRE SUPPORT

WE A PO N X XfXXXvX*: NORMALDISTANCE RATE OF FIRE ILLUSTRATION; BEHIND FEBA (KM) (RDZMIN) ÿ5S'kEYr

240-mm MORTAR 9,700 meters

130-mm FIELD GUN 27,000 meters 5 to 6

180-mm FIELD GUN 30,000 meters

122-mm HOWITZER 15,300 meters 6 to 8 122-mm SP GUN 15,300 meters 4 to 6 l 152-mm HOWITZER 12.400 meters 3 to 4

152-mm GUN/HOWITZER 17,000 meters

152-mm SP GUN/HOWITZER 18,500 meters 4 to 6 40 RDS/10MIN 122-mm MRL BM-21 20,500 meters (Rate/reload time) 40 RDS/5 MIN 122-mm MRL RM-70 20,500 meters (Rate/reload time). 11 to 70 18 23 1 RD/20 MIN FROG-7 kilometers 4t Highest probability for employment in Direct-Fire role.

2-10 FM 71 -2

120-mm M-1943 152-mm GUIM/HOW D,20 KHBBBB 1 mÊSÊSÈÉiài wm WÈi-

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122-mm HOW D-30 122 mm BM-21

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122-mm SP GUN FROG-7

2-11 — FM 71-2

AIE DEFENSE Threat forces have developed and deployed mobile surface-to-air missiles and conventional AA guns for air defense of their field units. The mobile low altitude air defense weapons to be found in maneuver elements are the ZSU-23-4 AA gun system, the man-portable SA-7 (GRAIL) and vehicle- mounted SA-9 (GASKIN) heat-seeking missiles, and the vehicle-mounted, radar-controlled SA-8 (GECKO); each of these systems is self-contained and capable of operating as a single fire unit. For medium altitude air defense, the maneuver elements are protected by SA-6 (GAINFUL) batteries. Larger formations are equipped with the SA-4 (GANEF) units for high altitude defense. The most important supply and command installations of the rear will be protected by the semi-mobile SA-2 (GUIDELINE) and SA- 3 (GOA) systems.

¿.-íí? HIT-iTk» r W.ifL ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS

EFFECTIVE VERTICAL MAXIMUM FIRE ILLUSTRATION MODEL CALIBER RATE OF RANGE (METERS) FIRE (RPM) CONTROL KEY ZSU-23-4 23-mm 2,500 TO 3,000 1,200 RADAR (OPTICS) (RADAR) OR OPTICAL

ZSU-57-2 57-mm 4,000 240 OPTICAL

S-60 57-mm 6,000 120 RADAR OR OPTICAL SURFACE-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES SLANT MISSILE NAME LEVEL OF PROTECTION ILLUSTRATION RANGE (KM) KEY

SA-2 GUIDELINE 45 HIGH ALTITUDE

SA-3 GOA 22 MEDIUM-LOW ALTITUDE

SA-4 GANEF 70 MEDIUM-HIGH ALTITUDE

SA-6 GAINFUL 30-35 LOW-MEDIUM ALTITUDE

SA-7B GRAIL Modified 3.5 LOW ALTITUDE 6

SA-8 GECKO 10-15 LOW-MEDIUM ALTITUDE

SA-9 GASKIN 7.0 LOW ALTITUDE 8 FM 71-2

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2-13 — FM 71 -2

THREAT AIR DEFENSE PROFILE

AREA OF POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS A GRAPHIC SIDE VIEW OF THE THREAT AS IT JAMMING AND MIGHT EXIST ON A MID-INTENSITY BATTLE- MONITORING FIELD. BOTH AIR DEFENSE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE ENVELOPES ARE PORTRAYED EARLY WARNING AND HOSTILE AIRCRAFT MAY BE PRESENT TRACKING RADAR OVER THE ENTIRE COMBAT ZONE. RANGE

EFFECTDVE RAKIGE OF A8F¡ OEFEMSE iWOSSCILES

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CORPS REAR BOUNDARY FEBA

The Threat provides air defense of its weapons to support his mission, lays down mobile formations by saturating the air coordination lines, and establishes priorities space from low to high altitude, using and procedures for supply and technical integrated systems of conventional weapons support. The division air defense commander 0 and SAM. Threat field formations rely on then plans deployments of his assets based vehicle mounted SAM and mobile guns to on the division commander’s instructions, protect their fast-moving tank and motorized the air situation, communications and rifle units. These are augmented by control. interceptor aircraft of Tactical Air Armies SAM missile units will normally move as a (TAAs) and by electronic countermeasures battery and either be integrated into the 0 (ECM) units. march column or be moved along separate Air defense is established on the basis of routes to insure adequate coverage. Towed providing zone or direct cover for troops and AA guns will also normally be moved as a objectives. Zone coverage is provided by the battery and integrated into march columns. SAM systems while point protection is The mobile air defense automatic weapons provided by divisional and regimental light and low altitude SAM will be integrated by air defense weapons. During the planning individual piece into march columns to insure ® phase, the division commander personally adequate air defense protection for the entire directs the deployment of the air defense march column. These weapons will fire on the

2-J4 FM 71-2 — move when the column is attacked. Additionally, antiaircraft machineguns mounted on vehicles will engage low-flying aircraft attacking the march column. When a column makes long halts, AD weapons will disperse slightly from the column to provide a full 360° protection while retaining the capability to rapidly move back into march column.

Air defense units will be employed to provide optimum coverage of the troops as well as protect critical support areas and division rear. Regimental AD weapons will be employed in direct support of maneuver battalions. These systems receive missions from the battery commander in addition to monitoring the air warning net. They will be deployed well forward and their primary targets will be enemy close air support aircraft and attack helicopters.

RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT The Threat may be expected to attempt to systematically analyze US Army communication and noncommunication emitters. The enemy may then attempt to IA/CAPOM Aiun destroy or disrupt at least 50 percent of our COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE command, control, and weapon system DESTROYED ON A communications wherever possible by using SYSTEMATIC BASIS suppressive fires or electronic jamming. Direction finding of radio transmitters is not precise. The enemy’s suppressive artillery fires will usually not be fired at locations provided only by direction finding. However, there are exceptions. Due to the high concentration and wide dispersal of multiple rocket launcher fires, they can be fired against soft targets located by direction finding with a good chance of destroying the target. Suppressive fires are also effective against most radars since,they can be located by direction finding to within 50 meters of their actual location. Jammers also provide excellent targets for suppressive fires used in conjunction with direction finding. Otherwise, the enemy requires information from other sources to refine direction finding

2-15

464-458 0-85-2 —FM 71-2

locations into targets. This information is often provided by poor signal sécurity (SIGSEC) or poor electronic counter- countermeasures (ECCM) on the part of the opposing force.

IHKEAT DIRECTION FINDING IS USED: To provide approximate locations of emitters suitable for firing suppressive barrages or multiple rocket fires. To provide precise locations of most radars and jammers. To provide locations which when applied in conjunction with signal and terrain analysis can be refined to a target area with a radius of 100 to 250 meters. To gain a picture of the battlefield with respect to the disposition and intentions of units. The dispositions and intentions of units may be revealed by a single key emitter.

ELAPSED PRIMARY CONCURRENT TIME UNIT/ACTIVITY ACTION ACTION UNIT/ACTIVITY

ÖS cænirmïES TFSAWSRfilDTTER corara y si ,• (CäTTü © M

DURING SEARCH OF VHF ALSO NOTIFIES io - COMINT BAND, IDENTIFIES US COMINT TRANSMITTER AND FLASHES COMINT ANALYSTS SECONDS OPERATOR ALERT TO RDF NCS ANALYSTS

COMINT ANALYSTS •25 ' FLASHES RDF NET RE- NET CONTROL QUESTING BEARINGS FORWARDS INFO TO SECONDS FROM EACH STATION TO PLOTTING & ANALYSIS STATION (RDF #2) TARGET TRANSMITTER SECTION

ACQUIRE BEARINGS AND 55 REPORT BACK TO RDF SECONDS RDF STATIONS NET CONTROL #1 AND #3

85 REPORTS APPROXIMATE NET CONTROL LOCATION TO PLOTTING SECONDS AND ANALYSIS STATION (RDF #2) SECTION

REFINES APPROXIMATE 115 LOCATION BY APPLYING SECONDS PLOTTING AND COLLATERAL INFO, MAP ANALYSIS SECTION ANALYSIS, AND COMINT

FEEDS INFO TO 2 TO 3 PLOTTING AND • JAMMING • COMBAT MINUTES ANALYSIS SECTION APPROPRIATE MISSION • FIRE • INTELLIGENCE

2-16 FM 71-2 —

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS Tactical Air Support. Threat forces consider air strikes as an extension of ii artillery. The greatest emphasis on tactical IG-21 FISHBED air support of ground operations is during Ii attacks against preplanned targets such as tactical nuclear delivery systems, control posts, and command and communication elements. Tactical air support also seeks to etc neutralize artillery support and reserves ¡mm I within the tactical and immediate ■ ■ ii operational depths. Threat aviation does not m SS»! normally utilize high performance aircraft to m provide close air support along the line of contact except in certain specialized operations and situations such as mountain iiî|#^REiêrôun'd|Àttà'ckSFi te mph) operations, hasty river crossings, and while feÄQMBÄTiRÄOlÜSSiat2Gfi?3Q0|rr>ilêsS| supporting penetrations and exploitations which have outrun the bulk of the supporting ENJ:„í,°c.ket P®.?!18 and bombs artillery. two 100 I» MM:* MIG-21 FISHBED m» ¿ras R ibml m m

ARMAMENT: BomSs; CBU s; one 23-mm SU-7B FITTER A twin cannon rack.

MIG-25 FOXBAT MIG-23 FLOGGER íBigh SPEED: 1,835 knots (2,115 mph) COMBAT RADIUS: 700 miles (800 km) =d ARMAMENT:; Four hardpoints and internal weapons bay. MIG-25 FOXBAT EH

SU-19 FENCER A TYPE: Heavy Fighter/Light Bomber SU-19 FENCER COMBAT RADIUS: 125-250 miles I (200-400 km) ARMAMENT: Externally carried warloads of approximately 5 tons. Includes bombs; 57-mm unguided rockets, or four air-to-surface missiles.

2-17 —FM 71-2

Helicopters. Threat forces are increasing their inventory and tactical use of an already large force. They have large, heavy-lift helicopters used for moving supplies and some troop-carrying aircraft used for airmobile operations. In the future, however, Threat forces can be expected to use helicopters in armed reconnaissance, cavalry and air assault roles plus close air support of ground operations.

Mi-4 HOUND

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■ , , •«%>''V ''A's ^ .> „ ■ ï*V •í'• . 0K S' Vf?, TYPE: Transport and General Utility. ; í SPEED: 113 knots,{130 mph)-; * : J7Z‘- ' i; . •'< , ■ .. 'ííC,: . .'•níí/:, , vv/; ,;;:ARMAMENT::;.CIose süp^rt versioo-jjas machmegun and air-tolsurface rockets,. , J S : K :■ '• : ‘ NÖTE:Ä'irßörh^ciyatry -sssayTfëf'T :* -, 'mm*/. ' 'T í*|5 .; r ■ commando raid- R|f ‘ - Ríp £ >,*í,

Mi-8 HIP

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TYPE: Medium Transport and Assault? S PEED: 135 knots (155 mph). ARMAMENT: Can be edüipped with external stores.^ £, •'TROOPS: " éa rfh es' 12-2^§Ên: NÖTE:£Airborne cavalry assault er commando raid.

2-18 FM 71-2

Mi-6 HOOK

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>Æ&ÎÊÙ, : , OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS ; ‘ .1 S'-A, "i¡ '''i ii> 'c? /#/,^ 4 Q.,,& m'MÉk/wS^, '/#: %$£§£$. V TYPE: Heavy Trainsport„and Assault SPEED: Í 62 knots ( 186 mph) ARMAMENT: Some fitted with feîïnSh'nose. ■., f^SSÉÍff fiSwSll 1 1 IMPI ,! ¿M-M&tî »■ fs»# sïjwaipwjr* «as »»¿ftiaTROQ^Síí.iÉarrieSíjSOíSOamen NOTE:fAirborn'e$cavalry assault or

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2-19 — FM 71-2

ENGINEER SUPPORT Threat combat engineer units are found at regiment and division. Above division, there are large specialized engineer organizations such as construction units, bridging units, assault crossing units, mapping and survey, and pipeline construction.

The primary mission of Threat combat engineers is to insure the momentum of maneuver mobility by rapidly overcoming natural and manmade obstacles while at the same time hindering the enemy force’s movement. Secondary, but vitally important, missions include camouflage, fire protection, damage clearing, and water supply.

Threat combat engineer units are equipped with the same small arms, tactical communications, and, in many cases, combat COMBAT ENGINEER UNITS CAN vehicles as are the combat arms units. They BE UTILIZED AS INFANTRY have the capability to fight as infantry when required. Engineer equipment may be classified as demolitions, including ADM, mine warfare, river crossing, heavy construction, and utility.

Threat offensive operations are characterized by speed and shock, much of which is aided by engineer operations. Engineer support is well forward and priority is given to the reduction of obstacles for maneuver units.

By far the most important engineer operation in the offense is the river crossing. Threat engineer equipment, organization, EQUIPMENT, ORGANIZATION, TRAINING: ALL STRESS and training are, therefore, designed to IMPORTANCE PLACED ON ensure that river crossings are regarded as a HIGH SPEED ASSAULT normal part of a day’s advance, to be carried RIVER CROSSING out from the line of march whenever possible. Threat forces have fielded some of the best bridging equipment in the world to complement their tactical doctrine of the high speed assault river crossing.

2-20 FM 71-2—

Mobile obstacle detachments (MOD) are formed from organic engineers to provide Engineers also support the offensive by flank security against armor threats. These providing technical assistance in detachments vary in strength from a platoon reconnoitering: to a company and are composed of motorized • Roads rifle squads or platoons, antitank teams, and • Defiles mechanized mine layers. Their mission is to provide protection for the advancing column • Bridges by laying-hasty minefields and establishing • River crossing sites other expedient obstacles along armor approaches. Threat doctrine calls for • Bivouac areas extensive use of mines, even in the offensive. • Water supply sources Threat defensive operations are Additionally they: characterized by the extensive use of m Mark march routes prepared positions and large scale employment of mines and other obstacles. ■ Reduce obstacles The primary mission of the engineers in the ■ Repair and strengthen bridges and roads defense is to assist the combat elements in ■ Clear passages through minefields and preparing defensive positions, supervise and contaminated areas assist in the preparation of obstacles, and assist in maintaining the mobility of the reserves. SUMMARY The battalion task force commander and his soldiers must seek an increased knowledge of the Threat so as to plan and execute successful battles. The more he knows about the enemy, the more the commander can reduce the uncertainties of battle. Important points to keep in mind are:

The Threat has a modern, highly mobile army which attempts to move rapidly over great distances. The offense is emphasized.

Concentration of forces in depth is meant to overwhelm the defenders even if casualties are suffered at high rates.

Threat forces are predominantly armored, featuring large numbers of tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles.

Artillery support is massive. Air defense is modern and comprehensive. And tactical air support is available at the critical points on the battlefield.

Threat forces are capable of fighting at full potential on a variety of battlefields, including the NBC environment. They train extensively for operations during limited visibility.

Threat forces are prepared to conduct effective electronic warfare operations such as radio interception, jamming, direction finding, and other countermeasures.

2-21

4940-77

CHAPTER 3 Organization and Operation of a Battalion Task Force

OVERVIEW

THE BATTALION TASK FORCE combines, temporarily, tanks, mechanized infantry, TOW sections, and support units. Led by the commander of either a tank or mechanized infantry headquarters, its combination of forces meets the brigade commander’s concept of operation. The task force commander must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of its components and its whole. He must organize to maximize the potential of the forces assigned him and he must make the organization work by aggressive, competent, uncomplicated leadership.

CONTENTS PAGE OVERVIEW 3-1 THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER 3-2 TASKFORCEORGANIZATION 3-4 THE MAJOR COMPONENTS: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 3-5 HOWTO TASK ORGANIZE 3-7 The Fire and Maneuver System 3-8 The Fire Support System 3-9 The Intelligence System 3-9 The Mobility-CountermobilitySystem 3-10 The Air Defense System 3-10 The Logistic System 3-11 The Command and Control System 3-11 THE TASK FORCE. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 3-12 HOWTO MAKE ITWORK 3-13 The Commander's Concept of Operation 3-13 Plansand Orders 3-14 The Troop Leading Process 3-16 Exampleof a Troop Leading Sequence 3-20 SUMMARY 3-23

3-1 —FM 71-2

THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER

Although it is true that the actual fighting is done by the members of companies, it is the battalion and its commander on which the battle outcome chiefly depends. The battalion normally fights as a cross-reinforced task force. But even when it does not (that is, when it fights as pure infantry or tanks), the battalion is the level which combines the various arms tactically on the terrain and brings its combined combat powers to bear on the enemy.

There are no “good” battalions with “bad” battalion commanders. The fighting characteristics of a battalion (good or bad) emanate from the character of the battalion commander. Aggressive and tough battalion THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A commanders have aggressive and tough BATTALION MIRROR THOSE OF battalions. Tactically skillful commanders THE COMMANDER have battalions which optimize their effectiveness and minimize their vulnerabilities, and thus habitually execute their missions successfully with minimum losses. Battalion commanders who understand their weapons, use them properly and see to it that crews and individual soldiers are trained up to the full potential of those weapons can win - even if outnumberedl^astly, battalion commanders who are also steadfast and unshakable can lead soldiers successfully on the dynamic, lethal and demanding modem battlefield.

The tank or mechanized infantry task force requires a commander who is equally versed in armor and infantry weapons, tactics, and support. All armor and infantry battalion commanders must be combined arms specialists!

Because the battalion commander must adapt the combined arms team to the enemy, the terrain and his mission, he must have a total understanding of all the tools at his disposal and what they can and cannot do. Then he must master the techniques of combining them in the best possible mix for

3-2 FM 71 -2—

each tactical problem as it arises. The The battalion commander is then free to commander has these tools: decide how to deploy his weapons and how to employ all the fire support which is available to him or which he needs. His staff His weapon systems infantry fjHis Weapon Systems - The battalion armor commander has three kinds of weapons or ATOM weapon systems which he can maneuver on the battlefield. This is true in the attack, in His fire support the defense, or the delay. mortars The first is his infantry which is especially artillery designed to operate at times and in places of close air limited visibility or relatively short fields of fire. attack helicopters air defense The second is the armor. Tanks are principally effective where they can move His reconnaissance and fast and shoot at long ranges. security elements The third is the long range anti-tank His engineers guided missile which cannot operate His combat service support effectively where rifle elements are usually deployed and cannot lead the attack like the heavily armored tank, but can deliver long range highly lethal pinpoint fire against enemy armor. ^jHis staff - The battalion is the first tactical echelon with a staff. Small but essential, it helps the battalion commander by doing all those things that need to be done by the commander which he cannot do ^jJHis Fire Support - The battalion because he doesn’t have the time to do them commander must use these systems in and because many must be done accordance with their peculiar strengths and simultaneously. weaknesses. The battalion commander must' organize and coordinate the firepower The battalion staff helps the commander available for support of his maneuver win the battle. Such a staff member has systems. Using both organic and supporting certain standard responsibilities. But the systems, he must bring to the battlefield greatest responsibility of all is to make the those elements which help him move, battalion commander’s plan work—to suppress, and destroy. support it in every conceivable way—with imagination, initiative and skill with or without instructions. oooHis Other Support - Likewise, he must The staff relieves the battalion commander of personal involvement in routine functions use his reconnaissance and security elements so that he can drive the battle. Supply, to help him see the battlefield and prevent maintenance, administration, reporting, being surprised. His engineers must help him communications, are all supervised or move and prevent enemy movement. And he performed by the staff. Standard operating must insure complete combat service support procedures (SOP) are used as much as to keep his soldiers and vehicle moving and possible. prepared for the fight.

3-3 —FM 71 -2 LEADERSHIP fights forward. He issues orders when The command of a tank or mechanized needed. He changes plans and instructions as infantry battalion task force is a highly necessary. He issues orders orally, directly personalized function in which the battalion and face to face when he can. His presence is commander controls the battlefield “felt” on the battlefield by his own troops and interaction of his weapons with the terrain the enemy. His orientation is forward, but his and the enemy. He does this by being on the actions fulfill the orders and intentions of his battlefield. He sees and feels the battle. He brigade commander. The battalion sees the enemy and he sees his companies. He commander must do all of these things brings in supporting fires and arranges the correctly under very difficult battlefield infantry support of tanks and vice versa. He conditions.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION The brigade commander determines the forces allocated to his battalion task forces Tank Heavy - More tank companies than based on his concept for the operation—how mechanized infantry companies he plans to operate, given the mission the Mech Heavy - More mech companies than brigade is to accomplish, the enemy his forces tank companies will encounter, the terrain the brigade will Balanced - Equal number of each type fight on, and the forces the division company commander has allocated to him. Pure - Only mech companies or tank The task force is generally described by the companies assigned. (Referred to as a type and number of maneuver companies battalion rather than a task force.) assigned or attached to it.

Usually the number of companies assigned or attached to a task force will vary between two and four. In terms of its principal systems assigned or attached, the amount and type of combat power the taskforce represents will varyas shown below:

ARC RATIO TANKS HAW* MECH W/50 MAW HVY LT PLT CAL. MORT MORT TANK HEAVY 2-1 34 20 MECH HEAVY 2-1 17 12 58 18 BALANCED (MECH HQ) 2-2 34 12 58 18 6 I PURE TANK 3-0 54 PURE MECH 3-0 18 78 27 'Number of HAW is illustrative only. Each is situation-dependent as discussed later. -AEDOBTTÖO^AB. Besides the maneuver companies, the task force will habitually have a variety of elements either assigned, attached, under operational control or in support, such as: • ATGM • Mortars • Scouts • Air Defense • Communicators • TACAIR Sorties • Bridging • Combat Service • Artillery Batteries • Attack Helicopters • Engineers Support Elements

3-4 FM 71-2—

Tanks and mechanized infantry battalions battalions and in the headquarters of their are similar in organization, each having a companies. headquarters company, maneuver companies and a combat support company. These differences must be considered The headquarters company provides com- whenever brigade and task force mand control, administration, and combat commanders alter the task organization. The service support. The combat support maintenance, recovery and aidmen elements company provides reconnaissance, surveil- accompanying a unit departing its parent lance, air defense and indirect fire support. battalion should be covered in the brigade Nevertheless, there are some important SOP. However, the TOW and AVLB differences in the combat, combat support, elements, and occasionally the 81mm and combat service support found in the two mortars, should be situation dependent.

r A MECH BN HQ TANK BN HQ MECH CO HQ TANK CO AND CS CO AND CS CO AND WPN PLT HQ

TOW 12 (16 in USAREUR) 81mm MORTARS

AVLB

TANK MAINT NO YES NO YES ELEMENTS APC MAINT YES MINIMAL YES NO ELEMENTS TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES (M88) LIGHT RECOVERY VEHICLES (M578) AIDMEN 23 10

THE MAJOR COMPONENTS: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS To properly task organize, brigade and task force commanders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the major building blocks or components they have available to allocate. Brigade commanders generally think in terms of the number of TOW weapons, tank companies and mech infantry companies to assign, and which task force to weight with available artillery, air defense, TACAIR, attack helicopters, and engineers. Task force commanders think in terms of TOW sections, tank platoons and mech platoons, as well as the distribution of other available support. 3-5 — FM 71 -2

The Mechanized Infantry Platoon consists of 38 infantrymen mounted in four APC and organized into a platoon headquarters and three 11-man squads. Armament consists of three Dragon trackers (currently without night sights), four cal .50 machineguns, five M60 machineguns, 28 rifles, six grenade launchers, four pistols, and LAW and mines issued according to the situation. When required to dismount, a minimum of a driver and gunner (the mounted team leader) usually remain with each APC, leaving a maximum of 30 personnel available for dismounted operations.

CAPABILITIES Conduct infiltration I When dismounted and dug attacks. in, infantry is vulnerable to: Protect tanks and ATGM from dismounted infantry • Conduct limited air • Tanks, if improperly and AT gunners. assault operations. employed on forward slopes with inadequate Move mounted as rapidly as • Secure prisoners. cover and concealment. tanks, swim streams and negotiate some soft 0 Dig in and hold ground • Automatic small arms fire surfaces restrictive for against a dismounted if frontal cover is tanks. infantry assault. inadequate. • NBC attack. Suppress and kill soft • Provide security—patrols targets with machineguns and OPs. • Direct hit by artillery, if and small arms while overhead cover is in- moving. • Ambush mounted or adequate. dismounted enemy. I When dismounted and not Kill tanks and thinner • Lay mines. dug in, infantry is particu- skinned vehicles with larly vulnerable to: Dragons out to 1000 meters LIMITATIONS • Tanks and LAW out to 200 meters. 1 APC can be destroyed by • Small arms I Dismount to: ATGM, AT guns, tanks. • NBC attack 9 Clear woods, buildings, BMP cannon, mines or a obstacles and dug-in direct hit by artillery or • Artillery and mortar fire positions. airstrike. • TAC AIR

The Tank Platoon consists of five tanks manned by 20 personnel. It is C ) organized into a heavy section of three tanks and a light section of two.

CAPABILITIES Relative invulnerability to Slow speed in crossing Mobility, armor protection artillery and small arms. water barriers. and firepower. LIMITATIONS Difficulty in identifying Ability to kill tanks and soft Vulnerability to ATGM, AT infantry and AT gunners in targets at long ranges. guns, tanks, and mines. close terrain.

3-6 FM 71 -2—

The TOW Section commanded by a Staff Sergeant section leader, consists of two TOW squads, each with a TOW launcher mounted on an APC. The TOW squad consists of the leader, gunner, assistant gunner and driver. One TOW section is organic to each mech infantry company. The antitank platoon of a mech battalion has an additional six sections (12 TOW). USAREUR scout platoons of mech and tank battalions have an additional four TOW.

CAPABILITIES LIMITATIONS to suppression by small arm, artillery, and mortar I Mobility equal to the tank I Vulnerability to ATGM# AT fire. and mech platoons. guns, tanks, BMP cannon, mines, or direct hit by I High probability of kill I Slow rate of fire. artillery or aiistrike. against armored vehicles out to a' range of 3000 I Gunner exposed while firing I Currently it has no night meters. and, therefore, vulnerable sight.

HOW TO TASK ORGANIZE

Task organizing distributes available consider reorganizing. Key questions to be assets to subordinate control headquarters considered by the task force commander are: by either attaching, placing in direct support or under the operational control of the subordinate. Can I significantly improve the mutual support of infantry, tanks and TOW within the teams by changing the task orgnization? FLEXIBILITY IS A PREREQUISITE Is the task force or one of the teams FOR RAPID REORGANIZATION about to face a significantly different situation requiring a different Peacetime training in the intricacies of balance of these components'? (For combined arms teamwork is facilitated if example - approaching a town, clearing brigade and task force SOP specify a woods, cleaning out a trench line, “normal” task organization. If the same approaching a stream, moving into the company, FO teams, engineer platoon, TOW lead, defending in the open, defending in sections, and other elements habitually woods, etc.) report to the same task force headquarters, Can I help a team break contact or teamwork is enhanced. However, occasional attack a position by sending another diversions from the “normal” SOP tank platoon or mech platoon? organization is also useful, since flexibility in changing task organization should be Besides the three chief components, another training objective. Such changes will should I reassign or redirect the efforts be frequent in combat. of my other combined arms assets? (Mortars, artillery, TACAIR, attack Regardless of the task organization in helicopters, scouts, AVLB, engineers, effect at a given time, when a task force air defense, combat service support.) commander is faced with a significant change in the combat situation, he should

3-7 -FM 71-2

The terrain on the other side of every cross compartment traversed may seem to dictate a new “best” task organization. However, the frequent temptation to reorganize should be resisted unless absolutely necessary, since each change takes time and may cause disruptions of control and service support.

The Maneuver System. The maneuver system of the task force consists of the three major components—tank platoons, mech platoons and TOW sections—organized under the control of a team headquarters. Usually the commander will be allocated from six to 12 platoons organized under two to four team headquarters, and from zero to eleven TOW sections. He may also be given attack helicopters. He decides how to allocate these components to the team headquarters during the formulation of his concept of the operation. Analyzing his mission, the enemy he expects to be up against, and the terrain he will fight on, he decides the best mix of these components and how they will operate as teams. Consistent with the categorization of task forces, he thinks of employing:

• • • • • • TANK-HEAVY TEAMS HQ c51 1^1 fc5 • • • ♦ • • • • • • • MECH-HEAVY TEAMS HQ BÜ] [g] |c5 • » • • • • • • • • BALANCED TEAMS HQ m CD CD • • • • • 9 9 0 9 9 9 PURE MECH COMPANIES HQ m m m • • • • • • • 0 9 PURE TANK COMPANIES HQ CD CD CD

To one or more or all of the teams he of each. He understands how the strength of organizes, he adds an appropriate number of each helps offset the vulnerabilities of the TOW sections to support them in carrying out others. his concept over the terrain he expects them to traverse. He will often find that the On occasion he may decide to retain a small majority of TOW can best employ their reserve under his control. This might consist long-range fire capability with the tank of one or two tank or mech platoons. TOW are heavy or pure tank teams, since they will generally not in reserve. However, due to usually be operating over more open terrain their long range, some may occasionally be than the mech heavy teams. placed in general support of the teams under the control of the AT platoon leader. The task He decides on the mix of his infantry, tank force commander must control the maneuver and TOW components after carefully of these TOW in general support as he considering the capabilities and limitations controls the maneuver of his companies.

3-8 FM 71-2—

The Fire Support System. The task force has mortars (heavy and often light), artillery in direct support, and often will have TACAIR to multiply the combat power of the company teams. On rare occasions the commander may consider reassigning an 81mm mortar section from one team to another. Frequently, he will change the priority for fire support of the heavy mortar section from team to team. He influences this system either directly to the FSO or ALO or through his S3. The teams are in the system through their artillery and mortar FO. (Details in Chapter 7)

The Intelligence System. The task force has very few assets of its own to gather intelligence. The scout platoon, combat patrols from the teams, and four GSR teams comprise the total collection assets of the task force. These same assets, plus REMS and outposts, also comprise the Security System. The task force must look to brigade and higher headquarters to provide the timely intelligence they need but which is beyond their capability to collect. The S2 is the commander’s representative for getting that information. He is not in the business of intelligence analysis—rather he spends the majority of his effort on insuring that every bit of useful processed intelligence and combat information has been made available to the task force and disseminated to all its elements. The task force commander, however, must personally direct the efforts of his intelligence system to insure that it will respond to his operational needs.

The scout platoon is an important component of these systems. This small, THE SCOUT PLATOON quick force consists of a headquarters with two APC and two scout sections with four • • e ARC each. Since there are only three men aboard each vehicle, they should not be used HQ as infantry. As the “eyes of the commander” they can provide timely 2 APCs information on the direction of enemy approach when acting as an outpost line in the defense. They are also useful in screening a flank during the attack. In these roles they are generally under the direct control of the S3 or commander. There are other situations, however—wide frontage, movement to contact—where the commander may find his 4 APCs 4 APCs “eyes” see better under team control. This is equally true of the GSR teams. (Details in Chapter 6)

3-9 —FM 71-2

The Mobility - Countermobility System. This system has three components—bridging, engineers and aerial delivered mines. The commander looks to the S3 to assist him in the employment of this system.

Laying minefields by hand is a long As previously discussed, assignment of process. The enemy does not always available AVLB needs careful attention by accommodate by attacking where the the brigade commander, since they are not minefield is. When this is the case, the task organic to mech battalions. Other AVLB and force can call upon the helicopter mine bridges capable of crossing 60-foot spans are dispensers (and in the near future, on available from the Bridge Company of the artillery delivered mines) to cover the Engineer Battalion. unexpected avenue of approach. Since this is Combat engineers, normally a platoon, are a highly time sensitive operation and not also usually in direct support of the task force. many assets are available to the division, it In the attack the commander may wish to should not be considered a normal weight the effort of the lead teams by alternative to a well implemented obstacle attaching all the available engineers to assist plan. in breaching obstacles. In the defense he When task forces are concentrated on the may wish to have them concentrate on the battlefield, such as in the defense against a installation of the most critical task force breakthrough attack, authority for minefields, assist in preparation of a team employing scatterable mines (either air or strongpoint, or parcel them out to assist the artillery delivered) is retained by the brigade teams in preparation of their own obstacles. commander. This is necessary to ensure that Although he looks to the S3 to assist him in the employment of scatterable mines does not directing the engineer effort, it is the restrict the mobility of other task forces. commander who decides the priority of effort. (Details in Chapter 7)

The Air Defense System. The task force has an organic Redeye Section consisting of five two man teams. They are normally attached out to protect the task force’s highest priority targets—the company teams, the TOC and the trains. Since the command group will normally be close to one of these, it does not usually require dedicated Redeye support.

A Vulcan platoon of four guns may also be in direct support or attached to the task force. The commander would position them to defend his highest priority and most vulnerable elements while insuring that no gun is outside of mutual support range of another (1000 meters). When the threat of air attack is low, Vulcan can also be used in a direct fire suppression role. The S3 assists the commander in the * employment of the air defense system. It is the Redeye platoon leader, however, who is VULCAN POSITIONING tied in via radio to the air defense system of ► ARROWS INDICATEURS the larger force. (Details in Chapter 7 and DISTANCES OF Appendix I). 1000 METERS OR LESS. 3-10 í

-FM 71-2-

The Combat Service Support Sy stem. T.. , , ,, Many commanders make the task force executive officer their principal agent to direct this complex, highly important system. It includes: • Vehicle recovery • Supply • Administration • Transportation • Mess • Medical © • Maintenance M/u *TT AT 9* o 'U, Each of these is covered in detail in Chapter o 8. It is important to note here, however, that O >o organizational differences between tank and o oo * mech battalions make vehicle recovery, i & maintenance and medical support important m aspects to consider for every change in the organization. & m 111 8 2* m «äSiS The Command and Control System. i ti rftjH when the task organ za on is /vsp Mtr ßsmmm 39 vT*5 o sco completed and all the systems discussed so far are working internally, it is Otfr4 T/o BiIII this system which gets them working together. It consists of: /V MA, GSn ^BNANCE 3AS sä# The command component - the TS ^commander and all those individuals he MESS REMS turns to to make the individual systems S4 1 function. irr SUPPLY ifSü pATROLS The communications component - the T\ON ifeîSË ^ '.x#i Œ) links that allow the commander to direct the vS Op systems to work together. PS> ^ c^v MV mam EXAMPLE OF TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S INTERFACE O CONTROL WITH HIS OPERATING SYSTEMS SYSTEM O Command is a very personal thing. Who is Regardless of the diagram for a particular O '»'A ^ in and who is out of the Command and task force, the objective is to get each system •yU O. 3*, ¿3 Control System circle, and which systems so that the commander can manage it by \\> 9 they assist the commander in directing, will exception involved only to give direction or vary from commander to commander. Each solve a major problem. When a task force is vG* will have his own variation of the diagram. operating like that, he can focus on the o One commander may turn to the Si and S4 systems most directly impacting on mission © directly for the operation of the combat accomplishment—fire and maneuver and fire es service support system, using the XO for support. other matters. Another may interface with In heavy combat the task force comm ander the combat support company commander on normally commands from his tank or APC. matters pertaining to the scouts and Redeye, On the modem lethal battlefield task force not calling on the S3. commanders can survive only in armored vehicles. 3-11 3-11 Foldin —FM 71-2 •* Fold this page out for: THE TASK FORCE: • THE COMBAT SERVICE CAPABILITIES AND SUPPORT SYSTEM LIMITATIONS In terrain suitable for employment of • THE COMMAND AND armored forces, tank and mechanized CONTROL SYSTEM infantry task forces can apply all their inherent combined arms mobility, firepower, • Example of Task and shock action to: Force Commander's Interface with his Operatirig Systems • Move to contact independently, or as • Operate in an NBC and EW part of the advance covering force, environment. flank, or rear guard of a larger force. • Defend or delay in sector as part of an • Attack to penetrate or envelop active defense. COMMANDERS NORMALLY LOCATE AS SHOWN HERE: prepared enemy defenses. • Conduct exploitation and pursuit • Operate as part of the covering force of CONDITIONS TANK BATTALION HQ MECH BATTALION HQ operations as part of a larger force. the larger unit. • Conduct reconnaissance in force • Move rapidly laterally or forward to CDR operations and raids. occupy and defend battle areas. • i ’ • Attack to seize and clear villages and strip areas. • Prepare and defend from battalion or IN HEAVY COMBAT TANK COMD& RECON ARC company size strongpoints. X • Continue operations in all weather and \ visibility conditions. • Conduct river crossing operations. ► WHEN HE MUST BE AT A CRITICAL PLACE The same characteristics which make tank FULL ALO ALO FULL * TRACK APC TRACK ARC and mechanized infantry battalion task forces so suitable for employment on armor-favorable terrain also limit their > DURING LULLS capabilities in other environments. In CDR CDR particular: ► WHEN THERE ARE MANY SMALL

ACTIONS CP> CP • Task forces can operate in large forests, LIGHT TRACK- LIGHT TRACK.- towns, cities and mountainous areas > WHEN TASK FORCE IS ACP ACP-^ only by sacrificing much of their OPERATING ON A mobility and long-range engagement BROAD FRONT advantage. ► WHEN HE NEEDS AN m m • Task forces required to conduct air UPDATE ON THE assault operations leave the vast OVERALL FULL TRACK ARC FULL TRACK ARC majority of their firepower and ground SITUATION mobility behind. They should be used in this role sparingly, and only when rapid link-up with their ground elements can COMMANDERS USE be effected. HELICOPTERS AND JEEPS FOR RAPID OBS HELICOPTER OBS HELICOPTER TRANSPORTATION. . . • The mobility of armored/mechanized NOT FOR COMMAND task forces is generally restricted when IN HEAVY BATTLE V« TON JEEP Vi TON JEEP, conducting jungle operations.

3-11 -Foldout 3-12 464-458 O i The moreheknows,thedevelops understanding ofthealwaysapplicable mind fortheemploymentofhistaskforce.He maneuver units.Heknowswhathehastodo, visualize aschemefortheunit’soverall When hehasthebasicinput,isthenableto refines hispictureasthesituationshapesup. precepts foremploymentofhisorganization. builds hisbasicconceptonanin-depth how thebattaliontaskforcewilldoit.He workings ofthetaskforce.Also,scheme situations likelytoarise,andtheinternal employment. Theschemeconsidersthe concept. Whenheisgivenamission, and heknows,conceptuallyindetail, combat servicesupport,andfriendly support agenciesandothercombatsupport, enemy, withhigherheadquarters,fire allows fortheunit’sinteractionwith actions ofspecificelements,critical the expressionofconcept. expression oftheconcept.Ordersandactionsvariouselementsare everything theTFintendstodoanddoes.Plansareasophisticated,orderly of actionasthebattledevelops.Itiscommonthreadthatrunsthrough action ofallelementsduringthebattle.Italsoindicatesappropriatecourses concept drivestheplanningprocessbeforebattle.Itdictatesinitial The commanderalwayshasaconceptin • Whataretheeffectsofweather andvisibility? • Whatistheterrainandhowcanitbeused? m Whatareotherfriendly forces doing? • Whatforcesareavailable?\ • Whatenemyforcesopposeandwhereare • Whatmustbedoneandwhen? The Commander’sConceptofOperation.commander’s they? j SITUATION MISSION HOW TOMAKEITWORK I I i • Whichofthesewaysisbestinthissituation? # Whatgeneralwaysaretheretousethese 9 Whatmustbethescheme ofmaneuver, 9 Whatcanbegainedandwhatmaylostin following questions: answers withfactsorbestjudgment,the ment. Itfollowsalogicalsequenceand rapid, mentalevaluationofthosefactors having abearingonmissionaccomplish- available. Thecommander’sestimateisa commander’s experience,andthetime complexity ofthemissionandsituation, seconds orafewhours,dependingonthe is anaturalprocess.Itmayrequirefew estimate. Makinganestimateofthesituation commander, itiscalledthecommander’s called anoperationestimate;whenmadebya the bestwaytoaccomplishagivenmissionis estimate ofthetacticalsituationtodetermine and ordersaretheresultsofestimates.An concept istheestimateofsituation.Plans keeps hisprincipalsubordinatesandstaff officers updatedonthisconcept, COMPARISON OFCOURSESACTION each oftheseways? the force? accomplish thismissionwith leastdamageto organization, andplanforfire supporttobest One toolfortheorderlydevelopmentofa forces onthisterraintoaccomplish mission? ANALYSIS OFCOURSESACTION DECISION ANDCONCEPT COURSES OFACTION 3-13 INPUTS TOTHECOMMANDER'SCONCEPT ANSWER -5^/3-p: ANSWER ANSWER ANSWER CONCEPT ANSWER ANSWER ANSWER ANSWER ANSWER ANSWER 3-13 Foldin MISSION FM 71-2— —FM 71-2

Plans and Orders. TF plans and orders are the expression of the conunander’s concept of operation. The procedure for planning, coordinating and the issuing of orders invariably requires some compromise between the necessity for speed and responsiveness and the need for orderly procedure and detailed planning.

The commander’s allocation of the time available is critical. If the maneuver elements do not get the time to respond according to plan at the critical time and place, then they will likely be heavily penalized. The damage may be irreparable. On the other hand, because the TF has at its disposal the full potential of the combined arms team, a good deal of planning and coordination is needed to bring the full weight of the TF to bear. If necessary the commander should err on the side of more time for the company teams. Before a battle theTF commander and staff may have a great deal of time—even days—to THE TF COMMANDER MAY HAVE consider in some detail what they intend to do A FEW DAYS—OR ONLY A FEW HOURS to build a concept and the detail of how they will do it. This process culminates in an operations order that presents in logical, commonly understood language the plan for the battle. During this “permissive time” situation theTF commander can function not only as order giver but also as a member of the planning group. He has time to attend to a certain amount of detail. The resulting plan is the detailed expression of the concept. In other circumstances the Bn TF commander may have only a few hours, or even minutes before execution of a mission. In this case the order will be abbreviated. It will probably not be written out, reproduced, and distributed. The commander will probably give the order to subordinates from notes—based on the five paragraph field order format—and from a map, an overlay, or a drawing on the ground. Whenever possible, the commander gives the orders to his subordinates at a site where the terrain can be viewed. Because time is so short the commander must give his subordinates a warning order as soon as possible. He must update the teams on the thrust of the new 3-13 Foldout 3-14 FM 71-2— mission, and the general scheme of maneuver very quickly. This allows executive officers to get the troops on the road while the commanders and staff go forward to work bn the details of the plan. During the heat of battle the commander only has time to monitor critical parts of the action, judge the situation, make decisions and issue orders. These orders are oral, brief DURING THE BATTLE, TIME and to the point. Most often they are MAY EXIST ONLY FOR A QUICK instructions for movement and missions for DECISION FOLOWED BY A the teams. If the teams and other elements of RAPID ISSUANCE OF ORDERS the battalion are familiar with the commander’s concept of operation and the original order, these brief orders should be adequate for immediate and correct response. When time permits, the task force commander and his staff plan operations in detail, following the sequence of command IN THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS, and staff actions described in FM 101-5. KNOWLEDGE OF THE However, if a requirement for immediate COMMANDER'S CONCEPT action precludes detailed planning, decisions DICTATES ACTION. are based on the commander’s concept. This does not mean that the staff is not consulted or used during fast moving situations. On the contrary, lack of time for detailed planning places increased emphasis on efficient staff work to insure continued operations. Under such conditions, routine actions must be planned for and executed by the staff on their own initiative, consistent with the commander’s overall concept.

PLANS ORDERS TYPE (MAJLNB'Rs TIME OF CONDITION AVAILABLE FORMAT FORMAT ¡»ai# PLAN _ ORDER DELIVERY lii «II ■ fti DETAILED ORAL ils BEFORE CONCEPT PLENTY AND/OR DETAILEDP WRITTEN IN BATTLE OF WRITTEN ORDER PERSON OPERATION HSMK _ - . » ws DURING mSmmgmk A LULL IN SOME UPDATED ORAL LD ORAL IN BATTLE CONCEPT IDER V PERSON

COMMANDERAS DURING ORDERS FOR/ Sli§ I Si HEAVY NONE MANEUVERf , ORAL , BY CONTACT ANqgFIREl RA iSUPRORT* fWmiimë m ¡S¡i¡ 3-15 —FM 71-2

ORDERS DURING HEAVY BATTLE These oral orders, from the TF Commander, are short and to the point. They normally contain instructions for maneuver and for fire support. They are built on the original concept and original order. They automatically trigger many other actions—other than those specified.

>- ORDGOWAL CONCEPT TrU/v^k. TV. THE ORDER OTiriao^nj^ /b-C- AfiWy -bo J-v\ "B Co move to battle position 42. Begin to LuV . move 10 min from now. Occupy BP 42 L/WA—V and engage enemy. Expect enemy force C^ckk of at least one tank Bn to approach from northeast. Estimate enemy to close your position in 1 'A hours from now. Ill meet To-p crif. POL o-ib Aoor\o-i- you at BP 42 in 20 min. Report dosing. " cXo-. reverse slope of BP 42 and refueled them. (Bn TOC notified POL section.) 5. TAAVW- v I'Vv"—..

The Troop Leading Process. Battalion task forces must be ready to execute a new mission in a matter of minutes, or, at the most, within several hours. The troop leading procedures enable the commander to quickly issue adequate orders and the necessary instructions to his subordinates. The process applies to all command levels, but the lower the echelon, the more simple and direct the process is.

Recurring use of the troop leading steps will teamwork and an understanding which lead to an almost instinctive way of thinking permits commanders to turn a mission-type for platoon, company, and battalion commanders. Once the battle starts, order into action. This action must support subsequent orders and responses must be the plan of the next higher commander fast, effective, and simple. This requires without detailed instructions.

3-16 FM 71-2—

The process allows available time to be used efficiently for preparation to respond to new missions. The process is not rigid; commanders modify it to fit the mission, situation, and available time. All the steps, however, should be covered, even if each takes only a few seconds. Some steps are taken concurrently, some go on continuously throughout the mission. ■The troop leading steps are:- STEP 1. Receive the Mission STEP 5. Reconnoiter STEP 2. Issue Warning Orders STEP 6. Complete the Plan STEP 3. Make a Tentative Plan to Accomplish the Mission STEP 7. Issue Orders STEP 4. Initiate the Necessary Movement Sequence STEP 8. Supervise and Refine

minutes while allowing platoon leaders 2 hours and 45 minutes.

RECEIVE THE MISSION Leaders may receive a mission in 2 either an oral or written operation order (OPORD) or a fragmentary ISSUE THE WARNING, ORDER order (FRAGO). Upon receipt of an A leader gives a warning order order, the leader analyzes his immediately after receipt of a mission to be certain he understands warning order from higher what is to be done, and plans the use headquarters. He does this by telling of available time. Often the most his subordinates the mission, the critical resource when a battalion time it starts, and the time and place task force receives a new mission is for issuance of the actual order. This time, especially daylight hours. The permits better use of time available commander must not waste time to plan and prepare. A warning order which should be used by company is usually issued orally. team, platoon and squad leaders for reconnaissance and planning of their own. A reasonable rule of thumb is: use no more than one third the available time for planning by the 3 battalion task force headquarters and leave two thirds for the MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN commanders and leaders of The commander should make a subordinate units. Thus a battalion tentative plan of how he intends to task force commander given six accomplish this mission. When the hours to prepare for an operation mission is complex and time is uses no more than two hours and available he may make a fairly provides at least four to subordi- formal mental estimate, following nates. Company team commanders the procedures outlined in FM101-5, could have about one hour and fifteen Command and Control of Combat

464-458 0-85-5 3-17 —FM 71-2

Operations. When the mission is be able to generate instant movement uncomplicated or time is short, he by every element of the team. For will make this mental estimate very example, orders like the following quickly. The commander knows his will be commonplace: own situation, knows as much about the enemy as he can under the specific circumstances, knows the “Change of mission. Move from your mission and what it requires, and battle position and follow me north on applies all of this to the terrain in the Route RED. Order is second platoon, first assigned area. The tentative plan he platoon. Third platoon overwatch and develops is the basis for coordina- follow. Move out now.” tion, unit movement, reorganization, if any, and reconnaissance. When the commander is called to The battalion task force mission will receive an order, he would take with usually be stated in specific terms as him some other person of authority to WHO, WHAT, WHEN and WHERE. who can return to the unit to issue a The HOW is left to the commander to follow-on warning order, prepare decide. He must apply the the unit, and if necessary, move it. fundamentals so that he optimizes This person can be the executive the capabilities of his organic, officer or S3. With these activities attached and supporting systems, under control, the commander can minimizes their vulnerabilities, and make his reconnaissance, confirm or accomplishes the mission. His modify his tentative plan, and tentative plan is a direct, simple prepare to issue his final order while expression of HOW. the task force elements are simultaneously moving to their new locations for their new mission. 4 INITIATE NECESSARY MOVEMENT RECONNOITER The commander will have many important matters on his mind at this To make best use of his forces and point. Often the driving considera- fires, the commander must see the tion is the absolute necessity to make assigned terrain. If possible, he good use of the available time so that meets his team commanders on the company team commanders and their terrain. There will be times when he subordinates can reconnoiter, move, can make only a map reconnaissance. prepare, and fit their units and But if any time at all is available and weapons to the ground. If the task if the commander has the first four force must move a considerable steps in hand, he must get out on the distance, it should be set in motion terrain. It is during this reconnais- immediately based on the first rough sance that the commander confirms concept. This permits platoons and his tentative plan or modifies it to squads to get on the ground early. magnify every advantage of his Then the commander needs to get out weapons and afford maximum on the ground and see for himself protection for his troops. He will how to best employ the combat power usually want some assistants with of his battalion task force. The him to save time and to add their commander must have a smooth skills to his. Often he will want his system, a standing operating fire support officer and may also procedure, to permit all these actions include his §2, S3, and a combat to proceed simultaneously so that no engineer if engineers are available. time is wasted. Equally important If he can see only part of the assigned are the movement SOP of the team area, then he plans the detail for only commanders. Brief oral orders must that part of the operation. The

3-18 FM 71-2—

remainder is covered in general subordinate commanders to copy this terms by telling team commanders to information on their own maps. If the “be prepared to” take other actions. entire battalion task force is moving or is already involved in an operation, he may issue orders over the radio or by messenger, or may meet each commander in turn to 6 instruct him face to face, while the unit continues its activity. The COMPLETE THE PLAN commander should make absolutely As a result of the reconnaissance, the clear his concept for the operation commander may not alter his from beginning to end; that is, how he tentative plan, but he certainly will sees the battle being fought and what add detail. He will refîne his concept he expects from each subordinate and plan for fire support, and will leader. The commander should also focus upon specific tasks for all units, prescribe what actions his insuring that all fit together simply subordinate leaders should take and effectively. under foreseeable situations in the event the commander is out of communication for some reason. 7 ISSUE ORDERS 8 Most orders are issued orally, SUPERVISE AND REFINE sometimes from a hand written five The commander and his staff must paragraph field order outline and a supervise to insure that all necessary sketch or overlay. If the battalion preparations for conduct of the task force commander has made a operation are being made. These reconnaissance, he will usually issue include coordination, reorganiza- orders from a vantage point in the tion, fire support and engineer assigned area. This permits him to activities, maintenance, resupply, point out particular terrain features movement and any other required on the ground as well as on the map, actions. and eliminates time which might be spent in driving back to a command Once the operation is under way, the post to speak to subordinates who commander must insure that the plan would then drive forward to is followed and must issue reconnoiter. The commander may fragmentary orders to modify or issue overlays with his order, but refine the operation as the situation more often he will have only his own develops. The requirement to map available with control measures supervise is continuous and as sketched on it. He then requires important as issuing orders.

3-19 — FM 71-

Example of a Troop Leading Sequence. The following example illustrates one way that a task force commander may put the troop leading process to work in a given situation. There are many feasible “solutions” other than this one.

In this situation, TF1-33 Mech is in reserve located in an assembly area. The division has been in combat for some time and has been conducting defensive operations. There has been a lull for the past several hours, but renewed attacks are expected shortly. Radio listening silence is in effect.

0600 A helicopter lands at TF 1-33 tactical operation center. The pilot states that the task force commander is wanted at brigade headquarters immediately to receive a mission. The helicopter isattheTFcommander'sdisposal. tt»* S3 tells the TOC to issuea warning te G* order to get ready to move. TF commander, S3, and FSO fly to brigade headquarters. Bn XO will supervise preparations (unit SOP te covers "Preparation for Move- RO« ment") while the commander and CZ S3 are gone. m TF 33 eLUF

0620 TF commander, S3 and FSO receive order, part of which is "TF 1 -33 Mech will defend in the right portion of the brigade sector. TF 1-3 Be in position as soon as possible, but not later than 0900. " tejí te G* Enemy attack—previously Qw expected from Northwest—is now expected from Northeast. TF 1-33 sector has previously been part of a screening operation by a ROW te cavalry unit. ED **0 Or M TF 33 BLUF

3-20 FM 71-2 —

C3D

$ TF 1-3 0630 Commander, S3 and 12 FSO huddle after receiving the Gc order. The commander, from a quick look at the map, determines the appropriate locations for his teams. He outlines other main m points of his tentative concept. He RO'J tells the S3 that he wants to meet the team commanders, S3, ALO, scout platoon leader, and antitank TF 33 platoon leader at checkpoint 12 at «¿(yp 0720. (This "orders group" assembles by SOP). The S3 returns by jeep to the TF command post. (By SOP the S3's 0650 S3 returns to the TOC commanders in order to begin jeep followed the S3 to the Bde and briefs team commanders and their reconnaissance as soon as TOC.) staff on the tentative plan. possible. 1 st Sgts also go forward "Orders Group" will leave to assist guiding company teams immediately. Routes and into position.) checkpoints are coordinated. 0645 Commander and FSO recon the sector by helicopter to identify potential battle positions 0710 Main body moves, and identify enemy avenues of 0700 "Orders Group" departs controlled by TF XO (team XOs approach. (platoon leaders accompany team control their teams).

if 0720 TF commander meets team commanders at CP 12. He takes them to a hill top where they * can see the battle area. Here he expands on his tentative order. In TF particular, as a result of his reconnaissance, he modifies the 6^ locations of the team battle it positions and indicates tentative successive battle positions. He shows them the positions on the ground and from the map.' He ROW highlights principal findings of his reconnaissance, and outlines his concept of fire support. *0 Ur* 8 LUF if 0735 Team commanders arrive leaders. 1 st Sgts return to CP 12 at their battle positions and point to pick up their respective out platoon positions to platoon company teams.

3-21 -FM 71-2

CO 0735 TF commander goes to O Tm A psn with the team 'vA M commander. He spends a few /—-'v B minutes going over the main things he wants the team to do, TF 1 -33 pointing out boundaries, target 12 reference points, common check points and landmarks, and It describing critical aspects of the o'J terrain in front of the position. He then goes to Teams B and C and does the same thing. These company teams do not delay their RO'J work waiting for the TF commander. He is simply expanding on the scheme he ^0 c/rf described earlier—on the ground! e¿(7? The TF commander then returns to CP 12 (the new TOC location) particularly the fire support. S3, 0800 Main body closes at CP to meet with the S3 and FSO and FSO, and ALO get together to 12, teams are met by their 1st complete the details of the plan— work out final details of the plan. Sgts.

0825 Company teams close in position. VA ' I—A B

TF 1 -33 0830 Commander and S3 issue complete order to the team G* etJS commanders and staff from a vantage point on Team B's battle RO position. Order now includes such detail as fire support, engineer tasks, and combat service m support. a? ROW KOu re Si

In this example the TF: 0845 TF commander and team commanders supervise detail of 1. Made the best use of available time by plan and ongoing preparation of initiating planning and necessary movement positions. Team commanders simultaneously—not sequentially. recon successive battle positions. ’ ^ ‘Operated in an orderly, efficient manner.

* 3. ^Guaranteed responsiveness and efficiency through the application of their unit SOP. 4. Did not break radio listening silence.

3-22 FM 71-2—

SUMMARY The battalion task force combines tanks, mechanized infantry and other units under a single commander. This combination takes advantage of various fire and maneuver and support units to meet the situation as viewed by the commander. The task force commander must:

Realize the capabilities and limitations of each component.

Organize the task force for the benefit of the whole.

Be aggressive, competent in his leadership, and confident in his decisions.

Create teamwork among his subordinates, so he can expect immediate and proper response to his plans and orders, and adherence to his concept of the operation.

3-23

CHAPTER 4 Offensive Operations OVERVIEW THE VICTOR IN BATTLE MUST ATTACK. Although defensive operations may weaken the enemy and prevent him from obtaining his objectives, it is the attack which brings decisive results. A defender, even ä relatively weak one, has significant advantages. He knows the terrain because he’s on it. His weapons are sited and emplaced to maximize capabilities and to minimize vulnerabilities. He can see the attacker before being seen. But he does not have the initiative; the attacker chooses the time and exact place of the battle. By taking the initiative, the attacker can penetrate or outflank the enemy, break his support and his command and control, and then destroy his disorganized remaining forces. The battalion task force commander must know the concept and fundamentals of the attack, how the opposing force will defend, how to apply his units to the battle using proper techniques and tactics, and how to direct the battle.

COt^TEliWS PAGE OVERVIEW 4-1 CONCEPTOFTHE OFFENSE 4-2 FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4-3 HOWTHE ENEMY DEFENDS 4-5 Security Zone 4-5 Main Defense Belt 4-5 Conduct of the Defense 4-7 FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER 4-7 TYPES OFOFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4-10 Movement to Contact 4-10 Hasty Attack 4-12 Deliberate Attack 4-23 Exploitation and Pursuit 4-40 Reconnaissance in Force 4-41 Raid 4-42 HOWTO CONDUCTA BYPASS 4-44 HOW TO ATTACK WHEN VISIBILITY IS LIMITED 4-47 HOW ATTACK HELICOPTERS ARE USED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4-52 HOWTO BREACH OBSTACLES 4-57 SUMMARY 4-59

4-1 —FM 71-2

CONCEPT OF TEE OFFENSE

Battalion task forces can expect to participate in offensive operations when brigade, division or corps commanders have decided the time is right to:

Complete the destruction of attacking enemy 0 forces Penetrate and destroy defending enemy 0 forces Seize key terrain Deprive the enemy of resources, demoralize » him, and destroy his will to continue the battle » Deceive and divert the enemy » Develop intelligence about the enemy

The Generals concentrate task forces and massive fire support at the critical time and place; that is, when and where the enemy is weakest. The enemy may be weak in a particular place because his forces are thinly spread, because there is little or no depth to his defense, because his fire support or logistics are inadequate, because his units are demoralized from fatigue and casualties, because he is defending with the wrong type of force, or because he hasn’t had time to organize a cohesive defense. Ideally, all those factors would be present at the point of attack.

The organization of which the task force is a part may be conducting any of the types of offensive operations discussed later in this chapter, or even defensive operations. However, when the task force makes contact and is ordered to maneuver against the enemy to destroy him, it is attacking. The concept of the attack is to find or create a weak point in the enemy’s defense; suppress the firepower the enemy can bring to bear on that point; maneuver to it using cover, concealment, and mutual support to penetrate or envelop the weakness; and exploit success by attacking adjacent positions from the flank or rear, or continue the attack to the rear to destroy the continuity of his defense. 4-2 FM 71-2—

CONCEPT OF THE ATTACK

Find or create a weak point Maneuver to the weakness to • Widen the penetration penetrate or envelop • Attack weakness; avoid • Protect lines of communica- strength • Understand the terrain tion • Avoid fire traps • See the enemy or • Use cover • Know his doctrine • Continue the attack to the rear • Use concealment • Know .his dispositions • Maintain momentum • Use mutual support • Know his weapons' capabil- • Retain the initiative ities • Use surprise • Maintain contact • Lead at the front • Strike from an unexpected direction • Disrupt his continuity • Obtain all available combat information • Strike at an unexpected time • Destroy headquarters, combat and combat service • Have teamsfire and maneuver support • Concentrate forces on one or • Move faster than counter- Suppress his firepower two positions at a time attacking forces • Concentrate fires on weak- • Integrate fires with maneuver or ness • Shock and overwhelm • Prepare to destroy a counter- • Isolate the weakness by sup- Exploit success attack pression and obscuration • Integrate all available direct • Roll up adjacent positions • Understand enemy doctrine and indirect fires • Attack from flanks and rear • Maintain security

FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

To make the concept work, certain basics the Battlefield. The first requirement need emphasis. The attack may succeed at any level of command is to see the without full realization of every aspect of the battlefield. This means know the enemy, concept, but failure to execute the know where he is and how his forces are set fundamentals will bring disaster to the up, know his capabilities and vulnerabilities operation. versus those of the task force, and know the terrain. The task force commander must know the capabilities of enemy weapons and Fy ft] OARÆ E R3YAILS he must understand the enemy’s defensive 1. SEE THE BAHT LE FOE LID doctrine: How he organizes strongpoints in 2. USE WEAPON SYSTEMS TO BEST depth, how he attempts to force the attacker ADVANTAGE into fire traps and then counterattacks with 3. CONCENTRATE OVERWHELMING tank heavy reserves, how he employs COMBAT POWER obstacles. 4. SHOCK, OVERWHELM, AND DESTROY The commander must be personally THE ENEMY involved in seeking combat information and 5. PROVIDE CONTINUOUS MOBILE intelligence. He analyzes all available data SUPPORT from higher headquarters and asks for more. He uses patrols, ground surveillance radar, 4-3

464-458 0-85-6 — FM 71-2-

and liaison with units familiar with the mission, the terrain, and the enemy he terrain and enemy to gain more information. expects to encounter. All must be mutually Fitting his unit to the terrain requires the supporting, get the combat support they need commander to see and know the ground in the and their organization changed as the greatest detail possible. Since in the attack he situation dictates. will seldom be able to see overthe first hill, he may have to depend only on his map reading skills. ^^Concentrate Overwhelming Combat Once the attack begins, leaders lead from Power. If no enemy weaknesses can be the advancing edge of their units. The task found, one can be created through surprise, force commander moves from vantage point massive firepower, or isolation from mutual to vantage point to see what his forward support. The enemy can be surprised either elements are encountering. By “feeling” the by the time of the attack or by its location or battle, he can influence the momentum of the direction. Firepower (direct and indirect) can attack. soften an area in the defensive lines. Suppression with direct fire, artillery and smoke against adjacent positions can isolate the area selected for concentration and penetration. ^^Use Weapon Systems to Best Attacking during limited visibility also Advantage. Every situation has a “best” isolates the penetration area from support by mix of weapon systems. But in the attack, the adjacent positions. Electronic warfare situation changes rapidly. It is usually best to support (provided by the division) assists by organize the company teams with a balanced disrupting the enemy’s command and mix of tanks, mechanized infantry, TOW, control. mortars, engineers, and air defense. This balanced mix provides the most flexibility for Overwhelming combat power is usually employment and is a good start point. thought of as a ratio of about 6:1; this requires a narrow front for a task force attack. Since However, exceptions to the balanced team an enemy battalion will likely defend with structure abound. For example, if the four to six platoons forward, the task force cómmander’s concept is to penetrate with one seeks to concentrate on one or at most two team while two suppress, he may organize the platoons at a time, a penetration width of penetrating force as a “shock team” of just about one kilometer. tanks. Or he may want an “overwatch team” of TOW and tanks to overwatch a critical phase of the attack. If his concept is to overrun a position and then clear it, he might use a “shock team” followed by a “clearing Shock, Overwhelm, and Destroy the Enemy. The task force pushes through the team” of mechanized infantry. If obstacles weakness in the enemy’s lines with all the must be breached or villages or woods cleared, a pure mechanized infantry team mobility, firepower, and shock action it can muster. The task force moves quickly to might be employed. If stealth is desired, he piecemeal the defense by attacking against might organize a dismounted infantry night infiltration. If a flank needs significant one platoon position at a time. Prepared positions are bypassed; cleared only when security forces, he may augment his scout absolutely necessary. The speed of the attack platoon with a tank platoon and GSR adds much to the task force’s security. If sections. temporarily halted, the commander attempts Regardless of the task organization the to overcome the resistance with a hasty commander uses, he insures his weapon attack. He exploits success, constantly systems and his teams are fitted to the seeking new enemy weaknesses. He drives

4-4 FM 71-2— I

O II relentlessly to the rear, disrupting enemy against counterattacks so that fuel, mo □ o _ command and control, artillery, air defense, ammunition, repair parts, and other items □ ID and service support to hasten the destruction can be pushed forward to the attacking ID C2 SECURITY ZONE MAIN DEFENSE BELT of the defending force. forces. No operational weapon system should The purpose of the security zone is to halt or This belt is the backbone of the defense. It remain unmanned while crewmen are O delay the attacker by forcing him to deploy takes advantage of natural defensive terrain available elsewhere. Tank, ATOM, artillery before reaching the main defense belt. This that affords the maximum protection and Provide Continuous Mobile Support. and mortar ammunition will be used at high zone normally extends up to 30km forward of defense against enemy target acquisition and The violence and rapid momentum of the rates and must be replaced quickly. Vehicle the main defense belt. It is at least deep nuclear attack. It is designed to stop and attack places severe demands on crewmen must be adept at rapid refueling and enough to prevent the attacker from destroy the attacking enemy forces. This belt commanders and logisticians at all levels. rearming. Task force SOPs must specify how delivering fire on the main and second is up to 15 kilometers deep and is manned Lines of communications must be secured these difficult tasks will be performed. defense belts with divisional weapons. preferably by motorized rifle units. Within Motorized rifle divisions manning the main this belt are those forces necessary to conduct defense belt establish general outposts Q in the defense, including tank, artillery, the security zone as much as 15 kilometers in antitank, REC, and air defense units; the HOW THE ENEMY DEFENDS front of the main defense belt. This is in division reserves; and the division main and SECURITY ZONE addition to the higher echelon security alternate command posts. Understanding how the enemy defends is concentrations, and extensive use of antitank forces £3 farther forward. Normally the The first echelon motorized rifle division vital to planning and conducting a successful mines and other obstacles. Artillery, divisions second echelon (a motorized rifle usually is assigned to defend a zone from 20 to offense. The lesser number of unknowns antitank weapons, air defense guns, tanks regiment) is employed in this task. In the case 30 kilometers wide and approximately 15 facing the commander, the more confident and assault guns are used in direct fire on of a contact and delay force, probable kilometers deep. The defense is organized in and precise he can be. Knowing enemy tanks that have penetrated the defense. deployment of the security outpost force two echelons, with two motorized rifle doctrine gives him a context for applying his would be on the order of one motorized rifle regiments in the first echelon and one own moves. The attacking force may never The deliberate defense is organized in battalion per each 8-12 kilometers of motorized rifle regiment in the second face a defense as strong as that described frontage. successive belts designed to provide depth to echelon. The first echelon motorized rifle here, but it must be prepared to do so. the defended area. Normally the defense First echelon regiments in the main regiments defend the forward 8 to 10 consists of a security zone, a main defense Q defense belt establish security outposts Q in kilometers of the division defense belt. The The purposes of the Threat defense are to belt, and a second and third defensive belt at o the security zone, 3-5 kilometers to the front of second echelon motorized rifle regiment (-) gain time, to create a favorable situation for echelons above division. Each defense belt forward battalions. Their missions are to organizes primary and alternate defensive resuming the offensive by inflicting heavy consists of a series of mutually supporting, protect the main defense belt against surprise positions across the division rear. losses on an opponent, to consolidate self-sufficient company and battalion-size FEBA attack, conduct counter-reconnaissance objectives, and to provide cover for with- strongpoints echeloned in depth. Strong, missions, conduct counter battery operations The medium tank regiment is retained drawing forces. r* mobile, tank-heavy reserves are retained as a rs© against enemy artillery fire on the main under division control as the division’s tank counterattack force. Obstacles are defense belt, deceive the enemy as to the reserve. Elements of this force (two or three Defense in depth is the basic concept. The V 'V/ r? H constructed both forward of and within each location of forward elements of the main companies) may be used to reinforce the Threat establishes a series of defensive belts defensive belt to impede the advance of X defense belt, and prevent the enemy from motorized rifle regiments. It is usually heavily supported by artillery, air defense Is] ••• opposing forces and canalize them into M \ Ali X clearing obstacles. A security outpost may located in the rear of the first and second systems, radioelectronic combat (REC) units, X preplanned killing zones. X AT consist of a motorized rifle company echelon regiments, and may be collocated | antitank weapons, engineer units and RES S3 // FIRST aviation assets. Each of these defensive belts (JAG) r AT ECHELON reinforced by AT weapons, artillery, tanks, with the second echelon regiments when the 1 RES and engineers. contains a series of well-fortified CTi tactical situation dictates. CD strongpoints located on the most likely axis i t of enemy advance; alternate positions are prepared to counter shifts in the direction of CP CD • SAMPLE • III attack. III NOTES: MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION DAG Antitank defense is a basic ingredient of 1. RIGHT SECTOR IS SUBSIDIARY SECTOR. the total defensive operation. Antitank IN THE DEFENSE ► Gs]<- SECOND 2. RAG - REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUP. f AAT PTIFROG in i ECHELON defense includes antitank strongpoints RES 3. DAG - DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY GROUP. astride and along suitable tank approaches, MA N primary and alternate firing positions XX 4. PLANNED DEPLOYMENT AREAS FOR A T RES NOT SHOWN. prepared for occupation by tanks and r antitank reserves, preplanned artillery 20 TO 30fcm

4-5 4-5 Foldin ! —FM 71-2

The motorized rifle battalion is assigned a elements from the air defense missile battery frontage of around 5,000 meters, with a depth of regiment. of approximately 4,000 meters. The defense A squad of antitank guns or recoilless guns # area is organized into 2 echelons and has a from the battalion antitank battery, a total of 3 lines of defense. The forward platoon of tanks, and a platoon of mortars companies are deployed in platoon from the battalion mortar battery normally î strongpoints on armor restrictive terrain, are attached to each first echelon company. forming two lines of defense. The battalion The tanks are dug in within the first and second echelon is formed by the third second defense lines but not further than 600 _ company, spread out across the rear of the meters from the forward trace of the main ™ defense belt. They are prepared to move battalion sector approximately 1,000 meters forward to assist a hard pressed defense. The behind the second defensive line. First reinforcing mortar platoon is usually echelon battalions are usually reinforced attached to the second echelon company on with a medium tank company, 120mm the third defense line. A platoon of tanks is mortar platoon, an antitank gun platoon, and also attached to the second echelon. A HOW THE ENEMY 5,000 Ü METERS DEFENDS FEBA

FIRST DEFENSE H LINE $

Z o

V> SECOND BN AT BC DEFENSE % PLATOON Z LINE SWITCH * % POSITION SWITCH POSITION V t- ' '

\ §! \ OS THIRD m Ux DEFENSE W BROM SAGGER FROM REGIMENT

l ;500 (±) METERS 1;000-2,000 METERS 1;500 (±) METERS

a 120MM ZSU 23-4 SPG-9 Sr HH TANK GGER 1 MORTAR I INFANTRYo PLT WITH 3 BfdPs NOTE: Each rifle platoon has 3 BMPs, each of which has a machinegun, a 73mm cannon, and a SAGGER.

