SOLUnON Ha.JS£is£
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
•L* \zA2USi Ur XwJLx i_.l 1U —X>Jti JtUSiX UaMxiU IL' Xr.( r.r .' At.\^ft BY oCUv AM, C. &G. S. Sch.. Fort Leevenworth 3-15-80 —25M >
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH
THE ATTACK
AND DEFENSE
OF A RIVER LIKE
IN
FUTURE WASS.
•
no. 69
//^r^-y*^/7 £e^tjuC^- Crrf>*'>fr2«-1 Fort Leavenworth, Kanaae,
June 2, 1930.
MBIORANDOI for the Director Second Tear Class, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*
SUBJECTS A Study of the attack and defense of a river line in future
wars*
1. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING. *a. Bibliography for this study.
b. This discussion does not attempt to go in to the details
of river crossings and the technical means? a very good discussion say " be found in "River Crossings in the Presence of the Enemy by Colonel
Robert Noraand, French Army. 4 2* The two chief obstacles to be encountered in any war, ore *MBlmpassable mountains and rivers. The purpose of this study is to
consider development* of our present scientific and mechanical age* its influence upon strategical and administrative organisations and the re
sulting influences upon the attack and defense of a river line.
3•>> Scientific development and the world's industrial ex* P> A 4 pans ion willhave the most to do with our conduct of the wars of tomorrow. Let us glance back to the World War as a starting point*
Here we have illustrated the far reaching efforts of the improvement of
our fire weapons \u2666 As a defense against them, there was developed a trench system in several lines on both sides protected by obstacles aching from the Alps to the North Sea* The use of mining, gas and flation by one side was followed by neutralising inventions on the other which kept the war stabilized until the breaking of this line by the
tank and more important the entry of the United States with her great
reserves of man-power and industrial resources* Thus we have the mobilization of practically all the most
important nations of the world on either one side or the other; some defeated and others conquerors, and then the final lasue on the western
front in 1918 without a brilliant successful victory but the mass on one side wearing the other side out* The Allies, with the inexhaustible
power and resources of the United States behind them, were the v£6t*gg>
1 I?©USTfcY WON.
What bawe been the conclusions which the leading powers
have drawn from their mm experiences as regards the organisation of
thrir arm lea?
The Baited States and England have returned to their pre-war peace time arcr The United States ha« considerably extended her efforts
toward industrial mobiiixation and for military training of bar youth
and Enjd^p has developed a strong air arc and is carrying oat experiments
with mech*nitation.
France is reorganising her army on new lin#e, the main fea
tures >M whitth consist of the Maintenance of a pes.ee time war strength
army ready for action on short notice and universal training to provide
for strong reserves. Industrial mobilization and the early trairing of
youth are worked out. A powerful air service also esusts.
Italy seems to. count on supporting h«»r prolessional army b Fascist Militia and e^loltinp actively the military fascist train
ing of youth.
Germany le restricted by the Peace Treaties*
Rusnia is trying; to provide herself with a peace time anuy, so Sufficient for her security and to control her immensa war power by the militia system \u2666
Poland, Csecho Slovakia and Tugo Slavia have the prewar as system of universal training reduced iOf low as possible while the neces sary peace time armies are maintained in a state of the greatest possible readiness*
It wouL d seem from this that the experience of the World \e Wfir has resulted in no great departure fror. the principal of prewar days.
The political and general economic situation compels all states to reduce their expenditures for armament and at the come time limitas far as possible the unproductive exploitation of the nation's man power by military service*
Each nation has more or less a different problem from the other. Franoe» for its security, feels that it has to have a large
2 army and all the man power trained* But then France has a land frontier of three hundred miles and the people of France wish to have their feel* Ing of safety satisfied* The raaembrance of the last war cannot pass so quickly since it was fought mostly on the soil of France*
In Germany this same preparation might take place ifit were not for the restrictions passed on it* From the above discussion, suppose we draw the conclusion, which seems a logical one, that there willnot be another major war until the nations of Europe have regained their wealth and industrial power to compete with the United States and England* (2)•
Lieutenant General Sir w. Hastings Andersen, K.C.P, , Quar termaster General, English Amy, says "We have to do something every year, and we must go slow to be sure that we are building in the right direction, so that the young men who have the knowledge and the experience in regard to the new mechanical forces ,may find the way plain for them and made in the right direction* They must not find that we are organ ising an army which is not required." (4) A thought in accord with the action of the first nations of the World*
Gemer&l voaSeeclgt, of the German Relchswehr in referring to the peace time armies of today, says: "The peace tine army, which may also be designated a covering or operating army, willconsist of profee sional soldieru, if possible of volunteers, serving for a. long period."
