DIVS Unit 3: Overview of the Strike Team and Task Force Leader Positions
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JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters 30 July 2012 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF headquarters’ role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. -
Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020 Cover Photo Credit: NASA Future of Defense Task Force
draft Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020 Cover photo credit: NASA Future of Defense Task Force FUTURE OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE September 23, 2020 The Honorable Adam Smith Chairman House Armed Services Committee 2216 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable William “Mac” Thornberry Ranking Member House Armed Services Committee 2216 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Thornberry: Thank you for your support in standing up the Future of Defense Task Force. We are pleased to present you with our final report. Sincerely, Seth Moulton Jim Banks Chair Chair Future of Defense Task Force Future of Defense Task Force Susan Davis Scott DesJarlais Member of Congress Member of Congress Chrissy Houlahan Paul Mitchell Member of Congress Member of Congress Elissa Slotkin Michael Waltz Member of Congress Member of Congress Future of Defense Task Force Table of Contents PROLOGUE ............................................................................................... 1 TASK FORCE MEMBERS ........................................................................ 3 FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 5 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................... 13 EVIDENCE .............................................................................................. 21 EMERGING -
The U.S. Military's Force Structure: a Primer
CHAPTER 2 Department of the Army Overview when the service launched a “modularity” initiative, the The Department of the Army includes the Army’s active Army was organized for nearly a century around divisions component; the two parts of its reserve component, the (which involved fewer but larger formations, with 12,000 Army Reserve and the Army National Guard; and all to 18,000 soldiers apiece). During that period, units in federal civilians employed by the service. By number of Army divisions could be separated into ad hoc BCTs military personnel, the Department of the Army is the (typically, three BCTs per division), but those units were biggest of the military departments. It also has the largest generally not organized to operate independently at any operation and support (O&S) budget. The Army does command level below the division. (For a description of not have the largest total budget, however, because it the Army’s command levels, see Box 2-1.) In the current receives significantly less funding to develop and acquire structure, BCTs are permanently organized for indepen- weapon systems than the other military departments do. dent operations, and division headquarters exist to pro- vide command and control for operations that involve The Army is responsible for providing the bulk of U.S. multiple BCTs. ground combat forces. To that end, the service is orga- nized primarily around brigade combat teams (BCTs)— The Army is distinct not only for the number of ground large combined-arms formations that are designed to combat forces it can provide but also for the large num- contain 4,400 to 4,700 soldiers apiece and include infan- ber of armored vehicles in its inventory and for the wide try, artillery, engineering, and other types of units.1 The array of support units it contains. -
Task Force One Navy
Way Forward / 5 Task Force One Navy RESPECT HONOR COURAGE COMMITMENT OUR NAVY TEAM - NAVIGATING a Course TO TRUE NORTH FINAL REPORT TABLE OF COnTENTS Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................... 4 Mission, Structure and Process ......................................................................................................... 4 Current State ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Abstract of Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 7 Way Forward .................................................................................................................................... 10 Closing Remarks .............................................................................................................................. 10 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 12 Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 12 Task Force One Navy Observations ................................................................................................. 14 Current State .................................................................................................................................. -
Afghanistan Order of Battle by Wesley Morgan September 2013
Coalition Combat and Advisory Forces in Afghanistan AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE by Wesley Morgan September 2013 This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat and advisory forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for advising or partnering with Afghan troops in particular districts or provinces; artillery units; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. International Security Assistance Force / United States ForcesAfghanistan (Gen. Joseph Dunford, USMC)ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Special Operations Joint Task ForceAfghanistan / NATO Special Operations Component CommandAfghanistan (Maj. Gen. Raymond Thomas III, USA)Camp Integrity, Kabul1 Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (USA) Bagram Airfield; village stability operations, advisors to Afghan Defense Ministry special operations forces, and other missions2 Special Operations Task Force East (USA) Bagram Airfield; operating in eastern Afghanistan Special Operations Task Force South (USA) Kandahar Airfield; operating in Kandahar Province Special Operations Task Force South-East (USN) U/I location; operating -
Unity Task Force Recommendations
BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS COMBATING THE CLIMATE CRISIS AND PURSUING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Climate change is a global emergency. We have no time to waste in taking action to protect Americans’ lives and futures. From Houston, Texas, to Paradise, California; from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Davenport, Iowa, the last four years have seen record-breaking storms, devastating wildfires, and historic floods. Urban and rural communities alike have suffered tens of billions of dollars in economic losses. Dams have failed catastrophically in Michigan. Neighborhoods have been all but wiped off the map in Florida. Farmers’ crops have been drowned in their fields across the Midwest. Thousands of Americans have died. And President Trump still callously and willfully denies the science that explains why so many are suffering. Like so many crises facing the United States, the impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed in our society or our economy. Communities of color, low-income families, and indigenous communities have long suffered disproportionate and cumulative harm from air pollution, water pollution, and toxic sites. Highways have been built to enforce racial segregation in our cities, with federal dollars and federal policy support. Coal companies have been allowed to reduce or ignore their obligations to fund retirees’ promised health care benefits and pensions. From Flint, Michigan, to the Navajo Nation, to Lowndes County, Alabama, millions of Americans have been denied access to clean, safe drinking water and even the most basic wastewater infrastructure. And although the youngest generations of Americans have contributed the least to this calamity, they stand to lose the most as they suffer from the impacts of runaway carbon pollution for decades to come. -