4-6

4-5 Foldnut FM 71-2-

CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE and reduce penetrations of the first echelon position. ' Security outposts keep the enemy under continuous surveillance and a constant Penetrations of the forward positions of volume of long-range fires. Action is taken to battalion defense areas are blocked by the deceive the enemy as to the location of the second echelon. main defense belt and to cause him to mass his forces. The combat outpost line holds its Penetrations of the regimental sectors are positions as long as possible without counterattacked by the divisional becoming closely engaged with the enemy. counterattack force (usually the divisional reserve consisting of the medium tank Little general firing from the frontline regiment, antitank weapons and other positions occurs until the enemy’s attack is artillery). If these counterattacks fail to stop definitely underway. When the enemy the enemy advance, threatened units may reaches a line about 400 meters from the main withdraw to alternate defense areas. defense belt, artillery and mortar barrages are fired. Here the enemy is brought under direct antitank and artillery fire. At the same FORMS OF OFFENSIVE time, he must deal with antipersonnel and MANEUVER antitank obstacles including mine belts. The intent of the commander and the best Tanks are primary targets and the fires of direction of approach to the enemy will all weapons that can damage or destroy dictate the form of maneuver used by the tanks are directed at them. Machinegun and battalion task force. The commander’s intent rifle fire attempt to separate the infantry may vary from time to time but normally can from the tanks. be described in one of four ways: Defending battalions remain in place until 1. Overrun and destroy a weaker overrun or ordered to withdraw by higher enemy in position. headquarters; however, occupation of 2. Fix or hold an enemy force in alternate and supplemental positions within position by suppression. the defense area is considered normal. The 3. Rupture and pass through enemy Threat expects enemy penetrations in the defenses to secure a deep , objec- gaps between units and intends to tive. accomplish maximum killing in these areas. Unengaged units adjacent to threatened 4. Pass around enemy main defenses to strike him from flanks defense areas may be employed to attack the and rear—causing him to fight in flanks of attacking enemy forces. Local an unexpected direction or per- counterattacks, employing small mobile tank haps in two directions. forces, are employed by the battalion, within its capability, to maintain the integrity of the defense area. Enemy positions can be approached in two ways—from the front or from the flank or The motorized rifle regiment begins the rear. And so, there are two forms of maneuver defense when the enemy makes contact with which can be used by the battalion task the security outposts. As hostile elements force—envelopment and penetration. move within range, security outposts take them under fire with mortars, small arms, It is important to understand that, in a machineguns, tanks, and antitank weapons. single attack, different units at the same level Artillery places fire on the advancing enemy may use different forms of maneuver. In a and covers the withdrawal of the security division attacking to rupture enemy defenses outposts as the latter are forced back. so as to exploit into the enemy rear, one brigade may be required to fix some enemy Small mobile tank forces are employed by units in position, while another passes the regiment to execute local counterattacks around those positions to destroy them from

464-458 0-85-7 4-7 -PM 71-2

the flank, and the third is poised to move from the front at the same time and will thus through the hole created. Within that first be forced to fight in multiple directions or to brigade, one battalion task force fixes enemy abandon his position. Either way, the forces while another attacks. Within continuity of his defense is disrupted and he battalion task forces, company teams use is vulnerable to exploitation. bounding overwatch and fire and maneuver. Envelopment requires an “assailable flank,” that is, an open flank, weakness or Envelopment gap in his lines which permits the enveloping In this form of maneuver the attacker force to approach the objective. If no open passes around the enemy to strike the flank or flank or gap in the enemy defensive system rear of the enemy position. Envelopment is exists, gaps should be created by fires, fire the preferred form of maneuver since striking and maneuver, a deception operation, or by the enemy from several directions or from some other means. A battalion task force unexpected directions which are lightly commander usually thinks in terms of defended or undefended multiplies combat attacking enemy flanks or rear rather than in power. Usually the enemy will be suppressed the formal term “envelopment. ”

1 T ^ ^

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4-8 FM 71-2-

Penetration successive defense lines and ultimately enter enemy rear areas, or he may turn forces to roll In this form of maneuver the attacker up enemy positions from the flanks. concentrates forces to strike at an enemy weak point, breaks through the position to When the battalion task force conducts a rupture his defense, holds the shoulders of the penetration of the enemy’s main defense gap created, and advances rapidly to the zone, its objective is usually located in the objective. Successful penetration depends area of the front line enemy battalion’s upon the ability of the attacker to suppress second echelon company (1500 - 3000 meters enemy weapons, to concentrate forces to to the rear of the enemy’s first line overwhelm the defender at the point of companies). The penetrating task force or attack, and to pass sufficient force through follow-on task forces would then continue the the gap to quickly secure the objective. Once penetration to the brigade objective (usually this is accomplished, the commander has two in the area of the enemy regiment’s reserve, options. He may continue forward to rupture another 5000 to 8000 meters deep).

OBJ

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4-9 -FM 71-2 TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The battalion task force can expect to take As in any other tactical operation, the part in these types of offensive operations: commander allocates forces and tasks according to his mission, the terrain and weather, and troops and equipment available. Since the task force is not in 1. RÆOVERÆEOT TO CO KIT ACT contact, an additional factor is the likelihood 2. HASTY ATTACK of enemy contact. 3. OEOBECSATE ATTACK MOVEMENTS ARE USUALLY 4. EKPLOOTATOOKl AKIO PURSUIT MADE WITH TWO OR MORE 5. RECOKIKIAOSSAR5CE OKI FORCE COMPANY TEAMS LEADING IN PARALLEL COLUMNS 6. RAOO The battalion task force usually moves to contact with at least two company teams leading on generally parallel axes. This is done for two reasons: First, moving the force on a single column axis risks accidental Movement to Contact. The purpose of bypass of substantial enemy forces; second, a movement to contact is to gain or regain battalion task force on a single axis might contact with the enemy. Any time the task stretch the column length to six kilometers or force is going toward the enemy but is not in more, limiting the commander’s ability to contact, the unit is performing this type of react swiftly to contact. offensive operation. Contact is sought by the smallest possible part of the task force, thus When a battalion task force moves to permitting the task force commander to contact, each leading team uses traveling immediately respond to the contact with the overwatch or bounding overwatch. Each bulk of his unit. normally leads with a tank platoon (because Two general situations can exist. If the of greater survivability) unless terrain brigade (or division) is out of contact and the dictates otherwise. TOWs can overwatch the distance between friendly and enemy areas of tanks. Movement techniques for the operation is many miles, then a formal company team are jdetailed in FM 71-1. movement to contact may be conducted. A If only one leading team makes contact, the battalion task force will then move with the task force commander decides whether to main body or act as advance, flank, or rear bypass, to attack to fight through, to develop guard. The more common situation is one in the situation, or to fix the enemy in position which a battalion task force is attacking, while he maneuvers his other teams. He has exploiting, pursuing or conducting a at least one company team already on the reconnaissance in force, and for any reason is flank, or ready to move to the flank, of the briefly out of contact with any enemy force. enemy. Should both leading platoons make contact, the commander can still maneuver Since movement to contact occurs as the the remainder of his force. Initial contact by first step of an attack, or as internal steps of minimum forces and swift maneuver by the other offensive operations, the commander rest are vital aspects of movement to contact. deploys his unit to perform the overall This is true whether the movement takes mission. But in any case, he deploys his unit place at the beginning of an attack or during so as to make initial contact with the exploitation or pursuit. minimum force possible, to maintain mutual support between company teams, and to MEETING ENGAGEMENT AND ACTIONS lessen the vulnerabilities of the task force. He ON CONTACT also uses reconnaissance to gain information A meeting engagement occurs when the and security for his unit. task force comes upon the enemy suddenly. 4-10 FM 71-2-

Little or no information is known about the enemy at this time. The enemy may be moving or stationary. The unit which meets the enemy takes actions on contact. Reacting immediately, the platoon making first contact returns fire, deploys, reports, and develops the situation. Suppressive fire from the overwatch positions, mortars, and artillery permit maneuver against the enemy. The company CONTINUING THE FORWARD team seeks to maintain forward motion of the MOTION OF THE TASK FORCE task force and provides an immediate and IS IMPORTANT accurate report of what is happening. The goal, once contact is made, is to gain the upper hand by overcoming the enemy before he can effectively react. To do so, the task force commander must keep his force in a posture to maneuver quickly to the contact, receive information instantly through good reports or personal observation, and issue instructions immediately. The meeting engagement ceases when the situation has been developed and other actions are begun. Based on the company team commander’s report, and his own observations, the battalion commander has at least four options:

1. Order the company team to eliminate the enemy and continue forward with the task force.

2. Order the company team to fix the force and bypass with the rest of the battalion task force.

3. Conduct a task force hasty attack.

4. Adopt a hasty defense if the enemy cannot be overcome or bypassed, while the brigade commander responds to the situation.

If the enemy is also moving (frequently the case in the exploitation, counterattack, and even defense), speed of decision and execution is even more critical. Threat doctrine for the case of two converging forces

4-11

464-458 0-85-8 -FM 71-2

is to immediately conduct a hasty attack from estimate the force ratios and either go to a the line of march and attempt envelopment. hasty defense or begin a hasty attack to The task force commander must quickly outflank and destroy the enemy.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT AGAINST A MOVING ENEMY

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^^Hasty Attack. A hasty attack situation bounding overwatch: The overwatching develops in several ways: element gives direct suppressive fire while the bounding element closes with the enemy. I I Movement to contact results in a If the hasty attack is successful, the task force meeting engagement. can continue; if not, the commander must Deliberate attack plan is modified after quickly choose another option. □ operation is underway. I I Further advance is ordered at end of a The hasty attack requires the commander deliberate attack. and his units to react quickly. The actions must happen without hesitation, decisions I I Small unit counterattacks. made as naturally as breathing. The When contact is made, the company team commander reacts almost instinctively to immediately begins fire and maneuver. This maintain momentum, to retain the initiative. fire and maneuver is an extension of He maintains contact while protecting his 4-12 FM 71-2 — own forces as he seeks the enemy’s weakness. He directs suppressive fires to keep the enemy pinned down and to take away the mutual support of enemy positions. He concentrates The commander orders forces and commits them by fire and movement to begin. Team B maneuver to destroy the enemy at a selected is to advance west of the spot. road. The scout platoon will screen the west flank. The Suppression is crucial. Fires must be rest of the task force will controlled to suppress or destroy weapons of advance on the eastern side different types in several locations. As the of the highway: Team C attack starts, the commander and his fire leading, followed by the support officer put artillery, mortar, tank, command group, mortar and TOW fire on enemy direct fire weapons platoon, and Team A. (or on possible locations). Dragon fire is N added as soon as the range permits; tanks and TOW then engage more distant enemy systems. Counterbattery fire is started as soon as possible to protect the maneuver 2 elements. Smoke is used to screen movement. V EXAMPLE OF HASTY ATTACK A tank-heavy task force, organized into three tank-heavy teams, has irv.t.T tf destroyed an enemy unit on the hill at Checkpoint (CP) 40 and is A ready to continue the attack to the north. Only scattered resistance is anticipated. The unit is out of contact now, but expect to regain it soon.

The current task organization is: / -1

TASK FORCE V2r- TEAM A TEAM B TEAM C CONTROL •Se Scout Pit A/2-76 Mech (-) B/2-4 Armor (-) C/2-4 Armor (-)

2,GSR 1/B2-4 Armor 1 /A/2-76 Mech 2/A/2-76 Mech

Hvÿ Mort Pit 2/C/2-4 Armor 1 AVLB 1 REDEYE TM(DS) JA* 'S REDEYE Sec *4 TOW Sec 1 REDEYETM (DS) A

GSR Sec (-) 1 REDEYETM (DS) A cza 1 AVLB RT G

*NOTE: When the brigade commander task organized, he considered each task force's need for HW TOW. He decided to give 2-4 Armor 4 TOW sections. Since the TF commander's concept was to have TMA follow and support, he left all TOW with them. This was done to reduce km tW.ii>i3B TOW vulnerability while retaining their long-range support. 2

4-13 4-13 Foldin FOLD THIS PAGE OUT — FM 71-2-

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1*^1 CM ^£^3* NU? GP ¿f~iBn ri\ HVY _A Team B: Leading platoon Scout platoon: Preparing to 48. Second tank platoon, has gained the woodline at bound forward to maintain bounding to CP 48, is CP 47. Mech platoon has contact with rear of Team B. engaged with missiles from K joined. These two a re moving vicinity of CP 46. PI J Team A: Mech platoon and 3 km > ~- sJ along the woodline prior to ir- J^. >N TOWs overwatching from Team C: Overwatching i*v*v - next bound toward CP 46. JSUZK*. > west end of Hill CP 40. One from CP 40. Enemy mortar Second tank platoon is tank platoon overwatching fire is falling along top of hill V ¿i s*\ preparing to move to CP 47. along ridgeline halfway to CP CP 40. fyOTE: TMS P/4Gf /W^/ fî£ ¿F^T" FOLDED OUT /4S AN AID IN REMAINING ORIENTED WHILE FOLLOWING THE ACTION DESCRIBED AND DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES. 4-14

4-13 Foldout FM 71-2 —

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Team A commander directs CP 46. Scouts report left Team B, begin your move on return fire from his over- flank secure. The task force an axis west of CP47 through watching tank platoon, commander realizes he can CP 44 to attack toward CP 46. moves the bounding platoon bypass to the east, but that enemy forces control the toward CP 48 and cover, Team C, follow command calls for artillery fire east of road along which trains and group to CP 47, move up on other support must follow. CP 46, and reports to the right of Team B to attack CP battalion task force com- He decides to attack by 46. mander. His report includes: envelopment to the left. He issues the following FRAGO via secure voice radio: Team A guard right flank, • enemy fire is missile only, continue to suppress CP 46 at a range of about 2000 Enemy ATGM located vicinity from present position. meters. CP 46. • Hill CP 48 is unoccupied Teams B and C attack to dear Scouts continue to screen left flank. • actions he is taking enemy positions vicinity CP 46, Team B on the left. Team C on the right. Mortars fire / will follow Team B as far as Team B commander reports smoke between CP's 46 and CP 47, then follow Teams B CP 47 unoccupied and that 47. FSO continue fire on and C in the attack. MOVE he cannot see the enemy at enemy. Team A FO adjust. OUT!

4-15

464-458 0-85-9 — FM 71-2

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The battalion task force CP 66 and CP 68 while the In order to destroy the enemy rapidly prepares to continue heavy mortar platoon fire support unit before it can the attack. Supporting field displaces to CP 48. Portions escape, the battalion task artillery fire continues in the of battalion task force trains force commander shifts not already there are moving area of CP 66. Team A artillery fire north of CP 66, advances to CP SO. Teams B to CP 47. Disabled vehicles and C overwatch the move. are dragged to the highway orders Team A to suppress Mortars of the weapons to be picked up by the from CP 50, and with Teams platoon of Team A place battalion maintenance B and C, he attacks toward smoke in the saddle between platoon. CP 66.

4-17 The battalion task force 1 mm destroyed an enemy mortar battery at Checkpoint 66 and continued its advance to the north astride the road. Team B is on left, Team C on the right with Team A following Team C. The AVLB attached to Team A earlier in -''i the operation is now with Team C.

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Team B is overwatching the • no other enemy activity force commander decides he movement of Team C from detected. cannot bypass. Envelopment right is difficult due to hill CP 71 due to the long • the bridge is out. fields of fire around the openness of terrain around bridge. Team C is bounding • the river is unfordable, the river and the distance an toward the bridge and but swimmable, has assault force would travel to receives fire from across the good banks, and can be CP 90. Envelopment left is river. Team C commander spanned by AVLB. possible, but complicated by enemy forces west of CP 87. returns fire, calls for mortar • action he is taking. and artillery fire, seeks cover, The unfordable river requires assesses the situation, and an assault force of pure reports: Scouts report an infantry mechanized infantry initially. element of unknown size at The commander decides to • enemy fire is BMP main checkpoint 87 at the base of attack on the axis CP 71 to gun and recoilless rifle. the hill. The battalion task CP 87 to CP 90.

4-1B — FM 71-2-

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TTre commander • Requests artillery fire on • Orders team A to detach its follow team A (now the enemy infantry at the tank platoons to team B, company A) across the base of CP 87. receive attachment of all river to enemy positions. Suppress for Company A • Orders Team C to detach infantry platoons, attack during the crossing. its mechanized infantry toward CP 87. platoon to team A and AVLB to team B, protect • Orders scout platoon to the right flank, suppress • Orders team B to detach its advance a section toward enemy direct fire weapons mech platoon to team A, the enemy infantry and to support the infantry receive attachment of A's suppress them with direct river crossing. tank platoon and C's AVLB, fire.

4-20 FM 71-2-

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Covered by the suppressive ridge. Scouts swim the river quickly revises the task fires of Teams B and C, and destroy the enemy organizations of A and B. Company A crosses the river outpost. The battalion task Leaving two tank platoons to by swimming, directly south force commander shifts overwatch near CP 90, he artillery smoke to CP 96 and of CP 87. Scouts suppress orders Team B to continue shifts mortar fire to CP 94. enemy troops to the west as rapidly to the east to secure AVLB are emplaced in the Enemy forces, consisting of the key terrain at CP 94. same area. With two bridges two reinforced platoons, are in, the four tank platoons of quickly overrun from the Company C (-) also over- Company B( reinforced) cross flank and rear. watches this move. Mortars rapidly to join in the assault continue to smoke to cover of enemy positions on the The task force commander movement.

4-21 -FM 71-2

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Having destroyed enemy forces in the and other brigade elements following, can immediate area, the task force undertakes cross. Medical aidmen with company teams several actions. It consolidates its positions treat or evacuate casualties as necessary. on the north side of the river so as to be ready Damaged vehicles are repaired or towed to in case of enemy counterattack. Radars are the highway to be taken over by the battalion emplaced to scan the area. Redeyes with maintenance platoon. While these activities forward teams are dismounted and deployed go on, the commander also directs that to cover air avenues of approach. One AVLB platoons be refueled and resupplied with is moved east to span the river near the blown ammunition, and briefs his company team highway bridge. The remainder of the task commanders on continuation of the force (Company C (-), mortars and trains), operation. 4-22 FM 71-2-

Deliberate Attack. The basic objective of offensive operations is to break through the enemy’s main defensive zone into his rear area in order to destroy artillery positions, command posts, logistics support areas, air defense artillery positions, and lines of communication. Periodically the battalion task force or the force of which the task force is a part will encounter a well prepared, strongly-held enemy defensive position that cannot be eliminated with a hasty attack. When this happens, the entire force will pause, taking sufficient time to prepare for and conduct a deliberate attack. A force larger than a battalion is normally assigned the mission of breaking through. To do this, the force concentrates overwhelming combat power into a rapid, violent attack on a narrow front through the enemy defensive system. In such an attack, the battalion task force may be assigned the mission to penetrate and drive rapidly through the enemy position, moving around the flanks of enemy strongpoints in order to quickly get into the enemy rear area. Detailed information about the enemy must be collected from higher, lower, and adjacent units. Sources include patrolling, reconnaissance by fire, aerial photographs, ALL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES prisoners, line crossers, electronic warfare, ARE UTILIZED radar, sensors, and any other means. Information about terrain can be collected from many of these same sources. Leaders at all levels should look at the actual terrain in daylight, and if the attack is to be conducted at night, they should look at it at night also. The likelihood is remote that terrain can be seen in detail or reconnoitered in detail more than four or five kilometers into enemy territory. Therefore the detailed planning of maneuver and fires will usually be restricted to this area. Planning for actions beyond this limit must be more general, with maneuver of forces and fires sketched out in broader terms and with units prepared to exploit any opportunity presented by terrain and enemy weakness. Two broad options will normally be present when a deliberate attack has successfully breached enemy defenses. The first is to press forward with committed forces toward the

4-23

464-458 0-85-10 —FM 71-2

next echelon of enemy defenses or the enemy rear area. The second is to turn left or right to roll up more enemy positions, one after another, from the flank, while the larger force exploits the breach with other forces. Most often the action will evolve as a series of hasty attacks.

Application of fundamentals is as important in deliberate attacks as in hasty attacks. Time is the biggest difference. For a deliberate attack, time must be made available for the collection and evaluation of enemy information, reconnaissance, planning and coordination. The battalion task force may itself be reorganized and will often change internal organization to optimize each force for the task it will be assigned. New units may be attached or DELIBERATE ATTACKS REQUIRE placed in support of the battalion task force or MORE PLANNING TIME THAN to subordinate units. Time must be available HASTY ATTACKS to thoroughly familiarize replacements with the situation, mission, standing operating procedures, and communications and electronics operating instructions. Time is used for careñil assignment and coordination of missions of tank, mechanized infantry, attack helicopter, artillery, antitank, mortar, engineer, bridging, surveillance, air defense, maintenance, medical, supply and signal assets. Each contributes to SEE-SUPPRESS- MOVE and each must be used to best advantage.

In planning a deliberate attack, the battalion task force commander and his staff follow the steps described in troop leading procedures in Chapter 3. Time, as a resource, must be spent profitably. Warning orders and reconnaissance are of special importance. Warning orders serve to initiate and orient activities in preparation for the attack. Reconnaissance of the terrain over which the attack is to be made can eliminate the danger of units becoming lost, misoriented or out of step with the sometimes precise timing of the attack.

Bringing subordinate commanders together for issuance of the order is an important advantage usually not available in a hasty attack. The operation can be explained in detail so that there are no doubts

4-24 FM 71-2

about who is to do what, and when it is to be done. SITUATION MAP Fold out for use

The power of a deliberate attack comes from the fact that units down to platoon and even squad size can pre-plan their initial actions and thus develop and apply to the enemy a very high percentage of the combat power available.

If the order is issued at a forward location, the battalion task force commander can indicate points of interest on the ground as well as on the map. With all commanders present, coordination among company teams can be started immediately and often can be completed before they disperse to continue their preparations.

The battalion task force commander and staff supervise preparations and execution of the plan. The commander and selected assistants must be well forward in the attack so as to exercise control. Success of the operation depends to a large degree upon immediate reaction by the commander to the situation as it develops. He must literally SEE in order to effectively SUPPRESS and MOVE.

EXAMPLE OF DELIBERATE ATTACK

Task Force 2-76 Mech is part of 3d Brigade; 3d Brigade has been in reserve for the past 24 hours . The division is preparing a deliberate attack to break through this line of defenses. Commander, Task Force 2-76 Mech received the 3d Brigade warning order at 0600 hours and in turn alerted his units. The commander and S3 reported to the brigade command post at 0830 hours to receive the attack order.

CONTINUED

4-25 4-26 Foldout FM 71-2 LEAVE THIS PAGE EXTENDED TO FACILITATE FOLLOWING THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES. r The order, in part, stated: "3d sance by TF 2-76 Mech forward to an observation Brigade attacks at 1400 commanders and staff. post in the area of TF 2-5 hours today through 1st Armor. Upon arrival, the CO, Starting the scout S2, S3, and FSO compared brigade, with TF 2-76 Mech platoon on a reconnais- their maps to the terrain they c on the right making the main sance of routes from attack to secure objective could observe. The S2 OBJ present locations toward reported on the terrain and MUSKET, TF 2-77 Mech on the line of departure. ftOO the left to secure objective the enemy situation.

400 BAYONET. TF2-4 Armor is in Asking the fire support 400 reserve initially, will follow officer, accompanied by the "Sir, our assigned zone TF 2-76 Mech, prepared to heavy mortar platoon assist or assume the mission leader, to coordinate with consists of four cross compartments. Observation of either leading task force, TF 2-5 Armor on targets. and fields of fire from hilltop and when the brigade has Learning that all units had broken through enemy to hilltop are excellent, as you 3? N acknowledged receipt of can see. We can shoot over regimental first echelon the warning order. the wooded areas in AO defense (secured MUSKET between. The woods can and BAYONET) TF2-4 Armor Learning that the at- will continue the attack to tached tank company and provide concealment, but we can get our vehicles through secure objective SABER.” supporting units had arrived and the detached mechan- them without great difficulty. QBJ==*JAo ized infantry company had The river is an obstacle to Baa The commander, S3, and departed. tanks and protects our left 300 379 394 FSO made preliminary flank all the way to the coordination with other Learning the current objective. The east (right) commanders and staff and status of maintenance, slopes of hills 348 (second then returned to their own supply and personnel line of hills) and 427 300 command post. There a strength. TF 76 (objective) are also obstacles. further warning order was We will have a lot of trouble issued to the companies and 338 C3235ÍP For this attack TF 2-76 Mech trying to assault up either of staff, and sent as information K/ JOQ them from the right. A // these «13 had available: to supporting units. This aspects considered, the best order stated: a avenue of approach is along 300 the left, the second best one "TF 2-76 Mech attacks north Hqand Hq Co 2-76 Mech is up the right center. at 1400 hours today to Combat Support Co. (less 2 secure an objective at hills TOW Sec.) 2-76 Mech The enemy is defending 379, 394 and 427. C36J Aand B Co 2-76 Mech three of the four ridgelines. \S> Light forces hold the first, The order also instructed CCo 2-4 Armor their main defenses are persons designated in SOP to along the second, the third Ek IstPIt, BBty 421 st ADA (DS) CB 320 receive tactical orders to has fortifications but is 300 300 report toa forward location at 1 st Pit, C Co 52 Engr(DS) unoccupied, and the enemy LD 1015 hours. Several actions battalion second echelon is were started simultaneously. on the fourth. There are eight The commander restated and motorized rifle platoons and There are no restrictions on 400 explained the mission to his about two tank platoons all mortar ammunition. 3d □□ staff, issued instructions and told. There are another four ■30o Brigade is supported by one received reports. These motorized rifle platoons and a 155 FA battalion (DS) and TF included: tank platoon in the zone on TF two 155 FA battalions (reinforcing): 2-76 Mech has each side of us and they all Sending the S2 to visit TF could influence our attack priority of fires. There are six 2-5 Armor, the unit through unless something is done CAS sorties available to 3d which TF 2-76 Mech would about them. TF 2-77 Mech Brigade. attack. His tasks were to and 2d Brigade should keep 300 gather information about Commander 2-76 Mech them occupied. I believe the terrain and enemy, and to considered several broad enemy will defend from the coordinate the reconnais- plans for attack on his way positions he's in now. ”

4-26 Foldin 4-26 FM 71-2-

For the next half hour, the porting fires of TF2-5 Armor. fire weapons suppress Hill commander, S3, S2, and FSO We must coordinate with 343 and Hill 361, TF 276 huddled to consider the 2-17 Mech for suppressive Mech will move up the left situation. The commander’s fires on the enemy in their side of the zone and attack estimate was as follows: zone. We must also plan for the enemy platoon on Hill suppression of enemy 343 from the flank. By this positions across the river in time 2-77 Mech should be "\Ne do not outnumber the case TF 2-77 Mech is unable making their supporting to destroy them. Step One enemy overall, but we can attack into the first ridge line. includes moving the force to Suppressive fires by artillery overcome him by concen- the line of departure. While and mortars will shift to 348 trating against one enemy artillery, our mortar platoon, and 352, the second platoon at a time and by the mortar platoon of TF 2-5 ridgeline, as we dear the first capitalizing on the sup- Armor and2-5 Armor’s direct position.

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Step Two includes maneu- continue direct suppressive the enemy main defense line ver to the left by two teams fires in the right part of the from the flank so that enemy while the third provides zone without danger to platoons can be isolated and direct suppressive fire from friendly troops. Maneuver to destroyed in succession from 34-3-339. TF2-5 Armor can the left permits an assault on left to right.

4-27

464-458 0-85-11 —FM 71-2

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Step Three begins when the the enemy platoon in the shifted from 348. The two enemy platoons on Hill valley, and continues forward observer with the 348 have been destroyed. forward to Hill 355. This is team on 355 can make any The attacking teams on Hill key to the whole attack as it adjustments necessary while 348 can suppress the last sets up the assault on the team commander two enemy platoons on that Objective MUSKET. Field controls direct suppressive line while the rear team artillery and mortar fire will fires on the objective. attacks from Hill 343 have been hitting MUSKET through the woods, overruns for several minutes, as it was

4-28 FM 71-2-

!n Step Four the two teams 379 to 427, as the assault in steps 2 and 4 should be on 348 will move up behind force advances. organized around a mech the masking of338-355 and headquarters so that it has its again assault from the left, AH three teams should be own TOWs, and also mortars taking out enemy platoons organized mechanized to assist in suppressing. The one at a time. Fires will be infantry heavy. The team antitank platoon can be in shifted from left to right, from which is in single overwatch general support and move

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with the single team. It will due to the obstacle on the platoons on each enemy always be in good overwatch left. platoon in turn, and supports positions. The scout platoon, the brigade scheme of with two ground surveillance This plan will accomplish the maneuver by opening a radars, should screen the mission. It takes advantage of corridor for TF 2-4 Armor right flank. An enemy the unoccupied hill in front of while MUSKET is being counterattack is more likely the objective, allows mopped up. " to come from that direction concentration of at least six

4-29 —FM 71-2

The commander told the S3 immediately so that they indicated the line of to forget about a written could take the necessary departure, avenues of order for now, but to prepare reorganization actions as approach and the objective, overlays for distribution by soon as possible. and outlined the enemy and friendly situation. He then tracing them off of the When subordinate com- moved the group to a more commander's map. He also manders arrived at the OP, covered position and told him to put the task the task force commander explained the scheme of organization on the overlay, pointed out prominent maneuver, plan for fire and to alert the teams to it terrain features to them, support and other details.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION ¡SI äMSste

• Headquarters, A/2-76 • Headquarters, B/2-76 • Headquarters. C/2-4 Mech Mech Armor #2 mechanized infantry • 2 mechanized infantry • 2 mechanized infantry platoons platoons platoons • 1 tank platoon • 1 tank platoon • 1 tank platoon • 1 weapons platoon • 1 weapons platoon • 1 Redeye Tm (DS) • 81 mm mortar section • 81 mm mortar section • TOW section (2 TOWs) • TOW section (2 TOWs) • 1 Redeye Tm (OS) • 1 Redeye Tm (OS)

■ Ü

• Scout Platoon • Redeye Section

• 2 GSR • Ground Surveillance *2 TOW sections accom- Section (less 2 radars) • Heavy Mortar Platoon panied C Company upon # 1 Vulcan Platoon (DS) detachment at the direction • *Antitank Platoon (less of brigade. 2 sections) # 1 Engineer Platoon (DS)

r The commander presented must suppress to the front, platoon at the base of the hill his concept as follows: right front and right in and on the enemy platoon on conjunction with TF 2-5 Hill 352 across the valley. "Team A will lead across the Armor. The enemy platoon at STEP LD. The command group right must not interfere with While Team A assaults 1 comes next, followed by task force maneuver. through the woods and Team B, scout platoon, moves on to Hill 355, C will STEP antitank platoon and Team C. FSO will control indirect fire suppress. The A Tplatoon will 3 After securing Hill 343. on Hill 348. Instructions for follow Team A. Team A, antitank platoon and shifting direct fire on Hill 348 STEP Scouts with radar must be in 2 scouts with radar will to the right as the assault remain, while Teams B and C progresses will be given to position on Hills 355 and and the command group Team A on the command net. 348 before the final assault continue the attack to Hill As soon as Hill 348 is secure. starts. Control of fires on 348. Team A and AT platoon Team B will fire on the enemy Objective MUSKET will be V.

4-30 FM 71-2—

300

OBJ 400 427; 379 MUSKET

Ssi.

300 ' 2-76 STEP 4 TF 2-77

30n 300

300

C^352 STERî3s 348^

STEP 2 CM

CD 300 C343 VP /)

BEER STEP 1 \ 3OO \ LD ]

1x2 400 Es] the same as in the earlier Consolidation must be com- TF 2-4 Armor will meet it step. pleted quickly, both to insure first. that TF2 -4 Armor can take up If a counterattack develops momentum of the attack, and We must be prepared to carry from the right, the scouts so that we are ready to defeat on even if the enemy jams should see it first. Team A a counterattack. With that in our command net. Your and the A T platoon will be in mind. Team A will remain on understanding of my concept position to fire against it until Hill 355 and orient to the is a vita! part of our ability to Teams B and C have secured east. Team B on Hill 427 and do that. We'll have our usual MUSKET. Team C on Hill 379 will pyrotechnic capability for orient north. Team C can best signaling when we want fires S3, be sure to plan for assist passage of its normal lifted or shifted. Your CEO! suppression of enemy parent headquarters. If a has today’s system. Be sure positions across the river in counterattack comes from you follow it. Also, if ¡cannot case TF 2-77 Mech is unable the north, northeast or east, reach one of you on the to destroy them. We also we will have two teams in command net due to need to keep in close touch position to defeat it. If it jamming, / will call you on with the TF on our right. comes from the northwest. your net.

4-31 —FM 71-2

—1 v \

CËZ) 427 ^X379 • • 338 355 Ci ¿s ï- 3. / 5fó JS*

î% -«■ -ii 76 tí Âacæ '.ti/7 y sBKSæ ■r>~P «•^s-v

^¿5: NvVS

Combat trains will move up Reorganization must be breaking through the enemy behind Hill 338 during Step completed as quickly as regimental second echelon, 4 and move forward on order possible. The task force must then TF 2-76 Mech must be for reorganization. Priority be ready to defend, to attack, ready to exploit the for resupply is ammunition, or to follow TF 2-4 Armor. If breakthrough. " then fuel. TF 2-4 Armor is successful in

Other items considered and with combat trains and one leader with the battalion task decided upon were: with the command post. force command group. Since the platoon is split, the leader Heavy Mortar Platoon is Ground Surveillance cannot be with all four Radar Section (minus) is in general support. It moved weapons. By moving with the in general support. It planned into position in TF 2-5 command group, he will Armor's area well before the to move to Objective MUSKET during reorganiza- always be near part of the attack started. It would platoon, and responsive to tion, to set up surveillance displace forward to a position the commander. behind Hill 348 prior to Step sectors north and northeast. 4. Air Defense Platoon, in Engineers were instructed Redeye Section placed one direct support, moved two to move one squad with firing team in direct support Vulcans with Team A, two Team A so that if mines or of each company team, one with Team C, and the platoon tree blowdown blocked

4-32 FM 71-2— progress in Step 3, engineer fires on all known enemy ning. Staff officers moved off support would be available. locations, along the flanks, to supervise final preparation The remainder of the platoon and beyonçi Objective for the attack and to prepare a was to move with Teams B MUSKET, to best support record copy of the order. and C, close enough to assist maneuver of the battalion in overcoming any obstacle, task force. This attack involved a brigade but not in the lead of any penetration preceded by task assault. They were to destroy force penetrations. Task any bunkers encountered on After insuring that all aspects Force 2-76 Mech planned a Objective MUSKET. of the operation were series of envelopments to understood, the task force take advantage of the Field Artillery support commander released the opportunity to concentrate presented no special group to go about their against single enemy problems. The Fire Support separate tasks. Subordinate platoons by assaulting from Officer and forward observer commanders completed their the flank while suppressing parties planned suppressive reconnaissance and plan- from the front.

THE BATTALION TASK FORCE IN BRIGADE RESERVE

A brigade conducting a deliberate attack may often retain a two or three company battalion task force in reserve initially. The commander and staff of a battalion task force so designated face a planning task unlike any other, and in many ways more complex than the task of planning a main or supporting attack. A reserve is held initially to exploit success and continue an attack already under way, to maintain momentum of an attack by adding a fresh unit at a critical time, and to provide security.

To be responsive to the brigade commander’s needs, the reserve must be far enough forward to quickly move into action when directed to do so. On the other hand, it should not be so far forward as to be engaged by enemy direct fire weapons and mortars or it may be tied down prematurely and not be available to fire or maneuver at the direction of the brigade commander. Finally, while the PROPER POSITIONING OF THE enemy situation may be clear at the RESERVE IS ESSENTIAL TO ITS beginning of a deliberate attack, the situation EVENTUAL USE which will exist when the reserve is committed may not be known far in advance. All of these complicate the planning task. A battalion task force in brigade reserve may be instructed to prepare for a number of contingencies. Among these are:

Assist a leading task force. This may require overwatching, providing suppressive fire, or maneuvering. Any of these may require commitment of a single team or the entire task force. 4-33 -FM 71-2

Assume the mission of a leading task any of them, he will have information as to force. This requires the reserve task their scheme of maneuver and plan for fire force to attack through or around the support. When the attack is under way, there leading task force to secure the objective should be representatives of the reserve in the or objectives assigned to that task force. command posts of leading task forces. Many Attacking around is preferable for three reasons. First, a passage of lines can be brigades require the commander of the difficult in the best of times; the midst of reserve to join the brigade command group. an attack is not one of them. Second, Such an SOP provides the advantage of passage through the leading task force permitting the reserve commander to SEE will place the former reserve in a frontal the attack develop as the brigade commander approach to any enemy force facing the sees it and thus can get forewarning of passed unit. Third, if an opportunity commitment. Face to face with the higher sufficient to warrant commitment of the commander, there will be no time lost nor any reserve is present, it usually will not lie misunderstanding of the mission as might be in passing straight through a committed the case if orders are transmitted force but in going around it one way or electronically or by messenger. the other. In a fast moving operation, the reserve may move continuously behind a designated force. Deliberate attacks are likely to be If there is a “continue the attack” relatively slow. The reserve should plan to contingency which can be planned in as move on at least two routes so as to have much detail as the example of the mech heavy combat units well forward but should also task force deliberate attack, then the plan dispersal areas where portions of the commander should task organize for that task force can obtain cover or concealment if mission. If the situation is vague from the held up even momentarily. Movement on task force point of view, balanced teams may multiple routes and provision for dispersal be best. are both ways of providing security for the The reserve commander needs to know the task force, and make it more difficult for the brigade concept in great detail, including any enemy to detect the direction of the brigade clues as to when and where the brigade main effort. commander feels the reserve may be committed. He also needs the concepts of Continuing the example of the leading battalion task forces so that should deliberate attack, the task force in the reserve be committed through or around reserve is called upon.

Task Force 2-4 Armor, part of The commander of TF 2-4 objectives BAYONET and 3d Brigade, received the Armor followed the steps of MUSKET forward to Objec- warning order and order at troop leading procedure tive SABER, observation and the same times as TF 2-76 much as followed by fields of fire will be good, Mech. TF 2-4 Armor, in commander TF 2-76 Mech. especially from the hilltops. addition to moving behind TF He and other members of the Forested areas which largely 2-76 Mech as brigade battalion task force made a fill the low lying areas reserve initially, was told: detailed map reconnaissance between the LD and the first and moved to a series of objectives thin out and forward OPs to learn as much disappear beyond. Conceal- "and when the brigade has about the assigned zone as ment is available in the few broken through enemy possible, even though it was wooded areas, especially regimental first echelon beyond objectives MUSKET between MUSKET and Hill defense (secured MUSKET and BAYONET. 400-440, and in one area and BAYONET)...TF 2-4 between 400-440 and Armor will continue the Objective SABER. Cover is attack to secure Objective Analysis of the terrain found in low areas where SABER...” provided the following: From ridgelines mask them from

4-34 FM 71-2

••• BUD 3 U OBJ SABER wl 400 C

409 N « «a 400

yoa.

OBJ MUSKET 427 300 [SI 0379 394 ÍWI 3 300 TF 77 = TF 2- 76 OBJ YONET BA 3 0Q 300

other ridgelines. The river SABER, and along the hilltop and some minor between TF 2-77 and TF 2-76 brigade boundary, west of enemy activity. These are is an obstacle to vehicular Hill 409 to SABER, and one probably observation posts, movement. Beyond BAYO- exists through the forest with one platoon manning all NET the river bends to the beyond MUSKET, over Hill three. They may be occupied west. Forested areas in the 440, and on to SABER. by parts of two platoons. near distance can easily be Combinations can be used. SABER is fortified and negotiated by vehicles and The best avenue of approach occupied. If the enemy forests beyond MUSKET will is through the forest, east of follows the pattern of probably be the same. Hill 440, through the previous defenses this will be Objectives BAYONET and wooded area north of 440, a motorized company with MUSKET represent key and on to the east end of two platoons on 465-451. terrain. They will be under SABER. Hill 410 is fortified and friendly control when our occupied by at least a attack starts. SABER is key Enemy information available platoon. There will be more terrain as is Hill 400-440 from brigade indicates that units further north and east and the near ends of the BAYONET and MUSKET are but no information is adjacent hills, 409 and 410. occupied by the second available about that. The From MUSKET to SABER the echelon of forward bat- enemy regimental and zone consists of two cross talions. Beyond these we can division reserves have not compartments. Avenues of expect some light local been located. The enemy will approach appear to be security forces, especially on defend his present positions present along both bounda- 400, 440 and 409. There and will counterattack to try ries, that is, along the river, are indications of some to eliminate the 3d Brigade then west of Hill 400 to entrenchments on each penetration. y

4-35 — FM 71-2

Byl 130 hours the plans of TF 76 Mech was maneuvering single enemy platoons, and a 2-77 Mech and 2-76 Mech generally along its left way to defeat the enemy were available to the boundary and suppressing counterattack they believed commander of TF 2-4 Armor. enemy forces to the right, TF they would face. Liaison parties to both task 2-4 Armor should generally Considering MISSION forces had learned the follow the same route to (secure Objective SABER, set scheme of maneuver of each avoid becoming involved the stage for exploitation unnecessarily with remnants and reported to TF 2-4 Armor. through the remainder, if of enemy forces between the It was learned that Bayonet a ny, of the defense belt to the line of departure and and Musket would be enemy rear), ENEMY (at least MUSKET. assaulted at about 1500 four motorized rifle platoons hours and thatTF 2-4 Armor, They recognized the reinforced, a counter- which would be following TF likelihood of counterattack by attacking tank company), 2-76 Mech, could pass an enemy tank company, TERRAIN (series of key between the objectives possibly reinforced. While ridgelines, some forested before 1530 hours. there was no information areas) and WEATHER (clear, The commander and S3 of TF about tanks on Objective dry, onset of darkness), and, 2-4 Armor recognized the SABER, a strong possibility TROOPS available (two tank desirability of moving out to existed that some tanks were companies, mechanized continue the attack toward present. The commander and infantry company, combat SABER with minimum delay. S3 estimated the overall support company, air They also recognized the combat power ratio to be defense platoon, engineer advantage of passing around about two to one and realized platoon, and supporting TF 2-76 rather than through that their plan must include artillery) the commander and it, over the top of Objective both a way to concentrate staff of TF 2-4 Armor made MUSKET. Further, since 2- several platoons against the following plan:

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION SI» • Co A/2-4 Armor (-) • Co B/2-4 Armor (-) • Co C/2-76 Mech (-) • 1/C/2-76 Mech • 2/C/2-76 Mech • 1 / A/2-4 Armor • 1 Redeye Tm (DS) • 1 Redeye Tm (DS) • 2/B/2-4 Armor • 2 TOW Sec • 1 Redeye Tm (DS)

• Scout Pit • GSR Sec • 2/B/421 ADA (DS) • Hvy Mort Pit • Redeye Sec • 2/C/52 Engr (DS) \ ' J

The task force will move out second ridgeline (Hill 348). Mech do not interfere with in order of Scout Platoon, Team A should move to a each other. When TF 2-76 Team A, Team B, GSR dispersal area vicinity of Mech starts their assault on section, Heavy Mortar checkpoint #1 after the Objective MUSKET, Team A Platoon, Engineer Platoon, forces of TF 2-76 Mech should move toward CP, Team C, and combat depart, so as not to interfere checkpoint 2. Scout Platoon trains with AVLB section. with their movement. Scout continues to maintain The task force will not pass Platoon will maintain contact contact with TD 2-76 while through positions of TF 2-5 with the rear of TF 2-76 Mech TF 2-4 Armor passes west of Armor near the LD until TF and insure that Team A and Objective MUSKET. Some 2-76 Mech has secured their the combat trains of TF 2-76 suppressive fire to the front V

4-36 FM 71-2—

465--^ O BJ EGTI451 410 SABER I v. j

440 400 409

'^5X5=3: tiQn5T<2£ A^v^-îC?-' ôr* riT-'—394 ^ 427 -4? 379 Sr: OBJECTIVE MUSKET fg? V

h 348 =T:

’■ Wv. 3^»-« y^'vr''- ■" '•'•

V! ■xrx

SS 1 i

‘AJâ.-z ^v. C *fv

-V.

may be provided by TF 2-76 Team B will move to a point secure the GSR section will Mech. Also it will have to d i rectly south of 440 a nd wi 11 join Team C. Scouts will be resupply so that they will be suppress 440 and 410. observing the north side of ready to continue the attack Team C will move through MUSKET to insure that or assist in defeating a larger the forest generally due remnants of enemy forces do enemy counterattack. north and assault to secure not surprise TF 24 Armor in Upon passage by Objective Hill 440. If it is necessary. the forest from the south. MUSKET, Team A will stay Team C will also assault west Thereafter scouts will move inside the woodline until it along the south side of the to screen the left flank of the reaches a pointdirectly south hill to eliminate the other task force. Heavy Mortar of the saddle between Hills local enemy security, OP, or Platoon will be available to 440 and 409. From there it whatever force remains fire in support of Team Cfrom will suppress 409 and 410. there. Once Hill 400/440 is a position near MUSKET.

4-37 —FM 71-2

SU Lu/ fefcr/-^ÔT-,

C 465as 45 OBJECTIVE^SABER J: MIO jr^TS 2î?

v rru 3ï FY

=v^ V L v= /_/

SM^ Li' X: Lv \

i-L_¿ 1$

--7>-Sî-r c< \

v yy, NX

When Team C has 400-440 from the right flank. Team A much as possible. Team B under control it will will lead initially. From the should leave some force on commence suppression of woods onward Team B will Hill 451 to secure it and Objective SABER and 410 be on the right, Team A on protect the rear of assaulting with direct fire and control the lëft. I will move with forces. indirect fire on SABER, 410 Team A and will control the and 409. Teams A and Bwill assault personally. SABER Fires on 465-451 will be then move quickly through includes a smaller occupied shifted left as the assault the saddle between 440 and hill farther north, so progresses but will continue 409, through the small assaulting teams must use on 409, 410 and the north wooded area and into SABER masking of Hill 465-451 as hill in SABER.

4-38 FM 71-2—

SsET\ v » rtî^QÂ 465 C_) 451 CD 410

44 400 / ZE5 [3X55x1

As soon as 465-451 is Team C should keep the artillery fire will be overrun, Teams A and B will woods between them and concentrated on the place direct suppressive fire any enemy forces beyond the remaining portion of SABER on the northern hill while brigade boundary. Taskforce under enemy control until Team C maneuvers by the mortars will continue to lifted by Team C. most direct route to assault. suppress Hill 410, and

& s 465 451 K V:

440 400

HO OR

V 'S Once all of Objective Saber is planning for defense of scouts will overwatch to occupied, the mortar platoon SABER will be among the detect a counterattack as can locate behind Hill 440 first priorities as soon as it is early as possible. If it comes while combat trains come secured. Such planning can during step 2, Team C must forward along the route of be done in detail only after relocate as necessary to Team C. The general plan for the actual ground can be deliver direct fire against it consolidation will be as seen. and to adjust indirect fires follows: Team A on the left will orient northwest; Team C An enemy counterattack can until the task force command in the center will orient come from the west, north, group is áble to take control north; Team B on the right northeast, east or southeast. of that fight. will orient east. Teams A and The task force is most B will have radars. The scout vulnerable during step 2 Redeye, air defense platoon, platoon will outpost Hill 400 while Teams A and B are engineers and field artillery and Hill 440 and will have a maneuvering to SABER and were employed as described radar on each. Detailed fire assaulting. Team C and for TF 2-76 Mech.

4-39 FM 71-2

©¡Exploitation avid Pursuit. The ultimate force operates in an exploitation the same as objective of combat operations is destruction in movements to contact, ready to conduct of the enemy’s armed forces and their will to hasty attacks to destroy vulnerable targets. resist. Exploitation and pursuit accomplish this objective. Commanders must always Exploitation may be limited more by keep this in mind and be prepared to exploit vehicle breakdown and by fuel than by success whenever the opportunity presents combat losses and ammunition. Exploitation itself. will be continued day and night as long as the Breakthrough may be achieved abruptly or opportunity permits. Plans made for other gradually. Enemy defenses consist of belts, offensive operations should include echelons and lines of positions. Having provisions for exploitation. This means that broken through one, it is often necessary to combat service support must always be move to and break through the next. The present and responsive. As the exploiting more rapidly this can be done, the less likely force penetrates deeper into enemy rear that succeeding lines will be fully prepared. areas, the length of supply lines obviously When it can be recognized that the enemy is increases. Adequate stocks of fuel, spare having trouble maintaining overall parts and food, as well as of ammunition, continuity, exploitation and pursuit will be should accompany the force. Momentum of ordered. Indicators that the enemy is in the exploitation must not be lost for lack of trouble are: support. Lines of communication must be secured. □ Decreasing resistance □ Increasing numbers of prisoners One battalion task force operating behind enemy lines can damage the enemy more □ Overrunning artillery positions than many struggling through main defense □ Overrunning command posts positions. Destruction of undefended or □ Overrunning signal installations lightly defended installations costs few casualties. The ability to penetrate to the □ Overrunning supply dumps enemy rear and destroy support activities □ Overrunning supporting units rapidly is the major advantage and major goal of mounted operations. In both exploitation and pursuit EXPLOITATION operations, the task force will often have The purpose of exploitation is to prevent dedicated field artillery battery support and the enemy from reconstituting an organized the battery moves with the task force. defense or conducting orderly withdrawal. Normally all combat service support This is done by rapidly advancing toward the elements move with the task force. As a enemy rear area, bypassing small pockets of general rule, four to six days of supplies resistance, and by destroying lightly should be carried. Disabled vehicles which defended and undefended installations and can readily be repaired are towed forward to activities. A battalion task force exploits as be repaired at the earliest opportunity. part of a larger force and is usually assigned a terrain objective, often a great distance away. This objective may or may not be a critical area which must be secured. The objective of an exploiting force may be a critical EXPLODTATOOR! DS AN ONGOING communications center, port, mountain pass, or similar area, which if captured will PROCESS, ONCUUDED DN ALL contribute significantly to destruction of PLANS FOR THE OFFENSE organized enemy resistemce. Or, the objective may simply be a point of orientation, and serve no other purpose. The battalion task

4-40 FM 71-2— PURSUIT The purpose of pursuit is to complete Mechanized infantry and tank units destruction of an enemy force which has lost perform equally well in encircling or direct the ability to defend or delay in organized pressure missions. The combination of fashion and is attempting to disengage and mobility and armor protected firepower withdraw. In exploitation, the attacking permit them to maneuver to successive force seeks to avoid enemy units in order to advantages over the enemy. Adequate destroy the enemy support system; in pursuit, combat service support is at least as the attacker focuses on the major enemy important in pursuit as it is in exploitation. force. Terrain objectives may be assigned to Combat support may be more important in orient pursuing forces and will usually be pursuit. Field artillery units are integrated very deep. A division, for example, having into pursuing units so that they will always broken through enemy defenses along the be available to fire into and beyond retreating Mississippi River, might be ordered to enemy columns. Engineers must be well “pursue enemy forces toward Kansas City.” forward so that hastily erected barricades Pursuit operations require: and natural obstacles will not impede progress of pursuing units or permit contact [ 1 I a direct pressure force: to be lost or permit enemy forces to to deny enemy units any chance to rest, reorganize. regroup, or resupply, by keeping them in flight. A follow and support force is usually employed in exploitation and pursuit m an encircling force: operations. Such a force is not a reserve but is to envelop the fleeing force, cut its escape committed to accomplish any or all of these route, and in conjunction with the direct tasks: pressure force, attack to destroy the enemy force. •Destroy bypassed enemy units. Battalion task forces usually pursue as part •Relieve in place any supported units of larger units. A battalion task force may which have halted to contain enemy operate alone or as part of a larger unit in forces. either the direct pressure or the encircling • Block movement of reinforcements. force. • Secure lines of communication. •Guard prisoners, key areas, installations. The direct pressure force conducts hasty attacks, always maintaining contact and •Control refugees. forward momentum. The enemy is harrassed, driven backward, weakened and attacked until it ceases to exist. A battalion task force operating as the The encircling force moves as swiftly as follow and support force is normally possible by the most advantageous route to responsive to the headquarters controlling cut off enemy retreat. If necessary, it adopts the leading force. hasty defense behind the enemy to block it. Caught between two forces, unprepared and unable to defend, the enemy must surrender ^Reconnaissance in Force. A or die. reconnaissance in force (RIF) is an operation to discover and test enemy disposition, composition and strength, to obtain other When attack helicopter units and airmobile information, and to develop the situation. A forces are available to the larger force, they battalion task force or cavalry squadron is are most often used as the encircling force normally the smallest unit which conducts while ground units are used in the direct RIF, and may be used independently or as pressure role. part of a larger force. 4-41 -FM 71 "2

The decision to conduct RIF operations is The reconnoitering force may secure its made by a higher commander who believes assigned objective and cause little or no that: enemy reaction, or the reconnoitering force may cause violent enemy reaction far short of 1. The information to be gained is of the assigned objective. vital importance. 2. The information cannot be gained from any other source. ^^Raid. A raid is an attack into enemy-held 3. The risk of revealing future plans is territory for a specific purpose and with no outweighed by the value of informa- intention of gaining or holding terrain. The • tion to be gained. raiding force always withdraws after it 4. The risk of danger to the force is out- accomplishes its mission. Raids may be weighed by the value of information conducted for a variety of purposes: to be gained. 1. Capture prisoners. A higher commander ordering a RIF must be prepared to explöit successes and enemy 2. Capture or destroy specific enemy weaknesses, or to extricate the force should it materiel. become necessary. 3. Disrupt enemy plans. 4. Obtain information about enemy: As part of a larger force conducting RIF, a battalion task force may be ordered to remain ■ units in defensive positions, prepared to: ■ locations ■ dispositions 1. Attack to exploit success of the maneuvering force or to exploit ■ strength or weaknesses enemy weakness detected by the m methods of operation maneuver force. 2. Support the maneuvering force by Security is vital because the raiding force fire or by fire and maneuver. is vulnerable to attack from all directions. Surprise and speed are of great importance to RIF is conducted against an enemy force mission accomplishment and survival of the known to exist but about which other raiding force. Raids may be conducted information is insufficient. It is planned and dismounted, motorized, mechanized, or by executed like a deliberate attack except for airmobile or watermobile means. A battalion the lack of detailed knowledge of the enemy. task force raid is normally conducted The headquarters ordering RIF usually mounted. For details of raids conducted selects a terrain objective which, if dismounted or by any means other than threatened or occupied, will cause the enemy with infantry carriers and tanks, see FM to react. The RIF mission may require: 7-10, The Rifle Company; 7-20, The Battalion (Infantry/Airborne/Air 1. Attack to secure an objective;prepare Assault/Ranger); 90-4, Air Mobile to continue the attack. Operations. 2. Attack toward an objective; return to friendly positions, when enemy RAID OBJECTIVES forces react in a specified way. When a battalion task force receives a raid 3. Sweep through enemy held territory mission the purpose will be stated in some and return to friendly positions. detail. This may be: 4-42 FM 71-2—

“Capture at least one commissioned officer” by temporarily occupying terrain which © dominates the route. “Capture one multiple rocket launcher” RETURN TO FRIENDLY LINES © Forces in the area into which the raiding “Draw the enemy’s attention west of force will pass must be prepared to assist the passage and to provide direct fire support if STRANGER CREEK.” enemy forces are pursuing. Coordination of primary and alternate passage points or In such cases the exact location of the raid lanes must be completed prior to the raid. may or may not be specified, and the task force commander may choose it himself. Other purposes include rather specific CONDUCT OF RAIDS guidance as to where the redd is to be Two general types of raids are common. conducted. Examples of these are: The first is one in which the force moves to, around or behind the objective or objective “Destroy the railroad bridge at EKRON” area as stealthily as possible so as to achieve surprise in its assault. Upon completion of © the specified task, the raiding force moves “Break up the enemy troop concentration at rapidly back to an area under friendly coordinates XY 4272.” control. This type of raid is well suited to missions requiring capture of prisoners or TIME OF RAID capture or destruction of specific enemy materiel. The second is one in which the force As with objectives, the time may be sweeps out of its positions, moves rapidly and specified, usually to coincide with other violently through an enemy-held area, offensive operations, either to support them destroying whatever is in its path, and or to be supported by them. If the time is not sweeps on to friendly lines. This type of raid is specified, the task force commander should well suited to missions related to consider launching the operation so as to reconnaissance in force, those requiring arrive in the objective area in the morning or destruction of a mobile force or facility in a evening twilight or during weather general area, and those intended to disrupt conditions causing low visibility. This will enemy plans. limit enemy observation and their ability to detect the raiding force, yet provide enough COMBAT SUPPORT light for close combat. Field artillery support must be carefully planned so that the battalion task force has ROUTES TO AND FROM THE such support continuously available. This OBJECTIVE AREA can usually be provided by field artillery units positioned behind friendly lines. In The raiding force should move to and from exceptional cases, some field artillery may the objective area by different routes. move with the task force. If enemy air attack Protection afforded by terrain should be used is possible while the force is beyond normal as much as possible, especially in daylight. air defense protection range, then some air Unless the enemy situation is known in great defense systems, in addition to Redeye, detail, a battalion task force should provide should be provided. Engineers will be an advance guard or advance security. A required in the raiding force to prepare and company team so employed will normally detonate demolition charges if the mission is move using appropriate movement to destroy certain kinds of enemy facilities. techniques until contact is made. During They may also be required if engineering is withdrawal from the objective area, the task necessary for movement of the force, force must keep its route open by using fire or especially in withdrawal. 4-43 I

—FM 71-2

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT The task force commander should have especially the withdrawal. Some sufficient means to accomplish the mission maintenance capability should be present so without resupply from outside the force. that quick repairs can be made. Severely Raids will often be of short duration and the damaged vehicles must be destroyed and force can complete it with onboard fuel and abandoned. Casualties must not be left ammunition. If there is a requirement for behind. They will normally be evacuated resupply of these, the commander must take with the task force main body. Under them with the force. Addition of resupply exceptional circumstances they may be vehicles complicates the overall task, evacuated by helicopter.

MOW TO CONDUCT A BYPASS An enemy force so small or so lacking in following forces or until they surrender. mobility as to pose little or no threat may be Because the attacker has the initiative, the bypassed. If the enemy force does represent a force assigned the task of containing the significant threat, it must be destroyed or enemy may be smaller than the force fixed in position. Guidelines from the brigade contained. They carry out their mission by commander, such as whether there are using direct and indirect fire suppression, following forces and the speed required by the pinning down the enemy force so that it mission must be considered. Any bypassed cannot maneuver against or fire effectively enemy must be reported so that following on the bypassing forces. forces will not be surprised. While the battalion task force may bypass some enemy units, it will be necessary to The following scenario illustrates one way the battalion task force can contain others until they can be destroyed by conduct a bypass.

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4-45 —FM 71-2

Actions on contact at each information that there is a non-interference with the level are taken immediately. route around the enemy, and bypass and moves the other The platoon returns fire, based upon his own teams rapidly. The combina- deploys, reports and observation from his position tion of arms properly applied attempts to develop the well forward, realizes that he in rapid reaction to a situation. The battalion task can bypass the enemy by relatively immobile enemy force commander has two routes which are covered mutually supporting com- most of the way. By ordering maintains forward momen- pany teams, either or both of the company team in contact tum of the battalion task which can assault the enemy to continue to suppress the force. position. He also receives enemy, he further insures

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Battalion task force com- Company team in contact CP 16, and becomes right mander decides to bypass to continues suppression until lead. the right and continue his battalion task force has advance. He reports to crossed stream east of CP One tank in the platoon first brigade commander who 16, then becomes rear engaged by the enemy was agrees. He requests company team. Company hit. It is towed to the task additional field artillery HE team now in rear leads force axis of advance in the and smoke on the enemy across the stream, then vicinity of CP 11. Two position and possible becomes left lead. Company wounded crewmen are positions at CP 16 and team now on left follows on evacuated by the team directs bypass to the right. axis CP 9 to CP 11 to east of aidmen.