The strength of this Jinny willbe in proportion to the financial resources of the country, its military and geographical eituati on and its site; it must at least provide it with security against surprise hostile attack."
"For the arming of the masses there is only one way; to decide upon the type of weapon, and then to prepare for mans production whon the need an * ises/ (2)
As a logical sequence the thoughts expressed herein, we come to the question. What willbe our next weapons of warfare and how will our scientific and industrial development play sn important part la the
3 wars of the fttffcffct
Scientific developments since the last war hare made great
JjLpioiWMiiitil in tilt airplane and their means of production. Experiment* in. have been carried on the production of gas and the development of tanks* sation ifife* the mass production of all kinds of notor most uneconomical state of affairs imaginable, due to the fatt that they become obsolete and would be of doubtful military value. Think, for instance, of storing ten thousand airplanes, to have them rendered worth less at the end of the year. Therefore, it may be said that nations willhave as a * naxfmum, few weapons for experimental purposes at the a T^cipOfcioii o x e\no vuior wbt* #> The nations today, which have a dominating influence on the political situation of the world on account of their wealth and industrial power are England find the United States . The United States can manufacture approximately 5,000,000 automobiles and 900,000 truck* a year in peaoe time end could probably increase that production 2b% in six months if there were any demand* The airplane industry turned oat 4,300 airplanes in 1928 and 6,000 in 1929. Also, today, there are 25,000,000 automobile s snd 4,500,000 trucks registered in the United States. When we consider how more economical it is to transport loads with a truck of a three ton capacity as against the use of two esoort wagons of the same total capacity and the keen realisation of this factor during the World War, and even as far back as the Mexican border trouble, so far as the United States is concerned. We om feel assured that for administrative purposes the motor truck willbe the means of transportation in conjunction with the railroads* lot only is the use of motor transportation cheaper than the equivalent animal transport, but the savings in bulk of forage over gasoline and oil is very great* This 4 Is particularly Important in mi OTersea expedition where the sea trans* port is limited. For strategical purposes, already the nations have proved in the World War that infantry, artillery and tanks can be sored from one front to another. There are several faotors which make the use of motor transport mandatory for strategical purposes in future wars* They are: • \u25a0 (1) The aeknolwedged need for further mobility to obtain strategical surprises, and prevent stabilisation* (2)* The existence of automobiles and trucks, trained drivers and mechanics, organisations to produce then in great quantities all existing in.the two greatest industrial nations in comcercial life. (3) * The need of increased speed for infantry who oronot ke9p up withtheir arms and willbe slowed by the airplane in the next war if left to march. (4)• As a means of obtaining the principle of mass , movement and objective* (6) • Tine as an important lactor, the saving in time obtained by using the vast resources of motor vehicles now in existence which could not possibly be diminished in number before the event of another war. Major General C. Bonham Carter, British Army, says in reference to nobile warfare: "What wre we all trying to do when we think about mechanisation? We are trying to ensure that war infuture shall be mobile * Ifa great war were fought again in the circumstances of the last, the victors just as much as the vanquished would be ruined* Ifwe are not successful, therefore, in planning mobile warfare, the only sensible advice that the military advisers of the Government, could % give, in the event of the danger of a great war, would be to avoid fight* ing at all costs •" (3 ) \u25a0 Should this be an expression of the thoughts of military men of all first nations, itwillbe interesting to observe the commercial 5 development of these nations along motor transport, lines* The use of motoriiation fo administrative purposes and strategical movements are allied one with the other end can be adopted at the beginning of any war between first class nations in proportion to the industrial development of these nations* Motorization or mechanisation for tactical purposes willbe subject for research and experimentation well in to the future* In an undeveloped country whore there are no roads for motorized vehicles, even for administrative and strategical purposes them can bo no use for motorization, except, possibly to the border where it does not lie across the seas* Here, the animal drawn transport will have to be used, light artillery, machine guns and possibly a machine shoulder rifle. In other words, an army such as the pro World War one supported by the airplane* Since such a war does not seem the most probable to prepare for itis not discussed here* Further, the organisation of the present day peace time armies lends Itself