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The Command and General Staff School SOLUnON Ha.JS£is£ THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL •L* \zA2USi Ur XwJLx i_.l 1U —X>Jti JtUSiX UaMxiU IL' Xr.( r.r .' At.\^ft BY oCUv AM, C. &G. S. Sch.. Fort Leevenworth 3-15-80 —25M > INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LIKE IN FUTURE WASS. • no. 69 //^r^-y*^/7 £e^tjuC^- Crrf>*'>fr2«-1 Fort Leavenworth, Kanaae, June 2, 1930. MBIORANDOI for the Director Second Tear Class, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas* SUBJECTS A Study of the attack and defense of a river line in future wars* 1. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING. *a. Bibliography for this study. b. This discussion does not attempt to go in to the details of river crossings and the technical means? a very good discussion say " be found in "River Crossings in the Presence of the Enemy by Colonel Robert Noraand, French Army. 4 2* The two chief obstacles to be encountered in any war, ore *MBlmpassable mountains and rivers. The purpose of this study is to consider development* of our present scientific and mechanical age* its influence upon strategical and administrative organisations and the re­ sulting influences upon the attack and defense of a river line. 3•>> Scientific development and the world's industrial ex* P> A 4 pans ion willhave the most to do with our conduct of the wars of tomorrow. Let us glance back to the World War as a starting point* Here we have illustrated the far reaching efforts of the improvement of our fire weapons \u2666 As a defense against them, there was developed a trench system in several lines on both sides protected by obstacles aching from the Alps to the North Sea* The use of mining, gas and flation by one side was followed by neutralising inventions on the other which kept the war stabilized until the breaking of this line by the tank and more important the entry of the United States with her great reserves of man-power and industrial resources* Thus we have the mobilization of practically all the most important nations of the world on either one side or the other; some defeated and others conquerors, and then the final lasue on the western front in 1918 without a brilliant successful victory but the mass on one side wearing the other side out* The Allies, with the inexhaustible power and resources of the United States behind them, were the v£6t*gg> 1 I?©USTfcY WON. What bawe been the conclusions which the leading powers have drawn from their mm experiences as regards the organisation of thrir arm lea? The Baited States and England have returned to their pre-war peace time arcr The United States ha« considerably extended her efforts toward industrial mobiiixation and for military training of bar youth and Enjd^p has developed a strong air arc and is carrying oat experiments with mech*nitation. France is reorganising her army on new lin#e, the main fea­ tures >M whitth consist of the Maintenance of a pes.ee time war strength army ready for action on short notice and universal training to provide for strong reserves. Industrial mobilization and the early trairing of youth are worked out. A powerful air service also esusts. Italy seems to. count on supporting h«»r prolessional army b Fascist Militia and e^loltinp actively the military fascist train­ ing of youth. Germany le restricted by the Peace Treaties* Rusnia is trying; to provide herself with a peace time anuy, so Sufficient for her security and to control her immensa war power by the militia system \u2666 Poland, Csecho Slovakia and Tugo Slavia have the prewar as system of universal training reduced iOf low as possible while the neces­ sary peace time armies are maintained in a state of the greatest possible readiness* It wouL d seem from this that the experience of the World \e Wfir has resulted in no great departure fror. the principal of prewar days. The political and general economic situation compels all states to reduce their expenditures for armament and at the come time limitas far as possible the unproductive exploitation of the nation's man power by military service* Each nation has more or less a different problem from the other. Franoe» for its security, feels that it has to have a large 2 army and all the man power trained* But then France has a land frontier of three hundred miles and the people of France wish to have their feel* Ing of safety satisfied* The raaembrance of the last war cannot pass so quickly since it was fought mostly on the soil of France* In Germany this same preparation might take place ifit were not for the restrictions passed on it* From the above discussion, suppose we draw the conclusion, which seems a logical one, that there willnot be another major war until the nations of Europe have regained their wealth and industrial power to compete with the United States and England* (2)• Lieutenant General Sir w. Hastings Andersen, K.C.P, , Quar­ termaster General, English Amy, says "We have to do something every year, and we must go slow to be sure that we are building in the right direction, so that the young men who have the knowledge and the experience in regard to the new mechanical forces ,may find the way plain for them and made in the right direction* They must not find that we are organ­ ising an army which is not required." (4) A thought in accord with the action of the first nations of the World* Gemer&l voaSeeclgt, of the German Relchswehr in referring to the peace time armies of today, says: "The peace tine army, which may also be designated a covering or operating army, willconsist of profee­ sional soldieru, if possible of volunteers, serving for a. long period." The strength of this Jinny willbe in proportion to the financial resources of the country, its military and geographical eituati on and its site; it must at least provide it with security against surprise hostile attack." "For the arming of the masses there is only one way; to decide upon the type of weapon, and then to prepare for mans production whon the need an­ * ises/ (2) As a logical sequence the thoughts expressed herein, we come to the question. What willbe our next weapons of warfare and how will our scientific and industrial development play sn important part la the 3 wars of the fttffcffct Scientific developments since the last war hare made great JjLpioiWMiiitil in tilt airplane and their means of production. Experiment* in. have been carried on the production of gas and the development of tanks* sation ifife* the mass production of all kinds of notor <Irive»• machines been doveloped . Tt»e range of.the fire power weapons has been in­ Eied and their use for protection against the airplane. However, the eocwwJation of Urge reserve stocks is the most uneconomical state of affairs imaginable, due to the fatt that they become obsolete and would be of doubtful military value. Think, for instance, of storing ten thousand airplanes, to have them rendered worth­ less at the end of the year. Therefore, it may be said that nations willhave as a * naxfmum, few weapons for experimental purposes at the a T^cipOfcioii o x e\no vuior wbt* #> The nations today, which have a dominating influence on the political situation of the world on account of their wealth and industrial power are England find the United States . The United States can manufacture approximately 5,000,000 automobiles and 900,000 truck* a year in peaoe time end could probably increase that production 2b% in six months if there were any demand* The airplane industry turned oat 4,300 airplanes in 1928 and 6,000 in 1929. Also, today, there are 25,000,000 automobile s snd 4,500,000 trucks registered in the United States. When we consider how more economical it is to transport loads with a truck of a three ton capacity as against the use of two esoort wagons of the same total capacity and the keen realisation of this factor during the World War, and even as far back as the Mexican border trouble, so far as the United States is concerned. We om feel assured that for administrative purposes the motor truck willbe the means of transportation in conjunction with the railroads* lot only is the use of motor transportation cheaper than the equivalent animal transport, but the savings in bulk of forage over gasoline and oil is very great* This 4 Is particularly Important in mi OTersea expedition where the sea trans* port is limited. For strategical purposes, already the nations have proved in the World War that infantry, artillery and tanks can be sored from one front to another. There are several faotors which make the use of motor transport mandatory for strategical purposes in future wars* They are: • \u25a0 (1) The aeknolwedged need for further mobility to obtain strategical surprises, and prevent stabilisation* (2)* The existence of automobiles and trucks, trained drivers and mechanics, organisations to produce then in great quantities all existing in.the two greatest industrial nations in comcercial life. (3) * The need of increased speed for infantry who oronot ke9p up withtheir arms and willbe slowed by the airplane in the next war if left to march. (4)• As a means of obtaining the principle of mass , movement and objective* (6) • Tine as an important lactor, the saving in time obtained by using the vast resources of motor vehicles now in existence which could not possibly be diminished in number before the event of another war.
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