4-46 FM 71-2—

HOW TO ATTACK WHEN VISIBILITY IS LIMITED The battalion task force will often move to dependent on the extent to which visibility is contact and attack during night and other limited and the availability of night vision periods of limited visibility. Offensive opera- devices to both the attacker and defender. tions during such periods have the advantage During periods of darkness with high of striking a defender when the range of his ambient light levels, passive night vision observation and antiarmor weapons is devices will allow the battle to be fought reduced, and mutual support between using daylight tactics; however, detection positions is limited. Such operations will be and engagement ranges, length of bounds, conducted to: and the ability to move mounted on covered and concealed routes are reduced. When • Achieve surprise ambient light levels are very low, or when the • Exploit earlier success defender has an advantage in night vision devices, illumination is used when favorable 9 Maintain momentum to the attacker. • Rupture strong enemy defenses MOperations in Periods of Limited •Minimize enemy mutual support. Visibility. Visibility limited by snow, rain, fog, or smoke presents special problems in ■ Operations A t Night. Modem devices for both navigation and in maneuver of forces. night vision provide the battalion task force Target acquisition is complicated by the with the capability of fighting at night much difficulty of identifying friends and foes. as in daylight, modified by reduced engagement ranges. White light artificial illumination with all its inaccuracies would PERSONAL DISCOMFORT IS BUT be used only when night vision devices are ONE OF MANY not available in sufficient quantities, when ambient light levels are very low, or when the PROBLEMS CREATED BY enemy has an advantage in night vision INCLEMENT WEATHER equipment. Flares have the disadvantage of being unable to discriminate between friend and foe, and may illuminate both. Changes in Human efficiency is reduced by the wind direction can result in exposure of the inability to see, and many tasks, simple in attack while defenders hide in the shadows. warm, dry weather, become difficult to Searchlights and other active illumination perform in snow or rain. Encumbered by means disclose their sources. The side which parkas, raincoat or poncho, mittens, or other is equipped with passive devices has a special clothing, soldiers will need extra time distinct advantage over the side which is not. to accomplish basic tasks and will tire more Techniques for using artificial quickly. Radar efficiency is reduced in snow, illumination are explained in FM 71-1, rain, fog or smoke, and night vision devices The Tank and Mechanized Infantry are of little help. Company Team. Dismounted operations The extra problems created by extremely are explained in FM 7-10, The Rifle limited visibility should not discourage Company and FM 7-20, The Battalion planners, for each can be overcome. (Infantry/Airborne/Air Assault/ Remember too, the enemy has the same Ranger). problems and more. He does not know when At night, the attacker has increased and where the attack will come and any difficulty with command and control, factor which limits the range of weapons navigation, coordination and use of fires, and favors the attacker. Additionally, it will take identification of friendly forces. ATOM have the enemy longer to concentrate no night sight and will have a greatly reduced reinforcements against the attack. Limited range unless illumination is used. The visibility will often create the conditions advantage given by illumination is necessary for a successful attack. 4-47 —FM 71-2

Suppression requirements are normally then decide to wait for darkness or the arrival less because enemy direct fire weapons and of bad weather or fog. He devises a simple indirect fire observers will already be concept to maneuver his forces up to or restricted. Reconnaissance should be between the positions of the enemy to put conducted by leaders at all levels, as in night them on terrain which facilitates the operations. Plans should be detailed and destruction of the enemy after visibility coordinated, but above all else, must be improves. He chooses terrain objectives SIMPLE. which he believes are void of enemy forces, and attempts to give each leader an ^Movement to Contact. Routes are chosen opportunity to observe as much of the terrain along terrain which facilitates navigation as possible during good visibility. This short and control. At team level, movement distance attack (4-5 km from the LD to the techniques are determined not only by objectives) could often result in the enemy likelihood of enemy contact but also by the deciding that the integrity of his defense has capability to overwatch even when contact is been compromised, and force him to expected since bounding may only add withdraw. In a sense this attack resembles an confusion. Scouts will reconnoiter ahead of infiltration, except it is conducted mounted the task force when possible. The task force and the enemy undoubtedly will know he has normally moves with a single team leading to been penetrated or outflanked. Contact is facilitate security. Engineers often move with avoided whenever possible. the lead team to allow rapid breaching of obstacles. At night, illumination fires are planned along the route and IR detection devices are employed throughout the task 2) ATTACK BY INFILTRATION force to acquire enemy IR devices. A dismounted infantry force using Navigation is eased by vectoring units with infiltration techniques moves around or GSR, by choosing routes that parallel between enemy positions to secure terrain identifiable terrain features, or by firing key to the continued forward movement of the preplanned indirect fire along the route task force. Moving with stealth, the force ahead. moves so as to avoid contact. Ideally the objective will be void of enemy—if not, the ^Attack. There are three types of limited dismounted element usually awaits the visibility attacks normally conducted by the arrival of daylight to conduct its final battalion task force. assault. Since control of the final assault is difficult during severely limited visibility, it should not be conducted unless some Movement to a more favorable significant advantages accrue to the © position (for a daylight attack). attacker. The timing of the final assault should be coordinated with that of the Attack by infiltration (by dismounted mounted elements so that the enemy cannot © elements). concentrate combat power against one at a time. When conducting such an attack, plans Attack of an occupied objective. must be made to have APCs and tanks rejoin ® the dismounted elements as early as possible.

MOVEMENT TO A MORE FAVORABLE © POSITION oA ATTACK OF AN OCCUPIED When attacking an enemy disposed in OBJECTIVE positions affording good mutual support with The manner in which a battalion task force SAGGERS, the last 3000 meters of the attacks an objective during periods of limited approach may produce unacceptable vehicle visibility parallels techniques used during a losses on the task force. The commander may daylight deliberate attack. Detailed

4-48 FM 71-2-

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enemy obstacles ahead of the mounted {3Commmtd & Control. Command and elements. Illumination fires are planned and control will be primarily by radio once the called when required—normally not until the attack begins. Insofar as they can be seen, final assaults are made. Smoke should be visual aids for recognition may assist in planned to cover movements, since the enemy control of forces. Color panels, arm bands, will undoubtedly have night vision devices. luminous strips or patterns may help. Field artillery and mortar fires may be used to Indirect fires will be difficult to adjust. If deceive the enemy and hide the sound of doubt exists as to relative locations of the vehicle movement, as well as to suppress his proposed target and friendly troops, the fires positions. Deception measures can be should be initially placed beyond the target effective in misleading the enemy as to the and “walked” onto the target. Objectives will location and time of the attack. The concept usually be smaller than normal and must be must be to move as close to the enemy’s sufficiently prominent to be found. positions as possible without having to Additional control measures which may be fight—then overwhelm him with carefully required, are shown. planned final assaults.

When passive devices are ineffective, navigation and control can be simplified in various ways. Maneuver forces can guide on ADDITSOhlAL roads, streams, rail lines or other identifiable CONTROL MEASURES terrain feature. Ground surveillance radar can vector a friendly force as long as a line of sight and communications are maintained. A stabilized gun can be laid in the desired direction of movement and “followed,” the attacking units can guide on artillery or □ Organization of Force. Scouts may be tracers fired on the objective, and, of course, used in front of the lead teams, along one compasses can be used. flank of the task force, or for movement control. A combined arms reserve is normally retained and often moves closer behind the Distances to be covered should be relatively leading teams than in daylight operations. shallow (1-3 km from LD to objective). Fire and maneuver by company teams will be Leaders at all levels should have the used less often than in daylight operations, opportunity to observe the terrain during and frontages will be narrower. Long-range good visibility all the way to the objectives. weapons, such as TOW, should maneuver Detailed plans are made all the way down to where they can be protected, yet readily squad level. When final assaults to clear available for employment when visibility objectives are required, they should be improves. planned to take place to facilitate control at least as high as platoon level—at first light or when fog allows about 100 meters visibility. \Z\Movement. Technique of movement may If this is not possible, the commander should depend more on conditions of visibility than anticipate the need to use artificial on likelihood of enemy contact. Units and illumination, and time all his final assaults vehicles may move closer together to keep in so that the use by one element will not sight, but should always avoid nose to tail unnecessarily expose another. When an closeness to preclude unnecessary casualties overwatch force is used, its weapon systems from area fire. Additionally, the conditions of should move into position just prior to limited visibility could unexpectedly change darkness to aid laying on targets, being and leave the task force in a very unfavorable cautious to avoid disclosing the commanders’ situation. As in any attack, covered and plan. concealed routes are important. FM 71-2

PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT The probable line of deployment should be easily identifiable terrain feature (road, trail or wood line, etc.). This is the location from which the assault OBJECTIVE RALLY POINT is conducted if enemy contact Selected by the commander of a DIRECTION OF ATTACK has not already been made. dismounted infiltration. Used as (Assignedby battalion task force.) A highly restrictive control an assembly area from which measure which a unit must the leaders can conduct a final follow and from which it does reconnaissance of the objec- not deviate except to maneuver tive, revise their plan and issue against enemy forces inter- final orders. fering with the advance. Because of its restrictive nature, a direction of attack should be used only if this degree of control is essential to the overall plan. (Assigned by battalion task force.)

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LIMIT OF ADVANCE fm To retain control and prevent the assaulting elements from being endangered by friendly fires, the commander establishes a limit of advance. This limit of advance should be easily recognizable under conditions POINT OF DEPARTURE of reduced visibility. It should This point is where the be far enough beyond and to the attacking platoons cross the flanks of the objective to allow line of departure. Platoons will space for security elements to normally cross traveling. The perform their mission. Fire point of departure should support elements can engage be readily identifiable and, if enemy forces beyond this line necessary, guides should be without clearance from the posted to facilitate control. supported unit. (Assigned by (Selected by company team.) battalion task.force.)

464-458 0-85-12 4-51 — FM 71-2

HOW ATTACK HELICOPTERS ARE USED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Attack helicopter units are employed as integral parts of a combined arms force. They are maneuver units, especially suited for situations in which time is critical, when there are inadequate ground forces, or ground forces are restricted by terrain. Using their speed, mobility, flexibility, and armor-defeating firepower, attack helicopter units can quickly respond to a threat, rapidly mass firepower, and exploit enemy weakness. Attack helicopter units are integrated into the tactical plan of the ground force commander, complementing his scheme of maneuver and enhancing the capabilities of both attack helicopter and ground combat forces. ATTACK HELICOPTER UNITS Regardless of the type of operation being PROVIDE ONE OF THE MOST conducted by higher HQ, attack helicopter VERSATILE, EFFICIENT AND units will normally be tasked to destroy EFFECTIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS armor and mechanized forces. They are FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS attack oriented and are most effective when attacking a moving enemy force. Attack helicopter units normally have considerably greater mobility than ground combat units. They can move rapidly to a critical point at a critical time and concentrate to strike the enemy where and when he is most vulnerable. Attack helicopter units operate most efficiently when their unit integrity is maintained. The attack helicopter battalion reinforces ground units with companies in one or more locations, reconstituting rapidly for employment against another threat. By rotating platoons within companies, or companies within battalions, attack helicopter units can maintain continuous P pressure on the enemy. Alternatively, given adequate terrain and lucrative targets, attack helicopter units can mass their entire firepower for a short period of time. The fighting capability of attack helicopter units is limited by conditions of reduced visibility which inhibits the ability of aircraft to fly and of men and machines to acquire targets. When night vision devices are fully

4-52 FM 71-2—

developed, attack helicopter units’ night ■ Attack pockets of resistance bypassed by fighting capabilities will increase the main force. significantly. ■ Attack withdrawing eneifcy forces or Attack helicopters combine their enemy reserve forcesi antiarmor fires with those of ground combat forces to: ■ Engage enemy counitera$ta

GENERAL SITUATION An attack helicopter company has been placed under operational control of an attacking brigade. The brigade commander has retained the AH company in a rear position to react to the needs of the brigade. As the brigade moves forward, the AH company will reposition by bounds to remain close to the lead ground forces. The AH company establishes liaison with each task force to provide for continuous coordination and rapid commitment of an attack helicopter team, platoon or the whole company.

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4-53 —FM 71-2

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4-55 FM 71-2

ATTACK WITHDRAWING ENEMY FORCES OR ENEMY RESERVE FORCES

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4-56 FM 71-2—

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HOW TO BREACH OBSTACLES The Threat plans to use obstacles to impede our advance and to canalize our forces. The task force commander cannot afford to lose The fundamentals of breaching operations the forward momentum of the offense and are: must be prepared to continue in spite of • Suppress enemy weapons using all obstacles. The unit may bypass, “force available fires. through,” or breach such obstacles. • Obscure the obstacle with smoke over a If an obstacle is bypassed, its nature and large area to prevent enemy observa- location must be reported to brigade. Note tion. that if a defender has taken time to construct an obstacle, he most likely is covering the • Secure the far side of the obstacle. bypass routes by fire. Conduct the bypass • Reduce the obstacle. with attention to cover, concealment, and suppression. “Forcing through” is attempted when no A hasty breach is done quickly, with little other way to cross the obstacle is possible. reconnaissance or planning. Company teams Minefields, for example, may be forced, but should be able to perform a hasty breach expect considerable loss to vehicles and without engineer support. A deliberate soldiers. The mission is the overriding factor. breach is preferred if there is time for Unfordable streams and concrete or steel reconnaissance and planning for special obstacles cannot be “forced through.” If they breaching devices. Engineer support for the cannot be bypassed, they must be breached. company teams is necessary.

4-57 —FM 71-2

may hold up armor vehicles long enough to HOW TO COMBAT SPECIFIC offer the enemy a good target. Boobytraps or OBSTACLES other antihandling devices must be The momentum of the offense neutralized if the obstacle is to be cleared. must be returned. Obstacles must not impede movement for I Tank Ditches and Craters are usually unusually long periods of time. reinforced with wire and mines. A dozer tank or CEV can be used to push down the sides of ditches or to fill in craters. If gaps are 60 feet H Minefields will differ in layout and or less, AVLBs can be used. Engineers can composition, depending on availability of use explosives to cave in the sides of ditches. mines and nature of avenues of approach. Whenever possible, mines are detonated in H Wire Entanglements alone are not a place. Breaching equipment includes CEV significant obstacle to mounted forces. (combat engineer vehicle), explosives However, wire can be a nuisance by (including hand-placed), rocket-projected line damaging suspension systems or halting charges, direct-fire weapons and, in the vehicles long enough for soldiers to cut it future, SLUFAE (surface launched fuel-air away. Bangalore torpedoes and explosives explosives). When the battalion task force are used to clear wire. CEV demolition guns must breach a minefield to continue the and tank and indirect fire will reduce the advance, it must often use mechanized obstacle. infantry to make the initial breach. As a general rule, tanks support by fire from a position to the flanks of the actual point of I Water Obstacles can slow the advance. entry into the minefield. Infantry platoons Unless it is involved in a large scale river are designated to conduct probing actions crossing operation, the battalion task force and open lanes through the minefield. Each cannot expect much engineer bridging lane normally requires one infantry platoon support. It will most often perform hasty for clearance. Indirect and direct fire crossings, using AVLBs where possible. weapons suppress and smoke the far side of When leading elements report a water the obstacle. obstacle, the following information is obtained if possible: For additional information about how • Obstacle Depth. mechanized infantry company teams conduct breaching operations and how • Stream Velocity. tank company teams employ rocket fuel • Possible Entry and Exit Points. air explosives, refer to Chapter 4, FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized • Enemy Situation. Infantry Company Team. When crossing water obstacles, infantry W Abatis, Stumps, Posts, and other Log secures the far shore, tanks support by fire, Obstacles can be overcome using the same and field artillery and mortars suppress. fundamentals—suppress enemy weapons, Engineers can improve the entrance banks secure the far side, clear a lane. Demolitions initially and then clear obstacles on the far reduce all log obstacles quickly. If shore. demolitions are not available, use saws and axes to cut through. Use vehicles to pull logs For additional information on out of the lane. company team operations at water obstacles, the reader should refer to WCribs and Hurdles reinforced by Appendix M, FM 71-1, The Tank and boobytraps and other antihandling devices Mechanized Infantry Company Team. 4-58 FM 71-2—

SUMMARY The winner must attack. The battle is not won until the enemy is destroyed and his will to continue the fight has been crumbled. To win, the task force commander must understand the enemy’s pattern of battle, see the battlefield, use weapon systems to best advantage, concentrate overwhelming combat power, and destroy the enemy.

Regardless of the name given the larger operation (movement to contact, hasty or deliberate attack, reconnaissance-in-force, exploitation or pursuit), the task force is usually attacking.

The attacking force seeks contact, develops the situation, penetrates or envelops the enemy, and continues the mission of defeating the enemy.

All advantages of the combined arms team are brought to bear.

Organization of the task force maximizes capabilities and minimizes vulnerabilities.

The task force must use the benefits of cover, concealment, suppression, and teamwork.

4-59

CHAPTER 5 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW

___ o THE US ARMY will most likely conduct defensive operations at the beginning of the next war. Defeating enemy attacks will be of paramount importance until we can concentrate the force necessary for offensive victory. The defender has many inherent advantages and the task force commander must put each one to best use. He must understand the concept of the defense and apply the fundamentals which will make the defense successful. An understanding of how the enemy larger scope, he must conduct an active attacks will aid him in planning and defense, blunting the attack at one place, organizing the defense. Since it is also likely then concentrating combat power at another that the defender will be outnumbered in the place to thwart the enemy’s advance.

CONTENTS

PAGE OVERVIEW 5-1 Howto Allocate Weapon Systems 5-27 Concept of the Defense 5-2 How to Concentrate Forces 5-27 Fundamentals of the Defense 5-4 How to Organize a Strongpoint 5-28 Reinforcing the Terrain 5-30 HOWTHE ENEMY ATTACKS 5-5 Command and Control 5-32 Meeting Engagement 5-5 Limited Visibility 5-32 The Deliberate Attack or Breakthrough .... 5-10 DELAY OPERATIONS 5-34 The Pursuit 5-13 Concept of the Delay 5-35 The Night Attack 5-14 When to Delay 5-36 Assault Tactics 5-15 DISENGAGING A BATTALION TASK HOW TO PLAN AND ORGANIZE THE FORCE 5-36 DEFENSE 5-16 Disengaging Under Enemy Pressure 5-37 Covering Force Area (CFA) 5-16 Disengaging When Not Under Enemy Main Battle Area (MBA) 5-18 Pressure 5-38 Rear Area 5-19 Combat Support and Combat Service Battalion Task Force Missions 5-19 Support 5-39 Company Team Missions 5-22 COUNTERATTACK 5-39 How to Employ Weapon Systems in CONDUCTOFDEFENSIVEOPERATIONS .. 5-39 the Defense 5-25 SUMMARY 5-69 J 5-1 Concept of the Defense. The battalion task force defends alone or as part of a larger force. The defender seeks to defeat an enemy attack, and does so by destroying substantial portions of the attacking force while attempting to minimize losses to the defender. Specific purposes and immediate reasons for defending are to: • Destroy the enemy. • Wear down enemy forces prior to attacking them. • Force the enemy to mass so that fires can be concentrated against him. • Retain or deny terrain, facilities, installations, and activities, or preserve forces essential to the mission. • Gain time for other activities elsewhere. The overall system of defense is ACTIVE, with commanders economizing forces in less threatened areas to concentrate against main enemy thrusts. Such concentration of force requires that the task force use its mobility and firepower to best advantage. When fighting outnumbered, it is vital to accomplish the defensive mission while denying the enemy the opportunity to critically damage the defending force. If the defender is fixed by the enemy and subsequently destroyed, or if the defending force is so degraded by successive losses as to become ineffective, the battle will be lost. The vast numbers of enemy forces which may be committed in succession against our ACTIVE DEFENSE CAN DEFEAT defense require us to defeat each echelon and REPEATED ECHELONS OF be ready to oppose the next with an effective THE ATTACKER force, over and over again. Active defense, intelligently planned and professionally conducted, provides a way to accomplish this. In an active defense, battalion task forces and subordinate company teams may engage the enemy from battle positions and, when appropriate, move to other battle positions, or may establish strongpoints around which the battle can pivot. In determining how he will defend, the task force commander must recognize all potential enemy avenues of approach into and through 5-2 /

FM 71-2 —

the defensive sector. He must plan indirect maneuvers. Using surprise fire and first-shot and direct fires in as many places along these advantage, each weapon in range must hit avenues as time permits so as to wear down one or two vehicles in each engagement, and and destroy the advancing enemy to the relocate before effective return fire can fix it fullest. He must plan the maneuver of in position or destroy it. With field artillery, company teams from battle position to battle mortars, and close air support providing position so that when the battle commences, suppression and additional destruction, a forces can be concentrated quickly at a battalion task force can destroy, contain, or decisive point and as quickly be redirected to drive out a succession of enemy attacks. another. While this technique of defense is designed Commanders must use every advantage primarily to defeat mounted attacks and offered by the terrain. Natural obstacles must enemy formations attempting to bypass be reinforced, extended, and covered by fire. obstacles and other areas, it can be adapted to Approaches must be examined to find areas dismounted enemy attacks as well. If enemy where enemy formations can be subjected to a troops dismount, one of two things happens. high volume of lethal fires. Development of Either the enemy assault must slow to the obstacles which tend to force an attacking pace of the dismounted troops, thereby enemy away from cover and concealment increasing the time his vehicles can be and into open ground must be a high priority. engaged by our weapons; or enemy tanks will Battle positions must be selected which become separated from their infantry, again provide long-range unobstructed fields of fire increasing their vulnerability. In either case, into places where the enemy will be. If the dismounted troops are more vulnerable to necessary, fields of fire must be created. At field artillery, mortar, and direct fires. As the same time, battle positions must provide infantrymen are eliminated from a cover and concealment, or nearby formation, the enemy tanks become more concealment from the fires of following vulnerable to surprise fires from all enemy echelons. They must have adequate antiarmor weapons. routes in and out so that units can occupy them quickly without unnecessary exposure, When there are terrain features in the and can vacate them in the same way when sector or area of operations which are critical they have completed an engagement. to the defense (or which must be denied to the enemy), the defender must organize It is highly desirable to choose positions strongpoints and hold them against all from which long-range fire can be delivered assaults. Once such terrain features are at ranges optimum for the weapons which identified or specified in the mission, the will be used there. The goal is to permit TOW battalion task force commander prepares his and missile firing tanks to engage enemy defense accordingly. As before, enemy forces at 3000 meters, conventional gun tanks avenues of approach must be identified. to engage in the 1500-2500 meter range, and Obstacles must be improved, and manmade Dragon to engage as near as possible to their obstacles may be constructed. Extensive use maximum effective range. may be made of mines, barbed wire, craters, Capitalizing on their range advantage over ditches, abatis, and any other hindrance to the enemy, TOW and missile firing tanks both mounted and dismounted enemy attack. initially engage the enemy with frontal fires All available surveillance and detection as early as possible. As the enemy devices are employed to detect enemy approaches closer, our weapons move to the movement at long range, in approaches not relative protection of terrain-masked observable by normal means, and in periods positions to deliver flanking fires. Weapons of limited visibility. Field artillery and will engage an enemy from one set of firing mortar fires, including final protective fires, positions, then move to alternate ones or to are carefully planned. If possible, these must new battle positions as the enemy fires and be registered. Antitank and machinegun fires

464-458 0-85-13 r

— FM 71-2

are integrated into the defense. The position □ See the battlefield must be fortified as extensively as time and Prior to the battle, the defending commander materials permit. All weapons must be dug in must organize to defeat all types of attack with overhead cover in both primary and from all feasible directions. He must then alternate positions. Communications conduct aggressive operations to gain trenches and wire lines can be installed to contact to learn where the enemy is, how he is permit control of forces, resupply, and some organized, which way he is moving, and in movement of weapons under fire. Fields of what strength. As the battle unfolds, he must fire are vital for both antiarmor weapons and have a continuous flow of information on for machineguns and small arms. Direct fires which to base decisions. He also must have must be possible from multiple, mutually effective OPSEC to deny the enemy similar supporting locations. An approaching enemy information about his task force as he must be subjected to an increasingly lethal maneuvers to counter each enemy thrust. volume of fire, with shorter range weapons joining the fight as the enemy closes the □ Use the defender’s advantages range. The battalion task force may be given the They are numerous and permit a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger mission to hold enemy forces forward of a line attacker. The defender can become or terrain feature for a specified amount of intimately familiar with the actual terrain time, or the mission may be allowed to slow prior to battle; the attacker cannot. The the enemy as much as possible without defender can prepare the ground in advance, risking destruction of the task force. In either building obstacles, firing positions, and case, the battalion task force is required to routes between battle positions. The attacker gain time for some other action to take place can only guess at these. The defender can in some other area. In a “high risk” situation fight from cover while the attacker is in the where times and lines are specified, the open. The defender can shoot first from battalion must present sufficient resistance stationary platforms or positions, thus to insure that enemy forces do not progress forcing the attacker to react and fire while faster than the stated time restrictions. This moving. The defender can shift forces from may require that company teams fight from prepared position to prepared position swiftly each position as they would fight from to concentrate for successive engagements. strongpoints, even risking decisive engage- The attacker must feel his way over the ment to accomplish the specified time. The terrain, seeing each new compartment for the missions given to company teams in such first time. The defender can plan cases may be defend, even though the task communications, control measures, fires, and force mission is delay. In a “low risk” logistical support in advance to fit any situation, the battalion task force requires its predictable situation. The attacker must company teams to destroy as much of the adhere to a predetermined course of action enemy as possible, then maneuvers them to and risk being outmaneuvered, or he must rearward positions before they can be fixed alter his plans as the battle develops and risk by enemy fire. an uncoordinated effort. Fundaméntala of the Defense. The concept requires the execution of certain □Concentrate at critical times and places fundamentals to insure a successful defense. If the commander understands the enemy he Understand the enemy faces, can see the battlefield and the □ developing battle better than the enemy The defender must be thoroughly familiar commander does, and if he uses the with the capabilities and limitations of defender’s advantages, he will be able to shift enemy weapons and equipment. He should forces and fires quickly. He must concentrate know how enemy units are organized and at critical points so that the locally engaged deployed, and understand formations, combat power ratio is no worse than 1:3, echelonment and tactics of enemy units. defeat the enemy attack, and shift again to 5-4 FM 71 -2 — alternate or supplementary positions to concentrate against the next threat. THREAT DIVISION ADVANCE TO CONTACT ■Fight as a combined arms team ENEMY SITUATION VAGUE OR WEAK Field artillery, air defense artillery, tactical aircraft, engineers, infantry, tanks, and attack helicopters each have a vital IDHSI@N contribution to make. No single arm can succeed alone. Each member arm must be used in combination with others so that the strengths of each are maximized and their vulnerabilities are minimized. • • • 8-10 KM FLANK GUARD HOW THE ENEMY ATTACKS • • • • •• • •• One of the keys in planning, preparing, and i FLANK (+) conducting a successful defense is to (+) GUARD BQJlISIfli understand the enemy’s capabilities, his likely actions, and tactics. Threat doctrine 5 KM stresses that decisive results are achieved Î only through offensive action. The defense is (-) (-) EEfli adopted only until an attack can be mounted. T" It follows then, that US forces will, at times, 5-10 defend. We cannot expect the attacker to KM follow “the book” any more than we are • • • JL _LL • •• committed to rigid, inflexible operations. FLANK AmWAWMi FLANK UP TO (-) However, we can expect to encounter some GUARD ' 3 KM " (-) GUARD ©MAMIS variation to basic Threat doctrine. Description of their doctrines centers around four basic forms of offensive action: <6 — 15 TO 25 KM -> -T-20-30 I meeting engagement (which includes KM advance to contact and hasty attack), O deliberate attack or breakthrough, o the pursuit (exploitation), and Q. 3 9 the night attack.

• • • ÜL • • • FLANK FLANK 1 GUARD (+ -) GUARD Meeting Engagement. The Threat 5-1 MAIN KM normally seeks enemy contact against an • • • if ILL • • • BODY undeveloped situation by advancing as FLANK 4 FLANK (-) shown in this “advance to contact” diagram. GUARD (-) UP TO 3 KM GUARD t _Ji BWAiß If the enemy situation is fully known, the ©WAiRiB Threat may modify the combat structure and DÜTl interval of the leading units in the advance to contact. 5-5 5-5 Foldin — FM 71 -2

A Threat division will normally use at least constituting a reinforced battalion. The role two or more main routes of advance. On each of the advance guard is to develop the route, reconnaissance elements from either situation and overcome light opposition. If the divisional reconnaissance battalion or unable to overcome or bypass opposition, the the regimental reconnaissance company advance guard will cover the deployment of usually precede the advance guard. the main body for an attack. Depicted here is Each forward regiment of the division a typical advance guard as formed by the organizes an advance guard normally motorized rifle and tank battalions.

MOTORIZED TANK RIFLE BATTALION BATTALION

QUO + RECON PLATOON [Ö (+> t LK] UP TO 5 KM o

fQI POINT- B53 FOLD OUT FOR DIAGRAM OF EDJ "ADVANCE TO CONTACT" r^j TANK AND 1 TO 11/2 KM MOTORIZED RIFLE RS3J() BATTALIONS IN THE ADVANCE CD (-) GUARD ROLE • •• ■ADVANCE DET- NOTE: Artillery under ESLU» 7I ](-, regimental control and the üñR regimental antitank reserve ••Í ! I (motorized rifle regiment MORT only) may also move within the zone shown, although these have not been CD CD included in the schematic. 5 TO 10 KM f Ll..- IJSQHQ |Ö]HQ 1 • • • E3 B ! [¿3 ; m

(-) : > MAIN GUARD ^ CD (-1 ! CD

CD (-) CD ABOUT 3 KM

SVGS svcs 1531 • REAR SECURITY PLT CD

5-5 Foldout 5-6 # m o 464-458 i enemy defensivepositions. only totheextentnecessaryovercome Deployment intovariousbattleformationsis normally moveincolumnformationto conducted bysuccessiveadvancingelements support theirhighspeedadvancedoctrine. Threat forcesintheadvancetocontact DEPLOYMENT STAGE SECOND INITIAL FINAL NOTE 2 NOTE (T) in DP 0 o m ö qi \n TYPICAL DEPLOYMENTFROMTHEMARCHBYTANKANDMOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALIONS ta V '-! TANK BATTALION Dl ooo m DP COMPANY COLUMNS PLATOON COLUMNS LINE OFCONTACT LINE OFCONTACT DEPLOYS INTO DEPLOYS INTO 4-6 KMFROM 1-3 KMFROM BATTALION COMPANY 5-7 > ^ NOTE 2 NOTE (T) 000000000 MOTORIZED RIFLEBATTALION 000000000 000000000 s: 0 <$> <$> © © PP 0 WEAPONS. FIRE ROLEAGAINSTAT MAY BEEMPLOYEDINDIRECT OF ADVANCE.SPARTILLERY COLUMNS INCREASESSPEED MAINTAINING MOVEMENTIN LESS FROMLINEOFCONTACT. BATTLE FORMATION1KMOR ATTEMPTS TODEPLOYINTO BATTALION NORMALLY THE ATTACK. SUPPORTA BATTALIONIN SP ARTILLERYWILLNORMALLY NOTES = MEDIUMTANK = BMP = ZSU23-4 KEY TOSYMBOLS SA-9 SP ARTY 5-7 Foldin FM 71-2 — FM 71-2 • The meeting engagement is characterized by rapid change in the situation and fluid operations on a wide front, fast changes in combat formation, and open flanks for friendly and enemy forces. The meeting engagement normally occurs during the advance-to-contact whenever the opposing forces make contact. Threat doctrine assumes the meeting engagement will be the most common form of combat. The initial action is carried out by security and reconnaissance units, followed by intense reconnaissance and maneuvering in search for gaps or weak points. Helicopters will probably keep the pressure on by performing armed reconnaissance, cavalry, and air assault missions. The main body attacks immediately from the line of march with a frontal assault or envelopment maneuver to the flank or rear. FOLD OUT FOR EXAMPLES OF DEPLOYMENT BY TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALIONS ENVELOPMENT

FRONTAL 3 ASSAULT ADVANCE GUARD

rv5

CONDUCT OF A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

• The hasty attack is normally an extension of the meeting engagement. It is conducted when enemy prepared positions are encountered and Threat forces have quickly located an assailable flank or gap in the enemy defenses. Threat forces will deploy from the march column and attack without 5-7 Foldout 5-8 FM 71-2 —

Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE-

XX xx

XX XX LIE LU _U1_ _U1_

o< o cp o o o CP ^ o

X3 1 V 2 kD

\ In this situation, the covering divisions in the first echelon, each permitted to determine ahead of force has met the advance of the division with two motorized rifle time that he is about to enter the enemy on a broad front, and is regiments forward. The enemy MBA. If the handoff occurs fighting a strong delay battle. The attack is narrowing as it advances properly, the enemy will be covering force is identifying the through the CFA. engaged by the fire of the MBA enemy's main thrusts as being forces without a discernible As the battalions of the covering forward of the left sector toward break. force fight back toward the MBA, the 1 st Bde. As indicators become they will come under control of #The other reason is to facilitate firmer, the division commander the MBA brigades for two the rapid and smooth passage of decides to start relocating task reasons. the covering forces through the forces from the 2d and 3d Bdesto forward MBA battalions. the sector of the 1 st Bde. #One is to facilitate handing off Task Force 2-76 Mech is pre- the enemy to the MBA task paring to defend in the sector of The enemy main attack appears to forces. This means that the enemy the 2d Bde which is the center of consist of two motorized rifle must not be given a respite, or be the MBA.

5-41 — FM 71-2 r Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE (cont)

□ A CD / □

63 91

O* V 9) <0

O 45

The TF 2-76 receives a change of 87. Team A use Route Black, threats of two divisions have mission from the 2d Bde com- Team B move by the fastest been identified. They are mander over the secure brigade routes to checkpoint 63, then on fighting toward the 1st Bde. The command radio net: Route Black. Team C move to division commander intends to checkpoint 91 fo 45 then Route concentrate in the 1st Bde "You are relieved of your Red. New mission to follow." sector. To do so, he will move present mission. Move your task forces from the 2d and 3d command by the fastest routes The commander also issues Bdes. Depending on the devel- toward checkpoint 87. You have instructions to move the oping situation, the TF from the route priority. Meet me at command post and trains toward 3d Bde will either join the fight in checkpoint 45 for instructions. checkpoint 87. and flies to meet the 1st Bde or occupy a more My helicopter is on the way to the brigade commander. Within critical location in the 2d Bde. pick you up. " minutes all teams are moving in response to the order. At The commander issues instruc- checkpoint 45, the brigade com- Task Force 2-76 Mech is tion over the secure battalion mander explains the situation. command net to the task force: detached from 2d Bde. It will The important points are: move under division control "Change of mission. TF 2-76 Covering forces will soon pass through checkpoint 87 to the 1 st Mech moves now to checkpoint into the MBA. Enemy main Bde. It is attached on arrival. V, 5-42 FM 71-2

Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE fconti r "N

Commander TF 2-76 Mech makes a map reconnaissance of the route while he awaits the arrival of Quick response and movement tion to the enemy and insured Team C. When the team appears, are possible because: understanding by subordi- he signals the team commander to nates. dismount while the team ^Checkpoints and routes had continues to march. Instructions been planned in advance. (This £Teams continued to move to Team C commander take about could be done by division.) while commanders were briefed. one minute. #Teams were trained to respond immediately to the He moves by helicopter to meet (Another way to brief a commanders of Teams A and B at mission change. Unit SOPs to facilitate rapid movement commander without hatting the checkpoint 63 and follows the team is to join that commander same procedure with each. He existed, were well known, and well-rehearsed. in his vehicle, or have him join dispatches the S3 (or some other the task force commander, and member of the command group) #Minimum use of radios and except for a momentary halt for to instruct command post and maximum use of face to face dismounting and mounting, all trains, and then moves off to the coordination denied informa- vehicles continue to move.) new assignment.

12 KM

O* 0 8^0

While TF 2-76 Mech is moving, TF 1-92 Mech and TF 1-70 Mech are defending in the 1st Bde sector. The enemy breakthrough attempt consists of eight reinforced tank and motorized rifle battalions attacking abreast in the first echelon on a 12 kilometer front. X*—— These first echelon battalions are closely followed by four rein- TF 92 TF 70 forced battalions in their respec- IX tive regiments' second echelon.

■■

T7 y 5-43

464-458 0-85-16 “FM 71-2

Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE (com)

The brigade commander realizes that the first task force available for deployment in his sector will not arrive in time to be deployed on the FEBA. Accordingly, he decides to have the first available task force, TF 2-77 Armor, occupy battle positions (BP) 23, 24 and 29. He designates this group of positions as battle area WHITE. The next task force available to him will be TF 1-13 Armor, which he directs to occupy battle positions 28,43 and 45. He designates this group of positions as battle area RED. The brigade com-

In a very brief meeting with the The boundaries of his battle that terrain has been vacated brigade commander, he learns of area allow him to: by friendly units. In all cases, the brigade commander's con- the brigade commander has cept for fighting this battle. The •Shift or move his company required that he approve all TF commander quickly transfers teams freely within his battle requests to call in scatterable the new boundaries of battle area area as he sees fit (i.e., the mines and emplace conven- WHITE to his own map. brigade commander in this tional mines. case did not restrict him by requiring him to hold a battle •Fire direct fire weapons position). against clearly identifiable enemy targets without •Call artillery or airstrikes into coordination. his own area but not into adjacent occupied battle areas • Be prepared to move or without first coordinating. He counterattack into the battle may freely call in artillery area of another unit on orders forward of his boundary when from the brigade commander.

V y 5-44 FM 71-2 = r Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE leant) PC tP V 1 S2 = TF1 -70 / , TF

As the battle progresses, TF 1-92 It' and TF 1-70 heavily attrit the advancing enemy forces. How- ever, they cannot hold their positions without becoming over- ■■ run. The brigade commander, ^ 50 * ■ ///i therefore, directs TF 1-92 Mech C3 ^ ■ ■ MX 47 to move to battle area BLUE and 4 •zj' occupy battle positions 62, 64, ■ BROWN \ and 69. TF 1-70 Mech is directed to move to battle area BROWN, and occupy battle positions 47, W éP 50, and 66. 69 BLUE

es To do this, the comany teams of these task forces move through battle areas WHITE and RED on designated routes overwatched by the company teams of TFs 2- / “ id 1-13.

* 7 (p

V. ED Q m bWHITE

BROWN V ^3 o- BLUE

5-45 — FM 71-2

-Example 1 - RELOCATING FORCES TO CONCENTRATE (cont)

As friendly forces vacate the area continues to advance, hoping to move through battle areas BLUE forward of battle areas WHITE and break through our defenses. Two and BROWN, overwatched by RED, the TF commanders are free new task forces arrive in the area company teams from these task to employ indirect fires without of concentration and the brigade forces. TFs 2-77 and 1-13 Armor restriction on advancing enemy commander fits them to the take up new battle areas desig- forces. As enemy units advance, terrain and assigns them battle nated by the brigade commander. TF commanders orchestrate the areas to the flanks of WHITE and fires from their own company RED. Task forces 1-92 and 1-70 teams and, most important, they Mech are now occupying battle The enemy advance is halted in insure that fires from their battle positions in battle areas BLUE and battle areas BROWN and BLUE. positions complement fires from BROWN and are prepared to fight. The brigade commander attaches adjacent battle positions of other a company team each to TF 1 -92 task forces. Since the enemy is continuing to advance despite heavy losses, the and TF 1-70 for an immediate As the battle is fought in battle brigade commander decides to counterattack. Weakened enemy areas WHITE and RED, resistance move his task forces out of battle elements are destroyed and considerably stiffens. Attrition of areas WHITE and RED. They several battle positions are enemy units is high, but he displace by company team and retaken.

Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front)

In this example, the brigade commander on the right m anticipates an attack by a motorized rifle division with two motorized rifle regiments forward, each on a front of 3 to 4 3-4 KM 3-4 KM kilometers. The brigade commander plans to un block the advance of each regiment with a mechanized IMl m infantry battalion task force and use the cavalry squadron, that the division commander gave him, to TF 2 - 76 block, reinforce, or counterattack as the battle develops. Task Force 2-76 Mech is defending in sector on the right. l\

//-' -w -\V

5-46 FM 71-2 —

Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) (cont)

Against an enemy regiment the ratio of critical systems is as shown here:

SYSTEMS ENEMY FRIENDLY RATIO TANKS 40 17 2.3:1 HAW MAW ANTITANK ASSETS1 111 44 2.5.1 INFANTRY VEHICLES2 96 37 2.6:1 INFANTRY PLATOONS3 27 3.8:1 ORGANIC INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS 24 13 1.8:1

1 INCLUDES BMP AS ANTITANK SYSTEM 2 BMPs /IS INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE ONLY Realizing that he has certain advantages as the 3 INCLUDES SCOUT PLATOON defender, the ratio of combat power is acceptable.

o. O The task force commander quickly determines that there are three avenues of approach through his sector. The most likely avenue to be used by the enemy in this case is avenue of approach 2, in the center, because it is a high speed armor approach. Avenues of approach / and 3 on the flanks can be used by either armor or infantry but are less dangerous initially because of restrictive terrain. A He expects the enemy to attack initially along avenue of approach 2 in order to clear this road and provide a route for the forward movement of supplies and combat support units. The enemy will probably employ security forces along avenues of approach 1 and 3 and push down avenue of approach 2 until strong resistance is encountered, then 8 KM attempt to envelop or bypass. He estimates that the enemy can deploy a battalion along the principal avenue of approach t* leading into his sector. It will have H about 13 tanks and 30 BMP.

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V h KM H y 5-47 — FM 71-2 r Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) {cont)

The commander's initial task is to positions initially. The high speed Therefore, the task force plan for inflicting maximum approach down the valley must commander organizes teams with damage on the enemy's armored also be blocked. He will use similar balance of capabilities. vehicles at long range. He then minefields and other obstacles This organization will provide a wants to fight a mobile battle of already constructed forward of good mix of complementary attrition, continuing to damage his positions to disrupt and combat systems for this terrain. the enemy and progressively canalize the enemy. Artillery fires The commander will be able to weakening him. are planned to slow the enemy, easily shift teams without being destroy him if he dismounts, and concerned about reorganizing the He selects positions near the inhibit reinforcements. task force in the middle of a fight. forward edge of his sector which When terrain is radically different provide for long-range antitank Each team will operate in varied in various parts of this sector, it fires. He plans to position the bulk terrain and must have multiple may be necessary to reorganize of his TOWs and tanks on these capabilities through the battle. during the fight.

TEAM ORGANIZATION

1 1 "YYY YYíYíí1 í Y: :> r; ■; ! Y- YY^ Y Y;: ?:' :: - " YYYYYY: : YYYY Y Y i : ;; YYY Y; :';: Y YT fii :: : ;; H '"Y — TFÄ ft/| A' f**#. YY;Y Y- Y ï ; f TEAM B Y- SY - Y Y; YY YY Y: Y: Í * ï j-; W ::;-: f :. H • : Y Y Yb / ; ■ / ‘

1 T1 ANK PLATOON 1 TANK PLATOON TANK PLATOON

2 I2NFANTRY PLATOONS 2 INFANTRY PLATOONSI NFANTRY PLATOONS

3 T3 OW SECTIONS 2 TOW SECTIONS TOW SECTIONS

MORTAR SECTION MORTAR SECTION 2 HQ TANKS

The battalion task force forces and weapons to create a sufficient fires in selected areas commander must employ his defensive system which will mass along avenues of approach.

To do this, he must: % Identify avenues of QDetermineJthe'density and, 0Prepare to reallocate and 1 approach for both mounted type fire required to destroy or reposition forces during the 1 and dismounted forces. repel the enemy in each area. battle by anticipating future 'I .[’l Yf. requirements. The initial task #Select likely engagement v 1.;^ > organization must be devel- #Allocate * sufficient^ forces oped after considering more areas for each type of weapon under available control than occupation of initial along each avenue of headquarters to ; deliver this positions. To reduce con- approach. fire. Give priority of force fusion, every attempt should #Estimate the maximum size allocation to teams firing on be made to limit the number of and type of force the enemy those avenues considered task organization changes can deploy in the first echelon most dangerous and econo- required once the battle is for each avenue of approach. mize forces in other areas. joined. V 5-48 FM 71-2

■ Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) (corn) After the initial engagement, the commander must be prepared to fight a fluid battle in depth. He wants to wear down the enemy within his sector. Positions are therefore planned in depth. They will be occupied, abandoned, and reoccupied insofar as they offer an opportunity to inflict damage on the enemy. He establishes mines and barriers throughout the sector to canalize the enemy, reduce his mobility, and hold him in areas where fires can be concentrated. He deploys his force initially as shown. The teams on the flanks can cover the valley by fire initially, but they can be suppressed by fire and blinded by smoke. Therefore, the valley must be blocked by another team. A minefield is used to assist S 1 in blocking the valley and is CM / Í covered by fire by the team LL \ occupying the village. The village, combined with the minefield, provides an effective fortified obstacle with relatively little preparation. The battalion task force commander will control the battle by using battle positions and designated routes. In this case, positions are preferred over areas of operation because there are obvious avenues of approach, the enemy is restricted as to his courses of action, and the terrain provides several areas where the task force can fight decisive battles yet retain the ability to disengage and relocate forces if required, all under task force control.

The task force commander #Designates successive #Plans movement using takes the following steps to positions throughout the covered routes. minimize vulnerability to sector to assist in quickly enemy suppressive fires: redeploying teams once they have been targeted. # Prepares to smoke and # Plans to fight from covered suppress likely enemy positions where possible. overwatch positions and # Avoids positioning teams on #Requires use of camouflage degrade enemy ability to adjust easily targeted terrain features. and concealment. fires. V. _y 5-49 —FM 71-2

Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) (corn)

The enemy attacks initially along avenue of approach 2 as anticipated. His forward units are engaged as they encounter the first obstacles. The enemy reacts immediately with heavy artillery and mortar fires and a hasty mounted assault against the team on the left. Because of intense friendly antitank fires, the enemy is forced to dismount. His dismounted assault is stopped by infantry, mortar, and artillery fires. Unable to overcome the resistance, the enemy intensifies his indirect fires and moves up additional artillery in preparation for an attack.

The enemy exerts pressure along the entire front. Since he encounters resistance on the flanks, he attempts to suppress the positions with smoke and fires, and move a large force down the valley. On orders from the task force commander, teams on the flanks displace, one at a time, to new positions further to the rear and prepare to engage the enemy as he advances. For the time being, the center team remains in position. The enemy advance is slowed in the center by the minefield covered by the team in the village.

L r\ 5-50 FM 71-2 —

Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) (cont)

In spite of losses, the enemy forces through under heavy smoke and indirect fires. The task force commander again repositions his forces along terrain deeper in sector, further evading suppressive fires against * positions which the enemy has discovered and concentrated against. In the active defense, commanders at all levels must take advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy. The brigade and task force commanders must (9 be watchful to exploit the enemy weaknesses. They must be prepared to move forces to attack the enemy from unexpected directions, in the process reoccupying terrain features which help in maximizing the effectiveness of the defense.

The enemy continues to maintain pressure along both flanks and uses large amounts of smoke to cover his force in the valley. Nevertheless, the task force commander observes that the tempo of the enemy advance is slackening. He advises the brigade commander that the enemy has been weakened: his center forces are exposed and present a lucrative target; the time is ripe for a limited counterattack. TF The brigade commander now has another task force under his / control and decides to reinforce TF 2-76 Mech. He alerts the uncommitted battalion located in a battle area to the rear of the forward battalions to attach a tank-heavy company team to this task force to conduct a counterattack. The enemy continues to attack in \J the center, but pressure is lessening against the flanks. The task force commander directs all teams to hold present positions while the counterattack is organized and conducted.

5-51 —FM 71-2-

Example 2 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Narrow Front) (cont) r \

The task force commander quickly analyzes the situation: The enemy in the valley is strong, but increasingly exposed to fires from his flanks. The enemy now on BP 35 has been attrited markedly and is estimated at the moment at no more than platoon strength. Counterattacking from BP 36 or BP 39 would meet the enemy's strength, and likely accomplish little. Adding more forces to BP 40, while beneficial, would not destroy the force in the valley. A surprise attack from the west against BP 35 would probably work. If the enemy is suppressed by fires from BP 36 and 39, and indirect fires seal and smoke the terrain to the north of BP 35. our forces would be in position to destroy the enemy in the valley with fires from BP 35 and 40, in addition to those from BP 36 and 39. >5 Having reached a decision, theTF — TF commander coordinates with TF2 12 — commander, TF 2-12 Armor for clearance to have the team joining TF 2-76 make the attack. The team commander is given a <9 fragmentary order (over the same task force command net) to move to the west side of HILL 432 and prepare to engage the enemy on BP 35. When and if it appears that the enemy there has been largely destroyed, theTF commander will LL & order the team commander to 432 seize BP 35 while the TF fires smoke and suppressive fires on the terrain overlooking ßP35 from the north.

Cf>

V y 5-52 FM 71-2

Example 3 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Wide Front) r "\ This example describes another way to defend in an area which is relatively wide and. while under "^T strong attack, is not in the path of the main effort. 2-12 Having given up two battalions to M the 1 st Bde as part of the division commander's effort to concentrate, the center (2d) Bde consists of two battalion task forces, both ■y- forward. ŒD The brigade commander can now refine his scheme of defense to 2-79 defeat the anticipated enemy threat in his sector. He plans to block the advance of each regiment with a battalion task force. Because he may have to •* fight these battalions in depth, he assigns them sectors.

PRIMARY AVENUE OF APPROACH 10 KIVl Task force 2-12 Armor is deployed as shown. o The primaiy enemy avenue of o approach into the task force sector is on the right. The battalion task force commander has ordered Teams B (mechanized infantry heavy) and C (tank heavy) to occupy battle positions 11 and 12 respectively. He has 22 assigned Company A a wide sector which includes several secondary avenues of approach. He intends to engage enemy forces on the right at long range ~ TF 2-79 with TOW and tank fire. In this way. he plans to strip away any reconnaissance screen and force LINE LINE RED the enemy to deploy early into a RED hasty attack. If the extent of the enemy's fire and maneuver makes it necessary, he intends to move his units to battle positions 21 and 22, * respectively, to continue the defense. Company A is prepared to maneuver to counter any secondary threats in its sector, to attack the enemy flank when appropriate, or to relocate beyond phase line Red and Blue.

LINE LINE BLUE BLUE V J 5-53 -FM 71-2

Example 3 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Wide Front) (cont) r \

O O The battalion task force com- O O mander has planned his operation O O AX in depth. He has planned several ways to maneuver company teams to concentrate. He has also planned ways to continue the fight if a company team is detached to another task force or if he should receive an additional company team. ! The enemy attack is preceded by small reconnaissance units which appear in the distance. Radar U operators report that there are no /y 's. units immediately behind these rf reconnaissance vehicles. Team B r >\ engages them with TOW, then with tank guns: the Team forward observer adjusts artillery fire. AO Most enemy reconnaissance vehicles caught in the open are A —B destroyed. One or two deploy to cover and stop. For a few moments there is no enemy response as artillery fire continues in the suspected enemy locations. Soon enemy artillery fire starts to fall in Team B's positions. Over -12 TF 2-79 the next half hour this pattern of activity is repeated in front of Company A, Team C, and in the sector of the adjacent task force. Radar operators and observation posts report the approach of twenty to thirty tracked vehicles. They are moving toward the battle position occupied by Team C. The battalion task force commander believes this to be an advance guard. According to the concept he has developed for this defense he: i ÿ 2 ^Requests airstrikes. fCalls for artillery fire on the I formation. QOrders Teams B and C to engage with all weapons in range. #Alerts Company A to be prepared- to occupy BP 21 or a position in the forward part of its sector from which to engage this enemy force. #Alerts scout platoon to screen TF north flank. #Reports the situation. y 5-54 FM 71-2

.Example 3 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Wide Front) (cont).

The enemy force deploys into platoon columns as i t comes into full view about 2500 meters away. It moves rapidly toward Team C but proves no match for the combined fires of Teams B and C. As it closes to within 1000 meters and Dragon fire is added to artillery, mortar, TOW, and tank gunfire, all but a half dozen vehicles have been halted. Some burn; others bear no visible signs of damage but have been hit and $ stopped. Among the vehicles specifically engaged are the accompanying ZSU-23-4 air defense weapons. The air strike O previously requested arrives and is targeted on the remaining vehicles by a Forward Air Controller with the task force commander. During a short lull that follows. Teams B and C adjust their positions, redistribute ammunition, attend casualties and make TF 2-79 minor repairs to vehicles and dug- in weapons positions.

Shortly thereafter a heavy volume of artillery fire starts to impact in the adjacent task force sector. Also, Team C's battle position is being smoked. Team B OPs report over a hundred enemy vehicles maneuvering toward Team C from the right front. Team C is unable to observe. The task force • • commander directs: #Team C to occupy Battle Position 22. #Team B to engage enemy forces in range. CD #AII available artillery and mortars to fire on the attacking formation. #Company A to locate on the right side of its sector to engage this enemy formation when it is within range. •Scout platoons to screen TF north flank. v n n.TF 2-79 y 5-55 “FM 71-2 r Example 3 DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Wide Front) (cont)

Qr The task force commander ■ reports the situation and moves to Battle Position 2 Mo observe. The situation is as shown. 'a 12 As the enemy reaches Battle Position 12. now abandoned, he receives artillery, mortar, TOW and tank fire from Team B and one platoon of Company A. As soon as Team C can observe the enemy, it engages from its new position. O The enemy is closing rapidly on on "m Team B. The task force O O commander orders Team B to relocate to Battle Position 21 before it loses freedom of maneuver. o 2 Z-- TF 2-79

The enemy formation, receiving direct fire from its front and right front, starts to maneuver to its left. Fire from the defensive • • positions slackens momentarily while Team B relocates. But as the formation passes the now unoccupied hill on its left. Team C places a high volume of tank fire on the enemy's left front. The rear of the formation is still receiving fire from its right (Company A) and as they press o their attack, now shifting artillery V o fire to the next line of hills, they receive fire from the right (the other two platoons of Company G A) and again from the front (Team B in its new position). 12 TF 2-79

~~5-56 FM 71-2 = r Example 3 - DEFENSE IN SECTOR (Wide Front) (contj y ^ ^ ^~~

vtf . The enemy attack is broken and halted by the combined fires of Q Teams A, B, C, and field artillery r ’/> and mortars. All vehicles in the leading half of the formation are out of action. The rear companies of this formation, still outside the original defensive positions, start to maneuver to their right to gain 0 cover. Recognizing the success of 's. defensive actions thus far and that the attack has halted, the task force commander orders Company A to counterattack by moving to vicinity Hill 96 and engaging the rear of the formation. Company A commander quickly maneuvers two platoons to join the third near his forwardmost position. He maneuvers platoons only to the extent necessary to regain -12 ^TF 2-79 advantageous firing positions. As the fires of the second and then the third tank platoon are added to the fight, this enemy force is halted before it gains cover. Field artillery and mortar fire add to the fight, keeping enemy hatches closed and eliminating crewmen as they abandon knocked-out vehicles.

At the conclusion of this fight, the task with combined arms firepower from well- force commander reports destruction of most prepared positions. of an enemy regiment. His own losses have %He maneuvered forces and fires to been minimal due to careful preparation of concentrate against the main enemy thrust, positions, relocation of units when faced with optimizing first-shot advantage, long-range massed artillery fire, and rapid, accurate fires, combined arms, knowledge of the engagement, often on the flanks of enemy terrain, and a combination of techniques. vehicles from positions of advantage. %He closely controlled two teams along the primary enemy avenue of approach. He allowed greater freedom to the one company This example illustrates these mainpoints: team assigned several secondary avenues of %The task force commander recognized the approach and several contingency missions. approach of enemy reconnaissance units and %He maneuvered forces rearward, laterally, destroyed them at maximum effective range. and forward, wherever the opportunity for %He destroyed the enemy advance guard success was present. V J 5-57 — FM 71-2

Example 4 - A TASK FORCE DELAY IN AN ECONOMY OF FORCE AREA ¿ ¿ ¿ $ Because the brigade has been given a very wide sector and relatively few forces. Task Force 3-79 Mech has been given a delay mission. The brigade commander intends for this task force to secure the left portion of the division sector. Commander, TF 3-79 Mech, has been told to maneuver his company teams to slow and defeat as much of the PL enemy as possible, but not to sacrifice the tactical integrity of SALEM the task force. TF 3-79 The task force can defeat enemy reconnaissance units and advance PL guards, even attacks by a larger force, as long as the local force CAT ratios to platoon, teams, and even the entire task force do not pose the risk of being overwhelmed. The TF is not capable of fending off an attack by substantial enemy forces without accepting a high degree of risk. However, this risk may become necessary if the preservation of the force must become secondary to the requirement to slow or temporarily halt the attack.

~~The assigned sector is in rough and broken terrain, containing many secondary, but not major, avenues of approach.~~

The task force commander organizes three similar company teams to provide a mix of weapons and capabilities throughout the sector. He requires each team to report all proposed team battle positions, Scouts maintain contact with the A constant flow of accurate and be prepared to delay enemy TF on the right flank. Obstacles reports from team to task force forces forward of Phase Line are constructed in as much depth allows the task force commander Salem. He attaches TOW sections as possible. When enemy forces to see the developing battle and to each team. He splits the heavy attempt to penetrate this area the inform the brigade commander of mortar platoon so as to more task force defeats those enemy the situation in a timely fashion. nearly cover the entire width of units it can and delays those it The task force commander sector and support all teams, cannot. (Defense and delay maneuvers his teams to stay in especially the tank team which techniques are described in FM front of the enemy. has no organic mortars. 71-1.)

~~5-58 FM 71-2 —~~

~~Example 4 - A TASK FORCE DELAY MM AIM ECONOMY OF FORCE AREA (cont)~~

After a series of enemy probes all along the brigade front, TF 3-79 Mech is attacked on the left and (+) (+) center by substantial forces. m N Company teams ward off the a enemy initially but soon are in o o danger of being outflanked by enemy infantry moving through SALEM woods and rough terrain. Because the enemy is pushing along three avenues, the task force commander cannot adequately PL concentrate against any of them. CAT He orders all teams to delay forward of Line CAT. Teams comply and soon report the flow of the battle. Upon receiving the situation report from TF 3-79 Mech, the brigade commander * TF 3-79 sends the following message:

"A fresh enemy regiment is moving toward your sector. Task PL Force 2-13 Armor will move to TIGER block. They will occupy your battle positions 43 and 44. You must delay the enemy forward of Phase Line TIGER for two hours. / requested attack helicopters, but they are not available at this time. "

(+) (+ TF 3-79 Mech now must provide M i+) time for the brigade commander Ml a to concentrate against the buildup of enemy strength in their sector. SALEM concentrate against the main enemy forces now in contact. He r screens the right portion of the sector with one reinforced M m PL platoon and the scout platoon. CAT (Air cavalry would be very useful, but is not available.) Using secure radio, he assigns two extra time PL delay lines to his units—delay lines Boston and Hartford. BOSTON y TF 3-79 Enemy forces continue to advance against TF 3-79 Mech. PL Teams engage them at maximum HARTFORD range with direct fire weapons and use indirect fires at every PL opportunity. Due to rough terrain, TIGER the enemy has difficulty in making rapid maneuvers. In open areas he is under direct fire; in woods he

~~5-59 = FM 71-2~~

~~Example 4 - A TASK FORCE DELAY IN AN ECONOMY OF FORCE AREA (cont)~~

encounters mines, abatis, tree blowdown, and artillery fire. By Mf M mf L 1430 the enemy has four o battalions preparing to assault a positions along Line CAT. Team Q commanders use fire and maneuver to reposition platoons, 'CsO wear down the enemy, and maintain contact. The task force commander controls the operation by phase lines. His units m PL are spread very thinly and are CAT outnumbered by 4 or 5 to 1. He DL must keep the enemy from A —B B — C outmaneuvering him. Without a PL reserve, he has no ready reaction BOSTON force to assist in disengaging platoons. He must depend on TF 3-79 team commanders to out-think PL the enemy and stay one move ahead. Team commanders control HARTFORD the movement of platoons from their battle positions, but do not ’L cross the phase lines without TIGER permission from the task force commander.

At 1440 the situation is as shown. TF 2-13 Armor is still about 40 IM Hr minutes away from battle Q positions 43 and 44. Company C. with one mech platoon, a TOW section and the scout platoon, is ©a screening on the right, and has no o enemy contact except for occasional artillery fire. Team B is in position along Line CAT and is PL engaging approximately two CAT battalions to its front. It has priority of artillery fire at the o o a moment. Team A is in contact o o with approximately two battalions forward of Line CAT and is in danger of being outflanked in Team B's sector. X A — B B — C TF 3-79 Commander, TF 3-79 Mech, orders Team A to reposition behind Line CAT. The team commander reports he is unable to do so because of heavy enemy PL pressure. The task force commander changes fire priority. TIGER Team A, with the help of the additional fires, can move again, and avoids the danger of being outflanked.

~~5-60 FM 71-2 —~~

~~Example 4 - A TASK FORCE DELAY IN AN ECONOMY OF FORCE AREA (cont)~~

At 1515. TF 3-79 Mech is generally on line just forward of Line CAT. The terrain is somewhat more open here, has fewer natural obstacles and, because it is deep in the brigade sector where less preparation has been accomplished, has fewer man-

I I il made obstacles. Enemy pressure is heavy all along the front. Company C is now in contact with IM] a force of unknown size. TF 2-13 Armor has been held up by rubble, fallen trees, and enemy air and a artillery strikes. It is still 30 9 minutes from assigned positions. The brigade commander sends a fragmentary order to TF 3-79 s* Mech:

~~"Hold enemy forward o/TIGER PL for at least 45 more minutes. CAT You have priority of artillery fire. Tactical air support is on the way. "~~

The task force commander sends A —B instructions to Teams A and B. B —C TF 3-79 • Each team repositions to face its enemy and halt his forward progress. The battle increases in intensity as enemy forces deploy once more and start to assault . team positions along Line CAT. )-PL As the enemy assault reaches TIGER Dragon range, it is subjected to TOW, Dragon, tank, mortar, artillery and machinegun fire. The promised aircraft arrive and strike _ the enemy formations. The four attacking battalions have been reduced to six or seven reinforced companies. Their advance stalls.

This example illustrates these main points: When the timetable had to be adjusted, the task force defended, though the teams might #Task Force 3-79 Mech succeeded in have been destroyed. delaying this enemy force until the brigade ♦ Through actions which caused the enemy commander could deal with it. to advance over obstacles and rough terrain, repeatedly deploy for assault, suffer heavy ® The commander accepted higher risk to losses and grow weaker in the process, TF 3- provide time for maneuver of other forces. 79 Mech accomplished its mission. V J 5-61 TM 71-2-

■Example 5 - PASSAGE OF COVERING FORCES INTO THE MBA rBy the time the combat elements the covering force elements to the MBA. It is undesirable to of the covering force pass through which will pass through the task commit covering forces to the forward MBA elements, they force sector is initially made by specific passage points while they should be under control of the the forward security force are still fighting a great distance MBA brigade. In those cases (normally the scout platoon, away, for their later maneuver where the covering force was which may be reinforced if would be restricted. MBA forces originally established as a necessary). The forward security separate force, it will have been force initiates coordination for will be improving their defenses passed to control of MBA passage of lines but usually and adding obstacles during this brigades while still fighting cannot confirm all details until time. forward of the MBA. Contact with covering forces maneuver closer f/i

I ICovering Force Disengages « l—'From The Enemy Ml Scouts make contact with covering force elements some distance forward of the MBA. Covering force command posts, trains, and supporting units will O pass into the MBA well ahead of maneuver units. Whether or not scouts actually lead covering forces into the M BA after their last sc engagement is a decision made by each MBA task force commander. If covering forces can pass through without difficulty, the scouts should remain forward to continue observation of UT OP approaching enemy forces.

~~FEBA MAIN BATTLE AREA POSITIONS~~

~~5-62 FM 71-2 —~~

~~■Example 5 - PASSAGE OF COVERING FORCES INTO THE MBA (cont).~~

□ Covering Force Cannot Disengage Prior to Arrival same time. Covering forces immediate vicinity. The MBA At MBA cannot pass into the MBA ahead battalion task force commander of the enemy. If covering force can then control the maneuver of Scouts make contact with units cannot easily veer aside to these units, adding them to the covering forces as before. In this pass into the MBA in a nearby fight or holding them out, until case, covering forces and enemy area, they may be attached to the they are able to pass safely into forces arrive at the FEBA at the battalion task force in the the MBA.

□ Enemy Penetrates The Covering Force Covering forces are fighting farther forward, still under control of a covering force headquarters. Information reaches the MBA brigade commander that an J ienemy force has broken through / //the covering force and is moving a toward the //7 main battle area. He is //»(instructed to defeat this enemy RFL A L£^while the covering force 7 continues its mission. MBA forces y are now responsible for this 1 'enemy. Scout OPs report the / enemy as he approaches, and 8 ? forces concentrate to engage him nr as he enters the MBA. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is established to prevent indirect fire engagement of one another by covering forces and MBA forces.