to expansion for such a purpose and there seems to be no reason to suppose that such a war would become stabilised* The tactical organisation that the nations of the world are Interested in begins with one which surrounds the tank and its develop* ment since the war* The use of the airplane seems to be taken for granted as used in the World War* As far as the tank is concerned, if itis to hold to a speed of from one to three miles for the attack, so a to conform to the speed of attacking infantry, it should be as small ami so light as possible* Light in order to be transportable and small osras to present a difficult target for anti-tank guns* The use of this • tank with the infantry* and as a part of the tactical unit of walking infantry in combat, becomes an effective ana for breaking up combat groups and strong points containing machine guns and other automatic weapons* k good many British writers advocate a small tank with a speed of ten miles an hour, to bo accompanied by motorized infantry In the attack* this tame infantry to dismount and hold localities after 6 they are taken, fighting on foot* This method of fighting would, no doubt, out down the amber of individual participants which is desired, however itis not believed that a future deval^pieni in the method of fighting our future battles, would take the. infantryman entirely off hie feet* Itwould seen . far more justifiable .to predict that steel palisades would be trans pjrteui to strategical points behind and wader which the infantryman is to fight* The most vital question today as to the effectiveness of the airfcroe as an only arm in war, is how it could hold territory gained without accompanying ground troops* So itmight U> be with reference to a completes^ motorized force , ffcfantrymen fighting sjp^y^ w ~ in tanks and in armored oars of some description* IsW oaa local succes ses on the battle field be consolidated* As soon as a largelane body of armored vehicles are brought together and are stabilised in one group they become a target for the hostile artillery* When they are moving and are scattered unless they come under direct fire they are not rwsy vulnerable* This is proven in the use of the light and medium tank* Another factor to consider ie what troops are going to ex ploit the wooded areas, mountainous regions that willnot allow the use of motor vehicles* Itis true this discussion does not contemplate that a major decision willbe sought except in the open in . the next great war* nevertheless all areas, local and general, willhave some influence in the ultimate results* Therefore, for tactical purposes, itis believed a flexible organization best fits the needs of the nations of today* Such a one that willhave the infantry fighting on foot ac companied as prescribed by tanks, this organisation covering the artillery In its movements so as to be assisted by its fire* That all units of +rfcVC+or**—** infantry, to be completely motorized Including small light iwrt' tread vehicles to transport machine guns, howitzers and 37 mm. guns across country* The War Department in1930, approved a provisional reorgani sation of infantry units in the war streangth infantry division, increas ing the number of machine from 144 to 256, motorizes the field trains of infantry regiment and Increases the 37 an* guns and howitzers to 32* 7 This is a movement in the direction of complete motorixation within cer t\in limits And itis believed willultimately resolve itself in to a completely motorized infantry division with both light and medium tanks, oapable of a maximal speed of three one one-half miles per hour for the light tank and twelve miles per hour for the medium* That the medium be used as leading tanks to blase the way, supported by artillery fire laid down as counter battery, in. The writer believes that fortaotloal purposes thatTtbe next war that motorisation willbe complete except for the walking infantrymen armed with the rifle* That the organisation of our present war strength division willbe changed from year to year so that in future wars itwill r. be as outlined below* INFANTRT DIVISICBE OF TOMORROW. (1). HEADQUARTERS AND SPECIAL TROOPS completely motorized, with oars motorcycles, trucks and buses* Organisation to be flexible so that detachments can go with each brigade of infantry* Headquarters, Headquarters Company, MilitaryPolice Company, Signal Company* Service Company , Light tank Battalion, Medium Tank Company, Ordnance Company, Armored Car Squadron. (2)» INFANTRY BRIGADES, completely motorized, walking infantrymen to be supplied with transportation by the Division Quarter* master Train* The brigade willbe of the formation above and for this purpose willbe given approximately half of the supporting artillery, administrative troops, and motor fighting units* Organisations Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Z Infantry Regiments containing 8 Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Service Company, How itior (8 37 nun guns; 8 SMSM Howitzers) Machine Gun Company (16 guns) Medical, The Infantry batta; ion to have a Headquarters, three rifle companies and one machine gun oompany# (3) • FIEID ARTILLEEY BRIGADE ooniisting of two regiments of 75s and one regiment of 1555, completely motorized* The 75s to be