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J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-78-02-01 on 1 February 1942. Downloaded from VOL. LXXVIII. FEBRUARY, 1942. No. 2. Authors are alone responsible for the statements _' ("...8<:8. 0 4~~ mad. ODd ... opinioruo ........... in ,'oh "P~ :!t ~({!1gr ~o~'1I)!;$ ~"- .~ ~ ~ 1,/~~~' Journal .~ • ~~40~ ~ of the ~~' O~ _ Royal Army Medic~orps. Original Communications. 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. " BLITZKRIEG." AN APPRECIATION. By BRI(!ADIER E. M. COWELL, C.B., CB.E., D.S.a., T.D. THIS is the title of a small book written by F. O. Miksche and recently published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. The author, an officer of the Regular Army :of the Czechoslovak Republic for twelve years, served with distinction with the Republican forces in the late War in Spain. The book is described by Tom Wintringham in his introduction as "a Conti­ nental, a European\ essay on Tactics." LieutenantMiksche writes with a sound knowledge of Germal1 tactics and a practical experience of Total War. He is in a position to be able to describe' tJ.()t only the plans for attack' on the new lines exploited by the http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ Germans with their ,armoured and motorized forces but also the methods to be adopted in defence in depth, as employed so brilliantly by our gallant Russian allies to-day. ' All medical officers in a Field Force will perform their duties with success 'proportional to their knowl~dge'oftactics. Whether it be the Regimental Medical Officer or the Director of Medical Services, m~dical arral~gements wiIH,,\iluilless'the tictical situation be studied, understood and appreciated tram a ptactical angle. 1'ri war many'of us have found that the medi~al services function at their b~~t when they cease to be ". A" and become" G." ' , on September 25, In" Blitzkrieg " the teaching is sound, practical and so important that ',all Medical Officers in the Field are advised to read, absorb and apply the lessons without delay. ' 5 J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-78-02-01 on 1 February 1942. Downloaded from « Blitzkrieg" In Chapter I a study is made of the reasons which led to the downfall of France and of the methods of Total War adopted and practised by the Germans in the Battle of Flanders, 1940. ' "Infiltration, both tactical, economic and political, is described and the Maginot psychosis is suitably d~alt with. The old' doctrines of Clausewitz have been revived and brought up to date. Attack is superior to defence because it forces the defence to opel:ate under unfavourable conditions. The basal factors of the German Blitzkrieg are surprise, speed and superiority in material and fire power. - The German doctrine teaches the value of local superiority. Hecon" naissance by contact units having revealed a weak spot, troops are conceni trated on a narrow front arid an intense attack delivered. This becomes possible by improved transport methods, superiority in fire power and per­ fected communications including the use of wireless. The fighting force hits hard and swiftly by means of its tanks., lorried infantry aild air arm. 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. These methods were worked out by Germans fighting with Franco's Army in Spain. In Chapter II a study is made of Spanish fighting, commencing with the Battle of Guadalajara, March 8, 1937. Here 150 Italian tanks achieved a local. success but two motorized. divisions. of six, battalions each and on separate roads failed to advance with sufficient speed. Bad weather con- ditions bogged the vehicles so that a surprise Republican air attack on the 12th createq pa11ic and a complete rout of the Italians. Next day, supported 'by forty heavy Russian tanks, the Republicans successfully continued the attack. At Brunette in July, 1937, tanks again failed because they operated on a wide front in accordance with the French theories and did not form a spear -head, 'tactical- thrust-point or " Schwerpunkt," supported by guns and aero- planes, according to the German plan. " At Bilbao, in the same year, a break through was secured on a narrow front hardly a thousand yards wide. This gap was enlarged by the direction http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ of the attack- b,eing switched laterally to cut communications, shooting up_ the defence from the rear. , Another important lesson from Spain is the value of .fortified villages and towns as islands of resistance Jor all-rO\lild defence; this will be referred to later and is of interest f~om the medi~al ,point of v,iew. C Chapter IlI.'