~~¿-1~~

~~FEBA~~

~~c 3~~

~~5-63 -FM 71-2 -~~

~~Example 6 • DISENGAGING THE BATTALION TASK FORCE LINEAR~~

In this example (which is not directly related to the preceding •J&c - ■‘ i£ • situations) the brigade commander must withdraw units from TM the right portion of the line of contact to concentrate against a y-O-v.TM A threat on his extreme left. He must also reposition Task Force 2- 80 Mech, the center of his task forces, to provide continuity of defense. At 1500 hours he orders TF 2-80 Mech to: ■TrO TMs» "Withdraw now to Line Salem and defend there. Brigade will not provide a covering force. Priority of fires remains with TF 2-72.

TF 2-80 Mech is in contact and under pressure. The TF v; CBT commander decides to disengage and withdraw. Team C is to overwatch the withdrawal of Teams A and B. TF 2-80 Mech is currently disposed on BP 1 -8. Immediately on receipt of these instructions from the brigade, the task force commander has the S3 issue a warning order, including instructions for advance parties to proceed to the new area. 2 r Concerned with minimizing any delays in taking up the new v: mission in the new area, he 3? charges the TF XO with coordinating the occupation of the new position. He directs that 5 the task force combat trains, y expecting recovery vehicles, be moved to the new area without delay. PL The commander quickly decides SALEM how to disengage the task force, how to move to the new area, and how to occupy the positions there. & w.

~~5=2 Í y. : ity~~

~~5-64 FM 71-2— r Example 6 - DISENGAGING THE BATTALION TASK FORCE (cont)~~

» He decides to use Team C, now on BP 7 and 8. as the overwatching force. He directs Team C to ?P relocate one mechanized infantry TMA^ platoon from BP 8 to 9 to be in a better position to overwatch the disengagement of Team B from BPs 4, 5 and 6. As Team B withdraws, it is to drop off a tank ¿r_ platoon to Team C at BP 9. To provide for a greater long- range overwatching antitank m. TM vSl capability, the task force commander directed that two TOW sections of the antitank ~ss platoon and one TOW section now ••• v attached to Team B, vicinity BP 5,

~~=»*•~~

~~7 5-65 F[VI 71-2~~

~~Example 6 - DISENGAGING THE BATTALION TASK FORCE (cont)~~

~~V ou~~

As the teams leave the assembly areas on the way to the new positions, the task force commander monitors their progress closely. Should Team C be attacked by a force too large for it to handle, the task force commander would have to assist it. In addition to arranging for ^ v 9 fires, he could position elements FTEAMG of the main body (platoons, team, Lrw-W’ • :• or the entire task force) to cover the disengagement of Team C. Toward that purpose he identifies potential battle positions 10 through 15. ■y If Team C were so heavily engaged it could not move, even 12 S?Sr TA under the covering fires of more 10 rearward elements, he could conduct a limited counterattack. This could relieve the pressure on the overwatching force, permitting it to pull back. 13 I As Teams A and B withdraw past BPs 10, 11, and 12, the task force T* commander directs Team C to start moving to BPs 10 and 12. delaying the enemy, who is trying )// to work his way forward. This process will be repeated as the withdrawal progresses, until -Vi \X Teams A and B occupy BPs X and 14 rSstl'S Z, respectively. Team C will then disengage from the enemy, covered by Teams A and B, and occupy its assigned BP Y. The withdrawal is completed; the task organization is adjusted as - Rpjyt -A. '•si necessary, units prepare their #■/ positions, and the task force commander reports that he is BP ready. J2&. X

~~iSi Ï3~~

~~5-66 FM 71-2 —~~

~~EXAMPLE 7 - ATTACK HELICOPTERS REINFORCING A TASK FORCE BY FIRE~~

Attack helicopter units are designed to be Attack helicopters are normally employed employed as. integral parts of a combined in mass—preferably in battalion strength but arms force. They are maneuverable not less than company strength. Normally, firepower, ideally suited for situations in an attack helicopter unit, either company or which rapid reaction time is important, battalion, placed OPCON to a brigade is ground forces are inadequate, or ground tactically employed directly under brigade forces are restricted by terrain. control.

Using their speed, mobility, flexibility, and However, a battalion task force in heavy armor defeating firepower, attack helicopter contact may receive an attack helicopter units can quickly respond to a threat, rapidly company which has been given the mission mass firepower, and exploit enemy weakness. of reinforcing by fire. When reinforcing by They attack by fire, defend by fire, or delay by fire, attack helicopter units attack targets fire. They cannot hold terrain like ground within a battalion task force’s battle area as maneuver fo#ces. Attack helicopter units are, directed by the ground commander. His therefore, integrated into the tactical plan of responsibility is for target designation only. the ground force commander, complementing The AH unit commander maneuvers the unit his scheme of maneuver and enhancing the to attack the targets. capabilities of both attack helicopter and ground combat forces. It is inappropriate to place attack helicopter units under the operational control Attack helicopter units normally have a of ground maneuver companies or troops. considerable mobility differential over When it is necessary for an attack helicopter ground combat units. They can be moved unit to coordinate with ground maneuver rapidly to a critical point at a critical time and companies or troops, aeroscouts do this, be employed there in mass, striking the normally by radio. enemy where and when he is most vulnerable. Attack helicopter units take operational control of ground maneuver units only in As a general rule, attack helicopter units severe cases where the ground unit is are not attached below division. When it is disintegrating under enemy pressure. And necessary to give an attack helicopter unit to then, the control lasts only long enough to a brigade, it should be placed under extricate the remaining ground elements, or operational control of the brigade, rather until effective command control by the than attached to the brigade. ground maneuver unit can be reestablished.

~~^h¿c: -K m .,■11’ M « '■ - 'í\ F" c: QJP~~

~~"A — FM 71-2~~

~~Example 7 ATTACK HELICOPTERS REINFORCING A TASK FORCE BY FIRE (com) / \~~

In this example TF 1-3 Armor is defending in a wide sector in the MBA. Team A is attacked in regimental strength as shown. The task force commander requests, and receives, an attack helicopter company to reinforce — the fires of his task force. The brigade commander decided not to employ the attack helicopter company independently in this case. Instead, he assigned it the mission of reinforcing by fire. The task force commander is con- SB O tacted by the aeroscouts of the attack helicopter company. Since _ns> he is in Team B's sector and cannot be on the scene in time, he o directs the aeroscouts to proceed to Team A and coordinate directly with the team commander. The task force commander then informs the team commander that a flight of five attack helicopters is inbound. They will arrive are shifting to new battle who directs that attack heli- momentarily to engage the positions. Aeroscouts arrive and copters engage enemy targets to attacking force while the platoons contact the team commander the west of the road.

The attack helicopters arrive and engage targets designated by r, aeroscouts. Selection of firing positions, timing for unmasking, and other tactics employed by the attack helicopters are controlled by the attack helicopter company com- IMI O mander. However, the ground commander (i.e., the company team commander in this case) is • ••

responsible for coordinating the V.T-1 , fires of the ground elements with those of the attack helicopter. In — this case, he uses the road to describe the principal target area -g. to the attack helicopters. The attack helicopter company commander rotates attack heli- enemy force is no longer a threat. returns to brigade (or division) copter platoons into battle as When the mission is complete, the control for employment else- necessary until the attacking attack helicopter company where. y 5-68 SUMMARY The battalion task force must be able to wage an active defense, moving and concentrating the combined arms forces as necessary, to thwart the enemy’s advance. The task force commander must be able to:

Understand the concept of the defense and the delay. Use the inherent advantages of the defender. See the battlefield and understand the enemy’s capabilities. Organize forces and positions to maximize his weapon systems. Delay, when required, to show the enemy’s momentum and buy time for larger units to defend or attack. Perform missions as assigned in the covering force area, main battle area, or rear area.

~~5-69~~

~~CHAPTER 6 Reconnaissance and Security~~

—— -- ——= OVERVIEW SUCCESS IN BATTLE depends to a large extent on which side has more information. It is obviously easier to concentrate forces against weak points in the attack or to counter the enemy’s main effort in the defense if a commander knows where the enemy is located, how many forces the enemy has, and what the enemy’s potential might be. The commander seeks this combat information and intelligence through every possible source. On the other hand, he protects his unit from surprise and denies to the enemy information about the task force. The task force commander makes full use of his scout platoon, patrols, outposts, ground surveillance radar, and remote sensors for reconnaissance and security. In addition, he uses Operations Security (OPSEC) measures and insures his soldiers practice security techniques.

~~COCOTEBOTS PAGE~~

~~OVERVIEW ...6-1~~

~~SEEING THE ENEMY .6-2~~

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS ...6-2 The Scout Platoon ...6-2 Patrols ...6-9 Ground Surveillance Radar Section 6-10 Remote Sensor Teams 6-12 OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) 6-12 Vehicle Camouflage 6-14 Light and Noise Discipline 6-14 Electronic and Communication Security 6-14 SUMMARY 6-17

~~6-1 •FÍVi 71-2~~

OEEÏNG THS ENEMY The first battlefield task the battalion task send out a patrol; other combat information force must perform is to SEE the enemy and can best be obtained by the battalion task the battlefield—see the battlefield better than force scout platoon or by the battalion task the enemy does, so that the battalion task force ground surveillance section. force has the advantage. While the battalion task force relies on the brigade and division The task force S2 makes a reconnaissance for much of its information about the enemy and surveillance plan. He uses battalion task and terrain, there are many things the force units to obtain as much information as battalion task force can do for itself to better possible. Frequently, the brigade will be able see its piece of the battlefield. It can mount to provide helicopters for use by the com- active and aggressive reconnaissance mander and members of his staff to better see operations designed to obtain specific combat the terrain before the fight begins. Combat information about the enemy or terrain, and information and intelligence required by the it can establish observation posts, use ground battalion task force, but which cannot be surveillance radar (GSR) and remote sensors obtained by task force units, are requested (REMS) to provide for continuous surveillance of its piece of the battlefield. from divisional or corps units specially organized to seethe battlefield. How to obtain Before or during an operation, the battalion support from these units is described in task force commander and his staff identify Chapter 7, Combat Support. specific information about the enemy and terrain that they require to better conduct the RECONNAISSANCE AND battle. This information is sometimes called SECURITY OPERATIONS essential elements of information (EEI). In order to see the enemy, the battalion task As a general rule, EEI required for an force must conduct active reconnaissance attack are: and security operations. • Where is the enemy located and in what Reconnaissance operations obtain strength? information about the enemy and terrain • Where are the enemy weak points? over which the battalion task force intends to move and to fight. • Can the enemy counterattack? If so, where, when and in what strength? Active security operations protect the • If the enemy has emplaced obstacles, battalion task force against surprise by an where and what type are they? enemy force. These include screen and, sometimes, guard operations. A scout platoon most often conducts reconnaissance and During defensive operations, most security operations, but maneuver platoons important EEI are: can also be assigned these missions. When • Where will the enemy make his main this is the case, they use the same techniques effort? In what strength? When? as the scout platoon. • Where will he make his secondary effort? In what strength? When? THE SCOUT PLATOON Scout platoons are generally organized the Once the EEI have been determined, the same in mechanized infantry battalions and battalion task force S2 and S3 determine how tank battalions. However, a modified table of best to obtain the information that is not organization and equipment (MTOE) is in otherwise available from higher effect for various units and these changes headquarters. Some combat information can may reflect differences in capabilities. be obtained by directing a company team to Although the scout platoon is generally 6-2 FM 71-2—

~~equipped with antitank weapons, it should not be employed as an antitank platoon—the scout platoon’s primary mission is seeing the battlefield.~~

~~SCOUT PLATOON IN OVERWATCH IN SQUADS~~

JÙ Examples of how the scout platoon performs its mission •v are best shown with a typical unit of two sections, each with two squads. ■* '5VA ITHIN SE TIONS ft rf AT* >9^ l* ss m // •"--^41 — -S’-/-*— A 3^: ITHIN THE PLATOON £3

■4*

A scout platoon moves about the battlefield scout platoon uses stealth whether the using terrain, overwatch, and, when operation is mounted or dismounted. required, suppression. (See FM 71-1 for Reconnaissance operations are termed details on movement techniques.) route, zone, and area. The techniques of Reconnaissance Operations gain reconnoitering are generally the same for all information about the terrain and the enemy. three; the mission indicates the type of Usually the task force S2 coordinates information sought. requirements with the S3 and supervises the Route reconnaissance seeks detailed operation. Leaders prepare for the operation information about specific routes: road and by using troop leading procedures similar to bridge classification, obstacles, chemical or any operation. Fire support, recognition radiological contamination, enemy, and signals, and contingency plans (e.g., what to terrain which if occupied by the enemy would do in event of contact) must be planned. The affect movement. The scouts go to 6-3 “FM 71-2

~~ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE~~

~~OBJECTIVE SERVES TO ORIENT I PLATOON- AND LIMIT THE RECONNAISSANCE ñfe^ I I INDIRECT FIRE IS PLANNED mmwm~~

~~CHECKPOINTS ARE USED FOR I REFERENCE AND TO DESIGNATE (T\ ' ^4- AREAS TO BE RECONNOITERED , r= & Uj- pv!'*- 4— êrmmÂ~~

~~, THE SCOUT PLATOON 1 RECONNOITERS BY STEALTH x' . r ■~~

~~y I- Á~~

~~J S'lAáSC-~~

A. STARttP_OINT^) dominating terrain out to 3,000 meters from When contact is expected or likely, or when the route, looking for enemy positions and, the route is long and through difficult terrain, particularly, antitank locations. Usually, the the entire platoon may be required. The scouts remain mounted. The number of routes platoon could reconnoiter as many as four the platoon can cover depends on the routes’ routes (one per squad) if the routes are short length and nature and the enemy situation. and enemy contact is unlikely. ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

~~I OBJECTIVE SERVES TO TERMINATE 1 1 THE RECONNAISSANCE äfäs* Vv- V XfrT OBJ CONTACT POINTS INDICATE WHERE SQUADS MUST ESTABLISH BLUE CONTACT TT CHECKPOINTS SERVE AS cr REFERENCE POINTS rk 4?~~

~~PHASE LINES ASSIST CONTROL F ? 10~~

^ r ■at. - Zone reconnaissance is the detailed search available (METT). A zone reconnaissance of an entire zone defined by boundaries. Its mission is normally assigned when the purpose is to obtain detailed information on enemy situation is in doubt or information on all enemy, terrain, and routes within the cross-country mobility is desired. The zone is zone. If time is not available to conduct a defined by lateral boundaries, a line of detailed zone reconnaissance, scouts may departure, and objective. The objective conduct a multiple route reconnaissance in provides a termination point for the mission zone. The width of a zone a scout platoon is and may or may not be occupied by the capable of reconnoitering depends on the enemy. A phase line may also be used as a factors of mission, enemy, terrain, and troops termination point.

~~6-4 FM 71-2—~~

~~AREA RECONNAISSANCE gSB» ON-CALL FIRES ARE PLANNED ALONG THE ROUTE~~

~~A RECONNAISSANCE UNIT r*. SHOULD NOT USE THE SAME ROUTE TWICE ßßj *3= 39 ENEMY IS AVOIDED~~

~~RECONNOITERING IS BY ru*. STEALTH •■S'*-~~

~~a* 9'^r^rSÂ. iíéJ~~

~~vT^a n* fr. -A «Ha-~~

~~ÄSu. y- ■*& /Xrw -A ss n. A. -fs~~

*tS- ~-r^ *r-

Area reconnaissance is conducted to obtain Security Operations protect the battalion information concerning a specified area, task force from tactical surprise. To such ELS a town, ridge line, woods, or other accomplish their mission, security forces feature critical to operations. The unit should must find the enemy before the enemy finds be told specifically what they are looking for the battalion task force. When done properly, and why; for example, the disposition and security operations provide the battalion task force commander sufficient time to move to strength of an enemy force located in a town. concentrate against the enemy force on The area is designated with a boundary line terrain which gives the advantage to the encircling the area. It differs from zone battalion task force. reconnaissance in that the unit moves to the Prior to enemy contact, a security force area to be reconnoitered by the most direct avoids enemy detection. Once contact is route, avoiding enemy contact and reporting made, the security force may or may not fight, any enemy encountered en route. Once in the depending on its mission. Security operations assigned area, the unit makes detailed (screen or guard) are planned and reconnaissance using zone reconnaissance conducted under the staff supervision of the techniques. The return route should not be the S3, who coordinates with the S2 for same as the outgoing one. information on enemy activity.

~~6-5~~

~~464-458 0-85-17 FM 71-2~~

~~SCREENING MISSION W; OPs MAY ADJUST FIRES ON APPROACHING ENEMY~~

~~OPs MONITOR AVENUES OF APPROACH~~

~~PATROLS COVER DEAD SPACE~~

~~GSR INCREASES CAPABILITY ¡Bw3^«»aafeVT)g>&» -'«O FEBA -rfWv SÄ OPs MAKE CONTACT AT CONTACT POINT~~

A screen is employed to give early warning made, the screening force withdraws on of the presence of enemy forces. Screening order, maintaining visual or electronic forces usually cover a wide area and cannot contact with the enemy, and reporting his concentrate sufficient force to delay the movements. The scout platoon is capable of enemy. A screening force fights only for self occupying four OPs for extended periods and protection, or within its capability to deny eight OPs for shorter periods. It may be enemy reconnaissance units close-in necessary to reinforce the scout platoon to observation of the main body. increase the number of OPs when visibility is A screen is a series of observation posts limited due to darkness, weather, or (OP) overlooking enemy avenues of approach extremely broken or heavily vegetated and areas between them. Patrols are used to terrain. Screening forces can use ground cover dead space and make contact in areas surveillance radar and remote sensors to between OPs. Once contact with the enemy is increase surveillance capability. GUARD MISSION fife TENTATIVE BATTLE is® POSITIONS ARE PLANNED IN ADVANCE W. SCOUTS LEAPFROG TO NEW OPs

ñ 'rhV-j y*- X X 5*

~~A«' J&*— • • --~~

Guard missions require the unit to give scout platoon only participates in guard early warning and to delay the enemy in operations as part of a larger force. The scout order to give the main body time to react to an platoon normally screens forward or to the enemy threat. Because larger forces are flank of a guard force. required to conduct guard operations, the 6-6 FM 71-2—

~~OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS~~

~~--V ••• m yva • • ••• CD • ••~~

~~« «'M. 'V~~

~~%MQ*T~~

~~r=2^ _^7 ¿S 4.~~

~~#-\. r'H~~

~~t*A4i ¿L / ŒD • • • rC DA- SCOUT PLATOON MAY PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE AHEAD OF THE MAIN BODY~~

~~JA: SCOUTS MAY BE EMPLOYED IN OVERWATCH~~

~~SCOUTS OCCUPY Jl&y SUCCESSIVE OPs AS THE *4 TASK FORCE ADVANCES 3~~

~~SCOUT PLATOON MAY SCREEN A FLANK. THE FLANK SCREEN EXTENDS iVi rP!= FROM THE REAR OF THE Ser. LAST COMPANY TEAM BACK ^L. JFC-, TO THE LD, OR AS FAR BACK AS IT CAN~~

When preparing for offensive operations, the scout platoon can be used to PRIOR TO THE ATTACK, reconnoiter assembly areas and routes, the THE SCOUT PLATOON CAN terrain over which the battalion task force RECONNOITER THE OBJECTIVE, ROUTES AND intends to fight, and, if possible, the objective TERRAIN ON THE WAY TO THE OBJECTIVE, AND area. When moving to contact, scouts screen POSSIBLE ASSEMBLY a flank or reconnoiter ahead of the task force. AREAS BEHIND THE LD. THIS RECONNAISSANCE During an attack, scouts are used to screen a LOOKS FOR OVER- flank or maintain contact with an adjacent WATCH POSITIONS, OBSTACLES, AND unit. (Situations in Chapter 4, Offensive ENEMY POSITIONS Operations, show typical employment of the scout platoon.)

~~6-7 —FM 71-2-~~

~~DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS~~

~~■Si' # te '.i i — —1,r»~~

~~THE SCOUT PLATOON SCREENS FORWARD OF THE FERA TO GIVE EARLY WARNING OF ENEMY ADVANCE AND AREA OF CONCENTRATION~~

-Y- S3 THE SCOUT PLATOON IN •••i THE MBA MAY ASSIST OR GUIDE THE PASSAGE OF >-v*4 THE COVERING FORCE OR O REMAIN FORWARD IN VISUAL CONTACT WITH érC? THE ENEMY AS ■/ .-^BV ■t/"' -■'-t 0 -N // THE SCOUT PLATOON MAY t0 EMPLACE LIMITED OB- STACLES AND DEMO- \rJX. LITIONS v-5 ■a, ^XutCs, \ríVv LRALLYROINT'VI ,-í- % ^/r THE SCOUT PLATOON IL± SCREEN IS REINFORCED Ö BY PATROLS AND OPs FROM THE COMPANY TEAMS

When preparing for defensive operations, scouts are most ofte.x used to AFTER WITHDRAWAL, , THE SCOUT PLATOON screen forward of the battalion ta.,k force I MAY SCREEN A FLANK, sector and establish contact with the enemy OR OCCUPY OPs IN DEPTH force. The platoon can be augmented with ground surveillance radar, remote sensors, and additional infantry tanks and ATOM. Once contact is made, scouts are withdrawn IT MAY HAVE AN ON ORDER MISSION TO RE- and used to screen a flank or man OPs within ASSEMBLE AND ACT AS the sector. If enemy contact is lost, scouts can A RESERVE be used to find the enemy. When the battalion task force is preparing for operations in the main battle area (MBA), THE SCOUT PLATOON scouts can be used to make contact with OF A COVERING FORCE UNIT MAY DO ALL OF withdrawing covering force units, and to THIS, PLUS, IT MAY guide those units to passage lanes through I PRECEDE THE MAIN BODY TO THE MBA TO the MBA. Should the need arise, the scout CONDUCT LIAISON, platoon can be used as a small reserve. This ASSIST AND GUIDE THE PASSAGE OF THE mission should not be routinely given to the COVERING FORCE platoon because such a mission would detract from more important tasks.

~~6-8 FM 71-2—~~

The scout platoon can also be used to: •Screen between battle positions • Conduct liaison • Provide contact parties • Act as a quartering party • Provide traffic control and road guides • Conduct limited pioneer and demolition work • Conduct chemical detection and radiological monitoring and survey operations • Participate in area damage control operations • Conduct patrols • Establish a roadblock • Establish observation posts

PATROLS Reconnaissance patrols can be used to all patrolling planned in the task force area of collect information and check the accuracy of operations. In the case of combat patrols, the previous information. Patrols can have area, battalion task force S3 plans and coordinates zone, or route reconnaissance missions. They the operation. Once requirements have been may perform surveillance, establish contact determined, the S2, after coordinating with with adjacent units, and monitor gaps the S3, determines what unit or units will between units. Combat patrols may be used to conduct patrols. The S2 also coordinates his raid an enemy OP or position, or to ambush plan with the fire support officer (FSO) to an enemy patrol. insure that the presence of patrols in Patrols are normally described as short- potential target areas is known. Within the range or long-range, depending on how far battalion task force, the scout platoon can be far forward of friendly forces the patrol will used for patrols, or a company team can be operate. The battalion task force most often tasked to send out a patrol. employs short-range patrols, while the When a company team initiates a patrol, division or corps employs long-range patrols. the company team commander reports his From time to time, the battalion task force plans, to include time of departure, route, and may support divisional long-range patrols expected time of return to the battalion task operating in the battalion task force area of force. If the S2 does not personally debrief the operations. patrol, the information gained is passed to The battalion task force may decide or be him. directed to conduct a patrol. In either event, the battalion task force S2 makes a task force For further detail on this subject, see FM reconnaissance patrol plan which includes 7-10, The Light Infantry Company. 6-9 —FM 71-2

GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR SECTION Ground surveillance radar can be used The battalion task force S2 advises the during most conditions of visibility. It can be commander on where and how ground of significant assistance when visibility is surveillance radar can best be employed to limited by darkness or other conditions. The support the scheme of maneuver. Avoid a battalion task force GSR section is normally pattern of preference in selecting radar sites organized with four radar teams which can to keep enemy from successful direction be used to: finding. Once this has been determined, the S2 assigns missions to the ground • Search enemy defensive positions, surveillance radar section. The task force S2 avenues of approach, possible enemy assigns areas and methods of search and attack positions, and assembly areas; locations when GSR is retained in general and report location, size, compo- support of the battalion task force. Each team sition, and activity of the enemy. reports information to the S2 who passes it to • Monitor point targets such as subordinate units and to the brigade. bridges, defiles, and road junctions; and report the number and type of For most operations, it is better to place targets and direction of movement GSR teams in direct support of company through the point. teams or to attach them to company teams. • Survey areas for enemy activity after When this is done, areas and method of nuclear and non-nuclear fires, to aid surveillance are determined by the supported in determining the effects. company team commander. In the case of direct support, the GSR team chief positions • Assist in the control of units during limited visibility operations by his radar where it can best support the monitoring course headings. company team. When a GSR team is attached, the company team commander • Provide a means of detecting friendly may prescribe the GSR location and areas of units or patrols passing into the task surveillance, or they may be directed by force area during periods of radio silence. GSRs detect motion, so battalion task force S2. identification must be by pre- Information must be reported by the most arranged motion. secure means. When operating close to the • Determine range. supported units, messengers or wire can be used. When this is not possible, or • Increase fire support effectiveness. When targets have been detected information requires immediate action by the with reasonable certainty by radar, supported unit, or when no other fire support means may illuminate or communication means is available, radio is take targets under fire. used. Ground surveillance radar is usually In order for radar teams to provide good employed mounted but may be employed coverage, it is important that they from ground mounts when operating with understand the mission, scheme of maneuver dismounted troops. Radars should be of the supported unit, and the most likely positioned on terrain which dominates the targets expected in the area of operations. area to be covered and which is relatively free This assists operators in interpreting the of ground clutter (buildings, trees, or other signals they receive. Teams must then be objects) which can distort the radar beam and assigned a specific sector of surveillance, the result in inaccurate information. Locations desired degree of overlapping coverage, and should be near the supported unit and have frequency of coverage. To prevent detection covered and concealed routes to and from the by enemy direction finding equipment and to position. Forward slopes of radar sites must prevent jamming, operators turn on be covered by other observation means since equipment only when needed. they will be dead space to the radar. GSR

~~6-10 FM 71-2—~~

teams displace only on order of the GSR section leader or supported unit commander. When time permits, alternate and supplementary positions are selected and prepared. Radar surveillance cards are prepared by the senior radar operator who gives a copy to the battalion task force S2.

~~SAMPLE RADAR SURVEILLANCE CARD~~

~~^§5~~

~~7Á n -A~~

~~m. 'û'M an \ ' sf m~~

~~OSITION COORDINATE 63542736 1500 MTR GRID 2,840 TZZZf&sál «s tffba~~

~~RANGE PRIORITY & ELEVATION AZIMUTH AREA (TGT) DESCRIPTION TIME TYPE SEARCH MIN MAX (MILS)~~

~~1 MONITOR 400 600 825 BRIDGE~~

~~2 MONITOR 500 700 125 RIVER CROSSING~~

~~3 MONITOR 5300 5600 225 1180 HIGH SPEED ROAD AT PASS~~

~~4 MONITOR 4800 5300 175 660 CHURCH - POSSIBLE OP~~

~~5 SEARCH 300 3000 200 100 0 - 600 RIVER - WOODS~~

~~6 SEARCH 250 3200 200 600 - 1160 RIVER - WOODS~~

~~7 SEARCH 300 5500 250 100 1160-1750 RIVER - WOODS - MIL~~

~~6-11 — FM71-2~~

During offensive operations, GSR teams occasions, REMS teams may operate in the are employed as far forward as the situation battalion task force area of operations in permits and normally in pairs to permit general support of the brigade or division. movement by bounds. Tentative positions When attached to or placed in direct support and routes are selected in advance from map of the battalion task force, the battalion task reconnaissance. During an attack, GSR is force S2 designates the area to be covered by used to screen an exposed flank or search for REMS. He integrates REMS coverage with enemy activity forward of lead elements. GSR other surveillance means to cover gaps, can also be used to search for gaps between flanks, or avenues of approach into the task enemy defensive positions and to cover enemy force area. avenues of approach into the area of operations. Part or all of the section often Whether REMS employed in the task force operates with the scout platoon. area of operations are in support of the task force or in general support of the brigade or During defensive operations, GSR is division, the REMS team emplaces the employed in both the covering force area and sensors where they can best cover the main battle area. The GSR section is assigned area. The exact location of sensor normally employed in general support of the strings and fields must be reported to the area battalion task force to screen avenues of maneuver commander. He will decide to fire approach and gaps between company teams on any locations if convinced the activation and battalion task forces. was caused by enemy forces. The team locates where sensor signals can be REMOTE SENSOR TEAMS monitored. Ideally, this location is the From time to time, especially during battalion task force tactical operations center defense operations, divisional REMS teams (TOC). If this is not possible, they locate with will be placed in direct support of the a company team command post. They must battalion task force, or attached to the task have reliable communications with the force. When required, the task force requests supported headquarters and with agencies REMS support through brigade. On other capable of firing on targets identified.

OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) Throughout all the phases of an operation, to the enemy any information pertaining to every effort must be made to maintain planned, ongoing, or post-operational security. Operations security is an integral activity. part of planning and conducting unit training and combat operations at all levels Unit S2s and S3s work together to develop of command. Simply defined, OPSEC denies OPSEC protective measures.

~~STEP’S 1RÜ THE OPSEC PLAR3WDMG SEQUENCE~~

1. Determine enemy capabilities tor units prior to an operation, if known to obtaining information about the and analyzed by the enemy, would operation. provide him the information he needs. 2. Determine what information obtained by the enemy can compromise the operation and when he would need the 4. Determine what protective measures information in order to react. are necessary and where they must be 3. Determine what actions taken by the implemented in order to deny him this battalion task force or its subordinate information.

~~6-12 FM 71-2—~~

Some examples of OPSEC measures are: These can be combined in various ways. A small force can simulate a larger one by Physical Security—Use of security forces, making the noises of a larger force; having barriers, and anti-intrusion devices to deny some actual positions, some dummy; raising enemy access to facilities, areas, equipment, dust clouds by dragging chains or tree materiel, and personnel in order to protect branches behind vehicles; moving a force operational information or activities. across an observable area, then returning it Signal Security—Use of communications under cover and presenting it again and security techniques (communication codes, again; creating extra radio stations to secure voice equipment, RTO procedures) and simulate traffic of a larger unit; and many electronic security techniques (use of radio others. Deception actions can be as varied as silence, proper positioning of radars and the imagination of the commander and have antennas) to prevent the disclosure of been used throughout history. The Trojan operational information. horse caused the downfall of Troy. General Information Security—Security of written, Washington’s army moved from Trenton to verbal, and graphic information to prevent Princeton one night in early 1776 while the disclosure of operational information. British sat observing his numerous campfires. General McClellan hesitated in Tactical Deception—Actions taken to mis- the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 in part lead the enemy on current or intended because of the many (dummy) “Quaker” guns operations for a specified time period. The and the repeated sightings of what was objective of deception is to keep the enemy actually a small force marching and misinformed. Deception includes all actions countermarching. The German Army held taken to surprise or mislead the enemy, substantial forces out of the Normandy causing him to react in a way favorable to beachhead for six weeks in 1944 because they friendly forces, or not react at all. These expected the notional Allied Army in Kent, portray logical activities which disguise, England to invade near Calais. The Egyptian conceal, or draw attention away from true Army successfully massed forces on the Suez activities. Deception operations may be West Bank in 1973 by only seeming to directed as part of comprehensive division withdraw at the end of annual maneuvers. and corps plans, or may be part of normal task force operational procedures. On the other hand, countersurveillance Deception includes feints, demonstrations, activities deny information about the actual ruses, displays, and security operations. location and intentions of friendly forces. The Activities behind friendly lines which are enemy also uses means to seek information unusual or do not fit into the enemy’s picture about our units. He conducts patrols and uses of friendly probable courses of action may scouts to observe us. His night observation cause the enemy to withhold combat power devices, seismic intrusion devices, radar, and from a decisive point. Activities which cause direction finding (DF) equipment can locate the enemy to shift forces to likely areas our radars and radio transmitters. Even the provide the opportunity to strike him heat from bodies and vehicles can be detected elsewhere. Deception means include: by his thermal devices at short ranges. Visual: Showing movement, equipment, The battalion task force commander and activity at a believable time in a believable his staff primarily concern themselves with place. This can be actual or dummy. keeping the enemy from seeing the command Sound: Engines running, track noise, group, tactical operations center, trains; and hatch closing, digging, gunfire. subordinate unit commanders use techniques described in FM 71-1, The Tank and Odor: Diesel fumes, cordite, cooking. Mechanized Infantry Company Team, to Electronic: False transmission, remote protect themselves from enemy surveillance. locations for radios, radar scan of areas other Built-up areas are good locations for the TOC than those of primary interest. and task force trains. Basements provide 6-13

~~464-458 0 - 85 - 18 —FM 71-2~~

good cover and concealment from enemy patterns must be avoided. Vehicles should be observation and fire. Vehicles can be hidden parked to take advantage of natural in garages, barns, and similar buildings. The concealment and shadows. Remember that existing hard surface roads make the shadows move as the sun or moon moves. A camouflage of vehicle traffic patterns much vehicle in shadow at 0800 may not be at 1100. easier. Windows can be covered to permit Reduce Vehicle Signatures and Noise. operations at night. Antennas can be sited Vehicle signatures are dust, exhaust smoke, where they are masked from the enemy but and tracks on the ground. Dust is reduced by not from receiver stations. Routes of with- route selection and speed control. Exhaust drawal must be carefully planned so as to smoke can be reduced by proper maintenance avoid entrapment within the town. and driving. To aerial observers, track When built-up areas are not available, TOC patterns indicate size, location, and tactical and trains can be positioned on reverse slopes disposition of a unit. They can be reduced by and concealed from aircraft. (How to enforcing a strict movement plan. In snow or organize a tactical operations center is sand, track patterns should be covered. further described in Appendix A, Command Dispersion of vehicles, troops, and command Control; considerations for trains locations facilities will lessen the chances of aerial are further described in Chapter 8, Combat observation or detection by sensitive heat- Service Support.) seeking devices. The battalion task force, therefore, takes all Armored units are naturally noisier than measures possible to keep the enemy from other units, but much can be done to reduce seeing it. Combined with proper techniques of noise. Hatches and doors must not be movement and suppression, camouflage; slammed. Vehicles are started and moved light and noise discipline; and using radios only as part of a plan or tactical operation. and other electronic devices only when Enemy observers can pinpoint type and necessary degrade the enemy’s ability to see number of vehicles by listening to starting the battalion task force. engines, so vehicles should be started at the same time. Maintenance is performed in terrain masked areas to shield noise. VEHICLE CAMOUFLAGE Break Up the Silhouette. Natural LIGHT AND NOISE DISCIPLINE vegetation is best for breaking up vehicle Light Discipline. During darkness, the use silhouettes. Tree branches can be placed on of light must be strictly controlled. Even vehicles to block off sharp edges and hide filtered flashlights and burning cigarettes distinctive features such as APC cupolas or can be seen for great distances. Lights needed tank guns. Camouflage must be kept natural for maintenance and other activities must be looking. If area vegetation is green, shielded from enemy view. camouflage must be replaced often. In fast- moving operations, camouflage must be Noise Discipline. Soldiers must talk and adjusted as vegetation changes. move only when necessary. At night, it is particularly important to talk in LOW voices Reduce Glare. To reduce glare, vehicles are and to move slowly to avoid unnecessary pattern-painted with drab paint. FM 5-20 noise. contains instructions for pattern-painting vehicles. ELECTRONIC AND COMMUNICATION Windshields on wheeled vehicles should be SECURITY removed or tied down and covered with Because the enemy uses direction finding burlap. Enemy pilots or ground soldiers can equipment to pinpoint locations of see windshield glare for miles. transmitters, electronic devices such as Camouflage nets can be used to hide radios, radars, and infrared equipment are vehicles in stationary positions. Geometric used only when needed. The enemy’s DF

6-14 FM 71 -2 halting in the belief that the disadvantage of reinforced companies forward and one a hastily planned and executed attack is more company in the second echelon. An AT than offset by the advantage of striking an reserve is maintained. The hasty attack can enemy who has not adequately completed his also be made with three companies forward. defensive plans. A typical formation for a The reinforced tank battalion looks similar; Threat motorized rifle battalion in attack only the tank-infantry ratio is reversed, and formation is shown here. Depicted are two there is no antitank reserve. MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION IN THE ATTACK

ABOUT 1 'h KM KEY TO IN A 2-3 KM SYMBOLS SECTOR.-r-z-P^ffl m [fl WHEN awn a INFANTRY BMP DISMOUNTS 100-150M THIS IS REDUCED 300M 0 TO 100M = SA-9 p UP TO 500M ::--lQ 000- /ooo 000 000 JUJ Ó ä SP ARTY <> h MEDIUM o ta- TANK 0 M 4> = ZSU-23-4

~~NOTES~~

~~• DISTANCES ARE ANTITANK RESERVE APPROXIMATE AND NOT TO SCALE.~~

• BMPs ARE 50 TO <$> - 100M APART. MORTAR PLT ENGINEER SECTION • 122mm SP BTRY. 1-2 KM P(FROMREGIMENT) • INDIRECT FIRE - DEPLOYED 2-3 KM H H W FROM LINE OF CONTACT. • DIRECT FIRE - DEPLOYED AS CLOSE AS 1000 METERS FROM -ooo-ooo-ooo-ä LINE OF CONTACT. 0 5-9 — FM 71-2 2 The Deliberate Attack or Break- consider artillery, tanks, and motorized rifle through. The Threat uses the deliberate troops as the primary ingredients of combat attack or breakthrough to rupture the power and will attempt to mass these arms in enemy’s forward defenses to permit the the quantities they deem necessary to achieve passage of exploitation forces. A penetration of the enemy defense. meticulously planned, deliberate offensive operation, the breakthrough is carried out against well-prepared defenses in which no Threat doctrine calls for the use of tank gaps or flanks can be found. Threat forces units both in the first echelon of the REINFORCED TANK BATTALION BREAKTHROUGH

~~-700-800M FIRST BATTLE LINE mn m \am tnumi 200-250M mtd turn 100M mm mm SECOND BATTLE LINE 000° Uo 0000 P0 <1 [-*—200M—►] 600-700M~~

~~THIRD BATTLE LINE ramm m m ra m mram 550 -TO- 950M~~

ARTILLERY AREA <$> © DISTANCES ARE NOT TO SCALE I /I ,¡1, 11,111, Mfl?~V,i (klf,, Iliimii/I/Mi 1 ■ W 4- j-i '/¿«-K-, J-s* -i*.#»- KEY-TO SYMBOLS í « Í - ii- jK - I » , ^ /fa* y* W4 -sM I? * ^ ^ in j " 't ,>f, lit III -IffI ¡y, I '1 Jl'1 'il$ /i'Ht j/iji1 K'l ^ t'' /"f 11'k I1 'll'/ - 'll'1 /W '"I 'ill,'ll ¿III 'mi ^ J -¿rl -"hr " & 4«, - ^ ». to Vi i'®;- P&sljjh. Jÿ «/ =-BMP i<51Ç>-.ZSU23 4 í 1 rÉM' * J '£ V#\# 4h ^ íñi 2’ ¡i

~~NOTE: SHOULD THE BATTLE SITUATION DEMAND ADDITIONAL DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, THE SP122 HOW BATTERY MAY BE USED IN THE ANTI-ATGM SUPPRESSION ROLE.~~

5-10 breakthrough and as exploitation forces. In expected to be deployed to the immediate rear the presence of exceptionally strong defenses, of the tanks in the second battle line along especially a heavy antitank defense, or with forward air defense units to provide a terrain unsuited to tank employment, combined arms capability. however, they will use motorized rifle units for the breakthrough. Troops remain Should a heavy antitank defense be ex- mounted and fight from the carrier until pected, a third battle line may be established forced to dismount. by deploying the tanks of the third company across the entire rear of the battalion sector at As seen from the vantage point of the a distance of 600-700 meters from the second Threat commander, the breakthrough battle line. These tanks can also bring fire to appears as a telescoping sequence of bear upon the enemy and rapidly replace increasingly larger penetrations as each losses in the forward battle lines while tactical level of organization is brought to covering the battalion’s flanks. bear. The sequence begins with the initial rupture by the first echelon battalions. When Should the battle situation demand the second echelon battalion passes through additional direct firepower, the self-propelled the gap, the regiment itself then becomes part artillery battery in support may be used in of the division’s breakthrough. As the process this role. continues up through each succeeding level, the width and depth of the breakthrough expands in proportion. In some cases, the Threat commander may elect to establish a second echelon or reserve in lieu of a third battle line. This option is The combat formation adopted by tank normally dependent upon the anticipation of battalions making the breakthrough is light to moderately established antitank normally that of forces deployed in defenses. successive battle lines as shown in the accompanying diagram. The battalion battle The deliberate attack is preceded by a line frontage under conventional conditions thorough reconnaissance and sufficient may approach 1000 meters with forward engineer work to clear lanes through enemy companies separated by up to 100 meters and obstacles. The Threat considers finding and assigned frontages of about 500 meters. At neutralizing ATOM positions of utmost the decisive point of breakthrough, the importance; one of the keys to launching a battalion frontage will narrow to between successful attack. 700-800 meters with forward companies separated by the normal vehicle internal which is less than 50 meters. Artillery is essential to the success of the breakthrough. In the conventional version of the breakthrough, concentrated preparations The second battle line advances behind the last from thirty minutes to an hour or longer. first at a distance of between 200-250 meters. The goal is to achieve total neutralization of The tanks of the second battle line maintain the defending enemy units and artillery in firing lanes through the gaps between tanks the breakthrough sector. Artillery fires will in the first line. This combat formation be concentrated in the breakthrough areas allows the second battle line to engage in the with up to 100 tubes per kilometer of battle simultaneously with the first, breakthrough frontage. Artillery support to maintain a constant readiness to move achieve this density may include multiple forward to replace losses, and adds an rocket launchers, mortars 120mm and above, offensive depth to the battalion’s attack. A and 100mm AT guns. Tank guns may be used reinforcing motorized rifle company is as artillery if necessary. 5-11

~~464-458 0-85-15 FM 71-2'~~

The drawings here are schematics of percentage of the unit conducts economy of Threat units in the breakthrough. In these force operations within the zone of action, but diagrams the dimensions given represent the outside the breakthrough sector. ideal case; frontages of Threat units are as sensitive to terrain and the enemy as US units are. The breakthrough is a two-phase Unit boundaries shown in each of the operation: the rupture of the forward figures delineate the zones of action. Within defensive positions followed by the these zones, the unit assigns an axis to each destruction or neutralization of supporting of its subordinate units. Breakthrough forces that can counterattack. As an sectors are shown in each of the figures as example, the mission of the regiment includes arrows. Dimensions of breakthrough sectors continuing the attack to destroy the division do not coincide with those of the zones of reserves. The depth of the breakthrough, action. The breakthrough is accomplished by then, is a function not only of the depth of the moving the bulk of the attacking force along enemy’s continuous defenses, but of the depth its assigned axis; the remaining small of the associated reserves as well. THREAT UNITS IN THE BREAKTHROUGH r DIVISION BREAKTHROUGH ARMY BREAKTHROUGH

~~BREAKTHROUGH BREAKTHROUG BREAKTHROUG~~

~~1 5-2 KM 1.5-2 KM “\ 4 KM AAA 111 O o CD CD CD CD 4-7 KM~~

~~DIVARTY DIV ARTY GROUP REGT ARTY GROUP. REGT ARTY GROUP. GROUP JL~~

~~CD m* Si'-' a ZONE OF ACTION ZONE OF ACTION MAIN ATTACK SECONDARY ATTACK ==—5-8 KM==¡ * V =——5-8 KM Ill Ill xx XX 15 KM 20-30 KM CD ZONES OF ACTION~~

~~CD sX CD CD m o ma a NOT TO SCALE NOT TO SCALE~~

5-12 Planning for the pursuit is begun before the 3 attack. Plans include consideration of possible withdrawal routes, composition of The Pursuit. The Threat considers the pursuit forces, and preparation of schemes of pursuit an offensive operation designed to maneuver best suited to the situation. The complete the destruction of the enemy. pursuit is initiated at the first opportunity by Rather than follow a retreating enemy, regiments and higher units and is terminated pursuing units move along routes parallel to only on orders by army or higher the enemy’s retreat, attempting to commanders. outdistance elements of the enemy force, cut the withdrawing columns into segments, and Orders to end the pursuit are issued 1 when destroy them. Helicopters will be employed to the enemy has been completely destroyed; locate and engage retreating units and guide 2 when pursuit forces have outdistanced pursuing forces into contact. Airborne, their logistical support or are over-extended airlanded, and airmobile forces will be used to and in danger of being cut off; or, 3 when the control critical terrain and block or slow enemy has succeeded in establishing a strong down the enemy’s withdrawal. defensive position. EXAMPLES OF PURSUIT OPERATIONS PARALLEL PURSUIT COMBINATION PURSUIT

~~0 0~~

~~G SD m &~~

~~o O oo oo~~

~~o o G5 • : (S5 »~~

5-13 — FM 71-2 □ The Night Attack. The Threat prefers to attack at night when terrain, minefields, and other obstacles eliminate the possibility of surprise and will cause excessive losses in daytime operations. Round-the-clock operations are habitual to maintain the uninterrupted momentum of the offensive.

Threat units are equipped with night fighting devices: gunlaying telescopes, night viewers, night driving and aiming equipment, sniperscopes and others. Battlefield illumination and artillery fire support of night operations are firequently practiced. However, to gain surprise, the Threat commander may, under certain conditions, opt not to employ one or both of these combat THREAT FORCES TRAIN suPPort means- All tactical organization EXTENSIVELY FOR e^emen^s can conduct night operations, and NIGHT COMBAT extensive training is conducted to prepare units for sustained employment at night and during periods of reduced visibility. Preparations for night attacks are made in detail and pleins are based on careful reconnaissance, simplicity of maneuver, speed of execution, and surprise.

The motorized rifle battalion normally attacks in a single echelon preceded by a small advance guard. Companies are deployed in line, each company being deployed in a line of platoons. Individual riflemen may wear some type of identification such as white armbands.

Tanks are frequently employed in night attacks with motorized rifle units. Careful terrain reconnaissance and close cooperation with motorized rifle units are considered essential for successful use of tanks at night. Each tank is assigned a route, mission, and specific assault team. Several riflemen are assigned to each tank to aid its crew in locating antitank weapons and obstacles. When the situation permits, tank headlights and searchlights are used to illuminate enemy firing points, to blind the enemy, and to assist obstacle-clearing parties. 5-14 FM 71-2 —

Illumination support for night attacks is assault elements will move in very close to primarily used to light up objectives deep this fire before it is shifted further to the rear. within the enemy positions and as a guide to If the Threat commander calculates that the advancing forces. Illumination is often used existing antiarmor resistance will be to mark targets for artillery fires and to degraded, he may lead the assault with tanks interfere with the enemy’s night vision followed closely by motorized riflemen equipment. mounted in BMPs. If heavy antitank defenses are expected, however, the During a night attack, the artillery motorized infantry may be dismounted with normally in support of the regiment may be the BMP following close behind. This will attached to lead battalions and companies. occur also when intense AT fire forces the This attachment supports the subordinate infantry to dismount from the BMP. units in their relatively independent action in developing the attack in depth. During the mounted assault, the Threat commander places great reliance upon his To repel enemy counterattacks at night, intelligence elements, the effects of Threat forces intensify reconnaissance along suppressive fires, and the tempo of attack to the flanks of each unit and to the front for surprise the defender. This minimizes the early detection of approaching enemy forces. time available for the defender to employ Continuous illumination of the terrain along antiarmor weapons effectively. The defender all possible axes of enemy counterattack is in this particular situation must plan to slow utilized. the Threat attack under conventional conditions by deploying heavy antiarmor defenses which will force the dismounted assault. Assault Tactics. The Threat force prefers to lead offensive operations with tanks, but will lead with motorized rifle units when either When facing heavy defensive fires, the the terrain is not suitable for armor, or when tanks and motorized rifle units will resort to heavy antitank defenses exist. Regardless of fire and maneuver techniques with infantry which arm dominates in the first echelon of dismounting and the BMPs supporting by an offensive operation, only rarely will fire. The tanks and infantry move forward Threat forces employ pure units. Normally, together, with the infantry remaining close to motorized rifle troops will accompany tanks, the tanks in order to suppress light antiarmor or tanks will accompany motorized rifle weapons by small arms fire. As antitank troops. resistance is eliminated, BMPs move forward, infantry mount vehicles, and the mounted attack resumes. Generally, artillery In the meeting engagement (both forces and mortar fires are relied on to provide moving), Threat forces normally attempt to fix with the advanced party and maneuver suppressive fires. the main body to conduct a mounted attack against the flank or rear of the enemy column. The BMP is ideally suited for this role in terms of maneuverability, firepower The Threat forces prefer to attack. and shock action. Knowing what the Threat is likely to do allows the US Army commander to In the conduct of the hasty or the deliberate plan and organize a defense which attack, intensive artillery and mortar will defeat the attack. preparations provide suppression. Leading 5-15 HOW TO PLAN AND ORGANIZE THE DEFENSE When conducting defensive operations, the US Army normally organizes its divisional and corps battlefield into three areas: Q covering force area,Q main battle area, Rand rear area.

~~“■ ï * I**”. * — W* JMfc i\ ^ Is- * :: ¿~~

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~~MAIN BATTLE AREA~~

~~— ,~~

~~REAR AREA XX~~

Covering Force Area (CFA). If a covering force is established, its mission will be primarily to find the enemy. Then it will fight with sufficient force to cause the enemy to reveal the location and direction of movement of his main thrust(s). This must be done 5-16 FM 71 -2 —

sufficiently far forward to permit forces in the main battle area to concentrate accordingly. The covering force strips away enemy reconnaissance units, forces the enemy to maneuver to bypass, and when the enemy launches hasty attacks, to defeat those attacks. As the enemy shifts forces, brings up artillery, and masses for a deliberate attack, he will reveal his composition, strength, and intended direction of attack. A covering force THE COVERING FORCE FIGHTS seeks to deceive the enemy as to the actual ANO DELAYS TO FORCE THE location of the main battle area. The covering ENEMY TO SHOW MAIN THRUST force mission is normally delay, which could AND TO DENY HIM ACCESS TO be terrain specific, time specific, or both. The THE MAIN BATTLE AREA mission of battalion task forces and squadrons operating with the covering force is normally delay, although sometimes it may be necessary to defend specific terrain or in specific areas to accomplish the covering force mission. The CFA begins at the line of contact and ends at the FEBA. The size and composition of the covering force are based on the mission, enemy and terrain. It is an antitank heavy force. A covering force operating in front of a division might consist of up to five or six tank-heavy battalions, artillery, air defense and engineer units. The covering force may be organized around a separate headquarters reporting directly to division or corps or to MBA brigades which assume control of covering forces operating forward of their positions. This is normally done when the covering force can be supported by direct support (DS) field artillery positioned in the MBA. The covering force presses the fight as far forward of the MBA as possible, fighting until forced to move toward the MBA or faced with the risk of unacceptable losses to the force. And when this occurs, the covering force continues to fight as it moves toward the MBA, maximizing destruction of the enemy while minimizing its own losses. The field artillery may continue its fires as elements move to the rear or lateral positions. 5-17 =FM 71-2

When operating as a part of the covering force, the battalion task force commander fights his company teams from a series of covered and concealed positions, engaging when the enemy cannot return effective fire. If not initially controlled by an MBA brigade, the task force can expect, at some point during the covering force battle, to be detached from the corps or divisional covering force and attached to an MBA brigade. Communications and liaison are established with the gaining brigade as in any operation. When directed to do so, the battalion task force hands off the enemy to MBA forces, moves to a designated area in the MBA, and prepares for operations in the MBA. IQ Main Battle Area (MBA). The decisive battle is fought in the main battle area. Here, forces will be concentrated against the enemy main thrust. As a result of concentration, forces usually will be unequally distributed laterally. The lateral arrangement of forces at the start of the fight in the MBA might be as shown. n n n rr MAIN ENEMY SECONDARY ENEMY THRUSTS THRUSTS

~~4 BN 4 BN 3 BN TFs TFs TFs~~

~~5-18 FM 71-2 =~~

Thus there will be differences in the way a Battalion Task Force Missions. While the battalion task force will fight the defensive battalion task force may sometimes receive battle. Much depends upon whether the task written defensive orders including formal force is in the area where forces are tasking statements and graphic control concentrated or in the area where forces are measures, the rapid flow of battle dictates economized. Additional differences are that defensive orders most often will be oral dictated by mission, enemy, terrain, and and fragmentary. In either case, the number and type of companies available. commander’s concept of how the overall action will be conducted is vital. In the best of cases, the brigade commander will tell the Rear Area. Division controls the area task force commander, face-to-face, what he behind brigade rear boundaries. Divisional is to do, where he is to do it, and how it command control and support activities are contributes to the brigade operation. If face- located here. Battalion task forces retained as to-face coordination is not possible, this same division reserve may be located in the rear information must be transmitted on secure area; however, normally they will be voice radio. committed to the fight in the MBA by The following are typical missions which attachment to brigades. The rear area must may be received by a battalion task force be protected from enemy thrusts, as loss of commander, together with examples of the any of the facilities located there would be a way each might be expressed by the brigade serious disadvantage for the overall defense. commander. -EXAMPLE- / \ Lieutenant Colonel Jones. I'm giving you a sector to DEFEND IN SECTOR defend. You're responsible for the area between Sectors, used primarily in Beetown over there (points to it), and A-Line Creek over the forward portion of the there (points to it), running all the way back to Highway MBA, are oriented on 44.1 expect you to destroy, stop, and if possible drive out enemy avenues of ap- the enemy regiments headed this way. You can use the proach, and are usually whole sector if you must, but I expect you to be about deeper than they are wide where we're now standing, pretty far forward in the to permit the defending sector, when you're finished. This is important because unit to fight the battle in depth from successive we expect a fresh enemy division in here soon after. positions. A commander receiving this mission generally establishes his initial positions as far i forward as possible, but may use any techniques appropriate to the situation , and the full depth of his sector, to destroy, stop, or drive out enemy forces. He must prevent enemy forces from passing ft through his sector beyond ws his rear boundary.

~~5-19 —FM 71-2~~

-EXAMPLE- DEFEND FROM A BATTLE AREA As battalion task forces are concentrated in the area of maximum enemy effort, such as a break- L through attempt, they may ■ be assigned battle areas SSIli behind the forward task forces in the MBA. From Lieutenant Colonel Smith, I want you to occupy this these they can reinforce battle area, which includes battle position 16,21 and 22. the forward TFs, or tpke up The enemy has massed for a breakthrough and is headed the battle as the enemy this way along the ridge lines out there to our front. Task advances beyond the Force 2-92 is in position on the left, with Task Force 2-90 forward TF positions. A behind them. Task Force 2-10 is occupying a battle area commander receiving this mission may use tech- behind you, offset as you can see on the map. Now when niques appropriate to the the enemy appears out of that woodline you start your situation to destroy, stop, engagement. That's about maximum range for any of or cause the withdrawal of your direct fire weapons. Keep him under fire until he enemy forces. The task gets to the farm road, just forward of where we're force may maneuver and standing, and give it everything you've got. But, I don't »Vwwrt'’ employ indirect fires freely »KB*WfifSetîS ' want you to get pinned down here, so when the enemy within the assigned battle gets to that farm road, you be ready to pull out quickly, area. It may employ direct ‘ 'Ä through this wooded area, and around Task Force 2-10 fires within or outside of into this battle area here on the map. Both 2-92 and 2-10 its assigned battle area against clearly identified will have the enemy under fire to cover your move. I'll enemy targets. In areas of mi either meet you in the new area or send instructions on a high density of friendly what I want you to do there. task forces concentrated against enemy breakthrough efforts, it is vm normal for the brigade commander to reserve the authority for employment of scatterable mines.

~~& A ?~~

~~w 1 A i 5-20 FM 71 -2 —~~

-EXAMPLE- DEFEND IN SECTOR (OR DEFEND FROM A BATTLE AREA), RETAIN SPECIFIED TERRAIN In addition to the freedom to occupy and hold of action and restrictions specified terrain features described above, the task (such as a hill or a town). force commander must also retain specified terrain, e.g., “retain village of Lieutenant Colonel Doe, here's your sector (/orf/cates/ton NEUDORF,” “retain Hill the map and by pointing to particular terrain features). You 596,” or hold Hill 597 can maneuver around as you see fit, but, there are things until TF 9-72 has with- you can't do. Don't give up Roundville without my drawn south of Hwy 95. ” permission, and you won't get that before about 1600 The brigade commander today. If the enemy maneuvers away to the left of will specify terrain to be Roundville it puts them right where I want them. If they retained when such has been directed by the try to go to the right you can handle them because the division commander, terrain canalizes them. If they come through Roundville where the terrain is and on down the valley in strength before late afternoon, critical to the defense, or, I won't be completely ready to take care of that. So to insure that the defensive you've GOT to hold the town until at least 1600 today. battle conducted by adjacent units is inte- f' grated. Occasionally, an entire TF may be required V

EXAMPLE DELAY IN SECTOR This is a LOW RISK mission important to retain tive, than to engage in which requires the battal- friendly forces between higher risk defensive ion task force to slow and the enemy and his objec- operations. defeat as much of the enemy as possible without sacrificing the tactical Here's the problem. Division has pulled Task Force 2-10 integrity of the battalion. out to go up to first brigade where they expect the enemy This mission is appro- ? i:: i i; i: : breakthrough attempt. We've still got at least two, and priate to battalion task ¿¿«-w I i-i J. maybe three, enemy regiments to contend with in your forces in the CFA when wiirr«; area. I want you to delay them in this sector for as long as preservation of the TF for you can. Attrite their force as much as you can, but don't tasks in the MBA is more get pinned down or overrun. I can't risk losing any of your important than giving companies, so I won't put any time restriction on you. maximum delay. Such may Just stay in front of the enemy, delay his advance as be the case when the forces in the MBA are properly m much as you can, and keep me posted. deployed in adequately prepared positions. This mission is also appropriate to the economy-of-force area in the MBA when, because of the strength of the enemy attacks and the resulting threat of deep ij penetrations, it is more >v

~~5-21 — FM 71-2~~

~~-EXAMPLE-~~

DELAY FORWARD OF A SPECIFIED LINE FOR A SPECIFIED TIME This is a HIGH RISK mission which requires the battalion task force to prevent enemy forces from You've got to delay the enemy forward of Cedar Creek reaching the specified area for at least 8 hours. Task Force Anderson has the same earlier than the specified mission on the right. We're not sure how much the time regardless of the cost. enemy has available to come this way. If you can hold This mission can be given right here, that would be fine. But even if they come with to battalion task forces in a major thrust, they must not get across Cedar Creek the CFA, or in the MBA if until 2d brigade sorts out their fight up north. You do NOT in the area of what you have to do to hold them. The chance of losing concentration. part of the force is a risk I'll just have to take.

~~<.1/7 {~~

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~~K > c;i VJI~~

Company Team Missions. The battalion Thereafter, he can implement or modify parts task force commander makes his plan based of the plan quickly and in few words. Most upon the brigade scheme of defense. Like the important, his subordinates can exercise brigade commander, he must explain how he their initiative and operate in concert with visualizes the overall use of forces and fires. It the TF commanders’ overall plan. This is is even more import£int at this level to explain particularly important during the confusion the battle as he believes it will flow. He does of battle and in the high threat EW this before the battle, if possible, so that he environment when radio communications can amply describe how he intends to may be blocked at critical moments. The maneuver companies or teams, when or following are typical missions which may be under what circumstances he will move them, received by a company or company team, when and where he will counterattack, and together with examples of the way orders his planned options and variations. might be expressed by the TF commander. 5-22 -PM 71-2 —

■EXAMPLE: (Mission issued during the battle.)- OCCUPY A BATTLE POSITION Bob, I want you to occupy Battle Position 34, right here. This mission requires the The enemy is going to come out of the town over there in company team to use the a few minutes. I want you to open up at max range and assigned battle position as a base for delivering fires knock out as many of them as you can. I'm giving you against an enemy in one or priority of artillery fires. My plan now is for you to fight- more designated target from here until the enemy gets to the stream here in areas. It is not normally front of the position. I'll be where I can see the fight and intended as a position from judge when to move you, but if you can't reach me on the which to repel an assault. radio when the battle starts up the near side of the The team commander must stream, you move out immediately to Battle Position 36. be told where his team will Go over the trail you and I just used. Joe's team and some go next, but not to relocate « TOWs on Battle Position 37 will cover your move. without approval of the battalion task force commander. il IK ", P TW r ■ô THTT c Vi K -EXAMPLE: (Mission issued during the battle.)-

DEFEND TO RETAIN A BATTLE POSITION This mission requires the company team to stay on John, I want you to hold this knoll. I realize you haven't the battle position until had time to prepare this as a strongpoint, but plan to stay told to move. Assaults are here until I tell you to leave. If they close on you and begin repelled even with possible to assault, you're to repel them. You're going to have a risk to the team. tough fight, but you've got to hold. I'm going to maneuver Jack's team up to the right to counterattack by fire into the enemy flank. You can move your carriers m and tanks around from that trail on the left to that gully on the right, but don't let them stray any further. I'll let you know what to do next after we stop this enemy unit. ¿TC /

~~w 5-23 — FM 71-2~~

~~-EXAMPLE-~~

CREATE AND DEFEND A STRONGPOINT This mission requires the company team to occupy the assigned battle position and prepare it as a strongpoint. The team m delivers fíres against the Jim, I'm sending the other two teams further forward to enemy in designated target occupy battle positions. They're going to fight from areas and repels enemy several battle positions and take out as much of the assaults against the enemy as they can. I want you to prepare this place as a strongpoint without strongpoint. You'll have time to do a pretty thorough job approval of the TF before the fight comes to you. When it does, you'll have commander. to hold out, even against dismounted assaults. The other teams will bottle him in here, and you'll be the cork to ms hold him. I can't tell you exactly how long you'll be here— just be prepared to stop whatever they throw at you. The brigade commander has a counterattack plan he. may use, or I may use the one we talked about earlier. Either way, you'll have to hold this position and I'll tell you what C to do next. mm wmm

~~c n f % 1 m S3 V'.~~

~~( O '«I V kV) r A ^l< \ '¿fa \~~

~~5-24 FM 71-2 —~~

How to Employ Weapon System» in the Defense. Usually, a battalion task force will contain three major weapon1 systems. The capabilities,- limitations and' employment considerations of each must be clearly understood by the TF commander.

MECHANIZED INFANTRY—organized, equipped, and trained to fake and hold ground, and to defeat enemy infantry with its numerous automatic small arms and machineguns. Also armed with light and medium antitank weapons, it can be used as a medium- range tank-killing system.

~~Mechanized infantry is used to:~~

> Defend in terrain restrictive to tanks, I Overwatch friendly tank and ARC such as forested areas, villages and movements or counterattacks with cities. MAW. • Suppress enemy antitank weapons. ) Defend designated positions against determined enemy mounted and I Block covered and concealed routes of dismounted'attacks. enemy attack or infiltration. • Secure tanks and ATGM under low 1 Destroy enemy armored vehicles out visibility conditions against infil- to mid-ranges (fOOm). tration.

~~iiOISMÖÜNXEDiWITH! ~ CARRIER-SUPPORT~~

~~? P?~~

Mechanized infantry in defensive in the delay, or to conduct mounted patrols operations fight either mounted in their and surveillance. carriers or dismounted. When DISMOUNTED, they employ The M OU NTED technique is used in an carriers to support the dismounted elements, active-type defense when battle positions are or the carriers are given separate combat hastily occupied and must be readily vacated tasks. 5-25 FM 71-2

trained to take ground, and to defeat enemy armored veMcles and other targets with main guns and secondary weapons. Armor protection permits operation under enemy small arms and artillery fire. Tanks fight best as mobile systems.

Tanks contribute a major role to the defense by destroying enemy tanks and other hard targets with their main guns, by protecting infantry, and by counterattacking. They provide the combat power to move the team and task force from one TANKS PROVIDE position to another in the face of enemy DEPTH DEFENSE-DESTROY opposition or in counterattack. ENEMY TARGETS, PROTECT Tanks must be used in ways that maximize INFANTRY, AND PROVIDE COUNTERATTACK POWER their maneuver capability whenever possible. In open, rolling terrain, tanks should be positioned to take advantage of their long-range main guns. In close terrain, tanks must be carefully sited to permit best use of available fields of fire.

HEAVY ANTITANK WEAPONS (TOW)— organized, equipped, and trained to provide medium and long-range antiarmor fires up to SOOOm. TOW sections may be under team control or occasionally retained under task force control.