equipped with bearings on the wheels so they can be pulled at high speeds ifneoessary, means of transportation for long distance and on roads to be by truck, each gun to have a small tractor for dragging the gun across country. The 155s to be equipped with pneumatic wheels in addition to its tractor:; treads for rapidity of movement over roads** Allartillery to be able to move at the rate of twenty-five miles per hour. Regimental and headquarters, sufficiently equipped with personnel equipnent to function away from the brigade headquarters* (4) • ENGINEER REGIMENT of a Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Qorapany and two battalions completely motorized* This organiza tion to be sufficiently flexible to allow a division into two parts for the purpose of operating with a brigade* To be equipped with sufficient Kapok foot bridges for training purposes and to be trained in the use of the Light Brigade Company and Bridge Battalion equipment* Equipment to be supplied as needed* (6) • MEDICAL REGIMENT, same as present organisation but completely motorized and flexible so as to be able to operate with both brigades* En For the sake of mobility there should be more times for the brigade to operate alone than not, moving for long distances, possibly cutting aloose from its supply l»ases and depending upon supplies carried or receiving supplies by aeroplane* The natural development should be toward the use of smaller forces in as much as the military thought is 4 9 toward great nobility and the industrial lifeof the nations of the world furnishes the means* THE ATTACK AMDD2FBISE OF A RIVER LINE. Our Field Service Regulations states Owing to the restrictions which they impose upon movement and maneuver, river lines exercise considerable influence on military operations* They constitute obstacles to an attack and material lines of resistance for a defense* River crossings require special prepara tion, both technical and tactical, proportionate to the size of the river and strength of the command •" (1) There are three general methods of successfully attacking river lines, they' are: (1). TURNING MOVEMENT* By demonstrations carried out at various points on the river line, attempt is made to deceive the enemy as to the projected point of crossing while the main force turns the hostile flank and effects its transfer t/> the farther bank before the opponent can readjust his dispositions* Examples of such crossings are UASSBNfc on the LEiVAT in 1799, NAPOLEON on the DANUBE in 1809, NAPOLEON on the BEREZINA in 1812 RUSSIANS on the DANUBE in 1877* (2). TO SEIZE TEE CROSSINGS BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN ARRIVE: When the enemy is near but not actually holding a river line that must be crossed, effort is made to anticipate him in posession of the necessary crossings* Cavalry, las been frequently employed in operations of this kind* (3)• FORCH) CROSSING OF A RtVEß when the enemy is .already <5a posession of the river line which cannot be turned, itmust be forced* This usually is Initiated on an extended front* Examples of these kinds of crossings are NAPOLEON on the RHINE in 1805, RUSSIANS on the DANUBE in 1877, JAPANESE on the YALU in 1904, 10 GERMANS on the MARNE in 1918. (l) (4) In the future the strategical and taetloal cons iteration willbe the sane as in past wars, rivers willbe of special ixaportanco • Hostilities willopen with attack and counterattack on the part of th* opposing air fleets* This willbe taken over rapidly by those troops we ready for aotiw* service* while the reserve in sen and material are being mobilised to obtain decisive action against the enemy or in defen sive against his superior force* (2) The beginning of any hostilities at once necessitates the study of the theater of operations* Data im reference to rivers in the theatre are contained in maps, handbooks and historical records kept In central localities* This information must be supplement ed as rapidly as possible by aerial observation, aerial photography and all other means available. (1) Since itis believed that a river willact as a barrier behind which the defender willtake up an active or passive defense sooner or later and the fact that the defenders* dispositions and ability to defend at a river line willcontrol the situation the plan of a defense of a river line is first discussed* THE DEFEHSE OP A HVER LINE* Time Is the most important factor for the attacker, he must push the advantage obtained by his sup; rior air force or quicker znobili zation of his ground forces* Therefore, the defender must repulse the attack at the river with the minimum forces a t the points of probable crossing in order not to disperse* his force unduly* Should tho attempted crossings be repulsed and contact be made along the river, itif not be* lleved that either side willmaintain large forces in the vicinity of the river as in previous mars, but that dispositions willbe made in depth with small forces in contact at the river and greater portion of the troops held back at ler-.st one hundred miles* For this reason a forced crossing and a crossing by a turning movement (feints at different points) becomes the same kind of operation* Thus any dispositions made by the defender for defense becomes the same in either case* 