-At the end of the Spanish War new methods of attack were worked out and used for the first time by the Fascists. In Aragon motorized columns 'pushed forward at the rate of twenty-five miles a day while in Catalonia the pace was doubled, largely owing to concomitailt air on September 25, ,attack. In Poland .in J939 the tempo was again increased, largely by means of overwhelming air superiority, Fifth Column activities and destruction of all Polish intercommunications. J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-78-02-01 on 1 February 1942. Downloaded from E.M. Cowell 55 Tank units broke through the wide Polish front, a pinning attack was made on every position the Poles 'took up and resistance was finally crushed by further attack from the rear. These lessons were not· appreciated by the French. In 1940 General Gamelin expected a repetition of the German move of 1914 and disposed his strongest force in front of Brussels, leaving two weak armies to defend a front of ninety miles .. It was here that three German columns crossed the Meuse on narrow fronts, May 12-13. This took the French by surprise, because. the Ardennes were thought to be .impassable owing to lack of rail­ ways and roads. But there were enough roads for armoured and motorized " formations. This" irruption," which was an advance on -narrow fronts, took place at such" speed that Abbeville was reached ten days later, May 24. In the second phase of the fighting after the evacuation of the B.-E.F'. the FreiIch waited on the" Weygand Line," and did not attempt any counter­ , manceuvre or counter-infiltration. On June 8 three narrow breaches were made through which seven Panzer Divisions were poured and which con­ 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. tinued to advance some thirty miles a day. This ended the French resistance . This success resulted from the new conception of warfare. The Germans attack the enemy flanks or rear and achieve this by searching for and piercing the defence on narrow fronts. This narrow gap is not wide enough for slow-moving masses but will permit fast-moving vehicles to pass through. On a. twelve mile front intensive attack may be concentrated on two or three points, each headed in a divergent direction so that Panzer Divisions, having broken through, can attack the defence zones from the flanks and rear. This method is described by the two German words "Schwerpunkt" and" Aufrollen." A " Schwerpunkt" or thrust-point implies the continual seeking for the weakest points of resistance, the application of a locally superior force and the constant maintenance of initiative and surprise. The" Aufrollen," which alternates with the movement of the Schwer­ http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ punkt, is the immediate and methodical exploiting of each local success by side, thrusts which protect the flanks of the advancing units. A modern battle is no longer fought along a wide front but over' wide areas. The line has given place to the column and operations are conducted in great depth. Chapter IV.-'-In this chapter the basic factors for success, initiative, surprise and speed, as outlined by Clausewitz, are again emphasized. Whereas troops used to move on the approach march at 15 to 25 miles a day, they now advance at 100 to 150 miles a day_ It is estimated that with on September 25, motorization the pace of development of any tactical situation is six or seven times faster than previously. Main forces can be moved rapidly from their concentration areas in any direction required, using roads and not railways. These areas may be 100 to 150 miles away from the foremost enemy forces" J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-78-02-01 on 1 February 1942. Downloaded from 56 « Blitzkrieg" so. far away that the massed attacking force thl"eatens not one but many [sectors of the enemy front. Actual physical concentration is no longer necessary. All that is needed 'is an elastic grouping which allows of rapid movement. The factors determining the choice of the strategical thrust~point are: . (i) The road system centring on the attack sector. (ii) Roads on the enemy side with diverging routes, (iii) The position of the enemy's strategical reserves . (iv) The presence of lateral roads to allow of rapid transfer to a new sector if the first attack fails. Plans for the first phase in the m~ve up from the elastic concentration to the r'egrouping zone include mo.vement of units in the order in ~hich they will go. into action. The second phase of the approach march is from the regrouping zone to the point of contact. 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. The normal order of march will be: (i) Armoured (Panzer) Divisions. (ii) Shock Divisions (specially trained, provided with extra weapons). (iii) Motorized Divisions. (iv) Normal Infantry Di~isions . Advanced echelons may travel 12 to 24 hours. ahead and will consist;of : (i) Reconnaissance troops working with air co~operation and includ­ ing staff and commanders, who travel in plain battle-dress in lorr1('s on trucks and not staff cars.
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