TOWs should be positioned to engage the enemy initially at long ranges where the TOW has a range advantage over the tank. As the battle closes, the TOW is positioned to engage the enemy from the flank to make it harder for the enemy to acquire and fire at TOWs, while providing cover from direct frontal fire. Since TOWs are optimized for long-range engagements, they are not normally collocated with mechanized infantry platoons. 5-26 FM 71 -2 —

While TOWs can be dismounted, they are #A way to slow the enemy; e.g., normally employed mounted on vehicles in obstacles, so that he is visible for a order to rapidly move them into firing longer time. positions, and to quickly relocate them to other positions to minimize their vulnerability to direct and indirect fires. If an enemy force can appear at mid-range For further discussion of the combined with a large number of armored vehicles, the arms interaction of these weapons systems in commander needs: the defense see FM 71-1, Chapter 5. # Early warning of enemy approach. How to Allocate Weapon Systems. # A large number of TOW and tanks. Combat power in the defense can be # Effective suppressive fires. considered in terms of the number of systems # Obstacles to canalize and slow the required to defeat the enemy targets expected enemy. to be present. This required density of fires is based upon two factors: # A series of positions from which to deliver direct fire.

flj the maximum number of vehicles the enemy can deploy at one time on a If the principal threat is dismounted infantry given avenue of approach, and the or if there are covered and concealed length of time this target array will be approaches, the commander needs: exposed. This must be based upon thorough knowledge of enemy # Effective surveillance. organization and tactics, careful study # Large numbers of anti-infantry of the terrain in the area, and a weapons (machineguns, mortars, reasoned estimate of the effect of artillery, antipersonnel mines, etc.). obstacles in the area. # Close-in defensive fires. # Infantry antitank weapons (Dragon, 19 the rate of fire and the capabilities of LAW, AT mines, etc.) to defeat weapon systems to hit and kill at the supporting enemy armor. ranges where the enemy will be exposed. This is based upon knowledge of systems capabilities, expertise of gunners, ammunition The commander plans the use of his available, and battlefield experience. weapon systems to achieve the required type and density of fires in accordance with his concept of how the battle will be fought. He organizes forces, creates or improves While the exact outcome of battle cannot be obstacles, plans and improves positions, and predicted, these factors can be used to issues orders so that the battalion task force determine the general number of weapon can achieve maximum effectiveness from systems required to achieve the necessary fire each system in each of several potential density. They also provide an indication of engagements. ways to improve the defense. If a large enemy force will be exposed but briefly at 2500 How to Concentrate Forces. If the defense meters, the commander will recognize that he against a strong, mobile enemy is to succeed, must have one or more of the following: the outnumbered defender must be able to move his weapon systems and forces so as to # A large number of TOW, or concentrate the required combat power at the # Better fields of fire, or time and place needed. 5-27 FM 71-2 —

Division and brigade commanders must ^^Employing platoons directly under count on being able to move task forces on task force control to occupy positions from extremely short notice. This fact places four which to engage the enemy (in cases where demands on the task force commander: the additional platoon should not be attached to one of the teams), to provide Q//' his task force is among those overwatch for movement of company teams ordered to a new area of concentration, in contact to new positions, or to he must disengage from the enemy, move, counterattack. and take up the new mission. 'Diese tasks must be accomplished as RAPIDLY as How to Organize a Strongpoint. In some possible. exceptional cases, when the brigade or Qjf his task force is already in the area division commander decides that it is in which additional forces are being required to prevent a catastrophic concentrated, he may have to modify his penetration by armor, a battalion task force plan for maneuver and fires to permit might be assigned the mission to prepare and. integration of the arriving units into the occupy a strongpoint. The strongpoint is defense. similar to a perimeter defense in that it is Ef f/' his task force is in the area of developed to defeat an attack from any concentration, he must be prepared to direction. It differs from a perimeter in that it accept attachment of additional company is essentially an antitank “nest” which teams and TOW sections, and rapidly physically cannot be overrun or bypassed by integrate them into his scheme of defense. tanks, and can be reduced by infantry only ^J//" his task force is remaining in the with the expenditure of much time and over- economy of force area from which units whelming forces. It is the cork in a bottleneck formed by terrain, obstacles, and units. The are moving to concentrate, he will likely strongpoint is distinguished from other have to reposition his teams to take over defensive positions by the importance of the additional responsibilities and perhaps terrain on which it is located and the detach a company team or TOW sections to resulting time, effort, and resources dedicated units moving to concentrate. to its development. It is an immovable object around which the battle will swirl. Within the task force sector or battle area, the task force commander must focus on Strongpoints may be located on the FEBA, concentrating enough of the right type of or in the depth of the battle area. The division weapon systems and fires where needed at commander makes that determination based the right time to defeat the enemy. The task on: force commander concentrates by: %Time and resources available to ^^Moving company teams as necessary develop the strongpoint. to new battle positions to bring their fires to # The best terrain available to serve as an bear on the enemy. armor chokepoint. \ ^¡[Directing company teams or platoons +How he can tie the chokepoint into the on a given battle position to engage the rest of his defense. enemy in an alternate sector of fire. ^^Attaching additional tank or Two aspects of the strongpoint location are mechanized infantry platoons to particularly critical. First, since considerable company teams in combat to be integrated time is required to develop a strongpoint, the into currently occupied positions, or to battalion must be placed far enough from the occupy nearby positions. line of contact to provide that time. Second, ^¡¡Attaching additional TOW sections to terrain on the flanks of the strongpoint must company teams, or directing the AT restrict the advance of the attacker, or the platoon to concentrate on a given area, to battalion faces an increased risk of isolation thicken AT fires there. and destruction. 5-28 FM 71-2 —

The battalion commander who receives the The commander then examines the terrain strongpoint mission immediately conducts a in terms of the enemy armor approaches to ground reconnaissance accompanied by the the position. Even though it may not be commander of the engineer unit committed to occupied permanently in a full 360 degree make it viable. In broad terms, their priorities perimeter, units must be able to meet a threat are: from any direction. The position must be %Make the position physically impass- rendered impassable by carefully integrating able to tanks. natural and artificial obstacles including % Protect the A T weapons with terrain, tank ditches, natural and diverted obstacles, and infantry. waterways, rubbled buildings, minefields, ^Protect the infantrymen who are cratered roads and other natural or manmade protecting the antitank weapons. features which might readily be used.

~~ONE SITUATION: VILLAGE IN A VALLEY~~

~~ANOTHER SITUATION: MOUNTAIN PASS - CHOKEPOINT IN DEPTH IN THE MBA~~

~~iL\ 2? \ s PYT = FM 71-2-~~

~~STILL ANOTHER SITUATION: BEHIND THE FEBA~~

~~MAJOR HIGHWAY IGHWAY ?Q G 0~~

~~ALTERNAT FERA N US~~

~~RES~~

~~DIV~~

~~'—"XX~~

Security is established around a positions. Avenues of approach to the strong- strongpoint prior to its occupation. The scout point which cannot be covered by forces in a platoon, remote sensors, and radar are primary position must be at least kept under employed, as appropriate, to screen possible surveillance and covered by supplemental enemy avenues of approach. The scouts also positions which are prepared in as much establish contact with units forward of and detail as time permits, and occupied on order. adjacent to the battalion. Counterattacks are planned to destroy or The battalion task force commander then eject enemy penetrations of the strongpoint, deploys his force to defeat all mounted, and to preserve the integrity of the position. dismounted, and air attacks. Infantry units Defense against air attack consists of a are positioned to defeat dismounted attacks comprehensive system of passive measures, with small arms fire and mounted attacks such as camouflage and air guards, and of with LAW and Dragon fire. active measures, such as positioning of Tanks and TOWs are initially positioned organic or attached ADA weapons. where they can engage the enemy at long Provisions are also made for engaging range and still be protected by the terrain and aircraft with small arms. obstacle system. They can then be moved, as Reinforcing the Terrain. Artificial necessary, to alternate positions within the obstacles are used to reinforce natural terrain strongpoint to shift or mass fires on an obstacles where required. Their proper use assaulting enemy and to avoid enemy fires. can greatly strengthen the defense. Obstacles All positions within a battalion can divert enemy forces from covered strongpoint are sited to tie in with adjacent avenues into open areas where direct fire positions. Proper positioning also allows the weapons can engage. In open areas, obstacles massing of the fires of two or more units can extend the amount of time enemy units against an assault and prevents the enemy will be exposed to fire. from isolating positions and defeating them Obstacles should decrease enemy mobility in detail. Sectors of fire are designated to without hindering friendly force maneuver. insure that fires are coordinated between all They reinforce the tactical plan and 5-30 FM 71-2 — supplément battalion task force combat power. Lanes and gaps through barriers must be EXAMPLES OF ARTIFICIAL provided. A gap is a portion of the barrier in OBSTACLES which no obstacles have been constructed • Road craters. and is seldom less them 100 meters wide. A • Abatis. lane is a clear route through an obstacle and is generally a road or path. Company team • Tank ditches. commanders usually control gaps and lanes • Log cribs and hurdles. in their areas. • Wire (double apron fences, concertina * Obstacles should be covered by fences, four-strand fences, tangle foot). observation, direct fire, indirect fire, and by • Mines. remote sensors when available. Artificial and natural obstacles should be tied together so they eure more difficult to bypass than to breach. Normally the most effective and least time Obstacles eure employed in depth. consuming type of artificial obstacle to The most desired cheuracteristic of a emplace is a minefield. Mines delay and NATURAL OBSTACLE is ease of canalize enemy movement, lower the enemy’s conversion into a more effective obstacle with will to fight, and cause fear of sudden and minimum effort. unexpected casualties. Hasty protective minefields are used for short periods of time or for specific operational missions. They can be laid by company teams, assisted by engineers if available. Each mine is individually placed to take best advantage of likely armor EXAMPLES OF NATURAL avenues of approach or expected future ANTIARMOR OBSTACLES enemy positions without regard to any pattern or density. Mines must be readily • Mountainous terrain and slopes over 60 detectable and removable by the installing percent. unit. The battalion task force commander can delegate authority to employ hasty • Escarpments (for example, railroad tracks or highways on a steep fill over VA meters minefields to a company team commander or, high). on special occasions, to a platoon leader. • Ravines, gullies, or ditches over 5 meters All hasty minefields, whether emplaced by wide. the battalion task force or emplaced at task • Rivers, streams, canals over 150 meters force request, must be recorded and reported wide and 1 'A meters deep. in accordance with procedures established by the brigade. • Swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep. • Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches in When planning for artificial obstacles, diameter, or 20 percent slopes with trees leaders and staff officers must consider: as small as 4 inches in diameter. Tree stumps 18 inches high are obstacles. Q MISSION • Snow over 1 meter deep. How much time is available? • Built-up areas. Can the specified degree of resistance be achieved without artificial obstacles? Will friendly maneuver be restricted as the battle develops? 5-31 FM 71-2

□ ENEMY into his scheme of defense on terrain with which they are not familiar. The task force Where will he come? commander’s defensive scheme in depth Will he be predominantly infantry or provides a framework upon which new units armor? can be quickly integrated. If the major enemy Where could we force him to go? thrust shifts, he must be prepared to detach units and continue the fight with fewer How much could we slow him? forces, or to disengage the battalion task force, move it quickly and fight in a new area. Q TERRAIN Limited Visibility. There are two general How can artificial obstacles best be tied in categories or conditions which limit with natural obstacles? visibility: those which mechanical aids can Can the obstacles be covered by overcome or partially overcome, and those observation and fire? which mechanical aids cannot overcome. The first category obviously includes darkness. QTROOP AVAILABLE The second category includes rain, snow, fog or any condition which cannot be at least Must all work be done by organic troops or partially overcome by artificial illumination, will assistance be provided by engineers, image intensification, or radar. artillery. Army aviation?

Command and Control. When the battle is NIGHT joined, the task force commander must Threat forces routinely continue daylight continuously monitor the enemy’s advance. attacks into the night to maintain He must know where all his units are located, momentum. If a hasty attack is stopped, the which are engaged at any moment, which are enemy will conduct a deliberate attack. They on the move and to what locations. If he is to normally move and engage targets using control the overall maneuver of the battalion artificial illumination (flares, searchlights, task force, he must be able to instantly assess infrared equipment). Enemy dependence on each new situation. He may be required to active systems can be advantageous to a direct detachment, movement, and defending battalion task force equipped with reattachment of platoons, thinning a passive night vision equipment. company team in one area to thicken another somewhere else. He must be able to Enemy dependence on infrared night accurately judge time-distance factors if he is driving equipment results in slower to concentrate forces against the major movement. This allows rapid acquisition by threat. Friendly forces moving along friendly night observation devices. previously reconnoitered routes can cover Adjustment of artificial illumination causes greater distance in a given time than can maneuvering forces to pause. Either way, enemy battalions feeling their way through defenders have more time to react, unfamiliar terrain, seeking soft spots in the concentrate, and engage. defense. He exercises control by his presence at critical points, by fragmentary orders, Enemy IR equipment is effective to 900 visual signals, messengers, and by requiring meters or less. Defenders can identify and adherence to SOP. engage targets well beyond this range, even His total picture of the battle must include in poor ambient light. Defenders can move in the engagements on-going and those to relative security and engage an enemy who follow. He must be prepared to receive or cannot see them. detach units. If major enemy forces enter his area of operations, he may receive In a daylight engagement, the enemy will operational control of more company teams. usually return fire within seconds of being He must be prepared to integrate fresh units engaged. At night the defender can fire much 5-32 FM 71-2 — longer before the enemy can identify the formations following easily identified terrain source and return effective fire. features along clearly defined avenues of approach. While the battalion task force can The enemy may attempt to gain surprise defend at night essentially as in daylight, through stealth, using no illumination. some adjustments particularly at team level Enemy units travel more slowly in tighter should be considered. ADJUSTMENTS TO DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION

• Use long-range detection forward on secondary avenues • Plan and rehearse required equipment (radar, sensors, of approach to detect and slow movement of weapons and night observation devices) on enemy movement. units and massing of fires on well-defined avenues of the approaches the enemy approach. • Use nuisance obstacles uses. along likely night approaches # Redeploy some units and • Reposition weapons as to slow the enemy or to alert weapons to concentrate along defenders to enemy presence necessary to take advantage of avenues of approach the the disparity between night as they are breached. enemy will more likely use at vision equipment of the enemy night (along identifiable terrain and the defenders. • Use OPs and patrols to features usable for orientation prevent enemy infiltration • Plan illumination on or in darkness). between battle positions. behind likely engagement O Use increased numbers of areas to silhouette enemy infantry, and scouts, OPs, • Dismount night driving forces while leaving defenders patrols, and armor killer teams periscopes to aid observers. in shadows and darkness. Adjustments to defensive organization daylight positions should be completed should commence before dark. Return to before dawn.

~~GOOD DAYLIGHT APPROACH.APPROACH "YE PROVIDES COVER, CONCEALMENT AND MINOR LIMITS TO MOVEMENT. set~~

POOR DAYLIGHT APPROACH LACKS COVER. CONCEALMENT Csl AA1 / GOOD NIGHT APPROACH. FACILITATES SPEEDY POOR NIGHT APPROACH. MOVEMENT, NAVIGATION SEVERELY LIMITS VISIBILITY AND CONTROL. FOR MOVEMENT. DAYTIME POSITION" A s' & DAYTIME _ _.eS2a 2» POSITION O". ÎtfîfKsNIGHTTIME POSITION % ✓ 9^-04

~~KEY TO SYMBOLS TANK HI = TANK 0 = ARC~~

~~5-33 — FM 71-2-~~

OTHER CONDITIONS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY When heavy rain, snowstorms, fog, or any other conditions prevent use of mechanical aids to vision, many of the techniques described for night defense are applicable. Defenders must move closer to the avenues of approach they are guarding. Sensors may still be of value and radar can sometimes penetrate. Techniques for target acquisition and engagement are shown here.

~~TECHNIQUES FOR TARGET ACQUISITION AND ENGAGEMENT~~

~~PRIMARY AVENUE SECONDARY A. OF APPROACH AVENUE OF APPROACH~~

~~N A •rí~~

USE LONG'RANGE DETECTION \ DEVICES (GSR. SENSORS) ALONG IA PRIMARY AVENUES OF APPROACH ■ (NOTE. GSR IS DEGRADED BY RAIN OR SNOW.) !> v- t -4 rv .n: "X. HP / REPOSITION SELECTED UNITS/WEAPONS CLOSER TO ySE REUTIVELY SHORT RANGE ENEMY ARMOR AVENUES OF DETECTION DEVICES (OP. PATROLS. APPROACH WHEN VISIBILITY SENSORS) IN GAPS AND *VAA V- IS REDUCED il I ALONG SECONDARY \AVENUES OF APPROACH FOR .EARLY DETECTION.AJUD DESTRUCTION OFV-.O* ml.A, INFILTRATING FORCES

~~,‘S'-~~

~~USE TANK KILLER TEAMS NEAR MINES OR OTHER OBSTACLES ALONG ENEMY AVENUES OF APPROACH~~

~~DELAY OPERATIONS~~

During defensive operations, the battalion slow the enemy, keeping the task force task force may be given the mission of between the enemy and his objective. conducting a delay operation rather than a defense. The underlying intent of both the If possible, the delay operation stops defense and the delay is destruction of the him completely. But if either his enemy. However, when defending, the more strength is too great, or because the risk immediate goal is to stop the enemy forward of losing our force in the process is too of or within your sector or battle area—at great, then at least the task force can great cost if necessary (unless the mission is buy time. changed). When delaying, the intent is to 5-34 FM 71-2 —

Concept of the Delay. The concept of the commanders report the situation to permit delay is to fight the enemy with sufficient him to influence the action appropriately. In force so that he has to take the time to other cases—because he can observe the concentrate, again and again, trying to actions in the sector, because of the need to overcome the delaying force. The delaying TF coordinate the movement of the various task commander places his teams in battle force elements, or because of the requirement positions which provide for long-range for the task force to gain every last possible observation and fields of fire. When time minute of delay—he retains the authority to permits, he reinforces natural terrain permit the teams to leave their delay obstacles, creates new obstacles, and positions. emplaces mines to hold up enemy forces in the field of fire of defensive weapons. If the brigade commander requires that the task force delay the enemy forward of a The enemy, faced with and engaged by the certain line until a certain time, his teams delaying teams, must take time to deploy. may have to conduct, in effect, a defense. At Just when the enemy is bringing his force times he may have to hold key terrain or fully to bear, at the last feasible moment, the conduct limited counterattacks. In such a delaying force leaves and the time- situation he may even have to risk the loss of consuming process must be repeated by the some of his elements. enemy at the next battle position. The TF commander may delegate the authority to The manner in which a delay is conducted leave a battle position to his team depends on the intent of the brigade and commanders when the delay sector is very battalion task force commander—what he wide or when he cannot readily observe the wishes to accomplish and the degree of risk action. He will, however, require that team he will accept to accomplish it.

~~A task force may conduct delays under any of the following conditions:~~

|The task force is required to delay the time accepting whatever risk is necessary. enemy for as long as possible, but without The delaying force fights longer and harder at risking its survivability or tactical integrity. A each position. Indirect and long-range direct time limit is usually not specified in this case. fires are emphasized, but the defensive battle Under this condition, the task force and its is also fought at mid-range and even, if teams seek to prevent the enemy from necessary, at close ranges. The task force closing and assaulting. Teams engage the commander may direct company teams to enemy at maximum range, force him to hold the enemy forward of a line or location deploy, then withdraw before he can close. for a specified time. Teams may be ordered to Counterattacks, feints, and ambushes are hold ground, a facility, etc., and be required to conducted as opportunities present continue to defend until the time restriction themselves. has been met or until new instructions are issued. I The task force is required to hold the enemy forward of a line or location for a specified

The delaying force must maintain a necessary to coordinate with adjacent units mobility advantage over the attacker to preclude exposing a flank. through the use of obstacles and superior knowledge and use of the terrain. During the The task force commander deploys his delay, units are positioned to expedite their company teams along the enemy’s main movement and to make the best use of avenues of approach with maximum covered routes. Once movement begins, it is firepower forward. Seldom will task forces 5-35 —FM 71-2

retain dedicated reserves. As enemy buildup If the task force is assigned a very wide occurs or as the direction of the main threat sector, it uses mounted patrols and various becomes more obvious, company teams will STANO devices to maintain surveillance be redeployed as necessary to slow or block and contact with the enemy across the entire the enemy advance. The action is conducted front. Tank platoons are normally held along much like defense except that frontages are the most likely avenues of approach where often much wider. Obstacles should be they can quickly move to a threatened area. created or strengthened whenever possible. Infantry may be employed to conduct All available indirect fires should engage at surveillance patrols, provide security for maximum range, taking advantage of range tanks and TOW during limited visibility, or differential, if any, over the attacker’s cover dismounted avenues of approach. Their weapons. mission is to detect an enemy advance—not When a company team must delay on a necessarily engage them with their weapons. wide firont, it usually selects platoon positions When the enemy is detected, contact is and delays in sector. Delay lines and phase maintained and delay is initiated by calling lines are used to continuously report the indirect fires, attack helicopters, and close air location of its platoons to the task force support. commander. Some portion of the task force must maintain contact while others maneuver to new locations to overwatch or When to Delay. In the CFA, the mission of suppress. Counterattacks may be necessary the covering force and normally that of its to assist in disengaging a unit. task forces, is delay.

~~In the MBA, delays likely will occur in two sets of conditions:~~

^When the enemy attack against a brigade is the brigade keep the enemy forward of a so strong that the resultant force ratios would specified line for a specified time. be excessive, e.g., 1 to 7 or even greater. Until the division commander can apply additional Hwhen, especially in the economy of force combat power, he may consider that if that area, the required combat power to defend is brigade were to try to defend, he, the division either not available (and will not become commander, would run unacceptable risks of available in the foreseeable future) or the deep penetration in that brigade's sector. forces in this area should pull back because Rather, he might direct that the brigade delay the battle in the area of maximum enemy the enemy until he can get additional effort has flowed back. In these cases, the battalions concentrated. He would, in this brigade and task force commanders would way, trade terrain for reduced risks to the likely be told, in effect, to do as much damage division and for the time needed to as possible to the enemy, but don't run any concentrate forces. This delay would most very high risks with your forces: we have to likely be characterized by a requirement that preserve them, there are no others.

~~DISENGAGING A BATTALION TASK FORCE~~

A battalion task force may be required to • conform to movements of other friendly disengage all or part of its forces and move to forces. a new area in order to: • concentrate forces there. 9 avoid combat under undesirable con- 9 draw the enemy into an unfavorable ditions. situation. 5-36 FM 71-2 —

In order to successfully disengage, the task the task force commander disengages his force commander must: teams in a manner which best preserves the integrity of the force. □Deceive the enemy. If the enemy knows a disengagement is taking place, he will increase pressure and efforts to bypass and encircle friendly forces. THE WITHDRAWING FORCE MUST FIRST SLOW THE □Take and keep enemy pressure off the ATTACKER'S MOMENTUM disengaging forces. Overwatching forces are positioned to block the enemy; fires and obstacles are used to stop or slow his advance. Enemy overwatch elements which can fire on Sufficient pressure must be kept on the disengaging forces and enemy supporting enemy to prevent enemy action from fire which can disrupt the withdrawal are disrupting the operation. This may require suppressed. some teams to become heavily engaged while they cover disengagement of less heavily □Maintain security. Threat tactics engaged teams. Under heavy enemy pressure emphasize bypass and encirclement of with- the task force commander must often drawing or defending forces. Avenues of maneuver his units and mass antiarmor fires approach which he can use to do this must be to stop or slow the enemy advance before at least monitored. In addition to ground beginning the movement of forces away from elements, the Threat uses airmobile, airborne the enemy. A heavy volume of antiarmof fires forces, and attack helicopters for these will force the enemy to dismount and slow his purposes. Be prepared to maneuver to meet advance. Field artillery and smoke will also any threat. Critical chokepoints along with- slow the momentum of a mounted attack. drawal routes must be secured. Timing of disengagement under such □ Gain a mobility advantage. Dis- conditions is critical. Beginning a with- engagement should take place at night or drawal away from a large, rapidly advancing during periods of reduced visibility whenever enemy force before its momentum has been possible. Withdrawal routes are slowed could lead to the loss of the entire task reconnoitered beforehand and obstacles are force. In most cases, breaking loose will occur used where and when they will limit the gradually. enemy’s ability to move without limiting When disengagement begins, movement of friendly force mobility. forces away from the enemy is covered by antitank fires. TOW and missile firing tanks should move first because they have the Disengaging Under Enemy Pressure. longest range of the task force weapons. When disengaging under enemy pressure the Their movement to the next suitable forward company teams normally cover their overwatch position is covered by fires of own disengagement. There are several tanks and Dragon. New overwatch positions techniques that may be employed to dis- should provide standoff and allow covering engage. fires for forward units. When the TOW (and To disengage, all available fires are used to missile firing tanks) are in position, infantry stop the enemy and allow company teams to and tanks disengage and move away from fire at and maneuver away from the enemy. the enemy, normally by bounds; infantry Disengagement from terrain masked first, then tanks. positions is easier because units are protected from enemy direct fire from their front. OVERWATCHING FORCES During good visibility, smoke may be used to Disengagement of the task force may be conceal movement. Where possible, all covered by the individual actions of the forward company teams begin disengaging forward teams or the TF commander may simultaneously, and move over multiple organize an overwatch force from unengaged routes away from the enemy. If impractical, or lightly engaged units. He deploys this force 5-37 FM 71-2 —

in battle positions behind committed units. The task force overwatch force is used to THE OVERWATCH ELEMENT provide additional fires to support the USUALLY INCLUDES PART OF withdrawal of the forward teams or to block EACH UNIT IN CONTACT enemy approaches through the area. Forward company teams pass through or When an overwatch force is employed, its around the task force overwatch force while it principal function is to deceive the enemy supports by fire and maneuver. The into believing that the task force is still in overwatch force defends or delays until it, too, position; Nevertheless, the overwatch force disengages and moves to new positions. must be prepared to fight if attacked. The Size and composition of the task force over- task force overwatch force in this type of watch force are dependent on: withdrawal usually consists of a platoon from each team in contact, or a squad from • Amount of support required by forward each platoon in contact, although an entire teams. team may be charged with this mission. The • Width of front. commander supplements deception efforts by maintaining dummy radio transmission and ^Forces available to form an overwatch carefully controlling ground traffic to insure force. the enemy is not alerted to the withdrawal. 9 Amount of enemy pressure. The task force commander will normally ' leave the executive officer in command of all % Amount of delay or defense expected out team overwatch forces, but may give this of the overwatch force after the dis- responsibility to one of the team engagement of the forward team. commanders. If the overwatch force is expected to hold COMMAND AND CONTROL the enemy for a period of time after the rest of the task force has moved, it should be Regardless of whether the task force is reinforced with additional maneuver, CS, under pressure or not, the task force and CSS elements. commander must quickly and precisely specify to the disengaging unit the scheme of Sometimes the higher headquarters will maneuver. Planning for disengagement provide a covering force. When this is the should be a part of any defensive operation. case, the battalion task force disengages or Predesignated phase lines, battle positions, fights its way toward the covering force and routes and checkpoints located throughout conducts a passage of lines as described in the task force sector aid such operations. Appendix F, Linkup, Passage of Lines and During the actual disengagement, the task Relief in Place. force commander will establish times, Disengaging When Not Under Enemy priorities and routes of movements, location and composition of covering forces, and Pressure. When enemy action is relatively light, the task force can sometimes slip away assembly areas by frag orders, using and quietly before the enemy realizes a with- modifying control measures as required. drawal is under way. This is particularly true The task force commander must specify: when the task force is occupying terrain- • The scheme of maneuver masked positions in depth. When time is limited, all teams withdraw simultaneously. • Time of withdrawal In such cases, security can be obtained by • The new task force mission rapid movement or by moving at night or • The location of new positions during periods of reduced visibility. Noise can be suppressed by field artillery fire or air • Routes to new positions strikes on nearby enemy positions. Routes He normally specifies: should avoid areas that can be scanned by enemy radar. If there is danger of pursuit, •Size and composition of advance parties teams move by bounds. •Size and composition of overwatch forces 5-38 FM 71-2 —

Combat Support and Combat Service concentrate sufficient combat power to Support. The task force commander will overwhelm the enemy force. Unlike other normally begin moving nonessential kinds of offensive action, in a counterattack elements of the task force trains out of the the enemy is often in the open and task force area as early in the disengagement unprepared to defend. as possible to provide for their protection and In rapidly planning a counterattack, the minimize congestion when maneuver commander has the advantage of knowing elements begin movement. Advance parties the terrain better than does the enemy. He from the task force and company teams must evaluate the enemy situation in the accompany these elements to aid in the immediate area and also consider the time organization of new positions and to post and distance factors relating to the following routes. During daylight disengagements, enemy echelon. Then he must determine GSR elements normally move with them; but which units are available, where théy are will remain with forward elements when located, and where they must be positioned visibility is limited and terrain allows proper after the counterattack, and plan for employment. The S4 usually is charged with suppression as necessary to isolate the enemy supervising this movement. The scout to be attacked. Platoons may be attached or platoon may also move with the trains detached from one team to emother for a element when necessary to provide security particular counterattack. Well-trained troops and to post routes. can respond to rapid changes in mission and COUNTERATTACK task organization. Offensive action is necessary to gain the CONDUCT OF DEFENSIVE initiative, maintain the continuity of the OPERATIONS defense, and reposition forces to defeat following enemy echelons. A battalion task The following examples illustrate how a battalion task force applies the principles force must be prepared to counterattack whenever the opportunity for success is great. previously discussed. They should not be used as absolute models to be rigidly copied in Some counterattacks are planned in great training. These scenarios are only examples detail. Others, like hasty attacks, are planned of how particular battles might be fought. and executed rapidly. Counterattacking Every commander must apply the principles forces must complete their tasks and regain according to his experience and best covered positions before overwatching or judgment in each new situation. following enemy echelons can interfere. When so ordered, a counterattack may be When the enemy decides to make a conducted by the task force as a whole or may breakthrough attack, he concentrates be conducted by teams under task force powerful forces in a small area. He would like control. Counterattacks are used to destroy to attack in the sector of his main effort with a weakened enemy units. When counter- 6:1 or greater superiority. He seeks to attack a attacking, units maneuver only to the extent US platoon with a battalion, a company with necessary to place effective fire on the enemy. a regiment, and a battalion with a division. Most often, this will require movement only He seeks to power his way through the MBA from one battle position to another, using area, strike deep to destroy the support, the covered routes. They close with the weakened reserves, the command and control. enemy force only when absolutely necessary US division commanders seek to detect the to eject it. area of the enemy breakthrough effort in time The task force may be ordered to to reinforce and reduce the adverse combat counterattack to regain terrain critical to the ratio to no worse than about 3:1. In the early defensive system. When this is the case, the stages of battle, the force ratio is likely to be task force mounts a hasty attack. When worse than 3:1, at the level of the company, counterattacking, it is necessary to battalion, and brigade. 5-39 — FM 71-2

~~CONCENTRATION TO MEET ENEMY ATTACK~~

~~Lui ca QU on on m o o~~

~~HD 2NO ECHELON DIVISIONS {APPROX 580-600 TANKS) i -- cm X" x M X \ X 1ST ECHELON DIVISION (APPROX cm 530-650 TANKS) \ €3 XX 1 □ C3> C3>~~

~~"--5~~

~~x —ll- X X~~

As division and brigade commanders commander could expect to receive six or estimate, identify, and confirm the direction seven battalion tEisk forces to stop such a of movement of the main enemy forces, they breakthrough attempt. These task forces concentrate battalion task forces to meet would be fitted to the terrain as they arrive in them. This concentration may take place the brigade sector according to the brigade prior to the start of battle or during the battle. commander’s concept. The earlier enemy intentions Eire understood, The amount of freedom of action the the easier it is to coordinate the shifting of brigade commander will give his task forces maneuver units, fires and other support. Of will depend on how closely the action of the course, commanders must recognize that the task forces have to be coordinated. Further, enemy’s advance may not conform to our especially in the area of maximum estimates of his intentions, and also that the concentration, the brigade commEmder will enemy’s plan will be modified EIS the attack likely retEiin the prerogative of determining progresses. when a task force is to move from one battle In the area of defending brigade we might area to another. In areas of lesser expect a breakthrough effort of four (or even concentration, especially in economy of force more) divisions. They may be either areas, the brigade commanders will more motorized rifle or tank divisions. This likely Eissign relatively deep sectors to the massive concentration of enemy forces would task forces Emd give them greater freedom of present a large target array to the defending action to fight the battle on subsequent task forces and companies. The brigade positions in depth. 5-40 FM 71-2 —

i equipment can locate any radio that removed, then the interference is external transmits in a forward area, particularly if and may be jamming. EFFECTIVE USE OF LOW POWER there is line-of-sight between the direction 7 finder and the radio. The enemy can also ^Continued operation. Radio operations should continue in a normal manner once monitor radio messages to gain information ALL FRIENDLY about our forces. jamming has been identified so that the STAT|ÖNS LQpATED enemy cannot determine the effect of his WITHiN LOW”'’ Electronic counter-countermeasures POWER RA'NGE ALL ENEMY jamming. The rule to follow is: during RDF (ECCM) are used by the battalion task force jamming, continue operations unless ordered STATIONS»» to prevent or delay enemy use of information LOCATED-Ä to shut down. IN HIGH of value gained from intercepted radio or POWER ' telephone communications. ECCM include ^Reporting. All operators must report HUPS RANGE.. communication security and anti-jamming jEunming to their next higher headquarters. ’CCr procedures. This report should be sent by another means iOct Communications security (COMSEC) of communication, like wire or messenger. A 3ctr denies or delays unauthorized persons from jamming report format is included in the gaining information of value from communications-electronics operating / /S°^ ' telecommunications. instructions (CEOI). ' / / *** ' m / / Z0*» S 9Use low power. When transmitting on / / / 7 lower power, the opportunity for an enemy to V5 Use authentication to insure that the hear the signal is reduced. If the signal can’t other station is an authorized one. Use only be heard, the transmitter can’t be located by \ LOW HIGH approved codes to prevent enemy radio direction finding. POWER © POWER cryptoanalysis. RANGE RANGE Obviously, if the friendly station can’t hear V Change frequencies and call signs to the signal either, the radio is of little use. The deny the enemy information about This technique will reduce the ERP at certain second signal is better. A 5-second signal is identification and disposition of tactical trick is to use only enough effective radiated frequencies, particularly between 60 and ideal. units. power (ERP) to be heard within the net, but 76MHz. Bending the antenna also deforms not enough to be heard by the enemy. Enemy RDF is not as effective once an Restrict the use of radio transmitters. the radiation pattern in the horizontal plane offensive operation has begun. We are Unfortunately, tactical VHF radios have which is another counter-RDF technique. Use wire or messenger whenever usually moving too fast. Short only two power settings: low and high. In (See Chapter 2, TM-11-5820-667-12, for communication time is not as critical during possible. Do not use the radio as a additional information.) Always use convenience. Use it only when required for most instances, the low position is preferred. the battle, but short communication as a tactical operations. Here’s why: Antenna Tip Assembly to prevent eye counter-RDF technique is vital during the damage from tied-down antennas. Enforce net discipline and insure proper A tank platoon will operate in formations preparation phase and the approach to the radio-telephone procedures. in which its tanks will be separated from one objective or in the defense. Also, since the another by about 100 to 1,000 meters, but the discovery of the displacement of a reinforcing Site antennas with a hill mass or other • Reduce communication time. Another tanks’ AN/VRC 12, 46, and 47 radios method to reduce the chance the signal will be unit is critical, the reserve force especially obstacle between them and the enemy. should use short communications. transmit an effective signal which may be intercepted by the enemy is to use radio only received by radio direction finders at a when necessary. Whenever possible, An observant enemy notices that in too distance well in excess of lOkms, perhaps to substitute landline communication. Use many instances US Army tactical Anti-jamming Procedures used by radio 30kms, even when the radio is set on low personnel as guides rather than providing communications may be used as a substitute operators to reduce enemy jamming effects power. On the high power setting, a radio direction and location over the radio. Once for complete battle planning. Analysis of US are: direction finder (RDF) may be able to station identity is confirmed (ALPHA ONE tactical communications indicates that most intercept the signal at a distance of 30 to BRAVO ONE SIX, THIS IS ALPHA ONE communications used in training exercises 9 Recognition. Try to find what is causing 80kms. Airborne radio direction finding the interference. Do not immediately assume BRAVO TWO SEVEN), eliminate call sign are explanatory, not directive, in nature. (ARDF) can certainly intercept the high redundancy by using the last letter of the Tactical communications should be used to jamming, because symptoms are often power signal at a distance of 80kms. similar to other types of radio or radar changing portion of the call sign plus the rapidly convey decisions, to key standing interference. Remove the receiver antenna Bending the AS-1729 whip antenna toward suffix (BRAVO ONE SIX, THIS IS BRAVO TWO operating procedures, and to direct and determine whether a signal is being the ground and keeping it in the tied down SEVEN). Call sign procedure is not a alternative courses of action. Execution of the generated internally by the receiver. If position reduces the ERP below that of the substitute for authentication. Limit concept must be inherent in training, interference decreases with the antenna AN/VRC 12 and AN/PRC 77 low setting. conversation to less than 30 seconds. A 20- planning, ingenuity, and teamwork.

~~6-15 6-15 Foldin -FM71-2~~

• Use a mobile antenna. A reduced height VHF ground plane (RC-292) antenna can be mounted into a pole holder welded to the front bumper of a M151, M715 truck, dr to an APC, and secured with guy wires. This procedure provides a highly mobile command net antenna which can be rapidly relocated and does not' tie a command post to an antenna FOLD THIS PAGE OUT array. The mobile RC-292 has excellent applications in desert operations.

~~EXAMPLE OF ANTENIMA MASKING~~

~~VEGETATION MASKS SIGNAL SOURCE r—~~

~~SC 7?~~

~~-rv-~~

~~MASKING CREATES FALSE RDF CONCLUSION~~

~~! Í f; AN ERROR OF 10 DEGREES EQUALS & ABOUT 2KM AT A RANGE OF 15KM~~

~~-4. V^. ~| ■A-. □ □ --A— Dir -~ S !Gl ?o Ta A*- -AL~~

~~vV- ^~~

• Antenna masking. Antenna masking is the Hills and dense forests also provide terrain technique of hiding radio signals behind obstacles. Antenna masking also occurs terrain. It is an inexpensive method to beat when antennas are positioned on the back RDF. Radio waves bend; they are reflected by slopes of hills. A radio operator should erect buildings and mountains. When this antennas as low as adequate communication happens, it is difficult to determine the permits, and, in all cases, antennas should be original direction from which the wave was camouflaged to blend with terrain. transmitted, but the strength of the signal is 9 Authenticate. Be aware of imitative affected very little. A radio operator can use communications deception (ICD). this principle to his advantage by attempting Authenticate. ICD is frequently used by an to place terrain obstacles between the enemy to prolong communications. RDF transmitter and the FEB A while affording an requires prolonged communications. Don’t be unblocked path to the intended receivers. caught by the lure.

6-15 Foldout 6-16 SUMMARY The task force commander pèrsonally becomes involved with gathering combat information and intelligence. He must learn all he can about the opposing force to plan and conduct a successful battle. At the same time, he insures the protection of his unit from surprise and denies information about his location and plans tó the enemy.

~~The scout platoon performs reconnaissance and security missions for the task force.~~

~~Reconnaissance operations kre termed route, zone, and area, according to the information desired.~~

~~Screening operations give early warning of enemy approach.~~

~~Patrols, ground surveillante radar, and remote sensors help gather enemy information. '~~

» Operations security protects task force plans through physical, signal, and information security meksures. ,i Camouflage, light and hoise discipline, good electronic counter- countermeasures are combined with proper movement techniques and suppression to degrade the enemy’s ability to see us.

~~6-17~~

~~464-458 0 85 19~~

~~CHAPTER 7 Combat Support~~

OVERVIEW THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER brings together and puts into action the combined arms team. The concerted employment of the available combat and combat support gives the battalion task force its combat power.

Combat support is provided by the missions to each platoon or section of the battalion task force’s combat support combat support company or attached company and by divisional and non- elements to company teams. Thus, the divisional units. In both the tank battalion combat support company headquarters and mechanized infantry battalion, the seldom controls its elements in combat. It combat support company has a heavy mortar does provide administrative and logistic sup- platoon, scout platoon, air defense section, port to elements not attached to other units. and ground surveillance radar section. The At times, the company headquarters may mechanized infantry also has an antitank control a tactical unit or serve as the alter- platoon; the tank battalion has an armored nate operations and intelligence center for vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) section. The the task force. mortar platoon and the AVLB section are discussed in this chapter. The other elements are covered in chapter 6 (scout platoon and Support from divisional and non- ground surveillance radar section), appendix divisional units includes fire support (field I (air defense section), and appendix J (antitank platoon). artillery, US Air Force close air support, and naval gunfire), Army aviation, engineer, air The battalion task force commander defense, military intelligence, and military assigns direct support or general support police.

~~COWTEI^YS~~

PAGE PAGE OVERVIEW 7-1 Defense 7-8 FIRE SUPPORT 7-2 Counterfire 7-8 MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT 7-3 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION 7-9 Support Missions 7-4 FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS 7-10 Operations 7-4 OTHER SUPPORT 7-11 Coordination 7-5 The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) Communication 7-5 Section 7-11 Army Aviation 7-13 FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT 7-5 Engineers 7-13 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) 7-6 Air Defense Support 7-13 WAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT 7-7 Military Intelligence Support 7-13 FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING 7-7 Military Police Support 7-14 Offense 7-8 SUMMARY 7-14

~~7-1 —FM 71-2~~

FIRE SUPPORT The battalion task force commander complements his scheme of maneuver and influences the battle with fire support. In addition to the four 4.2-in. mortars from his combat support company (and 81mm mortars in mechanized infantry companies), he usually has an artillery battery of six 155mm howitzers in support of his task force. More artillery can be made available, and, at times, close air support and naval gunfire may be in support.

Fire support improves the task force's direct fire by: # Blinding enemy armor forces. areas where the full power of TOW, tanks, scatterable mines, and artillery can take # Suppressing and blinding other enemy direct fire weapons. effect. # Isolating targets. • Providing separate communications channels for additional combat information, # Showing the enemy and forcing him into intelligence, and emergency command nets.

Fire support enhances maneuver by: • Destroying targets. • Covering attacks with overhead variable time •Containing enemy withdrawal and lateral (VT) fires against enemy RPG and infantry. moves. • Suppressing long-range ATGM. • Deceiving the enemy through support of feints. • Providing high rates of fire under all weather • Assisting economy of force operations. conditions. • Screening with smoke or isolating areas with • Reducing effect of enemy artillery by active scatterable mines. counterfires.

The commander’s greatest problem is how to exploit all of his combat power—maneuver, direct fires, and fire support—at the critical time and place. During an engagement there will be a multitude of targets to service in a very short period of time. Individually, the task force commander does not have time in a few short minutes to integrate the total effects of all the weapon systems available to him in terms of concentrated combat power. His right hand man for fire support is his fire support officer (FSO) who is Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) of the task force. The FSO is skilled in maneuver tactics and techniques and procedures for integrating each part of the fire support system into the

~~7-2 FM 71-2—~~

scheme of maneuver. Each company has a fire support team (FIST) headed by a field artillery lieutenant who is the FSCOORD for the team commander. He is the “front end” of all the fire support systems which put steel on the target. It is important for the task force commander to know that his FSO and the FISTs work for him.

Effective maneuver and fire support is possible by continuous and concurrent planning and execution between the TF commander, his staff, and his fire support coordinators. Don’t hand the FSO the scheme THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR of maneuver and tell him to support it. This is INTEGRATING MANEUVER AND wrong. The availability or nonavailability of FIRE SUPPORT BELONGS TO THE fire support may drive the scheme of TASK FORCE COMMANDER-THE FSCOORD HELPS HIM DO IT maneuver and have considerable influence on the task organization. Fire support can often take care of situations so troops need not be used. Consider these facts from the beginning—when the concept of the operation is first thought out.

~~MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT~~

The heavy mortar platoon of the combat support company provides indirect-fire support to the battalion task force. The platoon has a headquarters section and four mortar squads. Each squad is equipped with one carrier-mounted mortar. The mortars can fire high explosive (HE), white phosphorous (WP), illumination, or chemical (CS) ammunition. Mortar fire can kill and suppress enemy soldiers and weapons and can conceal the movement of the task force.

The fire support team (with each company team) provides forward observation. In a mech-heavy company team, this FIST has a headquarters (that works with the team commander) and one forward observer (FO) party per platoon. However, everyone in the company team should be trained in the call and adjustment of fires. 7-3 -FM 71-2 Support Missions. The mortar platoon may platoon will usually be instructed to locate in be placed in general support (GS), direct or near a battle position. In the offense, the support (DS), or attached. platoon may be given a series of positions or an axis of advance. In either case the platoon \Z\General support is most often used and may be directed to reposition or may bound requires the heavy mortar platoon to support forward and report when it does so. The the battalion task force as a whole. This platoon leader must stay abreast of the allows the task force commander to developing battle through reports from concentrate the fires of the platoon where forward observers and be ready to fire they are most needed. Normally, he assigns immediately upon request, whether moving priority of fires to one company team. This or stationary at the time a request is received. priority can be quickly shifted as the attack or defense develops. Operations. Mortars should be located on a □D/reci support requires the heavy mortar good hardstand which also provides cover platoon to respond to requests for fire from a and concealment from enemy visual designated unit and from the battalion task observation, radar, and other target force command group. Occasionally, a direct acquisition means. The position must be support mission may be given to the heavy large enough for dispersion of more than the mortar platoon when the battalion task force usual 35-40 meters between mortars when commander wants to concentrate all the fires enemy counterfire is expected, and must of the platoon in support of one company permit rapid displacement. Forward edges of team for an extended period of time. A direct tree lines, when masked by a hill or ridge line support mission should not be given to the to the front, are good mortar positions. When heavy mortar platoon routinely, since it operating under heavy counterfire degrades the platoon’s ability to respond to conditions, the platoon should displace calls for fire elsewhere in the battalion task frequently, so alternate positions must be force area of operations. planned. [^Attachment binds the platoon to a Another way to avoid enemy detection is to designated company team and requires the use the charge and elevation combination platoon to exclusively support that company that gives the lowest trajectory for a round. team. The heavy mortar platoon is seldom This can degrade enemy capabilities to track attached to a company team, and should be the round and locate the platoon. attached only when a company team is The heavy mortar platoon usually provides operating some distance from the battalion its own local security. Provisional rifle task force and there is no other way to provide squads are organized from crews and effective support. Of the three, this is the only assigned sectors to defend against attack by mission that requires the supported unit to enemy ground forces. LAW are carried and provide logistic support for the heavy mortar all personnel are trained in their use. platoon. When necessary, the heavy mortar platoon The battalion task force commander con- can split into two sections of two mortars siders the available field artillery support, each. When this is done, the fire direction and then determines which of the three ways center splits, one half accompanying each best suits battalion task force requirements section. The platoon most often splits when for an operation. moving to a new position. One section remains in place until the other moves to the The battalion task force commander or S3 new position and is ready to fire. This must know the location of the heavy mortar technique provides for continuous support of platoon at all times. In the defense, the the battalion task force.

7-4 FM 71-2— OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS battalion task force fire support officer or the supported company team commander. As During offensive operations, the heavy target lists are revised and modified by mortar platoon is most often used in general company team forward observers, new data support of the battalion task force. Priority of is computed and mortars shifted to other fires may be given to a leading company team priority targets. as previously described. For some operations such as deliberate attacks, the heavy mortar The mortar platoon leader or, in his platoon may control the fires of some or all absence, the platoon sergeant selects the company team mortars to permit concen- number of mortars to fire and the number and tration of fires. As a general rule, the platoon type of rounds to be fired. Number and type of is positioned about 1,000 meters to the rear of rounds for particular targets or missions may leading battalion task force elements. be specified by request by SOP. When preparing for the operation, at least Communication. The battalion task force three subsequent positions along the line of mortar platoon operates in the battalion task advance, about 2,000 meters apart, are force command radio net and the heavy identified from a map reconnaissance. mortar platoon command net. The platoon Mortars then displace as required to support fire direction center also operates in the the operation. supporting field artillery fire direction net. Whenever possible, wire should be used DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS between the platoon and the battalion task In defensive operations, the heavy mortar force tactical operations center. The platoon is most often used in general support. supporting field artillery unit may lay wire As in the attack, the fires of all company team from its fire direction center (FDC) to the mortars may be controlled by the heavy heavy mortar platoon FDC. mortar platoon. Mortars are positioned where they best cover avenues of approach into the FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT task force area of operations, generally 1,000 meters to the rear of supported elements as in While the commander has complete control the attack. Positions are prepared and of his mortars, his control of the field artillery reconnoitered and ammunition is prestocked depends on the mission or status assigned to throughout the battalion task force sector. those units by higher headquarters. Positions are occupied, vacated, and Supporting units may be designated reoccupied as the battle develops. When according to tactical mission (direct support defending over wide frontages, it may be or general support) or status (attached or necessary to split the heavy mortar platoon operational control). in order to provide adequate coverage. ^Direct support units respond immediately and independently to the task force’s needs. A Coordination. The heavy mortar platoon field artillery battalion, for example, is placed operates under the staff supervision of the DS to a brigade. The battalion establishes battalion task force S3 or the battalion task communications and provides FSOs to the force fire support officer. Its fires are planned brigade and the task forces. The brigade and coordinated as part of the overall fire commander sets priorities for support of the support plan. Regardless of the type of task forces. operation, firing data is determined by the platoon fire direction center for all planned WGeneral support units respond to the unit targets before the operation begins. During which they support. If GS to the task force, an operation, mortars are laid, ready to fire they fire for the task force; if GS to brigade, on priority targets as determined by the they are directed by that headquarters.

~~7-5 —FM 71-2~~

Attachment and operational control place the artillery units immediately responsive to the task force. A battalion task force is normally supported by a field artillery battalion DS to the brigade. Unless a task force is conducting covering force or separate operations, only a portion of the field artillery battalion will support the task force. The brigade commander decides how much field artillery support will be available to the task force THE BRIGADE COMMANDER from the DS battalion. SETS PRIORITIES AND DIRECTS ^ . THE USE OF FIELD ARTILLERY During movement to contact, when enemy IN SUPPORT OF THE BRIGADE action is expected and responsiveness is crucial, the fires of a battery may be dedicated to a company team. In this case, the total firepower of the dedicated battery is immediately available to the company team, especially to suppress enemy direct-fire weapons. Maximum effectiveness of the fire support system requires thorough planning and coordination. But time is usually scarce during heavy battle. And normally the battle unfolds in unplanned ways. The field artillery is tuned to quickly provide the fires when and where the commanders need them. The FSO (working with the task force commander) and the FIST chiefs (working with the team commanders) are the key to the responsiveness. They monitor and evaluate the battle situation, anticipate requirements, help keep the artillery units informed, recommend fire support, respond to requests, call fire missions, and adjust fires. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) The battalion task force may be supported by attack aircraft. Because of its large and varied ordnance load, the tactical fighter bomber is the best weapon to use in attacking well-fortified enemy positions. It can destroy hard targets quickly and effectively. Tactical air fire support should be integrated into the battalion task force scheme of maneuver and used simultaneously with other fire support means. A tactical air control party (TACP) normally operates with the task force to advise the commander and his staff on integration of close air support with ground operations to coordinate and direct close air 7-6 •• FM 71-2 — strikes. A TACP includes an air liaison how the task force commander will allocate officer (ALO) and a forward air controller means to support maneuver elements, (FAC). Tactical air strikes are normally priorities, how to obtain support, limitations, controlled by FACs, but Army personnel can and other items of interest to them. It tells control air strikes when FACs are those involved with fire support their role in unavailable. The FAC, when operating with the commander’s concept, mission a committed company team, can request assignment, march routes, restrictions, and through the battalion ALO immediate CAS coordinating instructions for counterfire, air from the direct air support center (DASC) defense suppression, and priorities. normally located near the corps tactical operation center (CTOC). The fire support plan is not always written. Neither does it follow any prescribed format. The battalion task force air liaison officer, But it normally includes a subsection for each operating in the fire support coordination fire support agency involved in the operation. center (FSCC), will monitor all such requests Above the battalion FSO level, the process is and subsequent corrections/directions more structured. transmitted to the strike aircraft. Fire support planning can be termed Preplanned CAS requests can originate formal and informal. from any company team and are forwarded through the battalion task force FSCC. These Formal planning deals with specific requests are processed by the TF S3-air in operations. When time permits, the plan may conjunction with the ALO. After approval of be written and included in paragraph 3 (with the TF commander, the FSCOORD forwards subparagraphs for each support agency) of preplanned CAS requests to the brigade the operations order. FSCC for further process and eventual Informal planning is dynamic, unpub- transmission to the appropriate action lished, and continually updated. agency. Both are meant to ease the exchange of NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT information and the use of fire support assets. The plan contains only those target lists and When operating by a coastline and gunfire information needed for each fire support support ships are within range, naval gunfire means to assist the task force. can be a highly effective fire support means. A shore fire control party (SFCP) of US Navy The task force commander reviews the plan and Marine personnel may be attached to the to insure that it is integrated with his scheme battalion task force. The SFCP has one of maneuver. The target list is given to liaison team and one spot team which provide company teams, the task force mortar ship-to-shore communications. The liaison platoon, supporting field artillery, and other team operates in the fire support coordination key elements. The list is also provided to the center and provides naval gunfire planning DS battalion fire direction center (DS BN and execution expertise to the battalion TF FDC) and the brigade FSO. The brigade FSO commander in coordination with the reviews all task force lists, eliminates FSCOORD. The spotting team is further duplication between lists, and adds targets of attached to one of the committed company brigade interest. He may also pass targets teams and provides observation (naval more appropriate for attack by another fire gunfire) expertise to the company team support means (close air support, for commander in coordination with the FIST example) to that agency and informs the task chief. force FSO of his actions. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING Company team commanders may request that additional targets be added to the task Fire support planning begins with the task force target list. Targets originated by the force commander’s guidance and ends when company team are assigned a letter/number the operation ends. It tells team commanders by the FIST chief from a block of numbers

~~7-7~~

~~464-458 0-85-20 —FM 71-2~~

provided by the task force FSO. As additional Defense. In the defense, the following targets are requested by company team, they categories of fires would be planned: are reviewed by the FSO who eliminates duplications and includes them in the task ^Harassing and interdiction fires disrupt force fire support plan. the enemy’s preparations for attack, hamper his ability to resupply his forces, impede Offense. Prior to an attack, harassing and movement of his reserves, and delay and interdiction fires can be planned to keep the disorganize his approach. enemy off balance, cause casualties, disrupt his defensive preparations, hamper his MCounterpreparation fires offset the ability to resupply his forces, and impede the potential effect of enemy preparation, break movement of his reserve. Preparation fires up the momentum of his attack, and destroy are usually delivered in a prearranged his command control. The brigade or higher sequence to degrade enemy defenses prior to level commander orders these fires when an the arrival of attacking forces. The decision enemy attack is imminent. . to fire a preparation is normally made by the brigade or division commander. When a MFires in support of battle areas are planned preparation is to be fired, the battalion task on likely avenues of approach, in conjunction force FSO provides targets of interest to the with barrier and denial plans and beyond, on task force commander and to the brigade top of, and behind defensive battle positions. FSO for inclusion in the preparation. ■ Final protective fires may also be planned. Factors which influence a brigade or division commander’s decision to fire a preparation are: ■ Field artillery final protective fires (FPF) are integrated with those of the supported force where they can best augment the I I Will the effect offset the loss of surprise? weapons organic to the maneuver elements occupying battle positions. FPFs are used only in the defense, and only one final I I Are sufficient targets available and protective fire mission is normally assigned known to warrant a preparation? to a field artillery battery (105mm and 155mm). The width of an FPF ranges from I I Are there sufficient fire support assets to 200 to 300 meters; its depth is not fixed. The attack the targets effectively? precise location of an FPF is designated by the team commander. The FA battery will continue to fire until ordered by the team I I Can the enemy recover before we exploit commander to end the mission or when all the fires? available rounds are expended.

Fires during the attack are fires planned MFires in support of a friendly counterattack. short of, on top of, and beyond the objective. Fires short of the objective suppress the Counterfire. Counterfire is the attack of the enemy weapons and block observation which enemy’s indirect fire system. It includes all could interfere with maneuver forces moving activities necessary to attack mortar, from the line of departure. Fires on the cannon, rocket, and missile systems and it objective soften it up by suppressing the can be employed during any stage of offense enemy and supporting assault company or defense. Availability of counterfires is teams. Fires beyond and to the flanks of the governed by the maneuver situation, objective support the battalion task force’s availability of FA resources, target coordination and preparation to continue acquisition means, and vulnerability of operations and impair the enemy’s ability to friendly artillery to enemy counterfire. counterattack. Counterfire activity is controlled at division. 7-8 FM 71-2-

~~FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION~~

’ Coordinated Fire Line (CFL). 1 This is a permissive fire support Î. >>: * measure normally established at ( brigade. Any target beyond the Fire support planning is deciding what and CFL is open for attack by mortars, PE how fires will be used; fire support FA, and naval gunfire without A coordination is putting the plan into effect. prior coordination. Fires short of 1^0 the CFL must be coordinated through the FSO of the The battalion task force commander must commander who established the interact with his FSO in the same manner i m 7 CFL. Its location is sent out by the MUST BE IN HPT' and priority that he does with his S3 and FSO through fire support ¡[."BilÄteK m subordinate commanders. The responsive- channels. § TP* ness and accuracy of his fire support are It is important to the com- directly related to this interaction. mander as it frees the FSO of the requirement to coordinate fires on all targets in sector or zone. It In selection of the optimum means for allows him to concentrate on r/ attack of a target, the battalion task force those which might endanger * friendly units—speed up the commander and his FSO must consider: attack of targets. 41

I I Characteristics of the target and the 4 m.. desired effect. Restrictive Fire Line (RFL). This 9 is a line established between two cz> * [^Characteristics, capabilities, and converging forces beyond which it limitations of available weapons. neither can fire any weapon Pi if RFL without coordinating with the IMUSTjBE IN I I Most economical means. affected commander. Normally established by the common RED I I Coordinated supply rate. commander of both forces, it is « placed along easily identifiable to I I Response time. terrain. Functioning much the <0 <7 O I I Safety of friendly troops. same as a boundary, it impacts on 3 troop safety. It is sent out by the I I Tactical benefits to be gained. FSO. o

Fire support coordination involves employment of various coordinating and limiting measures. Those of immediate impact on the battalion task force Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). An 9?* commander are: area into which no unit may fire o. without coordinating with the commander who established the I I Coordinated Fire Line. measure. It is an excellent measure for protecting patrols or □ Restrictive Fire Line. other forces operating at some kj distance from the main body ofr ; □ Restrictive Fire Area. the battalion. The area should include terrain features easily identifiable from the air. . RFA MUST f BEjOUTLIfiEED N RED

~~7-9 7-9 Foldin — FM 71-2~~

~~FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS~~

Requests for fire support result in a single Most fire support targets for the TF target or a list of targets going to the appro- originate at company level — more priate action agencies. Requests should specifically, from within the FIST. If the provide the firing unit with sufficient infor- means to attack the target are available to the mation to act on the request. This normally TF, assignments are made here. If not, the includes: target (list of targets) goes to a higher level for I I Description (nature) action. Requests for immediate fires take the I I Location/Attitude (if needed) most responsive route while requests for planned targets go through the FSCC via fire I I Size (in meters) When fire is needed support channels before being passed on to I I Type of fire needed the action weapon system. Some examples of I I Need for adjustment this are shown here: 1 ^ x fr“- > < 1 r f Ï ? ¥ ' f ^ 5? \¿ r1 rf~ W • IF . „ ;M,' «F STF*®• "i % ► PLANN EDTMPMETW HEAVY MORTAR SUPPORT

~~HVY FIST MORTAR FDC - MORTARS HVY FIST FSCC FDC MORTARS MORTAR MONITORSno > MORTAR FSO LO~~

~~FA SUPPORT~~

~~FIST FDC WEAPONS Jffl. FIST FSO FDC FA WEAPONS~~

~~MONITORS FSO~~

~~MONITORS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FSCC LLD XXX S3 AIR JOL S3 AIR FIST FSCC ALO DASC AIRCRAFT FIST FSCC ALO FSCC \ FSO XX N FSO ARRAY RflEANS FS TACP CVJEAftlS~~

~~NGF SUPPORT ARRAY RAEAR9S R3AVY RflEAWS JOL NGF LO rm S3 AIR FIST FSCC FSO .V. SHIP DS FIST FSCC ALO SHIP DS SPOTTER FSO~~

~~7-9 Foldout 7-10 FM 71-2—~~

~~OTHER SUPPORT~~

The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (A VLB) Section. The AVLB provides class 60 assault bridging capable of supporting all vehicles currently found in the battalion. The tank battalion’s combat support company has two armored launches in its AVLB section. Each launcher carries one bridge. The divisional engineer battalion provides AVLBs to a task force organized around a mechanized infantry headquarters. The divisional engineer battalion has four launchers and a total of six bridges.

~~AVLB ( )~~

The AVLB is used in both the offense and defense to cross... # Railroad cuts # Streams and canals # Road craters and antitank ditches # Partially blown bridges ...and other similar obstacles up to 60 feet across. Gaps larger than 60 feet can be crossed using both AVLBs together, providing some type of intermediate support exists. When obstacles are expected during movement to contact, one or both AVLBs normally will be employed in direct support of the leading company team(s). AVLBs may be attached when the tactical situation warrants, such as during an exploitation or pursuit. When obstacles are not expected, the AVLB will normally be retained in general

~~7-11~~

464-458 0-85-21 —FM 71-2 support and move with the battalion task force combat trains. When AVLBs from the division engineer battalion support the attacking force, they should be emplaced before organic bridges are committed. During defensive operations, AVLBs will normally be retained in general support of the entire force and positioned close to the obstacles they will be used to cross. Crossing sites should be reconnoitered and prepared, but bridges should not be emplaced until needed. Premature emplacement invites detection and destruction by enemy air and artillery. When multiple obstacles exist, the AVLB should be centrally located. The commander who emplaces the bridge is responsible for recovery unless relieved of that responsibility by a higher headquarters. In the offense, the brigade may require that a bridge be left in place. If this occurs, brigade coordinates the transfer of a new bridge or obtains a complete bridge/launcher combination for the attacking force. In the defense, enemy pressure may require destruction of the bridge to prevent capture. Authority to destroy the bridge is normally delegated to the commander who emplaces it. Emplacement of an AVLB is reported to brigade. The location, condition of the bridge, and estimated time the last elements will cross are included in the report. Recovery of an AVLB is also reported. Although the AVLB is mounted on a tank chassis, it does not possess the same degree of cross-country mobility as a tank. Because of AVLBs DEPEND ON MANEUVER its configuration and greater weight, it is FORCES FOR SECURITY unable to negotiate a slope of greater than 30 percent. Launch and retrieval times are dependent on crew training, the mechanical condition of the bridge/launcher, and conditions at the site. Well-trained crews can launch a bridge in 3 minutes and retrieve it in 10. The bridge can be launched without exposing crew members. When a gap is encountered by leading elements of a company team, or its existence has been determined from intelligence reports, a crossing site is reconnoitered to 7-12 FM 71-2-= determine gap width and bank conditions, to Air Defense Support. The task force, as locate access routes, and to mark the part of the division, receives general air launching site. If engineers are with the defense support from the HAWK battalion in company team, they will conduct the DS of the division and from the division reconnaissance. Chaparral/Vulcan battalion. It depends on its organic Redeye section for the local air On approval for emplacement, the bridge is defense coverage it needs. Based on division moved to the site and emplaced, overwatched and brigade priorities, one or more sections of by the leading platoon. If possible, security is Vulcan (two Vulcans per section) may be placed on the far bank. Indirect suppressive placed in direct support of a task force. A fires are used when required. detailed discussion of Redeye and Vulcan The company team then crosses the bridge employment with the battalion TF is found in and resumes the attack. Appendix I. When the last vehicle of the company team Military Intelligence Support. The has crossed, the commander will direct battalion task force commander gets much of recovery of the bridge unless ordered to leave his information about the enemy through it in place. On recovery, the AVLB should operations conducted to see the enemy. move rapidly forward to its position with Considerable information is available from leading tactical elements. artillery FDCs, and the task force S2 should seek this out through the fire support officer. Detailed information about the AVLB is Additional information about the enemy and found in TM 5-216. operational area is also available from adjacent and supporting units. The brigade Army Aviation. The battalion task force S2 can be expected to provide the task force may use Army aircraft for command control, commander with information about enemy, observation, reconniassance, and to move terrain, weather, and the situation as viewed troops and equipment about the battlefield. by the brigade commander. Specialists from the divisional military A variety of Army aircraft are available to intelligence company may be attached to the the battalion task force from the brigade battalion task force for counterintelligence aviation section and divisional and non- operations and prisoner-of-war interroga- divisional aviation units. When required by tion. A section firom the divisional remote the mission, the brigade provides or obtains sensor platoon may also be attached to the the Army aviation needed to support the task battalion task force. These devices can force. provide information about enemy movement. The section chief can advise the battalion S2 Engineers. Engineers have capabilities on employment of REMS which can be that complement the needs of the task force. emplaced by the section or by Army aircraft. In the offense they can clear areas, open Once emplaced, the REMS section monitors roads and keep them open, and putin bridges. the devices and provides information to the In the defense they can help construct field battalion task force S2. fortifications and put in various barriers to impede enemy movement. Two of their For aerial reconnaissance, the battalion important functions in the defense are task force S2 can request support through S2 installing minefields and assisting in the channels from the corps military intelligence fortification of TF battle positions. When battalion, aerial reconnaissance support required, one or more platoons from the (MIBARS). The MIBARS has photographic, engineer unit supporting the brigade may be radar, and infrared capabilities. attached or placed in support of the task Requests for planned aerial reconnais- force. The supporting engineers accomplish sance aire submitted to brigade S2. Immediate tasks based on priorities established by the requests are forwarded through Air Force brigade commander. channels. 7-13 r

~~—FM 71-2~~

Military Police Support. From time to time, the battalion task force may need military police support for prisoners of war, security, refugee control, traffic control, and maintenance of law, order, and discipline. When this is the case, the brigade can provide this support from the divisional military police company.