11 jtoy plan of defense wouldbe *.prophecy, however, with the facts at hand it should not be very difficultto come to a very close approximation, such as set forth herewith* Length of river line, 160 idles* (1). RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION: Continuous night and day for a distance of two hundred miles to the far side of the river* The mission to be that of determining the disposition of all hostile troops, the move* ment of small detachments by motor or other means toward the river* To determine the location of bridge equipment, this aviation reconnaissance to be centralised under the Commanding General of the AirForces who will keep the o*2 sections of all interested troops informed* SECRET AGENTS: To have secret agents scattered well into the areas to find out the location of all enemy troops* These agents to work under the G-2 Section of the General Headquarter s, or Army » GRODND: By armored oars along the far side of the river for a distance of twenty -five miles along all important avenues of ap proach, with special attention to any movement of vehicles, single or in groups on river reconnaissance, or attempted movement of any brigge material* One araored oar squadron per seventy -five miles should be sufficient to cover this front , INFANTS!: Motorized detacb&ents of infantry at each bridge equipped with searchlights and machine guns for the purpose of refusing the near bank to small detachments on reconnaissance* One battalion of infantry to each seventy; five miles* The sice of this detachment would depend somewhat upon the number of existing crossing* These do taohments to be accompanied by engineers who willprepare the bridges for demolition and destroy them when the river line is abandoned « (2)* FIRST LINE TROOPS: To be an infantry division (less a brigade) organised as set forth herein for each seventy-five miles of river line, located thirty-five miles in rear with roads and lines of communication to all parts of the river line in the section* This or ganization for the purpose of immediate attack before the attackar can land too many troops and especially its tanks* 12 SECOND LIN3 TROOPS: RESERVES. Corps of three divisions / less trodps on first line and Corps troops organized as set forth herein for 150 miles of river line, located centrally from one hundred to two hundred miles in rear of the river, depending upon the oommuni oations, generally not mor than ten hours away from the furthese part of the river line. For the purpose of counterattack, to drive the enemy back at his places of crossings and deny him freedom of maneuver on the near side cf the river*. Also, destroy any of his bridges that he may build. GENERAL RESCTH2: Concentrations and mobilizations prepared to take the offensive "when the situation presents itself. This plan contemplates the folowing results: Rapid transmission of complete information. The immediate launching of counterattack before too many of the enemy have crossed. Especially the tanks. Destroy the enemy bridges by bombardment aviation, medium artillery and floating mines. Road net and railroad net organised from the zone of the reserves to the river. Troops trained and maneuvered for rapidity in loading on ao tor transport and movement to the river lire, P Mobile artillery trained in movement to the river and base lines for firing established. Location established for railway artillery; firing data prepared for covering possible crossings, in order to destroy bridges constructed; plans for interdicting roads and crossroads. This artillery roost probably placed when the eneisy has sufficiently disclosed his dis positions to show where he is making his main crossings. That the units at the river engage only in delaying action. The first line of reserves counterattack before the attacker can land his tanks and artillery.- Delay ifnot successful. The second line of reserves to reinforce the first line reserves and expedite the counter offensive. 13 Ifthe river is wide oartain parts could be enfiladed with machine gun and artillery fire, keeping the guns camouflaged and not firinguntil the attackers start over* This plan, however, does not seem as good as one which contemplates attacking after he has crossed some of his troops, organizing in depth in order that the attackers will meet increased resistance as he advances* That the aviation willdestroy any bridges that may be constructed by the attackers for the use of his artillery, tanks and sup«» That the engineers willbe equipped with floating mines to be floated down against any bridges constructed * Also that they will have at different localities along the river, improvised rafts which can be floated down with burning barrels of oil to interrupt all crossings of foot bridges, with particular attention to rafts carrying tanks and /4 artillery* That there willbe sufficient motor transport for all units Time is the main factor and it should be exploited to the greatest extent* THE ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE* The objective of any aimed force willbe the army of the hostile oountry* Should a temporary superiority be obtained either by the ground forces or the air fleet, itis enoumbent upon the attacker to seek out the army of the defender and disastrously