Task Force & Strike Team Leader Guidebook
Task Force & Strike Team Leader Guidebook Updated for 2021 Table of Contents Code of Conduct 1 Expectations for all Responders 1 Task Force/Strike Team Leader Expectations 3 Checklist 1 – Assembly 5 Checklist 2 - Arrival 6 Checklist 3 - Demobilization 7 OSFM Structure Protection Guide 8 Sprinklers 18 Flagging 19 Forms Overview 20 Form – Task Force/Strike Team Resource Form 21 Form – Resource Manifest 22 Form – Apparatus Form 23 Form – ICS-214/Unit Log 24 Form – Incident Demobilization Inspection 25 Form – Engine Company or Crew Performance Rating 26 Form – Task Force After Action Review 27 Standard Incident Communications Plan 29 Wildland Fire COVID-19 Screening Tool 30 Apparatus Cleaning 31 Code of Conduct It is the duty of personnel mobilized by the State of Oregon to maintain high standards of performance and conduct that will promote public trust and provide the best possible service to Oregon. Personnel are expected to demonstrate cooperation, efficiency, integrity, and accountability in the performance of their duties. It is expected that all mobilized resources will conduct themselves in a professional manner, meet the performance standards for their position, and comply with all local, state, and federal laws. Your actions, behavior, and work ethic will be scrutinized by those with whom you work and interact and by the citizens being served. You represent the State of Oregon, your region, and your department as an individual and as a team member on the fire line, in camp, and in transit. Work hard, learn as much as you can, and come home safe. Specific Expectations for All Responders Adhere to applicable safety standards. -
Joint Interagency Task Force–South: the Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success by Evan Munsing and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 5 Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success by Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for Strategic Conferencing. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands, to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at NDU, and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and to the broader national security community. Cover: Joint Interagency Task Force–South headquarters at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. Photo by Linda Crippen Inset: Crossed-out snowflakes and marijuana leaves represent drug seizures. USCG (PA2 Donnie Brzuska) Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success By Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 5 Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2011 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options Alan Vick • David Orletsky Bruce Pirnie • Seth Jones Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited R Project AIR FORCE The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Stryker Brigade combat team : rethinking strategic responsiveness and assessing deployment options / Alan Vick ... [et al.]. p. cm. “MR-1606.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3268-2 1. United States. Army—Reorganization. 2. Unified operations (Military science) 3. United States—Armed Forces—Foreign service. 4. Airlift, Military— United States. 5. Military sealift—United States. I. Vick, Alan. UA25 .S857 2002 355.1'3'0973—dc21 2002031870 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 2002 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2002 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 202, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] PREFACE Under the leadership of Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, the U.S. -
JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
Joint Publication 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations 26 April 2007 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides joint doctrine for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing joint special operations task force (JSOTF) operations to include targeting and mission planning. It also provides guidance for establishing command relationships normally associated with a JSOTF or theater special operations command. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. -
The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept
PRESS - INFO - PRESS THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES CONCEPT The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) provides flexible and efficient means to enable the Alliance to generate forces at short notice, providing rapidly deployable, multi-national, multi- service task forces with appropriate command and control arrangements. A CJTF is a deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defence of the Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. The wide variety of possible uses of CJTFs, potentially in very different circumstances, places considerable demands on the arrangements for commanding and controlling such operations. The role of the headquarters for a CJTF is therefore crucial. CJTF headquarters “nuclei” or core staffs are being established on a permanent basis within selected “parent” headquarters of the NATO military command structure. Together with “augmentation” modules and “support” modules generated for the purposes of a specific operation they will form a headquarters to command a CJTF structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question. The concept was launched in late 1993 and endorsed at the Brussels Summit of January 1994. On that occasion, Alliance Heads of State and Government directed that the further development of the concept should also reflect their readiness to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions by the North Atlantic Council, for operations led by the Western European Union (WEU) thereby supporting the building of the European Security Defence Identity. In addition, they linked the development of the CJTF concept to practical political-military cooperation with non-NATO nations. -
Korean War, Which Began 60 Years Ago and Ended Korean Three Years Later on July 27, 1953
TaTasksk ForceForce PenetrationPenetration By LTC James H. Lynch This article is part of ARMY Maga- zine’s ongoing commemoration of the Army’s service to America during the Korean War, which began 60 years ago and ended Korean three years later on July 27, 1953. War The retrospective series covering at the war and its aftermath will run 60 through 2012. This article appeared in the January 1951 issue of ARMY. 60 ARMY I September 2010 To link up with the 31st Infantry Regiment, a task force of the 7th Cavalry Regiment drove 178 miles through enemy territory, engaging in a sharp skir- mish at a river-crossing on the first night and a remarkable tank-killing spree on the final night. t 1700 on September 21, 1950, near Tabu-dong, which is 12 miles north of Taegu, LTC William A. Harris, commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, issued a warning or- der. As soon as the 1st Battalion had taken Tabu-dong and joined with the 8th Cavalry about 2 miles south of it, the order aaread, I would organize Task Force Lynch and move my force in a motorized column to seize and secure the river-crossing at Sonsan on the Naktong, some 25 miles to the northeast. The territory my force would move through to get there was held by part of the North Ko- rean 1st and 3rd Divisions. These elements had been badly mauled by the 1st Cavalry Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Division in 10 days of recent fighting around Waegwan, Tabu-dong and the walled City of Kasan.