SUMMARY More than numerical force, the proper combination of the various maneuvers, fire support, and other support elements is crucial to success. The task force commander orchestrates this combat support with his scheme of maneuver to gain the best each has to offer. He uses:

~~Mortar and artillery fire to destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy, and obscure the enemy’s view.~~

~~Fire support to complement his maneuver.~~

~~The FSO as the advisor, planner, and coordinator of fire support.~~

~~Each FIST to give each company team direct access to fire support.~~

~~Other support (AVLB, aircraft, engineers, military intelligence, air defense, military police) to help the task force accomplish its mission.~~

~~7-14 CHAPTER 8 Combat Service Support~~

OVERVIEW IN THE NEXT WAR, mechanized forces will move quickly over long distances, engaging in lethal battles using much ammunition. Vehicles will have to be fueled, repaired, and replaced; ammunition resupplied; and troops fed and clothed, replaced, and their wounds attended. Mobile, continuous combat service support will be vital to the success of the maneuver and combat support elements.

~~CONTENTS~~

~~PAGE~~

~~OVERVIEW 8-1~~

~~TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION FOR COMBATSERVICE SUPPORT 8-2~~

~~TRAIN OPERATIONS 8 4~~

~~SUPPLY OPERATIONS 8-8~~

~~MAINTENANCE RECOVERY AND REPAIR OPERATIONS 8-12~~

~~OTHER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 8-14~~

~~PERSONNELSUPPORTANDADMINISTRATION 8-14~~

~~AREA PROTECTION AND AREA DAMAGE CONTROL 8-16~~

~~SUMMARY 8-18~~

~~8-1 • -FM 73-2~~

~~Combat service support is performed as far forward as the tactical situation permits. are delivered to ition).~~

~~FEBA~~

~~FEED IT* • • / FEBA~~

For some supplies, the unit goes back to a distribution point to pick up items (supply point distribution). Sometimes, when critical items are needed, corps units take them directly to the task force (throughput— frequently used for major assemblies, ammunition, and fuel). The task force obtains its supplies, then, through a combination of unit distribution and supply point distribution. Maintenance is performed at the lowest echelon capable of doing the job. Frequently, maintenance contact teams from division and corps will assist front-line units to cannibalize and repair equipment to get it back into battle as soon as possible.

~~TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT The task force headquarters company has four platoons to provide combat service support: 8-2 FM 71-2-~~

• •• THE SUPPORT PLATOON has SPT a transportation section to take supplies to company teams. It also has a food service section that delivers combat rations or prepared meals to all elements (£) of the task force and a supply section that requests and © TRANS CLASS I CLASS II CLASS III distributes supplies. The assistant S4 is usually the support platoon leader and task force ammunition officer. Q (g ^ © CLASS IV CLASS V CLASS VII CLASS X THE MAINTENANCE PLA- TOON performs organizational • •• maintenance services on all equipment in the battalion task force except communications- } C electronics (C-E) and medical equipment. It performs organizational maintenance r which cannot be done by company teams; stocks and provides repair parts; and REC EVAC performs battlefield recovery * and evacuation. It is commanded by the battalion MAINT CLASS IX RECOVERY EVACUATION task force motor officer.

THE COMMUNICATION PLA- TOON performs organizational • •• maintenance for communications-electronics equipment in the battalion task force head- COMM quarters and headquarters company, and some organizational maintenance on company team C-E equipment which cannot be done by company teams. It evacuates C-E equipment which it cannot repair. It is commanded by the task force communications- MAINT CLASS IX EVACUATION electronics officer. • •• THE MEDICAL PLATOON treats sick and wounded soldiers and evacuates them when necessary. It stocks and provides medical supplies for the battalion task force aid station and aidmen who are with company teams. It also performs organizational maintenance on all task force © medical equipment. AID STATION CLASS VIII EVAC

~~8-3 —FM 71-2~~

Units which are normally a part of the and supervise task force combat service battalion task force have some combat support. He is assisted by: service support of their own. The battalion task force headquarters and headquarters Si, who is responsible for personnel and company, combat support company, and administrative support: maintenance of unit company teams all have a headquarters strength; personnel management; and section to provide limited administrative maintenance of morale, discipline, law and support. The supply sergeant and the order. The Si may exercise staff supervision company armorer provide organizational over the medical platoon leader who plans, maintenance on small arms and other coordinates, and supervises medical weapons and supervise unit supply activities for the battalion task force. operations. S4, who is responsible for logistics support: The combat support company, a tank supply, maintenance, and equipment battalion headquarters company, and tank evacuation. and mechanized infantry company teams S3, who, when all needs of the battalion have a maintenance section of their own. The task force cannot be met, is responsible for maintenance section performs organiza- recommending to the commander personnel tional maintenance on vehicles and assignment priorities and supply and armament and performs battlefield recovery maintenance support priorities for and evacuation. Tank company maintenance subordinate units. He does this based on sections have turret mechanics assigned for recommendations from the S4 and his maintenance of tank turrets and fire control knowledge of current and planned task force systems. Tanks, mechanized infantry, and operations. combat support company maintenance Motor officer, who supervises sections have a radio repairman. Mechanized maintenance activities for the battalion task infantry battalion headquarters companies force except the maintenance of have no maintenance section and rely on the communications-electronics and medical battalion maintenance platoon to provide equipment. The communications-electronics this support. officer supervises maintenance of C-E items, The battalion task force commander often and the medical platoon leader is responsible relies on his executive officer to coordinate for maintenance of medical items.

TEAMS OPERATIONS Any grouping of personnel, vehicles, and equipment to provide combat service support to a unit is called the unit’s trains. Generally, trains can be organized for combat in two ways: Single location: All support operating under direct control of the unit are termed unit trains. Dual location: Elements providing critical battlefield support forward with the task force are called combat trains. Elements operating farther back with or near support units of the next higher echelon are termed field trains.

~~8-4 FM 71-2— -FM 71-2~~

~~SINGLE LOCATION: Unit Trains îSÏS CO TEAM K DS MAINT AOMIN SUP CONTACT TEAM MESS TEAM BN MAINT 'TÔ S PT PLT~~

~~HQ CO MAINT~~

~~■v» & bJ) i. AID A. /"-u JV STATION r-' K si /S4 K-' SS5î s'~~

»»■*

üf

~~JVw —r~~

~~DUAL LOCATION: Combat Trains & Field Trains~~

~~FEBA~~

~~DEPLOYMENT~~

~~rv OF LOGISTICAL -ti. «l- SUPPORT~~

~~ACTIVITIES~~

'S“ *t. vw A< l-rt -<*c % — -cA*

~~8-5 8-6 Foldout — FM 71-2~~

DEPLOYMENr oiEtLÖGIS^kO^L SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN ARMORED DIVISION WITH BATTALION TASK FORCE UNIT TRAINS LEGEND XXX XX x I SPT I HH I SPT I im (a MAIN ICDV CD —^ Pv*** l SIG 'S SPT IRF I* S.IIoMMcl ®® II S XX FWDI j S S/S * T A ♦ ADMIN • •• © POL Supply Point SUPPLY COLL I CD I ffl ""■X (©) COLL J COLL ÍS1/S4J J |ol • Class I (Rations) Supply Point . B FWD rv*** . ■ BDE ® pîîî-. I I ^©) 8N/Tf ; ^ (8) 0 ; © SIG I . SR COMM SR m\ CEN L D ri—I (T) A.D/EVAC Ammunition (All Types) ©’öS)®©©® 1 ® s® REC vLy ^ CSH @ W( Û. ) HOLT k©I3 tC| HV PI f|I MSLIVSPT r ~TlC, EVACCOLL <£> Supply Point AMBÍ® CO/TM TRAINS (0) CSH © 05 0@©© 0 © EVAC (5) ( coli Artillery Ammunition Supply HHC 0“ 3 < CO/TM PLL COSCOM TAM l 1 \ DIVISION SUPPORT AREA O © Point BRIGADETRAINS BATTALION TASK FORCE TRAINS DIVISION REAR XXX XX X /TTN Class VIII (Medical) Supply 1. Air ambulance detachments may be placed in the division area. 7. Quick supply stores issue over-the-counter, low-cost repair parts. Point 2. Division ammunition representatives normally locate in or near ammu- 8. Fuel and ammunition vehicles may remain with the company team if situa- nition supply points. tion requires. Normally these vehicles are located in the battalion task force trains. Class IX (Repair Parts) Supply 3. Normally a division is supported by two combat support hospitals and one Point evacuation hospital. 9. Ambulance team is usually attached from the supporting medical company. 4. When crew feeding system is used. Class I point may be located in division 10. Mess teams may be consolidated and operate from positions farther to Multiple Class Supply Point support area. rear, particularly when crew feeding system is used. O 5. Ammunition supply points may be located in brigade support area or in the 11. Direct support maintenance contact team is attached or placed in support. Graves Service division support area. 6. Maintenance and salvage collection points are operated jointly by the © Water Point maintenance battalion and the supply and transport battalion. Hospital or Aid Station ® DEPLOYMENT OF LOGISTICAL StIPPCfRT ACTIVITIES IN ARMORED DIVISION WITH BATTALION TASK FORCE COMBAT AND FIELD TRAINS

Maintenance Point XXX XX — i i XA I XX © I SPT I HH ISPT I \ pa ^xxx 1 1 X \ CD Airfield PMNJSPT • •• ei~ MAirMAIN 0 pa CBT l( ) SUPCOMf FLD A -¡©I OPS @® / A CD S1/S4 'S XX CD Repair & Maintenance Unit ; _ / FWD , , S ••• (•) ©ÉË0 m 0 ! COLL CLR , , , ■ - COLL |o©@l ^SUPPLT EB ®®© \pä Medical Unit X X ® 0 (S)(si/S4)i I II IV VII ^ /T\ AID/EVAC \ iv VII . C0L CO/TM niu KISR: I 1 (© • •• *- BN/TF © 0 BN/TF SR X ^ h) FWD r FWD a © HHC Transportation Unit m © 0»- ©Q®®©©© SIG J COMM COLL ¡ 0© CEN I CO/TM TRAINS/ w \ G) 7 — ® ■■ EVAC C0LL W © / DS AMB^ (PW/" Supply Unit © © i 1 H ■ CSH _ CO/TM PLL /fa hr? /TTN EV»C (J) ^ xx ®© rT*! Ordnance Unit (A} * Ç%u© ; @ CLR '•■r BN/TF FIELD TRAINS BN/TF COMBAT TRAINS 3 ( M+K © ü COSCOM n j | DIVISION SUPPORT AREA ; BRIGADE TRAINS DIVISION REAR Personnel Services & XXX XX X II PS Administration Unit 1. Air ambulance detachments may be placed in the division area. 7. Ammunition supply points may be located in brigade support area or in the 2. Division ammunition representatives normally locate in or near ammu- division support area. Ö Finance Unit nition supply points. 8. Maintenance and salvage collection points are operated jointly by the 3. Normally a division is supported by two combat support hospitals and one maintenance battalion and the supply and transport battalion. Signal Unit evacuation hospital. 9. Quick supply stores issue over-the-counter, low-cost repair parts. Aeromedical Evacuation Unit 4. Mess teams may be consolidated and operate from positions farther to 10. Fuel and ammunition vehicles may remn with the company team if situa- rear, particularly when crew feeding system is used. tion requires. Normally these vehicles are located in the battalion task 5. Field trains may be collocated with brigade. force combat trains. 6. When crew feeding system is used. Class I point may be located in division 11. Ambulanceteamisusuallyattachedfromthesupportingmedicalcompany. support area. 12. Direct support maintenance contact team is attached or placed in support.

8-6 Foldin 8-6 FM 71-2 — In order to understand how the battalion and corps support units. In most situations task force organizes its combat service the battalion task force trains are controlled support elements to support combat by the battalion task force S4. When it is operations, it is first necessary to describe necessary to echelon trains for some reason, brigade trains operations and company team combat trains are controlled by the task force trains operations. S4, and field trains are controlled by the support platoon leader. Battlefield recovery, maintenance, medical elements, and some Brigade trains are generally located ammunition and fuel vehicles are located between the division support area and with the combat trains. The remainder of battalion task force trains area and beyond battalion task force combat service support the range of most enemy cannon artillery. elements become field trains located between Locating about 20km behind the line of the task force combat trains and the brigade contact provides passive protection against trains, or perhaps with the brigade trains. enemy weapons up through 130mm. A brigade does not have combat service support To provide highly responsive support, the elements of its own with which to support bulk of combat service support must be battalion task forces; combat service support positioned as far forward as the situation located in the brigade trains area is from the allows in fast moving situations. In slow division or corps support command. As a moving operations, only maintenance and general rule, these elements consist of medical elements and some Class III and V ammunition (Class V) and fuel (Class III) vehicles may be positioned forward; the supply points, a forward support remainder of the task force trains is maintenance company with contact teams to positioned further to the rear to reduce the assist battalion task forces, a medical concentration of vehicles and the clearing station, and a small graves vulnerability of combat service support. registration element. Brigade combat service support is coordinated by a forward area support coordinator (FASCO) from the division support command (DISCOM) under /4s a general rule, battalion task force trains the staff supervision of the brigade S4. areas should be located: Company teams may operate using unit •Where there is good cover and trains controlled by the company first concealment from both air and ground sergeant. When company team trains are observation. echeloned, battlefield recovery, maintenance, • On ground which supports vehicle and medical elements will normally become traffic. combat trains; supply and mess will be field •Near a suitable helicopter landing site. trains located with the battalion task force trains. •Outside the range of enemy mortar fire. •Close to suitable routes to company When task forces are formed, companies team positions and to supply points move to their new assignment with unit located to the rear. trains, to include the appropriate slice of •Where movement of combat and POL, ammunition, medical, and food service combat support units will not be elements provided out of parent battalion restricted by battalion task force trains. headquarters. When company teams are formed, it may be necessary to readjust company team unit Built-up areas are good locations for trains. trains, such as ammunition loads and They provide cover and concealment for maintenance. Changes should be worked out vehicles and sheltered areas which facilitate between company team executive officers maintenance at night. When built-up areas and the battalion task force S4 ahead of time. are used, task force trains elements should Battalion task force trains are the link occupy buildings near the edge of the area to between company team trains and divisional preclude entrapment in the center of the area.

~~8-7~~

~~464-458 0-85-22 FM 71-2~~

~~SUPPLY OPERATIONS~~

Supplies are those items required to equip, The battalion task force uses a maintain, or operate a unit. Supply combination of supply point (unit goes back operations involve the process of determining to pick up items) and unit distribution (items requirements, requesting, procuring, storing, are brought to unit). The supply section of the and distributing items to fulfill those battalion task force support platoon is requirements. organized to process supply requests and to Units in the battalion task force stock some receive, store, and issue supplies for the task combat-essential supplies and repair parts force. As a general rule, the supply section called prescribed loads or, in the case of delivers supplies to company teams, using its own transportation. Distribution priorities ammunition, basic loads. The minimum for items in short supply are determined by stockage level is normally directed by a higher command such as a division or corps the battalion task force S3 based on and, in some cases, by Department of the recommendations by the S4 and operational Army publications. The purpose of prescribed requirements of the task force. or basic loads is to enable a unit to sustain itself for limited periods, or until resupply To ease supply management, supplies are operations begin. grouped into ten major classes:

~~Rations (Class 0) COSCOM / DIVISION SUPPORT AREA BRIGADE TRAINS BN/TF AREA~~

~~x X X~~

~~KEY: PACKAGED RATIONS (CREW FEEDING) DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PACKAGED RATIONS (CREW FEEDING) ALTERNATE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM UNIT RATIONS (A & B COMPONENTS) DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM~~

Combat rations for the feeding of personnel force S4 can submit a separate ration request to the assigned to each vehicle are carried aboard the DISCOM. vehicle. Normal practice is to carry from three to five days of rations. Crews and other personnel eat when The battalion task force support platoon draws time permits. This is called crew feeding. When fresh rations from a mobile DISCOM Class I distribution rations prepared by the mess section of the battalion point, usually located in the brigade trains area. At task force support platoon are distributed to entire times, the Class I distribution point may be located in units (for example, to company teams), this is called the division main supportarea. Rations maybe issued unit feeding. Rations are automatically requested for through supply channels or delivered by the mess the battalion task force by the divisional supply and section of the support platoon to company teams and transportation battalion, based on the daily strength other units attached or organic to the battalion task report submitted by the task force SI to the division force. Some expendable items such as soap, toilet adjutant general. Under unusual circumstances, tissue, a nd i nsecticides a re a Iso provided to task force when a specific item is required, the battalion task units when rations are issued.

~~8-8 FM 71-2—~~

~~Supplies and Equipment (Except Cryptographie) Prescribed by Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Tables of Allowances (TA),and Prescribed Load Lists(PLL)(CI]a)ss OS)~~

~~COSCOM I DIVISION SUPPORT AREA T BRIGADE TRAINS BN/TF AREA~~

~~D 0 \3 CD\ II IV VII~~

This class of supply includes clothing, individual supply section picks up Class II items from the forward equipment, tentage, tool sets, and administrative supply section with the brigade/task force trains and supplies. When a Class II item is lost, destroyed, or delivers them to the requesting unit. In some cases, worn out, battalion task force units send replacement corps or divisional support units may deliver critical requests through theta skforceS4totheDISCOM.The items directly to the requesting unit (throughput).

~~Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL^Oass ODD) COSCOM f DIVISION SUPPORT AREA f BRIGADE TRAINS BN/TF AREA~~

~~V V V -X. •a CD.~~

Empty fuel vehicles and containers presented at a place to resupply company teams and that bulk fuel distribution point are sufficient to obtain POL; a vehicles are kept filled by whatever procedures are formal request is not necessary. Battalion taskforces being used. Generally, company team refueling do, however, submit POL forecasts which form the operations are carried out in two ways: basis for division and corps stockage levels. POL is normally obtained by the transportation section from The fuel truck is taken to platoon positions. divisional mobile Class III distribution points located in the brigade trainsarea. When necessary, divisional B Leaving security in position, platoon vehicles fuel tankers deliver to the battalion task force trains are moved alternately to centrally located fuel area, or corps helicopters may deliver POL in trucks. collapsible fabric containers to the task force. Packaged grease and lubricants are obtained through Moving fuel trucks to the position is probably the the general supply system and formal requisitions are quietest refueling method. The service station required. method (moving combat vehicles to the tanker) is Some battalion task force tankers may move with probably the fastest, but may also be the noisiest. company team trains to supply company team When the service station method is used, other vehicles. When empty, tankers are exchanged for classes of supply can also be replenished in the same loaded vehicles or they go to a distribution point, location. The battalion task force SOP should replenish, and return. Battalion task force SOP prescribe procedures for a service station operation should prescribe how this is to be done. The task force and they should be practiced during field training to S4 insures that fuel is available at the right time and insure a smooth operation.

~~8-9~~

~~464-458 0-85-23 — FM 71-2~~

Items For Which Allowances Are Not Prescribed, Such as Construction, Camouflage, Barrier and Fortification Materials (Class IV) Requisitions for Class IV items are submitted fortification and barrier materials may be throughput through command channels. Class IV items are by corps support units, distributed the same as Class II items except that

~~Ammunition (Class V)~~

~~COSCOM DIVISION SUPPORT AREA 1 BRIGADE TRAINS BN/TF AREA~~

~~XXX XXX XXX CD~~

~~A X X X CD~~

Supply is normally based on an available supply Some task force ammunition vehicles may travel rate (ASR) announced by corps or division. At with company team trains. When a unit calls for battalion level, it is made available according to ammunition, it is delivered to the unit by battalion mission requirements. task force supply vehicles. Ammunition is sent The battalion task force resupplies ammunition as forward to release points where unit personnel take charge and move the supply vehicles to platoon areas. often as necessary from Corps Support Command Resupply must be accomplished quickly and vehicles (COSCOM) ammunition supply points (ASP) located released to return to the supply point for reloading. As in the division main support or brigade trains area. in refueling, there are two ways to do this: When resupply is required, the support platoon leader prepares a requisition, called a transportation order, based on unit reports of expenditure. The Q Ammunition is trucked to platoon positions transportation order is validated by a representative and loaded directly on combat vehicles. of the division ammunition officer (DAO) who is located along the main supply route between the supply vehicles at the battalion task force trains area Q Ammunition is placed on the ground near and ASPs. Ammunition is picked up by task force vehicles to be loaded aboard by crews. supply vehicles at the nearest ASP and returned to the task force trains area where it is held until needed by organic or attached units. When necessary, Sometimes it may be advisable to prestock DISCOM or COSCOM units deliver ammunition ammunition. This is especially true in the defense. directly to battalion task units by vehicle or by Prestock sites must be carefully located based on the helicopter. scheme for conducting the defense.

~~Personal Demand Items (Class VI)~~

~~Class VI includes personal items sold through are submitted by the SI through administrative COSCOM post exchanges (PX). Requests for support channels when no PX is available.~~

~~8-10 FM 71-2~~

Major Items Tanks, APCs, recovery vehicles, and heavy antitank force or its units. Smaller items are normally picked weapons (HAW) are issued based on daily battle loss up by the battalion task force support platoon at the reports or a formal requisition. Large items are divisional distribution point in the division main delivered by COSCOM directly to the battalion task support area.

~~Medical Supplies~~

~~These items are obtained for the battalion task clearing station located in the brigade trains area, force by the medical platoon from the divisional~~

~~Repair Parts (COass DU)~~

~~COSCOM I DIVISION SUPPORT AREA I BRIGADE TRAINS BN/TF AREA~~

~~(ZD~~

* * * X * 13 X (ZD IX CD

The battalion taskforce stocks repair parts based on for its organic units. Each company PLL is managed a prescribed load list. High demand repair parts are separately and may be sent with a company when usually stocked by company maintenance sections. detached from the task force. Other repair parts (except medical and communication) are stocked by the task force Repair parts are issued in response to a specific maintenance platoon. Communications-electronics request or by direct exchange. The batta lion task force repair parts are normally stocked by the battalion task obtains repair parts from the divisional forward force communications platoon, although the support maintenance company located in the brigade battalion task force comma nder may choose to let the trains area. They are delivered to company main- maintenance platoon manage them. The medical tenance sections in response to requests submitted platoon stocks medical repair parts. The task force over the logistics radio net or in person by company maintenance platoon normally manages repair parts maintenance personnel.

~~8-11 —FM 71-2~~

~~' Nonstandard Items t^lass ^.)~~

These items are intended for support of nonmilitary requested, obtained, and delivered by the S4 the programs such as agriculture and economic same as Class IV items, development. Those not included in Classes l-IX are

~~Other Supplies~~

9Water is obtained from divisional engineer water requirements established by the taskforce S2. The S2 points using battalion task force transportation. distributes maps to battalion task force units as required. 9Maps are obtained by the battalion task force S4 from the division supply officer based on

~~MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY, AND REPAIR OPERATIONS~~

Good maintenance keeps materiel in platoon personnel. In a mechanized infantry serviceable condition. It includes inspecting, battalion, the headquarters company has no testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, maintenance section, so the battalion task rebuilding, recovering, and evacuating. force maintenance or communication Repair and recovery are completed as far platoon performs all organizational forward as possible, at the lowest capable maintenance for the company. echelon. When equipment cannot be repaired The battalion task force may be authorized on site, it is moved only as far as necessary to cannibalize or remove parts from deunaged for repair. When all the maintenance require- or uneconomically repairable equipment or ments of the task force cannot be met, the vehicles in order to return other equipment or task force S3 determines maintenance vehicles to combat. When this is the case, support priorities for subordinate units based cannibalization policies are established by on recommendations of the S4 and the division commander. Cannibalization is operational requirements of the task force. generally limited to that performed by DS Categories of Maintenance. ordnance personnel. Organizational maintenance is the care and repair done by the unit on its own equipment. Recovery. Unit maintenance sections It includes services and repairs within the recover disabled vehicles, towing them to capabilities of authorized personnel, skills, where they can be repaired. Unit recovery tools, test equipment, and time available. sections may be augmented by task force Direct support maintenance, performed by maintenance platoon recovery vehicles if specific maintenance activities to assist necessary. using organizations, is limited to repair of end items or unserviceable assemblies. If unit personnel CANNOT repair the Support maintenance from the divisional vehicle: forward support maintenance company is £ During fast-moving operations, it is located in the brigade trains area. towed to the battalion task force Company level maintenance operations supply route (SR) and secured there are limited to organizational maintenance to await arrival of task force services, minor repairs, recovery, and maintenance personnel. evacuation. Maintenance tasks that cannot 0 During slower-moving operations, be done by company personnel in a it is towed to a collection point reasonable length of time must be done by established by the task force motor task force maintenance or communications officer. 8-12 ■FM 71-2 =

~~XX S PT CD B B CO CD~~

BDE SR QCOLL COLL SI? 0/1/ EQUIPMENT UNREPAIRABLE , BN/TF MAINTENANCE OR, CO/TM ATTEMPTS AT DS LEVEL IS LOST TO UNIT TO REPAIR. DS CONTACT TEAM ! REPLACEMENTS ARE ISSUED ¡UNREPAIRED VE- i FROM SUPPLY STOCKS OR ATTEMPT TO REPAIR. ¡NICLES ARE ¡ MAINTENANCE FLOATS. I UNREPAIRABLE EVACUATED TO EQUIPMENT IS EVACU- ¡SUPPLY ROUTE 1 ATED TO FORWARD OR TO BN/TF | SUPPORT MAINTE- ¡COLLECTION NANCE COLLECTION ¡POINT J POINT.

If the battalion task force maintenance Damaged communications-electronics platoon CANNOT repair the vehicle: equipment items are evacuated directly to the task force communications platoon or to a ^ It is repaired on site by an ordnance maintenance collection point. Classified # DS contact team. cryptographic equipment must be Moved to a collection point operated safeguarded during evacuation and by the DS maintenance company. processed through cryptographic channels. The unit armorer performs organizational Some or all crewmen remain with the maintenance on weapons. Weapons which 0 vehicle to return it or a replacement to their require repair beyond his capability are unit. Communications-electronics equipment evacuated through task force to the DS installed in a disabled vehicle is usually maintenance unit. evacuated with the vehicle. Personal equipment belonging to crewmen not EQUIPMENT EVACUATED TO A accompanying the vehicle; ammunition; and GENERAL SUPPORT sometimes special equipment should be MAINTENANCE UNIT CANNOT ® transferred to other vehicles before BE REPLACED OTHER THAN evacuation. BY REQUISITION Maintenance procedures for tank turrets Equipment that can be repaired by DS are the same as for vehicles. Work begins at ordnance personnel is either returned to the team level backed up by the task force user or replaced from DS maintenance floats. maintenance platoon. DS repairs are Equipment that cannot be repaired by DS # performed on site by the contact team. When maintenance personnel is evacuated to a necessary, the vehicle or component is general support maintenance unit. When this evacuated, but only as far as required to have happens, the equipment is lost to the the work done. battalion task force. A replacement must be Power-generating equipment services and requisitioned by the S4 and is provided by repairs, except operator maintenance, are corps or theater army support units. Salvage performed by the task force maintenance equipment is evacuated to a salvage platoon; or, if necessary, the equipment is collection point collocated with the forward evacuated to the forward support support maintenance company collection maintenance company. point. 8-13 -FM 71-2

OTHER COMBAT SERVICE executive officer, determines assignments for SUPPORT OPERATIONS individual replacements. For critical skills, the task force S3 or commander may Transportation requirements that cannot establish assignment priorities. be satisfied by unit transportation are provided by the transportation section in the When operating in an active nuclear battalion task force support platoon. If the environment, the battalion task force S3 is task force requires additional transportation responsible for determining a unit’s potential support, the requirement is passed to the to operate in an area contaminated by divisional supply and transportation radiation. He does this by comparing battalion through the brigade S4. radiation damage reports submitted by battalion task force units with the A bath and clothing exchange operational exposure guidance (OEG) service can be requested from the divisional established by the task force commander. supply and transportation battalion in the The amount of radiation exposure previously brigade trains area when the tactical suffered by individual replacements may also situation permits. influence unit assignments. Laundry service, when available, is Personnel Services. Leaves and passes, provided by nondivisional support units and command information, postal service, coordinated by the task force supply service. religious activities, exchanges, financial service, legal assistance, welfare, special services, and rest and relaxation help unit PERSONNEL SUPPORT commanders maintain morale. The battalion AND ADMINISTRATION task force commander is responsible for insuring these services are fairly and Battalion task force personnel support and impartially provided to soldiers of his task administration are supervised by the task force. force Si. Personnel Management. Classifica- Collection, Identification, Safe- tion, assignment, reclassification, guarding of Personal Effects; and reassignment, appointment, promotion, Evacuation of Dead from the Battle reduction, officer efficiency reports, enlisted Area. The unit has the responsibility, but is evaluation reports, enlisted conduct and monitored by the battalion task force Si. efficiency ratings, transfers, separations, Remains are placed in containers by either and reenlistments are performed primarily medical evacuation teams or aid station by the battalion task force SI section. Task personnel. Dead are evacuated with their force teams have a very limited personal effects to a graves registration administrative capability. collection point using available transportation. Maintenance of Unit Strength. Company teams submit daily strength Personal effects found on the body are reports to the battalion Si who forwards a never removed. Personal effects in unit battalion task force consolidated report storage are quickly screened, inventoried, through brigade to the division adjutant and forwarded to appropriate graves general. Casualty feeder reports, to include registration elements. Military equipment witness statements, are also processed by the found with the remains or in unit storage is task force Si and forwarded directly to the turned in to the battalion task force S4. If division adjutant general in accordance with battlefield conditions do not permit established procedures. These reports, immediate evacuation, remains are left at a together with authorized position vacancies, location designated by the task force Si for are the basis for requesting individual subsequent evacuation. Isolated and mass replacements. Normally the SI, in burials are performed only when authorized coordination with the battalion task force by appropriate authority. In either case,

8-14 FM 71-2— complete information, including overlays, wounded out of the company team area as must be forwarded through channels to the quickly as possible. Team aidmen therefore appropriate agency. primarily perform triage—sorting of Medical Support. Medical support for casualties to decide who needs further battalion task force units is provided by the treatment and who can be returned to duty. task force medical platoon. It is organized with a platoon headquarters, an aid station Casualties requiring further treatment section, aidman section, and evacuation may be evacuated to the battalion task force section. medical aid station by an ambulance from the medical platoon evacuation section. Task force medical support is planned by Depending on the seriousness of the wound, the medical platoon leader. It is important they may be moved directly to a division that he understand the scheme of maneuver clearing station located in the brigade trains and planned disposition of battalion task area or to a corps combat support hospital by force units in order to adequately support the divisional or corps ambulance. Evacuation operation. directly from the battlefield to division or Aidmen are attached to company teams corps medical support facilities will most from the aidman section. Mechanized often be by aerial ambulance. infantry battalions have 15 aidmen in the The battalion aid station is located as far aidman section; tank battalions have only forward as possible, normally with the three. Infantry units attach one aidman per battalion task force combat trains. It should platoon plus one additional aidman per be located in an area providing cover and company; tank units receive one aidman per concealment from ground and air attack, company. Medical aidmen should live and near routes which permit timely evacuation train with the unit to which they are attached of casualties, and near covered helicopter and act as unit medical advisors. In addition landing areas for air evacuation. The to the aidmen, each company team receives battalion aid station is supervised by a an evacuation team of a medical aidman and physician’s assistant who is a highly trained a driver with armored ambulance. warrant officer. Here, also, triage is Aidmen give emergency medical treatment performed and casualties are given medical within their capabilities and insure that treatment within the capabilities of aid casualties who must be evacuated are station personnel. Casualties requiring properly prepared and promptly moved. further treatment are evacuated by division While the company team can establish an aid or corps medical support units to medical post, it is normally preferable to move the facilities located further to the rear.

+ + + COMBAT EVACUATION CLEARING AID SUPPORT UNIT HOSPITAL STATION STATION t HOSPITAL // i 7 Z7 L V A I FIELD AMBULANCE ■ FIELD AMBULANCE ■ WALKING LITTER I AIR AMBULANCE ■ AIR AMBULANCE ■ ARMORED AMBULANCE IUSAF AIRCRAFT ■ AIR AMBULANCE ■ AMBULANCE TRAIN NOTE: ANY MEDICAL FACILITY MA Y BE BYPASSED WHEN CONDITION OF PA TIENT WARRANTS AND THE EVACUA TION MEANS PERMIT.

~~8-15 —FM 71-2~~

Prisoners of War. Processing and task force trains, such as the support platoon evacuation of prisoners of war are the and maintenance platoon, are assigned a responsibilities of the battalion task force Si; specific sector to defend. Mutually supporting processing and evacuation of captured positions which dominate likely avenues of enemy documents are the responsibilities of approach are selected for vehicles armed with the S2; and processing and evacuation of heavy machineguns. Provisional rifle squads captured equipment are the responsibilities are organized, and observers are positioned of the S4 in coordination with the S2. How outside the perimeter to provide early this is done is described in appendix K. warning. Internal communications and an alarm or warning system must be arranged. AEEA PROTECTION AND Plans must also be made for area damage AREA DAMAGE CONTROL control in the event of a natural disaster or Battalion task force elements located nuclear attack. Area damage control should behind company teams must be prepared to be included in battalion task force standing defend themselves against guerrillas, operating procedures. As a minimum, SOP partisans operating in the area, and also should provide for: main forces who have broken through or bypassed the defense. The battalion task £ A control and assessment team force S4 is responsible for planning security (CAT) and light rescue and decon- of the battalion task force trains area. tamination squad from battalion As a general rule, a perimeter defense is task force headquarters company. planned. The battalion task force trains area ^ A light rescue and decontamination is divided into sectors, and elements in the squad in each company-size unit. TW[§ (ê®W^©[i ÄRQ® Mil W TdÄRffl

~~Bn/TF XO 1 Driver~~

FUNCTIONS ■ MOVES TO DAMAGE AREA ON ORDER ESTABLISHES A CAT COMMAND POST ■ DETERMINES AND REPORTS EFFECTIVE- NESS OF UNITS ■ ASSUMES CONTROL OF UNITS IN AF- 1 Log Staff Off 1 C-E Staff Off FECTED AREA, IF NECESSARY 1 NCO (Sup) 2 C-E Equip Mech 1 Clk/Driver ■ CONTROLS ALL MOVEMENT IN AFFECTED AREA ■ RESTORES COMMAND AND COMMUNICA- TION TO AFFECTED UNITS ■ RELEASES COMBAT EFFECTIVE UNITS TO TACTICAL COMMANDER ■ REQUESTS REQUIRED COMBAT SERVICE 1 NBC Def Off 1 MSC Off SUPPORT 1 Cml Staff NCO 1 Med Aidman ■ DIRECTS AND CONTROLS OPERATION OF 1 NCO LIGHT RESCUE AND DECONTAMINATION 1 Driver SQUADS ■ RESUMES MISSIONS OF UNITS IN AF- FECTED AREA WHEN DIRECTED ■ REPORTS ALL RADIATION AREAS OVER 5 RAD/HR AND CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION

~~8-16 FM 71-2-~~

~~1 OIC/NCOIC RESCUE/DECONTAMIIMATION 1 Driver~~

RECO /ERY/ 1 IMCO 2 Drivers REF AIR 8 EM 1 Recovery NCO 1 Wrecker Op 1 Recovery Op 1 Trk Veh Mech 1 Trk Veh Mech FUNCTIONS MEDICAL AID EVACUATION ■ OPERATES CASUALTY AND EQUIPMENT COLLECTING POINTS ■ PROVIDES LIMITED EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT ■ CONDUCTS RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING. 1 Physician's Asst/NCO 1 Med Aidman REPORTS TO CAT 1 Sr Med Aidman 1 Amb Driver ■ PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO COMPANY 1 Amb Driver TEAM LIGHT RESCUE AND DECONTAMINA- TION SQUADS

~~1 Recovery NCO 1 NCO 1 Med Aidman 1 Recovery Op 1 Driver 1 Amb Driver 1 Trk Veh Mech 5 EM~~

FUNCTIONS ■ ADMINISTERS FIRST AID ■ RESCUES AND REMOVES CASUALTIES ■ EVACUATES VEHICLES AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ■ CONDUCTS RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING. REPORTS TO CAT ■ PERFORMS LIMITED DECONTAMINATION

~~8-17 FM 71-2~~

When area damage control operations are initiated, the CAT first assembles all required elements at some central point. In case of a nuclear strike, the point must be sufficient distance from ground zero (GZ) to minimize radiation effects on the CAT. The CAT depends on reports from observing units and initial assessment reports from brigade aerial survey teams. The CAT commander analyzes the situation, opens a CAT command post, and designates sectors of search; salvage and maintenance points; casualty collection points; and rally points for survivors. In case of a nuclear strike, the NBC defense officer determines or estimates GZ, type of burst, destructive power (yield) of the weapon, and the included radiation or fallout pattern. Sectors of search and collection points may be adjusted once actual conditions are determined. The CAT then directs the operations of task force and team rescue squads. Requests for additional assistance from brigade or division are processed through operations channels.

SUMMARY The battalion task force commander is primarily concerned with the winning of the battle and concentrates his efforts on directing the fight. This direction includes the provision of mobile, continuous support. The task force must be armed, fueled, fixed, and fed as far forward as possible.

~~The task force headquarters company has a support platoon, maintenance platoon, communication platoon, and medical platoon.~~

~~Support units may be grouped at a single location (unit trains) or at dual locations (combat trains and field trains).~~

~~The support system is designed to get all ten classes of supplies to the front as rapidly as possible.~~

~~Maintenance is performed at the lowest level capable of repair. T echnical assistance comes to the front when necessary.~~

~~Each battalion task force staff officer has definite responsibilities in the support system to aid the commander.~~

~~8-18 APPENDIX A Command, Control, and Communications- Electronics (C-E) Command Group~~

~~OVERVIEW~~

BECAUSE OF THE RAPID TEMPO of operations on the modem battlefield, the battalion task force commander frequently operates with a mobile command group. In addition to the commander, the command group consists of his fire support officer, his task force S3, and the USAF liaison officer.

The command group moves to where the task force commander can best control operations. In an attack, this is most often near a lead team. In defense, the command group is usually where the enemy’s main effort is being made. The remainder of his staff operates from a task force tactical operations center (TOC) and with the task force trains.

~~CONTENTS~~

~~PAGE~~

~~OVERVIEW A-1~~

~~TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER A-2~~

~~COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRON ICS A-5~~

~~FM RADIO NETS A-6~~

~~WIRE NETS A-8~~

~~MESSENGERS A-8~~

~~SOUND AND VISUAL(SV) COMMUNICATIONS A-8~~

~~COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS . A-9~~

~~COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY A-10~~

A-1 PM 71 -2 — In a task force organized around a TACTICAL OPERATIONS mechanized infantry battalion headquarters, CENTER the command group rides in armored personnel carriers (APC). The battalion task force TOC, located to the In a task force organized around a tank rear of forward deployed company teams, battalion headquarters, the command group serves as primary communications and rides in tanks from the battalion planning center. It is supervised by the headquarters company tank section or in battalion task force S3 or, in his absence, the armored personnel carriers. A tank battalion S2. Generally, it is manned by operations and headquarters section has an APC designated intelligence personnel not forward with the for the USAF tactical air control party. Other command group, and liaison personnel from APCs which cam be used by the command units attached under the operational control group are available in the combat support of, or supporting the battalion task force. company. When the command group operates from APCs, the headquarters From time to time, the battalion task force Si company tank section can be used to and S4 may operate with the TOC, but most overwatch. The command group would then often they operate with the battalion task be similar to other small units moving about force trains. Trains operations are described the battlefield. in chapter 8,Combat Service Support

~~LOCATION OF COMMAND GROUPS MECH INF HQ TANK BN HQ ONE METHOD COR ENEMY S3 ENEMY~~

~~FSO m. ALO~~

~~COB CDR CDR S3 S3 \~~

~~FSO FSO ALO ALO~~

~~A SECOND METHOD~~

A-2 FM 71-2 — The TOC must be capable of continuous headquarters and subordinate, adjacent, and operation for extended periods. supporting units. This is the most important Communications from the TOC are consideration when selecting the site. It established and maintained with higher should be located near routes to higher headquarters and subordinate and adjacent headquarters, company teams and other units in accordance with standing operating subordinate units, and to the battalion task procedures (SOP). force trains. Care should be taken to avoid Personnel in the TOC monitor task force crossroads in open terrain or other prominent operations and keep the command group, landmarks which might unnecessarily reveal task force units, higher headquarters, and its location to the enemy. adjacent units informed of the situation in Built-up areas are good locations for the the battalion task force area. Planning for battalion task force TOC. These areas future operations is also accomplished in the provide good cover and concealment from TOC. enemy observation and fire. The TOC can be The task force S3 selects the general TOC located in a basement or other suitable location based on recommendations of the shelter; vehicles can be hidden in garages or battalion task force C-E officer. The exact bams; light discipline can be enforced by location of the TOC will be selected by the covering windows—allowing operations senior man in charge of moving the facility, during darkness with minimum risk. usually the headquarters company commander. In an attack, the TOC is located When built-up areas cannot be used, the well forward, two or three terrain features TOC should be located on a reverse slope to behind the leading company team. It may provide cover and concealment from enemy move continuously in a fast moving ground observation and fire. If possible, the operation. In defense, the TOC should be area should also provide concealment firom located further to the rear to minimize its enemy air observation and attack; The vulnerability. When possible, alternate sites ground must be sufficiently hard to support are reconnoitered and prepared for vehicle traffic and there must be enough occupation. space to disperse vehicles. The following The location of the TOC must provide for illustration shows one way of organizing a good communication with higher battalion task force TOC area.

~~ONE WAY OF ORGANIZING A TOC AREA~~

~~100M~~

ENEMY Antennas placed 1000 meters from TOC TOC. Ccmm Platoon M577(s) maybe ARTY collocated or in another area for alternate comm. S3 S2 0 ÔTACP 70 M PARKING » OHHÇ RS3 LEGEND B R 2 Vi M577 J REDEYE DISMOUNT ❖ POINT Ml 13 (ZlTENT

~~^WHEELED 1KM~~

~~A-3 464-458 0-85-24 — FM 71-2~~

~~TWO WAYS OF ORGANIZING TOC VEHICLES~~

~~TOP VIEW TOP VIEW r 1 ——u ■ '"i i I M577 M577 M577 (TARP) M577 S3 FSO 52 S3 £1 t , I l__l a—a Ml 13 M577 Ml 13 TACP M577 S2 TACP» FSO~~

As a general rule, the task force TOC provides its own security. The task force headquarters company commander, assisted by his first sergeant, organizes a perimeter defense. Vehicle-mounted weapons are given sectors of fire. Provisional rifle squads are organized from TOC personnel and are assigned sectors. Off-duty personnel can be used to man observation posts. Warning systems and alarms must be provided for. All personnel must be proficient in firing the LAW. When the TOC displaces, it should do so by echelon under the control of the battalion task force S3 or headquarters company commander. One echelon moves to the new location, establishes communications, and gets ready to monitor battalion task force operations and receive and pass on information from brigade. When this echelon is in position, the second echelon should be covered in the battalion task force SOP. The keys to successful TOC operations on the modem battlefield are mobility and communications security (COMSEC). Excess creature comforts must be stripped away so ALL PERSONNEL MUST BE that the TOC can move on a moment’s notice. HIGHLY PROFICIENT IN COMSEC. All personnel must practice perfect COMSEC. To do less is to reveal your location, allowing the enemy to obtain valuable intelligence and target you with massive artillery or ground attack. A-4 FM 71-2 COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS The ability of the battalion task force to battalion task force S3 or XO. The C-E officer SEE, SUPPRESS and MOVE depends on its supervises all task force communications ability to communicate. The task force activities, to include installation, operations, commander is personally responsible for the and maintenance of communications adequacy and use of the communications systems and equipment necessary to support system within his command and for its task force operations. He is also responsible operation in the system of the next higher for preparation of battalion task force headquarters. The commander’s communica- communications-electronics operating tions responsibilities include planning, instructions (CEOI) and safeguarding of maintenance, and training. To assist him, he COMSEC material. During battalion task has a C-E staff officer who may also force operations, the C-E officer is normally command the battalion task force located in the TOC where he can best monitor communications platoon. The C-E officer the battalion task force communications works under the staff supervision of the system.

~~C-E Responsibilities~~

Senior to Subordinate. A superior unit is responsible for establishing communications to subordinate units. For communications responsibility, an attached unit of any size is considered subordinate to the command to which it is attached. Supporting to Supported. A supporting unit is responsible for establishing communication to the supported unit. Reinforcing to Reinforced. A reinforcing unit is responsible for establishing communications to the reinforced unit. Lateral Communications. Responsibility for establishing communications between adjacent units may be fixed by the next higher commander or SOP. If responsibility is not fixed by orders, the commander of the unit on the left is responsible for establishing communications with the unit on the right.

~~Restoration. Both units take prompt action to restore lost communications between units.~~

The communications platoon installs, outgoing messages. It may be collocated with operates, and maintains the communication the task force TOC, or nearby to act as an system for task force command control and alternate TOC. trains elements. The platoon installs and operates the The platoon performs organizational battalion task force wire system. This system maintenance on communications equipment includes lines within the TOC and trains area of the battalion task force headquarters for the commander, staff, and elements of the company. It also provides back-up headquarters company, and to subordinate organizational maintenance for company companies and attached units when time and teams and other subordinate units. All conditions permit. Priorities for installation elements of the battalion task force evacuate of lines are normally established by SOP or equipment for repair through the as directed by the task force commander or communications platoon. S3. The platoon operates AM-Radio The platoon establishes a telecommunica- Teletypewriter (RATT) equipment in the tions center for processing incoming and brigade RATT net.

~~A-5 “FM 71-2~~

FM RADIO NETS Radio should not be the primary means of communication until contact is made. To avoid detection by enemy direction finding (DF) equipment, the battalion task force uses all other means to communicate until it is absolutely necessary to use radio.

Command Net. A secure command net, Administrative Logistics (Admin/Log) Net. controlled by the S3, is used for command The admin/log net is controlled by the S4. control of the battalion task force. All organic This net is used for administrative and units normally operate in this net. The field artillery fire support officer, USAF air liaison logistics traffic within the battalion task officer, and supporting units may also force. All organic units normally operate in operate in this net. this net.

~~BATTALION TASK FORCE INTERNAL NETS~~

~~COMMAND NET ADMIN/LOG NET~~

~~BN BDE BDE XO S4 RATT CDR CO XO~~

~~FSO C-t S2 HHC XO MAINT~~

~~S3 S3 SI S4 ENGR AIR~~

~~MAINT HHC OFF CO S1/S4 FAC~~

~~CO S4 HQ SPT BN MED PLT ADMIN PLT~~

*The heavy mortar platoon, scout platoon, air defense platoon, and antitank platoon (mech bn) will usually operate on the command net directly.

~~A-6 FM 71-2~~

Intelligence (Intel) Net. The intel net, when used, is controlled by the S2. It functions as a surveillance net when required. Units may enter or leave the net as required to pass information. INTEL NET

Ui The baña I ion ta sk force a Iso operates i n the : co --Brigade Command Net FM (secure). HQ GSR -Brigade Admin/Log Net FM. -Brigade Intelligence Net FM (secure). -Brigade RATT Net. AM-RATT equipment S2 has an increased operating range over FM- (NCS) (VHF) line-of-sight equipment. The scout platoon, mortar platoon. Redeye section, antitank platoon, and each BDE BN company operate their own nets on INTEL COMO frequencies assigned by the battalion task NET NET force X Special Radio Nets. The fire support officer operates in the supporting field artillery command fire direction net and a designated fire direction net to coordinate field artillery fires. The USAF air liaison officer operates in a USAF tactical air request net (HF/SSB) and a UHF/AM air-ground net to control air strikes.

~~TOC WIRE NET~~

~~. xo TO CSC~~

~~TO ATTACHED/ ASSIGNED COMPANIES~~

~~AS SURVEY ä REQUIRED -O TELECOM TMS~~

~~-O MAINT PLT~~

~~-O SCH PLT TACP -Q SPTPLT~~

~~A-7 — FM 71-2~~

~~Wire Nets. Wire is normally used for internal communication in the TOC area and is the primary means of communication within the battalion task force whenever the situation permits.~~

~~TASK FORCE WIRE NET~~

Q. Q. Q. o cN ro TF CDR/XO O- =} TO CSC O S3< co/xo SB- — \ TO ATTACHED/ m 22/PT — / ASSIGNED COs l SWBD O HQ CO CP SB-993/GT TF STAFF - SWITCH- BOARD O TFMEDPLT CO CDR TF SURV (ZÍ O TELECOM CEN CO HQ TMs AS O BN MAINT PIT J REQ OP TACP O BN SCT PIT v> o- O SPT PLT LDR t- z cc TASK FORCE TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER Û Ü o o ? Î ?. CSC SWBD SWBD HV SB-22/PT MORT Ml CSC SWBD FOs SB-22/PT OP T FDC OP SWBD SB-993/GT OP ¿666

Messengers. Messengers are used between the battalion task force provided they are the TOC, triiins, higher headquarters, and changed frequently to avoid compromise and company teams. Although messengers are are understood by all. slower and more vulnerable than other Sound communications include vehicle means of communication (the messenger horns, whistles, and voice. Sound may be wounded, killed, or captured en route), communications may range from simple they can be used even when units are in SOP, such as three “beeps” from a vehicle contact. horn to warn of hostile aircraft, to Sound and Visual (SV) Communications. SV prearranged recognition signals, such as communications may be included in the thumping two steel helmets together in division CEOI extract and should be used at periods of limited visibility. Ground every opportunity. Signals not included in surveillance radar (GSR) can also be used for the CEOI may be established for use within communication. A patrol, for example, might A-8 FM 71-2

report its location by waving a reflector in a prearranged sequence to a monitoring GSR. Visual communications include pyrotechnics such as flares and smoke grenades, flags, hand and arm signals, and light signals. Visual signals may be SOP or prearranged and can be as simple as signals for parking a vehicle to sending extended messages by morse code or some other code using a flashlight or vehicle headlights (white light or infrared (IR)). When white light or IR is used, care must be taken to conceal the light from enemy observation. COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS When the scheme of maneuver has been developed, the C-E officer makes a map reconnaissance and, if possible, a visual OFFICER MUST BE reconnaissance to determine any special COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH communications requirements, wire routes LOCATION OF BATTALION TASK when wire is to be used, and a suitable FORCE TOC. location for the battalion task force TOC. When radio is used, transmission must be kept short. Secure means or operational and numerical codes should be used. Low-power transmission and use of terrain to mask signals from enemy DF equipment will minimize risk of detection. Messengers, and sometimes wire, should be used for lengthy transmissions. During offensive operations, wire is seldom used. When moving to contact, messengers and visual signals should be used whenever possible. Wire may be installed if the battalion task force is halted for extended periods, as, for example, in an assembly area. During defensive operations, wire is installed as rapidly as possible. As a general rule, the brigade communications platoon lays two or more wire lines from the brigade to the task force TOC. The task force communications platoon lays wire in the TOC and trains areas. Two or more lines over A =FM 71-2

alternate routes are laid to subordinate units cryptographic equipment is lost or captured, in accordance with priorities established by the facts are reported promptly to the next the battalion task force SOP or by the task higher command. The battalion task force force commander. SOP should contain instructions on Commercial lines can be used with destruction of equipment and classified permission of the brigade headquarters. If documents to prevent their capture or use by the battalion task force is forced to withdraw, the enemy. Complete CEOI and CESI should existing wire lines, including commercial not be carried forward of the task force TOC. lines, are cut and sections removed to When necessary, the C-E officer publishes preclude use by enemy forces. Once the extracts for use by forward elements. defensive battle begins, new lines are seldom Cryptosecurity is maintained by using laid. The battalion task force must then rely OPCODES, numeral encryption devices, on radio, messenger, or visual signals. secure voice devices, and teletype system Communications Security involves physical secure equipment in accordance with security, crypto security, and transmission authorized instructions. Unauthorized codes security. COMSEC procedures should be or cryptosystems are not used. covered in the battalion task force SOP. Transmission security limits the enemy’s Physical security protects the crypto ability to listen to US Army radio signals. systems and classified documents (including Any signal transmitted can be intercepted plain-language copies of messages and and jammed by the enemy. All transmissions carbons) from capture or loss. Before an area should be short, using correct procedure, and is vacated, it is inspected for messages, treated as if the enemy were listening. carbons, cipher tapes, and copies of maps or Chapter 6, Reconnaissance and Security, orders. Wire lines are patrolled to prevent describes measures to be taken to degrade enemy tapping. When CEOI codes or enemy DF and jamming capabilities.

~~A-10 APPENDIX B Warning, Operation, and Fragmentary Orders~~

~~OVERVIEW~~

COMBAT ORDERS ARE WRITTEN OR ORAL COMMUNI- CATIONS that transmit missions pertaining to combat operations. By combat orders, the commander announces his decisions, policies, and iiitentions as they apply to tactical pperations in the field. The three most common types of combat rders at battalion task force level are: warning orders (WO), operation orders (OPORD), and fragmentary orders (FRAGO). For ease of understanding, simplicity, and commonality, the first two types have a prescribed format and purpose. This appendix serves as a guide only. For additional information refer to FM 101-5, Command and Control of Combat Operations.

~~co^TEcrrs~~

~~PAGE~~

~~OVERVIEW B-1~~

~~WARNING ORDERS B-2~~

~~OPERATION ORDERS B-2~~

~~FRAGMENTARY ORDERS B-3~~

~~ANNOTATED ATTACK ORDERS B-4 FM 71-2 WARNING ORDERS~~

~~Warning orders give advance notice of an action or an order that is to follow. They are usually issued as brief oral or written messages. Warning orders have four minimum essential elements:~~

ADDRESSEES Tell recipients immediately if the order pertains to them. NATURE OF THE OPERATION Stated in sufficient detail to allow recipients to begin routine or special preparations for the operation. TIME AND PLACE When the entire order is to be issued and who is to come—exact location and time tell subordinate commander when and where to go to receive the entire order. An SOP "orders group"—detailing who usually comes to receive orders—helps shorten this process. TIME OF THE OPERATION Stated as precisely as possible, allows recipients to allocate time and set priorities.

It is essential that leaders and units at all levels have maximum time to prepare for an operation. Therefore, warning orders are issued at all levels of command down to squad or section. Upon receipt of a WO, each commander issues his own warning order to subordinates in as much detail as he can. OPERATION ORDERS Operation Orders detail the coordinated actions necessary to carry out the commander’s concept. They are used for both tactical operations and road marches. The battalion task force commander or his S3 issues orally the order to subordinate commanders (as described in Chapter 3), following a standard 5-paragraph format. The tempo of mounted operations does not often allow time for preparation of a complete written order. The S3 then may prepare a written order for historical purposes after the operation. The operation is most often conducted from the oral OPORD and a graphic overlay which shows boundaries, checkpoints, and battle 2 FM 71-2- position numbers common to the task force’s mission. In some cases there may not be time to prepare an overlay; subordinate leaders will then have to copy the graphic control measures from the TF commander’s map. The most important part of any order is the commander’s concept of the operation. . . He should personally explain his concept to subordinates in considerable detail so that there are no misunderstandings about what they are to do. Understanding how the commander envisions the battle being fought assists them in carrying out actions on their own initiative when necessary—confident that they are operating within the framework of the commander’s concept. The example attack and defense orders which follow provide only the framework of the concept of operations. The commander would expand it orally.

~~TURN THE PAGE FOR EXAMPLE OF OPERATION ORDERS. THE ATTACK ORDER IS ANNOTATED TO EXPLAIN EACH PART OF AN OPORD.~~

FRAGMENTARY ORDERS |/^ Fragmentary Orders contain missions of immediate concern to subordinate units. They are issued as oral or written orders and contain brief, specific, timely instructions. FRAGOs are used to change or modify the OPORD. FRAGOs include only those items which have changed since the issue of the last OPORD and are critical to performance of the mission. They follow the same ) sequence as an OPORD. 1 EKampOe: FRAGO Over Secure Radio. I "We've got to take out those SAGGER positions on the hill at CP40 before continuing." AOplha: "Move to 38 and suppress 40." Bravo: "Overwatch Alpha's move. Then Charlie's. Detach a mech platoon to Charlie. Have them come up on his net immediately." ClhairlDe: "Move around the right of 41 and take 40 from the right flank." Scouts: "Screen Charlie's right." FOLD THIS PAGE OUT B-3 • ; — FM 71-2

NOTE ANNOTATED ATTACK ORDERS a. Organization for combat is developed THIS PAGE MAY BE LEFT FOLDED OUTAS AN AID IN REMAINING Heading by S3 based on the commander’s decision and concept of the operation and the coordination ORIENTED WHILE FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE ORDER. Note: with staff officers having responsibilities for combat and combat support operations. Determined by S3. Classified per AR 380-5. Indentation of a unit indicates that it is Classification is shown at top and bottom of attached to the unit under which it is listed each page of the order. unless qualified by a parenthetical term indicating a different command relationship, Each staff officer having a responsibility in i.e., (DS), (GS), (OPCON). A unit that is further the preparation of the operation order indented under a unit that itself is indented has provides S3 with status of oral orders the same command relationship. pertaining to his activity. If no oral orders were issued, this comment will be left out. If there b. Task organization indicates the were oral orders, such expressions as "No organization for combat for the operation change from oral orders" or "No change from concerned and includes combat and combat oral orders except for paragraph " will be support units. Task organization normally is Ho O&j used, as appropriate. shown immediately preceding paragraph 1. However, it may be shown: sroM e a. Copy number: Assigned by S3 (must be oo- shown). (1 ) In an annex. This technique is used when a large number of units are involved. b. Issuing unit: May be in code. (2) In paragraph 3 of the operation «•*# i—. sz L D XX —15)— c. Place of issue: Show name of town or order, if simple. XV • •• SSI place, coordinate location (in parentheses), 15 c. Units listed under a major subordinate ¿i and country. May be in code. control headquarters are in an attached status d. Date-time group: Time order is signed unless otherwise indicated in parentheses and is effective unless otherwise indicated in following the unit designation. SM the body of the order. It is also the date and sourer , o • 'Mvj time when attachments and detachments Example: 1 Redeye Tm (DS). become effective unless a different effective SP ■RP|T 2, time is shown under task organization, d. Missions are not assigned in the task TMO « T/t n attachments and detachments, or organization. 'RouTC ¿o 08 coordinating instructions in the body of the order. Date-time group must include time zone e. Subordinate control headquarters are Tk?/-r -Tl QSR 2-I5K suffix. listed in the following order: t» "í?oOTt f / ^ V / (1) Combat units. 50 e. Message reference number: Assigned Zo by S3 from a block of numbers provided by the battalion task force C-E officer. Its use (a) Combined arms teams (in H5 facilitates acknowledgement of the order. numerical or alphabetical order).

Operation order number is assigned by S3. (b) Infantry (in order of infantry, Numbers run serially throughout the calendar infantry (mechanized), airmobile, and airborne year. infantry). TP /-C7 TP 2-13 TF 2-/3 Each staff officer providing information or (c) Armor (in order of tank, attack helicopter, armored cavalry, and air L v> entries for the operation order provides S3 TF 1-66 TF 2-93 with references as appropriate. List any maps, cavalry). TP 2-73 charts, or other documents required to understand the order. Reference to a map will (2) Combat support company (in OBJ include the map series number (and country or order of scout platoon, heavy mortar platoon, geographic area, if required), sheet number AT platoon. Redeye Section, GSR Section, fc AGLfc (and name if required), edition, and scale- AVLB Section).

The time zone applicable to the operations. f. Attachments reflected in task Times in other zones are converted to this time organization need not be repeated in zone for this operation. paragraph 1c or in paragraph 3. B-4 I

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~~464-458 0-85-26 B-5 — FM 71-2~~

Body Q Paragraph 2, MISSION, is a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished by Noto: the command and will include those tasks specified by the higher headquarters directing O Paragraph 1, SITUATION, always contains the operation and may include implied tasks three subparagraphs: determined by the commander as a result of his mission analysis. It normally includes the elements of who, what, when, and, as a. Subparagraph a. Enemy Forces. appropriate, why and where. This paragraph Provided by S2 and contains enemy has no subparagraphs. The mission is stated in information only. Instructions are not full regardless of how clearly it may be shown included. Reference may be made to an on the operation overlay. intelligence annex, operation overlay (if enemy information is shown), periodic 0 Paragraph 3, EXECUTION. intelligence report, or intelligence summary. Only enemy information vital to the entire a. The first subparagraph in paragraph 3 command is included. Letter designation of of the operation order is the concept of the annex is provided by S3. operation. It is derived by S3 from the commander's decision and concept. The b. Subparagraph b. Friendly Forces. S3 concept of operation states the tactical plan, extracts from the operation order of the next including the scheme of maneuver and plan of higher headquarters. Subparagraph b contains fire support. It may also provide the information concerning higher, adjacent commander's visualization of the conduct of supporting, and reinforcing units as the overall operation; it may clarify the applicable. Information should be limited to purpose of the operation, discuss phasing (if that which subordinate commanders need to applicable), employment of nuclear and know to accomplish their assigned mission. chemical fires, and whether or not a preparation is to be fired and its duration. c. Subparagraph c. Attachments and Priority of artillery fires as determined by the Detachments. S3 determined from the commander is shown here. Paragraph 3a may operation order of the next higher be further divided into subparagraphs titled ( 1 ) headquarters, units attached to or detached Maneuver, and (2) Fires. When the operation is from the battalion task force. He lists these to be executed in two or more distinct phases, units and indicates effective time of the concept of operation or maneuver attachment or detachment, if different from subparagraph will be further subparagraphed the date-time group in the heading of the to describe each phase separately. Phases will order. If these units are already listed in task be designated as Phase 1. Phase II, etc. organization, they need not be included in Material in paragraph 3a(1 ) is informative and subparagraph c. not directive in nature. B-6 FM 71-2 —

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~~B-7 r~~

~~— FM 71-2~~

~~® Recommended by FSO. Letter designation of annex is assigned by S3.~~

Reserve. S3 determines from the commander's explanation and amplification of his decision if included. It is always the next to the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. Troop units not committed initially are shown.

(£) Coordinating Instructions: The final subparagraph of paragraph 3 is titled "Coordi- nating Instructions" and contains tactical instructions and details of coordination applicable to two or more units of the command, listed in any sequence. When there are no coordinating instructions, the word None will be placed after the title. Coordinating instructions may include: a. Essential Elements of Information (EEI) (brigade and higher levels) or specific orders for collection of information (normally battalion and lower levels) of an intelligence nature.