defeat or destroy it before additional man power and industrial power can be organised* Finding the defender behind a river makes itmandatory to cross that river, establish a bridgehead and move all troops available against his army* Itis with only one strategical operation that we are in terested, that is the mass of the troops of both sides disposed at a dis tance from the river* In future wars we willnot fond one force getting to a river ahead of another nor a turning movement being any different from a forced crossing as discussed herein* 14 SURPRISE, both strategic and tactical are desirable for certain success* Strategic surprise may be obtained by making the dis position of the main force for the main crossing unknown to the defender* Tactical surprise may be obtained by attracting the attention to feints or crossings at several localities, causing the defender to disperse his forces, while the attacker concentrates his maximum effort on that part of the river nearest his main force* Training: The troops should be well trained for the opera tionf not so much in details of secrecy as in past wars, but the effective maneuvering of boats and rafts across the river and the prompt preparation of unloading facilities for supporting arms which willhave to follow the first infantry wave* Anti-tank guns should be sent over early inthe operation, also the machine gun tractors and it; is desirable to have the light tanks rafted over before any bridges are constructed* Time is the 'r3r3 factor and the whole operation should be organised with this in view* Let us consider a plan for making a river crossing along a a one hundred and fiftymile front, as in the defense* (1)* RECONNAISSANCE: Aviation night and day to at least two hundred miles to the defender's side of the river* To locate the enemy's forces immediately and guard reserves* Ground forces, consist T ing of armored oars, advancing over a broad front to obtain a breal through and make special reconnaissance of particular points of the river* Photographs should be taken of the river and of the adjacent country in advance* Reconnaissance should be made of the roads and approaches to the river and plans made for rapid movement over these roads once the operation is launched* Movement willnecessarily have to be regulated by traffic posts on all roads* (2)* BHMBER OF CROSSINGS* Itis believed that the cross ing should be made on a broad front with not less than three localities chosen in the one hundred and fifty miles* That each force dispatchnd to make the orossing must be tactically complete with the necessary fire weapons, armored motor vehicles and bridge equipment. It is understood that all discussions refer to motorized units for administrative and 15 strategical purpose and tactical, except infantry* (3) • MOVBffiNT TO THE RIVER. That each individual force to move to the river from approximately one hundred miles back. Grossing over a wide front* That the troops be so disposed that they id11 oome up in order of their crossing* That this movement be made entirely by motor at night• (4)* THE TIME OP CROSSING. That all groups arrive at the same time for the crossing. Ifcrossings are contemplated at four local ities of the one hundred and fifty miles, they should be made at the same time and the crossings within the group coordinated* Since the movement forward to the river is made at night and itis desirous to main the crossing under cover of darkness, itmight be advisable to make the movement forward during daylight where superiority of the air exists* This is, however, most undesirable and a movement by darkness, end the crossing, with the lighter units, the same night is the plan which con* tains the greater chance of success* (s)* FIRST TROOPS TO CROSS. These troops should be inf antry, accompanied by their different arms including machine guns, three inch howitzers, 37 mm. guns, light tanks and some 75 mm guns to be used as anti-tank guns* The infantry troops should cross on Kapok foot bridges* Sufficient bridge material should be carried to place b«+4oKoo one bridge over to a lulUlm iwre of infantry with plenty of spare mater ial* The infantry should be followed by the tanks and ether supple* mentary arms, rowed over inrafts constructed from the equipment of light bridge company* (6)* SECOND WAVE OF TROOPS* To consist of the field art illery, light and medium; itto be rafted over* There might be suf ficient time to construct a light bridge to take this equipment, but un less there is a overwhelming superiority of the air on the attacker's side Itwould no doubt be destroyed without being of effeotive use* In addi tion, the defender 9 s artillery would bring dectrjcti-.