~~Note: The battalion S2 will normally put out specific orders and requests for these items, but he may also include them in the order for emphasis.~~

~~b. Movement instructions, e.g., order of march, start point time, etc.~~

~~c. Any counterintelligence measures not a matter of SOP.~~

~~d. Troop safety instruction, if different from SOP.~~

~~e. Effective time of attachment or detachment of units within the issuing headquarters organization, when such times are different from the effective time of the order.~~

~~f. References to annexes not previously mentioned. B-8 FM 71-2 —~~

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464-458 0-85-27 — FM 71-2 © Paragraph 4, SERVICE SUPPORT. Due to (or authentication) in the same manner as the the functional system of combat service order. Authentication is performed by the support currently existing and the large primary staff officer responsible for the annex. number of procedures that are a matter of SOP, Examples of signature blocks for copy 1 of the instructions in paragraph 4 at task force level order, annexes, appendixes, tables, and may be very brief. Since distribution of a inclosures: division combat service support annex is made down to and including task force and separate Example 1: HASZARD company, a reference to these documents may MG suffice. However, the paragraph will normally contain information or instructions pertaining Example 2: FOR THE COMMANDER: to trains, messing, supply, and maintenance. FRANKLDN When a service support annex is used, para- Chief of Staff graph 4 of the operation order may consist only of a reference to annex. Subjects, as Annexes are lettered alphabetically and applicable, appearing in paragraph 4 are are listed in the order in which they appear in arranged in the following sequence: the operation order. S3 designates the letter to be associated with a given annex. Annexes are a. General prepared by the appropriate officer having b. Materiel and services staff responsibility for the activity, arm, or service covered by the annex. When an annex is c. Medical evacuation and hospitaliza- to be issued later and, therefore, does not tion accompany the order, the parenthetical phrase d. Personnel (to be issued) is shown following the listing of e. Civil-military cooperation the annex. f. Miscellaneous ^ A distribution formula is included in Standing operating procedures. S3 establishes Paragraph 5, COMMAND AND SIGNAL. distribution in coordination with other Instructions relative to command and the appropriate staff officers. Distribution must operation of signal communications. This also be made to adjacent and supporting units paragraph may have as many subparagraphs as not included in SOP distribution. required. b. S3 determines tasks for subordinate Three of the more common subheadings units from the commander's decisión and are Signal, Command, and Axis of Command concept. Separate lettered subparagraphs Post Displacement. Signal instructions may give the specific tasks to be accomplished by refer to an annex, but, as a minimum, should each element of the command charged with list the index and issue number of the the execution of a tactical mission. When a unit communication-electronics operations task is adequately shown graphically, that unit instructions (CEO!) that is in effect and will be addressed in its own subparagraph, instructions for control, coordination, and with a colon to indicate its tasks is shown establishment of priorities in the use of graphically. electromagnetic emissions, if not already issued. Command instructions include Example: command post (CP) location of pertinent units. Designation of alternate CP and succession of b. Team A: command will be entered in this subparagraph (Tasks shown graphically need not be repeated if not adequately covered in SOP or annex. The in the body of the order.) axis of command post displacement consists of one or more future locations. If shown (1) Combined arms commands in graphically, this subparagraph is not used. numerical or alphabetical order. lEndlDinig (2) Infantry ^1) Directs the recipient of the order to (3) Armor acknowledge receipt. Acknowledgement may (4) Scout Platoon be made in the clear, using the message reference number contained in the heading. (5) Heavy Mortar Platoon The commander or his authorized repre- (6) Antitank Platoon (mech only) sentative signs the original copy of the (7) Redeye Section operation order. If this signature cannot be reproduced, the S3 authenticates subsequent (8) Ground Surveillance Radar copies of the order. Annexes, appendixes, Section tabs, and inclosures issued with the order do (9) AVLB Section (tank only) not require signature or authentication. Annexes issued separately require signature (10) Reserve B-10 FM 71-2 —

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~~B-13 464-458 0-85-28 — FM 71-2~~