-v fire to bear upon these bridges as long as they w ere inrange • However, as soon as the defender has been pushed back to a distance from which he cannot reach 16 the river with Ms medium artillery fire (possibly six miles), and there has been sufficient time for the attacker to organise his anti-aircraft defense the bridges may be started* At least one light ponton bridge should be constructed and one heavy bridge at each locality* (7). THIRD WAVE OF TROOPS* The medium tanks, reserves and supply arrangements should be ferried and crossed to the far side of the river over heavy ponton bridges* (8) • The size of the forces sent to make the crossing will depend upon the Information that the attacker has of the dispositions of the defender, especially his reserves* The terrain willhave to be con sidered with regard to observation after the crossings have been made and the location of other rivers which might be located inthat vicinity* These forces should be a reinforced brigade or a division,ifitis planned that any one of the crossings may be used tor the main force or any part of it. Should more than one crossing be successful and only one is desired* the force should effectively dismantle its equipment when it is not needed in order that itmay be available for future operations* A permanent bridge should be constructed as rapidly as possible in the vicinity of the main crossing, located preferably in the vicinity of an old sitd where it willconnect through roads from one side of the river to the other* CROSSING WIDE RIVERS* In crossing wide rivers the operations willbe the same, with one exception; the boats for ferrying should be equipped with motors and the rafts willhave to be towed over by motor boats* Sufficient attachable motors must be acquired well in advance ad men trained in their operation, maintenance and method of attaching to tie ponton boats* 4* CONCLUSIONS* 1* That as a result of the experiences of the World War: the leading nations are not increasing the size of their armies and accu mulating exce solve stock of equipment and supplies but have returned to pre-orar conditions* 17 2* That the strength of the peace time army willbe in proportion to the financial resources of the country, its military and geographical situation and its size. 3* Time of another major war depends upon the regaining of industrial power by the nations of Europe • 4* That the political and general economic situation pre vents any preparation for war by storing uip vast quantities of supplies* * x 5. Scientific development and the -world's industrial ex pan b5 en willcontrol the conduct of the wars of tomorrow* V v \ 6* The use of motor driven vehicles for administrative and N * strategic purposes is the most economic and the most mobile* 7* Mobility be obtained all costs* \ will at X 8* That the tactical organisation for the attack is based £ V. the tank as the primary weapon* V 9* The dismounted infantryman willbe essential as he is N A v today* i fc r> 10* That the divisional organisation should be flexible in s & order to be used on any terrain* Itshould be so organised that itmay 2 be broken up in small groups which can operate independently* The ten dency willbe to use smaller faster fore ©8 in the operations of the future wars* 11* That river lines willexorcise important influences on military operations in future wars* This is particularly true on ac count of the advent of the large numbers of motor driven vehicles which willallow the defender to oonserve the mass of his forces inrear until the time arrives for him to move them to the locality where they are most needed* 12. That the defender willsooner or later during the opera* tion take up an active or a passive defense with a river as a barrier* 15* That time willbe the most important factor with the attacker in making a river crossing* ifhe exploits his superiority before the defender can strengthen his forces* 18 14, The forced cros sings of rivers willbe more of a turning movement than heretofore* The forces in contact at the river willbe small detachments with the main forces located away from the river* 15 • That detailed information willbe sought for by both the attacker and defender* That the means of communication willbe tar superior to thos operations of past wars* 16 • That the task willbe the most important weapon for de fense. 17 • Itwillbe desirable for the attacker to land anti- tan]: guns with the first troops to cross* Id* The defender should stage his attack at the points of crossing before the attacker has too many troops across; before the tanks are ferried over the river* 19* That the defender should launch his counterattack as soon as he has determined the main landing. 20* That although time is an important factor for the defen dorisurprise willgain the success he seeks* Strategical surprise may be obtained by disposing his main force ir such a way as to mask his fu ture movement of that foroe from the defender* Tactical surprise may be obtained by crossing at several localities separated by long distances, thus causing the defender to disperse his forces* 5* RECOMMEND ATIOISB * \u2666 Hone required* - • 6* CONCURRENCES None required* 19 BXBLXOORABSZ* • * 10 and 25. KKT: (2 10,26) & No* 2 text or article (below) pages 1. United States Field Service Regulations* German Reichs Z. Modem Armies. A lecture by General Yon Seeekt, of the Institution, wehr, contained la The Journal Royal United Service Febru~ ary, 1929. page 123 # 3. The Supply of Mechanised Forces in the Field. By Colonel D. C. Cameron, British Army, Commanding the Royal Axwy Service Corps Train- 1 College, before a War board s Conmittee, English Aimy# ling Servioe Instirution, ITovenber Contained in The Journal Eoyal United 1929, page 744* fennenie. by Colonel Robert 4#4 # FRaHCBLSaiEHT DES FLEUES en presence de l Nonaand, French Army* ** • 7