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APPENDIX C Records and Reports OVERVIEW
REPORTS ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS of providing information upon which plans and decisions are based. Reports must be accurate, timely, and complete. Negative information (“There is no enemy at ...”) is frequently as import£int as positive information. Standard procedures save time. Reports serve as the primary record of operational events. There are three broad categories of reports:
D Operation Reports. B Intelligence, Counterfire, and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warfare (NBC) Reports. B Administrative Reports. Means of transmitting reports and safeguarding information will vary from theater to theater, depending on equipment available and local requirements.
COOTE5WS PAGE
OVERVIEW ..C-1
OPERATION REPORTS C-2 Operational Situation Report (SITREP) C-2
Situation/Status Report (STATREP) C 2
Minefield Report ...C-3
INTELLIGENCE. COUNTERFIRE. AND NBC REPORTS C-3
Spot Report (SPOTREP) C-3
Reports of Enemy Shelling, Bombing, or Nuclear. Biological, Chemical Warfare Activity C-4
Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement C-5
Patrol Report C-S ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS C-6
C-1 -FM 71-2
OPERATION REPORTS DELTA-PERSONNEL Operational Situation Report Losses since (DTG) (in code): (SITREP) is submitted to higher DELTA ONE—Killed in action. headquarters by a battalion task force to summarize the tactical situation for a specific DELTA TWO—Wounded in action. period. The format and period for reporting DELTA THREE—Mission in action. will be specified by the higher headquarters SOP. Some elements which may be required DELTA FOUR—Captured. are: DELTA FIVE—Nonbattle casualties. • Period covered - Dates of report; maps DELTA SIX—Administrative losses. used. ECHO—AMMUNITION. • Enemy - Units encountered; estimate of Total ammunition required to replenish basic strength, morale, knowledge of friendly load (in code). activities; brief description of enemy FOXTROT—FUEL. activity and contacts. Total fuel required in gallons by type (in code). • Own Situation - Location of units, GOLF—EQUIPMENT. boundaries, headquarters (may be an Total vehicles and designated major items short; overlay); location of adjacent and include all items not immediately available for action (in code). supporting units; brief description and results of operations and noneffective HOTEL—REMARKS. units. Any additional information required to complete the situation/status picture. Omit if not required. • Administration - Brief description of abnormal situations as they affect the EXAMPLE tactical situation. (Battalion Task Force Operations) this is (Charlie Situation/Status Report (STATREP) Team Commander). is submitted by company team to report their (STATREP) One-Four-Zero-Four-Zero-Zero. tactical situation and status. It is submitted after significant events and as otherwise ALFA—(Charlie Team). specified by battalion task force. A BRAVO—(First Platoon) Grid (Mike-Alfa-One- fragmentary report is submitted when entire Eight-Two-Five-Six-Eight) to (One-Eight-Seven- Five-Six-Seven)/(Second Platoon) (One-Eight- report is not required. Seven-Five-Six-Seven)/ to (One-Eight-Niner-Five- Six-Two)/ (Third Platoon) (One-Niner-Zero-Five- FORMAT Five-Niner) to (One-Niner-Two-Five-Five-Five)/ (Command Post)(One-Eight-Four-Five-Six-Niner)/ Report as of (DTG) (Observation PostTwo) (Two-Zero-Eight-Five-Five- Niner)/ (Radar) (One-Eight-Eight-Five-Six-Three ALFA*—REPORTING UNIT (call sign). primary sector azimuth One-One-Eight-Zero Miles). BRAVO*—LOCATION(s). CHARLIE—All elements closed in position One- Company report locations of immediate Four-Zero-Four-Four-Eight receiving sporadic subordinate elements, command post, trains, artillery fire. and observation posts. Platoons report only center of mass or front line trace and observation DELTA—One-Three-One-Eight-Zero-Zero. post locations. DELTA TWO—(ONE). CHARLIE*—ACTIVITY. Brief summary of activity since last report. DELTA FIVE—(ONE). *These items are mandatory. ECHO—Negative.
C-2 FM 71-2-
FOXTROT—(One-Two-Hundred diesel Five- EXAMPLE Hundred Mogas). (Bn TF S3) this is (Co Tm Cdr) GOLF—(One One-Quarter-Ton Truck). (SPOTREP) HOTEL—In contact with (Bravo Team) at Contact ALFA—(Engineer Reconnaissance Team) Point Five-Niner. BRAVO—Bridge/One-Eight meters long/Six (SHELREP) FOLLOWS WAIT. meters wide/concrete slab/Class Seven-Two/ Three Six meter spa ns/Clearance unlimited. Minefield Report is submitted by units to indicate: CHARLIE—Grid (Mike-Alfa-Eight-Six-Six-Niner- Six-Five)/ Time Two-Five-One-Zero-Zero-Zero. • intention to lay mines. DELTA—Good condition/No bypass within Five- • initiation of laying. Hundred meters/No enemy. • completion of laying. ECHO—Returning to your location with more • enemy mine warfare activity, including information. coordinates of extremities, depth, enemy OVER. weapons and surveillance, coordinates of gaps or lanes, other pertinent information. SPOTREP FOR HIGHWAY, ROAD, Minefields, when established, must be TRAIL, OR CROSS-COUNTRY reported on DA Form 1355. This is usually ALFA—Who is observer or source?* done by battalion task force. Most often, units BRAVO—What? Distance? Width? Surface will establish hasty protective minefields. material? Alignment (bad curves or grades)? DA Form 1355-1 is prepared and submitted by Foundation (stable or unstable)? the unit emplacing the minefield. For additional information, see FM 5-34. CHARLIE—Where and when?** DELTA—Condition (of surface, shoulders, and INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERFIRE, drainage)? AND NBC REPORTS ECHO—What are you doing? Spot Report (SPOTREP) is used to report EXAMPLE enemy and area information. It is most often used by company teams, platoons, sections, (Bn TF S3) this is (Co Tm Cdr) and squads. (SPOTREP) SPOTREP FOR BRIDGE, OVERPASS, ALFA—(Team A) CULVERT, OR CAUSEWAY BRAVO—Road/Five meters wide/concrete ALFA—Who is observer or source?* surface. BRAVO—What? Overall length? Width of roadway? CHARLIE—From Checkpoint One-Ninerto Check- Type and material? Spans (number and length)? point Six-One/Time Two-Five-Zero-Niner-Five- Class (compute)? Clearances (overhead and Zero. horizontal)? DELTA—Good condition/suitable for use by (First CHARLIE—Where and when?** Brigade)/No enemy contact. DELTA—Condition? Bypass (add complete report ECHO—Continuing to Checkpoint 30. if required)?
ECHO—What are you doing? OVER.
C-3 —FM 71-2
SPOTREP FOR FORD, FERRY, OR ALFA—(Platoon Leader) OTHER CROSSING SITE BRAVO—Five aggressors with machineguns. ALFA—Who is observer or source?* CHARLIE—Grid Mike-Bravo-Niner-Eight-Five- BRAVO—What? Length of crossing? Width Five-Niner-One/Time Two-Five-One Seven-Four (usable)? Bottom material? Depth of water level Two. (present, maximum, and minimum)? Speed of current? Banks or approaches (material, height, DELTA—Dug in/firing. and slope)? Vessels and facilities (capacity, etc.)? ECHO—Applying suppressive fires and CHARLIE—Where and when?** maneuvering to attack from flank. DELTA—Condition (of bottom, banks, etc.)? OVER. Bypass (add complete report if required)? ECHO—What are you doing? NOTES: *Source: The actual origin from which informa- EXAMPLE tion is obtained, such (Bn TF S2) this is (Co Cdr) as prisoners of war, local civilians, docu- (SPOTREP) ments, etc. ALFA—(Adjacent unit's contact party) **Where: Include from-to for BRAVO—Ford/Six-Five meters long/One-Two route or trace of area; meters wide/Rock bottom/One-Half meter deep/ enemy locations sent Current slow/Approaches Two-Zero percent in grid coordinates in gravel both sides. the clear except CHARLIE—From Checkpoint Two-Niner down behind- friendly- lines Three-Hundred Right One-Five-Zero/ Time Two- information locating Five-Zero-Six-Zero-Zero. friendly units or DELTA—Good condition/No enemy. activities in code. ECHO—Continuing mission. Reports of Enemy Shelling, Bombing, OVER. or Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warfare Activity are often used by company teams, platoons, sections, and SPOTREP FOR ENEMY INFORMATION squads to inform higher headquarters of such activity. These reports are known as ALFA—Who is observer or source?* SHELREP, BOMREP, NBC-1, respectively. BRAVO—What? How many? How equipped? CHARLIE—Where and when?** STANDARD FORMAT DELTA—Doing what (if moving, direction, speed, and altitude)? ALFA—From (unit call sign) and type report (SHELREP. BOMREP. NBC-1 - (NUCLEAR) ECHO—What are you doing? (TOXIC) (BIOLOGICAL)) EXAMPLE BRAVO—Position of observer (in grid coordinates in code). (Bn TF S2) this is (Co Tm Cdr). CHARLIE—Azimuth of flash (or sound or groove of shell - state which) or origin of flight path of (SPOTREP) missile).
C-4 FM 71-2 —
DELTA—Time from/date-time of attack. MIKE—Top Two-Seven-Hundred meters estimated. • ECHO—Time to (for illumination time). NOVEMBER—One-Thousand meters estimated. FOXTROT—Area attached (either azimuth and distance from observer in code orgrid coordinates OVER. in the clear). GOLF—Number and nature of guns, mortars, air- EXAMPLE £ craft, or other means of delivery if known. (Bn TF S2) this is (Co Tm) HOTEL—Nature of fire (barrage, registration, etc.) (or type of burst—air or surface—NUCREP only) (SHELREP) or type of toxic agent). ALFA—(First Platoon) INDIA—Number and type of bombs, shells, rockets, etc. BRAVO—(Mike-Bravo-Two-One-Six-Eight) 9 JULIETT—Time flash-to-Bang in seconds (of CHARLIE—Magnetic azimuth groove of shells weapon). Niner-Six degrees approximate. KILO—Damage (in code) or Crater diameter— DELTA—Zero-Niner-One-Six-Two-Five. NUCREP only. ECHO—One-Six-Four-Five. LIMA—Fireball width (immediately after shock wave passage) NUCREP only. FOXTROT—Same as Bravo. MIKE—Cloud height (top or bottom—state which) GOLF—Estimate Four One-Five-Two millimeter (10 minutes after burst) NUCREP only. howitzers. NOVEMBER—Cloud width (10 minutes after HOTEL—Harassment. burst) NUCREP only. INDIA—Two-Four rounds high explosive. KILO—Negligible. EXAMPLE OVER.
(Bn TF S2) this is (Alfa Tm Cdr) NOTE: Omit items not applicable; state NBC 1 (NUCLEAR) units of measure used, such as ALFA—(Alfa Team) meters, mils, etc. For additional information, see FMs 3-12, 21-40, BRAVO—Vicinity (Mike-Bravo-Two-Niner-Six- and 30-5. Three). DELTA—Zero-Two-Zero-Four-Five-Zero. ECHO—Illumination time four seconds. Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement is normally reported through FOXTROT—Vicinity Mike-Bravo-Two-Zero-Six- Two. command channels using the NBC-4 reports. Radiological monitoring or survey parties HOTEL—Air burst. report data are collected as expeditiously as INDIA—One round type unknown small yield. possible. Radiological survey data are reported as directed. DA Form 1971-1-4 (Route KILO—(Severe flash blindness throughout area; Technique or Course Leg Technique Ground other damage unknown at this time.) and Aerial Survey) is used for recording LIMA—Two-Five-Zero meters estimated. information collected (see FM 3-12). C-5 FOLDOUT C-6 FM 71-2
PATROL DEBRIEFING REPORT Patrol Report by reconnaissance (Omit Heading(s) Not Applicable) elements is normally submitted by SPOTREP as events occur. For debriefings, a DESIGNATION OF PATROL (DATE) report format will assist in insuring all information obtained is reported by the TO: patrol. MAPS: ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS A. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL Administrative reports should be included in a unit tactical SOP. Battalion task force B. TASK makes up the SOP for use within the C. TIME OF DEPARTURE battalion task force. Normally, these formats will correspond to brigade formats for ease in D. TIME OF RETURN compiling. The frequency of these reports is E. ROUTES (OUT AND BACK) also covered in the SOP. The reports are formatted by line number (ALFA, BRAVO, F. TERRAIN etc.) similar to SPOTREP or STATREP. (Description of the terrain—dry, swampy, jungle, thickly wooded, high brush, rocky, Typical reports are: deepness of ravines and draws: condition of bridges as to type, size and strength, effect on armor and wheeled vehicles.) • Request for POL Resupply. • Request for Ammunition Resupply. G. ENEMY • Casualty Report - Should be followed up (Strength, disposition, condition of defenses, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, by DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder exact location, movements and any shift in dispositions.) Time activity was observed: Report; and DA Form 1155, Witness coordinates where activity occurred. Statement on Individual. H. ANY MAP CORRECTIONS • Standardized Installation and I. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION Divisional Personnel Report System (SIDPERS). (Including aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.) J. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY (Enemy prisoners and dispositions; identification; enemy casualties; captured documents and equipment.) K. CONDITION OF PATROL, INCLUDING DISPOSITION OF ANY DEAD OR WOUNDED L. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Including to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.)
Signature Grade/Rank Organization/Unit of Patrol Leader M. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER
N. DISTRIBUTION APPENDIX D Breakout From Encirclement
OVERVIEW
BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR, a battalion task force may find itself encircled by enemy forces. This should not necessarily be viewed as alarming or critical, especially if it provides the opportunity to attack or counterattack the flanks and rear of enemy units. There will be times when it is necessary for an encircled force to break out and join other forces elsewhere on the battlefield. Once such a decision has been made, the attack should take place as soon as possible to prevent the enemy from concentrating against the task force.
The battalion task force is considered to be strength; an enemy force may occupy only encircled when all ground routes of scattered positions in the battalion task force evacuation and reinforcement are cut off by vicinity. The enemy may not even be aware of the enemy. This can most often happen when the task force’s location and may not have the enemy bypasses the battalion task force detailed information on battalion task force or when the task force is cut off as a result of strength and composition. The battalion task an enemy counterattack. Encirclement does force must take advantage of this state of not necessarily mean that the battalion task confusion and break out before the enemy force is surrounded by enemy forces in realizes what has happened.
COl^TE^TS PAGE OVERVIEW D-1 PREPARING FOR BREAKOUTOPERATIOWS D-2 ORGANIZATION FOR BREAKOUT OPERATIONS .. D-4 CONDUCTOFTHE OPERATION D-5
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PEEPAEING POE BEEAKOUT When preparing for a breakout operation, OPEEATIIONg the battalion task force commander follows the troop-leading procedures described in To be successful in breaking out from chapter 3, Preparing for Combat Operation, encirclement, the battalion task force must: keeping the following considerations in I Deceive the enemy as to battalion task mind: force composition, strength, and intentions. I Time of the Attack. Attacking at night or ■ Concentrate sufficient force at an enemy during other conditions of limited visibility is weak point. advantageous, but every minute spent I Provide for security to the flanks and rear encircled increases the enemy’s advantage. If of the battalion task force as it moves out of waiting for limited visibility conditions risks the encircled area. destruction of the battalion task force, the D-2 FM 71-2 — attack should be initiated as soon as adequate preparations can be made. I Location of the A ttack. The attack should be conducted against the enemy’s weakest point in the direction of other friendly forces. Against scattered resistance, it is best to attack through gaps between enemy units. Covered and concealed routes, troops available, and surprise should also be considered. ■ Speed of Execution. The success of breakout operations depends in a large measure on speed of execution. Once the breakthrough is achieved, battalion task force elements must rapidly move out of the encircled area. Therefore, it is important to attack in a direction which will allow link-up with US Army forces in the shortest possible time. ■ Security. When preparing for breakout ATTACK THE ENEMY'S operations, security is maintained by secrecy WEAKEST POINT and deception. Since the task force concentrates the bulk of its forces to break through enemy resistance, the task force rear is most vulnerable. To minimize its vulnerability, a rear guard must be provided. H Evacuation of Wounded. Wounded soldiers must not be left behind. Wounded soldiers who can fight are given duties consistent with the severity of the wound. Others are moved by the most practical means. I Destruction of Equipment and Supplies. To prevent capture by the enemy, take as much equipment and supplies as possible out of the encircled area. It may be necessary, however, to abandon some usable equipment and supplies in ortL* tr w«>cute breakout operations quickly. Abandoned material is destroyed or otherwise disabled within the capability of the battalion task force. Don’t begin destruction too soon, as this may alert the enemy as to battalion task force intentions. ■ Combat Support. Plan sufficient suppressive fires to cover battalion task force D-3
464-458 0-85-30 —FM 71-2 =
movement. The decision to use indirect fires to cover noise of units moving within the encircled area should be carefully weighed against the possibility of alerting enemy forces to the battalion task force’s intentions. ORGANIZATION FOR BREAKOUT OPERATIONS The battalion task force organizes into four primary elements for breakout operations: D A rupture force—penetrates enemy forces and opens a gap for the remainder of the task force to pass through. Once the rupture force has opened a gap, it holds the shoulders until the main body has passed through, and then joins the rear guard. The size and composition of the force depend on the factors of mission, enemy, troops available, and terrain, as in any other combat operation. ONCE THE BREAKOUT HAS The rupture force should receive priority STARTED THE MOMENTUM IS when distributing available troops. MAINTAINED UNTIL THE ra BREAKOUT IS COMPLETED H A reserve force—assists the rupture force or assumes its mission, and then passes through the rupture force, maintaining the momentum of the breakout operation. In determining the composition of the reserve force, the battalion commander must decide how much combat force is needed to make the penetration and how much is required to maintain momentum once the operation has started. B A rear guard—deceives the enemy as to the location of the main effort and protects the rear of the battalion task force as it moves out of the encircled area. The rear guard consists of the minimum force necessary to simulate activities of task force elements which have repositioned elsewhere. It must be strong enough to delay or disrupt an enemy attack. It normally consists of elements from company teams, the scout platoon, and a squad or two from the battalion task force heavy mortar platoon. It is usually commanded by the battalion task force executive officer. Disabled vehicles still D-4 “FM 71-2-
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As the rear guard clears the penetration, Once the attack has started, the rupturing the battalion task force moves on a column force continues to lead the battalion task axis toward the nearest friendly force. If the force, unless forced to deploy by enemy distance is great, the task force may deploy as resistance. If this happens, the rupturing in a movement to contact, primarily so that force secures the shoulders of the penetration length will be reduced. Enemy forces along and the reserve force leads the remainder of the route should be bypassed. If bypass is not the task force rapidly through. The attack possible, a hasty attack is conducted, as from must not be permitted to bog down. a movement to contact. D-6 APPENDIX E Linkup, Passage of Lines, and Relief in Place
OVERVIEW
LINKUP, PASSAGE OF LINES, and relief-in-place operations involve the joining of one unit with another for a limited period of time. Preparation for these operations and their execution are similar.
LINKUP OPERATIONS A linkup operation may be conducted when: • Two US Army forces advancing on separate axes encircle an enemy force; for example, in a double envelopment. • A US Army force attacks to join another US Army force which has been inserted in the enemy rear area; for example, an air assault force. • An encircled force breaks out from encirclement and joins another US Army force. • A US Army force attacks through an enemy force to relieve an encircled US Army force.
CONTENTS PAGE OVERVIEW E-1 LINKUP OPERATIONS E-1 PREPARATION FOR LINKUP OPERATIONS E-2 PASSAGE OF LINES E-2 RELIEF IN PLACE E-4 E-1 — FM 71-2
PREPARATION FOR LINKUP OPERATIONS Planners must consider what will happen between the two forces. A common radio when linkup is completed. Possible options frequency is also vital, as are recognition are: signals which may be visual or audio. • The linked up forces continue the attack Linkup between two moving units is one of together. the most difficult linkup operations. As • The linkup forces may simply reinforce joining units move closer to one another, the the circled or stationary force until both are need for positive control to avoid firing on one ordered to attack or, indeed, until both are another must be linked to insuring the enemy relieved by a larger force. doesn’t escape between the two forces. Common sense dictates that leading The headquarters ordering a linkup elements of each force should be on a common operation normally specifies the: radio net, if possible. • Command relationships between the PASSAGE OF LINES joining forces. The battalion task force may frequently • The time and/or location of linkup. pass through the fighting positions of other Sometimes, both time and location of units in order to attack or to reposition itself linkup will be specified. Frequently, time may for defense. Passage of lines can involve be critical, in which case location can be either forward or rearward movement. adjusted. Sometimes location is vital, as in an During passage of lines, both units are encirclement operation. temporarily concentrated in a small area, and therefore are vulnerable to enemy action. Regardless of the circumstances, the free The normal confusion is increased by having and frequent exchange of information two units in an area where only one was between both organizations is central to all before. If it is a forward passage, task force linkup operations. commanders should try to arrange for Control measures are designated by the company team commanders and their responsible headquarters, the most platoon leaders to reconnoiter the area of important being: passage. In a rearward move, the battalion task force executive officer and company • Linkup points where the joining forces team executive officers may reconnoiter the are expected to make initial physical contact. area of passage. • Restrictive fire line (RFL) to prevent joining units from firing at one another. (For Some control measures and other further information about use of RFL, refer to information which must be exchanged chapter 7, Combat Support.) between the two units are listed below: • Checkpoints, passage points, phase • Disposition of stationary force, to lines, etc., used to control the operation. include obstacles. • Contact points. When possible, communications- • Passage lanes. electronics operating instructions (CEOI) • Attack positions or assembly areas for a and liaison officers must be exchanged forward passage. E-2 FM 71-2 =
• Location of combat support and combat Once a passage of lines starts, it’s desirable service support elements. to finish it as quickly as possible, but avoid • Enemy positions (for a forward passage). haste which breeds confusion. If it’s a rearward passage, it’s important that the stationary force assume control of the battle early. Here, the stationary force must have ■ Time when responsibility is transferred. freedom to maneuver. Chapter 5, Defense, This may be a predetermined time, but more describes how to do this. In a forward logically is kept flexible and worked out passage, the moving force must assume between the two task force commanders control of the battle as quickly as possible concerned. after its lead elements have passed through • Traffic control. the stationary force. In this case, it is most • Fire support. important that the moving force has freedom to maneuver. The following scenario shows a • Communications. part of a battalion task force passing through another unit’s position during a rearward passage of lines. This scenario shows ■ Combat Service Support. During passage, multiple passage lanes which are normal; the stationary force should help the passing however, task forces may be required to pass force with casualty sind vehicle evacuation, through a single lane due to either terrain fuel, and ammunition resupply. restrictions or barriers.
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RELIEF IN PLACE In a relief operation, one unit assumes the Normally, the outgoing unit provides fire mission or responsibility for enemy contact support until responsibility for the area from another. Incoming commanders passes. Organic fire support elements of reconnoiter their areas of operation as they incoming units initially take up positions and would for any defensive operation. Each fire plans of outgoing elements. company team prepares to occupy positions Relief in place should be conducted during of an outgoing company team. Once a period of limited visibility, if possible. The responsibility has changed, the incoming incoming unit moves to an assembly area battalion task force commander adjusts unit behind the outgoing unit using covered and dispositions as necessary. Incoming and concealed routes. Communications between outgoing commanders coordinate: the outgoing and incoming units are by • Locations of weapons. messenger or wire. Although the incoming • Exchange of range cards and fire plans. unit monitors radio nets (fire direction and command) of the outgoing unit, it remains on • Locations of obstacles. listening silence. • Transfer of responsibility for minefields. Once the operation begins, normal • Routes into and out of positions and activities of the outgoing unit are continued; guides for each vehicle. for example, radio traffic is maintained at the • Turnover of excess ammunition, wire same level, and patrols are conducted as lines, POL, and other material to incoming unit. before. Although it may be necessary to camouflage noise level of moving vehicles • Communication. with field artillery or mortar fire, care must be • Enemy situation and intelligence. taken to do this without abruptly increasing » Sequence of relief. density of fires. • Time and circumstances of change of The incoming unit command group and responsibility for the area. TOC collocates with the outgoing unit command group and TOC. Vehicles carrying Liaison officers are exchanged. The sections or squads infiltrate into position on outgoing unit should leave one man with covered and concealed routes; or crews, each incoming platoon until it is established sections, and squads may infiltrate on foot to in position and thoroughly familiar with the take over the equipment of the outgoing unit. area. As one element replaces the other, the Fire support plans are exchanged and relief outgoing unit exfiltrates by crew, section, or of organic fire support elements is planned. squad.
E-4 APPENDIX F MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BUILT-UP AREAS (MOBA)
MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD, especially Western Europe, have experienced a massive growth in built-up areas and man-made changes to the natural landscape. These changes significantly affect potential future battlefields. Avoidance of built-up areas is no longer possible. Rather, military operations in built-up areas are an integral part of combat operations and present special opportunities and challenges to the battalion task force commander. MOBA pertain to defending or attacking through an area that is interspersed by many small villages and towns, some larger towns, and major urban complexes. Characteristics of Urban Combat. There are four different categories of built-up areas. Each presents different problems and opportunities to tactical commanders. H Small villages (population of 1,000 or less). B Strip areas, generally interconnecting built-up areas between villages and towns along roads and valleys. B Towns and small cities (population up to 100,000 and not a part of a major urban complex). D Large cities with associated urban sprawl (population up to millions, covering 100 or more square miles).
COMTEMTS PAGE OVERVIEW F-1 USE OF BATTALION TASK FORCE ELEMENTS F-1 NONORGANICCOMBATSUPPORT F-1 COMMUNICATIONS F-1 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN BUILT-UP AREAS F-1
F-1 “FM 71-2
At the task force level, small villages and Both attacking and defending forces will take strip areas will be the most common. The advantage of the cover and concealment towns and small city will impact on the offered by built-up areas to locate command operations of brigades and divisions. Large posts, stocks of supplies, and combat service cities or major urban complexes will require support units. operations at division or corps level. The battalion task force can normally expect to Fighting in Built-Up Areas. The whole operate in the latter two only as part of a subject of combat in built-up areas is one in larger force. which the US Army is not well versed. Our The defender has the advantage in the use doctrine has centered on techniques of of built-up areas. He has superior protection, combat in cities or in house-to-house fighting, readily available, as well as concealment and and the placement of weapons in the defense. covered routes of movement within the area. These techniques remain important and will The attacker can isolate and bypass some be updated in FM 90-10. The principles of built-up areas, but will be required to attack conducting operations in continuous and others. He is then faced with fighting from contiguous built-up areas, however, are new the outside into a well-defended position. and must be tested.
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Villages. The typical village, especially in villages and provide mutual support to other Europe, is characterized by stone, brick, or villages. Thus, battle positions within a concrete stores, houses, and bams in a cluster group of adjacent villages could provide a with a number of more modem and more system of prefabricated and mutually lightly constructed houses on the outskirts. supporting positions within the task force Villages provide ready-made cover for battle area. Enemy armored forces may be platoons and company teams and, in some able to bypass one or two villages, but would cases, even the task force. They can be readily probably take high losses from tanks and developed into strongpoints through the ATOM in attempting to bypass the group of application of obstacles, carefully sited villages. Thus, enemy units will be forced to weapon systems, preplanned fires, and develop a combined arms attack against a improved field of fire. village or group of villages. Such attacks are Defense. Villages provide formidable battle costly to the enemy in time and casualties. If positions when occupied by well-trained the task force is fighting outnumbered, the troops with modem antitank weapons. The commander may choose to use villages as defender is provided strong cover and good battle positions from which to attrit the concealment. Thick walls protect from direct enemy, moving to new positions before the suppressive fires, and positions on first floors enemy mounts a deliberate combined arms and basements protect from some of the attack to close on the positions. Movement effects of indirect fires. Antitank guided from these battle positions can be covered missiles can be employed from within from supporting battle positions or nearby buildings if sufficient space exists, and favorable terrain. armored vehicles can be concealed within When considering a village as a possible bams or large buildings. strongpoint, the commander must insure that Villages are often spaced 2,000-4,000meters it cannot be bypassed. Strongpoints are apart. ATOM and tanks of the task force may fortified to the extent time and available be able to cover the open ground between materials allow. The task force commander F-3 — FM 71-2
must allocate the necessary engineer support he can consolidate or reinforce his gains. to the company team directed to create the Offense. In keeping with the cardinal strongpoint. APCs are located with or near principle of the offense—that is, attack where the infantry to support by fire and move forces as the battle develops. When tanks are the enemy is weak—defended village strongpoints should not be attacked if they used, they provide direct fire support, stop can be suppressed or bypassed. However, penetrations, and counterattack to destroy within the active defense, or in the offense, it enemy forces attempting to isolate or encircle may be necessary to eliminate resistance the area. Obstacles are placed on avenues of from a defended village which blocks a approach to slow movement of enemy supply route or is inflicting losses on vehicles into the built-up area. Combat bypassing forces. The attacking force must support elements may be attached or placed bring overwhelming force to bear on the in direct support of battalion task force strongpoint and supporting enemy positions. elements. Indirect fire can be planned very close to friendly positions due to the excellent Isolate the enemy by securing dominant cover afforded by buildings. terrain around the built-up area to restrict the Once an enemy force gains a foothold in a enemy’s ability to resupply or reinforce. The built-up area, he can only be dislodged at size force required depends on the extensive cost to the defender. Therefore, availability of dominant terrain and enemy within a penetration must be attacked observation. If the mission is only to contain immediately by whatever forces are available the enemy in the built-up area, this may be and destroyed, or forced to withdraw before the only phase of the attack.
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Secure a foothold in the edge of the built-up penetrated. There are two techniques used to area, covered and concealed from enemy clear a built-up area, again depending on the observation and fire. The foothold area is factors of the mission, enemy, troops normally one or two blocks in size, assigned available, and terrain. as an intermediate objective and isolated by A rapid advance may be used when an smoke and indirect fire prior to the attack. installation, building, or other terrain feature The approach of the attacking force to the critical to the battalion task force mission village must be covered by smoke. When the must be secured. area is secure, additional forces then move into the area and prepare to continue the A company team against light resistance attack. This phase is necessary each time the attacks toward the critical objective. It battalion task force moves into a more advances as rapidly as possible to secure the densely built-up portion of the area to a objective, destroying only enough enemy to business district. maintain its advance. The remainder of the Once a foothold has been gained, the battalion task force follows and clears the battalion task force continues the attack to zone. The battalion task force may operate clear all of its assigned portion of the built-up with no reserve or with a small reserve. area. Identified or suspected targets should Against strong resistance, or if a critical be destroyed by direct fire in order to drive the area has not been identified, a slower defender back into the village. Artillery fires, advance is preferred. A main attack is made with delayed fusing, should be used until all by a company team on a narrow front against or most of the buildings have been an enemy weak point or through a lightly — FM 71-2
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built-up area; for example, an area where buildings are not concentrated or are of wooden construction. Remaining company teams move along the flanks of the main attack and advance more slowly than the main attack. Either team can enter the corridor cleared by the main attack to attack EACH ATTACK TEAM SHOULD the flanks of a strong enemy force. KNOW THE BOUNDARIES OF THEIR SECTOR BEFORE THE Width of zone may vary with density of ATTACK BEGINS buildings. In suburbs, each company team may cover several blocks. In a city of large, heavily constructed buildings, each company team should be assigned no more than one block in width. Boundaries should be placed along the sides of streets. A company team making the main attack should have a zone of action which includes one block in width and the streets on either side. Strip Development. Where houses, stores, and factories have grown up along roads or down valleys between towns and villages, they can present an approximation of a F-6 FM 71-2 —
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fortified line. These areas provide the same an extensivé defense line. Tanks and ATGM advantages to the defender as those can inflict high losses on attacking enemy discussed for villages. armor and slow his momentum. Strips afford covered avenues of withdrawal to the flanks. Defense. A battalion task force may not be Offense. Defended strip developments must able to occupy the entire strip and associated not be permitted to slow the mobility of the villages and towns—certainly not if attacking task force. They are not easily outnumbered. However, if visibility is good bypassed and therefore weak points should and if sufficient fields of fire are available, be isolated through suppression and the task force can occupy positions within the obscuration. Heavy concentration of direct strip and deceive the enemy into thinking it is and indirect fire should support a penetration
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F-7 — FM 71-2
through the strip by fast-moving armor NONORGANIC COMBAT forces. SUPPORT If the enemy force does not withdraw after the penetration, suppression and obscuration Field Artillery units initially support the of the flanks must continue for the task force attack with suppressive fires as in any other to pass through. Eventually these areas must operation. High-angle fire is used. The be reduced by follow-on forces. decision to use preparatory fire is made by the division or corps commander after determining the political impact and the USE OF BATTALION TASK FORCE effect that rubble and burning buildings will ELEMENTS have on movement. Inside the built-up area, artillery may, in some cases, be employed by The scout platoon may be used to screen section in the direct fire role to destroy an exposed flank, provide rear area security buildings housing enemy strongpoints. by patrolling previously cleared areas, establish observation posts, act as a portion Engineers create and breach obstacles of the isolating force, or serve as messengers. and barriers, assist task force elements with explosives, clear away rubble, maintain The long-range fires of the antitank routes for combat vehicles, and breach walls platoon of a mechanized infantry battalion to permit movement through buildings. can be used to isolate the built-up area or Combat engineer vehicles (CEV) can be used support while a foothold is being secured. to destroy buildings or to create rubble to Suitable firing positions and fields of fire will impede enemy attacks. generally be restricted within a built-up area. Streets and open areas can be effectively When assault helicopters can be used in covered by antitank weapons in either attack an attack, units can be inserted on rooftops or defense. and then, clear down through buildings. Isolation units can be positioned quickly and, The heavy mortar platoon is used in a during the clearance phase, reinforcements built-up area as in any other operation. can be rapidly shifted using cover of However, observed fire may be restricted by previously cleared buildings. Parking lots, buildings, and firing positions not masked by playgrounds, and parks may also be used as buildings may be hard to find. Mortar fire can landing zones. be used to suppress targets located on rooftops. Tactical air reconnaissance missions can provide detailed intelligence on enemy The Redeye section provides protection dispositions and capabilities. Air photos are from air attack as for any other operation. very useful, especially if recent maps are not When employed within the built-up area, available. Close air support can provide the rooftops may offer the best firing positions. ground commander with selective and Heavy machineguns placed on rooftops discriminating fire support. In addition to provide additional air defense. general purpose bombs, cluster bomb units, The ground surveillance radar section rockets, and guns, the Air Force has several can be positioned to monitor routes into and guided bombs and missiles especially suited out of the built-up area. Inside the built-up for engaging hard point targets. An airborne area, radars are positioned to detect FAC will normally control strike aircraft. He movement along streets, alleys, and other has the advantage of being able to acquire open areas, especially at night and other targets more easily than could a ground FAC, periods of limited visibility. ground commander, or artillery FO. F-8 FM 71-2-
COMMUNICATIONS FM radio communications will be degraded by buildings, wire, and messengers; and radio relays must be used during the fight. Wire should be routed through buildings and sewers to avoid disruption or breaking by artillery. It may be possible to use commercial telephone lines. FM relays and HF/SSB radios can help overcome line-of-sight obstacles. Manual relays and auxiliary antennas (e.g., RC 292) can be placed on strategic rooftops. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN BUILT-UP AREAS Fuel consumption is less than that consumed in operations outside built-up areas in either offense or defense. Ammunition expenditure is increased due to the intensity of fighting. The inability of vehicles to move through the area due to rubble may require manpacking ammunition. Demolitions, grenades, mines, LAWs, and small arms ammunition are high- use items. Water sources may be destroyed or contaminated. Water sources outside the built-up area should be provided for. Defenders must prestock water. Evacuation of wounded may be difficult due to closeness of the enemy and when encircled. It may be necessary to provide additional medical personnel and supplies to a defending force. Fire fighting equipment must be available. Security from sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and intelligence gathering by a hostile population must be provided. Even friendly civilians may steal supplies. Civilians are evacuated whenever possible. Population control is normally provided by attached or supporting military police and civil affairs units. Friendly civilian volunteers may be used to construct barriers, but cannot be allowed to fight. F-9
APPENDIX G
Operations in Active Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Conditions
OVERVIEW
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE of using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons is the same as for any other weapon— to produce casualties, destroy or disable equipment, and generally disrupt operations. Chemical and biological agents and nuclear weapons may be employed separately or in combination and, when used, normally supplement conventional weapons.
NUCLEAR BATTLE conventional battlefield, and the battalion task force and company teams may be No treaty or international agreement isolated for extended periods. Forces will be prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in concentrated only when absolutely necessary warfare. If an enemy has nuclear weapons, to avoid creating a lucrative nuclear target. the battalion task force must be prepared to For the same reason, greater dispersion may operate in a nuclear environment. The enemy be required among battalion task forces and might employ nuclear weapons from the company teams. Tactics used on the start, or he might attack in a conventional conventional battlefield—cover and manner and use them later. concealment, overwatch, and suppression— are especially suitable to the nuclear The battalion task force will fight on the battlefield. However, characteristics of nuclear battlefield essentially the same as on nuclear weapons, their effects on equipment the conventional battlefield. However, and personnel, and protective measures to be combat service support and communications taken by the task force during operations in will be disrupted more than on the active nuclear conditions must be considered.
CONTENTS
PAGE
OVERVIEW G-1
NUCLEAR BATTLE G-1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS G-2
PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN NUCLEAR WARFARE G-4
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR DISMOUNTED PERSONNEL G-5
OPERATIONS IN ACTIVE CHEMICALORBIOLOGICALCONDITIONS G-6
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS G-6
DETECTION G-6
G-1 First, however, it is necessary to describe nuclear weapons to neutralize terrain what to expect from the enemy during dominating his axes of advance. nuclear operations. Threat forces with To avoid presenting worthwhile nuclear nuclear weapons plan for their employment targets, the enemy will disperse his forces, in both offensive and defensive operations as concentrating for short periods of time only the basis of all fire planning. Nuclear attacks when necessary. He may close with the are combined and coordinated with defender to either destroy him or to inhibit the conventional fires and air attacks, and are defender’s use of nuclear weapons because of exploited rapidly by ground forces. Nuclear the hazard to the defender’s forces. Primary weapons may also be employed with nuclear targets for attacking Threat forces chemical agents. are command control systems, logistics In the attach, Threat tactics will be systems, nuclear delivery means, and large similar to those employed on the concentrations of troops. conventional battlefield. The enemy will In the defense. Threat forces will fight on attempt to overwhelm the defense with the the nuclear battlefield as on the conventional weight and speed of his attack, both day and battlefield. The only difference is that night. The attack will be on a broad front, defending Threat forces will be more widely with formations moving on independent dispersed. Primary nuclear targets for axes, accepting the risk of open flanks. To defending Threat forces are the same as when minimize this danger, the enemy will use they are attacking.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS
Nuclear detonation effects present new The immediate incapacitation radiation phenomena and increased destructiveness on level is 8,000-18,000 rads (unit of measure for the battlefield when compared to radiation), but an active soldier suddenly conventional firepower. Blast effect is vastly exposed to 3,000 rads will become increased and, in the smaller yields, incapacitated within 3-5 minutes. He may radiation has the most significant effect on recover to some degree in about 45 minutes, troops whether they are in the open, in but due to vomiting, diarrhea, and other armored vehicles, or in foxholes. radiation sickness symptoms, he would be only partially effective until he dies within a Thermal radiation is an added danger to week. A soldier exposed to 650 rads initially unprotected soldiers. The electromagnetic shows no symptoms, but loses some of his pulse (EMP) which emanates from a nuclear effectiveness in about 2 hours and can be burst can damage radios and other electronic expected to die within a few weeks under equipment, seriously interfering with battlefield conditions. Exposure in the 100- command and control communications and rad region usually has little effect if there has target acquisition systems such as the task been no prior radiation exposure. force ground surveillance radar (GSR). Fallout can also produce casualties, delay In addition to the immediate effects of movements, and deny terrain if the task force nuclear weapons, the task force commander is unprepared to detect residual radiation and must also be concerned with residual take protective measures from its effects. radiation from fallout and induced radiation. For the yields of most interest on the battle- When a nuclear weapon detonates too near field (subkilotons to tens of kilotons), radia- the surface of the earth, dust and debris tion is the main killer. which are sucked up into the air fall to the G-2 FM 71-2
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5> it ground and create areas of lethal radiation. Similar results could occur when the cloud from a nuclear burst, even at a fallout safe height (about 50 meters for a 1KT), passes through rain which then carries radioactive particles to the earth. Radiological monitoring is essential to detect areas contaminated by induced radiation or by fallout.
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G-3 = FM 71-2
PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN NUCLEAR WARFARE The nuclear weapon, although a tremendously destructive military device, is not one against which there is no defense. The more each soldier knows about nuclear weapons capabilities, the more effective he will be on the nuclear battlefield and the greater will be his chances for survival. Training must stress the interrelated importance of discipline, camouflage, cover, concealment, dispersion, and immediate reaction for battlefield survival. A tank provides protection roughly equivalent to that provided by an uncovered foxhole. Tank crews may have to operate on the nuclear battlefield with hatches closed. APCs provide protection generally the same as that of the tank. Hazard from fallout may last for days and RADIATION MAY ONLY BE cover many square miles. Since nuclear DETECTED BY RADIAC radiation cannot be detected by the physical INSTRUMENTS senses, radiac instruments are provided to the battalion task force for the purpose of measuring radiation. Radiological monitoring is included in all reconnaissance and intelligence activities according to procedures established by higher levels of command. After residual radiation has been detected, the battalion task force continues its mission and, if possible, relocates to minimize radiation exposure. If it is necessary to remain in the fallout area, armored vehicles button up completely with the crews remaining inside. A tank provides protection roughly equivalent to that provided by a 4-foot-deep foxhole with overhead cover. Shelters must have overhead cover. The period of time a unit may remain in a contaminated area depends on intensity of radiation and protection available. Time spent away from cover must be minimized. Once fallout has stopped, radioactive dust on top of shelters and vehicles must be brushed away. This will serve as emergency decontaminating; however, complete decontamination must be accomplished as soon as possible. G-4 FM 71-2
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PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR DISMOUNTED PERSONNEL The measures illustrated above provide protection against the initial effects of nuclear weapons, to include blast, heat, and nuclear radiation. Deep, covered foxholes or deeply buried culverts offer the best protection against fallout. Operations on a nuclear battlefield require that individual protective measures be performed without detailed direction. Unit SOPs must include action taken during both friendly and enemy employment of nuclear weapons.
SOP ENEMY STRIKE FRIENDLY STRIKE Carry no unnecessary items. Orient your vehicle to face ground zero. Secure equipment and ammunition. Tie down antenna. Take advantage of natural shielding. Close and lock hatches. Traverse turret to rear and lock turret traversing mechanism. . r
G-5 — FM 71-2
OPERATIONS IN ACTIVE equipment. Liquid chemical agent CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL contamination on equipment can restrict its CONDITIONS use until appropriate decontamination is accomplished. It is the policy of the United States not to use toxic chemical weapons first. However, Emergency decontamination of vehicles they may be used if an enemy employs them and equipment is done by crew members (see against the United States. The united States TM 3-220, Chemical, Biological and will not use biological weapons under any Radiological (CBR) Decontamination). circumstances. Threat forces have both chemical and biological weapons and are Effects on Terrain. Liquid chemical prepared to use them, so the battalion task agents may restrict use of terrain and force may have to fight in active chemical buildings. and biological conditions. These weapons Decontamination of terrain is beyond the may be used separately, simultaneously, or capabilities of the battalion task force. with nuclear weapons. Contaminated areas may either be bypassed, or crossed when individual protective CHARACTERISTICS OF equipment is worn. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS Soldiers and equipment must be decontaminated after a mission in a Chemical agents are similar to poisonous contaminated area. pesticides, but are far more powerful compounds meant to kill or damage man. They are released to cover relatively large DETECTION areas. They may be placed on a target as a gas, as finely divided liquid or solid particles Chemical agents can be detected by using a (aerosols), or as liquid droplets. A mixture of chemical agent alarm, detection paper, or agents can be used to cause confusion and crayon (see FM 21-40). Soldiers cannot rely on increase casualties. Artillery, mortars, odors to detect chemical agents because some rockets, missiles, aircraft spray, bombs, and are odorless. landmines can deliver the agents. Biological agents are usually difficult to Biological agents are disease-producing detect during early stages of use. Information micro-organisms (germs). The intentional on enemy use of biological agents is most use of micro-organisms creates a disease often disseminated by higher headquarters. hazard where none exists naturally. These Soldiers should be alert to any indication that biological agents may be dispersed as biological agents are being used. Unusual aerosols by generators, explosives, bomblets, occurrence of diseases must be promptly missiles, and aircraft. Harmful micro- reported to brigade and division. organisms may also be spread by the release of living insects, such as flies, mosquitos, fleas, and tics. PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN Effects on Personnel. Chemical and CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL biological agents may enter the body through WARFARE the eyes, nose, mouth, or skin. They can The battalion task force must train to apply produce incapacitation or death. protective measures against toxic, chemical, Liquid agents may be dispersed on and biological attack. Standing operating equipment, terrain, and foliage. The agent procedures must provide for a warning may remain for hours or days, presenting a system; use of individual and unit-protective serious hazard to unprotected personnel. equipment; procedures for prompt decontami- Effects on Equipment. Chemical and nation of individuals, equipment, and biological agents have little direct effect on supplies; and prompt treatment of casualties. G-6 FM 71-2 —
A soldier’s primary protection against psychological stress, reduced mobility, visual TOXIC, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL acuity, and manual dexterity will have an attack is his protective MASK. adverse effect on mission accomplishment. Soldiers wearing chemical protective To be protected against LIQUID equipment have a limited tolerance time for CHEMICAL AGENTS, soldiers must wear hard work and must be allowed to attend to chemical PROTECTIVE CLOTHING as well body functions. Therefore, the dual as MASKS. Complete individual protection is vulnerability of forces to both the effects of provided by wearing the mask with hood, the chemical agent and the stresses from the protective overgarments, protective socks protective equipment can result in an with chemical-resistant boots, and protective unacceptable degradation of combat gloves. effectiveness and attrition of the force. Unless the task force is well trained and conditioned in NBC protective operations, This chart depicts the degradation of the loss of operational effectiveness performance the task force commander can associated with wearing protective clothing expect when his troops are forced to wear due to heat stress, respiratory strain, protective clothing:
PREDICTED TIME TO 50% UNIT HEAT CASUALTIES
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
CLOSED SUIT-LIGHT WORK OPEN SUIT-LIGHT WORK CLOSED SUIT-MODERATE WORK ■ A- OPEN SUIT-MODERATE WORK CLOSED SUIT-HARD WORK OPEN SUIT-HARD WORK
100
4. 80 A:
70
60 120 180 240 300 360 420 MINUTES J G-7 y
FM 71-2
Chemical protective clothing and equipment provide protection from biological attack also. There are two additional aspects of biological defense with which the task force commander must be continuously concerned. The first is an aggressively enforced immunization program. Such a program provides immunity to a wide variety of potential biological warfare agents, but it must be enforced prior to an attack to be effective. The second aspect is a rigorous adherence to good field sanitation practices. This type of program is effective both before and after attack in reducing losses to disease. Once chemical agents have been employed or while the threat of chemical attack exists, IMMUNIZATION PROGRAMS the battalion task force commander AND GOOD FIELD SANITATION determines the level of protection required. PRACTICES ARE A CONTINUOUS This decision, called mission-oriented CONCERN TO THE COMMANDER protective posture (MOPP), is based on the chemical threat, mission, work rate, and temperature. Whenever possible, the commander specifies the degree of protection before the mission. He may subsequently direct that the protection be modified, according to his continuing estimate of the situation. Subordinate commands down to squad leader level may also need to modify the MOPP based upon existing conditions and the particular work rate of their personnel. Training in NBC defense must be integrated into unit training programs. Training objectives must be to develop and evaluate the readiness of forces to operate in an NBC environment and to insure proficiency with all available offensive and protective materiel. Emphasis must be placed on performing all operational missions while using NBC detection, warning, and protective equipment. Toward this end, agent stimulants should be used whenever possible to provide realism. 8 APPENDIX H Road Marches and Assembly Areas - - OVERVIEW
A COMBAT UNIT MOVING TO CONTACT MOVES along the terrain. Techniques of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch are described in this manual and in FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. At times, a unit not in contact may have to move long distances to position itself for future combat operations, or from garrison to a distant training area.
These movements, called road marches, differ from a march to contact in that —
■ The purpose is relocation, not enemy ■ A prescribed interval is maintained contact. between vehicles. ■ It is conducted at a prescribed rate of ■ Primary consideration is the rapid move- speed. ment of units.
CONTENTS
PAGE
OVERVIEW H-1
PLANNING : H-2
TRAINING H-2
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES H-2
PREPARING FOR ROAD MARCHES H-3
MARCH COLUMNS H-4
ASSEMBLY AREAS H-8
ROAD MARCH PLANNING FACTORS H-9
APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT FORMULAS H-10
MOVEMENT ORDERS H-14
ROAD MOVEMENTGRAPH H-16
ROAD MOVEMENTTABLE H-16
H-1 —FM 71-2
The information in this appendix is capabilities; and establishing unit move- sufficiently detailed to plan a road march in ment priorities. The following factors are con- wartime or peacetime. The degree of planning sidered in movement planning: necessary prior to the operation depends on: ■ Organization of units and their equipment. Mission: How far must the task ■Assembly of units and transportation force move? How soon means. must it arrive at its destination? What is it to ■ Loading personnel and equipment. do when it gets there? ■Control, coordination, and combat ser- Is it moving as a part of vice support for the movement and at the a larger force? What is destination. the likelihood of ■Assembly of units and equipment at enemy ground con- destination. tact? ■ Security measures before and during movement, and at destination. , Enemy: What is the likelihood of enemy air attack? ■Enemy situation, geographic conditions, and weather.
Terrain: What routes are available: Are they primary TRAINING or secondary roads? The success or failure of a mission could very well depend upon the ability of units to move rapidly and efficiently over great Time Available: A road march should distances. Training is necessary to test and be planned in as much check unit loading plans, to develop and detail as time permits improve standing operating procedures to provide for efficient (SOP), to prevent wasted time and effort, and movement and to mini- to maintain operational efficiency. The bat- mize the possibility of talion task force should integrate road vehicles becoming marching and occupation of assembly areas lost. In peacetime, it into other types of training whenever may be possible to plan possible. road marches in great detail; however, in wartime, time and STANDING OPERATING mission may not allow PROCEDURES detailed planning. The battalion task force should develop an SOP for road marches and occupation of assembly areas. Some of the routine items that may be included in the SOP are loading PLANNING plans; composition of serials and march Road march planning consists of three units; control measures; rates of march under steps which may be done concurrently: Deter- various conditions; formations; communica- mining requirements for the move; analyzing tions; security measures; time intervals and organic and nonorganic movement distances; location of the command post H-2 FM 71-2-
during the march; timing and duration of Route Reconnaissance. Route recon- halts; tasks during halts; organization of naissance determines travel times, capacities quartering and reconnaissance parties; and of underpasses and bridges, locations of reporting instructions. culverts, ferries and fords; and identifies Like vehicles should have the same critical points and obstacles. Prior location of stowage plan for equipment and ammuni- critical points can prevent congestion and tion. This prevents confusion during combat assist security measures. when personnel must move from one vehicle A route reconnaissance may be conducted to another and during recovery operations. to confirm and supplement data obtained Sectors for each vehicular-mounted weapon from map studies, higher headquarters, and should be prescribed throughout the column. air reconnaissance. The detail of Orders for a particular movement may reconnaissance is often closely related to modify or amplify the SOP to fit the require- speed of movement. ments of a particular situation. Instructions to the route reconnaissance party, usually the scout platoon, should state PREPARING FOR ROAD what information is required, and when and MARCHES where the report is to be submitted. The basic considerations in planning any road march are: The mission and situation; Quartering Party (Advance Party). A what is to be moved (troops and equipment); quartering or advance party should precede and the type, number, and characteristics of the main body whenever possible. It is vehicles available for the move. normally composed of an officer-in-charge, a March Planning Sequence. When security element if the tactical situation preparing for a tactical road march, use the requires, communications and medical following sequence of march planning if time personnel, plus necessary staff section and permits: subordinate representatives. Its mission is to reconnoiter the new area, make necessary ■ Prepare and issue the warning order improvements to entrances and routes in the (issued orally at company team level and area, and guide march elements to and into below) as early as possible to allow units the new area. It may also perform route recon- maximum time for preparation. naissance when time is critical. The ■ Prepare an estimate of the situation; commander of the quartering party must be select route and organization of march told the route, order of march, and estimated column. time of arrival of the main body. A battalion ■ Organize and dispatch reconnaissance task force quartering party is usually led by and quartering parties (should follow the Si and consists of the quartering parties SOP). from each subordinate company and, as a security element, the battalion scout platoon. ■ Prepare detailed movement plans: • Organize the march. It is preferred that the same soldiers be used • Review reconnaissance information. regularly on quartering party assignments • Compute march data. and be trained in mine detection and removal. The quartering party should have • Prepare a movement table. sufficient guides and markers, and neces- ■ Prepare and issue the march order (issued sary pioneer tools to improve the new area. As orally at company team and below). march elements clear the release point, H-3 —FM 71-2
quartering party members guide them to intervals at a rate that will keep the traffic selected or designated areas without halt. density down and prevent undue massing of vehicles. Often the advance party will infiltrate. MARCH COLUMNS Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation A tactical march may be conducted in close and attack. It is suited for tactical marches column, open column, or by infiltration. when sufficient time and road space are March techniques may vary depending on available and when maximum security, the situation. In dusty conditions, for deception, and dispersion are desired. example, vehicles must march at least “dust distance” from one another for drivers to see. Close Column. Vehicles are spaced March Organization. A march column approximately 25 meters apart during includes all elements using the same route for daylight. At night, vehicles are spaced so that a single movement under control of a single the driver can see two lights in the blackout commander. A battalion task force may marker of the vehicle ahead. march over multiple routes to reduce closing Close column is normally used for marches time. A large column may be composed of a during darkness, under blackout driving number of subdivisions, each under the conditions. This method of marching takes control of a subordinate commander. March maximum advantage of the traffic capacity columns, regardless of size, are composed of of the routes, but provides little dispersion. three elements: a head, a main body, and a Vehicle density is approximately 30 trail element. March columns are organized vehicles per kilometer along the route of to maintain unit integrity and to maintain a march. task organization consistent with mission requirements. Open Column. Distance between vehicles is increased to provide greater dispersion and The head is the first vehicle of the column varies from 50 to 100 meters, or greater if the and sets the pace. situation requires. The major elements of the column—serials Open column is normally used during and march units—are the main body. daylight. It may also be used at night using A serial is a major subdivision of a march infrared lights, blackout lights, or when column, organized as a single unit under one passive night vision equipment is available. commander for purposes of planning, Normal vehicle density is approximately regulation, and control. A battalion task 15 vehicles per kilometer when vehicles are 50 force usually forms into a serial. meters apart; 12 vehicles per kilometer when A march unit is a subdivision of a serial the distance is 75 meters; and 10 vehicles per and is normally a squad, section, platoon, or kilometer when the distance is increased to company. It moves and halts under control of 100 meters. In choosing interval or density, a single commander using voice and visual the planner must realize the effect on column signals. Radio is used only when no other length and the time it will require to move. In means of communication can be used. close column, a mechanized infantry heavy The trail party follows the march column task force is 6 km long. In 100-meter open and includes personnel and equipment column, it is 18 km long. necessary for emergency vehicle repair and Infiltration. Vehicles are dispatched recovery, medical aid and evacuation, and individually, in small groups, or at irregular unscheduled refueling. H-4 RM 71-2 —
March Column Control. Column control the RP and lead them to the new areas. is maintained through the chain of Multiple routes and cross-country movement command. The commander has no prescribed from the RP to assembly areas enable units to place in the column. He positions himself disperse rapidly. In selecting an RP, hills, where he can best control the operation. Com- defiles, and sharp curves should be avoided. manders of serials and march units are No unit should be required to countermarch responsible for controlling their elements, or pass through another unit to reach its new each using his staff or representatives to position. assist as he may direct. Ground vehicles, Critical Points. Critical points on a route aircraft, route-marking guides, and military are those used for reference in providing police may be used to assist in control and instructions, places where interference with coordination of the march. movement might occur, or places where Each unit marching as part of a larger timing might be critical. The route recon- element maintains liaison with the preceding naissance report or a map study should unit. When appropriate, a liaison officer permit the march planner to designate travels with the preceding unit, keeps his critical points along the route of march and commander informed of that unit’s location, distances from one critical point to another. and provides him early warning of any Once identified, action must be taken to unscheduled halt and the reason, as soon as it insure uninterrupted movement through is determined. each. Road guides and signs may be sufficient. The commander may want to be present at some critical points to control the movement. Start Point (SP). An SP provides all units of a march column a common point for Restrictions. Restrictions are points starting their movement. When units use along the route of march, such as bridges, more than one route, each route has a start intersections, ferries, or bypasses, where point. The SP is a place along the route of movement may be limited or obstructed march that is easily recognizable on the during specified periods of time. The march ground, such as a road intersection. An SP planner should start the move early enough should not be in a defile, on a hill, or at a to pass before the restriction begins, delay the sharp curve in the road. It should be far start of the move to pass the restriction after enough from assembly areas to allow units to it has ended, or plan to halt the column along be organized and moving at the prescribed the route until the restriction is over. rate when it is reached. No element of a march column should be required to march to the rear or through another unit in order to Communications. Messengers are the reach it. Prior to starting a march, each major primary means of communication during unit of a serial reconnoiters its route to the SP road marches. Visual signals are also used. and determines and announces the times for Because the enemy has good radio direction major units of the serial to arrive at and clear finding equipment, radio is used only in emer- the serial start point. gencies and when no other means of Release Point (RP). An RP provides all communication can be used. Road guides can units of the march column a common point also be used to pass messages from one march for reverting to control of their parent unit. unit to a following march unit. Because of the The RP should be on the route of march and need to stay off the radio, road guides are very easily recognizable on the map and on the important in controlling the speed of march ground. Guides meet units as they arrive at units and the interval between them. H-5 —FM 71-2
Traffic Control. Traffic control is Halts. Halts are made for rest; personal normally provided by the headquarters con- comfort and relief; messing; refueling; trolling the march. Military police traffic maintenance and inspection of equipment; control posts may be located at critical points allowing other traffic to pass; and for making along the route to provide orientation and to adjustments in schedules. The time and minimize delay caused by other columns, duration of halts are usually established in civilian or refugee traffic, congested areas, or the movement order or prescribed in the unit difficult terrain. Movements on multiple SOP. routes during periods of poor visibility and the existence of major intersections, defiles, and detours along routes increase traffic Short halts for rest are usually taken for control problems. 15 minutes after the first hour of marching and for 10 minutes every 2 hours thereafter. The prescribed rate of march includes the Road guides may be used to augment and time required for short halts. When possible, support the military police effort. Road march elements using the same route stop at guides should be posted in pairs, one to direct the same time. Route characteristics may traffic while the other provides security. make it necessary for the halt to occur in one Their equipment should provide for identi- particular part of the route rather than simul- fication during hours of darkness. Guides are taneously at a fixed time. normally posted by an advance party of the moving unit. Long halts are planned in advance, requiring that additional time be specifically Speed Control. Elements in a column of allocated and added to the total travel time. any length may simultaneously encounter Locations for long halts eure normally many different types of routes and obstacles, selected to allow all vehicles to clear the road resulting in different parts of the column and permit proper dispersion. moving at different speeds at the same time. This can produce an undesirable accordian- Unit SOPs should prescribe actions to be like action or whip effect. The movement taken during halts. Vehicular crews perform order gives march speed, rate of march, and during-operation maintenance services at maximum catch-up speed for safety and to scheduled halts. Whenever unscheduled reduce “column whipping.” halts occur, vehicle commanders must make contact with the vehicle to their front, and movement commanders must take To control whipping, the leading vehicle appropriate action to determine and must not exceed the authorized maximum eliminate the cause of the halt. speed of the slowest vehicle in the column, especially after negotiating an obstacle. To minimize vehicle congestion on the near side Halts for refueling should be scheduled in of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and advance, enabling march unit com- drivers must be alert and maintain the pre- manders to make definite plans for refueling. scribed minimum distance, each vehicle making gradual speed changes. Intervals It may be desirable to clear the route of must also be maintained between march march temporarily to shorten the column. units. A two-minute interval between march When terrain permits, units do this by coiling units is fairly standard. up on each side of the route. A coil is a circle H-6 FM 71-2—
with weapons oriented outward. If sufficient terrain precludes coiling, a HERRINGBONE area is not available or condition of the is formed. FORMING A HERRINGBONE
c A
The first priority at a halt is to establish and posts guides to direct traffic. If the crew local security. Observation posts (OP) are repairs the vehicle, it rejoins the rear of the established and sectors of fire are assigned to column. Vehicles that have dropped out of the each platoon, section, and squad. column for any reason should return to their Disabled Vehicles. Disabled vehicles positions only when the column has halted. must not obstruct traffic. They are moved off Until then, they march at the rear, just ahead the road and their status reported of the trail element. If the crew cannot repair immediately. The crew establishes security the vehicle, it is recovered by the trail party. SECTOR OF OBSERVATION
TRACK COMMANDER AND GRENADIER OR DRIVER-*-/ \#;ÖttvER MACHINE GUNNER Cïlîllîi?!/
ER
LOADER m□
TANK OR LIGHT GRENADIER OR i VEHICLE COMMANDER MACHINE GUNNER VEHICLE COMMANDER VEHICLE COMMANDER AND AIR OBSERVER ALSO AND THE LOADER ALSO WATCH FOR ENEMY 7 USUALLY WATCH FOR ENEMY' AIRCRAFT TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT TO INCLUDE HELICOPTERS HELICOPTERS
Security. Vehicle commanders assign air security. Specific vehicles may be sectors of observation to their personnel so that there is 360-degree observation designated as air guard vehicles, and the around their vehicle. Each vehicle com- entire crew orients only on air observation mander designates an air guard to provide rather than air and ground observation. H-7 464-458 0-85-31 —FM 71-2
ASSEMBLY AREAS position in the march column. If a subordi- An assembly area is a location where a unit nate quartering party leader determines from gathers to prepare for future operations. his reconnaissance that his unit’s area is Here, the unit reviews and issues orders, unsatisfactory, he immediately notifies the services and repairs vehicles, receives and senior quartering party leader and requests a issues supplies, and feeds troops. The change. If a change cannot be made in the assembly area, when used to prepare for an time available, the unit is located under the attack, is usually well forward. If possible, it best available cover and concealment as soon should be out of range of enemy light as it arrives, and adjustments are made later. artillery. • Improves and marks entrances, Characteristics. Overhead concealment exits, and internal routes (within its is important if the unit is to remain in the area capabilities) for any length of time. Vehicles, equipment, • Marks or removes obstacles and entrances, and exists should be camouflaged mines. to keep the enemy from detecting the location • Marks vehicle locations. Each platoon of the unit. Consideration should be given to: quartering party member marks the • Cover from direct fire. general area for mutually supporting • Good drainage and a surface that will vehicle positions. The exact positions are selected by vehicle commanders on support vehicles. arrival. • Good exits and entrances, and adequate internal roads or trails. Performs guide duties. Each platoon is • Space for dispersion of vehicles, person- guided from its RP into its sector of the nel, and equipment. assembly area by its quartering party member. • A suitable landing site nearby for organic, attached, or supporting heli- Upon arrival of a unit at an assembly area, copters. all elements move off the road and clear the route of march without slowing or halting. Actions in Assembly Areas. Before the Posting of guides, selection of routes, and main body leaves the rear assembly area, the allocation of areas by the quartering party march commander sends a quartering party are done with this objective in mind. The to the forward assembly area. During this march route must not be blocked while movement, the quartering party provides its precise adjustments are made. After a march own security. A quartering party, on arriving serial has cleared the route, adjustments of in the forward assembly area— vehicles can be made without holding up Reconnoiters the area. If the area is traffic. unsatisfactory (poor drainage, no Observation posts cover key terrain concealment, poor routes), the quartering features and likely avenues of approach. party leader contacts his commander and Although an assembly area is not a defensive asks for permission to find another area. position, a unit must be ready to see and Organizes the area. The quartering defeat enemy attacks. Local security is party leader selects locations for subordinate established as vehicles are positioned. units, command post, and trains, as appro- Vehicle commanders and platoon leaders priate. When selecting locations, the coordinate overlapping observation and quartering party leader considers each unit’s fires. Crews prepare weapon range cards.
H-8 FM 71-2—
Crews and squads camouflage each vehicle and time, are transformed into movement Distance Factors: and position to prevent detection from formulas. Formulas are applied to known Vehicle distance is spaced between two ground and air. Protective mines, when data to derive information necessary to consecutive vehicles of an organized authorized, may be placed to provide close-in prepare a time schedule. The time schedule is element of a column. protection and warning of enemy approach. used to regulate departures and arrivals of Column gap is space between two march elements. organized elements following each other Primary means of communication are by on the same route. It can be calculated in messenger and by wire. Only essential wire units of length or in units of time as lines will be laid, usually to each company Time and Distance Relationship. Rela- measured from the rear of one element to team, to provide adequate command control. tionships between time and distance are the the front of the following element. Visual signals may be used if feasible. Radio basis for march planning. The planner must Traffic density is the average number is only used in an emergency when no other determine how far the column is to travel of vehicles that occupy 1 mile or 1 kilo- means of communication can be used. Each (distance) and how long it will take to make meters of road space, expressed in company team provides a messenger to the the move (time). He must know the space vehicles per mile (VPM) or vehicles per battalion task force command post. The (length of column) the column will occupy on kilometer (VPKM). battalion task force provides a liaison officer the route. He must also include in his compu- and messenger to the brigade. tations the safety factor of distance (road Length of a column is the length of gap) or time (time gap) which must separate roadway occupied by a column, including march columns and their elements. Each gaps in the column, measured from front ROAD MARCH PLANNING term used for distance has its corresponding to rear, inclusive. FACTORS term for time. The length of a column in Road gap is distance between two kilometers has an equivalent pass time in march elements. It is the length aspect of An understanding of certain march terms minutes; the road distance, kilometers or column gap, and since it is more signifi- is necessary for the planner to develop miles, has a corresponding time distance. The cant when the column is moving than detailed movement plans. These terms, relationship between time and distance is when it is halted, it becomes a factor of together with basic factors of distance, rate, shown below. time rather than distance.
TIME DISTANCE RELATIONSHIPS
DISTANCE
(LENGTH OF COLUMN) ROAD SPACE -ROAD DISTANCE ►
MARCH UNIT S P R P LENGTH \ i \ r\ COLUMN GAP J T~ ^ J ~r ^ j T ^ | ~r ^ TIMEGAP -PASS!- ' J TIME
TIME SPACE- <*—TIME G ^JDISTANCE- TIME
H-9 —FM 71-2
Rate Factors: • Time distance (TDIS) is time required • Speed indicates actual rate of speed of a to move from one point to another at a vehicle at a given moment as shown on given rate of march. It normally repre- the speedometer (in kilometers per hour sents the movement of the head vehicle of (KMPH) or miles per hour (MPH)). the column from the start point to the release point. • Pace is regulated speed of a column or • Time gap is time measured between rear element, set by the head vehicle, to rftain- and front of successive vehicles of tain the prescribed average speed. elements as they move past any given point. It is the time aspect of column gap • Rate of march is average number of and may also be the conversion of road miles or kilometers traveled in any given gap to time. There are no prescribed period of time, including short periodic standard gaps. These depend on the size halts and other short delays. It is ex- of serials and march units, the time avail- pressed as miles or kilometers in the able for the movement, and the tactics hour. required for protection against air and nuclear attack. Time Factors: • Arrival time is when the head of the APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT ■ column arrives at a designated point. FORMULAS • Clearance time is when the tail of a Distance, rate, and time are the basic column passes a designated point. factors for movement computations. If two of • Completion time is when the last these factors are known, the third may be vehicle of a column passes the release easily found by dividing or multiplying one point. by the other. • Extra time allowance (EXTAL) of 1 •Rate is determined by dividing distance minute per 25 vehicles is always allotted above the calculated pass time within a by time - R = -ijr column moving under one identification serial number. In a column where the number of vehicles is over 600, the EXTAL will be 2 minutes per 25 vehicles. • Distance is found by multiplying rate by A serial of less than 25 vehicles is not the time - D = R x T allotted any extra time. EXTAL is equitably added to march unit pass times within a serial. •Time is calculated by dividing distance • Pass time (PST) of a column is actual time between the moment the first vehicle by the rate - T = K passes a given point and the moment the last vehicle passes the same point. • Road clearance time is total time a The march planner must determine Pass column requires to travel over and clear a Time, Time Distance, Arrival Time, and Com- section of road. Road clearance time pletion Time: equals time distance plus column pass • Pass Time. PST is calculated by divid- time. ing total-number-of-vehicles-multiplied- FOLDOUTH-9 H-10 » oo O in n CN i 464-458 I :k L FM 71-2 —
by-60 by vehicle-density-multiplied-by- speed. To this figure are added EXTAL (see below) and time gaps between march elements. This formula may be used to quickly calculate pass time for an entire serial or march column. r Pass time formula: '\ PST = No of Vehs x 60 + No of Vehs + Time Gaps (Min) Density x Speed 25
Example. Determine PST of a aerial of kmph, with a density of 15 VPKM, and using 150 vehicles organized into 6 march units of a 2-minute time gap between march units. 25 vehicles each, traveling at a speed of 24
150 x 60 + 150 9000 (2x5) + 6 + 10 =25 + 6 + 10 PST 15x24 25 360
PST = 41 minutes
Notes. 1. Round off fractions of minutes to next higher minute. 2. EXTAL is allocated on the basis of 1 minute per 25 vehicles added to serial pass time. EXTAL is equitably added to pass time of each march unit in the serial. V y A pass time table (see pg H-13), together with the extra time allowance table, simplifies march planners’ mathematical processes. To prepare the time schedule for a aerial, it is a simple process to determine PST for any march unit regardless of number of vehicles, traveling speed, or column density. EXTAL is then added to calculated PST to determine total PST.
PST for a serial is determined by adding march unit pass times together, including time gaps between march units. Examples are shown in the explanation at the bottom of the tables. H-ll FOLDOUT H-12 FM 71-2 1
Time Distance. Time distance is A determined by dividing distance to be r Time distance formula: traveled by rate of march (see the TDIS table, page ). TDIS does not include time Distance (miles or km) for long delays or extended scheduled halts. TDIS Rate of march (mih or kmih) A time distance table is a valuable tool to Example. Determine TDIS of a serial traveling 135 kilometers at a speed of 24 the march planner. It provides a listing of < kmph (rate of march 20 kmih). factors used to calculate time required to 135 (km) .75 (fraction) travel certain distances at specified vehicular TDIS 6.75 hours x 60 (minutes) speeds. Travel rates are expressed in 20 (kmih) 45.00 (minutes) vehicular speeds and corresponding rates of march. Travel factors are derived from rate of TDIS = 6 hours and 45 minutes march, which includes time for short periodic halts and other minor delays that might * V J occur.
f TIME DISTANCE TABLE t
Speed Rate of March Minutes to Minutes to Miles/Kilometers Miles/Kilometers Travel 1 Travel 1 This table provides the time required to travel 1 kilometer per Hour in the Hour Kilometer Mile or 1 mile while using specified march speeds. The travel t times are calculated based upon rates of march (miles/ kilometers in the hour) and include time for scheduled 10 mph 8 mih 7.5 short halts and time lost due to road and traffic con- 16 kmph 12 kmih ditions. The time for long halts must be added to the total travel time. Multiply the total distance to be traveled 15 mph 12 mih (miles or kilometers) by the travel time factor for 1 mile or 24 kmph 20 kmih 1 kilometer for the designated speed.
20 mph 16 mih 2.4 3.75 32 kmph 25 kmih Example: Determine TDIS for a column traveling 25 mph 20 mih 1.84 310 kilometers at a speed of 24 kmph. 40 kmph 32 kmih Multiply 310 (km) x 3 (min) = 930 minutes. Convert 930 minutes to 15 30 mph 25 mih 1.5 2.4 hours and 30 minutes. 48 kmph 40 kmih
35 mph 30 mih 1.3 56 kmph 46 kmih
40 mph 33 mih 1.13 1.8 Note. Fractional parts of an hour are converted to 65 kmph 53 kmih minutes by multiplying the fraction by 60 and rounding off to the next higher minute.
H-12 FM 71-2 —
ARRIVAL TIME (AT). In march a scheduled halt of 1 hour. planning, the release point is normally designated as the terminal point of move- Hours Minutes ment. Arrival time at the release point is SP Time 08 00 determined by adding time distance and any Time Distance 6 45 long scheduled halts to the start point time. Scheduled Halt 1 00 Example. Determine arrival time for a serial with a start point time of 0800 hours, 15 45 time distance of 6 hours and 45 minutes, and Arrival time is 1545 hours.
PASS TIME TABLE (SINGLE MARCH UNIT)
PASS TIME (MINUTES AND SECONDS) The Pass Time Table is used in conjunction with the Extra Time Allowance Table to calculate the pass times for single march units of a battalion task force aerial. The PST Table is based upon the number of vehicles in the march NUMBER 16 KMPH—10 MPH 24 KMPH-15 MPH 32 KMPH—20 MPH 40 KMPH—25 MPH 48 KMPH—30 MPH 56 KMPH—35 MPH OF unit (density), the interval between the vehicles, and a specified vehicular speed. The figures in this table are INTERVAL—METERS INTERVAL—METERS INTERVAL—METERS INTERVAL—METERS INTERVAL-METERS INTERVAL—METERS VEHICLES expressed in minutes and seconds. The Extra Time Allowance Table provides the EXTAL in minutes based upon the MARCH number of vehicles (density) in the march unit. UNIT
EXAMPLE 1. Determine the PST for a march unit of 29 vehicles at 50-meter intervals traveling at a speed of 40 kmph. Use the 40 kmph—25 mph division of the table and select the 50-meter interval 15 vpkm column. Find the PST for 25 vehicles which is 3 minutes. Next, find the PST for 4 vehicles which is 29 seconds. Add the 3 minutes and the 29 seconds, then round to the next higher minute for a total of 4 minutes. Finally, using the EXTAL Table, determine the EXTAL for 29 vehicles which is 1 minute. Add 1 minute EXTAL to the 4 minutes PST for the march unit pass time of 5 minutes. To calculate the pass time for a battalion task force serial, add the march unit pass times together and include the time gaps (see page ) between the march units. There will always be one less time gap than march units.
EXAMPLE 2. Determine the PST for a serial of four march units, each with a PST of 5 minutes and a time gap of 2 minutes. Add 5 minutes (MU1) + 2 minutes (time gap)+ 5 minutes (MU2) +2 minutes (time
11 15 gap) + 5 minutes (MU3) + 2 minutes (time gap) + 5 minutes (MU4) = 26 minutestotal serial PST.
7 49 9 23
EXTRA TIME ALLOWANCE (EXTAL) TABLE (SINGLE MARCH UNIT)
NUMBER OF VEHICLES IN MARCH UNIT
EXTAL IN MINUTES
H-13 COMPLETION TIME. Completion time is calculated by adding pass time to arrival time. Completion time may also be determined by adding to start point time, the time distance, pass time, and any long or scheduled halts. Example 1. Determine completion time for a serial with an arrival time of1545 hours and a pass time of 41 minutes.
Hours Minutes Arrival time 15 45 Pass time 41
15 86
Completion time is 1626 hours.
Note. Convert 86 minutes to 1 hour and 26 minutes, then add it to 1500 hours.
Example2. Determine completion time for a serial with a start point time of0800 hours, time distance of 6 hours and 45 minutes, a pass time of 41 minutes, and a scheduled halt of 1 hour.
Hours Minutes SP Time 08 00 Time Distance 6 45 Pass Time 41 Scheduled Halt 1 00
15 86
Completion time is 1626 hours.
A movement order is a type of operation order. It contains instructions for movement FM 71-2—
of units from one location to another within a become standard, and units include them in stated time. Preparation of the order SOP. normally follows reconnaissance and an Repetition of these items is not necessary in estimate of the situation. the order. Information in the movement order includes situation of friendly and enemy A strip map is a sketch of the route of forces, destination, routes, rate of march, march and is normally included as an annex maximum speeds, order of march, start point, to the movement order. Strip maps should be start point times, details of air and ground reproduced in sufficient quantities to supply alert guards, scheduled halts, vehicle them to key personnel, including vehicle distances, time gaps, release point, critical commanders and road guides. The amount of points, service support, communications, detail depends upon the intended purpose of location of the commander during the march, the strip map and the unit level at which it is and strip maps. Other details included, as prepared. A strip map should contain the necessary, are route or unit markers to be start point and release point, restrictions, and used, control or checkpoint, and location of critical points with the distance between road guides. Certain items listed above often them. An example strip map is shown.
(CLASSIFICATION) ANNEX A (STRIP MAP) to OPORD 10-2-10 Armor. Reference: Map, series M501, sheet NM32-5 (FRANKFORT AU MAIN), edition 2-AMS, 1:250,000. Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA. CP 2 254
LAUTERBACH 2-10 12 KM GROSSENLUTER 254 276 60 KM RP E4 275 457 FULDA 275 AA 455 275 2-10 RANSTADT FRIEDBURG /l8 KM"^ 276 S SELTERS + SP FAUERBACH CP 1 457
NOT TO SCALE (CLASSIFICATION)
H-15
464-458 0-85-33 -FM 71-2
ROAD MOVEMENT GRAPH A road movement graph is a time space # diagram that visually depicts a movement from start point to release point. It may be used during movement planning stage to » avoid conflicts and discrepancies, and prevent congestion along the route of march. It may also be used to prepare and check the road movement table. It shdws the relative time and location of the head and tail of each march element at any point along the route; arrival and clearance times of march elements at critical points and restrictions; and displays pass times, time distance, and rate of march. Preparation of a road movement graph is not mandatory; however, it is of great value to the planner simply because it reduces mathematical calculations that would ordinarily be required to prepare. march schedules. Information derived from march formulas or obtained from march tables is transferred directly to the graph. To complete the road movement graph, the planner must have already organized the march column into serials or the serials into march units; determined time distance, arrival time, completion time; and computed pass times for each serial or march unit as appropriate.
ROAD MOVEMENT TABLE A road movement table is normally an annex to a movement order. It is a convenient means of transmitting to subordinate units time schedules and other essential details of the move. It is particularly useful when the inclusion of such details in the body of the operation order would tend to make the order complicated or unduly long. Road movement tables consist of two parts: • Data paragraphs reflecting general information common to two or more march elements; and a list of serials or march units, together with all other necessary information arranged in tabular form.
H-16 FM 71-2—
• Data from the road movement graph is date of move, units involved, number of transferred to the road movement table. Of vehicles, load class ofheaviest vehicle routes particular importance to the march planner to be used, and a “remarks” section to reflect are the times at which serials or march units any details not covered elsewhere. An arrive at and clear critical points. example of a road movement table • Other information on the road movement scheduling the move of a battalion-size unit table includes serial or march unit number, follows.
90 1 1 1 1 1— ROAD CLEARANCE TIME 8 HOURS 18 MINUTES COMPLETION (AP)80 ARRIVAL TIME 1130 HOURS GROSSENLUDER /* TIME 1215 HOURS (CP 2) 70 HEAD •TAIL LAUTERBACH
60
50 40 —HATE OF MARCH n
~ 30
20 RANSTADT (CP 1 )
10
FRIEDBURG (SP) 0
0700 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300
464-458 0-85-34 H-17 —FM 71-2
ROAD MOVEMENT TABLE-EXAMPLE OF ANNEX TO ARMOR BATTALION OPERATION ORDER {A guide only; modification or adjustment is necessary to suit specific cases)
(CLASSIFICATION)
ANNEX B (ROAD MOVEMENT TABLE) to OPORD 10-2-10 Armor Reforeneo: Map, aeries MB01, sheet NM32-5 (FRANKFURT AM MAIN), edition2-AMS, 1:2SO.OOO. Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.
General Data: Speed: 24 kmph. 10. Critical Points: Rate of March: 20 kmih. a. Start Point: RJ 275 at MA839764 (FAUERBACH). Open Column. b. Release Point: RJ 254 at NB383038 (GROSSENLUDER). Traffic Density: 16 VPK. c. Other Critical Points: Time Gaps: 2 minutes between MU. (1) RJ 457 and 275 at MA989780 (RAN8TADT). Halts: SOP. (2) RJ 275 and 254 et NB278102 (LAUTERBACH). Route: Annex A, Strip Map. d. Route Classification: 6 m x 60. From: FRIEDBURG MA812610. 11. Mein Routes to SP: Hy 3 to Hy 276. TO: KLEINLUDER NB38500S. 12. Main Routes from RP: Unnumbered secondary route.
March Load Critical Points Route Unit Class Routa Due Clear from to SP No. Hv Veh (hr) (hr) RP (a) (C) (d) (a) (9) (n)
Qtr 4 Aug SI, Comm Pit HHC X0, (8 above) (9 above) Strip map Move by infiltration. Party Spt Co X0. Co A, Co B. CoC
Recon 4 Aug (12 above) Move by infiltration. Party
4 Aug (8 above) (9 above) Strip map (11 above) SP 0700 0706 Det: IV«-ton qtr pty. sup trk to bn tns. CP1 0761 0757 Ateh: 1 Cl III trk. 1 aid/evac veh. CP2 1048 10S4 RP 1130 1138 P8T: 6 minutes.
4 Aug HHC (-) SP 0708 0713 (12 above] Det: 2'16-ton and l-IVi-ton qtr pty. Bn HQ Sec. HQ CPI 0759 0804 Atch: 1 Cl III trk. Tk Sec, Co HQ, Comm CP2 1088 1101 Pit Co Maint RP 1138 1143 PST: 5 minutes.
4 Aug Co B SP 0715 0721 (12 above) Det: 1 -V-i-ton qtr pty. sup trk to bn tns. CPI 0806 0812 Atch: 1 Cl NI trk, 1 aid/evec veh. CP2 1103 1109 RP 1145 1161 PST: 6 minutes.
Spt Co (-) (8 above) (9 above) Strip map SP 0723 0729 Det: Set pit to recon pty, 1 M113 toqtr pty. CPI 0814 0820 Atch: 1 Cl III trk. Co HQ, Meint Sec. CP2 1111 1117 AVLB Sec. Gnd Survi. Sec, RP 1153 1159 P8T: 0 minutes. Redeye, Mtr Pit
4 Aug Bn Tns, (9 above) Strip map (11 above) SP 0731 0736 (12 above) Det: 6 Cl III trtts, 4 aid/evac vehs. Spt Pit H CPI 0822 0827 Atch: 3 co sup trk«. Med Pit <-> CP2 1119 1124 PST: S minutes. RP 1201 1206
4 Aug (8 above) (9 above) Strip map (11 above) SP 0738 0744 ( 12 above) Det: 1 -’/«-ton qtr pty. sup trk to bn tns. CPI 0829 0835 Atch: 1 Cl III trk, 1 aid/evac veh. CP2 1126 1132 RP 1208 1214 P8T: 8 minutes.
Trail 4 Aug 11 above) (12 above) Move by infiltration. Party Atch: 1 Cl III trk, 1 aid/evac veh. (CLASSIFICATION) Notea. 1. Only the minimum number of headings above Should be used. Any information common to two or more movement numbers should be included under General Data paragraphs. (Columna (f), (g). (h), (i), and (m) could have been omitted in this sxampis.) 2. Sines the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. It may not be desirable to Include dates or locations. 3. If the table is Issued by itself. end not as an annex to a more detailed order, the table must be signed or authenticated in the normal way. 4. Critical point is defined as "a selected point along a route used for reference In giving instructions.” It includes start points, release points, and otfeer points along a routa where interference with movement may occur or where timings are critical. 6. The movement number (column (a)) identifiée a column (or element of column) during the whole of the movement. 6. if an annex has the same distribution as an operation order, it is not necessary to include the headings shown in this
7. To Obtain dus timas for MUI, transfer directly from road movement graph or calculate using time distance table and atrip map.
8. To obtain dear times, add MU pasa tima to due time. 9. To complete the schedule for successive march unite, add peas time plus time gap to due time. (Example: PST of MU 1 which Is 6 minutes plus time gep between MU which is 2 minutes equals 8 minutes. Add the 6 minutes to the0700 8P due tbne of MU 1 to obtain the SP due time for MU 2 which is 0708.
H-18 APPENDIX I Air Defense OVERVIEW THREAT AIR FORCES WILL BE CAPABLE of operating over the battlefield from time to time and will be able to attack US Army ground forces. Even though the battalion task force is operating under the protective umbrella of air defense artillery units, for close-in protection it must depend on passive measures, small arms fire, and its organic Redeye section. A Vulcan platoon or section may occasionally be attached; this is particularly likely when the battalion task force is one of the key elements in an attack or is responsible for defending a critical asset like a bridge. PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE Enemy pilots must be able to see and Camouflage vehicles that are exposed. When identify a target in order to attack it. The moving, travel by covered and concealed effectiveness of high-performance aircraft is routes. greatly reduced when ground units take full • Dig in dismounted positions as well as advantage of terrain for concealment and camouflaging them. If vehicles must occupy cover. The battalion task force should: positions visible from the air, improve cover • When stopped, occupy positions which by scooping a hole or building up protection offer natural cover and concealment. on the sides, or both.
CONTENTS
PAGE
OVERVIEW M
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE |-i
SMALL ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE 1-2
THE BATTALION TASK FORCE AIR DEFENSE SECTION (REDEYE) 1-2
USE IN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 1-2
AIR DEFENSE (REDEYE) TEAMS OPERATE MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED 1-3
OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY 1-3
VULCAN 1-4 .
COMMAND CONTROL 1-4
1-1 —FM 71-2
• Disperse vehicles as much as possible, The battalion task force area of operations not only to make detection difficult, but so will often be too large to be covered that, if detected, a single aircraft on a single completely with five teams. Therefore, the pass can only attack a single vehicle. commander must establish priorities for • Wipe out, as far as possible, track marks protection based upon the importance and made when moving into position. vulnerabilities of various elements in the situation at hand. The air defense section • If moving when an enemy aircraft leader provides advice on how to best protect attacks, turn vehicles 90 degrees to the task force elements not already covered by direction of attack—the attack is normally divisional or corps units. Air defense teams parallel to the movement of the convoy—and can be employed in several ways: seek cover and concealment. This is a quick way to get vehicles out of the line of fire. In general support of the battalion task force with priorities of protection as directed • Require air guards on each vehicle or in by the commander. each position. Rotate the responsibility since scanning for long periods dulls spotting Some teams in direct support of company ability. teams, the remainder in general support. • Establish an air warning system in the Some teams attached to company teams, SOP. Include both visual and audible signals. the remainder in general support. In rare cases all five air defense teams may be attached or placed in direct support of SMALL ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE maneuver units. Employment is based upon The firepower of the task force’s the considerations of which method provides machineguns and rifles—directed at an the best protection according to established attacking aircraft in a concerted manner—is, priorities and which method provides the best in itself, a formidable air defense system. The control of air defense weapons. Whatever small arms air defense system in a mech- method is used, air defense teams should heavy task force includes approximately 108 operate with or near the unit, element, or .50-cal machineguns, 63 M60 machineguns, facility they are defending, but should also and 558 M16 rifles. remain responsive to the air defense section leader for purposes of fire control. A Redeye Use of small arms against attacking team moves when the company team moves, aircraft is described in detail in TC 23-44, but stays in communication with the air Small Arms Air Defense Against Air defense section leader. Attack, and in Appendix I, FM 71-1, Air Defense. USE IN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE In offensive operations, the attacking THE BATTALION TASK FORCE teams generally receive first priority. All AIR DEFENSE SECTION company teams are high priority units; (REDEYE) tactical operations center and trains may The air defense section of the combat have lower priority. A typical arrangement support company is organized with a section would be to place the section in general headquarters and five Redeye teams. Each support with priorities in sequence of Teams team consists of two men and a basic load of A, B, C, TOC, and trains. The section leader six weapons. One man is designated as would instruct one firing team to move with gunner, but either man can launch missiles. each. During a tactical road march or 1-2 FM 71-2—
movement to contact, there should be a Whether operating mounted or dismounted, Redeye team near the front of the battalion one of the most important things a Redeye task force and one near the rear with others team chief must do is to position his team evenly spaced throughout the unit. where it can best protect the defended unit. In defensive operations, the reserve, if any, Because gunners must visually identify air- may receive first priority. Other priorities are craft as either friend or foe, there are special similar to those in offense. If the battalion siting considerations. Positions should be task force is defending a particularly wide selected on a relatively high ground for good and deep area, a typical arrangement would all-around observation. Also, the area be to attach one Redeye team to each of three surrounding the gunner must be clear of company teams while the section (minus) personnel and equipment for a distance of 13 protects the tactical operations center and meters to provide safety from the weapon’s trains. If one company team is blocking or backblast. retaining a piece of key terrain, two Redeye Once fired, the missile has a highly visible teams might be attached. In this case the signature that provides an enemy pilot a TOC and trains would rely on Redeye team direct bearing to the gunner’s position. To for protection. If the probability of an survive, gunners should move immediately airborne or airmobile attack is high, firing after firing. teams should cover potential landing zones. The following additional considerations Air defense weapons should locate to engage should guide Redeye . team chiefs when enemy aircraft attacking at a high angle, or attacking along low avenues of approach prenariRg for combat operations: ' such as rivers, valleys, and mountain passes. • Prepare for action immediately upon arriving at the position area. • Reconnoiter as necessary and select AIR DEFENSE (REDEYE) TEAMS individual firing positions. OPERATE MOUNTED OR • Prepare individuell firing positions. DISMOUNTED Establish local security; stay in contact Redeye teams are truck-mounted. When a with other friendly elements in the area. Redeye team is operating with a company ^jfcfeam, the company team commander will • Select and prepare alternate and usually mount the team in a track, thus, it can supplementary firing positions. move with the company team and have the • Prepare a position sketch indicating same armor protection. Teams normally gunner location(s) and zone of coverage, and dismount when conducting a firing sequence pass it to the AD section leader. to limit hazard to personnel and vehicles. • Establish wire communications in Redeye teams may operate dismounted to accordance with unit SOP. accompany dismounted infantry through • Improve primary firing position. difficult terrain. When this is done, the team takes its radio and two or three weapons and deploys as required to defend the dismounted element. It protects a dismounted assault OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS force from positions which provide for best OF LIMITED VISIBILITY coverage of the area where the assault is to go Redeye gunners must visually acquire in. It is important that Redeye team positions enemy aircraft. Although night vision be covered from small arms fire. devices assist Redeye gunners. Redeye is not 1-3 FIV] 71-2
as effective at night as daring the day. Bad by higher headquarters. Redeye team leaders weather also degrades Redeye capabilities. and Vulcan platoon/section leaders are ^Soldiers of the defended unit acting as air responsible for deciding whether an aircraft guards can assist Redeye teams in acquiring is hostile by visual observation. Once targets at night. identified as hostile, engagement is controlled by the weapons control status. VULCAN Weapons control status categories are: In some circumstances a Vulcan section (two weapons) or a Vulcan platoon (four •Weapons Free. May fire at aircraft not weapons) may provide air defense support to positively identified as friendly. the battalion task force. These Vulcans are part of the division Chaparral Vulcan •Weapons Tight. Fire only at aircraft battalion. There are six platoons of Vulcans positively identified as hostile according to (total of 24 weapons) in the division. announced hostile criteria. The Vulcan, because of its mobility and •Weapons Hold. DO NOT FIRE except ability to fire on the move, minimum in self-defense. preparation time, and head-on capability, is In order to permit friendly aircraft to €ai excellent air defense weapon for defending operate in a hostile air environment, air space a maneuver force. Chaparrals are more manágement elements at division or corps suitable for defense of relatively static assets sometimes establish “safe corridors.” and probably will not be directly supporting a task force. For example: The Vulcans should be employed in pairs and sited not more than 1,000 meters apart for mutual support. The weapon has a range “Weapons tight except weapons hold of 1,200 meters. The Vulcan sections should 1300-1330 for jet aircraft westbound over be positioned on or near the defended asset, Area A” permits continued engagement forcing the attacking aircraft to fly directly at of hostile aircraft, but provides special the Vulcan to make a strike. This provides the protection for friendly westbound flights best target for the Vulcan. of jets expected between 1300-1330 hours. When the TF is moving by bounds, the Vulcans are normally sited with the overwatching element. Because the Vulcan is Early warning of enemy air attack is most “thinskinned,” it should not normally be part often provided by the divisional air defense of the vanguard of an attack. battalion. Normally, the probability of attack The air defense artillery Vulcan platoon is described using one of three conditions: leader or section leader will advise the TF RED—attack imminent or in progress. commander on the most effective use of their YELLOW—attack probable. Vulcans. WHITE—attack not probable.
COKMANB CONTROL Redeye teams operate in the AD section Air defense fires are controlled using command net. The section headquarters also “hostile criteria” (determining type of monitors the battalion task force command aircraft and whether that type is friend or net and the divisional AD battalion foe) and weapons control status established command net. 1-4 ■FM 71-2=
"N
4 O
&
<9
AZIMUTH IDENTITY
RANGE
PAAR æ o
o
TADDS
A target alert data display set (TADDS). found in the section headquarters and in each Redeye team, is tied into a forward area alerting radar (PAAR). This link provides early warning information concerning aircraft operating in the area and tentative identity (friendly or unknown). 1-5
APPENDIX J Antitank Platoon
OVERVIEW THE COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY of a mechanized infantry battalion has an antitank platoon. It consists of a platoon headquarters and six antitank sections. Each section has two squads, each equipped with a heavy antitank weapon.
The antitank platoon can be employed in one of two ways: • The task force commander can keep the antitank platoon or portions of it under his own control in general support of the task force. This could be a workable option when only a single narrow armor avenue of approach into the task force area exists. • Normally, the task force commander will attach TOW sections directly to the company teams. This arrangement aids the integration of TOW fires with other antiarmor weapons (e.g., tanks, Dragons, and LAWs). The commander’s estimate determines the distribution of TOW, by weapons or sections. In fact, in active defense it is one of his major decisions. Obviously, the greater number of TOW must be assigned to the company team covering the most likely or most dangerous armor approach. J-l — FM 71-2 ■
The task force commander should consider 3,000 meters. This will seldom be to mech the deployment of the antitank platoon heavy teams; more often to tank heavy headquarters as well. One option is to send teams. As teams conduct an active defense the antitank platoon leader to the company and move to subsequent battle positions, the team which is assigned the largest share of task force commander needs to reconsider the TOW resources. The antitank platoon leader distribution of his TOW on the new terrain can assist the team commander by occupied. reconnoitering for TOW weapons sites and insuring their fires are coordinated with If the scout platoon is initially employed as other antiarmor weapons. Finally, he can a screen force forward of the FEBA, the coordinate TOW fire control during the terrain they occupy may be suitable for engagement phase. The antitank platoon employment of TOW. The commander should sergeant may be assigned a similar mission consider reinforcing the platoon with TOW and perform similar functions with another sections and even tank platoons to start the company team. The most experienced section attrition of enemy armor well forward of the leader can then be assigned to a third FEBA, and deceive the attacker as to the company team. location of the main battle area. In this role, TOW sections should be used as a “hit-and- In the defense, an alternative mission for run” weapon, getting off one or two missiles, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant is the and then returning rapidly to their previously coordination of TOW squad emplacement prepared positions in the MBA. and engagement between squads attached to different company teams. In this role, they In both offense and defense, TOW integrate target planning and engagement should be employed where its capabilities on avenues of approach that can be covered offset its vulnerabilities. It should not by squads attached to different teams. necessarily be employed where tanks and Dragons can do the job and are available in COMBAT OPERATIONS sufficient quantity. If the terrain does not In the offense, TOWs are best employed afford suitable fields of fire for all the TOW with overwatch elements due to their long- assigned, this fact should be reported to range engagement potential and brigade for redistribution of TOW to other vulnerability. Unless the terrain is task forces with a greater need. Don’t waste extensively open, this overwatch role is most TOW. efficiently accomplished by attaching TOW to the teams. Occasionally, TOW can be Visibility limitations have a significant attached to the scout platoon when it is effect on TOW capabilities. During darkness, screening a particularly dangerous flank. TOW squads must be repositioned closer to Depending on the terrain and the number of the avenues of approach, allowing them to TOW attached, the team commander may engage effectively with illumination. During then employ them as an independent fog, TOW will be of little use. Commanders overwatch element for his entire team, or should consider moving them to safer attach them to platoons to assist in their own locations from which they can quickly return bounding overwatch movement. to primary positions when visibility improves. In the defense, TOWs are usually attached to the company teams occupying battle For further details of TOW employment, positions which guard the armor avenues of see FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized approach and afford good fields of fire out to Infantry Team, Appendix B. APPENDIX K Prisoners of War and Captured Enemy Documents
OVERVIEW
PRISONERS OF WAR (PWS), enemy maps, letters, diaries, and military documents are important sources of combat intelligence. Trained intelligence personnel can quickly produce useful information once they gain possession of written materials or talk to PWs. Since prisoners and materials are usually captured by squads and platoons offrent line units, rapid reporting and rapid evacuation are vital. The sooner trained personnel can go to work, the more valuable their information will be.
Rights of Prisoners of War. Rights of PWs responsible for their legal care. A unit which have been established by international law. cannot evacuate a PW within a reasonable The United States has agreed to obey these time must provide him food, water, and laws. Once an enemy soldier surrenders, he medical treatment. Mistreated PWs and PWs must be treated humanely. It is a who receive favors are not good interrogation court-martial offense to physically or subjects. PWs should not be given comfort mentally mistreat a PW. The senior officer or items (cigarettes, candy, etc.) before their first noncommissioned officer on the scene is interrogation.
CONTENTS
PAGE
OVERVIEW K-1
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT K-3
CAPTURED MATERIEL K-3
K-1 FM 71-2
Offensive Operations. During offensive taken except on orders of an officer. In this operations, supporting military policemen event, a property register is maintained, and will normally establish a collecting point on signed receipts given each PW for personal the supply route or in the trains area of the items taken. Capturing troops segregate PWs battalion task force. This aids evacuation according to rank, sex, nationality, and other from task force collecting points. appropriate categories, and tag each PW to show time, place, circumstances of capture, In fast-moving operations, interrogators and capturing unit. Selective interrogation may be with forward elements. Interrogation by PW interrogation teams for immediate by the battalion task force and subordinate information may be undertaken in the units is limited to information of immediate forward area. Five basic principles are use, such as location and deployment of followed when processing PWs: antitank weapons and defenses, enemy roadblocks, and presence of enemy tank n Search units. PWs are questioned only briefly on the • Remove all weapons and documents. spot and then evacuated to a division PW collecting point or turned over to other units • Return to PW personal items of no military for evacuation. value.
Defensive Operations. In defensive • Leave helmet, protective mask, and operations, evacuation of PWs is normally equipment to protect him from immediate from the point of capture to the battalion task dangers of battle area. force PW collecting point and then to brigade B Segregate or division PW collecting point. As during offensive operations, interrogation within • Break chain of command. Separate by the battalion task force attempts to develop rank, sex, and other appropriate category. information of immediate tactical value. • Keep the staunch fighter away from those who willingly surrendered. Staff Responsibility. The battalion task force Si prepares and supervises the B Silence execution of plans for the collection and • Prevent giving orders, planning escape, or evacuation of enemy prisoners of war. He developing false “cover stories.” does this in coordination with any supporting military police units. He coordinates with the □ Speed S2 for PW estimates and for interrogation • Speed to rear to remove PW from battle area facilities, and with the headquarters and to obtain and exploit his information. company commander for the operation of PW collecting points. He coordinates with the S4 S Safeguard for transportation to evacuate prisoners and • Prevent escape and harm. the medical platoon leader for evacuation of wounded prisoners. Before evacuating the PW, the capturing unit attaches a tag to him. The tag may be Duties of Capturing Troops. Capturing printed before combat or made out of troops disarm, segregate, tag, and search materials at hand on the battlefield. PWs for documents of military value. Documents are tagged to identify them with For evacuation and interrogation, PWs are the PWs from whom taken and evacuated first taken to the platoon leader. He assigns with PWs. Personal effects of a PW are not guards to take PWs to an area chosen by the K-2 FM 71-2 =
# company team commander. If trained interrogators are available, the company team commander asks for information about the local tactical situation. The PW is then TfXG evacuated to the battalion task force p\N collection point for further interrogation and TES) (At Of CM“ COO* evacuation. ofC*p pt>ct nG VJNU CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS 0B' IHO'N Cfkf' -tv)«'6 AND EQUIPMENT s CÊ-f (*cf Of CVJ Captured enemy documents and equip- C\P8*Pf ENEO' ment are excellent sources of intelligence information. Documents may be official, such as maps, orders, records, or photographs; or personal, such as letters, diaries, or pay records. If not handled properly, captured items may be lost or delayed until their information is useless. Captured documents and equipment must be evacuated to the next level of command as rapidly as possible. Capturing personnel should tag each captured item. The tag may be printed before combat or made out of materials at hand on the battlefield. Information contained on the tag helps speed up processing of the captured item and indicates its probable value. If the captured item was found on a PW, prisoner’s name is included on the tag. CAPTURED MATERIEL The battalion task force S2, in coordination with the battalion task force S4, issues instructions for disposition of captured EOO'f TVpt nOCO materiel. It is normally evacuated to a TtSl divisional salvage and maintenance -n(Afc Ci'.f ' COO collection point. Ammunition and other CR p-tOP PEA CfOf dangerous items are not moved. Their 6 (pO'N location is reported to the division 10 CRf TUP ammunition office. Captured medical CAP (ASIA MCES Of emeupNEOl supplies are evacuated to the battalion HAPP medical platoon; the medical platoon leader disposes of them as directed by brigade or division K-3
464-458 0-85-35
APPENDIX L Training The Battalion Task Force
OVERVIEW
THE PRINCIPAL PUBLICATION which sets forth training objectives for the battalion task force is Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 71-2. The purpose of this appendix is to describe some techniques which can be used by the battalion task force to gain the maximum possible training benefits from the time and resources available.
Train as a Combined Arms Team. To fight successfully as a combined arms team, the battalion task force must train as a combined arms team. Since the company team is the smallest combined arms team, tank and mechanized infantry companies must cross-attach and train as company teams. All the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements which would normally accompany teams and task forces on combat operations must train with them. = CÛ1MTEIMTS H
PAGE OVERVIEW L-1
Train as a Combined Arms Team L-1
Train to DefeattheThreat L-2
Train During Periods of Limited Visibility L-2
Train for Continuous Operations L-2 Conduct Live-Fire Exercises L-2
Learn to Survive in the Nuclear and Chemical Battlefield L-2
Train in a Realistic Electronic Warfare(EW) Environment L-2
TRAIN THE STAFF AND LEADERS L-2 Good Training Results From Good Leadership L-3
L-1 FM 71-2
Train to Defeat the Threat. understanding the lethality of modern Conducting opposing force field training weapons. exercises accomplishes three things: it trains Learn to Survive in the Nuclear and teams in Threat tactics; it trains teams to Chemical Battlefield. Train to the fight forces employing Threat tactics; it standards given in Appendix B, FM 21-40. trains teams to fight outnumbered. Company teams can do this by maneuvering two Train in a Realistic Electronic platoons against a third platoon. The Warfare (EW) Environment. The battalion task force can do this by intercept, direction finding, and jamming maneuvering two company teams using threats must be realistically injected in Threat doctrine against a third team. The training. Actual jamming, using simulators battalion task force commander could or unit radios, should be used to train radio request that his parent unit coordinate operators in practical electronic counter- opposing force support for maneuver against countermeasures (ECCM). Radio nets should the entire task force. be monitored to insure transmissions are Train During Periods of Limited brief and do not disclose tactically significant Visibility. Threat forces can be expected to information. attack during periods of darkness, fog, and snow. The battalion task force must routinely TRAIN THE STAFF AND train during periods of limited visibility- LEADERS train to defend and attack, to operate just as There is often a tendency in any battalion during periods of unlimited visibility. As a task force to concentrate on training general rule, half of battalion task force company teams and neglect training the staff training should take place during periods of and individual leaders. It is not necessary to darkness or other limited visibility. wait until company teams are ready to Train for Continuous Operations. participate in battalion task force exercises Soldiers must be trained to fight even when before conducting training for leaders and fatigued. The battalion task force should staff. conduct continuous field training for periods Staff and leadership training should of three, four, and five days whenever parallel unit training to that when company possible. When this is not possible, artificial teams are ready, the staff and leaders are fatigue can be introduced into training by ready. conducting 24-hour exercises, starting with a move from garrison to the field training area Command post exercises in field or shortly after 2400 hours. garrison can be conducted for the staff and all leaders down to platoon level. Conduct Live-Fire Exercises. Do this as often as time, ammunition, and available Free-play wargames can be arranged training areas permit. Moving under cover of and conducted between battalion task overhead indirect fire; adjusting indirect fire forces. within a few hundred meters of protected Tactical Exercises Without Troops bunkers or buttoned-up armored vehicles; (TEWT) can be used to train leaders at and firing machineguns over the heads of any level. They are especially useful for soldiers in trenches accustom soldiers to the training in such subjects as terrain battlefield environment and give them appreciation and analysis, map reading, confidence in supporting weapons and in and tactics; and by presenting situations FM 71-2 —
and asking a subordinate leader, "How subordinates during breaks in training. would you do it?" TEWT can be con- Informal discussions increase under- ducted when the majority of the troops standing and add depth- to the knowledge of are not available for training due to other both seniors and subordinates. commitments. To accurately assess time Men must be challenged to meet high distance factors, however, limited use of standards set by leaders; care should be troops, such as one APC representing a exercised to insure that standards are platoon, is helpful. attainable. Competition promoted between Good Training Results From Good crews or platoons will motivate soldiers to Leadership. Soldiers are strongly strive for excellence, which then should be influenced by the example and conduct of properly recognized. their leaders. Leaders must live with their A poorly trained unit is likely to fail in a soldiers and share their dangers and critical moment, particularly in its first privations as well as their accomplishments. engagements. A well-trained unit is reflected Good leaders avoid subjecting troops to in the outward appearance of its soldiers, in useless hardships and unnecessary the condition of its equipment, and in its harassment. readiness for combat. Most of all, it is a Interest in training can be stimulated by reflection of the officers and non- discussions initiated by leaders with their commissioned officers who are its leaders.
"The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training." General Erwin Rommel
L-3
APPENDIX M Functions of the Staff
OVERVIEW
THE PURPOSE OF THE STAFF IS TO RELIEVE the commander of as much of the burden of routine matters as possible. When preparing for operations, it is up to the staff to gather the information which will help the commander make his decisions. Based on the information available to him from the staff and on his own judgment and experience, THE COMMANDER DECIDES. It is then up to the staff to see that the commander’s decision is carried out and that necessary support required for an operation is provided to the battalion task force.
The battalion task force operates with a individual capabilities of each officer. It is single staff. It consists of the SI, Personnel; important, therefore, that the battalion task S2, Intelligence; S3, Operations; and S4, force commander inform his staff of how he Logistics. The Modified Table of intends to operate. As soon as possible after Organization and Equipment (MTOE) under assumption of command, he should prescribe which a battalion is organized may also staff relationships to himself and to designate some battalion officers as special subordinate units, and, most important, to staff officers; for example, the battalion those whom he will look for coordination of communications platoon leader, the staff activities. battalion medical platoon leader, and the battalion motor officer. Staff officers should remember that their jobs are not only to assist the battalion task No two commanders operate alike. The force commander, but to assist company task force commander will use his staff team commanders as well, for the company according to his needs, based on the team commander has no staff.
PAGE
OVERVIEW M-1
BATTAÍ.IOW TASK FORCE STAFF OPERATIONS M-2
STAFF RELATIONSHIPS M-3
M-l — FM 71-2
BATTALION TASK FORCE STAFF OPERATIONS
To be successful, the staff must work together. No staff officer can work in isolation and expect to do his job. Each staff officer must actively pursue every scrap of information that will help the commander to see the battlefield and use his combat power. Staff officers continually exchange information with superior headquarters staff officers, subordinate unit leaders, and among themselves. The S2, for example, keeps the entire staff informed about the enemy and terrain over which the battalion task force expects to fight. The S4 informs the S3 when a proposed course of action cannot be logistically supported. Likewise, the Si must tell the S3 when critical personnel shortages occur so the S3 can recommend priority for assignment of replacements. The S3 keeps the staff informed of the tactical situation so each staff officer can determine what he needs to do to make the operation a success. The staff works to see the battle as it unfolds, to anticipate requirements for support of the battalion task force, and to get the support necessary to win the battle. Tbe command sergeant major primarily advises the commander on matters concerning the enlisted ranks. The command sergeant major should not be relegated to the status of an administrator. He is frequently the MOST EXPERIENCED SOLDIER in the task force. A good command sergeant major has his finger on the pulse of the command. He is often the one who first discovers that the commander’s decisions and policies are not being carried out in the manner the commander intended. It is also the command sergeant major who first discovers which of the commander’s policies are successful and should be continued. The task force commander should establish a close relationship with his command sergeant major. Whenever possible, he should M-2 FM 71-2—
accompany the commander to his units’ proficiency to the commander. locations. While there, he should talk to the The pages which follow describe the troops; spot-check their job knowledge, traditional staff relationships as they pertain positions, and equipment maintenance; and to the most common tasks accomplished by feed back his impressions of morale and task forces.
STAFF DELATO ©ROOT OtPiB
Section 1. Personnel
TASK SI §2 S3
1. Maintenance of Unit Strength
a. Loss Estimating. Maintains a continu- Furnishes anticipated Considers impact of ous loss estimate, effects of enemy mass- anticipated losses on balanced against fore- destruction weapons. courses of action. cast replacements.
b. Personnel Re- Supervises system of Considers personnel Considers personnel ports and Records. records and reports strengths in planning strengths in formu- showing status of requirements for lating plans and deter- personnel matters in- logistic operations. mining vulnerabili- cluding: strength re- ties. ports, casualty reports, and personnel requisitions
c. Replacements. Determines require- Recommends priority Recommends dispo- Recommends priority ments; supervises of assignment to sition of specially of assignments when requisitioning pro- combat service sup- trained intelligence replacements are cedures; recommends port elements when personnel. critical. allocations; estab- strength is critical; lishes policies and provides logistic sup- procedures for proc- port of replacement essing; plans for system. movement.
2. Personnel Man- Classifies and as- agement. signs personnel.
Prisoners of War. Plans for and super- Provides feeding, Estimates the number Considers require- vises custody, ad- emergency clothing, and capture rate of ments for troop units ministration, utiliza- and transportation; PWs; insures screening as guards for large tion, and treatment of and coordinates evac- and initial interroga- numbers of PWs; co- prisoners of war and uation. tion of selected PWs. ordinates MP support. and civilian internees.
M-3 — FM 71-2
TASK S4 S2 S3
3. Development and Exercises staff re- Maintenance of sponsibility for postal, Morale. financial, religious, exchange welfare, and legal services; rest and leave.
a. Decorations and Recommends policies Procures decorations Awards for decorations and as required. awards; insures that recommendations for awards are made promptly.
b. Graves Regis- Exercises staff re- Coordinates trans- tration. sponsibility for plan- portation. ning and supervising graves registration activities.
4. Health Services. Develops estimate of Provides additional Provides SI with Provides plan of ope- injury, sick, and transportation as re- enemy situation and rations and present wounded rate for quired. capabilities, charac- dispositions for plan- future operations. teristics of the area of ning for evacuation Recommends policy operations which may and hospitalization. for evacuation and affect evacuation or Requests attachment hospitalization of hospitalization plans. of medical units and/ casualties due to fall- or facilities when ap- out contamination, proved by the com- and chemical or bio- mander. logical warfare. Requests Army aviation for evacuation requirements. 5. Maintenance of Exercises staff re- Furnishes statistics Monitors matters of Includes corrective Discipline, Law, and sponsibility for mat- on trends of loss or discipline, law, and measures in training Order. ters of discipline, law, damage to equipment order for impact on programs as directed. and order; arranges due to carelessness. security clearances. for courts martial within commander's jurisdiction and de- sires.
6. Headquarters Coordinates logistic Assists SI and HQ Coordinates the gen- Management. support, including company commander eral location, time, shelter, repair, con- in planning for coun- and conditions of struction, and main- terintelligence meas- movement of the HQ, tenance for the head- ures for movement, and overall defense of quarters. location, and opera- the HQ area with HQ tion of the head- company commander. quarters. 7. Message Center Coordinates the in- Operations. ternal distribution of incoming messages and use of motor messengers with the C-EO.
M-4 FM 71-2— Ssction II. Intelligence
TASK S2 S3 SI S4
1. Collection of In- formation.
a. Ground Recon- Develops plans for, Designates combat Provides logistic sup- naissance. and coordinates units for reconnais- port for reconnais- ground reconnaissance, plans recon- sance activities. sance. naissance in force, coordinates ground reconnaissance with combat patrols and with other combat operations including fires. S3 (air) coordinates air support in area of reconnaissance.
b Air Reconnais- Originates requests Coordinates with sance (Army Avn). and consolidates and other operational air screens requestsfrom missions. other staff elements, agencies, or units.
c. Air Reconnais- Originates requests Coordinates with sance (Supporting for air reconnais- other air missions. Services). sance; consolidates Recommends basic and screens requests and front-line cover- from other staff age. elements, agencies, and units; disseminates results of reconnaissance.
d. Surveillance. Plans for systematic Furnishes informa- Coordinates con- watch of the battle tion on location of trolled equipment re- area Assigns mis- own forces and opera- quirements. sions in coordination tion plans. with S3. Coordinates all surveillance activities. Coordinates EW aspects of radars with C-EO.
e. Target Acqui- Plans target acquisi- Evaluates potential sition. tion in coordination targets developed by with S3. Assigns col- S2; makes general lection missions and target analysis. coordinates collection of target information. Identifies potential targets and disseminates this information to the S3 and teams.
M-5 —FM 71-2
TASK S2 S3 SI S4
f. Prediction of Enemy With brigade guid- Evaluates vulnera- Uses fallout as a factor Estimates effect the Nuclear Weapon Fall- ance, estimates effects bility of units tothe pre- in estimating casual- predicted fallout will out of the predicted fall- dicted fallout. Pre- ties and replacement have on logistic sup- out on the area of pares recommenda- requirement. port and initiates operations and enemy tion for revised task planning to minimize capabilities; dissemi- organization and effects. Estimates nates to staff. Re- alternate tactical vulnerability of train ceives information course of action, if areas to predicted from subordinate, required. fallout and initiates adjacent, and superior tentative planning as units on the Ground appropriate Zero (GZ), height of burst, and yield of enemy-delivered nuclear weapons and disseminates to staff and affected units.
g Technical Intel- Coordinates activities Receives and re- Assists in evacuation ligence. of technical intelli- quests technical in- of technical intelligence detachments telligence that may gence material when attached. Uses affect operations. As- technical intelligence signs elements to in estimates and secure the detach- studies. Disseminates ments. technical intelligence to appropriate parties.
h. Weather Infor- Requests weather in- Analyzes weather in- Analyzes weather in- Analyzes weather in- mation. formation from Brigade formation for effect on formation for effect on formation for effect on S2, disseminates. operations and train- health of personnel logistics activities. ing.
2. Production of Intelligence.
a. Ana lyses of Area Disseminates infor- of Operations. mation on area of operations and analyzes the area as required.
b. Preparation of Prepares and dis- Intelligence Estimate. seminates intelligence estimates as required.
c. Planning for and Prescribes allow- Recommends type, Provides materialsfor Distribution of Maps ances, scales, and scales, and distribu- fabrication of map and Map Substitutes. types (in coordination tion. substitutes. Requests, with S3/S4). receives, stores, and issues maps.
M-6 FM 71-2-
TASK S2 S3
3. Development of Recommends EEI to Essential Elements of the commander based Information (EEI). on determination of information and intelligence requirements and recommendations of other staff officers. Disseminates approved EEI as specific questions to subordinate units. AM staff officers recommend to S2 EEI on enemy capabilities and characteristics of area of operations having major effect on particular area of interest.
4. Counterintelligence Plans and supervises Determines effect on Designates logistics implementation of operations. Des- activities requiring counterintelligence ignates forces, area, priority measures. measures to support equipment, and opera- all operations. tions requiring priority measures.
5. Training of Unit in Supervises intelli- Allocates time and Intelligence. gence training of all facilities in unit train- subordinate units. ing programs. Inte- Prepares intelligence grates with other training programs. training. Establishes requirements for intelligence training material. Co- ordinates EW aspects of training with C-EO.
Section 111. Operations.
TASK S3 S2 S1 S4
1. Operations, Gen- Advises the com- Provides commander SI /S4 advise commander and/or S3 on ability eral. mander on combat and staff with thecur- to support operations. and combat support rent intelligence situ- matters, and on ation. Exercises staff organization and supervision over in- training. telligence and counterintelligence activities.
M-7 —FM 71-2
TASK S3 S2 SI S4
2. Training. Prepares and super- SI, S2, S4, & C-EO, in conjunction with S3, are responsible for supervises execution of vision of training of the command in respective area of interest. Provide training programs, S3 with recommendationsconcerning training. Submit requirementsfor directives, and orders; training aids and areas to S3. supervises the planning and conduct of field exercises. De- termines requirements for, procures and distributes, or assigns training aids and facilities. Plans, conducts, and coordinates training inspections and tests.
3. Operations.
a. Operation Esti- Based on the com- Provides S3 with in- Informs S3 of capa- Informs S3 of logistics mate. mander's planning telligence estimate bility to support mis- limitations and of guidance and infor- andanalysisofareaof sion, personnel limi- capability to support mation received from operations. tations, and may rec- mission, and may rec- other staff officers, ommend course of ommend course of prepares operation action from person- action from a logistics estimate which cul- nel viewpoint. viewpoint. minates in a recommended course of action.
b. Tactical Plans. Conducts tactical Based on command- With S4, advises S3 of limitations in combat planning to include er's guidance, devel- service support which may affect the tactical (1 ) General. supervision and coor- ops EEI. plan; develops planstoprovide required combat dination of supporting Provides S3 with con- service support; recommends to S3 allocations plans. tinuing intelligence and priorities for combat units. Prepares alternate and makes recom- operation plans as mendations concern- required. ing the plan as affected Recommends alloca- by the changing intel- tion and priorities for ligence. personnel, supplies, and equipment, including ASR for combat and combat support units. Establishes prescribed load for combat and combat support units.
M-8 FM 71-2—
TASK S3 S2 SI
(2) Fire Support. Supervises fire sup- Develops list of poten- Provides S3 with am- port planning. Re- tial targets for attack munition supply and views fire support by fire support means. location data and plan to insure it is in Directs collection ef- logistic delivery capa- consonance with fort to detect indica- bility for consideration command guidance tions of potential tar- in determining em- and iscompatiblewith gets and to develop ployment of fire sup- the planned scheme detailed target infor- port. of maneuver or mation. Insures approved fire scheme of defense. support plan can be supported, relocates ammunition stocks as needed, or notifies S3 of inabilities to support the plan and makes appropriate recommendations.
c. Tactical Troop In coordination with Advises S3 concern- Receives transporta- Movements. S4, plans and super- ing counterintelli- tion requirements vises tactical troop gence aspects Pro- from S3 and deter- movement. vides information on mines allocation of weather, terrain, and transportation. De- enemy situation. termines priority for movement of combat service support units. Exercises supervision over traffic regulation and traffic control.
d. Miscellaneous Activities.
(1) Signal com- Establishes priorities Coordinates enemy SI/S4 submit requirements to S3 for signal munications. for communications to EW threat with C-EO communications, support tactical opera- and S3. tions. Reviews the signal operation plans for communications support of tactical operations. The C-EO develops plan for establishing signal communications.
(2) General Loca- In coordination with Advises on intelli- tion of T actica I Opera - the C-EO and HQ gence aspects. lions Center (TOC). company commander, selects the general location of the TOC.
M-9 -FM 71-2
/
TASK S3 S2 SI S4
e. Execution. Supervises, coordi- Advise, supervise and support within respective areas of interest. nates, and integrates combat and combat support operations, making adjustments as required, within authority delegated to him by the commander.
Section IV. Logistics
TASK S4 S3 S2 SI
1. Supply. Determines supply Recommends alloca- Provides S4 with Provides unit strengths requirements. tion and priorities for information of enemy and loss estimates to Procures supplies by equipment and sup- capabilities for inter- S4 as a basis for logis- requisition on the supplies having an impact fering with logistic tic support forecast. ply base of support. on training or tactical support and of char- Provides S4 with esti- mission. acteristics of area of Insures proper receipt, mated number of re- operations which may storage, and distribu- Recommends pre- placements for deter- affect logistic support. tion of supplies. scribed loads for equip- mination of equipment ment and supplies per- Provides requirements and supply. Determines method of taining to training for prisoners and esti- distribution; insures mated capture rates. distribution schedules tactical mission. are effective, insures availability of transportation for distribution; and selects supply routes.
2. Transportation. Determines transpor- Provides S4 with re- Provides information Provides S4 with re- tation requirements. quirements for trans- on the area of opera- quirements on trans- Coordinates required portation for training tions as it affects the port of replacements transportation from or tactical purposes. use of transportation. and PWs. assigned and attached transportation assets or from those received from superior headquarters. Consults with S3 to determine allocations and priorities. Provides information and instructions to Spt Pit Ldr regarding transportation. Spt Pit Ldr M-10 FM 71-2 —
TASK S4 S3 S2 SI
prepares transportation plans to meet vehicular requirements. Responsible for ad- Coordinates use of Keeps S4 informed of Coordinates with S3 ministrative move- routes with S4. May enemy capabilities for use of military ments, to include recommend routesbe that may interrupt police for traffic con- selection of routes (in restricted for tactical routes. trol and discipline, coordination with S3), use only. law and order en- highway regulation, forcement. and traffic control.
3. Services.
a. Priorities for Prepares general plan Provides S4 with re- Submits to the S4 re- Employment. for service support to quirements for com- quirements for com- include: selection and bat service support. bat service support. allocation of combat May recommend pri- service support assets ority of maintenance (in coordination with effort. the operations officer); plans for recovery and evacuation of vehicles and equipment; collection and disposition of excess property. Recommends evacuation and repair policies. Recommends amount and type of maintenance training. Provides commander and staff with evaluation of maintenance conditions, an estimate of impact on planned operations, and recommendations for correction or improvement of conditions.
b. Movement and Selects general loca- Provides S4 with Coordinates with S4 General Location for tion of support area, enemy situation and on general location Combat Service Sup- designates time of capabilities affecting and time of move- port Activities. movement of service location of logistic ment as concerns ad- units; coordinates activities and time of ministrative activi- with supporting activi- movement. ties. ties. M-ll -FM 71-2
TASK S4 S3 S2 SI
c. Maintenance. Supervises mainte- Coordinates with S4 nance program. for inclusion of main- Coordinates backup tenance training and support for mainte- supply economy in nance beyond the training program capability of assigned CEO coordinates or attached mainte- COMSEC evacuation, nance assets. CE org maint, and external support requirements.
d. Utilities for Coordinates activities Facilities. pertaining to maintenance and repair of utilities for facilities.
e Collection and Provides subordinate May recommend use, Collection and dis- Disposition of Excess units with guidance allocation, and priority position of captured Property Salvage and for disposition of of issue of excess enemy materiel are Captured Materiel excess property sal- property. the primary staff re- vage and captured sponsibilities of the materiel. S4, but coordination with S2and technical intelligence personnel is required. Allocates usable supplies and equipment (coordinates with S3).
M-12 APPENDIX N Symbols and Control Measures
- - ■ OVERVIEW THE FOLLOWING SYMBOLS AND CONTROL MEASURES supplement and clarify those listed in current publications. They have been placed in this manual to provide a convenient reference.
COMTEIWTS
PAGE
OVERVIEW N-1
SIZE NOTATION/UNIT N-2
TACTICALUNITSYMBOLS . ..N-2
COMBATSERVICE SUPPORTSYMBOLS N-3
CONTROLMEASURES N-5
WEAPONSANDVEHICLES N-7
RADAR SURVEILLANCE UNITS OR DEVICES . N-8
SENSOR SYMBOL N-9
ENEMY SYMBOLS N-9
N-1 — FM 7H -2
Size Notation/Unit r«Size Notation Unit Size Notation Unit
Squad III Group, Regiment, or Equivalent •• Section x Brigade ••• Platoon or Detach- ment XX Division
Company, Battery, XXX Corps or Troop xxxx Army II Battalion or Squadron xxxxx Army group
r Tactical Unit Symbols-
Mech Inf Bn Task Force Tank Company Team
C3 Tank Bn Task Force Helicopter Platoon
Scout Platoon Cavalry Sqdn (Mech Inf, Tk Bns, Cav Sqdn)
Mech Inf Co Tm Antitank Section
N-2 FM 71-2 = r Combat Service Support Symbols-
Combat Trains Ordnance Unit a TJ U
A Airfield Personnel Services and Administration Unit PS
3—c Repair and Maintenance Unit Finance Unit O
Communications Unit Aeromedical Evacuation Unit l
Medical Unit Class I Supply Point (Rations) ©
Class II Supply Point Transportation Unit (Clothing & Indiv Equip) Q)
LJ Supply Unit Class III Supply Point (POL)
N-3 = FM 71-2 r Combat Service Support Symbols (cont) ■
Class IV Supply Point Multiple Class Supply Point (Construction Material) o
Class V Supply Point Water Point (Ammunition) ©
Class VI Supply Point Maintenance Point I >—( (Personal Demand Items)
Class VII Supply Point Graves Service in (Major End Items)
M I Class VIII Supply Point Hospital or Aid Station VHHV (Medical Material) ©
Class IX Supply Point Evacuation (Repair Parts) IEVAC
\ Class X Supply Point Recovery ( REC © (Civil Affairs Items) V N-4 FM 71-2 =
Control Measures-
Assembly Area J . TF ITF «HReí\ Boundaries — 2-77 j 2-7C,
Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA)
Attack Position Axis of Advance
i_D Line of Departure (LD) Battle Area ©
CLFL cFi t*T ^ \ Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) ("WST — — 1 ) IM ^Li\a/C) I 2-HiZoo Nov , ( 1*l 2. ( 5
itX ftit* »j BDÉ V Restrictive Fire Line (RFL) R*7*- ^ ((*\OST BE IM -REO) A
AT-5 — FM 71-2
Control Measures (cont) r \
Restrictive Fire Area (RFA) WtK-* TF \-Zb A'RFt 00 C(*VUST i>e It.OO'iS-lfeî- ^ <3 ooTurtep SES OPoM> LS/ -Reo)
PU Phase Lines "tâLüt
uA
Limit of Advance (LA) Checkpoints ©
Coordinating Point U*
Contact Point
30) Target Reference Point OÖ3 Objectives SAC. K.
Direction of Attack ►
N-6 FM 71-2 = r Control Measures (cont)
Passage Lanes Battle Position (Company)
JUT-TL Any Trench System Proposed Battle Position (Company)
^ ^
r Weapons and Vehicles
a. Weapons (Exact caliber, if known, is indicated by placing the appropriate number on the right of the symbol.)
Antitank Weapons: n ß a AAA LAW DRAGON TOW
Mortars â 81mm or 82mm to 200mm and smaller _ 199mm larger Î Î Redeye Chap/Vulcan
N-7 FM 71-2
r Weapons and Vehicles (cont) ■
Vehicles Ü tu tnl Tank. Light Tank, Medium Tank, Heavy
Full Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier: 0 0 0 Light Medium Heavy
Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (Light) A Five-Ton Cargo Wheeled Vehicle § W
Obstacles
Minefield Scatterable Mine Town (Artillery Delivered)
r Radar Surveillance Units or Devices
Lines indicate assigned area of scan, and juncture of lines indicates radar location.
V. N-8 FM 71-2-=
r Sensor Symbol A Remote Sensors (REMS) V y r Enemy Symbols Enemy unit and tactical dispositions are usually shown in red. When red is not available, the symbol will be inclosed by a second line.
Example: Battle Position
Question marks used in conjunction with an enemy symbol indicate unconfirmed enemy information. No notation is made for unknown information.
Weapons î S k ï é SAGGER ADA SPG-9 120mm Mortar 122mm HOW
Vehicles a l Tank BMP v y N-9 r APPENDIX O RELEVANT STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAGS)
This manual is in accordance with the provisions of the following standardization agreements:
NATO CENTO SEATO ABCA TITLE STANAG STANAG STANAG STANAG
Marking of Contaminated 2002 124 or Dangerous Land Areas Patrol Reports by Army 2003 6R Forces Operation Orders 2014 17R Method of Describing 2029 Ground Locations, Areas, and Boundaries Battlefield Illumination 2088 2088 108 Fire Coordination in the 2099 2099 2099 Land/Air Battle Radiological Survey 2112 2112
O-l »
#
* FM 71-2
30 JUNE 1977
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
BERNARD W. ROGERS General. United States Army Chief of Staff
Official:
PAUL T. SMITH Major General. United States Army The Adjutant Genera!
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG. To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 A, Require- ments for The Inf Bn (Qty rqr block no. 79); The Inf Brigade (Qty rqr block no. 80); Tank Units, Platoon, Co, and Bn (Qty rqr block no. 129); The Armored Brigade (Qty rqr block no. 130).
Additional copies can be requisitioned (DA Form 17) from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1985 0 - 464-458 r
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